evolcore 0.0.17 → 0.0.19

package/dist/core/command/agent-control.js

@@ -11,22 +11,18 @@ import { isValidAid } from '../../aun/aid/validation.js';
 const SUPPORTED_AGENT_PATCH_FIELDS = new Set(['aid', 'name', 'avatar', 'active_baseagent', 'baseagents', 'projects', 'owners', 'chatmode', 'channels', 'channelOwners']);
 const HIDDEN_VALUE = '[hidden]';
 const SENSITIVE_CONFIG_KEYS = new Set([
-    'apiKey',
     'apikey',
-    'appId',
-    'appSecret',
-    'botId',
-    'clientId',
-    'clientSecret',
-    'secret',
-    'token',
-    'accessToken',
+    'appid',
+    'appsecret',
+    'botid',
     'authorization',
+    'clientid',
     'credential',
     'credentials',
     'password',
-    'privateKey',
-    'encryptionSeed',
+    'privatekey',
+    'encryptionseed',
+    'aeskey',
 ]);
 const HIDDEN_SETTINGS_KEYS = new Set([
     'pathToClaudeCodeExecutable',
@@ -225,7 +221,7 @@ function sanitizeConfigValue(value) {
             if (out.effort === undefined)
                 out.effort = sanitizeConfigValue(raw);
         }
-        else if (SENSITIVE_CONFIG_KEYS.has(key)) {
+        else if (isSensitiveConfigKey(key)) {
             out[key] = raw == null || raw === '' ? raw : HIDDEN_VALUE;
         }
         else if (key === 'projects') {
@@ -237,6 +233,18 @@ function sanitizeConfigValue(value) {
     }
     return out;
 }
+function isSensitiveConfigKey(key) {
+    const normalized = key.replace(/[-_\s]/g, '').toLowerCase();
+    return SENSITIVE_CONFIG_KEYS.has(normalized)
+        || normalized.endsWith('token')
+        || normalized.endsWith('secret')
+        || normalized.endsWith('password')
+        || normalized.endsWith('credential')
+        || normalized.endsWith('credentials')
+        || normalized.endsWith('privatekey')
+        || normalized.endsWith('apikey')
+        || normalized.endsWith('authorization');
+}
 function buildSafeAgentConfig(config) {
     if (!config)
         return null;
@@ -592,14 +600,15 @@ export async function execAgentQuery(args) {
     }
     const config = cfgRead(ConfigTarget.Agent, { self: aid });
     const safeConfig = buildSafeAgentConfig(config);
+    const safeAgentConfig = safeConfig ?? {};
     const data = {
         ...res,
         config: {
             ...(res.config ?? {}),
-            active_baseagent: config?.active_baseagent ?? res.config?.baseagent ?? null,
-            projects: stripUnsupportedProjectFields(config?.projects) ?? {},
-            baseagents: config?.baseagents ?? {},
-            owners: config?.owners ?? res.config?.owners ?? [],
+            active_baseagent: safeAgentConfig.active_baseagent ?? res.config?.baseagent ?? null,
+            projects: safeAgentConfig.projects ?? {},
+            baseagents: safeAgentConfig.baseagents ?? {},
+            owners: safeAgentConfig.owners ?? res.config?.owners ?? [],
         },
         safeConfig,
     };

package/dist/core/command/command-handler.js

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import { buildSessionTurnList } from '../session/session-turns.js';
 import { resolveConfigCommand } from '../../config/resolved-config-op.js';
 import { AUTHENTICATED_CONFIG_ROLE_ENV, executeResolvedConfigCommand } from '../../config/config-operation-service.js';
 import { splitConfigBatchGetArgv } from '../../cli/cli-argv.js';
-import { hashArgv } from '../auth/authorization-audit.js';
+import { auditCommandAuthorization, hashArgv } from '../auth/authorization-audit.js';
 import { executeResolvedContactCommand, resolveContactCommand } from '../../config/contact-operation-service.js';
 import { executeManagedAidOperation, ManagedAidOperationError, resolveManagedAidOperation, } from '../../aun/aid/managed-operation.js';
 import { executeManagedGroupOperation, isManagedGroupRelationRead, ManagedGroupOperationError, resolveManagedGroupOperation, executeManagedMsgOperation, ManagedMsgOperationError, resolveManagedMsgOperation, executeManagedFsOperation, ManagedFsOperationError, resolveManagedFsOperation, } from '../../aun/msg/managed-operation.js';
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ import { authorizeOperation, buildAuthSubject } from '../auth/auth-gateway.js';
 import { isHClassPath, isLClassPath, isSameOrDescendant } from '../protected-paths.js';
 import { validateModelSelectionForRole } from '../model/model-permission.js';
 import { getModelInfo } from '../model/model-catalog.js';
-import { constrainRuntimePermissionMode, validateRuntimeStringFieldOverride } from '../role/runtime-policy.js';
+import { constrainRuntimePermissionMode, resolveRuntimePermissionMode, validateRuntimeStringFieldOverride } from '../role/runtime-policy.js';
 import { parsePeerKey } from '../relation/peer-identity.js';
 import { isQuickCommand } from './slash-gate.js';
 import { handleSlashCommand } from './slash-handler.js';
@@ -1002,7 +1002,13 @@ export class CommandHandler {
             }
             const payload = result;
             if (payload.kind === 'command.error') {
-                return { error: payload.text || '执行失败', code: 'EXEC_FAILED' };
+                return {
+                    error: payload.text || '执行失败',
+                    code: payload.reason || 'EXEC_FAILED',
+                    ...(payload.reasonCode ? {
+                        data: { reasonCode: payload.reasonCode, nextStep: payload.nextStep },
+                    } : {}),
+                };
             }
             const data = payload.structured && typeof payload.structured === 'object'
                 ? { ...payload.structured }
@@ -1771,6 +1777,7 @@ export class CommandHandler {
                 },
             },
             auditMetadata: {
+                correlationId: grant.taskId,
                 argvHash: hashArgv(parsed.command.canonicalArgv),
                 taskId: grant.taskId,
                 messageId: grant.messageId,
@@ -1854,8 +1861,41 @@ export class CommandHandler {
         if (!session)
             return { ok: false, code: 'INVALID_SESSION', error: 'Invalid session' };
         const parsed = resolveManagedMsgOperation(argv);
-        if (!parsed.ok)
+        if (!parsed.ok) {
+            const grant = delegation.grant;
+            auditCommandAuthorization({
+                ts: Date.now(),
+                source: 'agent-tool',
+                operation: 'ec.msg.managed.parse',
+                scope: 'relation',
+                dangerous: false,
+                decision: 'deny',
+                executed: false,
+                executionState: 'blocked',
+                decisionSource: 'policy',
+                policyCode: parsed.code,
+                code: parsed.code,
+                reason: parsed.reason,
+                correlationId: grant.taskId,
+                requestId: grant.taskId,
+                sessionId,
+                agentAid: grant.selfAid,
+                permissionMode: resolveRuntimePermissionMode({ selfAid: grant.selfAid, role: grant.issuedRole }).effectiveValue,
+                actorId: grant.actorId,
+                selfAid: grant.selfAid,
+                peerKey: grant.peerKey,
+                channel: grant.channel,
+                role: grant.issuedRole,
+                taskId: grant.taskId,
+                messageId: grant.messageId,
+                argvHash: hashArgv(argv),
+                argsSummary: {
+                    subcommand: String(argv[1] ?? argv[0] ?? '<missing>'),
+                    providedOptions: argv.filter(value => typeof value === 'string' && value.startsWith('--')).join(','),
+                },
+            });
             return { ok: false, code: parsed.code, error: parsed.reason };
+        }
         const grant = delegation.grant;
         const grantSelfAid = grant.selfAid.replace(/^@/, '');
         const sessionSelfAid = session.selfAID?.replace(/^@/, '');
@@ -1897,9 +1937,15 @@ export class CommandHandler {
                     targetId: parsed.command.target,
                     peer: parsed.command.target,
                     peerKey: formatPeerKey('aun', parsed.command.target),
+                    ...(parsed.command.session ? { session: parsed.command.session } : {}),
+                    ...(parsed.command.limit !== undefined ? { limit: parsed.command.limit } : {}),
+                    ...(parsed.command.before !== undefined ? { before: parsed.command.before } : {}),
+                    ...(parsed.command.after !== undefined ? { after: parsed.command.after } : {}),
+                    ...(parsed.command.direction ? { direction: parsed.command.direction } : {}),
                 },
             },
             auditMetadata: {
+                correlationId: grant.taskId,
                 argvHash: hashArgv(parsed.command.canonicalArgv),
                 taskId: grant.taskId,
                 messageId: grant.messageId,

package/dist/core/command/group-menu.js

@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ function updateSetting(key, target, value, args, context) {
     if (!allowed.has(raw)) {
         throw new GroupMenuError('INVALID_ARGUMENT', `Invalid ${key} value: ${raw || '<empty>'}`);
     }
-    if (key === 'rulesPolicy' && context.role !== 'owner' && !context.isDaemonOwner) {
+    if (key === 'rulesPolicy' && context.role !== 'owner') {
         throw new GroupMenuError('PERMISSION_DENIED', 'rulesPolicy can only be changed by an Agent owner');
     }
     const expectedRevision = stringArg(args?.expectedRevision);

package/dist/core/command/menu-catalog.js

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
 import { groupInfo, groupMembers } from '../../aun/msg/group.js';
 import { formatPeerKey } from '../relation/peer-identity.js';
 import { authorizeAccess, authorizeOperation, buildAuthSubject } from '../auth/auth-gateway.js';
+import { authorizationDenialData, formatAuthorizationDenial } from '../auth/authorization-denial.js';
 import { ConfigTarget, read as readConfig } from '../../config/config-manager.js';
 import { readRolesConfig } from '../../config/roles.js';
 import { normalizeMenuError } from './menu-protocol.js';
@@ -106,8 +107,13 @@ export async function resolveMenuCatalogContext(input) {
         throw { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'control catalog context requires a control subject' };
     }
     if (requested === 'process') {
-        if (input.channelScope !== 'control' || !subject.fromControlChannel || !subject.isDaemonOwner)
-            throw { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'process context requires a daemon owner control subject' };
+        if (input.channelScope !== 'control' || !subject.fromControlChannel || !subject.isDaemonOwner) {
+            throw {
+                code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+                message: formatAuthorizationDenial('Process context requires a DaemonOwner control subject.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+                data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+            };
+        }
         return makeContext(input, requested, subject, input.channelId);
     }
     if (requested === 'agent') {
@@ -139,9 +145,18 @@ export async function resolveMenuCatalogContext(input) {
             chatType: 'private',
             conversationId: subject.actorId,
             fromControlChannel: subject.fromControlChannel,
-            identity: subject.isDaemonOwner ? subject.identity : undefined,
         });
-        const bound = { ...rebuilt, channel: subject.channel, channelId: subject.actorId, peerKey: formatPeerKey('aun', subject.actorId), isDaemonOwner: subject.isDaemonOwner || rebuilt.isDaemonOwner, fromControlChannel: subject.fromControlChannel };
+        const processRole = subject.processRole ?? (subject.isDaemonOwner ? 'daemon-owner' : 'none');
+        const bound = {
+            ...rebuilt,
+            channel: subject.channel,
+            channelId: subject.actorId,
+            peerKey: formatPeerKey('aun', subject.actorId),
+            processRole,
+            isDaemonOwner: processRole === 'daemon-owner',
+            fromControlChannel: subject.fromControlChannel,
+            allowAccess: processRole !== 'none' || rebuilt.allowAccess,
+        };
         const access = authorizeAccess(bound);
         if (!access.allow)
             throw { code: access.code, message: access.reason };
@@ -201,9 +216,19 @@ export async function resolveMenuCatalogContext(input) {
         chatType: 'group',
         conversationId: canonicalGroupId,
         fromControlChannel: subject.fromControlChannel,
-        identity: subject.isDaemonOwner ? subject.identity : undefined,
     });
-    const bound = { ...rebuilt, channel: subject.channel, channelId: canonicalGroupId, conversationId: canonicalGroupId, peerKey, isDaemonOwner: subject.isDaemonOwner || rebuilt.isDaemonOwner, fromControlChannel: subject.fromControlChannel };
+    const processRole = subject.processRole ?? (subject.isDaemonOwner ? 'daemon-owner' : 'none');
+    const bound = {
+        ...rebuilt,
+        channel: subject.channel,
+        channelId: canonicalGroupId,
+        conversationId: canonicalGroupId,
+        peerKey,
+        processRole,
+        isDaemonOwner: processRole === 'daemon-owner',
+        fromControlChannel: subject.fromControlChannel,
+        allowAccess: processRole !== 'none' || rebuilt.allowAccess,
+    };
     const access = authorizeAccess(bound);
     if (!access.allow)
         throw { code: access.code, message: access.reason };
@@ -278,7 +303,7 @@ async function operationView(binding, context) {
         return undefined;
     if (binding.supported === false)
         return { supported: false, allowed: false, reason: { code: 'NOT_SUPPORTED', message: 'operation is not supported' } };
-    if (binding.operation === 'group.rulespolicy.update' && context.subject.role !== 'owner' && !context.subject.isDaemonOwner) {
+    if (binding.operation === 'group.rulespolicy.update' && context.subject.role !== 'owner') {
         return { supported: true, allowed: false, reason: { code: 'PERMISSION_DENIED', message: 'rulesPolicy can only be changed by an Agent owner' } };
     }
     const decision = authorizeOperation({ source: 'menu', intent: intentFor(binding, context), subject: context.subject, audit: false });

package/dist/core/command/menu-handler.js

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import { isCapabilityType, listCapabilityOptions, queryCapabilityTypes, resolveC
 import { normalizeCliArgv, parseCliIntent, parseLegacyCliCommand, validateCliArgv, withDefaultRelationContext } from './cli-intent-parser.js';
 import { auditCommandAuthorization, hashArgv } from '../auth/authorization-audit.js';
 import { authorizeOperation, buildAuthSubject } from '../auth/auth-gateway.js';
+import { authorizationDenialData, formatAuthorizationDenial } from '../auth/authorization-denial.js';
 import { evaluateRoleOperationCapability } from '../auth/operation-authorizer.js';
 import { splitConfigBatchGetArgv } from '../../cli/cli-argv.js';
 import { chatmodeFieldForPeer, resolveChatModeForField } from '../message/peer-mode.js';
@@ -854,13 +855,21 @@ function gateControlScope(opts) {
     if (fromControlChannel)
         return null;
     if (isProcessLevelAction(cmdBase, action)) {
-        return { error: '此操作仅允许通过控制 AID channel 执行', code: 'FORBIDDEN' };
+        return {
+            error: formatAuthorizationDenial('This daemon-level operation is not available from an Agent channel.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+            code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+            data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+        };
     }
     const targetAid = args?.aid;
     if (targetAid) {
         const currentAgentAid = this.getOwningAgent?.(channel)?.aid;
         if (targetAid !== currentAgentAid) {
-            return { error: '跨 agent 操作仅允许通过控制 AID channel 执行', code: 'FORBIDDEN' };
+            return {
+                error: formatAuthorizationDenial('An Agent channel may only target its current Agent.', 'TARGET_SELF_ONLY'),
+                code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+                data: authorizationDenialData('TARGET_SELF_ONLY'),
+            };
         }
     }
     return null;
@@ -983,8 +992,12 @@ function buildMenuIntent(verb, cmdBase, args, action, value, fromControlChannel
                 return intent('agent.reload', fromControlChannel ? 'control' : 'agent', { action });
             if (action === 'create')
                 return intent('agent.create', 'control', { action });
-            if (action === 'delete' || action === 'disable')
+            if (action === 'delete')
                 return intent('agent.delete', 'control', { action });
+            if (action === 'enable')
+                return intent('agent.enable', 'control', { action });
+            if (action === 'disable')
+                return intent('agent.disable', 'control', { action });
         }
         if (cmdBase === '/trigger') {
             if (action === 'create' || action === 'set')
@@ -1088,7 +1101,12 @@ async function authorizeMenuIntent(params) {
                 },
             };
         }
-        return { error: decision.reason, code: decision.code };
+        const reasonCode = decision.command?.reasonCode;
+        return {
+            error: formatAuthorizationDenial(decision.reason, reasonCode),
+            code: decision.code,
+            ...(reasonCode ? { data: authorizationDenialData(reasonCode) } : {}),
+        };
     }
     return null;
 }
@@ -1136,8 +1154,6 @@ function buildRoleMenuContext(owner, channel, subject) {
             },
         } : {}),
         availableBaseagents: Array.from(new Set([
-            ...Object.keys(owningAgent?.config?.baseagents ?? {}),
-            ...(owningAgent?.baseagent ? [owningAgent.baseagent] : []),
             ...(owningAgent?.name ? (owner.getAvailableBaseagentsForOwner?.(owningAgent.name) ?? []) : []),
         ])),
         listModels: async (baseagent) => {
@@ -1187,9 +1203,6 @@ async function executeGroupMenu(owner, params) {
         return menuResultFailure(error);
     }
     const authorizationArgs = groupMenuAuthorizationArgs(params.args, params.subject.selfAid, menuIntent.scope === 'relation' ? params.subject.peerKey : undefined);
-    const authorizationSubject = params.subject.isDaemonOwner && params.subject.role !== 'owner'
-        ? { ...params.subject, role: 'owner' }
-        : params.subject;
     const denied = await authorizeMenuIntent.call(owner, {
         intent: {
             operation: menuIntent.operation,
@@ -1198,7 +1211,7 @@ async function executeGroupMenu(owner, params) {
             args: authorizationArgs,
         },
         identity: params.identity,
-        subject: authorizationSubject,
+        subject: params.subject,
         session: params.session,
         explicitChatType: params.explicitChatType,
         channel: params.channel,
@@ -1541,16 +1554,15 @@ export async function getSubMenuItems(cmd, channel, channelId, userId, args, ove
                 throw { code: res.code, message: res.error };
             return res.data.agents.map(ag => ({ value: ag.aid, label: ag.name || ag.aid, desc: ag.status }));
         }
-        // agent channel：作用域绑定自身，仅返回自身单条
+        // agent channel：直接读取自身，避免先枚举全部 Agent 再过滤。
         const selfAid = this.getOwningAgent?.(channel)?.aid;
         if (!selfAid)
             throw { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: '当前 channel 无绑定 agent' };
-        const res = await execAgentOptions(args);
+        const res = await execAgentQuery({ aid: selfAid });
         if ('error' in res)
             throw { code: res.code, message: res.error };
-        return res.data.agents
-            .filter(ag => ag.aid === selfAid)
-            .map(ag => ({ value: ag.aid, label: ag.name || ag.aid, desc: ag.status }));
+        const ag = res.data;
+        return [{ value: ag.aid, label: ag.identity?.name || ag.name || ag.aid, desc: ag.status }];
     }
     if (cmd === '/capability') {
         const type = args?.type;
@@ -1890,7 +1902,7 @@ export async function execMenuQuery(cmd, channel, channelId, userId, args, expli
     // 授权由 agent.list/agent.show operation 决定；channel 闸门只负责目标范围。
     if (cmdBase === '/agent') {
         if (fromControlChannel) {
-            return await execAgentQuery(args);
+            return args?.aid ? await execAgentQuery(args) : await execAgentOptions(args);
         }
         const selfAid = this.getOwningAgent?.(channel)?.aid;
         if (!selfAid)
@@ -2727,7 +2739,11 @@ export async function execMenuAction(cmd, action, args, channel, channelId, user
         subject: authSubject,
     });
     if (cmdBase === '/system' && fromControlChannel && !subject.isDaemonOwner) {
-        return { error: '操作需要 owner 权限', code: 'FORBIDDEN' };
+        return {
+            error: formatAuthorizationDenial('This daemon-level operation requires DaemonOwner.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+            code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+            data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+        };
     }
     if (cmdBase === '/role') {
         const authorized = await authorizeRoleMenu(this, {
@@ -2808,7 +2824,11 @@ export async function execMenuAction(cmd, action, args, channel, channelId, user
     if (cmdBase === '/agent') {
         if (fromControlChannel) {
             if (!subject.isDaemonOwner) {
-                return { error: '操作需要 owner 权限', code: 'FORBIDDEN' };
+                return {
+                    error: formatAuthorizationDenial('This Agent lifecycle operation requires DaemonOwner.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+                    code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+                    data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+                };
             }
         }
         else {
@@ -3323,7 +3343,11 @@ export async function execMenuAction(cmd, action, args, channel, channelId, user
     if (cmdBase === '/system') {
         // D1 迁移：进程级鉴权统一查 daemon.json owners，替代各 action 内联的 identity.role 判断
         if (!subject.isDaemonOwner) {
-            return { error: '操作需要 owner 权限', code: 'FORBIDDEN' };
+            return {
+                error: formatAuthorizationDenial('This daemon-level operation requires DaemonOwner.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+                code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+                data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+            };
         }
         if (action === 'restart') {
             const suppressRealRestart = shouldSuppressRealRestart();
@@ -3475,6 +3499,7 @@ export async function execMenuAction(cmd, action, args, channel, channelId, user
                     requestId, sessionId: subject.sessionId, agentAid: subject.selfAid,
                     permissionMode: subject.permissionMode,
                     channel, channelId, role: identity.role, decision: 'deny', code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+                    executed: false, executionState: 'blocked',
                     reason: 'Unrecognized CLI command', taskId: requestId, argvHash: hashArgv(intentArgv),
                     name: 'cli', action: 'exec', args: { argv: [...requestedArgv] },
                 });
@@ -3534,6 +3559,8 @@ export async function execMenuAction(cmd, action, args, channel, channelId, user
                 permissionMode: subject.permissionMode,
                 channel, channelId, role: identity.role, isDaemonOwner,
                 fromControlChannel: fromControlChannel ?? false, decision: 'allow',
+                executed: true,
+                executionState: executionData?.exitCode === undefined || executionData.exitCode === 0 ? 'completed' : 'failed',
                 matchedRule: decision.command?.matchedRule, taskId: requestId, argvHash: hashArgv(argv),
                 name: 'cli', action: 'exec',
                 args: { argv: [...requestedArgv] },
@@ -3665,7 +3692,6 @@ async function execMenuForSystemControl(payload, context) {
         channelId: context.actorAid || SYSTEM_CONTROL_CHANNEL,
         chatType: 'private',
         conversationId: context.actorAid || SYSTEM_CONTROL_CHANNEL,
-        identity: context.localDirect ? { role: 'owner', mode: 'interactive' } : undefined,
         processOwners: context.owners,
         fromControlChannel: true,
     });
@@ -3788,7 +3814,11 @@ export async function execMenuForEcweb(payload, trusted) {
     const isProcessLevel = isProcessLevelMenu(name, payload?.cmd) || isProcessContextMenu(payload);
     const owners = loadDaemonConfig().owners ?? [];
     if (isProcessLevel && owners.length === 0) {
-        return { type: 'menu.response', id, name, error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: '请在 daemon.json 配置 owners 后使用进程级操作' } };
+        return menuFailure({ id, ...(name ? { name } : {}) }, {
+            code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+            message: formatAuthorizationDenial('Configure daemon.json.owners before using process-level operations.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+            data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+        });
     }
     if (!trusted || (!trusted.localDirect && !trusted.actorAid)) {
         return menuFailure({ id, ...(name ? { name } : {}) }, {
@@ -3797,7 +3827,9 @@ export async function execMenuForEcweb(payload, trusted) {
             data: { $schema_version: 1, kind: 'role_permission_denied', self: payload?.args?.self ?? null },
         });
     }
-    const userId = trusted.actorAid ?? (trusted.localDirect ? (isProcessLevel ? owners[0] : 'local-direct') : undefined);
+    // A verified local ECWeb connection acts through the configured human
+    // DaemonOwner identity; it is not an anonymous daemon service principal.
+    const userId = trusted.actorAid ?? (trusted.localDirect ? (owners[0] || 'local-direct') : undefined);
     return execMenuForSystemControl.call(this, payload, {
         source: 'ecweb',
         actorAid: userId || 'local-direct',
@@ -3819,7 +3851,11 @@ export async function execMenuForControl(payload, peerId) {
     const isRoleRequest = name === 'role' || compatCmd === '/role';
     const isConnectRequest = name === 'connect' || compatCmd === '/connect';
     if (!isRoleRequest && !isConnectRequest && !isProcessLevelOwner(peerId, owners)) {
-        return menuFailure({ id, ...(name ? { name } : {}) }, { code: 'ROLE_ACCESS_DENIED', message: '控制 channel 操作需要 owner 权限' });
+        return menuFailure({ id, ...(name ? { name } : {}) }, {
+            code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+            message: formatAuthorizationDenial('Control-channel process operations require DaemonOwner.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+            data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+        });
     }
     return execMenuForSystemControl.call(this, payload, {
         source: 'control',