evolcore 0.0.15 → 0.0.17

package/dist/core/message/response-engine.js

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ import { registerBuiltinModes } from '../../response-system/modes/index.js';
 import { deriveSessionTitle, shouldAutoFillSessionTitle } from '../session/session-title.js';
 import { SessionTurnCoordinator } from '../session/session-turn-coordinator.js';
 import { recordTriggerExecutionAnomaly } from '../../trigger/anomaly-store.js';
+import { classifyToolErrorCode } from '../permission/tool-error-code.js';
 function isShowActivitiesMode(value) {
     return value === 'all' || value === 'text' || value === 'none';
 }
@@ -1388,13 +1389,15 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                 }
             }, 30000);
         });
-        const totalExecutionPromise = new Promise((_, reject) => {
-            totalExecutionTimer = setTimeout(() => {
-                logger.warn(`[ResponseEngine] Total execution timeout after ${totalExecutionMs}ms, stream: ${streamKey}`);
-                rejectAfterInterruptBarrier(new Error('TOTAL_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT'));
-            }, totalExecutionMs);
-            totalExecutionTimer.unref?.();
-        });
+        const totalExecutionPromise = totalExecutionMs === undefined
+            ? undefined
+            : new Promise((_, reject) => {
+                totalExecutionTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+                    logger.warn(`[ResponseEngine] Total execution timeout after ${totalExecutionMs}ms, stream: ${streamKey}`);
+                    rejectAfterInterruptBarrier(new Error('TOTAL_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT'));
+                }, totalExecutionMs);
+                totalExecutionTimer.unref?.();
+            });
         try {
             const processingPromise = this._processMessageInternal(message, session, absoluteProjectPath, resetTimer, shouldSuppress, () => lastIdleSec, outputState, timeoutControl);
             const guardedProcessingPromise = processingPromise.then(async () => {
@@ -1403,11 +1406,10 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                 await timeoutControl.barrier;
                 throw timeoutControl.error;
             });
-            await Promise.race([
-                guardedProcessingPromise,
-                timeoutPromise,
-                totalExecutionPromise,
-            ]);
+            const processingPromises = [guardedProcessingPromise, timeoutPromise];
+            if (totalExecutionPromise)
+                processingPromises.push(totalExecutionPromise);
+            await Promise.race(processingPromises);
         }
         catch (error) {
             if (error instanceof Error && (error.message === 'SDK_TIMEOUT' || error.message === 'TOTAL_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT')) {
@@ -1467,7 +1469,7 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
             && Number.isFinite(configuredSeconds)
             && configuredSeconds > 0
             ? configuredSeconds * 1000
-            : 60 * 60 * 1000;
+            : undefined;
     }
     retryAttemptTimeoutMs() {
         if (this.globalSettings.idleMonitor?.enabled === false)
@@ -1807,12 +1809,14 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                 const statusPayload = {
                     kind: 'status.timeout',
                     metadata: isTotalExecutionTimeout
-                        ? { totalExecutionMs }
+                        ? (totalExecutionMs === undefined ? {} : { totalExecutionMs })
                         : { idleSec: getLastIdleSec?.() || undefined },
                 };
                 const idleSec = getLastIdleSec?.() || 0;
                 const userMessage = isTotalExecutionTimeout
-                    ? `⚠️ 任务超过总执行时限（${Math.round(totalExecutionMs / 1000)}秒），已自动中断`
+                    ? (totalExecutionMs === undefined
+                        ? '⚠️ 任务超过总执行时限，已自动中断'
+                        : `⚠️ 任务超过总执行时限（${Math.round(totalExecutionMs / 1000)}秒），已自动中断`)
                     : idleSec > 0
                         ? `⚠️ 任务超时（${idleSec}秒无响应），已自动中断`
                         : '⚠️ 任务超时，已自动中断';
@@ -2198,6 +2202,7 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                 role: peerRole,
                 chatType: authChatType,
                 selfAid: session.selfAID || message.selfAID,
+                allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics: effectiveAgentConfig?.readonlySourceDiagnostics === true,
                 peerKey: authPeerKey,
                 causation: taskCausation,
                 approvalRouting,
@@ -2770,6 +2775,7 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                     taskId,
                     sessionId: session.id,
                     messageId: message.messageId,
+                    baseagent: normalizedBaseagent.canonical,
                     channel: configChannelType,
                     channelId: message.channelId,
                     chatType: configChatType,
@@ -3688,7 +3694,7 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
             const daemonTrigger = this.isTrustedDaemonTrigger(message);
             const statusPayload = procStatus === 'timeout'
                 ? { kind: 'status.timeout', metadata: isTotalExecutionTimeout
-                        ? { totalExecutionMs }
+                        ? (totalExecutionMs === undefined ? {} : { totalExecutionMs })
                         : { idleSec: getLastIdleSec?.() || undefined } }
                 : procStatus === 'interrupted'
                     ? { kind: 'status.interrupted', metadata: { reason: 'stream_error' } }
@@ -3756,7 +3762,9 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                         : modelFallbackExhaustedMessage
                             ? modelFallbackExhaustedMessage
                             : isTotalExecutionTimeout
-                                ? `⚠️ 任务超过总执行时限（${Math.round(totalExecutionMs / 1000)}秒），已自动中断`
+                                ? (totalExecutionMs === undefined
+                                    ? '⚠️ 任务超过总执行时限，已自动中断'
+                                    : `⚠️ 任务超过总执行时限（${Math.round(totalExecutionMs / 1000)}秒），已自动中断`)
                                 : isTimeout
                                     ? (idleSec > 0 ? `⚠️ 任务超时（${idleSec}秒无响应），已自动中断` : '⚠️ 任务超时，已自动中断')
                                     : getErrorMessage(error, undefined);
@@ -4097,6 +4105,12 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                 if (event.type === 'complete') {
                     event = normalizeCompleteAgentEvent(event);
                 }
+                if (event.type === 'tool_result' && event.isError && !event.errorCode) {
+                    event = {
+                        ...event,
+                        errorCode: classifyToolErrorCode({ error: event.error, result: event.result }),
+                    };
+                }
                 // 每收到事件重置空闲超时
                 const toolName = event.type === 'tool_use' ? event.name : undefined;
                 resetTimer(event.type, toolName);
@@ -4413,8 +4427,8 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                             input: event.input,
                             ...(event.callId ? { callId: event.callId } : {}),
                             ...(event.correlationId || event.callId ? { correlationId: event.correlationId ?? event.callId } : {}),
-                            ...(session.selfAID ? { agentAid: session.selfAID } : {}),
-                            ...(permissionMode ? { permissionMode } : {}),
+                            agentAid: session.selfAID ?? 'unknown',
+                            permissionMode: permissionMode ?? 'unknown',
                             timestamp: Date.now(),
                             causation,
                         });
@@ -4478,11 +4492,12 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                             sessionId: session.id,
                             toolName: event.name,
                             isError: event.isError,
+                            ...(event.isError ? { errorCode: classifyToolErrorCode({ errorCode: event.errorCode, error: event.error, result: event.result }) } : {}),
                             agentName: agentNameForStats,
                             ...(event.callId ? { callId: event.callId } : {}),
                             ...(event.correlationId || event.callId ? { correlationId: event.correlationId ?? event.callId } : {}),
-                            ...(session.selfAID ? { agentAid: session.selfAID } : {}),
-                            ...(permissionMode ? { permissionMode } : {}),
+                            agentAid: session.selfAID ?? 'unknown',
+                            permissionMode: permissionMode ?? 'unknown',
                             timestamp: Date.now(),
                             causation,
                         });

package/dist/core/permission/tool-error-code.js

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+export function normalizeToolErrorCode(value) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string')
+        return undefined;
+    const code = value.trim().toUpperCase().replace(/[ .-]+/g, '_');
+    if ([
+        'POLICY_DENIED', 'ROLE_DENIED', 'USER_DENIED', 'APPROVAL_TIMEOUT',
+        'DELEGATION_FAILED', 'CAPABILITY_UNAVAILABLE', 'INVALID_ARGUMENT',
+        'EXECUTION_FAILED',
+    ].includes(code))
+        return code;
+    return undefined;
+}
+export function classifyToolErrorCode(input) {
+    const explicit = normalizeToolErrorCode(input.errorCode);
+    if (explicit)
+        return explicit;
+    const text = [input.error, input.result]
+        .map(value => {
+        if (typeof value === 'string')
+            return value;
+        if (value === undefined || value === null)
+            return '';
+        try {
+            return JSON.stringify(value);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return String(value);
+        }
+    })
+        .join(' ')
+        .toLowerCase();
+    if (/delegat(?:ion|ed)|carrier|command hash|not armed/.test(text))
+        return 'DELEGATION_FAILED';
+    if (/approval.*(?:timeout|timed out)|timed out.*approval|审批.*超时/.test(text))
+        return 'APPROVAL_TIMEOUT';
+    if (/user.*(?:denied|declined|cancel)|用户.*(?:拒绝|取消)|cancelled by user/.test(text))
+        return 'USER_DENIED';
+    if (/role|no_permission|not_allowed|visitor|member.*(?:denied|forbidden)|角色.*(?:拒绝|无权)/.test(text))
+        return 'ROLE_DENIED';
+    if (/policy|preflight|h[ .-]?class|l[ .-]?class|protected|readonly|dangerous|permission[_ ](?:denied|rejected|forbidden)|权限.*拒绝|策略.*拒绝/.test(text))
+        return 'POLICY_DENIED';
+    if (/capability|unsupported|unavailable|未找到.*工具|能力.*不可用/.test(text))
+        return 'CAPABILITY_UNAVAILABLE';
+    if (/invalid|argument|parameter|参数|用法/.test(text))
+        return 'INVALID_ARGUMENT';
+    return 'EXECUTION_FAILED';
+}

package/dist/core/permission/tool-policy.js

@@ -484,13 +484,19 @@ function analyzeShellProtectedOperands(command, options) {
             analysis,
             hClass: containsHClassReference(command),
             lClass: containsLClassReference(command),
+            pathHClass: false,
+            lockDiagnostic: false,
         };
     }
     const operands = queryPathOperands(analysis);
+    const lockDiagnostic = /(?:^|[\/\s'"`])(?:[^\s'"`/]*\.lock|EVOLCORE_RUNTIME_LOCK_DIR)(?=$|[\/\s'"`=])/i.test(command);
+    const pathHClass = operands.some(({ operand, accessKind }) => shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, 'h', options, accessKind));
     return {
         analysis,
-        hClass: operands.some(({ operand, accessKind }) => shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, 'h', options, accessKind)),
+        hClass: lockDiagnostic || pathHClass,
         lClass: operands.some(({ operand, accessKind }) => shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, 'l', options, accessKind)),
+        pathHClass,
+        lockDiagnostic,
     };
 }
 function protectedReadToolPaths(toolName, input) {
@@ -586,6 +592,45 @@ function readonlyShellStaysInWorkspace(analysis, projectPath, managedTempDir) {
             || (!!managedTemp && isSameOrDescendant(candidate, managedTemp));
     })());
 }
+const READONLY_SOURCE_ROOTS = new Set([
+    'src', 'lib', 'app', 'apps', 'packages', 'package', 'scripts',
+    'test', 'tests', 'ecagent', 'ecweb',
+]);
+/**
+ * Optional source-diagnostic capability. It is deliberately opt-in and only
+ * admits bounded, proven-readonly queries rooted at a named source directory;
+ * project root, home, dependency, config, and session trees remain outside it.
+ */
+function readonlySourceDiagnosticAllowed(analysis, projectPath) {
+    if (analysis.kind !== 'proven-readonly')
+        return false;
+    const workspace = resolveProtectedCandidate(projectPath);
+    const operands = queryPathOperands(analysis);
+    if (operands.length === 0)
+        return false;
+    return operands.every(({ operand, accessKind }) => {
+        if (accessKind === 'metadata')
+            return false;
+        const candidate = resolveProtectedCandidate(operand.value, projectPath);
+        if (!isSameOrDescendant(candidate, workspace))
+            return false;
+        const relative = path.relative(workspace, candidate);
+        const segments = relative.split(path.sep).filter(Boolean);
+        const first = segments[0];
+        if (!first || !READONLY_SOURCE_ROOTS.has(first) || segments.includes('node_modules'))
+            return false;
+        return !containsHClassReference(operand.value) && !containsLClassReference(operand.value)
+            && !containsLockPathReference(operand.value)
+            && !isHClassPath(candidate, { root: resolveRoot() })
+            && !isLClassPath(candidate, { root: resolveRoot() });
+    });
+}
+/** A lock filename used as a query pattern is safe; an operand naming the
+ * actual lock path is still protected. */
+function containsLockPathReference(value) {
+    return /(?:^|[\\/])(?:[^\\/]*\.lock|EVOLCORE_RUNTIME_LOCK_DIR)(?:$|[\\/])/i.test(value)
+        || /^(?:[^\\/]*\.lock|EVOLCORE_RUNTIME_LOCK_DIR)$/i.test(value);
+}
 /**
  * 只读模式检查（用于 PreToolUse hook 和 canUseTool callback）。普通
  * 路径上的受限查询 Bash 可自动执行；H/L-class 和未建模 Shell 仍拒绝。
@@ -631,6 +676,13 @@ export function checkReadonly(toolName, input, projectPath, context) {
             managedTempDir,
             allowProtectedMetadata: context?.allowProtectedMetadata,
         });
+        const sourceDiagnosticAllowed = context?.allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics
+            && readonlySourceDiagnosticAllowed(protectedOperands.analysis, projectPath)
+            && !protectedOperands.lClass
+            && (!protectedOperands.hClass || (protectedOperands.lockDiagnostic && !protectedOperands.pathHClass));
+        if (sourceDiagnosticAllowed) {
+            return { behavior: 'allow' };
+        }
         if (protectedOperands.analysis.kind === 'proven-readonly'
             && !protectedOperands.hClass
             && !protectedOperands.lClass
@@ -929,7 +981,12 @@ export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
             managedTempDir: context?.managedTempDir,
             allowProtectedMetadata: context?.allowProtectedMetadata,
         });
-        if (protectedOperands.hClass) {
+        const sourceDiagnosticAllowed = context?.permissionMode === 'readonly'
+            && context.allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics === true
+            && readonlySourceDiagnosticAllowed(protectedOperands.analysis, context.projectPath ?? process.cwd())
+            && !protectedOperands.lClass
+            && (!protectedOperands.hClass || (protectedOperands.lockDiagnostic && !protectedOperands.pathHClass));
+        if (protectedOperands.hClass && !sourceDiagnosticAllowed) {
             logger.warn(`[H-Class Protection] 🔒 Protected filesystem operand in shell command: tool=${toolName} ` +
                 `session=${context?.sessionId} channel=${context?.channel} peer=${context?.peerId} role=${context?.role}`);
             return {
@@ -1398,6 +1455,8 @@ export function evaluateToolPreflight(toolName, input, context) {
         workspacePath: context.workspacePath,
         root: context.root,
         managedTempDir: context.managedTempDir,
+        permissionMode: context.permissionMode,
+        allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics: context.allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics,
         allowProtectedMetadata: context.allowProtectedMetadata,
     });
     if (hClass.behavior === 'deny') {

package/dist/index.js

@@ -227,18 +227,21 @@ export function resolvePersistedRestartDelivery(opts) {
         ? { valid: true, delivery: opts.delivery }
         : { valid: false };
 }
-function daemonConversationWatchdogMs(settings) {
+function daemonIdleTimeoutMs(settings) {
     const idleTimeoutSec = settings.idleMonitor?.timeout;
-    const idleMs = typeof idleTimeoutSec === 'number' && Number.isFinite(idleTimeoutSec) && idleTimeoutSec > 0
+    return typeof idleTimeoutSec === 'number' && Number.isFinite(idleTimeoutSec) && idleTimeoutSec > 0
         ? idleTimeoutSec * 1000
         : 120_000;
+}
+function daemonConversationWatchdogMs(settings) {
+    const idleMs = daemonIdleTimeoutMs(settings);
     return Math.ceil(idleMs * 5 + 60_000);
 }
 function daemonConversationTotalExecutionMs(settings) {
     const seconds = settings.idleMonitor?.maxExecutionTime;
     return typeof seconds === 'number' && Number.isFinite(seconds) && seconds > 0
         ? seconds * 1000
-        : 60 * 60 * 1000;
+        : undefined;
 }
 function originFromActorSession(session, authenticatedPeerId, authenticatedChannelKey, authenticatedChatType) {
     const peerId = authenticatedPeerId || session.metadata?.peerId;
@@ -1227,6 +1230,7 @@ async function main() {
     // 回填 messageQueue 引用
     cmdHandler.setMessageQueue(messageQueue);
     processor.setMessageQueue(messageQueue);
+    const handoffQueueTtlMs = daemonIdleTimeoutMs(globalSettings);
     const taskExecutionTtlMs = daemonConversationTotalExecutionMs(globalSettings);
     const handoffRuntime = new HandoffRuntime(sessionManager, messageQueue, async (handoff) => {
         const targetSession = await sessionManager.getSessionById(handoff.target_session_id);
@@ -1277,7 +1281,7 @@ async function main() {
                 })
                 : { ok: false, error: 'AUN channel does not support daemon private sends' };
         return { ok: result.ok, message_id: result.message_id, error: result.error };
-    }, undefined, { queueTtlMs: taskExecutionTtlMs });
+    }, undefined, { queueTtlMs: handoffQueueTtlMs });
     responseEngine.setHandoffRuntime(handoffRuntime);
     cmdHandler.setHandoffRuntime(handoffRuntime);
     // Trigger runtime: daemon-level script + feedback scheduler.

package/dist/ipc.js

@@ -1047,6 +1047,7 @@ export class IpcServer {
  * Query the running EvolCore daemon via Unix socket.
  * Returns null if the service is not running or the socket is unreachable.
  */
+/** Pass `null` as timeoutMs to wait without a client-side deadline. */
 export function ipcQuery(socketPath, cmd, timeoutMs = 3000) {
     let authenticatedCmd = cmd;
     if (!process.env.EVOLCORE_SESSION_ID
@@ -1067,10 +1068,12 @@ export function ipcQuery(socketPath, cmd, timeoutMs = 3000) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const conn = net.connect(socketPath);
         let buf = '';
-        const timer = setTimeout(() => {
-            conn.destroy();
-            resolve(null);
-        }, timeoutMs);
+        const timer = timeoutMs === null
+            ? undefined
+            : setTimeout(() => {
+                conn.destroy();
+                resolve(null);
+            }, timeoutMs);
         conn.on('connect', () => {
             conn.write(JSON.stringify(request) + '\n');
         });
@@ -1078,7 +1081,8 @@ export function ipcQuery(socketPath, cmd, timeoutMs = 3000) {
             buf += data.toString();
             const idx = buf.indexOf('\n');
             if (idx !== -1) {
-                clearTimeout(timer);
+                if (timer)
+                    clearTimeout(timer);
                 try {
                     resolve(JSON.parse(buf.slice(0, idx)));
                 }
@@ -1089,7 +1093,8 @@ export function ipcQuery(socketPath, cmd, timeoutMs = 3000) {
             }
         });
         conn.on('error', () => {
-            clearTimeout(timer);
+            if (timer)
+                clearTimeout(timer);
             resolve(null);
         });
     });

package/dist/paths.js

@@ -169,7 +169,24 @@ function resolveInstanceSocketPath(root) {
         const hash = crypto.createHash('sha1').update(root).digest('hex').slice(0, 12);
         return `\\\\.\\pipe\\${WINDOWS_PIPE_PREFIX}-${hash}`;
     }
-    return path.join(root, 'data', 'instance', INSTANCE_SOCKET_FILENAME);
+    const filesystemPath = path.join(root, 'data', 'instance', INSTANCE_SOCKET_FILENAME);
+    // Linux/macOS Unix-domain sockets have a small sockaddr path limit
+    // (typically 108 bytes on Linux). Long managed TMPDIR prefixes can make a
+    // perfectly valid EVOLCORE_HOME impossible to bind. Keep the fallback a
+    // normal filesystem socket whenever possible: the endpoint is passed to
+    // child processes through environment variables, which cannot contain NUL
+    // bytes. The short path remains inside the managed temporary directory and
+    // uses the runtime root hash for isolation.
+    if (Buffer.byteLength(filesystemPath) < 100)
+        return filesystemPath;
+    const hash = crypto.createHash('sha1').update(root).digest('hex').slice(0, 20);
+    const shortFilesystemPath = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `.ec-${hash.slice(0, 15)}.sock`);
+    if (Buffer.byteLength(shortFilesystemPath) < 100)
+        return shortFilesystemPath;
+    // This is only reachable when the managed temporary directory itself is
+    // unusually long. Node's in-process IPC can use the abstract namespace;
+    // callers that cross a process boundary must provide an encoded endpoint.
+    return `\0evolcore-${hash}`;
 }
 export function ensureDataDirs() {
     const p = resolvePaths();

package/dist/trigger/scheduler.js

@@ -1064,9 +1064,10 @@ export class TriggerRuntimeScheduler {
             && !!run.attemptId
             && typeof run.executionSessionId === 'string'
             && !!run.executionSessionId
-            && typeof run.executionDeadlineAt === 'number'
-            && Number.isFinite(run.executionDeadlineAt)
-            && run.executionDeadlineAt > Date.now()
+            && (run.executionDeadlineAt === undefined
+                || (typeof run.executionDeadlineAt === 'number'
+                    && Number.isFinite(run.executionDeadlineAt)
+                    && run.executionDeadlineAt > Date.now()))
             && run.definitionRevision === definitionRevision(definition);
     }
     async continueRecoveredRun(definition, runtime, session) {
@@ -1668,7 +1669,7 @@ export class TriggerRuntimeScheduler {
         return this.running.get(triggerId)?.has(runId) === true;
     }
     daemonExecutionDeadlineAt(startedAt) {
-        return this.daemonChannel.executionDeadlineAt?.(startedAt) ?? startedAt + 60 * 60 * 1_000;
+        return this.daemonChannel.executionDeadlineAt?.(startedAt);
     }
     clearTimer(triggerId) {
         const timer = this.timers.get(triggerId);

package/dist/utils/cross-platform.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { execFileSync, execFile, spawn, spawnSync } from 'child_process';
 import { promisify } from 'util';
 import fs from 'fs';
 import { getProcessStartTime, parseCimDate } from './process-introspect.js';
+import { decodeWindowsOutput } from './windows-output.js';
 const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
 export const isWindows = process.platform === 'win32';
 /**
@@ -287,30 +288,6 @@ function parseDateString(value) {
     const parsed = Date.parse(value);
     return Number.isNaN(parsed) ? null : parsed;
 }
-/** Decode PowerShell output consistently across Windows 5.1 and pwsh. */
-function decodeWindowsOutput(value) {
-    if (!value)
-        return '';
-    const bytes = Buffer.isBuffer(value) ? value : Buffer.from(value);
-    if (bytes.length >= 2 && bytes[0] === 0xff && bytes[1] === 0xfe) {
-        return bytes.subarray(2).toString('utf16le');
-    }
-    if (bytes.length >= 2 && bytes[0] === 0xfe && bytes[1] === 0xff) {
-        const swapped = Buffer.allocUnsafe(bytes.length - 2);
-        for (let i = 2; i + 1 < bytes.length; i += 2) {
-            swapped[i - 2] = bytes[i + 1];
-            swapped[i - 1] = bytes[i];
-        }
-        return swapped.toString('utf16le');
-    }
-    const utf8 = bytes.toString('utf8').replace(/^\uFEFF/, '');
-    if (utf8.includes('\u0000')) {
-        const utf16 = bytes.toString('utf16le').replace(/^\uFEFF/, '');
-        if (utf16.includes('{') || utf16.includes('[') || utf16.includes('CommandLine'))
-            return utf16;
-    }
-    return utf8;
-}
 /**
  * Cross-platform command existence check.
  */

package/dist/utils/error-utils.js

@@ -3,6 +3,32 @@ import path from 'path';
 import { getPackageRoot, resolvePaths } from '../paths.js';
 import { logger } from './logger.js';
 import { isSandboxInitializationFailure } from '../core/permission/sandbox-runtime.js';
+export const CLAUDE_STARTUP_ARGUMENTS_TOO_LONG = 'claude_startup_arguments_too_long';
+/** Identify a Claude process-start failure without treating ordinary tool errors as startup failures. */
+export function isClaudeStartupArgumentsTooLong(error) {
+    const code = error && typeof error === 'object' && 'code' in error
+        ? String(error.code ?? '')
+        : '';
+    const message = error && typeof error === 'object' && 'message' in error
+        ? String(error.message ?? '')
+        : String(error ?? '');
+    const text = `${code}\n${message}`.toLowerCase();
+    return text.includes(CLAUDE_STARTUP_ARGUMENTS_TOO_LONG)
+        || text.includes('enametoolong')
+        || text.includes('e2big')
+        || text.includes('argument list too long')
+        || text.includes('command line too long');
+}
+export function createClaudeStartupArgumentsTooLongError(error) {
+    const wrapped = new Error(`${CLAUDE_STARTUP_ARGUMENTS_TOO_LONG}: Claude 启动参数过长，任务未执行`);
+    wrapped.name = 'ClaudeStartupArgumentsTooLongError';
+    wrapped.code = CLAUDE_STARTUP_ARGUMENTS_TOO_LONG;
+    // Keep the original error available to diagnostics without echoing argv,
+    // settings contents, or absolute paths to users.
+    if (error !== undefined)
+        wrapped.cause = error;
+    return wrapped;
+}
 export var ErrorType;
 (function (ErrorType) {
     ErrorType["SDK_TIMEOUT"] = "sdk_timeout";
@@ -13,6 +39,7 @@ export var ErrorType;
     ErrorType["CONTEXT_TOO_LONG"] = "context_too_long";
     ErrorType["MODEL_UNAVAILABLE"] = "model_unavailable";
     ErrorType["SANDBOX_INITIALIZATION_FAILED"] = "sandbox_initialization_failed";
+    ErrorType["CLAUDE_STARTUP_ARGUMENTS_TOO_LONG"] = "claude_startup_arguments_too_long";
     ErrorType["UNKNOWN"] = "unknown";
 })(ErrorType || (ErrorType = {}));
 /**
@@ -251,6 +278,11 @@ function hasRetryableHttpStatus(text) {
 }
 export function classifyError(error) {
     const msg = (error?.message || '').toLowerCase();
+    // Startup-size failures are deterministic local failures and must win over
+    // dictionary rules that would otherwise turn them into generic retries.
+    if (isClaudeStartupArgumentsTooLong(error)) {
+        return ErrorType.CLAUDE_STARTUP_ARGUMENTS_TOO_LONG;
+    }
     // 字典优先 — 命中则直接返回
     const rule = matchErrorRule(msg);
     if (rule) {
@@ -314,6 +346,10 @@ export function isRetryableError(error) {
     return false;
 }
 export function getErrorMessage(error, terminalReason, includeEmoji = true) {
+    if (isClaudeStartupArgumentsTooLong(error)) {
+        const prefix = includeEmoji ? '⚠️ ' : '';
+        return `${prefix}当前 Claude 启动参数过长，任务未执行`;
+    }
     // terminalReason 提供更精确的错误提示（SDK 0.2.100+）
     if (terminalReason) {
         const prefix = includeEmoji ? '❌ ' : '';
@@ -335,6 +371,8 @@ export function getErrorMessage(error, terminalReason, includeEmoji = true) {
                 return `${prefix}权限被拒绝，操作已取消`;
             case 'sandbox_initialization_failed':
                 return `${warnPrefix}只读执行沙箱启动失败（sandbox_initialization_failed），当前任务未执行；请检查 user namespace/seccomp 配置后重试`;
+            case 'claude_startup_arguments_too_long':
+                return `${warnPrefix}当前 Claude 启动参数过长，任务未执行`;
             case 'aborted_streaming':
             case 'aborted_tools':
                 return `${prefix}任务已中断`;

package/dist/utils/instance-registry.js

@@ -11,10 +11,11 @@
 import fs from 'fs';
 import path from 'path';
 import { spawnSync } from 'child_process';
-import { resolvePaths } from '../paths.js';
+import { getPackageRoot, resolvePaths } from '../paths.js';
 import { isProcessRunning, killProcess, isWindows, findProcesses } from './cross-platform.js';
 import { getProcessStartTime, startTimeMatches } from './process-introspect.js';
 import { isConfirmedLeakedTestDaemon, runtimeHomeFromEnv } from './restart-safety.js';
+import { decodeWindowsOutput } from './windows-output.js';
 // ── Helpers ──
 function instanceDir() {
     return resolvePaths().instanceDir;
@@ -334,8 +335,37 @@ export function removeAll(pid) {
 function killPid(pid) {
     killProcess(pid, true);
 }
+function normalizeProcessPath(value) {
+    return value.replace(/[\\/]+/g, '/').toLowerCase();
+}
+function escapeRegExp(value) {
+    return value.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
+}
 /**
- * 扫所有 node 进程中跑 dist/index.js 的 PID，减去当前 HOME 已登记的 main PID。
+ * Return whether a process command line contains an exact EvolCore package
+ * main entry point. The current package path is accepted verbatim, while
+ * other installations are accepted only when their package directory is
+ * explicitly named `evolcore`.
+ *
+ * Matching the package entry instead of any `dist/index.js` path prevents
+ * unrelated Node services (for example BrowserMCP) from being classified as
+ * EvolCore orphans.
+ */
+export function isEvolCoreMainCommand(cmdline, packageRoot = getPackageRoot()) {
+    const mainEntry = normalizeProcessPath(path.join(packageRoot, 'dist', 'index.js'));
+    const command = normalizeProcessPath(cmdline);
+    const entryPattern = escapeRegExp(mainEntry);
+    if (new RegExp(`(?:^|[\\s"'=])${entryPattern}(?=$|[\\s"'])`).test(command))
+        return true;
+    // Cross-install detection (notably on Windows/macOS where process
+    // environments may be unavailable): only an exact `evolcore/dist/index.js`
+    // package suffix qualifies. This deliberately excludes BrowserMCP and
+    // every other package that happens to use the same entry filename.
+    return /(?:^|[\s"'=])(?:[^"'=]*\/)?evolcore\/dist\/index\.js(?=$|[\s"'])/.test(command);
+}
+/**
+ * 扫所有 node 进程中运行当前 EvolCore 包 dist/index.js 的 PID，减去当前 HOME
+ * 已登记的 main PID。
  *
  * 用途：检测跨 HOME 残留的 evolcore 主进程（例如测试套件 spawn 后未清理、
  * 旧版本 pidfile 模式遗留等），由 cmdStart/cmdRestart 在启动前提示用户。
@@ -358,7 +388,7 @@ export function findOrphanProcesses() {
         if (m.alive)
             known.add(m.record.pid);
     }
-    // 2. 系统中所有跑 dist/index.js 的 node 进程
+    // 2. 先按入口文件名找候选，再用完整包路径做严格校验。
     // Use a stable filename anchor for the Windows CIM query. The full path
     // regex contains escaped separators and is applied after command lines have
     // been fetched; embedding it in the CIM pre-filter can silently miss a
@@ -371,11 +401,8 @@ export function findOrphanProcesses() {
         if (!isProcessRunning(pid))
             continue;
         const cmdline = readCmdline(pid);
-        // 二次验证：确实是 evolcore 的 dist/index.js
-        if (!/dist[\\/]index\.js/.test(cmdline))
-            continue;
-        // 三次验证：排除内嵌 ecweb 与独立 npm 包 ec-web。
-        if (/[\\/](?:ecweb|ec-web)[\\/]dist[\\/]index\.js/.test(cmdline))
+        // 二次验证：入口必须是当前 EvolCore 包的 dist/index.js。
+        if (!isEvolCoreMainCommand(cmdline))
             continue;
         const processEnv = readProcessEnvironment(pid);
         orphans.push({
@@ -440,25 +467,6 @@ function readCmdline(pid) {
         }
     }
 }
-function decodeWindowsOutput(value) {
-    if (!value)
-        return '';
-    const bytes = Buffer.isBuffer(value) ? value : Buffer.from(value);
-    if (bytes.length >= 2 && bytes[0] === 0xff && bytes[1] === 0xfe)
-        return bytes.subarray(2).toString('utf16le');
-    if (bytes.length >= 2 && bytes[0] === 0xfe && bytes[1] === 0xff) {
-        const swapped = Buffer.allocUnsafe(bytes.length - 2);
-        for (let i = 2; i + 1 < bytes.length; i += 2) {
-            swapped[i - 2] = bytes[i + 1];
-            swapped[i - 1] = bytes[i];
-        }
-        return swapped.toString('utf16le');
-    }
-    const utf8 = bytes.toString('utf8').replace(/^\uFEFF/, '');
-    if (utf8.includes('\u0000'))
-        return bytes.toString('utf16le').replace(/^\uFEFF/, '');
-    return utf8;
-}
 function readProcessEnvironment(pid) {
     // Linux: /proc/<pid>/environ
     if (!isWindows && process.platform !== 'darwin') {