evolcore 0.0.12 → 0.0.14

package/dist/agents/ecagent-runner.js

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import { normalizePermissionMode } from '../core/permission/mode.js';
 import { checkDangerousCommand, checkReadonly, evaluateToolPreflight } from '../core/permission/tool-policy.js';
 import { logger } from '../utils/logger.js';
 import { summarizeToolInputForAudit } from '../utils/tool-summary.js';
+import { auditToolPreflightDenial } from '../core/auth/authorization-audit.js';
 import { resolveEcagentConfig } from './baseagent.js';
 import { buildModelRequestHeaders } from './request-identity.js';
 const PROVIDER_ID = 'evolcore-gateway';
@@ -959,6 +960,21 @@ export class EcagentRunner {
     async authorizeTool(sessionId, projectPath, mode, toolName, input) {
         const permissionContext = this.permissionContexts.get(sessionId);
         const recordBlockedOperation = async (policyCode, operationInput = input) => {
+            const summary = summarizeToolInputForAudit(toolName, operationInput).slice(0, 512);
+            auditToolPreflightDenial({
+                toolName,
+                policyCode,
+                reason: 'policy denied',
+                summary,
+                sessionId,
+                agentAid: permissionContext?.selfAid,
+                permissionMode: mode,
+                channel: permissionContext?.channel,
+                actorId: permissionContext?.userId,
+                role: permissionContext?.role,
+                selfAid: permissionContext?.selfAid,
+                taskId: permissionContext?.taskId,
+            });
             try {
                 await permissionContext?.recordExecutionAnomaly?.({
                     code: 'operation_blocked',
@@ -967,7 +983,10 @@ export class EcagentRunner {
                     occurredAt: Date.now(),
                     toolName,
                     policyCode,
-                    summary: summarizeToolInputForAudit(toolName, operationInput).slice(0, 512),
+                    decisionSource: 'policy',
+                    agentAid: permissionContext?.selfAid,
+                    permissionMode: mode,
+                    summary,
                     effect: 'operation_skipped',
                 });
             }
@@ -1003,7 +1022,7 @@ export class EcagentRunner {
                 sessionId, channel: permissionContext?.channel, peerId: permissionContext?.userId, role: permissionContext?.role,
             });
             if (decision.behavior === 'deny') {
-                await recordBlockedOperation('readonly_mode', checkedInput);
+                await recordBlockedOperation(decision.policyCode ?? 'readonly_mode', checkedInput);
                 return { block: true, reason: decision.message };
             }
             return {};

package/dist/agents/gemini-runner.js

@@ -279,11 +279,16 @@ export class GeminiRunner {
         const requestedPermissionMode = modelOverride?.permissionMode || this.currentMode;
         const permissionProfile = resolveGeminiPermissionProfile(requestedPermissionMode);
         const callModel = modelOverride?.model || this.model;
+        const runtimeDir = runtimeEnv?.EVOLCORE_SESSION_RUNTIME_DIR;
+        const managedTmpDir = runtimeDir ?? process.env.TMPDIR;
+        if (!managedTmpDir || !path.isAbsolute(managedTmpDir))
+            throw new Error('managed TMPDIR is unset or not absolute');
+        const runtimeLockDir = runtimeEnv?.EVOLCORE_RUNTIME_LOCK_DIR;
         const geminiHome = path.join(os.homedir(), '.gemini');
         fs.mkdirSync(geminiHome, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
         const sandboxProbe = buildBubblewrapCommand(this.resolved.cliPath, [], {
             projectPath,
-            writablePaths: [geminiHome],
+            writablePaths: [geminiHome, ...(runtimeDir ? [runtimeDir] : []), ...(runtimeLockDir ? [runtimeLockDir] : [])],
         });
         if (!sandboxProbe && workspaceContainsHClassPaths(projectPath)) {
             throw new Error('Gemini 缺少可用的路径级隔离运行时，且项目覆盖 EvolCore 受保护根；已拒绝启动本轮任务');
@@ -303,13 +308,13 @@ export class GeminiRunner {
             if (hasStandardGeminiAdminPolicy()) {
                 throw new Error('Gemini 系统级 admin policy 会忽略 EvolCore 的临时安全策略，已拒绝启动本轮任务');
             }
-            const policyPath = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `evolcore-gemini-permission-${crypto.randomUUID()}.toml`);
+            const policyPath = path.join(managedTmpDir, `evolcore-gemini-permission-${crypto.randomUUID()}.toml`);
             fs.writeFileSync(policyPath, buildGeminiAdminPolicy(permissionProfile), { mode: 0o600, flag: 'wx' });
             tempFiles.push(policyPath);
             args.push(...buildGeminiPermissionArgs(permissionProfile, policyPath, !!sandboxProbe));
         }
         if (images?.length) {
-            const tmpDir = os.tmpdir();
+            const tmpDir = managedTmpDir;
             const fileParts = [];
             for (let i = 0; i < images.length; i++) {
                 const img = images[i];
@@ -337,7 +342,7 @@ export class GeminiRunner {
         const env = this.buildAgentEnv(sessionId, runtimeEnv);
         const sandboxedCommand = buildBubblewrapCommand(this.resolved.cliPath, args, {
             projectPath,
-            writablePaths: [geminiHome],
+            writablePaths: [geminiHome, ...(runtimeDir ? [runtimeDir] : []), ...(runtimeLockDir ? [runtimeLockDir] : [])],
             readonlyPaths: tempFiles,
         });
         const child = spawn(sandboxedCommand?.command ?? this.resolved.cliPath, sandboxedCommand?.args ?? args, {

package/dist/aun/aid/control-aid.js

@@ -62,7 +62,8 @@ async function candidateExists(store, candidate) {
     throw new Error(`Gateway 不可达，无法查重控制 AID：${r.error?.message ?? 'unknown'}`);
 }
 /**
- * 生成控制 AID：循环候选 → candidateExists 查重（权威 PKI 判据）→ 不冲突则 aidCreate。
+ * 生成控制 AID：循环候选 → candidateExists 查重（权威 PKI 判据）→ 不冲突则 aidCreate；
+ * 查重通过但注册失败时也换候选重试，覆盖查重与注册之间的竞态。
  * - 查重走 GET 证书（见 candidateExists；不拉 agent.md，控制 AID 本就不传 agent.md）
  * - fail-fast：查重探测失败（网关不可达）立即抛错，不掩盖成"均冲突"
  * - agent.md 不上传：aidCreate 仅注册身份 + 写私钥，不调 agentmdPut
@@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ export async function generateControlAid(aidDomain) {
         ? resolveControlAidDomain()
         : normalizeAidDomain(aidDomain, 'aidDomain');
     const store = await getAidStore({ slotId: SLOT.cli });
+    let lastRegistrationError;
     try {
         for (let i = 0; i < MAX_ATTEMPTS; i++) {
             const candidate = candidateAid(finalAidDomain);
@@ -79,22 +81,43 @@ export async function generateControlAid(aidDomain) {
                 logger.info(`[control-aid] ${candidate} 已注册，重试 (${i + 1}/${MAX_ATTEMPTS})`);
                 continue;
             }
-            const created = await aidCreate(candidate);
-            // 清理 aidCreate 内部另开的 client/store——关闭失败不可丢弃已注册的 AID（否则下次 init
-            // 会把它当冲突，白白消耗一次重试）。close 异常降级为 warn。
             try {
-                await created.client?.close?.();
+                const created = await aidCreate(candidate);
+                // 清理 aidCreate 内部另开的 client/store——关闭失败不可丢弃已注册的 AID（否则下次 init
+                // 会把它当冲突，白白消耗一次重试）。close 异常降级为 warn。
+                try {
+                    await created.client?.close?.();
+                }
+                catch (e) {
+                    logger.warn(`[control-aid] client.close() 失败（非致命）: ${e}`);
+                }
+                try {
+                    await created.store?.close?.();
+                }
+                catch (e) {
+                    logger.warn(`[control-aid] store.close() 失败（非致命）: ${e}`);
+                }
+                return { aid: created.aid, gateway: created.gateway };
             }
             catch (e) {
-                logger.warn(`[control-aid] client.close() 失败（非致命）: ${e}`);
+                // 查重与实际注册之间存在 TOCTOU 竞态；注册接口也可能因服务端暂时失败而拒绝，
+                // 这些情况都换一个候选继续尝试。查重阶段的网关错误仍在 candidateExists 中 fail-fast。
+                lastRegistrationError = e;
+                const reason = e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e);
+                logger.warn(`[control-aid] ${candidate} 注册失败: ${reason}，重试 (${i + 1}/${MAX_ATTEMPTS})`);
             }
-            try {
-                await created.store?.close?.();
-            }
-            catch (e) {
-                logger.warn(`[control-aid] store.close() 失败（非致命）: ${e}`);
-            }
-            return { aid: created.aid, gateway: created.gateway };
+        }
+        if (lastRegistrationError !== undefined) {
+            const reason = lastRegistrationError instanceof Error
+                ? lastRegistrationError.message
+                : String(lastRegistrationError);
+            const error = new Error(`无法生成控制 AID：连续 ${MAX_ATTEMPTS} 次注册尝试失败；最后错误：${reason}`, {
+                cause: lastRegistrationError,
+            });
+            const code = lastRegistrationError?.code;
+            if (typeof code === 'string')
+                error.code = code;
+            throw error;
         }
         throw new Error(`无法生成控制 AID：连续 ${MAX_ATTEMPTS} 次候选均冲突`);
     }

package/dist/aun/aid/store.js

@@ -7,21 +7,27 @@ import { AUN_KEYSTORE_ENCRYPTION_SEED } from './encryption-seed-policy.js';
  * slotIsolationKey 取第一个分隔符（空格/'/'/':'）之前的部分作为隔离键，
  * 隔离键相同 = 共享消费通道（token / seq 游标 / 消息过滤）。
  *
- *   'evolcore daemon'   → 隔离键 'evolcore'   ┐
- *   'evolcore cli'      → 隔离键 'evolcore'   ├ 共享 evolcore 消费通道
- *   'evolcore netcheck' → 隔离键 'evolcore'   ┘
+ *   'evolcore daemon'   → 隔离键 'evolcore'
+ *   'evolcore-cli'      → 隔离键 'evolcore-cli'
+ *   'evolcore-netcheck' → 隔离键 'evolcore-netcheck'
+ *   'evolcore-group-rules' → 隔离键 'evolcore-group-rules'
  *   'evolcore-bench'    → 隔离键 'evolcore-bench'（连字符非分隔符）→ 独立通道
  *
  * 设计意图：
- *  - daemon 长连接 + cli 短连接共存于 evolcore 通道（1 长 + N 短，短连接不踢长连接）
- *  - netcheck 长连接抢 evolcore 长连接位 → 踢掉 daemon（用于踢人/extra_info 测试）
+ *  - daemon 保留历史 slot 值；slot_id 是网关上的消费游标身份，不可改名。
+ *  - CLI / ecweb 查询使用新的独立 slot，不能共享 daemon 的 token 或 seq 游标。
+ *  - netcheck 使用独立消费者，不得因诊断连接影响 daemon 的入站顺序。
+ *  - 群规则同步是短连接 RPC，也必须使用独立 slot，避免触碰 daemon 消费游标。
  *  - bench 各并发单元用 evolcore-bench-<N>，各自独立隔离键，互不干扰
  */
 export const SLOT = {
+    // Wire-compatibility contract: changing this creates a new gateway cursor
+    // and can replay retained history into the daemon.
     daemon: 'evolcore daemon',
-    cli: 'evolcore cli',
+    cli: 'evolcore-cli',
+    groupRules: 'evolcore-group-rules',
     bench: 'evolcore-bench',
-    netcheck: 'evolcore netcheck',
+    netcheck: 'evolcore-netcheck',
 };
 /** 加载身份失败时抛出，携带 SDK 的错误码与消息。 */
 export class AidLoadError extends Error {

package/dist/aun/group-fs-download.js

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+export class GroupFsDownloadError extends Error {
+    code;
+    constructor(code, message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.code = code;
+        this.name = 'GroupFsDownloadError';
+    }
+}
+/** Download a group file into memory through the ticket/data plane. */
+export async function downloadGroupFsBytes(client, path) {
+    const ticketValue = await client.call('group.fs.create_download_ticket', { path });
+    if (!isRecord(ticketValue)) {
+        throw new GroupFsDownloadError('INVALID_TICKET', 'group.fs.create_download_ticket returned invalid response');
+    }
+    const downloadUrl = stringField(ticketValue, ['download_url', 'url']);
+    if (!downloadUrl) {
+        throw new GroupFsDownloadError('MISSING_DOWNLOAD_URL', 'group.fs.create_download_ticket did not return download_url');
+    }
+    const bytes = await client.group.fs.lowlevel.httpGet(downloadUrl, bearerHeaders(client));
+    const expectedSha = stringField(ticketValue, ['sha256']);
+    if (expectedSha && sha256Hex(bytes).toLowerCase() !== expectedSha.toLowerCase()) {
+        throw new GroupFsDownloadError('HASH_MISMATCH', 'download hash verification failed');
+    }
+    return { bytes, ticket: ticketValue };
+}
+function isRecord(value) {
+    return value !== null && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+function stringField(value, keys) {
+    for (const key of keys) {
+        const field = value[key];
+        if (typeof field === 'string' && field.trim())
+            return field;
+    }
+    return undefined;
+}
+function sha256Hex(bytes) {
+    return createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex');
+}
+function bearerHeaders(client) {
+    const anyClient = client;
+    if (typeof anyClient.getAccessToken === 'function') {
+        const token = stringValue(anyClient.getAccessToken());
+        if (token)
+            return { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` };
+    }
+    const token = stringValue(anyClient.accessToken)
+        || stringValue(anyClient.access_token)
+        || stringValue(anyClient._identity?.access_token)
+        || stringValue(anyClient._sessionParams?.access_token);
+    return token ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } : undefined;
+}
+function stringValue(value) {
+    return value === undefined || value === null ? '' : String(value).trim();
+}

package/dist/aun/group-identity.js

@@ -5,6 +5,5 @@ export function isExplicitGroupId(value) {
     return (id.startsWith('group.') && id.includes('/'))
         || /^\d+\.[a-z0-9.-]+$/i.test(id)
         || /^grp_[a-z0-9_-]+$/i.test(id)
-        || /^g-[a-z0-9_-]+(?:[.@][a-z0-9.-]+)?$/i.test(id)
-        || /(?:^|\.)groupid\.pub$/i.test(id);
+        || /^g-[a-z0-9_-]+(?:[.@][a-z0-9.-]+)?$/i.test(id);
 }

package/dist/aun/msg/group.js

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import { ipcQuery } from '../../ipc.js';
 import { resolvePaths } from '../../paths.js';
 import { AGENT_DELEGATION_TOKEN_ENV } from '../../core/auth/agent-delegation.js';
 import { normalizeAunMentionEntries } from './mention-schema.js';
+import { downloadGroupFsBytes } from '../group-fs-download.js';
 function buildGroupPayload(body) {
     return body.mode === 'text' ? { type: 'text', text: body.text } : { ...body.payload };
 }
@@ -130,17 +131,18 @@ async function daemonGroupSendResult(args, payload, runtimeContext, result) {
             status: result.status,
         };
     }
-    if (!result.group_id || !result.message) {
+    const messageId = result.message_id
+        ?? (typeof result.message?.message_id === 'string' ? result.message.message_id : undefined);
+    if (!result.group_id || !messageId) {
         return { ok: false, error: 'daemon AUN group send returned no group message' };
     }
-    const messageId = result.message_id
-        ?? (typeof result.message.message_id === 'string' ? result.message.message_id : undefined);
     if (messageId && !result.log_written) {
         appendGroupSendOutboundLog(args, messageId, payload, runtimeContext, result.encrypt ?? resolveAunMessageEncrypt(args.encrypt));
     }
     return {
         ok: true,
         group_id: result.group_id || args.groupId,
+        message_id: messageId,
         message: result.message,
         event: result.event,
     };
@@ -1055,20 +1057,7 @@ async function uploadGroupRulesBytes(client, groupId, bytes) {
 }
 async function readGroupRulesBytes(client, groupId) {
     const remoteRef = `${groupId}:${GROUP_RULES_FILE_PATH}`;
-    const ticket = await client.call('group.fs.create_download_ticket', { path: remoteRef });
-    if (!isRecord(ticket)) {
-        throw new Error('group.fs.create_download_ticket returned invalid response');
-    }
-    const downloadUrl = stringField(ticket, ['download_url', 'url']);
-    if (!downloadUrl) {
-        throw new Error('group.fs.create_download_ticket did not return download_url');
-    }
-    const bytes = await client.group.fs.lowlevel.httpGet(downloadUrl, bearerHeaders(client));
-    const expectedSha = stringField(ticket, ['sha256']);
-    if (expectedSha && sha256Hex(bytes).toLowerCase() !== expectedSha.toLowerCase()) {
-        throw new Error('download hash verification failed');
-    }
-    return bytes;
+    return (await downloadGroupFsBytes(client, remoteRef)).bytes;
 }
 function decodeRulesText(bytes) {
     return new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(bytes);
@@ -1126,22 +1115,6 @@ function groupIndexEtagFromUpdate(result, groupId) {
 function sha256Hex(bytes) {
     return createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex');
 }
-function bearerHeaders(client) {
-    const token = accessTokenFromClient(client);
-    return token ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } : undefined;
-}
-function accessTokenFromClient(client) {
-    const anyClient = client;
-    if (typeof anyClient.getAccessToken === 'function') {
-        const token = stringValue(anyClient.getAccessToken());
-        if (token)
-            return token;
-    }
-    return stringValue(anyClient.accessToken)
-        || stringValue(anyClient.access_token)
-        || stringValue(anyClient._identity?.access_token)
-        || stringValue(anyClient._sessionParams?.access_token);
-}
 function stringField(obj, keys) {
     for (const key of keys) {
         const value = obj[key];
@@ -1189,6 +1162,11 @@ function rulesFileStatusFromError(error) {
     if (tagged)
         return tagged;
     const haystack = errorHaystack(error);
+    // A peer cache miss means signer discovery failed; it does not establish
+    // that the group's rules file is absent.
+    if (/peer\s+not\s+found\s+in\s+cache/i.test(haystack)) {
+        return 'unreadable';
+    }
     if (/(forbidden|unauthorized|permission|denied|no_permission|permission_denied|无权限|权限|拒绝|\b401\b|\b403\b)/i.test(haystack)) {
         return 'forbidden';
     }

package/dist/aun/msg/index.js

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 export { msgSend, msgPull, msgAck, msgRecall, msgOnline, } from './p2p.js';
 export { msgHistory, MAX_MSG_HISTORY_LIMIT } from './history.js';
 export { groupSend, groupPull, groupAck, groupCreate, groupInfo, groupList, groupUpdate, groupDissolve, groupSuspend, groupResume, groupJoin, groupLeave, groupInvite, groupKick, groupMembers, groupOnline, groupSetRole, groupTransferOwner, groupBan, groupUnban, groupBanlist, groupRules, groupUpdateRules, groupRulesFileGet, groupRulesFileSet, groupRulesFilePublish, } from './group.js';
-export { uploadFileAndBuildPayload } from './upload.js';
-export { inferPayloadType, isValidPayloadType } from './payload-type.js';
+export { uploadFileAndBuildPayload, inferPayloadType, isValidPayloadType } from './upload.js';