eslint-plugin-secure-coding 3.1.3 → 3.3.0

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Files changed (35) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +102 -0
  2. package/README.md +128 -65
  3. package/package.json +23 -4
  4. package/src/index.js +70 -12
  5. package/src/oxlint.d.ts +20 -0
  6. package/src/oxlint.js +21 -0
  7. package/src/rules/detect-non-literal-regexp/index.js +9 -1
  8. package/src/rules/detect-object-injection/index.js +344 -6
  9. package/src/rules/detect-weak-password-validation/index.js +4 -1
  10. package/src/rules/no-directive-injection/index.js +7 -4
  11. package/src/rules/no-electron-security-issues/index.js +6 -2
  12. package/src/rules/no-format-string-injection/index.js +32 -23
  13. package/src/rules/no-graphql-injection/index.js +8 -3
  14. package/src/rules/no-hardcoded-credentials/index.js +366 -52
  15. package/src/rules/no-hardcoded-session-tokens/index.js +3 -0
  16. package/src/rules/no-improper-sanitization/index.js +31 -4
  17. package/src/rules/no-improper-type-validation/index.js +6 -4
  18. package/src/rules/no-insecure-comparison/index.js +39 -3
  19. package/src/rules/no-ldap-injection/index.js +6 -3
  20. package/src/rules/no-missing-authentication/index.js +5 -2
  21. package/src/rules/no-pii-in-logs/index.js +4 -1
  22. package/src/rules/no-privilege-escalation/index.js +5 -2
  23. package/src/rules/no-redos-vulnerable-regex/index.js +79 -0
  24. package/src/rules/no-sensitive-data-exposure/index.js +4 -1
  25. package/src/rules/no-template-injection/index.d.ts +23 -0
  26. package/src/rules/no-template-injection/index.js +90 -0
  27. package/src/rules/no-unchecked-loop-condition/index.js +5 -3
  28. package/src/rules/no-unlimited-resource-allocation/index.js +46 -30
  29. package/src/rules/no-unsafe-deserialization/index.js +22 -5
  30. package/src/rules/no-unsafe-regex-construction/index.js +10 -3
  31. package/src/rules/no-weak-password-recovery/index.js +5 -3
  32. package/src/rules/no-xpath-injection/index.js +6 -3
  33. package/src/rules/no-xxe-injection/index.js +48 -46
  34. package/src/rules/require-backend-authorization/index.js +6 -3
  35. package/src/rules/require-secure-defaults/index.js +3 -0
@@ -13,9 +13,12 @@ exports.noInsecureComparison = (0, eslint_devkit_2.createRule)({
13
13
  meta: {
14
14
  type: 'problem',
15
15
  deprecated: true,
16
- replacedBy: ['@see eslint-plugin-crypto/no-timing-unsafe-compare'],
16
+ replacedBy: ['node-security/no-timing-unsafe-compare'],
17
17
  docs: {
18
+ url: 'https://github.com/ofri-peretz/eslint/blob/main/packages/eslint-plugin-secure-coding/docs/rules/no-insecure-comparison.md',
18
19
  description: 'Detects insecure comparison operators (==, !=) that can lead to type coercion vulnerabilities',
20
+ cwe: 'CWE-697',
21
+ cvss: 7.5,
19
22
  },
20
23
  fixable: 'code',
21
24
  hasSuggestions: true,
@@ -75,12 +78,40 @@ exports.noInsecureComparison = (0, eslint_devkit_2.createRule)({
75
78
  ],
76
79
  create(context, [options = {}]) {
77
80
  const { allowInTests = false, ignorePatterns = [], } = options;
78
- const filename = context.getFilename();
81
+ const filename = context.filename;
79
82
  const isTestFile = allowInTests && /\.(test|spec)\.(ts|tsx|js|jsx)$/.test(filename);
80
- const sourceCode = context.sourceCode || context.sourceCode;
83
+ const sourceCode = context.sourceCode;
84
+ // Codemods and AST-walker tools legitimately compare AST identifiers
85
+ // (`node.key === 'foo'`, `node.name === 'bar'`) — those keys aren't
86
+ // secrets, they're AST property names that happen to share the word
87
+ // "key". Detect codemod context once per file.
88
+ const AST_TOOL_PACKAGES = [
89
+ '@babel/types', '@babel/traverse', '@babel/generator', '@babel/parser',
90
+ 'recast', 'jscodeshift', 'estree-walker', 'unist-util-visit',
91
+ '@typescript-eslint/utils', '@typescript-eslint/typescript-estree',
92
+ 'typescript', 'ts-morph', 'eslint',
93
+ ];
94
+ const isCodemodFile = (() => {
95
+ if (/\/codemod[s]?\//i.test(filename))
96
+ return true;
97
+ if (/codemod\.[mc]?[jt]sx?$/i.test(filename))
98
+ return true;
99
+ // Look for AST-tool imports at the top of the file
100
+ const program = sourceCode.ast;
101
+ for (const stmt of program.body) {
102
+ if (stmt.type === 'ImportDeclaration') {
103
+ const source = stmt.source.value;
104
+ if (typeof source === 'string' && AST_TOOL_PACKAGES.some((p) => source === p || source.startsWith(p + '/'))) {
105
+ return true;
106
+ }
107
+ }
108
+ }
109
+ return false;
110
+ })();
81
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  /**
82
112
  * Check if a string matches any ignore pattern
83
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  */
114
+ // oxlint-disable-next-line consistent-function-scoping
84
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  function matchesIgnorePattern(text, patterns) {
85
116
  return patterns.some(pattern => {
86
117
  try {
@@ -100,6 +131,11 @@ exports.noInsecureComparison = (0, eslint_devkit_2.createRule)({
100
131
  if (isTestFile) {
101
132
  return;
102
133
  }
134
+ // Skip codemod / AST-walker contexts — `node.key === '...'` style
135
+ // comparisons there are AST identifier checks, not secret comparisons.
136
+ if (isCodemodFile) {
137
+ return;
138
+ }
103
139
  const secretKeywords = ['secret', 'token', 'password', 'apikey', 'api_key', 'signature', 'auth', 'key', 'hash', 'digest', 'mac'];
104
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  const isSecurityContext = (() => {
105
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  let current = node;
@@ -14,9 +14,10 @@ exports.noLdapInjection = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
14
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  meta: {
15
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  type: 'problem',
16
16
  docs: {
17
+ url: 'https://github.com/ofri-peretz/eslint/blob/main/packages/eslint-plugin-secure-coding/docs/rules/no-ldap-injection.md',
17
18
  description: 'Detects LDAP injection vulnerabilities',
19
+ cwe: 'CWE-90',
18
20
  },
19
- fixable: 'code',
20
21
  hasSuggestions: true,
21
22
  messages: {
22
23
  ldapInjection: (0, eslint_devkit_2.formatLLMMessage)({
@@ -158,8 +159,8 @@ exports.noLdapInjection = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
158
159
  create(context) {
159
160
  const options = context.options[0] || {};
160
161
  const { ldapFunctions = ['search', 'bind', 'modify', 'add', 'delete', 'compare', 'searchAsync'], ldapEscapeFunctions = ['escape.filterValue', 'escape.dnValue', 'filterEscape', 'dnEscape'], ldapValidationFunctions = ['validateLdapInput', 'sanitizeLdapFilter', 'cleanLdapValue', 'checkLdapFilter'], trustedSanitizers = [], trustedAnnotations = [], strictMode = false, } = options;
161
- const sourceCode = context.sourceCode || context.sourceCode;
162
- const filename = context.filename || context.filename;
162
+ const sourceCode = context.sourceCode;
163
+ const filename = context.filename;
163
164
  // Create safety checker for false positive detection
164
165
  const safetyChecker = (0, eslint_devkit_3.createSafetyChecker)({
165
166
  trustedSanitizers,
@@ -183,6 +184,7 @@ exports.noLdapInjection = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
183
184
  /**
184
185
  * Check if LDAP filter contains dangerous patterns
185
186
  */
187
+ // oxlint-disable-next-line consistent-function-scoping
186
188
  const containsDangerousLdapFilter = (filterText) => {
187
189
  // Dangerous LDAP filter patterns
188
190
  const dangerousPatterns = [
@@ -199,6 +201,7 @@ exports.noLdapInjection = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
199
201
  /**
200
202
  * Check if string contains LDAP filter interpolation
201
203
  */
204
+ // oxlint-disable-next-line consistent-function-scoping
202
205
  const containsLdapInterpolation = (text) => {
203
206
  return /\$\{[^}]+\}/.test(text) || /'[^']*\+[^+]*'/.test(text) || /"[^"]*\+[^+]*"/.test(text);
204
207
  };
@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ exports.noMissingAuthentication = (0, eslint_devkit_2.createRule)({
108
108
  meta: {
109
109
  type: 'problem',
110
110
  docs: {
111
+ url: 'https://github.com/ofri-peretz/eslint/blob/main/packages/eslint-plugin-secure-coding/docs/rules/no-missing-authentication.md',
111
112
  description: 'Detects missing authentication checks in route handlers',
113
+ cwe: 'CWE-287',
114
+ cvss: 9.5,
112
115
  },
113
116
  hasSuggestions: true,
114
117
  messages: {
@@ -178,10 +181,10 @@ exports.noMissingAuthentication = (0, eslint_devkit_2.createRule)({
178
181
  ],
179
182
  create(context, [options = {}]) {
180
183
  const { allowInTests = false, testFilePattern = '\\.(test|spec)\\.(ts|tsx|js|jsx)$', authMiddlewarePatterns = DEFAULT_AUTH_MIDDLEWARE_PATTERNS, routeHandlerPatterns = DEFAULT_ROUTE_HANDLER_PATTERNS, ignorePatterns = [], } = options;
181
- const filename = context.getFilename();
184
+ const filename = context.filename;
182
185
  const testFileRegex = new RegExp(testFilePattern);
183
186
  const isTestFile = allowInTests && testFileRegex.test(filename);
184
- const sourceCode = context.sourceCode || context.sourceCode;
187
+ const sourceCode = context.sourceCode;
185
188
  /**
186
189
  * Find variable declaration for an identifier
187
190
  */
@@ -15,9 +15,12 @@ const eslint_devkit_1 = require("@interlace/eslint-devkit");
15
15
  exports.noPiiInLogs = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
16
16
  name: 'no-pii-in-logs',
17
17
  meta: {
18
- type: 'problem',
18
+ type: 'suggestion',
19
19
  docs: {
20
+ url: 'https://github.com/ofri-peretz/eslint/blob/main/packages/eslint-plugin-secure-coding/docs/rules/no-pii-in-logs.md',
20
21
  description: 'Prevent PII (email, SSN, credit cards) in console logs',
22
+ cwe: 'CWE-359',
23
+ cvss: 7.5,
21
24
  },
22
25
  messages: {
23
26
  violationDetected: (0, eslint_devkit_1.formatLLMMessage)({
@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ exports.noPrivilegeEscalation = (0, eslint_devkit_2.createRule)({
108
108
  meta: {
109
109
  type: 'problem',
110
110
  docs: {
111
+ url: 'https://github.com/ofri-peretz/eslint/blob/main/packages/eslint-plugin-secure-coding/docs/rules/no-privilege-escalation.md',
111
112
  description: 'Detects potential privilege escalation vulnerabilities',
113
+ cwe: 'CWE-269',
114
+ cvss: 7.5,
112
115
  },
113
116
  hasSuggestions: true,
114
117
  messages: {
@@ -178,10 +181,10 @@ exports.noPrivilegeEscalation = (0, eslint_devkit_2.createRule)({
178
181
  ],
179
182
  create(context, [options = {}]) {
180
183
  const { allowInTests = false, testFilePattern = '\\.(test|spec)\\.(ts|tsx|js|jsx)$', roleCheckPatterns = DEFAULT_ROLE_CHECK_PATTERNS, userInputPatterns: additionalUserInputPatterns = [], ignorePatterns = [], } = options;
181
- const filename = context.getFilename();
184
+ const filename = context.filename;
182
185
  const testFileRegex = new RegExp(testFilePattern);
183
186
  const isTestFile = allowInTests && testFileRegex.test(filename);
184
- const sourceCode = context.sourceCode || context.sourceCode;
187
+ const sourceCode = context.sourceCode;
185
188
  // Combine default and additional user input patterns
186
189
  const userInputPatterns = [
187
190
  ...DEFAULT_USER_INPUT_PATTERNS,
@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
8
8
  exports.noRedosVulnerableRegex = void 0;
9
9
  const eslint_devkit_1 = require("@interlace/eslint-devkit");
10
10
  const eslint_devkit_2 = require("@interlace/eslint-devkit");
11
+ const regexpp_1 = require("@eslint-community/regexpp");
12
+ const scslre_1 = require("scslre");
13
+ // Module-level parser; cheap to reuse.
14
+ const REGEXPP_PARSER = new regexpp_1.RegExpParser();
11
15
  // Type guard for regex literal nodes
12
16
  const isRegExpLiteral = (node) => {
13
17
  return node.type === 'Literal' && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(node, 'regex');
@@ -127,7 +131,9 @@ exports.noRedosVulnerableRegex = (0, eslint_devkit_2.createRule)({
127
131
  meta: {
128
132
  type: 'problem',
129
133
  docs: {
134
+ url: 'https://github.com/ofri-peretz/eslint/blob/main/packages/eslint-plugin-secure-coding/docs/rules/no-redos-vulnerable-regex.md',
130
135
  description: 'Detects ReDoS-vulnerable regex patterns in literal regex patterns',
136
+ cwe: 'CWE-400',
131
137
  },
132
138
  hasSuggestions: true,
133
139
  messages: {
@@ -201,6 +207,43 @@ exports.noRedosVulnerableRegex = (0, eslint_devkit_2.createRule)({
201
207
  ],
202
208
  create(context, [options = {}]) {
203
209
  const { allowCommonPatterns = false, maxPatternLength = 500 } = options || {};
210
+ /**
211
+ * NFA-based ReDoS detection via scslre — the same library used by
212
+ * eslint-plugin-regexp. Catches patterns that the heuristic regex
213
+ * pattern matching can't see (cross-quantifier "trade" issues, deep
214
+ * nested loops, etc.). Heuristic detection runs as a fallback for
215
+ * cases where parsing fails or the pattern is exotic.
216
+ */
217
+ function checkWithScslre(node, pattern, flags) {
218
+ try {
219
+ const ast = REGEXPP_PARSER.parsePattern(pattern, 0, pattern.length, { unicode: flags.includes('u'), unicodeSets: flags.includes('v') });
220
+ const result = (0, scslre_1.analyse)({ pattern: ast, flags: { ignoreCase: flags.includes('i'), unicode: flags.includes('u'), dotAll: flags.includes('s'), multiline: flags.includes('m') } }, { reportTypes: { Move: false } });
221
+ if (result.reports.length === 0)
222
+ return false;
223
+ for (const report of result.reports) {
224
+ const isExp = report.exponential;
225
+ context.report({
226
+ node,
227
+ messageId: 'redosVulnerable',
228
+ data: {
229
+ vulnerabilityName: report.type === 'Self'
230
+ ? `Self-loop quantifier (${isExp ? 'exponential' : 'polynomial'} backtracking)`
231
+ : `Cross-quantifier trade (${isExp ? 'exponential' : 'polynomial'} backtracking)`,
232
+ description: report.type === 'Self'
233
+ ? `A quantifier reaches itself via the parent loop. An attacker can craft input that triggers ${isExp ? 'exponential' : 'polynomial'} backtracking.`
234
+ : `Two quantifiers can exchange characters, enabling ${isExp ? 'exponential' : 'polynomial'} backtracking on crafted input.`,
235
+ severity: isExp ? 'CRITICAL' : 'HIGH',
236
+ fix: 'Atomic group, possessive quantifier, or rewrite to eliminate the ambiguity. The scslre auto-suggested fix may be available.',
237
+ },
238
+ });
239
+ }
240
+ return true;
241
+ }
242
+ catch {
243
+ // Fall through to heuristic check
244
+ return false;
245
+ }
246
+ }
204
247
  /**
205
248
  * Check literal regex patterns for ReDoS vulnerabilities
206
249
  */
@@ -209,10 +252,15 @@ exports.noRedosVulnerableRegex = (0, eslint_devkit_2.createRule)({
209
252
  return;
210
253
  }
211
254
  const pattern = node.regex.pattern;
255
+ const flags = node.regex.flags || '';
212
256
  // Skip if pattern is too long (performance)
213
257
  if (pattern.length > maxPatternLength) {
214
258
  return;
215
259
  }
260
+ // NFA-based detection first — catches what heuristics miss.
261
+ if (checkWithScslre(node, pattern, flags)) {
262
+ return;
263
+ }
216
264
  const vulnerability = hasReDoSVulnerability(pattern);
217
265
  if (!vulnerability) {
218
266
  return;
@@ -265,6 +313,37 @@ exports.noRedosVulnerableRegex = (0, eslint_devkit_2.createRule)({
265
313
  return;
266
314
  }
267
315
  const firstArg = node.arguments[0];
316
+ // Template literal with interpolation — runtime-built pattern.
317
+ // Closes the audit FN where `new RegExp(\`^(\${pattern}+)+$\`)` was
318
+ // bypassing detection. We can't fully analyse the resulting regex
319
+ // (the interpolated parts are user-controlled), but we CAN detect
320
+ // the nested-quantifier signature `+)+`/`+)*`/`*)+`/`*)*` in the
321
+ // static template text — that shape is catastrophic regardless of
322
+ // what the interpolation injects. See benchmarks/AUDIT_PATTERNS.md
323
+ // §3.5 ("Runtime-built patterns").
324
+ if (firstArg.type === 'TemplateLiteral' && firstArg.expressions.length > 0) {
325
+ const concatenated = firstArg.quasis
326
+ .map((q) => q.value.cooked ?? q.value.raw)
327
+ .join(''); // sentinel between static parts
328
+ // Look for the nested-quantifier signature on either side of an
329
+ // interpolation: `+)+`, `+)*`, `*)+`, `*)*`, `})+` etc.
330
+ const hasNestedQuantifier = /[+*}](?:\)\s*[+*]|\)\s*\{\s*\d+\s*,?\s*\d*\s*\}|\s*[+*])/.test(concatenated) ||
331
+ /[+*].*\)[+*]/.test(concatenated) ||
332
+ /\([+*]\)[+*]/.test(concatenated);
333
+ if (hasNestedQuantifier) {
334
+ context.report({
335
+ node,
336
+ messageId: 'redosVulnerable',
337
+ data: {
338
+ vulnerabilityName: 'Runtime-built nested quantifier',
339
+ description: 'Template-literal pattern interpolation places user input inside a nested-quantifier shape (`(...+)+` / `(...*)*`); this is catastrophic regardless of what the interpolation injects.',
340
+ severity: 'HIGH',
341
+ fix: 'Avoid runtime-built nested quantifiers. Build the pattern at module load time and validate; or constrain the interpolated section to a non-quantifier region.',
342
+ },
343
+ });
344
+ }
345
+ return;
346
+ }
268
347
  if (firstArg.type !== 'Literal' || typeof firstArg.value !== 'string') {
269
348
  /* c8 ignore next */
270
349
  return;
@@ -30,9 +30,12 @@ function containsSensitiveData(text, patterns) {
30
30
  exports.noSensitiveDataExposure = (0, eslint_devkit_2.createRule)({
31
31
  name: 'no-sensitive-data-exposure',
32
32
  meta: {
33
- type: 'problem',
33
+ type: 'suggestion',
34
34
  docs: {
35
+ url: 'https://github.com/ofri-peretz/eslint/blob/main/packages/eslint-plugin-secure-coding/docs/rules/no-sensitive-data-exposure.md',
35
36
  description: 'Detects PII/credentials in logs, responses, or error messages',
37
+ cwe: 'CWE-532',
38
+ cvss: 7.5,
36
39
  },
37
40
  hasSuggestions: true,
38
41
  messages: {
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Copyright (c) 2025 Ofri Peretz
3
+ * Licensed under the MIT License.
4
+ */
5
+ /**
6
+ * ESLint Rule: no-template-injection
7
+ * CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code (Code Injection via Templates)
8
+ *
9
+ * Detects server-side template engine calls where the template argument is
10
+ * dynamic (not a string literal). An attacker who controls the template
11
+ * string can execute arbitrary server-side code.
12
+ *
13
+ * Detection: structural-api.
14
+ * Handlebars.compile(userInput) — fires (dynamic first arg)
15
+ * Handlebars.compile('<h1>{{t}}</h1>') — silent (string literal)
16
+ *
17
+ * Covered engines: Handlebars, EJS, Pug/Jade, Mustache, Nunjucks, Swig,
18
+ * Dust, doT, and their common aliases.
19
+ */
20
+ import type { TSESLint } from '@interlace/eslint-devkit';
21
+ export declare const noTemplateInjection: TSESLint.RuleModule<"templateInjection", [], unknown, TSESLint.RuleListener> & {
22
+ name: string;
23
+ };
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
1
+ "use strict";
2
+ /**
3
+ * Copyright (c) 2025 Ofri Peretz
4
+ * Licensed under the MIT License.
5
+ */
6
+ Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
7
+ exports.noTemplateInjection = void 0;
8
+ const eslint_devkit_1 = require("@interlace/eslint-devkit");
9
+ const TEMPLATE_COMPILE_METHODS = new Set([
10
+ 'compile', 'precompile', 'create', 'parse', 'template',
11
+ ]);
12
+ const TEMPLATE_RENDER_METHODS = new Set([
13
+ 'render', 'renderFile', 'renderString', 'renderToString', 'renderTemplate',
14
+ ]);
15
+ const ALL_TEMPLATE_METHODS = new Set([
16
+ ...TEMPLATE_COMPILE_METHODS,
17
+ ...TEMPLATE_RENDER_METHODS,
18
+ ]);
19
+ const TEMPLATE_ENGINE_OBJECTS = new Set([
20
+ 'Handlebars', 'handlebars',
21
+ 'ejs',
22
+ 'pug', 'jade',
23
+ 'mustache', 'Mustache',
24
+ 'nunjucks',
25
+ 'swig',
26
+ 'dust', 'Dust',
27
+ 'doT',
28
+ 'consolidate',
29
+ ]);
30
+ exports.noTemplateInjection = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
31
+ name: 'no-template-injection',
32
+ meta: {
33
+ type: 'problem',
34
+ docs: {
35
+ url: 'https://github.com/ofri-peretz/eslint/blob/main/packages/eslint-plugin-secure-coding/docs/rules/no-template-injection.md',
36
+ description: 'Disallow dynamic strings as template arguments to server-side template engines (CWE-94)',
37
+ cwe: 'CWE-94',
38
+ cvss: 9.1,
39
+ },
40
+ messages: {
41
+ templateInjection: (0, eslint_devkit_1.formatLLMMessage)({
42
+ icon: eslint_devkit_1.MessageIcons.SECURITY,
43
+ issueName: 'Template Injection (CWE-94)',
44
+ cwe: 'CWE-94',
45
+ description: '{{engine}}.{{method}}() receives a dynamic string. An attacker who controls the template can execute arbitrary server-side code.',
46
+ severity: 'CRITICAL',
47
+ fix: 'Pass only string literals as templates. If the template must vary, load it from a trusted file system path, never from user input.',
48
+ documentationLink: 'https://portswigger.net/web-security/server-side-template-injection',
49
+ }),
50
+ },
51
+ schema: [],
52
+ },
53
+ defaultOptions: [],
54
+ create(context) {
55
+ return {
56
+ CallExpression(node) {
57
+ const { callee, arguments: args } = node;
58
+ if (callee.type !== eslint_devkit_1.AST_NODE_TYPES.MemberExpression)
59
+ return;
60
+ const { object, property } = callee;
61
+ if (object.type !== eslint_devkit_1.AST_NODE_TYPES.Identifier)
62
+ return;
63
+ if (property.type !== eslint_devkit_1.AST_NODE_TYPES.Identifier)
64
+ return;
65
+ const engineName = object.name;
66
+ const methodName = property.name;
67
+ if (!TEMPLATE_ENGINE_OBJECTS.has(engineName))
68
+ return;
69
+ if (!ALL_TEMPLATE_METHODS.has(methodName))
70
+ return;
71
+ const firstArg = args[0];
72
+ if (!firstArg)
73
+ return;
74
+ // String literal → safe (static template, no injection surface)
75
+ if (firstArg.type === eslint_devkit_1.AST_NODE_TYPES.Literal &&
76
+ typeof firstArg.value === 'string')
77
+ return;
78
+ // Template literal with NO expressions → safe (equivalent to a string literal)
79
+ if (firstArg.type === eslint_devkit_1.AST_NODE_TYPES.TemplateLiteral &&
80
+ firstArg.expressions.length === 0)
81
+ return;
82
+ context.report({
83
+ node: firstArg,
84
+ messageId: 'templateInjection',
85
+ data: { engine: engineName, method: methodName },
86
+ });
87
+ },
88
+ };
89
+ },
90
+ });
@@ -14,9 +14,10 @@ exports.noUncheckedLoopCondition = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
14
14
  meta: {
15
15
  type: 'problem',
16
16
  docs: {
17
+ url: 'https://github.com/ofri-peretz/eslint/blob/main/packages/eslint-plugin-secure-coding/docs/rules/no-unchecked-loop-condition.md',
17
18
  description: 'Detects unchecked loop conditions that could cause DoS',
19
+ cwe: 'CWE-400',
18
20
  },
19
- fixable: 'code',
20
21
  hasSuggestions: true,
21
22
  messages: {
22
23
  uncheckedLoopCondition: (0, eslint_devkit_2.formatLLMMessage)({
@@ -141,8 +142,8 @@ exports.noUncheckedLoopCondition = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
141
142
  create(context) {
142
143
  const options = context.options[0] || {};
143
144
  const { maxStaticIterations = 10000, userInputVariables = ['req', 'request', 'body', 'query', 'params', 'input', 'data'], allowWhileTrueWithBreak = true, maxRecursionDepth = 10, trustedSanitizers = [], trustedAnnotations = [], strictMode = false, } = options;
144
- const sourceCode = context.sourceCode || context.sourceCode;
145
- const filename = context.filename || context.getFilename();
145
+ const sourceCode = context.sourceCode;
146
+ const filename = context.filename;
146
147
  // Create safety checker for false positive detection
147
148
  const safetyChecker = (0, eslint_devkit_3.createSafetyChecker)({
148
149
  trustedSanitizers,
@@ -322,6 +323,7 @@ exports.noUncheckedLoopCondition = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
322
323
  /**
323
324
  * Estimate loop iterations from static analysis
324
325
  */
326
+ // oxlint-disable-next-line consistent-function-scoping
325
327
  const estimateIterations = (loop) => {
326
328
  if (loop.type === 'ForStatement') {
327
329
  // Try to parse for loop bounds
@@ -14,9 +14,10 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
14
14
  meta: {
15
15
  type: 'problem',
16
16
  docs: {
17
+ url: 'https://github.com/ofri-peretz/eslint/blob/main/packages/eslint-plugin-secure-coding/docs/rules/no-unlimited-resource-allocation.md',
17
18
  description: 'Detects unlimited resource allocation that could cause DoS',
19
+ cwe: 'CWE-770',
18
20
  },
19
- fixable: 'code',
20
21
  hasSuggestions: true,
21
22
  messages: {
22
23
  unlimitedResourceAllocation: (0, eslint_devkit_2.formatLLMMessage)({
@@ -199,8 +200,8 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
199
200
  create(context) {
200
201
  const options = context.options[0] || {};
201
202
  const { maxResourceSize = 1048576, userInputVariables = ['req', 'request', 'body', 'query', 'params', 'input', 'data'], safeResourceFunctions = ['validateSize', 'checkLimits', 'limitResource', 'safeAlloc'], requireResourceValidation = true, trustedSanitizers = [], trustedAnnotations = [], strictMode = false, } = options;
202
- const sourceCode = context.sourceCode || context.sourceCode;
203
- const filename = context.filename || context.getFilename();
203
+ const sourceCode = context.sourceCode;
204
+ const filename = context.filename;
204
205
  // Create safety checker for false positive detection
205
206
  const safetyChecker = (0, eslint_devkit_3.createSafetyChecker)({
206
207
  trustedSanitizers,
@@ -502,35 +503,46 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
502
503
  /* c8 ignore stop */
503
504
  // Check for resource allocation inside loops
504
505
  if ((0, eslint_devkit_3.isInsideLoop)(node)) {
505
- const calleeText = sourceCode.getText(callee);
506
506
  // Check if this allocates resources
507
507
  if (calleeText.includes('alloc') ||
508
508
  calleeText.includes('Array') ||
509
509
  calleeText.includes('Buffer') ||
510
510
  calleeText.includes('readFile') ||
511
511
  calleeText.includes('writeFile')) {
512
- /* c8 ignore start -- safetyChecker requires JSDoc annotations not testable via RuleTester */
513
- if (safetyChecker.isSafe(node, context)) {
514
- return;
512
+ // SAFE: Array.isArray / Array.from / Array.of are not allocation hazards.
513
+ if (calleeText === 'Array.isArray' ||
514
+ calleeText === 'Array.from' ||
515
+ calleeText === 'Array.of') {
516
+ // Array.from / Array.of are fine; allocation comes from their args, not size
515
517
  }
516
- /* c8 ignore stop */
517
- // Skip if this is an assignment to an array element (pre-allocated pattern)
518
- const parent = node.parent;
519
- if (parent && parent.type === 'AssignmentExpression' &&
520
- parent.left.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
521
- parent.left.object.type === 'Identifier') {
522
- // This is assigning to an array element, likely pre-allocated
523
- return;
518
+ else {
519
+ /* c8 ignore start -- safetyChecker requires JSDoc annotations not testable via RuleTester */
520
+ if (safetyChecker.isSafe(node, context)) {
521
+ return;
522
+ }
523
+ /* c8 ignore stop */
524
+ // SAFE: first arg is a numeric literal — size is statically bounded.
525
+ const firstArg = node.arguments[0];
526
+ if (firstArg?.type === 'Literal' && typeof firstArg.value === 'number') {
527
+ return;
528
+ }
529
+ // Skip if this is an assignment to an array element (pre-allocated pattern)
530
+ const parent = node.parent;
531
+ if (parent && parent.type === 'AssignmentExpression' &&
532
+ parent.left.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
533
+ parent.left.object.type === 'Identifier') {
534
+ return;
535
+ }
536
+ // Report resourceAllocationInLoop - this can be in addition to user input errors
537
+ context.report({
538
+ node,
539
+ messageId: 'resourceAllocationInLoop',
540
+ data: {
541
+ filePath: filename,
542
+ line: String(node.loc?.start.line ?? 0),
543
+ },
544
+ });
524
545
  }
525
- // Report resourceAllocationInLoop - this can be in addition to user input errors
526
- context.report({
527
- node,
528
- messageId: 'resourceAllocationInLoop',
529
- data: {
530
- filePath: filename,
531
- line: String(node.loc?.start.line ?? 0),
532
- },
533
- });
534
546
  }
535
547
  }
536
548
  },
@@ -621,17 +633,21 @@ exports.noUnlimitedResourceAllocation = (0, eslint_devkit_1.createRule)({
621
633
  }
622
634
  // Check for resource allocation inside loops
623
635
  if ((0, eslint_devkit_3.isInsideLoop)(node)) {
624
- const calleeText = sourceCode.getText(callee);
625
- // Check if this allocates resources
626
- if (calleeText.includes('Buffer') ||
627
- calleeText.includes('Array') ||
628
- calleeText.includes('Map') ||
629
- calleeText.includes('Set')) {
636
+ const newCalleeText = sourceCode.getText(callee);
637
+ if (newCalleeText.includes('Buffer') ||
638
+ newCalleeText.includes('Array') ||
639
+ newCalleeText.includes('Map') ||
640
+ newCalleeText.includes('Set')) {
630
641
  /* c8 ignore start -- safetyChecker requires JSDoc annotations not testable via RuleTester */
631
642
  if (safetyChecker.isSafe(node, context)) {
632
643
  return;
633
644
  }
634
645
  /* c8 ignore stop */
646
+ // SAFE: first arg is a numeric literal — size is statically bounded.
647
+ const firstArg = node.arguments[0];
648
+ if (firstArg?.type === 'Literal' && typeof firstArg.value === 'number') {
649
+ return;
650
+ }
635
651
  context.report({
636
652
  node,
637
653
  messageId: 'resourceAllocationInLoop',