endpoint-attest 0.1.0 → 0.1.1

package/README.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ capacity-attest answers "did the seller deliver what was paid for". An endpoint
 1. **The owner proves control of the endpoint.** Two ACME-style methods, both stateless (no server-side session to manage): a DNS TXT record at `_endpoint-attest.<host>`, or a file at the RFC 8615 well-known path `/.well-known/endpoint-attest.txt`. The token to publish is an HMAC of the endpoint, the owner's address and a shared secret, so it is bound to that exact endpoint and that owner address. It cannot be reused on a different endpoint or claimed under a different owner address. What it proves is control of the host (a TXT record under the host, or a file at the root of the origin), not of one path on it, and the owner address is a label the requester names: nobody proves they hold that address's key. See "What this does not do".
 2. **A distinct attester runs checks and signs.** The attester can never be the owner (`verifyAttestation` rejects that as `attester_is_owner`). It records what it actually checked (`checksPerformed` must be non-empty, so "passed" can never be read as a blanket safety claim), an outcome, and a hash of its findings.
 3. **The attestation is content-addressed and signed.** `computeAttestationId` hashes the canonical JSON of the content (reusing capacity-attest's `canonicalize`), and `signAttestation` produces an EIP-191 signature over that id (reusing capacity-attest's signing primitives). Anyone can recompute the id and the signer independently, without trusting this package's code.
-4. **The attestation always expires.** `expiresAt` is required, must be after `checkedAt` and at most 366 days after it, and the ownership proof may be at most 30 days older than `checkedAt`. There is no way to construct a non-expiring attestation; `verifyAttestation` treats an expired one as failed by default (`ignoreExpiry` exists only for callers who explicitly want to inspect an expired record).
+4. **The attestation always expires.** `expiresAt` is required, must be after `checkedAt` and at most 366 days after it, and the ownership proof may be at most 30 days older than `checkedAt`. An attestation whose `checkedAt` lies more than five minutes in the future is refused, both when it is signed and when it is verified (`checked_in_future`), because the 366 days count from `checkedAt`. There is no way to construct a non-expiring attestation; `verifyAttestation` treats an expired one as failed by default (`ignoreExpiry` exists only for callers who explicitly want to inspect an expired record).
 
 ## Usage
 
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Full working example with a real local HTTP server proving the whole flow, inclu
 
 ## Status
 
-78 tests passing (`npm test`), clean typecheck and build. No independent, external review of this code has been done; see [capacity-attest's own security notes](../capacity-attest/docs/SECURITY-REVIEW-2026-09-11.md) for how that project handles the same honesty requirement, which this package follows too.
+81 tests passing (`npm test`), clean typecheck and build. No independent, external review of this code has been done; see [capacity-attest's own security notes](../capacity-attest/docs/SECURITY-REVIEW-2026-09-11.md) for how that project handles the same honesty requirement, which this package follows too.
 
 ## Verifying your own implementation
 

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-export { OWNERSHIP_METHODS, OUTCOMES, ETH_ADDRESS_RE, AttestationContentSchema, EndpointAttestationSchema, OwnershipProofSchema, attestationPreimage, computeAttestationId, isExpired, type OwnershipMethod, type Outcome, type OwnershipProof, type AttestationContent, type EndpointAttestation, } from "./schema.js";
-export { signAttestation, verifyAttestation, type SignedAttestationParts, type VerifyResult, type VerifyReason, type VerifyOptions, } from "./signing.js";
+export { OWNERSHIP_METHODS, OUTCOMES, ETH_ADDRESS_RE, AttestationContentSchema, EndpointAttestationSchema, OwnershipProofSchema, attestationPreimage, computeAttestationId, isExpired, MAX_ATTESTATION_LIFE_DAYS, MAX_OWNERSHIP_PROOF_AGE_DAYS, type OwnershipMethod, type Outcome, type OwnershipProof, type AttestationContent, type EndpointAttestation, } from "./schema.js";
+export { signAttestation, verifyAttestation, MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS, type SignedAttestationParts, type VerifyResult, type VerifyReason, type VerifyOptions, } from "./signing.js";
 export { DNS_LABEL, WELL_KNOWN_PATH, ACTIVE_CONSENT_DNS_LABEL, ACTIVE_CONSENT_WELL_KNOWN_PATH, challengeToken, activeTestConsentToken, endpointHost, normalizeEndpoint, proofLocation, consentProofLocation, verifyOwnership, verifyActiveTestConsent, OwnershipError, type OwnershipCheckDeps, type OwnershipResult, } from "./ownership.js";
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,OAAO,EACL,iBAAiB,EACjB,QAAQ,EACR,cAAc,EACd,wBAAwB,EACxB,yBAAyB,EACzB,oBAAoB,EACpB,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,EACpB,SAAS,EACT,KAAK,eAAe,EACpB,KAAK,OAAO,EACZ,KAAK,cAAc,EACnB,KAAK,kBAAkB,EACvB,KAAK,mBAAmB,GACzB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAErB,OAAO,EACL,eAAe,EACf,iBAAiB,EACjB,KAAK,sBAAsB,EAC3B,KAAK,YAAY,EACjB,KAAK,YAAY,EACjB,KAAK,aAAa,GACnB,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAEtB,OAAO,EACL,SAAS,EACT,eAAe,EACf,wBAAwB,EACxB,8BAA8B,EAC9B,cAAc,EACd,sBAAsB,EACtB,YAAY,EACZ,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,uBAAuB,EACvB,cAAc,EACd,KAAK,kBAAkB,EACvB,KAAK,eAAe,GACrB,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,OAAO,EACL,iBAAiB,EACjB,QAAQ,EACR,cAAc,EACd,wBAAwB,EACxB,yBAAyB,EACzB,oBAAoB,EACpB,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,EACpB,SAAS,EACT,yBAAyB,EACzB,4BAA4B,EAC5B,KAAK,eAAe,EACpB,KAAK,OAAO,EACZ,KAAK,cAAc,EACnB,KAAK,kBAAkB,EACvB,KAAK,mBAAmB,GACzB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAErB,OAAO,EACL,eAAe,EACf,iBAAiB,EACjB,iBAAiB,EACjB,KAAK,sBAAsB,EAC3B,KAAK,YAAY,EACjB,KAAK,YAAY,EACjB,KAAK,aAAa,GACnB,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAEtB,OAAO,EACL,SAAS,EACT,eAAe,EACf,wBAAwB,EACxB,8BAA8B,EAC9B,cAAc,EACd,sBAAsB,EACtB,YAAY,EACZ,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,uBAAuB,EACvB,cAAc,EACd,KAAK,kBAAkB,EACvB,KAAK,eAAe,GACrB,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC"}

package/dist/index.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 // index.ts — public surface of this package.
-export { OWNERSHIP_METHODS, OUTCOMES, ETH_ADDRESS_RE, AttestationContentSchema, EndpointAttestationSchema, OwnershipProofSchema, attestationPreimage, computeAttestationId, isExpired, } from "./schema.js";
-export { signAttestation, verifyAttestation, } from "./signing.js";
+export { OWNERSHIP_METHODS, OUTCOMES, ETH_ADDRESS_RE, AttestationContentSchema, EndpointAttestationSchema, OwnershipProofSchema, attestationPreimage, computeAttestationId, isExpired, MAX_ATTESTATION_LIFE_DAYS, MAX_OWNERSHIP_PROOF_AGE_DAYS, } from "./schema.js";
+export { signAttestation, verifyAttestation, MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS, } from "./signing.js";
 export { DNS_LABEL, WELL_KNOWN_PATH, ACTIVE_CONSENT_DNS_LABEL, ACTIVE_CONSENT_WELL_KNOWN_PATH, challengeToken, activeTestConsentToken, endpointHost, normalizeEndpoint, proofLocation, consentProofLocation, verifyOwnership, verifyActiveTestConsent, OwnershipError, } from "./ownership.js";
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,6CAA6C;AAE7C,OAAO,EACL,iBAAiB,EACjB,QAAQ,EACR,cAAc,EACd,wBAAwB,EACxB,yBAAyB,EACzB,oBAAoB,EACpB,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,EACpB,SAAS,GAMV,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAErB,OAAO,EACL,eAAe,EACf,iBAAiB,GAKlB,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAEtB,OAAO,EACL,SAAS,EACT,eAAe,EACf,wBAAwB,EACxB,8BAA8B,EAC9B,cAAc,EACd,sBAAsB,EACtB,YAAY,EACZ,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,uBAAuB,EACvB,cAAc,GAGf,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,6CAA6C;AAE7C,OAAO,EACL,iBAAiB,EACjB,QAAQ,EACR,cAAc,EACd,wBAAwB,EACxB,yBAAyB,EACzB,oBAAoB,EACpB,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,EACpB,SAAS,EACT,yBAAyB,EACzB,4BAA4B,GAM7B,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAErB,OAAO,EACL,eAAe,EACf,iBAAiB,EACjB,iBAAiB,GAKlB,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAEtB,OAAO,EACL,SAAS,EACT,eAAe,EACf,wBAAwB,EACxB,8BAA8B,EAC9B,cAAc,EACd,sBAAsB,EACtB,YAAY,EACZ,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,EACf,uBAAuB,EACvB,cAAc,GAGf,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC"}

package/dist/signing.d.ts

@@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ export interface SignedAttestationParts {
     attestationId: string;
     signature: string;
 }
-/** Sign an attestation as the attester. Returns the content-addressed id alongside the signature so a caller can assemble a full EndpointAttestation. */
-export declare function signAttestation(attester: ethers.Signer, content: AttestationContent): Promise<SignedAttestationParts>;
-export type VerifyReason = "attestation_id_mismatch" | "signature_recovery_failed" | "signature_does_not_match_attester" | "attester_is_owner" | "expired";
+/** How far ahead of "now" a checkedAt may be before the attestation is refused. Covers clock differences between machines, nothing more. */
+export declare const MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS: number;
+/** Sign an attestation as the attester. Returns the content-addressed id alongside the signature so a caller can assemble a full EndpointAttestation. Refuses a checkedAt in the future, because the 366 day bound counts from checkedAt. */
+export declare function signAttestation(attester: ethers.Signer, content: AttestationContent, opts?: {
+    now?: Date;
+}): Promise<SignedAttestationParts>;
+export type VerifyReason = "attestation_id_mismatch" | "signature_recovery_failed" | "signature_does_not_match_attester" | "attester_is_owner" | "checked_in_future" | "expired";
 export type VerifyResult = {
     ok: true;
 } | {

package/dist/signing.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"signing.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/signing.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAkBA,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAEhC,OAAO,EACL,KAAK,kBAAkB,EACvB,KAAK,mBAAmB,EAGzB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAErB,MAAM,WAAW,sBAAsB;IACrC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACnB;AAED,yJAAyJ;AACzJ,wBAAsB,eAAe,CACnC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EACvB,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,GAC1B,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAIjC;AAED,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY,GACpB,yBAAyB,GACzB,2BAA2B,GAC3B,mCAAmC,GACnC,mBAAmB,GACnB,SAAS,CAAC;AAEd,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG;IAAE,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAA;CAAE,GAAG;IAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CAAC;AAE/F,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa;IAC5B,qGAAqG;IACrG,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IACX;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACxB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI,GAAE,aAAkB,GAAG,YAAY,CAkC1G"}
+{"version":3,"file":"signing.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/signing.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAkBA,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAEhC,OAAO,EACL,KAAK,kBAAkB,EACvB,KAAK,mBAAmB,EAGzB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAErB,MAAM,WAAW,sBAAsB;IACrC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACnB;AAED,4IAA4I;AAC5I,eAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,QAAgB,CAAC;AAE/C,6OAA6O;AAC7O,wBAAsB,eAAe,CACnC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EACvB,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAC3B,IAAI,GAAE;IAAE,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAA;CAAO,GACxB,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAQjC;AAED,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY,GACpB,yBAAyB,GACzB,2BAA2B,GAC3B,mCAAmC,GACnC,mBAAmB,GACnB,mBAAmB,GACnB,SAAS,CAAC;AAEd,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG;IAAE,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAA;CAAE,GAAG;IAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CAAC;AAE/F,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa;IAC5B,qGAAqG;IACrG,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IACX;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACxB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI,GAAE,aAAkB,GAAG,YAAY,CAwC1G"}

package/dist/signing.js

@@ -17,8 +17,14 @@
 // rejects an attestation where attester and owner are the same address.
 import { recoverClaimSigner } from "capacity-attest/dist/signing.js";
 import { computeAttestationId, isExpired, } from "./schema.js";
-/** Sign an attestation as the attester. Returns the content-addressed id alongside the signature so a caller can assemble a full EndpointAttestation. */
-export async function signAttestation(attester, content) {
+/** How far ahead of "now" a checkedAt may be before the attestation is refused. Covers clock differences between machines, nothing more. */
+export const MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
+/** Sign an attestation as the attester. Returns the content-addressed id alongside the signature so a caller can assemble a full EndpointAttestation. Refuses a checkedAt in the future, because the 366 day bound counts from checkedAt. */
+export async function signAttestation(attester, content, opts = {}) {
+    const now = opts.now ?? new Date();
+    if (Date.parse(content.checkedAt) > now.getTime() + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS) {
+        throw new Error("checkedAt is in the future: the attestation would outlive the 366 day bound that counts from checkedAt");
+    }
     const attestationId = computeAttestationId(content);
     const signature = await attester.signMessage(attestationId);
     return { attestationId, signature };
@@ -62,6 +68,11 @@ export function verifyAttestation(attestation, opts = {}) {
     if (attestation.attesterAddress.toLowerCase() === attestation.ownerAddress.toLowerCase()) {
         return { ok: false, reason: "attester_is_owner" };
     }
+    // The 366 day bound counts from checkedAt, which the attester writes. Without this a far-future checkedAt would give a far-future expiry.
+    // Not skipped by ignoreExpiry: an attestation checked in the future was never valid, however old it is when someone looks at it.
+    if (Date.parse(attestation.checkedAt) > (opts.now ?? new Date()).getTime() + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: "checked_in_future" };
+    }
     if (!opts.ignoreExpiry && isExpired(attestation, opts.now ?? new Date())) {
         return { ok: false, reason: "expired" };
     }

package/dist/signing.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"signing.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/signing.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,kFAAkF;AAClF,EAAE;AACF,4EAA4E;AAC5E,4EAA4E;AAC5E,oEAAoE;AACpE,8DAA8D;AAC9D,qEAAqE;AACrE,2EAA2E;AAC3E,EAAE;AACF,wEAAwE;AACxE,2EAA2E;AAC3E,qEAAqE;AACrE,wEAAwE;AACxE,uEAAuE;AACvE,qEAAqE;AACrE,2EAA2E;AAC3E,wEAAwE;AAGxE,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,iCAAiC,CAAC;AACrE,OAAO,EAGL,oBAAoB,EACpB,SAAS,GACV,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAOrB,yJAAyJ;AACzJ,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,eAAe,CACnC,QAAuB,EACvB,OAA2B;IAE3B,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,oBAAoB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACpD,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5D,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;AACtC,CAAC;AAwBD;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,WAAgC,EAAE,OAAsB,EAAE;IAC1F,IAAI,UAAkB,CAAC;IACvB,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,UAAU,GAAG,oBAAoB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;IACjD,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACX,wEAAwE;QACxE,uEAAuE;QACvE,mEAAmE;QACnE,sCAAsC;QACtC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,EAAG,CAAW,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACxF,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QACzE,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1D,CAAC;IAED,IAAI,SAAiB,CAAC;IACtB,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,SAAS,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;IACnF,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACX,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,EAAG,CAAW,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1F,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1E,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,CAAC;IACpE,CAAC;IAED,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QACzF,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;IACpD,CAAC;IAED,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACzE,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1C,CAAC;IAED,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;AACtB,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"signing.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/signing.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,kFAAkF;AAClF,EAAE;AACF,4EAA4E;AAC5E,4EAA4E;AAC5E,oEAAoE;AACpE,8DAA8D;AAC9D,qEAAqE;AACrE,2EAA2E;AAC3E,EAAE;AACF,wEAAwE;AACxE,2EAA2E;AAC3E,qEAAqE;AACrE,wEAAwE;AACxE,uEAAuE;AACvE,qEAAqE;AACrE,2EAA2E;AAC3E,wEAAwE;AAGxE,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,iCAAiC,CAAC;AACrE,OAAO,EAGL,oBAAoB,EACpB,SAAS,GACV,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAOrB,4IAA4I;AAC5I,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;AAE/C,6OAA6O;AAC7O,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,eAAe,CACnC,QAAuB,EACvB,OAA2B,EAC3B,OAAuB,EAAE;IAEzB,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;IACnC,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC;QACtE,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,wGAAwG,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5H,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,oBAAoB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACpD,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5D,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;AACtC,CAAC;AAyBD;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,WAAgC,EAAE,OAAsB,EAAE;IAC1F,IAAI,UAAkB,CAAC;IACvB,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,UAAU,GAAG,oBAAoB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;IACjD,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACX,wEAAwE;QACxE,uEAAuE;QACvE,mEAAmE;QACnE,sCAAsC;QACtC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,EAAG,CAAW,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACxF,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QACzE,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1D,CAAC;IAED,IAAI,SAAiB,CAAC;IACtB,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,SAAS,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;IACnF,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACX,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,EAAG,CAAW,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1F,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1E,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,mCAAmC,EAAE,CAAC;IACpE,CAAC;IAED,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QACzF,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;IACpD,CAAC;IAED,0IAA0I;IAC1I,iIAAiI;IACjI,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC;QAC/F,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;IACpD,CAAC;IAED,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACzE,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1C,CAAC;IAED,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;AACtB,CAAC"}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "endpoint-attest",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "description": "Time-bounded, owner-requested security attestations for a network endpoint: the operator proves control of the endpoint, a check is run, and the outcome is recorded as a signed, content-addressed, expiring attestation. Reuses capacity-attest's canonical hashing and EIP-191 signing rather than reimplementing them. Never a security score, never a claim about a party that did not ask.",
   "keywords": [
     "attestation",