evolcore 0.0.14 → 0.0.16

package/dist/core/message/response-engine.js

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ import { registerBuiltinModes } from '../../response-system/modes/index.js';
 import { deriveSessionTitle, shouldAutoFillSessionTitle } from '../session/session-title.js';
 import { SessionTurnCoordinator } from '../session/session-turn-coordinator.js';
 import { recordTriggerExecutionAnomaly } from '../../trigger/anomaly-store.js';
+import { classifyToolErrorCode } from '../permission/tool-error-code.js';
 function isShowActivitiesMode(value) {
     return value === 'all' || value === 'text' || value === 'none';
 }
@@ -1388,13 +1389,15 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                 }
             }, 30000);
         });
-        const totalExecutionPromise = new Promise((_, reject) => {
-            totalExecutionTimer = setTimeout(() => {
-                logger.warn(`[ResponseEngine] Total execution timeout after ${totalExecutionMs}ms, stream: ${streamKey}`);
-                rejectAfterInterruptBarrier(new Error('TOTAL_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT'));
-            }, totalExecutionMs);
-            totalExecutionTimer.unref?.();
-        });
+        const totalExecutionPromise = totalExecutionMs === undefined
+            ? undefined
+            : new Promise((_, reject) => {
+                totalExecutionTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+                    logger.warn(`[ResponseEngine] Total execution timeout after ${totalExecutionMs}ms, stream: ${streamKey}`);
+                    rejectAfterInterruptBarrier(new Error('TOTAL_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT'));
+                }, totalExecutionMs);
+                totalExecutionTimer.unref?.();
+            });
         try {
             const processingPromise = this._processMessageInternal(message, session, absoluteProjectPath, resetTimer, shouldSuppress, () => lastIdleSec, outputState, timeoutControl);
             const guardedProcessingPromise = processingPromise.then(async () => {
@@ -1403,11 +1406,10 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                 await timeoutControl.barrier;
                 throw timeoutControl.error;
             });
-            await Promise.race([
-                guardedProcessingPromise,
-                timeoutPromise,
-                totalExecutionPromise,
-            ]);
+            const processingPromises = [guardedProcessingPromise, timeoutPromise];
+            if (totalExecutionPromise)
+                processingPromises.push(totalExecutionPromise);
+            await Promise.race(processingPromises);
         }
         catch (error) {
             if (error instanceof Error && (error.message === 'SDK_TIMEOUT' || error.message === 'TOTAL_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT')) {
@@ -1467,7 +1469,7 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
             && Number.isFinite(configuredSeconds)
             && configuredSeconds > 0
             ? configuredSeconds * 1000
-            : 60 * 60 * 1000;
+            : undefined;
     }
     retryAttemptTimeoutMs() {
         if (this.globalSettings.idleMonitor?.enabled === false)
@@ -1807,12 +1809,14 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                 const statusPayload = {
                     kind: 'status.timeout',
                     metadata: isTotalExecutionTimeout
-                        ? { totalExecutionMs }
+                        ? (totalExecutionMs === undefined ? {} : { totalExecutionMs })
                         : { idleSec: getLastIdleSec?.() || undefined },
                 };
                 const idleSec = getLastIdleSec?.() || 0;
                 const userMessage = isTotalExecutionTimeout
-                    ? `⚠️ 任务超过总执行时限（${Math.round(totalExecutionMs / 1000)}秒），已自动中断`
+                    ? (totalExecutionMs === undefined
+                        ? '⚠️ 任务超过总执行时限，已自动中断'
+                        : `⚠️ 任务超过总执行时限（${Math.round(totalExecutionMs / 1000)}秒），已自动中断`)
                     : idleSec > 0
                         ? `⚠️ 任务超时（${idleSec}秒无响应），已自动中断`
                         : '⚠️ 任务超时，已自动中断';
@@ -2198,6 +2202,7 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                 role: peerRole,
                 chatType: authChatType,
                 selfAid: session.selfAID || message.selfAID,
+                allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics: effectiveAgentConfig?.readonlySourceDiagnostics === true,
                 peerKey: authPeerKey,
                 causation: taskCausation,
                 approvalRouting,
@@ -3688,7 +3693,7 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
             const daemonTrigger = this.isTrustedDaemonTrigger(message);
             const statusPayload = procStatus === 'timeout'
                 ? { kind: 'status.timeout', metadata: isTotalExecutionTimeout
-                        ? { totalExecutionMs }
+                        ? (totalExecutionMs === undefined ? {} : { totalExecutionMs })
                         : { idleSec: getLastIdleSec?.() || undefined } }
                 : procStatus === 'interrupted'
                     ? { kind: 'status.interrupted', metadata: { reason: 'stream_error' } }
@@ -3756,7 +3761,9 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                         : modelFallbackExhaustedMessage
                             ? modelFallbackExhaustedMessage
                             : isTotalExecutionTimeout
-                                ? `⚠️ 任务超过总执行时限（${Math.round(totalExecutionMs / 1000)}秒），已自动中断`
+                                ? (totalExecutionMs === undefined
+                                    ? '⚠️ 任务超过总执行时限，已自动中断'
+                                    : `⚠️ 任务超过总执行时限（${Math.round(totalExecutionMs / 1000)}秒），已自动中断`)
                                 : isTimeout
                                     ? (idleSec > 0 ? `⚠️ 任务超时（${idleSec}秒无响应），已自动中断` : '⚠️ 任务超时，已自动中断')
                                     : getErrorMessage(error, undefined);
@@ -4097,6 +4104,12 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                 if (event.type === 'complete') {
                     event = normalizeCompleteAgentEvent(event);
                 }
+                if (event.type === 'tool_result' && event.isError && !event.errorCode) {
+                    event = {
+                        ...event,
+                        errorCode: classifyToolErrorCode({ error: event.error, result: event.result }),
+                    };
+                }
                 // 每收到事件重置空闲超时
                 const toolName = event.type === 'tool_use' ? event.name : undefined;
                 resetTimer(event.type, toolName);
@@ -4413,8 +4426,8 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                             input: event.input,
                             ...(event.callId ? { callId: event.callId } : {}),
                             ...(event.correlationId || event.callId ? { correlationId: event.correlationId ?? event.callId } : {}),
-                            ...(session.selfAID ? { agentAid: session.selfAID } : {}),
-                            ...(permissionMode ? { permissionMode } : {}),
+                            agentAid: session.selfAID ?? 'unknown',
+                            permissionMode: permissionMode ?? 'unknown',
                             timestamp: Date.now(),
                             causation,
                         });
@@ -4478,11 +4491,12 @@ export class ResponseEngine {
                             sessionId: session.id,
                             toolName: event.name,
                             isError: event.isError,
+                            ...(event.isError ? { errorCode: classifyToolErrorCode({ errorCode: event.errorCode, error: event.error, result: event.result }) } : {}),
                             agentName: agentNameForStats,
                             ...(event.callId ? { callId: event.callId } : {}),
                             ...(event.correlationId || event.callId ? { correlationId: event.correlationId ?? event.callId } : {}),
-                            ...(session.selfAID ? { agentAid: session.selfAID } : {}),
-                            ...(permissionMode ? { permissionMode } : {}),
+                            agentAid: session.selfAID ?? 'unknown',
+                            permissionMode: permissionMode ?? 'unknown',
                             timestamp: Date.now(),
                             causation,
                         });

package/dist/core/permission/approval-gateway.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { summarizeToolInput } from '../../utils/tool-summary.js';
 import { createRootCausation, deriveCausation, normalizeCausation } from '../causation/context.js';
 import { recordCausationSpan } from '../causation/audit.js';
 import { checkDangerousCommand } from './tool-policy.js';
+import { resolveProtectedCandidate } from '../protected-paths.js';
 export async function requestDangerousCommandPermission(gateway, sessionId, toolName, input, sendPrompt, context, grantScope = 'default', mode = 'request') {
     const dangerCheck = checkDangerousCommand(toolName, input);
     if (!dangerCheck.isDangerous) {
@@ -41,6 +42,76 @@ function stablePermissionInput(value) {
 function permissionInputFingerprint(input) {
     return createHash('sha256').update(stablePermissionInput(input)).digest('hex');
 }
+function collectExplicitFileChangeGrantPaths(record, output) {
+    const pathKeys = ['path', 'filePath', 'file_path', 'movePath', 'move_path', 'destinationPath', 'targetPath'];
+    const hasExplicitPath = pathKeys.some(key => typeof record[key] === 'string' && !!record[key]);
+    for (const key of pathKeys) {
+        const candidate = record[key];
+        if (typeof candidate === 'string' && candidate)
+            output.push(candidate);
+    }
+    if (record.kind && typeof record.kind === 'object' && !Array.isArray(record.kind)) {
+        collectExplicitFileChangeGrantPaths(record.kind, output);
+    }
+    return hasExplicitPath;
+}
+function collectFileChangeGrantPaths(value, output) {
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+        for (const entry of value) {
+            if (entry && typeof entry === 'object' && !Array.isArray(entry)) {
+                collectExplicitFileChangeGrantPaths(entry, output);
+            }
+        }
+        return;
+    }
+    if (!value || typeof value !== 'object')
+        return;
+    const record = value;
+    const hasExplicitPath = collectExplicitFileChangeGrantPaths(record, output);
+    if (hasExplicitPath)
+        return;
+    // Some backends encode file changes as a map keyed by path. Do not treat
+    // metadata keys as paths, and still collect explicit move destinations.
+    for (const [filePath, change] of Object.entries(record)) {
+        if (filePath !== 'kind' && filePath !== 'type')
+            output.push(filePath);
+        if (change && typeof change === 'object' && !Array.isArray(change)) {
+            collectExplicitFileChangeGrantPaths(change, output);
+        }
+    }
+}
+function permissionGrantMatch(toolName, input, options) {
+    const fileChangeCwd = options?.fileChangeCwd?.trim();
+    // grantRoot is already a broad filesystem capability. Keep it exact rather
+    // than silently widening it through the concrete-file convenience scope.
+    if (toolName === 'FileChange' && fileChangeCwd && !input.grantRoot) {
+        const rawPaths = [];
+        collectFileChangeGrantPaths(input.fileChanges, rawPaths);
+        try {
+            const canonicalPaths = [...new Set(rawPaths.map(candidate => {
+                    const canonical = resolveProtectedCandidate(candidate, fileChangeCwd);
+                    return process.platform === 'win32' ? canonical.toLowerCase() : canonical;
+                }))].sort();
+            if (canonicalPaths.length > 0) {
+                return {
+                    inputFingerprint: permissionInputFingerprint({
+                        scope: 'file-change-paths-v1',
+                        paths: canonicalPaths,
+                    }),
+                    scope: 'file-change-paths',
+                };
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            // Invalid path input falls back to exact matching; policy checks still
+            // decide whether the request itself may be approved.
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        inputFingerprint: permissionInputFingerprint(input),
+        scope: 'exact-operation',
+    };
+}
 function truncateApprovalDetail(value) {
     const trimmed = value.trim();
     return trimmed.length > APPROVAL_DETAIL_LIMIT
@@ -238,13 +309,14 @@ export class PermissionGateway {
                 this.temporaryGrants.delete(key);
         }
     }
-    hasTemporaryGrant(sessionId, toolName, toolInput, grantScope = 'default') {
-        return !!this.getTemporaryGrant(sessionId, toolName, toolInput, grantScope);
+    hasTemporaryGrant(sessionId, toolName, toolInput, grantScope = 'default', matchOptions) {
+        const match = permissionGrantMatch(toolName, toolInput, matchOptions);
+        return !!this.getTemporaryGrant(sessionId, toolName, match.inputFingerprint, grantScope);
     }
-    getTemporaryGrant(sessionId, toolName, toolInput, grantScope = 'default') {
+    getTemporaryGrant(sessionId, toolName, inputFingerprint, grantScope = 'default') {
         const now = Date.now();
         this.pruneTemporaryGrants(now);
-        const key = this.temporaryGrantKey(sessionId, toolName, permissionInputFingerprint(toolInput), grantScope);
+        const key = this.temporaryGrantKey(sessionId, toolName, inputFingerprint, grantScope);
         return this.temporaryGrants.get(key);
     }
     addTemporaryGrant(pending, causation) {
@@ -425,7 +497,7 @@ export class PermissionGateway {
         }
         return true;
     }
-    async requestCrossSessionPermission(sessionId, challenge, route, sendPrompt, context, grantScope, requestCausation) {
+    async requestCrossSessionPermission(sessionId, challenge, route, sendPrompt, context, grantScope, requestCausation, grantMatch) {
         const approval = context.approvalRouting;
         const interactionRouter = context.interactionRouter;
         if (!approval || !interactionRouter) {
@@ -480,7 +552,11 @@ export class PermissionGateway {
                 bodyFormat: 'markdown',
                 buttons: [
                     { key: 'approve_once', label: '批准本次', style: 'primary' },
-                    { key: 'approve_session_30m', label: '本会话 30 分钟', style: 'default' },
+                    {
+                        key: 'approve_session_30m',
+                        label: grantMatch.scope === 'file-change-paths' ? '同文件 30 分钟' : '本会话 30 分钟',
+                        style: 'default',
+                    },
                     { key: 'deny', label: '拒绝', style: 'danger' },
                 ],
             },
@@ -508,7 +584,7 @@ export class PermissionGateway {
                 displaySummary,
                 reason,
                 resolve,
-                inputFingerprint: permissionInputFingerprint(toolInput),
+                inputFingerprint: grantMatch.inputFingerprint,
                 grantScope,
                 approverPolicy: challenge.approverPolicy,
                 approvalRouteKind: route.kind,
@@ -644,7 +720,7 @@ export class PermissionGateway {
     /**
      * 请求人工审批。返回三态决策。
      */
-    async requestPermission(sessionId, toolName, toolInput, sendPrompt, context, summary, reason, grantScope = 'default', approverPolicy) {
+    async requestPermission(sessionId, toolName, toolInput, sendPrompt, context, summary, reason, grantScope = 'default', approverPolicy, matchOptions) {
         const effectiveApproverPolicy = approverPolicy
             ?? context?.approvalRouting?.approverPolicy
             ?? 'requester';
@@ -672,7 +748,8 @@ export class PermissionGateway {
             await sendPrompt('当前操作需要授权，但无法验证申请人身份。');
             return 'deny';
         }
-        const temporaryGrant = this.getTemporaryGrant(sessionId, toolName, toolInput, grantScope);
+        const grantMatch = permissionGrantMatch(toolName, toolInput, matchOptions);
+        const temporaryGrant = this.getTemporaryGrant(sessionId, toolName, grantMatch.inputFingerprint, grantScope);
         if (temporaryGrant) {
             const consumeCausation = deriveCausation(normalizeCausation(temporaryGrant.causation)
                 ?? normalizeCausation(context?.causation)
@@ -731,7 +808,7 @@ export class PermissionGateway {
             return 'deny';
         }
         if (route.kind === 'handoff') {
-            return this.requestCrossSessionPermission(sessionId, challenge, route, sendPrompt, context, grantScope, requestCausation);
+            return this.requestCrossSessionPermission(sessionId, challenge, route, sendPrompt, context, grantScope, requestCausation, grantMatch);
         }
         // 构造 ActionInteraction
         const interaction = {
@@ -743,7 +820,11 @@ export class PermissionGateway {
                 body: `工具：${toolName}\n操作：${displaySummary}${reasonLine}`,
                 buttons: [
                     { key: 'allow', label: '✅ 允许本次', style: 'primary' },
-                    { key: 'always', label: '⏱ 同操作 30 分钟', style: 'default' },
+                    {
+                        key: 'always',
+                        label: grantMatch.scope === 'file-change-paths' ? '⏱ 同文件 30 分钟' : '⏱ 同操作 30 分钟',
+                        style: 'default',
+                    },
                     { key: 'deny', label: '❌ 拒绝', style: 'danger' },
                 ],
             },
@@ -767,7 +848,7 @@ export class PermissionGateway {
             const pending = {
                 sessionId,
                 toolName,
-                inputFingerprint: permissionInputFingerprint(toolInput),
+                inputFingerprint: grantMatch.inputFingerprint,
                 grantScope,
                 approverPolicy: challenge.approverPolicy,
                 approvalRouteKind: route.kind,
@@ -839,7 +920,10 @@ export class PermissionGateway {
                     replyContext: context.replyContext,
                     causation: requestCausation,
                 });
-                const fallbackText = `🔐 权限请求 - ${toolName}\n${displaySummary}${reasonLine}\n回复 /perm ${requestId} allow 允许本次 / /perm ${requestId} always 同操作授权 30 分钟 / /perm ${requestId} deny 拒绝`;
+                const temporaryGrantLabel = grantMatch.scope === 'file-change-paths'
+                    ? '同文件授权 30 分钟'
+                    : '同操作授权 30 分钟';
+                const fallbackText = `🔐 权限请求 - ${toolName}\n${displaySummary}${reasonLine}\n回复 /perm ${requestId} allow 允许本次 / /perm ${requestId} always ${temporaryGrantLabel} / /perm ${requestId} deny 拒绝`;
                 const result = await sendInteractionPayload(context.adapter, envelope, interaction, fallbackText, context.replyContext);
                 interactionSent = !!result;
             }
@@ -879,9 +963,8 @@ export class PermissionGateway {
         const normalizedDecision = decision === 'allow' || decision === 'always'
             ? decision
             : 'deny';
-        // Legacy "always" now means this exact operation in this session for 30 minutes.
-        // The backend receives a one-shot allow. Future identical operations must
-        // return through this gateway so the exact fingerprint and TTL are checked.
+        // The backend receives a one-shot allow. Future requests must return
+        // through this gateway so the selected match scope and TTL are checked.
         this.clearPendingResources(pending);
         pending.interactionRouter?.cancel(requestId);
         pending.resolve(normalizedDecision === 'deny' ? 'deny' : 'allow');

package/dist/core/permission/tool-error-code.js

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+export function normalizeToolErrorCode(value) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string')
+        return undefined;
+    const code = value.trim().toUpperCase().replace(/[ .-]+/g, '_');
+    if ([
+        'POLICY_DENIED', 'ROLE_DENIED', 'USER_DENIED', 'APPROVAL_TIMEOUT',
+        'DELEGATION_FAILED', 'CAPABILITY_UNAVAILABLE', 'INVALID_ARGUMENT',
+        'EXECUTION_FAILED',
+    ].includes(code))
+        return code;
+    return undefined;
+}
+export function classifyToolErrorCode(input) {
+    const explicit = normalizeToolErrorCode(input.errorCode);
+    if (explicit)
+        return explicit;
+    const text = [input.error, input.result]
+        .map(value => {
+        if (typeof value === 'string')
+            return value;
+        if (value === undefined || value === null)
+            return '';
+        try {
+            return JSON.stringify(value);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return String(value);
+        }
+    })
+        .join(' ')
+        .toLowerCase();
+    if (/delegat(?:ion|ed)|carrier|command hash|not armed/.test(text))
+        return 'DELEGATION_FAILED';
+    if (/approval.*(?:timeout|timed out)|timed out.*approval|审批.*超时/.test(text))
+        return 'APPROVAL_TIMEOUT';
+    if (/user.*(?:denied|declined|cancel)|用户.*(?:拒绝|取消)|cancelled by user/.test(text))
+        return 'USER_DENIED';
+    if (/role|no_permission|not_allowed|visitor|member.*(?:denied|forbidden)|角色.*(?:拒绝|无权)/.test(text))
+        return 'ROLE_DENIED';
+    if (/policy|preflight|h[ .-]?class|l[ .-]?class|protected|readonly|dangerous|permission[_ ](?:denied|rejected|forbidden)|权限.*拒绝|策略.*拒绝/.test(text))
+        return 'POLICY_DENIED';
+    if (/capability|unsupported|unavailable|未找到.*工具|能力.*不可用/.test(text))
+        return 'CAPABILITY_UNAVAILABLE';
+    if (/invalid|argument|parameter|参数|用法/.test(text))
+        return 'INVALID_ARGUMENT';
+    return 'EXECUTION_FAILED';
+}

package/dist/core/permission/tool-policy.js

@@ -484,13 +484,19 @@ function analyzeShellProtectedOperands(command, options) {
             analysis,
             hClass: containsHClassReference(command),
             lClass: containsLClassReference(command),
+            pathHClass: false,
+            lockDiagnostic: false,
         };
     }
     const operands = queryPathOperands(analysis);
+    const lockDiagnostic = /(?:^|[\/\s'"`])(?:[^\s'"`/]*\.lock|EVOLCORE_RUNTIME_LOCK_DIR)(?=$|[\/\s'"`=])/i.test(command);
+    const pathHClass = operands.some(({ operand, accessKind }) => shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, 'h', options, accessKind));
     return {
         analysis,
-        hClass: operands.some(({ operand, accessKind }) => shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, 'h', options, accessKind)),
+        hClass: lockDiagnostic || pathHClass,
         lClass: operands.some(({ operand, accessKind }) => shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, 'l', options, accessKind)),
+        pathHClass,
+        lockDiagnostic,
     };
 }
 function protectedReadToolPaths(toolName, input) {
@@ -586,6 +592,45 @@ function readonlyShellStaysInWorkspace(analysis, projectPath, managedTempDir) {
             || (!!managedTemp && isSameOrDescendant(candidate, managedTemp));
     })());
 }
+const READONLY_SOURCE_ROOTS = new Set([
+    'src', 'lib', 'app', 'apps', 'packages', 'package', 'scripts',
+    'test', 'tests', 'ecagent', 'ecweb',
+]);
+/**
+ * Optional source-diagnostic capability. It is deliberately opt-in and only
+ * admits bounded, proven-readonly queries rooted at a named source directory;
+ * project root, home, dependency, config, and session trees remain outside it.
+ */
+function readonlySourceDiagnosticAllowed(analysis, projectPath) {
+    if (analysis.kind !== 'proven-readonly')
+        return false;
+    const workspace = resolveProtectedCandidate(projectPath);
+    const operands = queryPathOperands(analysis);
+    if (operands.length === 0)
+        return false;
+    return operands.every(({ operand, accessKind }) => {
+        if (accessKind === 'metadata')
+            return false;
+        const candidate = resolveProtectedCandidate(operand.value, projectPath);
+        if (!isSameOrDescendant(candidate, workspace))
+            return false;
+        const relative = path.relative(workspace, candidate);
+        const segments = relative.split(path.sep).filter(Boolean);
+        const first = segments[0];
+        if (!first || !READONLY_SOURCE_ROOTS.has(first) || segments.includes('node_modules'))
+            return false;
+        return !containsHClassReference(operand.value) && !containsLClassReference(operand.value)
+            && !containsLockPathReference(operand.value)
+            && !isHClassPath(candidate, { root: resolveRoot() })
+            && !isLClassPath(candidate, { root: resolveRoot() });
+    });
+}
+/** A lock filename used as a query pattern is safe; an operand naming the
+ * actual lock path is still protected. */
+function containsLockPathReference(value) {
+    return /(?:^|[\\/])(?:[^\\/]*\.lock|EVOLCORE_RUNTIME_LOCK_DIR)(?:$|[\\/])/i.test(value)
+        || /^(?:[^\\/]*\.lock|EVOLCORE_RUNTIME_LOCK_DIR)$/i.test(value);
+}
 /**
  * 只读模式检查（用于 PreToolUse hook 和 canUseTool callback）。普通
  * 路径上的受限查询 Bash 可自动执行；H/L-class 和未建模 Shell 仍拒绝。
@@ -631,6 +676,13 @@ export function checkReadonly(toolName, input, projectPath, context) {
             managedTempDir,
             allowProtectedMetadata: context?.allowProtectedMetadata,
         });
+        const sourceDiagnosticAllowed = context?.allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics
+            && readonlySourceDiagnosticAllowed(protectedOperands.analysis, projectPath)
+            && !protectedOperands.lClass
+            && (!protectedOperands.hClass || (protectedOperands.lockDiagnostic && !protectedOperands.pathHClass));
+        if (sourceDiagnosticAllowed) {
+            return { behavior: 'allow' };
+        }
         if (protectedOperands.analysis.kind === 'proven-readonly'
             && !protectedOperands.hClass
             && !protectedOperands.lClass
@@ -929,7 +981,12 @@ export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
             managedTempDir: context?.managedTempDir,
             allowProtectedMetadata: context?.allowProtectedMetadata,
         });
-        if (protectedOperands.hClass) {
+        const sourceDiagnosticAllowed = context?.permissionMode === 'readonly'
+            && context.allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics === true
+            && readonlySourceDiagnosticAllowed(protectedOperands.analysis, context.projectPath ?? process.cwd())
+            && !protectedOperands.lClass
+            && (!protectedOperands.hClass || (protectedOperands.lockDiagnostic && !protectedOperands.pathHClass));
+        if (protectedOperands.hClass && !sourceDiagnosticAllowed) {
             logger.warn(`[H-Class Protection] 🔒 Protected filesystem operand in shell command: tool=${toolName} ` +
                 `session=${context?.sessionId} channel=${context?.channel} peer=${context?.peerId} role=${context?.role}`);
             return {
@@ -1398,6 +1455,8 @@ export function evaluateToolPreflight(toolName, input, context) {
         workspacePath: context.workspacePath,
         root: context.root,
         managedTempDir: context.managedTempDir,
+        permissionMode: context.permissionMode,
+        allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics: context.allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics,
         allowProtectedMetadata: context.allowProtectedMetadata,
     });
     if (hClass.behavior === 'deny') {

package/dist/index.js

@@ -227,18 +227,21 @@ export function resolvePersistedRestartDelivery(opts) {
         ? { valid: true, delivery: opts.delivery }
         : { valid: false };
 }
-function daemonConversationWatchdogMs(settings) {
+function daemonIdleTimeoutMs(settings) {
     const idleTimeoutSec = settings.idleMonitor?.timeout;
-    const idleMs = typeof idleTimeoutSec === 'number' && Number.isFinite(idleTimeoutSec) && idleTimeoutSec > 0
+    return typeof idleTimeoutSec === 'number' && Number.isFinite(idleTimeoutSec) && idleTimeoutSec > 0
         ? idleTimeoutSec * 1000
         : 120_000;
+}
+function daemonConversationWatchdogMs(settings) {
+    const idleMs = daemonIdleTimeoutMs(settings);
     return Math.ceil(idleMs * 5 + 60_000);
 }
 function daemonConversationTotalExecutionMs(settings) {
     const seconds = settings.idleMonitor?.maxExecutionTime;
     return typeof seconds === 'number' && Number.isFinite(seconds) && seconds > 0
         ? seconds * 1000
-        : 60 * 60 * 1000;
+        : undefined;
 }
 function originFromActorSession(session, authenticatedPeerId, authenticatedChannelKey, authenticatedChatType) {
     const peerId = authenticatedPeerId || session.metadata?.peerId;
@@ -1227,6 +1230,7 @@ async function main() {
     // 回填 messageQueue 引用
     cmdHandler.setMessageQueue(messageQueue);
     processor.setMessageQueue(messageQueue);
+    const handoffQueueTtlMs = daemonIdleTimeoutMs(globalSettings);
     const taskExecutionTtlMs = daemonConversationTotalExecutionMs(globalSettings);
     const handoffRuntime = new HandoffRuntime(sessionManager, messageQueue, async (handoff) => {
         const targetSession = await sessionManager.getSessionById(handoff.target_session_id);
@@ -1277,7 +1281,7 @@ async function main() {
                 })
                 : { ok: false, error: 'AUN channel does not support daemon private sends' };
         return { ok: result.ok, message_id: result.message_id, error: result.error };
-    }, undefined, { queueTtlMs: taskExecutionTtlMs });
+    }, undefined, { queueTtlMs: handoffQueueTtlMs });
     responseEngine.setHandoffRuntime(handoffRuntime);
     cmdHandler.setHandoffRuntime(handoffRuntime);
     // Trigger runtime: daemon-level script + feedback scheduler.

package/dist/ipc.js

@@ -1047,6 +1047,7 @@ export class IpcServer {
  * Query the running EvolCore daemon via Unix socket.
  * Returns null if the service is not running or the socket is unreachable.
  */
+/** Pass `null` as timeoutMs to wait without a client-side deadline. */
 export function ipcQuery(socketPath, cmd, timeoutMs = 3000) {
     let authenticatedCmd = cmd;
     if (!process.env.EVOLCORE_SESSION_ID
@@ -1067,10 +1068,12 @@ export function ipcQuery(socketPath, cmd, timeoutMs = 3000) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const conn = net.connect(socketPath);
         let buf = '';
-        const timer = setTimeout(() => {
-            conn.destroy();
-            resolve(null);
-        }, timeoutMs);
+        const timer = timeoutMs === null
+            ? undefined
+            : setTimeout(() => {
+                conn.destroy();
+                resolve(null);
+            }, timeoutMs);
         conn.on('connect', () => {
             conn.write(JSON.stringify(request) + '\n');
         });
@@ -1078,7 +1081,8 @@ export function ipcQuery(socketPath, cmd, timeoutMs = 3000) {
             buf += data.toString();
             const idx = buf.indexOf('\n');
             if (idx !== -1) {
-                clearTimeout(timer);
+                if (timer)
+                    clearTimeout(timer);
                 try {
                     resolve(JSON.parse(buf.slice(0, idx)));
                 }
@@ -1089,7 +1093,8 @@ export function ipcQuery(socketPath, cmd, timeoutMs = 3000) {
             }
         });
         conn.on('error', () => {
-            clearTimeout(timer);
+            if (timer)
+                clearTimeout(timer);
             resolve(null);
         });
     });

package/dist/paths.js

@@ -169,7 +169,24 @@ function resolveInstanceSocketPath(root) {
         const hash = crypto.createHash('sha1').update(root).digest('hex').slice(0, 12);
         return `\\\\.\\pipe\\${WINDOWS_PIPE_PREFIX}-${hash}`;
     }
-    return path.join(root, 'data', 'instance', INSTANCE_SOCKET_FILENAME);
+    const filesystemPath = path.join(root, 'data', 'instance', INSTANCE_SOCKET_FILENAME);
+    // Linux/macOS Unix-domain sockets have a small sockaddr path limit
+    // (typically 108 bytes on Linux). Long managed TMPDIR prefixes can make a
+    // perfectly valid EVOLCORE_HOME impossible to bind. Keep the fallback a
+    // normal filesystem socket whenever possible: the endpoint is passed to
+    // child processes through environment variables, which cannot contain NUL
+    // bytes. The short path remains inside the managed temporary directory and
+    // uses the runtime root hash for isolation.
+    if (Buffer.byteLength(filesystemPath) < 100)
+        return filesystemPath;
+    const hash = crypto.createHash('sha1').update(root).digest('hex').slice(0, 20);
+    const shortFilesystemPath = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `.ec-${hash.slice(0, 15)}.sock`);
+    if (Buffer.byteLength(shortFilesystemPath) < 100)
+        return shortFilesystemPath;
+    // This is only reachable when the managed temporary directory itself is
+    // unusually long. Node's in-process IPC can use the abstract namespace;
+    // callers that cross a process boundary must provide an encoded endpoint.
+    return `\0evolcore-${hash}`;
 }
 export function ensureDataDirs() {
     const p = resolvePaths();

package/dist/trigger/scheduler.js

@@ -1064,9 +1064,10 @@ export class TriggerRuntimeScheduler {
             && !!run.attemptId
             && typeof run.executionSessionId === 'string'
             && !!run.executionSessionId
-            && typeof run.executionDeadlineAt === 'number'
-            && Number.isFinite(run.executionDeadlineAt)
-            && run.executionDeadlineAt > Date.now()
+            && (run.executionDeadlineAt === undefined
+                || (typeof run.executionDeadlineAt === 'number'
+                    && Number.isFinite(run.executionDeadlineAt)
+                    && run.executionDeadlineAt > Date.now()))
             && run.definitionRevision === definitionRevision(definition);
     }
     async continueRecoveredRun(definition, runtime, session) {
@@ -1668,7 +1669,7 @@ export class TriggerRuntimeScheduler {
         return this.running.get(triggerId)?.has(runId) === true;
     }
     daemonExecutionDeadlineAt(startedAt) {
-        return this.daemonChannel.executionDeadlineAt?.(startedAt) ?? startedAt + 60 * 60 * 1_000;
+        return this.daemonChannel.executionDeadlineAt?.(startedAt);
     }
     clearTimer(triggerId) {
         const timer = this.timers.get(triggerId);