eslint-plugin-sdl-2 1.0.4

package/docs/rules/no-postmessage-star-origin.md

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+# no-postmessage-star-origin
+
+Disallow wildcard target origins in `postMessage` calls.
+
+## Targeted pattern scope
+
+This rule targets `window.postMessage(...)` style calls where the target origin
+argument is `"*"`.
+
+## What this rule reports
+
+This rule reports message sends that do not restrict target origin to a known
+trusted origin.
+
+## Why this rule exists
+
+Using `"*"` can expose sensitive messages to unintended or attacker-controlled
+origins.
+
+## ❌ Incorrect
+
+```ts
+otherWindow.postMessage({ token }, "*");
+```
+
+## ✅ Correct
+
+```ts
+otherWindow.postMessage({ token }, "https://example.com");
+```
+
+## ESLint flat config example
+
+```ts
+import sdl from "eslint-plugin-sdl-2";
+
+export default [
+ {
+  plugins: { sdl },
+  rules: {
+   "sdl/no-postmessage-star-origin": "error",
+  },
+ },
+];
+```
+
+## When not to use it
+
+Disable only in controlled test harnesses where wildcard messaging is required.
+
+## Package documentation
+
+- [Rule source](../../src/rules/no-postmessage-star-origin.ts)
+
+## Further reading
+
+> **Rule catalog ID:** R024
+
+- [MDN: `Window.postMessage` security concerns](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window/postMessage#security_concerns)

package/docs/rules/no-postmessage-without-origin-allowlist.md

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+# no-postmessage-without-origin-allowlist
+
+Require explicit allowlisted origins for `postMessage` targetOrigin values.
+
+## Targeted pattern scope
+
+`postMessage` calls without strict explicit target-origin allowlists.
+
+## What this rule reports
+
+`postMessage` targetOrigin values that are wildcard or non-literal/dynamic.
+
+## Why this rule exists
+
+Weak targetOrigin control can expose cross-origin data or command channels to malicious frames.
+
+## ❌ Incorrect
+
+```ts
+target.postMessage(data, "*");
+```
+
+## ✅ Correct
+
+```ts
+target.postMessage(data, "https://example.com");
+```
+
+## ESLint flat config example
+
+```ts
+import sdl from "eslint-plugin-sdl-2";
+
+export default [
+ {
+  plugins: { sdl },
+
+  rules: {
+   "sdl/no-postmessage-without-origin-allowlist": "error",
+  },
+ },
+];
+```
+
+## When not to use it
+
+Disable only if the target origin is validated by a reviewed helper abstraction or a controlled embedding environment.
+
+## Package documentation
+
+- [Rule source](../../src/rules/no-postmessage-without-origin-allowlist.ts)
+
+## Further reading
+
+> **Rule catalog ID:** R044
+
+- [OWASP Top 10: Injection](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)
+
+- [OWASP Top 10: Security Misconfiguration](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)

package/docs/rules/no-range-create-contextual-fragment.md

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+# no-range-create-contextual-fragment
+
+Disallow `Range.createContextualFragment(...)` on unsanitized HTML input.
+
+## Targeted pattern scope
+
+This rule targets `range.createContextualFragment(html)` calls when the HTML
+argument is not sanitized first.
+
+## What this rule reports
+
+This rule reports `Range.createContextualFragment(...)` calls whose first
+argument is raw HTML instead of the output of a reviewed sanitizer or Trusted
+Types-producing helper.
+
+## Why this rule exists
+
+`Range.createContextualFragment(...)` parses HTML strings into live DOM
+fragments. Passing unsanitized markup into that parser recreates the same XSS
+and DOM injection problems that appear with other HTML sink APIs.
+
+## ❌ Incorrect
+
+```ts
+range.createContextualFragment(userHtml);
+```
+
+## ✅ Correct
+
+```ts
+range.createContextualFragment(sanitize(userHtml));
+```
+
+## ESLint flat config example
+
+```ts
+import sdl from "eslint-plugin-sdl-2";
+
+export default [
+ {
+  plugins: { sdl },
+  rules: {
+   "sdl/no-range-create-contextual-fragment": "error",
+  },
+ },
+];
+```
+
+## When not to use it
+
+Disable only if your HTML input has already passed through a reviewed sanitizer
+or Trusted Types pipeline that this rule cannot recognize.
+
+## Package documentation
+
+- [Rule source](../../src/rules/no-range-create-contextual-fragment.ts)
+
+## Further reading
+
+> **Rule catalog ID:** R054
+
+- [MDN: `Range.createContextualFragment()`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Range/createContextualFragment)
+- [Trusted Types](https://web.dev/trusted-types/)
+- [OWASP Cross Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://owasp.org/www-community/xss-prevention)

package/docs/rules/no-script-src-data-url.md

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+---
+title: no-script-src-data-url
+---
+
+# no-script-src-data-url
+
+Disallow `HTMLScriptElement.src` values that use `data:` URLs.
+
+## Targeted pattern scope
+
+This rule targets static `data:` URLs assigned to script `src` sinks such as
+`script.src = ...`, `script.setAttribute("src", ...)`, and JSX
+`<script src=...>`.
+
+## What this rule reports
+
+This rule reports `data:` URLs only when they are written into script-loading
+sinks. It does not report non-script uses such as `img.src = "data:..."`.
+
+## Why this rule exists
+
+A `data:` URL in a script-loading sink embeds executable code directly in the
+URL itself. That bypasses the usual reviewed external-script loading path and
+makes it easier to smuggle code through values that look like plain strings.
+
+## ❌ Incorrect
+
+```ts
+const script = document.createElement("script");
+script.src = "data:text/javascript,alert('owned')";
+```
+
+```tsx
+const loader = <script src="data:text/javascript,bootstrap()" />;
+```
+
+## ✅ Correct
+
+```ts
+const script = document.createElement("script");
+script.src = "https://cdn.example.com/app.js";
+```
+
+```ts
+const image = new Image();
+image.src = "";
+```
+
+## Behavior and migration notes
+
+This rule intentionally focuses on script `src` sinks and does not attempt to
+analyze other executable loading surfaces such as workers.
+
+## ESLint flat config example
+
+```ts
+import sdl from "eslint-plugin-sdl-2";
+
+export default [
+ {
+  plugins: { sdl },
+  rules: {
+   "sdl/no-script-src-data-url": "error",
+  },
+ },
+];
+```
+
+## When not to use it
+
+If your codebase intentionally relies on `data:` script URLs and that behavior
+is acceptable in your threat model, this rule may be too strict.
+
+## Package documentation
+
+- [Rule source](../../src/rules/no-script-src-data-url.ts)
+
+## Further reading
+
+> **Rule catalog ID:** R063
+
+- [MDN: `HTMLScriptElement.src`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/HTMLScriptElement/src)
+- [MDN: `data:` URLs](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/URI/Reference/Schemes/data)

package/docs/rules/no-script-text.md

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+# no-script-text
+
+Disallow assigning executable code through `<script>` text sinks.
+
+## Targeted pattern scope
+
+This rule targets assignments to the following `HTMLScriptElement` properties:
+
+- `script.text = ...`
+- `script.textContent = ...`
+- `script.innerText = ...`
+
+The rule uses type information when available and otherwise falls back to narrow
+syntax heuristics such as `document.createElement("script")` or identifiers like
+`scriptElement`.
+
+## What this rule reports
+
+This rule reports non-empty assignments that inject code directly into script
+text sinks.
+
+## Why this rule exists
+
+Writing source code directly into a `<script>` element turns data flow into code
+execution. That creates an obvious XSS/code-injection sink and bypasses safer
+patterns such as loading reviewed static modules or script URLs.
+
+## ❌ Incorrect
+
+```ts
+const scriptElement = document.createElement("script");
+scriptElement.textContent = userCode;
+```
+
+## ✅ Correct
+
+```ts
+const scriptElement = document.createElement("script");
+scriptElement.src = "/assets/app.js";
+```
+
+## Behavior and migration notes
+
+This rule allows empty-string resets such as `script.text = ""`.
+
+It intentionally does not autofix because there is no universally safe rewrite
+for executable inline script injection.
+
+## ESLint flat config example
+
+```ts
+import sdl from "eslint-plugin-sdl-2";
+
+export default [
+ {
+  plugins: { sdl },
+  rules: {
+   "sdl/no-script-text": "error",
+  },
+ },
+];
+```
+
+## When not to use it
+
+Disable only if your application intentionally emits inline script bodies,
+those script bodies are tightly controlled, and the surrounding trust boundary
+is reviewed outside this rule.
+
+## Package documentation
+
+- [Rule source](../../src/rules/no-script-text.ts)
+
+## Further reading
+
+> **Rule catalog ID:** R057
+
+- [MDN: `HTMLScriptElement.textContent`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/HTMLScriptElement/textContent)
+- [MDN: `HTMLScriptElement.text`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/HTMLScriptElement/text)
+- [Trusted Types API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Trusted_Types_API)

package/docs/rules/no-service-worker-unsafe-script-url.md

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+---
+title: no-service-worker-unsafe-script-url
+---
+
+# no-service-worker-unsafe-script-url
+
+Disallow unsafe service worker script URLs such as `data:`, `blob:`, `javascript:`, and direct `URL.createObjectURL(...)` registrations.
+
+## Targeted pattern scope
+
+This rule targets `navigator.serviceWorker.register(...)` when the script URL is
+one of the following direct expressions:
+
+- a static `data:` URL
+- a static `blob:` URL
+- a static `javascript:` URL
+- a direct `URL.createObjectURL(...)` call
+
+The rule also covers `window.navigator`, `self.navigator`, and
+`globalThis.navigator` access forms.
+
+## What this rule reports
+
+This rule reports direct unsafe service worker registration URLs only. Indirect
+variables and broader registration policies are out of scope.
+
+## Why this rule exists
+
+`ServiceWorkerContainer.register()` is an executable script-loading sink. Using
+non-reviewable or dynamically generated script URLs for service workers makes
+registration paths harder to audit and can undermine SDL expectations around
+trusted worker code.
+
+## ❌ Incorrect
+
+```ts
+navigator.serviceWorker.register("data:text/javascript,bootstrap()");
+```
+
+```ts
+globalThis.navigator.serviceWorker.register(URL.createObjectURL(workerBlob));
+```
+
+## ✅ Correct
+
+```ts
+navigator.serviceWorker.register("/sw.js");
+```
+
+## Behavior and migration notes
+
+This rule intentionally focuses on direct unsafe script URL expressions. Dynamic
+variables, Trusted Types policies, and broader origin-validation strategies are
+out of scope.
+
+## ESLint flat config example
+
+```ts
+import sdl from "eslint-plugin-sdl-2";
+
+export default [
+ {
+  plugins: { sdl },
+  rules: {
+   "sdl/no-service-worker-unsafe-script-url": "error",
+  },
+ },
+];
+```
+
+## When not to use it
+
+Disable this rule only if your project intentionally relies on these service
+worker registration forms and that design has been reviewed and approved.
+
+## Package documentation
+
+- [Rule source](../../src/rules/no-service-worker-unsafe-script-url.ts)
+
+## Further reading
+
+> **Rule catalog ID:** R069
+
+- [MDN: `ServiceWorkerContainer.register()`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/ServiceWorkerContainer/register)
+- [Trusted Types: injection sinks](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Trusted_Types_API)

package/docs/rules/no-set-html-unsafe.md

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+# no-set-html-unsafe
+
+Disallow `setHTMLUnsafe()` calls that bypass the safer HTML Sanitizer API path.
+
+## Targeted pattern scope
+
+This rule targets direct `.setHTMLUnsafe(...)` calls.
+
+## What this rule reports
+
+This rule reports calls to `setHTMLUnsafe()` because that API is the explicit
+unsafe escape hatch for injecting HTML content.
+
+## Why this rule exists
+
+`setHTMLUnsafe()` makes dangerous HTML parsing look deceptively close to the
+safer `setHTML()` API. Standardizing on the safe API path reduces accidental use
+of the unsafe variant and keeps security review focused on fewer HTML sink
+surfaces.
+
+## ❌ Incorrect
+
+```ts
+element.setHTMLUnsafe(userHtml);
+```
+
+## ✅ Correct
+
+```ts
+element.setHTML(userHtml);
+```
+
+## ESLint flat config example
+
+```ts
+import sdl from "eslint-plugin-sdl-2";
+
+export default [
+ {
+  plugins: { sdl },
+  rules: {
+   "sdl/no-set-html-unsafe": "error",
+  },
+ },
+];
+```
+
+## When not to use it
+
+Disable only if you have an explicit requirement to use the unsafe HTML setter,
+its inputs are tightly controlled, and the surrounding review process documents
+why the safe `setHTML()` path is not sufficient.
+
+## Package documentation
+
+- [Rule source](../../src/rules/no-set-html-unsafe.ts)
+
+## Further reading
+
+> **Rule catalog ID:** R055
+
+- [MDN: `Element.setHTMLUnsafe()`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Element/setHTMLUnsafe)
+- [MDN: `Element.setHTML()`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Element/setHTML)
+- [HTML Sanitizer API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/HTML_Sanitizer_API)

package/docs/rules/no-trusted-types-policy-pass-through.md

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+# no-trusted-types-policy-pass-through
+
+Disallow Trusted Types policies that return unvalidated input unchanged.
+
+## Targeted pattern scope
+
+This rule targets `trustedTypes.createPolicy(...)` calls whose `createHTML`,
+`createScript`, or `createScriptURL` callbacks simply return the first input
+parameter unchanged.
+
+## What this rule reports
+
+This rule reports pass-through Trusted Types policy factories such as
+`createHTML: (value) => value`.
+
+## Why this rule exists
+
+Trusted Types policies are supposed to narrow unsafe string flows. Pass-through
+policies defeat that goal by rebranding untrusted input as trusted output
+without any sanitization or validation.
+
+## ❌ Incorrect
+
+```ts
+trustedTypes.createPolicy("default", {
+ createHTML: (value) => value,
+});
+```
+
+## ✅ Correct
+
+```ts
+trustedTypes.createPolicy("default", {
+ createHTML: (value) => sanitize(value),
+});
+```
+
+## ESLint flat config example
+
+```ts
+import sdl from "eslint-plugin-sdl-2";
+
+export default [
+ {
+  plugins: { sdl },
+
+  rules: {
+   "sdl/no-trusted-types-policy-pass-through": "error",
+  },
+ },
+];
+```
+
+## When not to use it
+
+Disable only if your Trusted Types policy wraps a reviewed validation layer that
+this rule cannot observe and the pass-through shape is intentional.
+
+## Package documentation
+
+- [Rule source](../../src/rules/no-trusted-types-policy-pass-through.ts)
+
+## Further reading
+
+> **Rule catalog ID:** R052
+
+- [Trusted Types](https://web.dev/trusted-types/)
+- [MDN: Trusted Types API](https://developer.mozilla.org/docs/Web/API/Trusted_Types_API)

package/docs/rules/no-unsafe-alloc.md

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+# no-unsafe-alloc
+
+Disallow unsafe uninitialized buffer allocation APIs in Node.js.
+
+## Targeted pattern scope
+
+This rule targets:
+
+- `Buffer.allocUnsafe(...)`
+- `Buffer.allocUnsafeSlow(...)`.
+
+## What this rule reports
+
+This rule reports calls to unsafe buffer constructors that may expose stale
+memory data.
+
+## Why this rule exists
+
+Unsafe buffer allocation can leak sensitive process memory contents if buffers
+are consumed before full initialization.
+
+## ❌ Incorrect
+
+```ts
+const payload = Buffer.allocUnsafe(64);
+```
+
+## ✅ Correct
+
+```ts
+const payload = Buffer.alloc(64);
+```
+
+## ESLint flat config example
+
+```ts
+import sdl from "eslint-plugin-sdl-2";
+
+export default [
+ {
+  plugins: { sdl },
+  rules: {
+   "sdl/no-unsafe-alloc": "error",
+  },
+ },
+];
+```
+
+## When not to use it
+
+Disable only for profiled performance hotspots that guarantee complete buffer
+initialization before use.
+
+## Package documentation
+
+- [Rule source](../../src/rules/no-unsafe-alloc.ts)
+
+## Further reading
+
+> **Rule catalog ID:** R025
+
+- [Node.js buffer security note](https://nodejs.org/api/buffer.html#what-makes-bufferallocunsafe-and-bufferallocunsafeslow-unsafe)

package/docs/rules/no-unsafe-cast-to-trusted-types.md

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+# no-unsafe-cast-to-trusted-types
+
+Disallow unsafe casts to Trusted Types without using trusted factory creation.
+
+## Targeted pattern scope
+
+Type assertions/casts to Trusted Types without trusted factory creation.
+
+## What this rule reports
+
+Unsafe casts/as-assertions to `TrustedHTML`/`TrustedScript`/`TrustedScriptURL`.
+
+## Why this rule exists
+
+Type-only casts do not sanitize data and can bypass Trusted Types enforcement intent.
+
+## ❌ Incorrect
+
+```ts
+const trusted = userHtml as TrustedHTML;
+```
+
+## ✅ Correct
+
+```ts
+const trusted = policy.createHTML(userHtml) as TrustedHTML;
+```
+
+## ESLint flat config example
+
+```ts
+import sdl from "eslint-plugin-sdl-2";
+
+export default [
+ {
+  plugins: { sdl },
+
+  rules: {
+   "sdl/no-unsafe-cast-to-trusted-types": "error",
+  },
+ },
+];
+```
+
+## When not to use it
+
+Disable only if Trusted Type objects are guaranteed by a reviewed factory or policy wrapper that this rule cannot observe.
+
+## Package documentation
+
+- [Rule source](../../src/rules/no-unsafe-cast-to-trusted-types.ts)
+
+## Further reading
+
+> **Rule catalog ID:** R045
+
+- [OWASP Top 10: Injection](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)
+
+- [OWASP Top 10: Security Misconfiguration](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)