eslint-plugin-secure-coding 3.4.0 → 3.4.2

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (65) hide show
  1. package/README.md +4 -2
  2. package/package.json +5 -18
  3. package/src/index.d.ts +17 -23
  4. package/src/index.js +2 -131
  5. package/src/oxlint.d.ts +17 -20
  6. package/src/oxlint.js +0 -18
  7. package/src/rules/detect-non-literal-regexp/index.js +5 -79
  8. package/src/rules/detect-object-injection/index.js +2 -221
  9. package/src/rules/detect-weak-password-validation/index.js +0 -12
  10. package/src/rules/no-directive-injection/index.js +0 -33
  11. package/src/rules/no-electron-security-issues/index.js +0 -41
  12. package/src/rules/no-format-string-injection/index.js +0 -82
  13. package/src/rules/no-graphql-injection/index.js +8 -133
  14. package/src/rules/no-hardcoded-credentials/index.js +3 -297
  15. package/src/rules/no-hardcoded-session-tokens/index.js +0 -11
  16. package/src/rules/no-improper-sanitization/index.js +0 -44
  17. package/src/rules/no-improper-type-validation/index.js +1 -51
  18. package/src/rules/no-insecure-comparison/index.js +8 -47
  19. package/src/rules/no-ldap-injection/index.js +8 -61
  20. package/src/rules/no-missing-authentication/index.js +2 -56
  21. package/src/rules/no-pii-in-logs/index.js +0 -13
  22. package/src/rules/no-privilege-escalation/index.js +2 -49
  23. package/src/rules/no-redos-vulnerable-regex/index.js +3 -49
  24. package/src/rules/no-sensitive-data-exposure/index.js +5 -29
  25. package/src/rules/no-template-injection/index.js +0 -6
  26. package/src/rules/no-unchecked-loop-condition/index.js +3 -99
  27. package/src/rules/no-unlimited-resource-allocation/index.js +2 -75
  28. package/src/rules/no-unsafe-deserialization/index.js +1 -111
  29. package/src/rules/no-unsafe-regex-construction/index.js +22 -62
  30. package/src/rules/no-weak-password-recovery/index.js +0 -43
  31. package/src/rules/no-xpath-injection/index.js +13 -75
  32. package/src/rules/no-xxe-injection/index.js +1 -47
  33. package/src/rules/require-backend-authorization/index.js +0 -10
  34. package/src/rules/require-secure-defaults/index.js +0 -10
  35. package/src/types/index.js +0 -5
  36. package/AGENTS.md +0 -131
  37. package/CHANGELOG.md +0 -379
  38. package/src/rules/detect-non-literal-regexp/index.d.ts +0 -28
  39. package/src/rules/detect-object-injection/index.d.ts +0 -35
  40. package/src/rules/detect-weak-password-validation/index.d.ts +0 -12
  41. package/src/rules/no-directive-injection/index.d.ts +0 -38
  42. package/src/rules/no-electron-security-issues/index.d.ts +0 -36
  43. package/src/rules/no-format-string-injection/index.d.ts +0 -44
  44. package/src/rules/no-graphql-injection/index.d.ts +0 -47
  45. package/src/rules/no-hardcoded-credentials/index.d.ts +0 -95
  46. package/src/rules/no-hardcoded-session-tokens/index.d.ts +0 -12
  47. package/src/rules/no-improper-sanitization/index.d.ts +0 -38
  48. package/src/rules/no-improper-type-validation/index.d.ts +0 -36
  49. package/src/rules/no-insecure-comparison/index.d.ts +0 -26
  50. package/src/rules/no-ldap-injection/index.d.ts +0 -53
  51. package/src/rules/no-missing-authentication/index.d.ts +0 -32
  52. package/src/rules/no-pii-in-logs/index.d.ts +0 -12
  53. package/src/rules/no-privilege-escalation/index.d.ts +0 -32
  54. package/src/rules/no-redos-vulnerable-regex/index.d.ts +0 -28
  55. package/src/rules/no-sensitive-data-exposure/index.d.ts +0 -30
  56. package/src/rules/no-template-injection/index.d.ts +0 -23
  57. package/src/rules/no-unchecked-loop-condition/index.d.ts +0 -38
  58. package/src/rules/no-unlimited-resource-allocation/index.d.ts +0 -38
  59. package/src/rules/no-unsafe-deserialization/index.d.ts +0 -40
  60. package/src/rules/no-unsafe-regex-construction/index.d.ts +0 -30
  61. package/src/rules/no-weak-password-recovery/index.d.ts +0 -38
  62. package/src/rules/no-xpath-injection/index.d.ts +0 -39
  63. package/src/rules/no-xxe-injection/index.d.ts +0 -36
  64. package/src/rules/require-backend-authorization/index.d.ts +0 -12
  65. package/src/rules/require-secure-defaults/index.d.ts +0 -12
@@ -1,9 +1,4 @@
1
1
  "use strict";
2
- /**
3
- * Copyright (c) 2025 Ofri Peretz
4
- * Licensed under the MIT License. Use of this source code is governed by the
5
- * MIT license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
6
- */
7
2
  Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
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  exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = void 0;
9
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  const eslint_devkit_1 = require("@interlace/eslint-devkit");
@@ -148,7 +143,7 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  maxResourceSize: {
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  type: 'number',
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  minimum: 1024,
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- default: 1048576, // 1MB
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+ default: 1048576,
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  },
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  userInputVariables: {
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  type: 'array',
@@ -188,7 +183,7 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  },
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  defaultOptions: [
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  {
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- maxResourceSize: 1048576, // 1MB
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+ maxResourceSize: 1048576,
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  userInputVariables: ['req', 'request', 'body', 'query', 'params', 'input', 'data'],
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  safeResourceFunctions: ['validateSize', 'checkLimits', 'limitResource', 'safeAlloc'],
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  requireResourceValidation: true,
@@ -202,41 +197,26 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  const { maxResourceSize = 1048576, userInputVariables = ['req', 'request', 'body', 'query', 'params', 'input', 'data'], safeResourceFunctions = ['validateSize', 'checkLimits', 'limitResource', 'safeAlloc'], requireResourceValidation = true, trustedSanitizers = [], trustedAnnotations = [], strictMode = false, } = options;
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  const sourceCode = context.sourceCode;
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  const filename = context.filename;
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- // Create safety checker for false positive detection
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  const safetyChecker = (0, eslint_devkit_3.createSafetyChecker)({
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  trustedSanitizers,
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  trustedAnnotations,
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  trustedOrmPatterns: [],
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  strictMode,
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  });
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- /**
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- * Check if an expression contains user input - using shared utility
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- */
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  const isUserInput = (expression) => (0, eslint_devkit_3.isUserInputExpression)(expression, sourceCode, userInputVariables);
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- /**
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- * Check if resource allocation has size validation
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- */
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- // All call sites invoke this only after already confirming `args.length > 0`,
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- // so the "no arguments" case is unreachable and intentionally not handled here.
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  const hasSizeValidation = (node) => {
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  const args = node.arguments;
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- // Check if size argument is a validated expression
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  const sizeArg = args[0];
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  const sizeText = sourceCode.getText(sizeArg);
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- // Look for validation patterns
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  return sizeText.includes('Math.min(') ||
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  sizeText.includes('Math.max(') ||
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  sizeText.includes('Math.clamp(') ||
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  safeResourceFunctions.some(func => sizeText.includes(func));
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  };
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- /**
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- * Estimate resource size from static analysis
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- */
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  const estimateResourceSize = (sizeExpression) => {
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  if (sizeExpression.type === 'Literal' && typeof sizeExpression.value === 'number') {
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  return sizeExpression.value;
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  }
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- // Handle binary expressions like 1024 * 1024 * 100
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  if (sizeExpression.type === 'BinaryExpression') {
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  const left = estimateResourceSize(sizeExpression.left);
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  const right = estimateResourceSize(sizeExpression.right);
@@ -258,11 +238,9 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  return null;
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  };
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  return {
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- // Check Buffer allocation
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  CallExpression(node) {
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  const callee = node.callee;
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  const calleeText = sourceCode.getText(callee);
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- // Check for Buffer.alloc(), Buffer.allocUnsafe() or new Buffer()
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  const isBufferAlloc = callee.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
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  callee.object.type === 'Identifier' &&
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  callee.object.name === 'Buffer' &&
@@ -275,10 +253,6 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  const args = node.arguments;
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  if (args.length > 0) {
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  const sizeArg = args[0];
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- // Check if size comes from user input (but skip if validated).
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- // When `requireResourceValidation` is disabled, callers have opted
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- // out of the "must call a validator" requirement entirely, so this
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- // branch is skipped regardless of whether validation is present.
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  if (requireResourceValidation &&
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  sizeArg.type !== 'SpreadElement' &&
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  isUserInput(sizeArg) &&
@@ -296,7 +270,6 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  });
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  return;
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  }
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- // Check if size exceeds limits
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  const estimatedSize = sizeArg.type === 'SpreadElement' ? null : estimateResourceSize(sizeArg);
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  if (estimatedSize && estimatedSize > maxResourceSize) {
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  if (safetyChecker.isSafe(node, context)) {
@@ -312,29 +285,18 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  });
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  return;
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  }
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- // NOTE: a `missingResourceLimits` check previously lived here for
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- // "non-literal, user-input sizes with no validation" — but that
317
- // condition is a strict subset of the userControlledResourceSize
318
- // check above (same `isUserInput(sizeArg) && !hasSizeValidation(node)`
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- // predicate), which already reports and returns first. It was
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- // therefore unreachable dead code and has been removed
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- // (behavior-neutral: no observable path changes).
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  }
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  }
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- // Check for multer configuration without limits
325
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  if (callee.type === 'Identifier' && callee.name === 'multer') {
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  const args = node.arguments;
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  if (args.length > 0 && args[0].type === 'ObjectExpression') {
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  const props = args[0].properties;
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- // Check for valid limits definition
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  const hasValidLimits = props.some((prop) => {
331
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  if (prop.type !== 'Property' || prop.key.type !== 'Identifier') {
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  return false;
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  }
334
- // Direct fileSize (not standard but maybe used?)
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  if (prop.key.name === 'fileSize')
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  return true;
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- // Limits object
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  if (prop.key.name === 'limits' && prop.value.type === 'ObjectExpression') {
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  return prop.value.properties.some((limitProp) => limitProp.type === 'Property' &&
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  limitProp.key.type === 'Identifier' &&
@@ -358,7 +320,6 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  }
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  return;
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  }
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- // Check for fs operations
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  if (callee.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
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  callee.object.type === 'Identifier' &&
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  callee.object.name === 'fs' &&
@@ -366,23 +327,18 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  ['readFile', 'writeFile', 'readFileSync', 'writeFileSync'].includes(callee.property.name)) {
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  const args = node.arguments;
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  if (args.length > 0) {
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- // Check if file path comes from user input (potential for large files)
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  const pathArg = args[0];
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- // SAFE: Static path construction with path.join(__dirname, ...literals)
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- // This is a common pattern that doesn't involve user input
373
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  if (pathArg.type === 'CallExpression' &&
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  pathArg.callee.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
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  pathArg.callee.object.type === 'Identifier' &&
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  pathArg.callee.object.name === 'path' &&
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  pathArg.callee.property.type === 'Identifier' &&
378
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  (pathArg.callee.property.name === 'join' || pathArg.callee.property.name === 'resolve')) {
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- // Check if first arg is __dirname and all subsequent args are literals
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  const pathArgs = pathArg.arguments;
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  if (pathArgs.length > 0 &&
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  pathArgs[0].type === 'Identifier' &&
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  pathArgs[0].name === '__dirname' &&
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  pathArgs.slice(1).every(arg => arg.type === 'Literal')) {
385
- // Safe: path.join(__dirname, 'static', 'path')
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  return;
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  }
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  }
@@ -401,7 +357,6 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  }
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  }
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  }
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- // Check for Array constructor with user input
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  if (callee.type === 'Identifier' && callee.name === 'Array') {
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  const args = node.arguments;
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  if (args.length === 1) {
@@ -421,10 +376,7 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  }
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  }
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  }
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- // Check for complex resource exhaustion patterns
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- // ZIP bomb detection - unlimited decompression
426
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  if (calleeText.includes('unzipper') || calleeText.includes('Extract')) {
427
- // Check for unlimited ZIP extraction
428
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  context.report({
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  node,
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  messageId: 'unlimitedFileOperations',
@@ -434,7 +386,6 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  },
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  });
436
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  }
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- // XML expansion attack detection
438
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  if (calleeText.includes('xml2js') || calleeText.includes('parseString')) {
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  context.report({
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  node,
@@ -445,9 +396,7 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  },
446
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  });
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  }
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- // Check for cache with unlimited growth
449
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  if (calleeText.includes('set') && sourceCode.getText(node).includes('Buffer.alloc')) {
450
- // Detect cache patterns that allocate buffers without limits
451
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  const args = node.arguments;
452
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  if (args.length >= 2) {
453
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  const valueArg = args[1];
@@ -464,13 +413,11 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  }
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  }
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  }
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- // Check for recursive data structure processing
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  if (calleeText.includes('map') || calleeText.includes('forEach')) {
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  const args = node.arguments;
470
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  if (args.length > 0) {
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  const callbackArg = args[0];
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  const callbackText = sourceCode.getText(callbackArg);
473
- // Detect patterns that create arrays from nested object properties
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  if (callbackText.includes('Object.keys') && callbackText.includes('map')) {
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  context.report({
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  node,
@@ -483,37 +430,30 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  }
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  }
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  }
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- // Check for resource allocation inside loops
487
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  if ((0, eslint_devkit_3.isInsideLoop)(node)) {
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- // Check if this allocates resources
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  if (calleeText.includes('alloc') ||
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  calleeText.includes('Array') ||
491
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  calleeText.includes('Buffer') ||
492
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  calleeText.includes('readFile') ||
493
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  calleeText.includes('writeFile')) {
494
- // SAFE: Array.isArray / Array.from / Array.of are not allocation hazards.
495
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  if (calleeText === 'Array.isArray' ||
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  calleeText === 'Array.from' ||
497
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  calleeText === 'Array.of') {
498
- // Array.from / Array.of are fine; allocation comes from their args, not size
499
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  }
500
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  else {
501
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  if (safetyChecker.isSafe(node, context)) {
502
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  return;
503
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  }
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- // SAFE: first arg is a numeric literal — size is statically bounded.
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  const firstArg = node.arguments[0];
506
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  if (firstArg?.type === 'Literal' && typeof firstArg.value === 'number') {
507
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  return;
508
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  }
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- // Skip if this is an assignment to an array element (pre-allocated pattern)
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  const parent = node.parent;
511
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  if (parent && parent.type === 'AssignmentExpression' &&
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  parent.left.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
513
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  parent.left.object.type === 'Identifier') {
514
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  return;
515
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  }
516
- // Report resourceAllocationInLoop - this can be in addition to user input errors
517
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  context.report({
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  node,
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  messageId: 'resourceAllocationInLoop',
@@ -526,17 +466,12 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  }
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  }
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  },
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- // Check new expressions for resource allocation
530
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  NewExpression(node) {
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  const callee = node.callee;
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- // Check for new Buffer() with user input
533
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  if (callee.type === 'Identifier' && callee.name === 'Buffer') {
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  const args = node.arguments;
535
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  if (args.length > 0) {
536
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  const sizeArg = args[0];
537
- // Check if size comes from user input (but skip if validated).
538
- // Disabling `requireResourceValidation` opts out of this check
539
- // entirely, mirroring the CallExpression Buffer.alloc() branch.
540
475
  if (requireResourceValidation &&
541
476
  sizeArg.type !== 'SpreadElement' &&
542
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  isUserInput(sizeArg) &&
@@ -554,7 +489,6 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
554
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  });
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  return;
556
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  }
557
- // Check if size exceeds limits
558
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  const estimatedSize = sizeArg.type === 'SpreadElement' ? null : estimateResourceSize(sizeArg);
559
493
  if (estimatedSize && estimatedSize > maxResourceSize) {
560
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  if (safetyChecker.isSafe(node, context)) {
@@ -570,13 +504,8 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
570
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  });
571
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  return;
572
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  }
573
- // NOTE: same unreachable `missingResourceLimits` pattern as the
574
- // CallExpression Buffer.alloc handler above — removed for the
575
- // identical reason (subset of the userControlledResourceSize
576
- // check, which already reports and returns first).
577
507
  }
578
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  }
579
- // Check for new Array() with user input
580
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  if (callee.type === 'Identifier' && callee.name === 'Array') {
581
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  const args = node.arguments;
582
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  if (args.length === 1) {
@@ -596,7 +525,6 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
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  }
597
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  }
598
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  }
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- // Check for resource allocation inside loops
600
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  if ((0, eslint_devkit_3.isInsideLoop)(node)) {
601
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  const newCalleeText = sourceCode.getText(callee);
602
530
  if (newCalleeText.includes('Buffer') ||
@@ -606,7 +534,6 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
606
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  if (safetyChecker.isSafe(node, context)) {
607
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  return;
608
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  }
609
- // SAFE: first arg is a numeric literal — size is statically bounded.
610
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  const firstArg = node.arguments[0];
611
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  if (firstArg?.type === 'Literal' && typeof firstArg.value === 'number') {
612
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  return;
@@ -1,25 +1,10 @@
1
1
  "use strict";
2
- /**
3
- * Copyright (c) 2025 Ofri Peretz
4
- * Licensed under the MIT License. Use of this source code is governed by the
5
- * MIT license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
6
- */
7
2
  Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
8
3
  exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = void 0;
9
4
  const eslint_devkit_1 = require("@interlace/eslint-devkit");
10
5
  const eslint_devkit_2 = require("@interlace/eslint-devkit");
11
6
  const eslint_devkit_3 = require("@interlace/eslint-devkit");
12
- /**
13
- * Timer functions that double as an implied-`eval` sink — but only when the
14
- * first argument is a string. `setTimeout(fn, 0)` is a scheduler, not a
15
- * deserializer.
16
- */
17
7
  const TIMER_FUNCTIONS = new Set(['setTimeout', 'setInterval']);
18
- /**
19
- * True when the expression can only evaluate to a string, i.e. the argument
20
- * would actually be compiled by `setTimeout` / `setInterval`. A function
21
- * reference, an arrow function, or anything else is never implied-eval.
22
- */
23
8
  function isStringValued(arg) {
24
9
  if (!arg)
25
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  return false;
@@ -194,69 +179,40 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
194
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  const { dangerousFunctions = ['eval', 'Function', 'setTimeout', 'setInterval', 'unserialize', 'deserialize', 'parseUnsafe'], validationFunctions = ['validateInput', 'sanitizeData', 'checkSchema', 'validateSchema'], trustedSanitizers = [], trustedAnnotations = [], strictMode = false, } = options;
195
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  const sourceCode = context.sourceCode;
196
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  const filename = context.filename;
197
- // Create safety checker for false positive detection
198
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  const safetyChecker = (0, eslint_devkit_3.createSafetyChecker)({
199
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  trustedSanitizers,
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  trustedAnnotations,
201
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  trustedOrmPatterns: [],
202
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  strictMode,
203
187
  });
204
- // Track variables that have been validated/sanitized
205
188
  const validatedVariables = new Set();
206
- // Track variables that contain untrusted data
207
189
  const untrustedVariables = new Set();
208
- // Variables read from a literal-string file path (e.g. fs.readFileSync('config.json')).
209
- // These are still "untrusted" for eval/Function but safe for JSON.parse and other
210
- // schema-validating parsers because the file content is statically bundled.
211
190
  const literalPathFileVars = new Set();
212
- /**
213
- * Check if this is a dangerous deserialization function
214
- */
215
191
  const isDangerousDeserialization = (node) => {
216
192
  const callee = node.callee;
217
- // Check for dangerous function calls
218
193
  if (callee.type === 'Identifier' && dangerousFunctions.includes(callee.name)) {
219
- // `setTimeout` / `setInterval` are only a code-execution sink in their
220
- // implied-eval form — when the FIRST argument is a *string* that the
221
- // engine compiles. `setTimeout(callback, 1000)` is the ordinary timer
222
- // form and is not deserialization of anything.
223
- //
224
- // Without this gate the rule reported
225
- // `await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 1000))` at CVSS
226
- // 9.8 CRITICAL, because `resolve` is an enclosing arrow-function
227
- // parameter and every parameter is treated as untrusted input.
228
194
  if (TIMER_FUNCTIONS.has(callee.name)) {
229
195
  return isStringValued(node.arguments[0]);
230
196
  }
231
197
  return true;
232
198
  }
233
- // Check for member expressions like yaml.load, serialize.unserialize
234
199
  if (callee.type === 'MemberExpression') {
235
200
  const memberName = callee.property.type === 'Identifier' ? callee.property.name : '';
236
201
  const objectName = callee.object.type === 'Identifier' ? callee.object.name : '';
237
- // `super.deserialize(context)` / `this.deserialize(context)` is a class
238
- // *implementing* a (de)serialization protocol and chaining to its own
239
- // base implementation — webpack's serialization layer does this in
240
- // every Dependency subclass. The argument is the framework's own
241
- // context object, not attacker-controlled data.
242
202
  if (callee.object.type === 'Super' || callee.object.type === 'ThisExpression') {
243
203
  return false;
244
204
  }
245
- // Same implied-eval reasoning as above for `window.setTimeout(...)`.
246
205
  if (TIMER_FUNCTIONS.has(memberName)) {
247
206
  return isStringValued(node.arguments[0]);
248
207
  }
249
- // Check dangerous methods
250
208
  if (dangerousFunctions.includes(memberName)) {
251
209
  return true;
252
210
  }
253
- // Check dangerous libraries
254
211
  if (['yaml', 'js-yaml', 'node-serialize', 'serialize-javascript'].includes(objectName.toLowerCase()) &&
255
212
  ['load', 'parse', 'unserialize', 'deserialize'].includes(memberName)) {
256
213
  return true;
257
214
  }
258
215
  }
259
- // Check for require() calls with dangerous libraries
260
216
  if (callee.type === 'Identifier' && callee.name === 'require') {
261
217
  const args = node.arguments;
262
218
  if (args.length > 0 && args[0].type === 'Literal' && typeof args[0].value === 'string') {
@@ -268,21 +224,13 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
268
224
  }
269
225
  return false;
270
226
  };
271
- /**
272
- * Check if input comes from untrusted source
273
- */
274
227
  const isUntrustedInput = (inputNode) => {
275
- // Concatenations and template literals carry their operands' trust:
276
- // `setTimeout("alert(" + userCode + ")", 100)` is implied eval on
277
- // untrusted input even though the argument node itself is a
278
- // BinaryExpression rather than an Identifier.
279
228
  if (inputNode.type === 'BinaryExpression' && inputNode.operator === '+') {
280
229
  return isUntrustedInput(inputNode.left) || isUntrustedInput(inputNode.right);
281
230
  }
282
231
  if (inputNode.type === 'TemplateLiteral') {
283
232
  return inputNode.expressions.some((e) => isUntrustedInput(e));
284
233
  }
285
- // Check for MemberExpression patterns like req.body, req.query, etc.
286
234
  if (inputNode.type === 'MemberExpression') {
287
235
  if (inputNode.object.type === 'Identifier' && inputNode.object.name === 'req') {
288
236
  return true;
@@ -294,14 +242,9 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
294
242
  }
295
243
  }
296
244
  if (inputNode.type === 'Identifier') {
297
- // Check if this variable has been marked as untrusted
298
245
  if (untrustedVariables.has(inputNode.name)) {
299
246
  return true;
300
247
  }
301
- // Only consider variables untrusted if they actually come from req.* patterns
302
- // Don't flag generic variable names like 'input', 'data', etc.
303
- // unless they have been explicitly marked as untrusted
304
- // Check if it comes from function parameters (these are potentially untrusted)
305
248
  let current = inputNode;
306
249
  while (current) {
307
250
  if (current.type === 'FunctionDeclaration' ||
@@ -314,7 +257,7 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
314
257
  }
315
258
  return false;
316
259
  })) {
317
- return true; // Function parameters are untrusted
260
+ return true;
318
261
  }
319
262
  }
320
263
  current = current.parent;
@@ -322,9 +265,6 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
322
265
  }
323
266
  return false;
324
267
  };
325
- /**
326
- * Check if input has been validated
327
- */
328
268
  const isInputValidated = (inputNode) => {
329
269
  let current = inputNode;
330
270
  while (current) {
@@ -337,16 +277,11 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
337
277
  }
338
278
  return false;
339
279
  };
340
- /**
341
- * Check if this is a safe deserialization library
342
- */
343
- // oxlint-disable-next-line consistent-function-scoping
344
280
  const isSafeLibrary = (node) => {
345
281
  const callee = node.callee;
346
282
  if (callee.type === 'MemberExpression') {
347
283
  const objectName = callee.object.type === 'Identifier' ? callee.object.name : '';
348
284
  const memberName = callee.property.type === 'Identifier' ? callee.property.name : '';
349
- // Check for safe patterns
350
285
  if (objectName === 'JSON' && memberName === 'parse') {
351
286
  return true;
352
287
  }
@@ -356,23 +291,6 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
356
291
  }
357
292
  return false;
358
293
  };
359
- /**
360
- * True when the call sits inside a function that is itself named
361
- * `deserialize` / `unserialize` / `fromJSON` — i.e. the file is
362
- * *implementing* a (de)serialization protocol and delegating to the next
363
- * layer of it, which is what webpack's whole `lib/serialization` tree and
364
- * every `static deserialize(context)` factory does:
365
- *
366
- * static deserialize(context) {
367
- * const obj = new CssModule({ ... });
368
- * obj.deserialize(context); // ← not attacker-controlled
369
- * return obj;
370
- * }
371
- *
372
- * A rule that cannot see the protocol cannot judge it, and 33 of 35 corpus
373
- * findings were exactly this shape.
374
- */
375
- // oxlint-disable-next-line consistent-function-scoping
376
294
  const isInsideDeserializerImplementation = (node) => {
377
295
  const DESERIALIZER_NAMES = new Set(['deserialize', 'unserialize', 'fromJSON', 'fromBuffer']);
378
296
  let current = node.parent;
@@ -399,7 +317,6 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
399
317
  return false;
400
318
  };
401
319
  const checkCallExpression = (node) => {
402
- // 1. Check Function Constructor (NewExpression or CallExpression)
403
320
  if ((node.type === 'NewExpression' || node.type === 'CallExpression') &&
404
321
  node.callee.type === 'Identifier' &&
405
322
  node.callee.name === 'Function') {
@@ -421,24 +338,18 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
421
338
  return;
422
339
  }
423
340
  }
424
- // 2. Check CallExpressions (eval, unserialize, yaml, etc.)
425
341
  if (isDangerousDeserialization(node) && !isInsideDeserializerImplementation(node)) {
426
342
  const args = node.arguments;
427
343
  const hasUntrustedInput = args.some((arg) => isUntrustedInput(arg));
428
- // Check if explicit validation is present
429
344
  const isSafe = isSafeLibrary(node);
430
345
  if (!isSafe && hasUntrustedInput) {
431
- // Basic safety check
432
346
  const safe = safetyChecker.isSafe(node, context);
433
347
  if (!safe) {
434
- // Determine message ID
435
348
  let messageId = 'unsafeDeserialization';
436
- // Check specifically for YAML
437
349
  const calleeText = sourceCode.getText(node.callee);
438
350
  if (calleeText.includes('yaml') || calleeText.includes('YAML')) {
439
351
  messageId = 'unsafeYamlParsing';
440
352
  }
441
- // Check for generic dangerous functions
442
353
  if (node.callee.type === 'Identifier' && ['eval', 'setTimeout', 'setInterval'].includes(node.callee.name)) {
443
354
  messageId = 'dangerousEvalUsage';
444
355
  }
@@ -462,23 +373,18 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
462
373
  }
463
374
  }
464
375
  }
465
- // Check for untrusted input in potentially safe functions
466
376
  if (isSafeLibrary(node)) {
467
377
  const args = node.arguments;
468
378
  const hasUntrustedInput = args.some((arg) => {
469
- // Check if it's validated
470
379
  if (arg.type === 'Identifier' && validatedVariables.has(arg.name)) {
471
380
  return false;
472
381
  }
473
- // SAFE for JSON.parse/schema parsers: if the input came from a
474
- // literal-path file read (bundled config), it is not user-controlled.
475
382
  if (arg.type === 'Identifier' && literalPathFileVars.has(arg.name)) {
476
383
  return false;
477
384
  }
478
385
  return isUntrustedInput(arg) && !isInputValidated(arg);
479
386
  });
480
387
  if (hasUntrustedInput) {
481
- // Even JSON.parse can be unsafe if used on complex objects that get eval'd later
482
388
  if (safetyChecker.isSafe(node, context)) {
483
389
  return;
484
390
  }
@@ -500,15 +406,12 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
500
406
  }
501
407
  };
502
408
  return {
503
- // Track variable assignments from untrusted sources
504
409
  VariableDeclaration(node) {
505
410
  for (const declarator of node.declarations) {
506
411
  if (declarator.id.type === 'Identifier' && declarator.init) {
507
- // Check if the initializer comes from an untrusted source
508
412
  if (isUntrustedInput(declarator.init)) {
509
413
  untrustedVariables.add(declarator.id.name);
510
414
  }
511
- // Check if it's assigned from fs operations or other untrusted sources
512
415
  if (declarator.init.type === 'CallExpression') {
513
416
  const callee = declarator.init.callee;
514
417
  if (callee.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
@@ -517,8 +420,6 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
517
420
  callee.property.type === 'Identifier' &&
518
421
  ['readFile', 'readFileSync'].includes(callee.property.name)) {
519
422
  untrustedVariables.add(declarator.id.name);
520
- // Track whether the path is a literal — used downstream to skip
521
- // safe deserializers (JSON.parse) on known-static files.
522
423
  const pathArg = declarator.init.arguments[0];
523
424
  if (pathArg?.type === 'Literal' && typeof pathArg.value === 'string') {
524
425
  literalPathFileVars.add(declarator.id.name);
@@ -528,32 +429,27 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
528
429
  }
529
430
  }
530
431
  },
531
- // Track assignment expressions
532
432
  AssignmentExpression(node) {
533
433
  if (node.left.type === 'Identifier' && isUntrustedInput(node.right)) {
534
434
  untrustedVariables.add(node.left.name);
535
435
  }
536
436
  },
537
- // Check dangerous function calls
538
437
  CallExpression(node) {
539
438
  checkCallExpression(node);
540
439
  },
541
440
  NewExpression(node) {
542
441
  checkCallExpression(node);
543
442
  },
544
- // Check for dangerous require/import patterns
545
443
  VariableDeclarator(node) {
546
444
  if (!node.init) {
547
445
  return;
548
446
  }
549
- // Track variables assigned from validation functions
550
447
  if (node.id.type === 'Identifier' &&
551
448
  node.init.type === 'CallExpression' &&
552
449
  node.init.callee.type === 'Identifier' &&
553
450
  (validationFunctions.includes(node.init.callee.name) || trustedSanitizers.includes(node.init.callee.name))) {
554
451
  validatedVariables.add(node.id.name);
555
452
  }
556
- // Check for require/import of dangerous libraries
557
453
  if (node.init.type === 'CallExpression' &&
558
454
  node.init.callee.type === 'Identifier' &&
559
455
  node.init.callee.name === 'require') {
@@ -561,16 +457,11 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
561
457
  if (requireArg?.type === 'Literal' && typeof requireArg.value === 'string') {
562
458
  const moduleName = requireArg.value;
563
459
  if (['node-serialize', 'serialize-javascript', 'js-yaml', 'yaml'].includes(moduleName)) {
564
- // Check if this variable is used unsafely later
565
460
  if (node.id.type === 'Identifier') {
566
- // Look ahead to see if this library is used dangerously
567
- // This is a simplified check - in practice, we'd need more sophisticated analysis
568
461
  const variables = sourceCode.getDeclaredVariables(node);
569
462
  for (const variable of variables) {
570
463
  for (const reference of variable.references) {
571
464
  const refNode = reference.identifier;
572
- // Check if reference is part of a call to dangerous method
573
- // e.g. serialize.unserialize()
574
465
  if (refNode.parent && refNode.parent.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
575
466
  refNode.parent.object === refNode) {
576
467
  const memberExpr = refNode.parent;
@@ -578,7 +469,6 @@ exports.noUnsafeDeserialization = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
578
469
  if (['unserialize', 'deserialize', 'load', 'parse'].includes(propertyName)) {
579
470
  const callExpr = memberExpr.parent;
580
471
  if (callExpr && callExpr.type === 'CallExpression' && callExpr.callee === memberExpr) {
581
- // FALSE POSITIVE REDUCTION
582
472
  if (safetyChecker.isSafe(callExpr, context)) {
583
473
  continue;
584
474
  }