evolcore 0.0.22 → 0.0.23

package/dist/cli/menu-client.js

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import { getArgValue, wantsHelp } from './help.js';
+import { executeMenuClientRequest, MenuClientError } from '../aun/menu-client.js';
+function parseDurationMs(value) {
+    if (value === undefined)
+        return undefined;
+    const match = value.trim().match(/^(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)(ms|s|m|h)$/i);
+    if (!match)
+        throw new MenuClientError('INVALID_ARGUMENT', `Invalid timeout: ${value}`);
+    const amount = Number(match[1]);
+    const unit = match[2].toLowerCase();
+    return amount * (unit === 'ms' ? 1 : unit === 's' ? 1_000 : unit === 'm' ? 60_000 : 3_600_000);
+}
+function readRequest(args) {
+    const file = getArgValue(args, '--request-file');
+    const inline = getArgValue(args, '--request-json');
+    if (!!file === !!inline)
+        throw new MenuClientError('INVALID_ARGUMENT', '--request-file and --request-json are mutually exclusive');
+    let raw;
+    try {
+        raw = file ? fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8') : inline;
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        throw new MenuClientError('INVALID_ARGUMENT', `Unable to read request: ${error?.message ?? String(error)}`);
+    }
+    try {
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+        if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed))
+            throw new Error('request must be a JSON object');
+        return parsed;
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        throw new MenuClientError('INVALID_ARGUMENT', `Invalid request JSON: ${error?.message ?? String(error)}`);
+    }
+}
+function validateOptions(args) {
+    const valueOptions = new Set(['--request-file', '--request-json', '--timeout', '--remote-token', '--ecweb-token', '--app', '--aun-path', '--format']);
+    const booleanOptions = new Set(['--encrypt', '--no-encrypt']);
+    for (let index = 0; index < args.length; index += 1) {
+        const option = args[index];
+        if (booleanOptions.has(option))
+            continue;
+        if (!valueOptions.has(option))
+            throw new MenuClientError('INVALID_ARGUMENT', `Unknown menu-client option: ${option}`);
+        if (index + 1 >= args.length || args[index + 1].startsWith('--')) {
+            throw new MenuClientError('INVALID_ARGUMENT', `${option} requires a value`);
+        }
+        index += 1;
+    }
+    if (args.includes('--encrypt') && args.includes('--no-encrypt')) {
+        throw new MenuClientError('INVALID_ARGUMENT', '--encrypt and --no-encrypt are mutually exclusive');
+    }
+    const format = getArgValue(args, '--format');
+    if (format !== undefined && format !== 'json')
+        throw new MenuClientError('INVALID_ARGUMENT', '--format currently supports only json');
+}
+export async function cmdMenuClient(args) {
+    if (wantsHelp(args)) {
+        console.log(`用法: ec menu-client request <from-aid> <daemon-aid> [选项]
+
+  --request-file <path>    从 JSON 文件读取一个 menu.* 请求
+  --request-json <json>    直接传入一个 menu.* JSON 请求
+  --timeout <时长>         默认 15s，最大 120s
+  --encrypt                使用 E2EE（默认）
+  --no-encrypt             已拒绝：ec-menu-client 必须使用 E2EE
+  --remote-token <token>   使用 daemon 远程访问 token 临时授权
+  --ecweb-token <token>    --remote-token 的兼容别名
+  --app <slot>             覆盖默认 evolcore-menu-client 消费槽位
+  --aun-path <path>        覆盖本地 AUN keystore 根目录
+  --format json            输出标准 menu.response JSON`);
+        return;
+    }
+    if (args[0] !== 'request')
+        throw new MenuClientError('INVALID_ARGUMENT', 'menu-client currently supports only the request subcommand');
+    const fromAid = args[1]?.trim();
+    const targetAid = args[2]?.trim();
+    if (!fromAid || !targetAid)
+        throw new MenuClientError('INVALID_ARGUMENT', 'request requires <from-aid> and <daemon-aid>');
+    const options = args.slice(3);
+    validateOptions(options);
+    const request = readRequest(options);
+    const timeoutMs = parseDurationMs(getArgValue(args, '--timeout'));
+    const encrypt = args.includes('--no-encrypt') ? false : true;
+    const response = await executeMenuClientRequest({
+        fromAid,
+        targetAid,
+        request,
+        timeoutMs,
+        encrypt,
+        remoteAccessToken: getArgValue(args, '--remote-token') ?? getArgValue(args, '--ecweb-token'),
+        slotId: getArgValue(args, '--app'),
+        aunPath: getArgValue(args, '--aun-path'),
+    });
+    console.log(JSON.stringify(response, null, 2));
+}

package/dist/cli/model.js

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 import { isHelpFlag, wantsHelp, getArgValue } from './help.js';
 import { ModelScopeError, normalizePeer, determineScope, activeBaseagent, writeScope, clearScope, } from '../core/model/config-scope.js';
 import { resolveEffectiveFieldWithSource } from '../config/config-manager.js';
-import { getCatalog, getModelInfo } from '../core/model/model-catalog.js';
+import { getCatalog, getModelInfo, catalogEfforts, resolveCatalogModel, assertCatalogSelectable } from '../core/model/model-catalog.js';
 import { constrainResolvedModelForRole, filterModelsForRole, validateModelSelectionForRole, } from '../core/model/model-permission.js';
 import { resolvePaths } from '../paths.js';
 import { ipcQuery } from '../ipc.js';
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import { getFieldPermission } from '../config/roles.js';
 import { AGENT_DELEGATION_TOKEN_ENV } from '../core/auth/agent-delegation.js';
 import { formatModelCheck, runModelCheck } from '../core/model/model-diagnostics.js';
 import { validateRuntimeStringFieldOverride } from '../core/role/runtime-policy.js';
-const ALL_EFFORTS = ['low', 'medium', 'high', 'xhigh', 'max', 'auto'];
+const ALL_EFFORTS = ['none', 'minimal', 'low', 'medium', 'high', 'xhigh', 'max', 'auto'];
 const SCOPE_LABEL = {
     global: '全局', agent: 'agent级', role: '角色级', relation: '关系级',
 };
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ async function cmdList(args, formatJson) {
     const cat = await getCatalog(sel.self, ba);
     const resolved = resolveModelConfig(effectiveSel, ba);
     const allowedModelIds = role
-        ? filterModelsForRole(role, ba, cat.models.map(m => m.id), undefined, sel.self)
+        ? filterModelsForRole(role, ba, cat.models.map(m => m.id), model => resolveCatalogModel(cat, model), sel.self)
         : null;
     const models = allowedModelIds
         ? allowedModelIds.map(id => cat.models.find(m => m.id === id) ?? { id })
@@ -308,15 +308,21 @@ async function cmdList(args, formatJson) {
         effective: { model: resolved.model ?? null, source: resolved.source ?? null },
         role: role ?? null,
         catalogSource: cat.source,
+        freshness: cat.freshness,
+        revision: cat.revision,
+        fetchedAt: cat.fetchedAt,
+        diagnostics: cat.diagnostics,
         models,
     }, () => {
         const lines = [];
         lines.push(`当前生效: ${resolved.model ?? '(未设置，回落 SDK 默认)'}` +
             (resolved.source ? `  (来源: ${SCOPE_LABEL[resolved.source]})` : ''));
         lines.push('');
-        const srcTag = cat.source === 'mock' ? ' [mock]'
-            : cat.source === 'remote' ? ' [remote]'
-                : '';
+        if (resolved.model && !cat.models.some(m => m.id === resolved.model))
+            lines.push('当前配置未列入目录');
+        lines.push(...cat.diagnostics.map(d => d.message));
+        const srcTag = cat.freshness === 'fallback' ? ` [${cat.source}/unverified]`
+            : cat.freshness === 'stale' ? ' [stale]' : '';
         lines.push(`可用模型 (${models.length})${srcTag}:`);
         for (const e of models) {
             const live = resolved.model === e.id ? '✓' : ' ';
@@ -430,6 +436,7 @@ async function cmdUse(args, formatJson) {
     const ba = activeBaseagent(sel.self);
     // 校验模型在 catalog 中
     const cat = await getCatalog(sel.self, ba);
+    assertCatalogSelectable(cat);
     if (!cat.models.some(m => m.id === modelId)) {
         fail(formatJson, 'UNKNOWN_MODEL', `模型不在目录中: ${modelId}（model list 查看可用模型）`);
     }
@@ -439,14 +446,15 @@ async function cmdUse(args, formatJson) {
             baseagent: ba,
             requestedModel: modelId,
             models: cat.models.map(m => m.id),
+            resolveModelId: model => resolveCatalogModel(cat, model),
             selfAid: sel.self,
         });
         if (!decision.ok)
             fail(formatJson, decision.code || 'MODEL_NOT_ALLOWED', decision.message || `model not allowed: ${modelId}`);
     }
     const effort = getArgValue(args, '--effort');
-    if (effort !== undefined && !ALL_EFFORTS.includes(effort)) {
-        fail(formatJson, 'INVALID_EFFORT', `无效推理强度: ${effort}（${ALL_EFFORTS.join('/')})`);
+    if (effort !== undefined && effort !== 'auto' && !catalogEfforts(cat, modelId, ba).includes(effort)) {
+        fail(formatJson, 'INVALID_EFFORT', `当前模型目录未声明支持推理强度: ${effort}`);
     }
     const effortVal = effort === 'auto' ? null : (effort ?? undefined);
     if (isManagedTargetedWriteEnv(args)) {
@@ -492,6 +500,13 @@ async function cmdEffort(args, formatJson) {
     const scope = determineWriteScope(sel, formatJson);
     const ba = activeBaseagent(sel.self);
     const val = level === 'auto' ? null : level;
+    if (val) {
+        const cat = await getCatalog(sel.self, ba);
+        assertCatalogSelectable(cat);
+        const model = resolveModelConfig(selectorWithRole(sel, explicitOrDerivedRole(args, sel)), ba).model;
+        if (!model || !catalogEfforts(cat, model, ba).includes(val))
+            fail(formatJson, 'INVALID_EFFORT', `当前模型目录未声明支持推理强度: ${val}`);
+    }
     if (isManagedTargetedWriteEnv(args)) {
         const effortKey = 'effort';
         preflightManagedFieldOverride(sel, explicitOrDerivedRole(args, sel), `baseagents.${ba}.${effortKey}`, val, formatJson);

package/dist/cli/task-context.js

@@ -253,8 +253,18 @@ export function getManagedTaskTempDir(runtimeEnv) {
  * silently escape the session-owned temporary workspace.
  */
 export function ensureSessionRuntimeDir(sessionId) {
-    const base = process.env.TMPDIR?.trim();
-    if (!base || !path.isAbsolute(base) || !sessionId)
+    if (!sessionId)
+        return undefined;
+    let base = process.env.TMPDIR?.trim();
+    try {
+        if (!base || !path.isAbsolute(base) || !isPrivateDirectory(path.resolve(base))) {
+            base = ensureProcessManagedTempDir();
+        }
+    }
+    catch {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    if (!base || !path.isAbsolute(base))
         return undefined;
     const root = path.resolve(base);
     const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(sessionId).digest('hex').slice(0, 24);

package/dist/cli/trigger-command.js

@@ -121,12 +121,20 @@ Create 参数模式支持:
 通用输出参数:
   --json | --format json
 
-Update 仅支持常用字段:
+Update 参数:
   --once | --delay | --at | --cron | --every | --event [--tz]
   --prompt <文本> | --prompt-file <路径>  --script-file <路径>  --name <名称>
+  --description <文本>  (空字符串删除)
   --model <模型>  --effort <强度>  --permission <权限模式|inherit>（inherit 清除覆盖）
   --max-runs <次数>  --max-duration <时长>
   --concurrency <forbid|replace|allow>  --missed-policy <skip|run-once|run-all>
+  --feedback <origin|target|silent>
+  --target-channel <channelKey> --target-channel-id <ID>  (必须同时指定)
+  --target-chat-type <private|group>  --target-session <main|thread> [--target-thread-id <threadId>]
+  --trigger-thread <by-run|by-trigger>  --baseagent <name>  (仅 trigger_session 之间)
+  --on-error <fail|retry>  --noop-sentinel <文本>
+  --retry-attempts <次数>  --retry-backoff <毫秒>
+  --script-runtime <node|python|bash>  --script-args <JSON>  --script-timeout <时长>
 
 省略 --agent 时使用当前 agent AID；无会话上下文或跨身份操作时需要显式指定。
 任务会话中的跨身份操作仅允许目标 Agent 上具备 owner/admin 权限的调用者执行 list/show/history；创建、修改、启停、删除和运行仍只允许当前 Agent。`);

package/dist/config/schema-migration.js

@@ -342,8 +342,20 @@ function processIsAlive(pid) {
 function assertDaemonStopped(home) {
     const candidates = [];
     const pidFile = path.join(home, 'daemon.pid');
-    if (fs.existsSync(pidFile)) {
-        candidates.push({ pid: Number(fs.readFileSync(pidFile, 'utf8').trim()), source: pidFile });
+    try {
+        // daemon.pid was retired in favor of the instance registry.  It may still
+        // exist as a stale legacy file, but a Windows Codex sandbox can also leave
+        // a directory at this path when protecting a not-yet-created file.  Never
+        // feed a directory (or symlink) to readFileSync: that turns harmless
+        // legacy residue into an EISDIR startup failure.
+        const stat = fs.lstatSync(pidFile);
+        if (stat.isFile()) {
+            candidates.push({ pid: Number(fs.readFileSync(pidFile, 'utf8').trim()), source: pidFile });
+        }
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (!isRecord(error) || error.code !== 'ENOENT')
+            throw error;
     }
     const instanceDir = path.join(home, 'data', 'instance');
     if (fs.existsSync(instanceDir)) {

package/dist/core/auth/agent-delegation.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import crypto from 'crypto';
 import { authorizeOperation, buildAuthSubject } from './auth-gateway.js';
 import { formatPeerKey, parsePeerKey } from '../relation/peer-identity.js';
+import { logger } from '../../utils/logger.js';
 export const AGENT_DELEGATION_TOKEN_ENV = 'EVOLCORE_DELEGATION_TOKEN';
 export const AGENT_DELEGATION_COMMAND_TTL_MS = 5 * 60_000;
 export class AgentDelegationRegistry {
@@ -43,17 +44,19 @@ export class AgentDelegationRegistry {
             : undefined;
         if (approved)
             return { ok: true, grant: approved };
+        const diagnosticCause = grant
+            ? grant.sessionId !== sessionId
+                ? 'session_mismatch'
+                : 'task_replaced'
+            : commandHash
+                ? 'approved_command_unavailable'
+                : 'unknown_token';
+        logger.warn(`[AgentDelegation] validate failed: cause=${diagnosticCause} session=${sessionId} grantSession=${grant?.sessionId ?? 'none'} taskId=${grant?.taskId ?? 'none'} hasCommandHash=${!!commandHash} tokenKnown=${!!grant} activeForSession=${this.activeHashBySession.get(sessionId) ?? 'none'} grantTokenHash=${grant?.tokenHash ?? 'none'}`);
         return {
             ok: false,
             code: 'INVALID_DELEGATION',
             reason: 'The task delegation token is invalid, revoked, or belongs to another session',
-            diagnosticCause: grant
-                ? grant.sessionId !== sessionId
-                    ? 'session_mismatch'
-                    : 'task_replaced'
-                : commandHash
-                    ? 'approved_command_unavailable'
-                    : 'unknown_token',
+            diagnosticCause,
         };
     }
     armApprovedCommand(input) {

package/dist/core/auth/authorization-audit.js

@@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ export function auditCodexApprovalDecision(input) {
         taskId: input.taskId,
         argsSummary: {
             method: input.method,
+            ...(input.summary ? { summary: input.summary } : {}),
+            ...(input.threadId ? { threadId: input.threadId } : {}),
+            ...(input.cwd ? { cwd: input.cwd } : {}),
             ...(input.parseFailure ? { parseFailure: input.parseFailure } : {}),
         },
     });
@@ -218,6 +221,7 @@ export function auditPermissionDecision(input) {
         dangerous: false,
         role: input.role ?? 'unknown',
         taskId: input.taskId,
+        argsSummary: input.summary ? { summary: input.summary } : undefined,
         decision: 'deny',
         executed: false,
         executionState: 'blocked',

package/dist/core/auth/operation-catalog.js

@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ const GROUP_MANAGEMENT_OPERATIONS = [
     ['ec.group.join', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Request to join a group'],
     ['ec.group.leave', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Leave a group'],
     ['ec.group.invite', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Invite group members'],
+    ['ec.group.invites', 'read', ['agent'], 'List pending targeted group invitations'],
+    ['ec.group.accept-invite', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Accept a targeted group invitation'],
+    ['ec.group.reject-invite', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Reject a targeted group invitation'],
+    ['ec.group.revoke-invite', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Revoke a targeted group invitation'],
     ['ec.group.kick', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Remove a group member'],
     ['ec.group.role', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Change a group member role'],
     ['ec.group.owner', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Transfer group ownership'],

package/dist/core/auth/remote-access-store.js

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+import crypto from 'node:crypto';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { resolvePaths } from '../../paths.js';
+export const REMOTE_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+export const REMOTE_ACCESS_PAIRING_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
+export function remoteAccessTokenStorePath() {
+    return path.join(resolvePaths().instanceDir, 'control-access-tokens.json');
+}
+function loadStore() {
+    try {
+        const value = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(remoteAccessTokenStorePath(), 'utf8'));
+        if (Array.isArray(value.tokens))
+            return value;
+    }
+    catch { }
+    return { tokens: [] };
+}
+function saveStore(store) {
+    const file = remoteAccessTokenStorePath();
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
+    const temporary = `${file}.${process.pid}.tmp`;
+    try {
+        fs.writeFileSync(temporary, JSON.stringify(store, null, 2) + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
+        fs.renameSync(temporary, file);
+        try {
+            fs.chmodSync(file, 0o600);
+        }
+        catch { }
+    }
+    finally {
+        if (fs.existsSync(temporary)) {
+            try {
+                fs.unlinkSync(temporary);
+            }
+            catch { }
+        }
+    }
+}
+function pruneExpired(store, now) {
+    const before = store.tokens.length;
+    store.tokens = store.tokens.filter(record => typeof record?.token === 'string'
+        && typeof record.lastActive === 'number'
+        && now - record.lastActive < REMOTE_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_MS);
+    return store.tokens.length !== before;
+}
+function validLabel(value) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string')
+        return 'remote';
+    const normalized = value.trim().replace(/[\r\n]/g, ' ').slice(0, 256);
+    return normalized || 'remote';
+}
+function validOwner(value) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string')
+        return undefined;
+    const normalized = value.trim();
+    if (!normalized || normalized.length > 512 || /[\r\n]/.test(normalized))
+        return undefined;
+    return normalized;
+}
+/** Validate and slide the expiry window of a daemon-owned remote token. */
+export function validateAndRenewRemoteAccessToken(token, now = Date.now()) {
+    if (typeof token !== 'string' || !token || token.length > 512)
+        return { valid: false };
+    try {
+        const store = loadStore();
+        const changed = pruneExpired(store, now);
+        const record = store.tokens.find(candidate => candidate.token === token);
+        if (!record) {
+            if (changed)
+                saveStore(store);
+            return { valid: false };
+        }
+        record.lastActive = now;
+        saveStore(store);
+        const authorizedBy = validOwner(record.authorizedBy);
+        return { valid: true, ...(authorizedBy ? { authorizedBy } : {}) };
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { valid: false };
+    }
+}
+export class RemoteAccessService {
+    pairingCode = '';
+    pairingExpiresAt = 0;
+    pairingAuthorizedBy;
+    getPairingCode(authorizedBy, now = Date.now()) {
+        if (!this.pairingCode || now >= this.pairingExpiresAt) {
+            this.pairingCode = String(crypto.randomInt(0, 1_000_000)).padStart(6, '0');
+            this.pairingExpiresAt = now + REMOTE_ACCESS_PAIRING_TTL_MS;
+            this.pairingAuthorizedBy = undefined;
+        }
+        const owner = validOwner(authorizedBy);
+        if (!this.pairingAuthorizedBy && owner)
+            this.pairingAuthorizedBy = owner;
+        return { code: this.pairingCode, expiresAt: this.pairingExpiresAt };
+    }
+    redeemPairingCode(code, label, authorizedBy, now = Date.now()) {
+        if (typeof code !== 'string' || !/^\d{6}$/.test(code)) {
+            return { ok: false, code: 'INVALID_ARGUMENT', error: 'pairing code must be six digits' };
+        }
+        if (!this.pairingCode || now >= this.pairingExpiresAt) {
+            return { ok: false, code: 'PAIRING_EXPIRED', error: 'pairing code has expired' };
+        }
+        if (code !== this.pairingCode) {
+            return { ok: false, code: 'PAIRING_INVALID', error: 'pairing code is invalid' };
+        }
+        const createdAt = now;
+        const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
+        const store = loadStore();
+        pruneExpired(store, now);
+        const owner = validOwner(authorizedBy) ?? this.pairingAuthorizedBy;
+        store.tokens.push({
+            token,
+            createdAt,
+            lastActive: createdAt,
+            label: validLabel(label),
+            ...(owner ? { authorizedBy: owner } : {}),
+        });
+        saveStore(store);
+        return { ok: true, token, expiresAt: createdAt + REMOTE_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_MS };
+    }
+    issueLocalToken(label, now = Date.now()) {
+        const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
+        const store = loadStore();
+        pruneExpired(store, now);
+        store.tokens.push({ token, createdAt: now, lastActive: now, label: validLabel(label) });
+        saveStore(store);
+        return { ok: true, token, expiresAt: now + REMOTE_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_MS };
+    }
+    validateToken(token, now = Date.now()) {
+        return validateAndRenewRemoteAccessToken(token, now);
+    }
+}
+export const remoteAccessService = new RemoteAccessService();

package/dist/core/command/command-handler.js

@@ -114,7 +114,12 @@ export class CommandHandler {
     triggerSchedulerResolver;
     triggerSchedulerFallback;
     triggerSchedulerFallbackAid;
+    /** Runtime-only owner for the daemon trigger scheduler. It is intentionally
+     * kept outside EvolAgentRegistry because the daemon channel is not an Agent. */
+    daemonTriggerOwnerAid;
+    daemonTriggerChannel = 'daemon';
     daemonStatusProvider;
+    daemonMonitorProvider;
     agentDelegationRegistry;
     handoffRuntime;
     contactRequestSubmitter;
@@ -219,6 +224,32 @@ export class CommandHandler {
     setTriggerSchedulerResolver(resolver) {
         this.triggerSchedulerResolver = resolver;
     }
+    /** Bind the virtual daemon channel to its trigger scheduler owner AID. */
+    setDaemonTriggerOwner(aid, channel = 'daemon') {
+        const normalizedAid = String(aid || '').trim();
+        if (!normalizedAid)
+            throw new Error('daemon trigger owner AID is required');
+        this.daemonTriggerOwnerAid = normalizedAid;
+        this.daemonTriggerChannel = String(channel || 'daemon').trim() || 'daemon';
+    }
+    /** Used by control-menu routing; daemon owner is not in the Agent registry. */
+    getDaemonTriggerOwnerAid(channel = 'daemon') {
+        if (channel !== this.daemonTriggerChannel)
+            return undefined;
+        if (this.daemonTriggerOwnerAid)
+            return this.daemonTriggerOwnerAid;
+        try {
+            const controlAid = String(loadDaemonConfig().aid || '__daemon__').trim() || '__daemon__';
+            const existing = this.agentRegistry?.get?.(controlAid);
+            // Match index.ts: only a runnable (pre-start `stopped`) Agent causes
+            // the daemon scheduler owner to receive the collision suffix.
+            const conflicts = !!existing && (existing.status === undefined || existing.status === 'stopped');
+            return conflicts ? `${controlAid}#daemon` : controlAid;
+        }
+        catch {
+            return undefined;
+        }
+    }
     /** Compatibility entrypoint for older tests/callers that inject a single scheduler. */
     setTriggerScheduler(scheduler, manager) {
         this.triggerSchedulerFallback = scheduler;
@@ -233,6 +264,9 @@ export class CommandHandler {
     setDaemonStatusProvider(provider) {
         this.daemonStatusProvider = provider;
     }
+    setDaemonMonitorProvider(provider) {
+        this.daemonMonitorProvider = provider;
+    }
     /** 返回管理当前通道的 EvolAgent，无则返回 null */
     getOwningAgent(channel) {
         if (!this.agentRegistry)
@@ -240,7 +274,9 @@ export class CommandHandler {
         return this.agentRegistry.resolveByChannel(channel);
     }
     getTriggerSchedulerForChannel(channel) {
-        const agentAid = this.getOwningAgent(channel)?.aid ?? tryParseChannelKey(channel)?.selfAID;
+        const agentAid = this.getOwningAgent(channel)?.aid
+            ?? this.getDaemonTriggerOwnerAid(channel)
+            ?? tryParseChannelKey(channel)?.selfAID;
         return agentAid ? this.triggerSchedulerResolver?.(agentAid) : this.triggerSchedulerFallback;
     }
     getTriggerSchedulerForAgent(agentAid) {
@@ -975,9 +1011,9 @@ export class CommandHandler {
     async execMenuForEcweb(payload, auth) {
         return await menuExecMenuForEcweb.call(this, payload, auth);
     }
-    /** 控制 AID channel 专用入口：peerId 须 ∈ evolcore.owners，全量权限。 */
-    async execMenuForControl(payload, peerId) {
-        return await menuExecMenuForControl.call(this, payload, peerId);
+    /** Control AID Menu entry: daemon-owner or validated remote-access token. */
+    async execMenuForControl(payload, peerId, auth) {
+        return await menuExecMenuForControl.call(this, payload, peerId, auth);
     }
     /**
      * CLI 透传执行：spawn `node dist/cli/index.js <argv>` 子进程，捕获输出回传。
@@ -1344,7 +1380,7 @@ export class CommandHandler {
 /trigger list [--all] — 查看所有触发器
 /trigger create <参数> — 创建触发器（set 为兼容别名）
 /trigger update <名称|ID> <参数> — 修改触发器
-常用参数：--exec script|trigger-session|target-session（create 必填）、--delay/--at/--cron/--every、--prompt、--model、--effort、--permission（省略则继承；update 可用 inherit 清除覆盖）
+常用参数：--delay/--at/--cron/--every、--prompt、--description、--model、--effort、--permission（省略则继承；update 可用 inherit 清除覆盖）、--feedback、--target-channel/--target-channel-id、--trigger-thread、--baseagent、--on-error、--retry-attempts/--retry-backoff、--script-runtime/--script-args/--script-timeout
 /trigger enable <名称|ID> — 启用触发器
 /trigger disable <名称|ID> — 暂停触发器
 /trigger show <名称|ID> — 查看触发器详情