emdash 0.40.0 → 0.41.0

package/dist/ssrf-Dv0_tRpo.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
+//#region src/security/ssrf.ts
+/**
+* SSRF protection for outbound HTTP requests.
+*
+* Validates that URLs do not target non-public network addresses.
+*/
+const IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN = /^\[|\]$/g;
+const IPV4_PART_PATTERN = /^(?:0|[1-9]\d{0,2})$/;
+const IPV6_PART_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/i;
+/** Strip trailing dots from an FQDN-form hostname ("localhost." -> "localhost"). */
+const TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN = /\.+$/;
+/**
+* IPv4 ranges that are not globally reachable unicast destinations.
+*/
+const BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(0, 0, 0, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(0, 255, 255, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(10, 0, 0, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(10, 255, 255, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(100, 64, 0, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(100, 127, 255, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(127, 0, 0, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(127, 255, 255, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 0, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 255, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(172, 16, 0, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(172, 31, 255, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(192, 0, 0, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(192, 0, 0, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(192, 0, 2, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(192, 0, 2, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(192, 88, 99, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(192, 88, 99, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 0, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 255, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(198, 18, 0, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(198, 19, 255, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(198, 51, 100, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(198, 51, 100, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(203, 0, 113, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(203, 0, 113, 255)
+	},
+	{
+		start: ip4ToNum(224, 0, 0, 0),
+		end: ip4ToNum(255, 255, 255, 255)
+	}
+];
+const ALLOWED_IPV4_EXCEPTIONS = new Set([ip4ToNum(192, 0, 0, 9), ip4ToNum(192, 0, 0, 10)]);
+function ipv6Range(address, prefixLength) {
+	const parsed = parseIpv6(address);
+	if (parsed === null) throw new Error(`Invalid IPv6 range: ${address}/${prefixLength}`);
+	return {
+		address: parsed,
+		prefixLength
+	};
+}
+const IPV6_GLOBAL_UNICAST_RANGE = ipv6Range("2000::", 3);
+const IPV4_COMPATIBLE_IPV6_RANGE = ipv6Range("::", 96);
+const IPV4_EMBEDDED_IPV6_RANGES = [
+	IPV4_COMPATIBLE_IPV6_RANGE,
+	ipv6Range("::ffff:0:0", 96),
+	ipv6Range("::ffff:0:0:0", 96),
+	ipv6Range("64:ff9b::", 96)
+];
+/** Globally reachable allocations inside the otherwise reserved 2001::/23 block. */
+const ALLOWED_IPV6_SPECIAL_RANGES = [
+	ipv6Range("2001:1::1", 128),
+	ipv6Range("2001:1::2", 128),
+	ipv6Range("2001:1::3", 128),
+	ipv6Range("2001:3::", 32),
+	ipv6Range("2001:4:112::", 48),
+	ipv6Range("2001:20::", 28),
+	ipv6Range("2001:30::", 28)
+];
+/** Non-global allocations inside the ordinary IPv6 global-unicast range. */
+const BLOCKED_IPV6_GLOBAL_UNICAST_RANGES = [
+	ipv6Range("2001::", 23),
+	ipv6Range("2001:db8::", 32),
+	ipv6Range("2002::", 16),
+	ipv6Range("3ffe::", 16),
+	ipv6Range("3fff::", 20)
+];
+const BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES = new Set([
+	"localhost",
+	"metadata.google.internal",
+	"metadata.google",
+	"::1"
+]);
+/**
+* Wildcard DNS services that publicly resolve arbitrary IPs embedded in the
+* hostname. Commonly used in local dev and by SSRF exploit tooling to bypass
+* hostname-only blocklists (e.g. 127.0.0.1.nip.io -> 127.0.0.1).
+*
+* Matched case-insensitively as a suffix, so both the apex and any subdomain
+* are blocked.
+*/
+const BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES = [
+	"nip.io",
+	"sslip.io",
+	"xip.io",
+	"traefik.me",
+	"lvh.me",
+	"localtest.me"
+];
+/** Blocked URL schemes */
+const ALLOWED_SCHEMES = new Set(["http:", "https:"]);
+function ip4ToNum(a, b, c, d) {
+	return (a << 24 | b << 16 | c << 8 | d) >>> 0;
+}
+function parseIpv4(ip) {
+	const parts = ip.split(".");
+	if (parts.length !== 4) return null;
+	const nums = parts.map((part) => IPV4_PART_PATTERN.test(part) ? Number(part) : NaN);
+	if (nums.some((n) => !Number.isInteger(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return null;
+	return ip4ToNum(nums[0], nums[1], nums[2], nums[3]);
+}
+function parseIpv6(ip) {
+	let address = ip;
+	if (address.includes(".")) {
+		const separator = address.lastIndexOf(":");
+		if (separator === -1) return null;
+		const ipv4 = parseIpv4(address.slice(separator + 1));
+		if (ipv4 === null) return null;
+		address = `${address.slice(0, separator + 1)}${(ipv4 >>> 16).toString(16)}:${(ipv4 & 65535).toString(16)}`;
+	}
+	if (address.includes(":::") || address.split("::").length > 2) return null;
+	const [before = "", after = ""] = address.split("::");
+	const head = before === "" ? [] : before.split(":");
+	const tail = after === "" ? [] : after.split(":");
+	const parts = [...head, ...tail];
+	if (parts.some((part) => !IPV6_PART_PATTERN.test(part)) || parts.length > 8) return null;
+	if (address.includes("::") ? parts.length >= 8 : parts.length !== 8) return null;
+	const zeroCount = address.includes("::") ? 8 - parts.length : 0;
+	return [
+		...head,
+		...Array.from({ length: zeroCount }).fill("0"),
+		...tail
+	].map((part) => Number.parseInt(part, 16));
+}
+function isIpv6InRange(address, range) {
+	const completeParts = Math.floor(range.prefixLength / 16);
+	for (let i = 0; i < completeParts; i++) if (address[i] !== range.address[i]) return false;
+	const remainingBits = range.prefixLength % 16;
+	if (remainingBits === 0) return true;
+	const mask = 65535 << 16 - remainingBits & 65535;
+	return (address[completeParts] & mask) === (range.address[completeParts] & mask);
+}
+function extractEmbeddedIpv4(address) {
+	if (!IPV4_EMBEDDED_IPV6_RANGES.some((range) => isIpv6InRange(address, range))) return null;
+	const ipv4 = (address[6] << 16 | address[7]) >>> 0;
+	if (ipv4 <= 1 && isIpv6InRange(address, IPV4_COMPATIBLE_IPV6_RANGE)) return null;
+	return ipv4;
+}
+function isNonPublicIp(ip) {
+	const parsedIpv4 = parseIpv4(ip);
+	const ipv6 = parsedIpv4 === null ? parseIpv6(ip) : null;
+	const ipv4 = ipv6 === null ? parsedIpv4 : extractEmbeddedIpv4(ipv6);
+	if (ipv4 !== null) {
+		if (ALLOWED_IPV4_EXCEPTIONS.has(ipv4)) return false;
+		return BLOCKED_PATTERNS.some((range) => ipv4 >= range.start && ipv4 <= range.end);
+	}
+	if (ipv6 === null) return true;
+	if (ALLOWED_IPV6_SPECIAL_RANGES.some((range) => isIpv6InRange(ipv6, range))) return false;
+	if (!isIpv6InRange(ipv6, IPV6_GLOBAL_UNICAST_RANGE)) return true;
+	return BLOCKED_IPV6_GLOBAL_UNICAST_RANGES.some((range) => isIpv6InRange(ipv6, range));
+}
+/**
+* Error thrown when SSRF protection blocks a URL.
+*/
+var SsrfError = class extends Error {
+	code = "SSRF_BLOCKED";
+	constructor(message) {
+		super(message);
+		this.name = "SsrfError";
+	}
+};
+/**
+* Validate a URL's scheme, hostname, and literal address.
+*
+* Checks:
+* 1. URL is well-formed with http/https scheme
+* 2. Hostname is not a known internal name (localhost, metadata endpoints)
+* 3. If hostname is an IP literal, it is a public address
+*
+* Hostnames also need DNS validation before dispatch. Resolving and checking
+* addresses does not bind an ordinary fetch() connection to those addresses.
+*
+* @throws SsrfError if the URL targets an internal address
+*/
+/** Maximum number of redirects to follow in ssrfSafeFetch */
+const MAX_REDIRECTS = 5;
+function validateExternalUrl(url) {
+	let parsed;
+	try {
+		parsed = new URL(url);
+	} catch {
+		throw new SsrfError("Invalid URL");
+	}
+	if (!ALLOWED_SCHEMES.has(parsed.protocol)) throw new SsrfError(`Scheme '${parsed.protocol}' is not allowed`);
+	const normalizedHost = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, "").toLowerCase().replace(TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN, "");
+	if (BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES.has(normalizedHost)) throw new SsrfError("URLs targeting internal hosts are not allowed");
+	for (const suffix of BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES) if (normalizedHost === suffix || normalizedHost.endsWith(`.${suffix}`)) throw new SsrfError("URLs targeting wildcard DNS services are not allowed");
+	if (isIpLiteral(normalizedHost) && isNonPublicIp(normalizedHost)) throw new SsrfError("URLs targeting non-public IP addresses are not allowed");
+	return parsed;
+}
+/**
+* Module-level default resolver. Tests can swap this with a stub so fetch
+* mocks don't see unexpected DoH round-trips. Production code should leave
+* it alone.
+*/
+let defaultResolver = null;
+/** Timeout for a single DoH request, in milliseconds. */
+const DOH_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e3;
+/** Default DoH endpoint — Cloudflare's public resolver. */
+const DEFAULT_DOH_URL = "https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query";
+function hasProperty(obj, key) {
+	return typeof obj === "object" && obj !== null && key in obj;
+}
+/**
+* Narrow an unknown JSON body to a DohResponse shape we can read safely.
+* Throws if the body doesn't look like a DoH response — a malformed body is
+* indistinguishable from a failure and must not be silently treated as empty.
+*/
+function parseDohResponse(raw) {
+	if (!hasProperty(raw, "Status") || typeof raw.Status !== "number") throw new Error("DoH response missing Status field");
+	const answers = [];
+	if (hasProperty(raw, "Answer") && Array.isArray(raw.Answer)) {
+		for (const entry of raw.Answer) if (hasProperty(entry, "type") && typeof entry.type === "number" && Number.isInteger(entry.type) && hasProperty(entry, "data") && typeof entry.data === "string") answers.push({
+			type: entry.type,
+			data: entry.data
+		});
+	}
+	return {
+		Status: raw.Status,
+		Answer: answers
+	};
+}
+/**
+* Resolve a hostname via DNS over HTTPS (Cloudflare). Returns all A and AAAA
+* records. Works in both Workers and Node without requiring node:dns.
+*
+* Fails closed: any network error, non-2xx response, or DNS rcode != 0
+* causes a rejected promise so the calling validator treats it as a block.
+*/
+const cloudflareDohResolver = async (hostname) => {
+	async function query(type) {
+		const expectedAnswerType = type === "A" ? 1 : 28;
+		const params = new URLSearchParams({
+			name: hostname,
+			type
+		});
+		const controller = new AbortController();
+		const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), DOH_TIMEOUT_MS);
+		try {
+			const response = await globalThis.fetch(`${DEFAULT_DOH_URL}?${params.toString()}`, {
+				headers: { Accept: "application/dns-json" },
+				signal: controller.signal
+			});
+			if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`DoH lookup failed: ${response.status}`);
+			const body = parseDohResponse(await response.json());
+			if (body.Status === 3) return [];
+			if (body.Status !== 0) throw new Error(`DoH ${type} lookup failed: rcode=${body.Status}`);
+			return body.Answer.filter((answer) => answer.type === expectedAnswerType).map((answer) => answer.data).filter(isIpLiteral);
+		} finally {
+			clearTimeout(timeout);
+		}
+	}
+	const [a, aaaa] = await Promise.all([query("A"), query("AAAA")]);
+	return [...a, ...aaaa];
+};
+/**
+* Validate a URL and reject hostnames that resolve to non-public addresses,
+* including wildcard DNS services like nip.io used by exploit tooling.
+*
+* Runs `validateExternalUrl` first for cheap pre-flight checks (scheme,
+* literal IP, known-bad hostnames). Then resolves the hostname and rejects
+* if ANY returned address is non-public.
+*
+* Fails closed: if resolution fails or returns no records, throws SsrfError.
+*
+* **Caveats.** This does NOT fully close the TOCTOU between check and
+* connect. Attacks that still work against this layer include:
+*
+* - TTL=0 rebind: authoritative server returns public IP to the check, then
+*   private IP to the subsequent fetch() a few milliseconds later.
+* - Split-view via EDNS Client Subnet or source-IP inspection: the
+*   authoritative server returns public IP to Cloudflare's DoH resolver and
+*   private IP to the victim's own resolver (used by fetch()).
+* - Host-file overrides or split-horizon corporate DNS on self-hosted Node.
+* - Attacker-controlled rebinding services the caller has allowlisted.
+*
+* Connections must use the addresses from resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget
+* to avoid a second lookup. Callers using ordinary fetch() need network-level
+* egress controls to prevent these attacks.
+*/
+async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(url, options) {
+	return (await resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget(url, options)).url;
+}
+/**
+* Validate a URL and return the exact public addresses approved for the
+* subsequent connection.
+*/
+async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget(url, options) {
+	const parsed = validateExternalUrl(url);
+	const hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, "");
+	if (isIpLiteral(hostname)) return {
+		url: parsed,
+		addresses: [hostname]
+	};
+	const resolver = options?.resolver ?? defaultResolver ?? cloudflareDohResolver;
+	let addresses;
+	try {
+		addresses = await resolver(hostname);
+	} catch (error) {
+		throw new SsrfError(`Could not resolve hostname: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`);
+	}
+	if (addresses.length === 0) throw new SsrfError("Hostname resolved to no addresses");
+	for (const ip of addresses) {
+		if (!isIpLiteral(ip)) throw new SsrfError("Hostname resolver returned a non-IP address");
+		if (isNonPublicIp(ip)) throw new SsrfError("Hostname resolves to a non-public IP address");
+	}
+	return {
+		url: parsed,
+		addresses
+	};
+}
+/** True when a string is a valid IPv4 or IPv6 literal. */
+function isIpLiteral(host) {
+	return parseIpv4(host) !== null || parseIpv6(host) !== null;
+}
+/**
+* Fetch a URL with SSRF protection on redirects.
+*
+* Uses `redirect: "manual"` to intercept redirects and re-validate each
+* redirect target against SSRF rules before following it. This prevents
+* an attacker from setting up an allowed external URL that redirects to
+* an internal IP (e.g. 169.254.169.254 for cloud metadata).
+*
+* @throws SsrfError if the initial URL or any redirect target is internal
+*/
+/** Headers that must be stripped when a redirect crosses origins */
+const CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = [
+	"authorization",
+	"cookie",
+	"proxy-authorization"
+];
+async function ssrfSafeFetch(url, init, options) {
+	let currentUrl = url;
+	let currentInit = init;
+	for (let i = 0; i <= MAX_REDIRECTS; i++) {
+		const validated = await resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(currentUrl, options);
+		if (options?.httpsOnly === true && validated.protocol !== "https:") throw new SsrfError("Only HTTPS URLs are allowed");
+		const response = await globalThis.fetch(currentUrl, {
+			...currentInit,
+			redirect: "manual"
+		});
+		if (response.status < 300 || response.status >= 400) return response;
+		const location = response.headers.get("Location");
+		if (!location) return response;
+		const previousOrigin = new URL(currentUrl).origin;
+		currentUrl = new URL(location, currentUrl).href;
+		if (previousOrigin !== new URL(currentUrl).origin && currentInit) currentInit = stripCredentialHeaders(currentInit);
+	}
+	throw new SsrfError(`Too many redirects (max ${MAX_REDIRECTS})`);
+}
+/**
+* Return a copy of init with credential headers removed.
+*/
+function stripCredentialHeaders(init) {
+	if (!init.headers) return init;
+	const headers = new Headers(init.headers);
+	for (const name of CREDENTIAL_HEADERS) headers.delete(name);
+	return {
+		...init,
+		headers
+	};
+}
+
+//#endregion
+export { ssrfSafeFetch as a, resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget as i, cloudflareDohResolver as n, stripCredentialHeaders as o, resolveAndValidateExternalUrl as r, validateExternalUrl as s, SsrfError as t };
+//# sourceMappingURL=ssrf-Dv0_tRpo.mjs.map

package/dist/ssrf-Dv0_tRpo.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"ssrf-Dv0_tRpo.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/security/ssrf.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * SSRF protection for outbound HTTP requests.\n *\n * Validates that URLs do not target non-public network addresses.\n */\n\nconst IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN = /^\\[|\\]$/g;\nconst IPV4_PART_PATTERN = /^(?:0|[1-9]\\d{0,2})$/;\nconst IPV6_PART_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/i;\n\n/** Strip trailing dots from an FQDN-form hostname (\"localhost.\" -> \"localhost\"). */\nconst TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN = /\\.+$/;\n\n/**\n * IPv4 ranges that are not globally reachable unicast destinations.\n */\nconst BLOCKED_PATTERNS: Array<{ start: number; end: number }> = [\n\t// Current network\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(0, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(0, 255, 255, 255) },\n\t// Private use\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(10, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(10, 255, 255, 255) },\n\t// Shared address space\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(100, 64, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(100, 127, 255, 255) },\n\t// Loopback\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(127, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(127, 255, 255, 255) },\n\t// Link-local, including common cloud metadata endpoints\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 255, 255) },\n\t// Private use\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(172, 16, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(172, 31, 255, 255) },\n\t// IETF protocol assignments. Globally reachable exceptions are handled below.\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(192, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(192, 0, 0, 255) },\n\t// Documentation\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(192, 0, 2, 0), end: ip4ToNum(192, 0, 2, 255) },\n\t// Deprecated 6to4 relay anycast\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(192, 88, 99, 0), end: ip4ToNum(192, 88, 99, 255) },\n\t// Private use\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 255, 255) },\n\t// Benchmarking\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(198, 18, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(198, 19, 255, 255) },\n\t// Documentation\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(198, 51, 100, 0), end: ip4ToNum(198, 51, 100, 255) },\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(203, 0, 113, 0), end: ip4ToNum(203, 0, 113, 255) },\n\t// Multicast, reserved, and limited broadcast\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(224, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(255, 255, 255, 255) },\n];\n\nconst ALLOWED_IPV4_EXCEPTIONS = new Set([ip4ToNum(192, 0, 0, 9), ip4ToNum(192, 0, 0, 10)]);\n\ninterface Ipv6Range {\n\taddress: number[];\n\tprefixLength: number;\n}\n\nfunction ipv6Range(address: string, prefixLength: number): Ipv6Range {\n\tconst parsed = parseIpv6(address);\n\tif (parsed === null) throw new Error(`Invalid IPv6 range: ${address}/${prefixLength}`);\n\treturn { address: parsed, prefixLength };\n}\n\nconst IPV6_GLOBAL_UNICAST_RANGE = ipv6Range(\"2000::\", 3);\nconst IPV4_COMPATIBLE_IPV6_RANGE = ipv6Range(\"::\", 96);\nconst IPV4_EMBEDDED_IPV6_RANGES: Ipv6Range[] = [\n\tIPV4_COMPATIBLE_IPV6_RANGE,\n\tipv6Range(\"::ffff:0:0\", 96),\n\tipv6Range(\"::ffff:0:0:0\", 96),\n\tipv6Range(\"64:ff9b::\", 96),\n];\n\n/** Globally reachable allocations inside the otherwise reserved 2001::/23 block. */\nconst ALLOWED_IPV6_SPECIAL_RANGES: Ipv6Range[] = [\n\tipv6Range(\"2001:1::1\", 128),\n\tipv6Range(\"2001:1::2\", 128),\n\tipv6Range(\"2001:1::3\", 128),\n\tipv6Range(\"2001:3::\", 32),\n\tipv6Range(\"2001:4:112::\", 48),\n\tipv6Range(\"2001:20::\", 28),\n\tipv6Range(\"2001:30::\", 28),\n];\n\n/** Non-global allocations inside the ordinary IPv6 global-unicast range. */\nconst BLOCKED_IPV6_GLOBAL_UNICAST_RANGES: Ipv6Range[] = [\n\tipv6Range(\"2001::\", 23),\n\tipv6Range(\"2001:db8::\", 32),\n\tipv6Range(\"2002::\", 16),\n\tipv6Range(\"3ffe::\", 16),\n\tipv6Range(\"3fff::\", 20),\n];\n\n// Bracket-stripped form is used for lookups (validateExternalUrl strips\n// brackets from parsed.hostname before checking), so \"::1\" appears here\n// without brackets. The \"::1\" case is already covered by isNonPublicIp, but\n// keeping it here makes the intent explicit and gives a clearer error\n// message for the common `http://[::1]/` form.\nconst BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES = new Set([\n\t\"localhost\",\n\t\"metadata.google.internal\",\n\t\"metadata.google\",\n\t\"::1\",\n]);\n\n/**\n * Wildcard DNS services that publicly resolve arbitrary IPs embedded in the\n * hostname. Commonly used in local dev and by SSRF exploit tooling to bypass\n * hostname-only blocklists (e.g. 127.0.0.1.nip.io -> 127.0.0.1).\n *\n * Matched case-insensitively as a suffix, so both the apex and any subdomain\n * are blocked.\n */\nconst BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES = [\n\t\"nip.io\",\n\t\"sslip.io\",\n\t\"xip.io\",\n\t\"traefik.me\",\n\t\"lvh.me\",\n\t\"localtest.me\",\n];\n\n/** Blocked URL schemes */\nconst ALLOWED_SCHEMES = new Set([\"http:\", \"https:\"]);\n\nfunction ip4ToNum(a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number): number {\n\treturn ((a << 24) | (b << 16) | (c << 8) | d) >>> 0;\n}\n\nfunction parseIpv4(ip: string): number | null {\n\tconst parts = ip.split(\".\");\n\tif (parts.length !== 4) return null;\n\n\tconst nums = parts.map((part) => (IPV4_PART_PATTERN.test(part) ? Number(part) : Number.NaN));\n\tif (nums.some((n) => !Number.isInteger(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return null;\n\n\treturn ip4ToNum(nums[0], nums[1], nums[2], nums[3]);\n}\n\nfunction parseIpv6(ip: string): number[] | null {\n\tlet address = ip;\n\tif (address.includes(\".\")) {\n\t\tconst separator = address.lastIndexOf(\":\");\n\t\tif (separator === -1) return null;\n\t\tconst ipv4 = parseIpv4(address.slice(separator + 1));\n\t\tif (ipv4 === null) return null;\n\t\taddress = `${address.slice(0, separator + 1)}${(ipv4 >>> 16).toString(16)}:${(ipv4 & 0xffff).toString(16)}`;\n\t}\n\tif (address.includes(\":::\") || address.split(\"::\").length > 2) return null;\n\n\tconst [before = \"\", after = \"\"] = address.split(\"::\");\n\tconst head = before === \"\" ? [] : before.split(\":\");\n\tconst tail = after === \"\" ? [] : after.split(\":\");\n\tconst parts = [...head, ...tail];\n\tif (parts.some((part) => !IPV6_PART_PATTERN.test(part)) || parts.length > 8) return null;\n\tif (address.includes(\"::\") ? parts.length >= 8 : parts.length !== 8) return null;\n\n\tconst zeroCount = address.includes(\"::\") ? 8 - parts.length : 0;\n\treturn [...head, ...Array.from<string>({ length: zeroCount }).fill(\"0\"), ...tail].map((part) =>\n\t\tNumber.parseInt(part, 16),\n\t);\n}\n\nfunction isIpv6InRange(address: number[], range: Ipv6Range): boolean {\n\tconst completeParts = Math.floor(range.prefixLength / 16);\n\tfor (let i = 0; i < completeParts; i++) {\n\t\tif (address[i] !== range.address[i]) return false;\n\t}\n\n\tconst remainingBits = range.prefixLength % 16;\n\tif (remainingBits === 0) return true;\n\tconst mask = (0xffff << (16 - remainingBits)) & 0xffff;\n\treturn (address[completeParts] & mask) === (range.address[completeParts] & mask);\n}\n\nfunction extractEmbeddedIpv4(address: number[]): number | null {\n\tif (!IPV4_EMBEDDED_IPV6_RANGES.some((range) => isIpv6InRange(address, range))) return null;\n\tconst ipv4 = ((address[6] << 16) | address[7]) >>> 0;\n\t// The unspecified and loopback addresses retain their native IPv6 meaning.\n\tif (ipv4 <= 1 && isIpv6InRange(address, IPV4_COMPATIBLE_IPV6_RANGE)) return null;\n\treturn ipv4;\n}\n\n/** Convert a hex-form IPv6 address with an embedded IPv4 destination to dotted decimal. */\nexport function normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(ip: string): string | null {\n\tif (ip.includes(\".\")) return null;\n\tconst address = parseIpv6(ip);\n\tif (address === null) return null;\n\tconst ipv4 = extractEmbeddedIpv4(address);\n\tif (ipv4 === null) return null;\n\treturn `${ipv4 >>> 24}.${(ipv4 >>> 16) & 0xff}.${(ipv4 >>> 8) & 0xff}.${ipv4 & 0xff}`;\n}\n\nfunction isNonPublicIp(ip: string): boolean {\n\tconst parsedIpv4 = parseIpv4(ip);\n\tconst ipv6 = parsedIpv4 === null ? parseIpv6(ip) : null;\n\tconst ipv4 = ipv6 === null ? parsedIpv4 : extractEmbeddedIpv4(ipv6);\n\tif (ipv4 !== null) {\n\t\tif (ALLOWED_IPV4_EXCEPTIONS.has(ipv4)) return false;\n\t\treturn BLOCKED_PATTERNS.some((range) => ipv4 >= range.start && ipv4 <= range.end);\n\t}\n\tif (ipv6 === null) return true;\n\tif (ALLOWED_IPV6_SPECIAL_RANGES.some((range) => isIpv6InRange(ipv6, range))) return false;\n\tif (!isIpv6InRange(ipv6, IPV6_GLOBAL_UNICAST_RANGE)) return true;\n\treturn BLOCKED_IPV6_GLOBAL_UNICAST_RANGES.some((range) => isIpv6InRange(ipv6, range));\n}\n\n/**\n * Error thrown when SSRF protection blocks a URL.\n */\nexport class SsrfError extends Error {\n\tcode = \"SSRF_BLOCKED\" as const;\n\n\tconstructor(message: string) {\n\t\tsuper(message);\n\t\tthis.name = \"SsrfError\";\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate a URL's scheme, hostname, and literal address.\n *\n * Checks:\n * 1. URL is well-formed with http/https scheme\n * 2. Hostname is not a known internal name (localhost, metadata endpoints)\n * 3. If hostname is an IP literal, it is a public address\n *\n * Hostnames also need DNS validation before dispatch. Resolving and checking\n * addresses does not bind an ordinary fetch() connection to those addresses.\n *\n * @throws SsrfError if the URL targets an internal address\n */\n/** Maximum number of redirects to follow in ssrfSafeFetch */\nconst MAX_REDIRECTS = 5;\n\nexport function validateExternalUrl(url: string): URL {\n\tlet parsed: URL;\n\ttry {\n\t\tparsed = new URL(url);\n\t} catch {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Invalid URL\");\n\t}\n\n\t// Only allow http/https\n\tif (!ALLOWED_SCHEMES.has(parsed.protocol)) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(`Scheme '${parsed.protocol}' is not allowed`);\n\t}\n\n\t// Strip brackets from IPv6 hostname\n\tconst hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// Normalize the hostname for blocklist matching: lowercase + strip any\n\t// trailing dots. WHATWG preserves trailing dots on .hostname, so without\n\t// this normalization \"localhost.\" and \"nip.io.\" bypass the checks.\n\tconst normalizedHost = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// Check against known internal hostnames\n\tif (BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES.has(normalizedHost)) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"URLs targeting internal hosts are not allowed\");\n\t}\n\n\t// Check against wildcard DNS services used by SSRF tooling to bypass\n\t// hostname-only checks. Match the apex and any subdomain.\n\tfor (const suffix of BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES) {\n\t\tif (normalizedHost === suffix || normalizedHost.endsWith(`.${suffix}`)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"URLs targeting wildcard DNS services are not allowed\");\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if hostname is a non-public IP address. Use the\n\t// normalized form so \"127.0.0.1..\" and friends don't bypass parseIpv4\n\t// (which rejects extra trailing dots).\n\tif (isIpLiteral(normalizedHost) && isNonPublicIp(normalizedHost)) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"URLs targeting non-public IP addresses are not allowed\");\n\t}\n\n\treturn parsed;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// DNS-aware validation\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * A resolver that maps a hostname to a list of IPv4/IPv6 addresses.\n * Injectable so callers can swap in OS-level DNS on Node, stub it in tests,\n * or point to a different DoH endpoint.\n */\nexport type DnsResolver = (hostname: string) => Promise<string[]>;\n\n/**\n * Module-level default resolver. Tests can swap this with a stub so fetch\n * mocks don't see unexpected DoH round-trips. Production code should leave\n * it alone.\n */\nlet defaultResolver: DnsResolver | null = null;\n\n/** Override the default DNS resolver. Returns the previous value. */\nexport function setDefaultDnsResolver(resolver: DnsResolver | null): DnsResolver | null {\n\tconst previous = defaultResolver;\n\tdefaultResolver = resolver;\n\treturn previous;\n}\n\n/** Timeout for a single DoH request, in milliseconds. */\nconst DOH_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000;\n\n/** Default DoH endpoint — Cloudflare's public resolver. */\nconst DEFAULT_DOH_URL = \"https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query\";\n\ninterface DohAnswer {\n\ttype: number;\n\tdata: string;\n}\n\ninterface DohResponse {\n\tStatus: number;\n\tAnswer: DohAnswer[];\n}\n\nfunction hasProperty<K extends string>(obj: unknown, key: K): obj is Record<K, unknown> {\n\treturn typeof obj === \"object\" && obj !== null && key in obj;\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow an unknown JSON body to a DohResponse shape we can read safely.\n * Throws if the body doesn't look like a DoH response — a malformed body is\n * indistinguishable from a failure and must not be silently treated as empty.\n */\nfunction parseDohResponse(raw: unknown): DohResponse {\n\tif (!hasProperty(raw, \"Status\") || typeof raw.Status !== \"number\") {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\"DoH response missing Status field\");\n\t}\n\tconst answers: DohAnswer[] = [];\n\tif (hasProperty(raw, \"Answer\") && Array.isArray(raw.Answer)) {\n\t\tfor (const entry of raw.Answer) {\n\t\t\tif (\n\t\t\t\thasProperty(entry, \"type\") &&\n\t\t\t\ttypeof entry.type === \"number\" &&\n\t\t\t\tNumber.isInteger(entry.type) &&\n\t\t\t\thasProperty(entry, \"data\") &&\n\t\t\t\ttypeof entry.data === \"string\"\n\t\t\t) {\n\t\t\t\tanswers.push({ type: entry.type, data: entry.data });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn { Status: raw.Status, Answer: answers };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve a hostname via DNS over HTTPS (Cloudflare). Returns all A and AAAA\n * records. Works in both Workers and Node without requiring node:dns.\n *\n * Fails closed: any network error, non-2xx response, or DNS rcode != 0\n * causes a rejected promise so the calling validator treats it as a block.\n */\nexport const cloudflareDohResolver: DnsResolver = async (hostname) => {\n\tasync function query(type: \"A\" | \"AAAA\"): Promise<string[]> {\n\t\tconst expectedAnswerType = type === \"A\" ? 1 : 28;\n\t\tconst params = new URLSearchParams({ name: hostname, type });\n\t\tconst controller = new AbortController();\n\t\tconst timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), DOH_TIMEOUT_MS);\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst response = await globalThis.fetch(`${DEFAULT_DOH_URL}?${params.toString()}`, {\n\t\t\t\theaders: { Accept: \"application/dns-json\" },\n\t\t\t\tsignal: controller.signal,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tif (!response.ok) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(`DoH lookup failed: ${response.status}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst raw = await response.json();\n\t\t\tconst body = parseDohResponse(raw);\n\t\t\t// NXDOMAIN (3) is a legitimate \"does not exist\" — treat as empty.\n\t\t\t// Any other non-zero status (SERVFAIL=2, REFUSED=5, etc.) is\n\t\t\t// ambiguous and could be a split-view attacker hiding records\n\t\t\t// from our resolver. Fail closed.\n\t\t\tif (body.Status === 3) return [];\n\t\t\tif (body.Status !== 0) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(`DoH ${type} lookup failed: rcode=${body.Status}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// DoH Answer arrays often include CNAME records alongside A/AAAA\n\t\t\t// records. Their `data` is a hostname, not an IP. Filter to just\n\t\t\t// IP literals of the requested record type.\n\t\t\treturn body.Answer.filter((answer) => answer.type === expectedAnswerType)\n\t\t\t\t.map((answer) => answer.data)\n\t\t\t\t.filter(isIpLiteral);\n\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\tclearTimeout(timeout);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tconst [a, aaaa] = await Promise.all([query(\"A\"), query(\"AAAA\")]);\n\treturn [...a, ...aaaa];\n};\n\n/**\n * Validate a URL and reject hostnames that resolve to non-public addresses,\n * including wildcard DNS services like nip.io used by exploit tooling.\n *\n * Runs `validateExternalUrl` first for cheap pre-flight checks (scheme,\n * literal IP, known-bad hostnames). Then resolves the hostname and rejects\n * if ANY returned address is non-public.\n *\n * Fails closed: if resolution fails or returns no records, throws SsrfError.\n *\n * **Caveats.** This does NOT fully close the TOCTOU between check and\n * connect. Attacks that still work against this layer include:\n *\n * - TTL=0 rebind: authoritative server returns public IP to the check, then\n *   private IP to the subsequent fetch() a few milliseconds later.\n * - Split-view via EDNS Client Subnet or source-IP inspection: the\n *   authoritative server returns public IP to Cloudflare's DoH resolver and\n *   private IP to the victim's own resolver (used by fetch()).\n * - Host-file overrides or split-horizon corporate DNS on self-hosted Node.\n * - Attacker-controlled rebinding services the caller has allowlisted.\n *\n * Connections must use the addresses from resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget\n * to avoid a second lookup. Callers using ordinary fetch() need network-level\n * egress controls to prevent these attacks.\n */\nexport async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(\n\turl: string,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver },\n): Promise<URL> {\n\treturn (await resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget(url, options)).url;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedExternalUrlTarget {\n\turl: URL;\n\taddresses: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate a URL and return the exact public addresses approved for the\n * subsequent connection.\n */\nexport async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget(\n\turl: string,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver },\n): Promise<ResolvedExternalUrlTarget> {\n\tconst parsed = validateExternalUrl(url);\n\n\t// Strip brackets from IPv6 hostnames\n\tconst hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// If the hostname is already an IP literal, validateExternalUrl has\n\t// already checked it against the non-public ranges. Skip DNS.\n\tif (isIpLiteral(hostname)) {\n\t\treturn { url: parsed, addresses: [hostname] };\n\t}\n\n\tconst resolver = options?.resolver ?? defaultResolver ?? cloudflareDohResolver;\n\n\tlet addresses: string[];\n\ttry {\n\t\taddresses = await resolver(hostname);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\n\t\t\t`Could not resolve hostname: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tif (addresses.length === 0) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolved to no addresses\");\n\t}\n\n\tfor (const ip of addresses) {\n\t\tif (!isIpLiteral(ip)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolver returned a non-IP address\");\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (isNonPublicIp(ip)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolves to a non-public IP address\");\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn { url: parsed, addresses };\n}\n\n/** True when a string is a valid IPv4 or IPv6 literal. */\nfunction isIpLiteral(host: string): boolean {\n\treturn parseIpv4(host) !== null || parseIpv6(host) !== null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch a URL with SSRF protection on redirects.\n *\n * Uses `redirect: \"manual\"` to intercept redirects and re-validate each\n * redirect target against SSRF rules before following it. This prevents\n * an attacker from setting up an allowed external URL that redirects to\n * an internal IP (e.g. 169.254.169.254 for cloud metadata).\n *\n * @throws SsrfError if the initial URL or any redirect target is internal\n */\n/** Headers that must be stripped when a redirect crosses origins */\nconst CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = [\"authorization\", \"cookie\", \"proxy-authorization\"];\n\nexport async function ssrfSafeFetch(\n\turl: string,\n\tinit?: RequestInit,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver; httpsOnly?: boolean },\n): Promise<Response> {\n\tlet currentUrl = url;\n\tlet currentInit = init;\n\n\tfor (let i = 0; i <= MAX_REDIRECTS; i++) {\n\t\tconst validated = await resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(currentUrl, options);\n\t\tif (options?.httpsOnly === true && validated.protocol !== \"https:\") {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Only HTTPS URLs are allowed\");\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst response = await globalThis.fetch(currentUrl, {\n\t\t\t...currentInit,\n\t\t\tredirect: \"manual\",\n\t\t});\n\n\t\t// Not a redirect -- return directly\n\t\tif (response.status < 300 || response.status >= 400) {\n\t\t\treturn response;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Extract redirect target\n\t\tconst location = response.headers.get(\"Location\");\n\t\tif (!location) {\n\t\t\treturn response;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Resolve relative redirects against the current URL\n\t\tconst previousOrigin = new URL(currentUrl).origin;\n\t\tcurrentUrl = new URL(location, currentUrl).href;\n\t\tconst nextOrigin = new URL(currentUrl).origin;\n\n\t\t// Strip credential headers on cross-origin redirects\n\t\tif (previousOrigin !== nextOrigin && currentInit) {\n\t\t\tcurrentInit = stripCredentialHeaders(currentInit);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tthrow new SsrfError(`Too many redirects (max ${MAX_REDIRECTS})`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Return a copy of init with credential headers removed.\n */\nexport function stripCredentialHeaders(init: RequestInit): RequestInit {\n\tif (!init.headers) return init;\n\n\tconst headers = new Headers(init.headers);\n\tfor (const name of CREDENTIAL_HEADERS) {\n\t\theaders.delete(name);\n\t}\n\n\treturn { ...init, headers };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAMA,MAAM,uBAAuB;AAC7B,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAC1B,MAAM,oBAAoB;;AAG1B,MAAM,uBAAuB;;;;AAK7B,MAAM,mBAA0D;CAE/D;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAEhE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAElE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAErE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAEpE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAEtE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAEpE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI;EAAE;CAEhE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI;EAAE;CAEhE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI;EAAE;CAEpE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAEtE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAEpE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CACtE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAEpE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CACpE;AAED,MAAM,0BAA0B,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AAO1F,SAAS,UAAU,SAAiB,cAAiC;CACpE,MAAM,SAAS,UAAU,QAAQ;AACjC,KAAI,WAAW,KAAM,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,uBAAuB,QAAQ,GAAG,eAAe;AACtF,QAAO;EAAE,SAAS;EAAQ;EAAc;;AAGzC,MAAM,4BAA4B,UAAU,UAAU,EAAE;AACxD,MAAM,6BAA6B,UAAU,MAAM,GAAG;AACtD,MAAM,4BAAyC;CAC9C;CACA,UAAU,cAAc,GAAG;CAC3B,UAAU,gBAAgB,GAAG;CAC7B,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG;CAC1B;;AAGD,MAAM,8BAA2C;CAChD,UAAU,aAAa,IAAI;CAC3B,UAAU,aAAa,IAAI;CAC3B,UAAU,aAAa,IAAI;CAC3B,UAAU,YAAY,GAAG;CACzB,UAAU,gBAAgB,GAAG;CAC7B,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG;CAC1B,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG;CAC1B;;AAGD,MAAM,qCAAkD;CACvD,UAAU,UAAU,GAAG;CACvB,UAAU,cAAc,GAAG;CAC3B,UAAU,UAAU,GAAG;CACvB,UAAU,UAAU,GAAG;CACvB,UAAU,UAAU,GAAG;CACvB;AAOD,MAAM,oBAAoB,IAAI,IAAI;CACjC;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA,CAAC;;;;;;;;;AAUF,MAAM,4BAA4B;CACjC;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;;AAGD,MAAM,kBAAkB,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC;AAEpD,SAAS,SAAS,GAAW,GAAW,GAAW,GAAmB;AACrE,SAAS,KAAK,KAAO,KAAK,KAAO,KAAK,IAAK,OAAO;;AAGnD,SAAS,UAAU,IAA2B;CAC7C,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI;AAC3B,KAAI,MAAM,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;CAE/B,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAU,kBAAkB,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,IAAY;AAC5F,KAAI,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,CAAE,QAAO;AAEvE,QAAO,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG;;AAGpD,SAAS,UAAU,IAA6B;CAC/C,IAAI,UAAU;AACd,KAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE;EAC1B,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI;AAC1C,MAAI,cAAc,GAAI,QAAO;EAC7B,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,QAAQ,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;AACpD,MAAI,SAAS,KAAM,QAAO;AAC1B,YAAU,GAAG,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,SAAS,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,OAAQ,SAAS,GAAG;;AAE1G,KAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS,EAAG,QAAO;CAEtE,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK;CACrD,MAAM,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;CACnD,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI;CACjD,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK;AAChC,KAAI,MAAM,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC,kBAAkB,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM,SAAS,EAAG,QAAO;AACpF,KAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;CAE5E,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,SAAS;AAC9D,QAAO;EAAC,GAAG;EAAM,GAAG,MAAM,KAAa,EAAE,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE,GAAG;EAAK,CAAC,KAAK,SACtF,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,CACzB;;AAGF,SAAS,cAAc,SAAmB,OAA2B;CACpE,MAAM,gBAAgB,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG;AACzD,MAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,eAAe,IAClC,KAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAI,QAAO;CAG7C,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,eAAe;AAC3C,KAAI,kBAAkB,EAAG,QAAO;CAChC,MAAM,OAAQ,SAAW,KAAK,gBAAkB;AAChD,SAAQ,QAAQ,iBAAiB,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB;;AAG5E,SAAS,oBAAoB,SAAkC;AAC9D,KAAI,CAAC,0BAA0B,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,SAAS,MAAM,CAAC,CAAE,QAAO;CACtF,MAAM,QAAS,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAEnD,KAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,cAAc,SAAS,2BAA2B,CAAE,QAAO;AAC5E,QAAO;;AAaR,SAAS,cAAc,IAAqB;CAC3C,MAAM,aAAa,UAAU,GAAG;CAChC,MAAM,OAAO,eAAe,OAAO,UAAU,GAAG,GAAG;CACnD,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,aAAa,oBAAoB,KAAK;AACnE,KAAI,SAAS,MAAM;AAClB,MAAI,wBAAwB,IAAI,KAAK,CAAE,QAAO;AAC9C,SAAO,iBAAiB,MAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI;;AAElF,KAAI,SAAS,KAAM,QAAO;AAC1B,KAAI,4BAA4B,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,CAAE,QAAO;AACpF,KAAI,CAAC,cAAc,MAAM,0BAA0B,CAAE,QAAO;AAC5D,QAAO,mCAAmC,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;;;;;AAMtF,IAAa,YAAb,cAA+B,MAAM;CACpC,OAAO;CAEP,YAAY,SAAiB;AAC5B,QAAM,QAAQ;AACd,OAAK,OAAO;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAkBd,MAAM,gBAAgB;AAEtB,SAAgB,oBAAoB,KAAkB;CACrD,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACH,WAAS,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI;SACd;AACP,QAAM,IAAI,UAAU,cAAc;;AAInC,KAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,CACxC,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,WAAW,OAAO,SAAS,kBAAkB;CASlE,MAAM,iBALW,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,sBAAsB,GAAG,CAKlC,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,sBAAsB,GAAG;AAG/E,KAAI,kBAAkB,IAAI,eAAe,CACxC,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,gDAAgD;AAKrE,MAAK,MAAM,UAAU,0BACpB,KAAI,mBAAmB,UAAU,eAAe,SAAS,IAAI,SAAS,CACrE,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,uDAAuD;AAO7E,KAAI,YAAY,eAAe,IAAI,cAAc,eAAe,CAC/D,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,yDAAyD;AAG9E,QAAO;;;;;;;AAmBR,IAAI,kBAAsC;;AAU1C,MAAM,iBAAiB;;AAGvB,MAAM,kBAAkB;AAYxB,SAAS,YAA8B,KAAc,KAAmC;AACvF,QAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO;;;;;;;AAQ1D,SAAS,iBAAiB,KAA2B;AACpD,KAAI,CAAC,YAAY,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,SACxD,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,oCAAoC;CAErD,MAAM,UAAuB,EAAE;AAC/B,KAAI,YAAY,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,EAC1D;OAAK,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,OACvB,KACC,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,IAC1B,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,YACtB,OAAO,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,IAC5B,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,IAC1B,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,SAEtB,SAAQ,KAAK;GAAE,MAAM,MAAM;GAAM,MAAM,MAAM;GAAM,CAAC;;AAIvD,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI;EAAQ,QAAQ;EAAS;;;;;;;;;AAU/C,MAAa,wBAAqC,OAAO,aAAa;CACrE,eAAe,MAAM,MAAuC;EAC3D,MAAM,qBAAqB,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI;EAC9C,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,gBAAgB;GAAE,MAAM;GAAU;GAAM,CAAC;EAC5D,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,iBAAiB;EACxC,MAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,WAAW,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe;AACpE,MAAI;GACH,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,GAAG,gBAAgB,GAAG,OAAO,UAAU,IAAI;IAClF,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,wBAAwB;IAC3C,QAAQ,WAAW;IACnB,CAAC;AACF,OAAI,CAAC,SAAS,GACb,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,sBAAsB,SAAS,SAAS;GAGzD,MAAM,OAAO,iBADD,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,CACC;AAKlC,OAAI,KAAK,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE;AAChC,OAAI,KAAK,WAAW,EACnB,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,wBAAwB,KAAK,SAAS;AAKnE,UAAO,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAO,SAAS,mBAAmB,CACvE,KAAK,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,CAC5B,OAAO,YAAY;YACZ;AACT,gBAAa,QAAQ;;;CAIvB,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;AAChE,QAAO,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4BvB,eAAsB,8BACrB,KACA,SACe;AACf,SAAQ,MAAM,oCAAoC,KAAK,QAAQ,EAAE;;;;;;AAYlE,eAAsB,oCACrB,KACA,SACqC;CACrC,MAAM,SAAS,oBAAoB,IAAI;CAGvC,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,sBAAsB,GAAG;AAIlE,KAAI,YAAY,SAAS,CACxB,QAAO;EAAE,KAAK;EAAQ,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS;EAAE;CAG9C,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,YAAY,mBAAmB;CAEzD,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACH,cAAY,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS;UAC5B,OAAO;AACf,QAAM,IAAI,UACT,+BAA+B,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM,GACrF;;AAGF,KAAI,UAAU,WAAW,EACxB,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,oCAAoC;AAGzD,MAAK,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,YAAY,GAAG,CACnB,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,8CAA8C;AAEnE,MAAI,cAAc,GAAG,CACpB,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,+CAA+C;;AAIrE,QAAO;EAAE,KAAK;EAAQ;EAAW;;;AAIlC,SAAS,YAAY,MAAuB;AAC3C,QAAO,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAcxD,MAAM,qBAAqB;CAAC;CAAiB;CAAU;CAAsB;AAE7E,eAAsB,cACrB,KACA,MACA,SACoB;CACpB,IAAI,aAAa;CACjB,IAAI,cAAc;AAElB,MAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,eAAe,KAAK;EACxC,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,8BAA8B,YAAY,QAAQ;AAC1E,MAAI,SAAS,cAAc,QAAQ,UAAU,aAAa,SACzD,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,8BAA8B;EAGnD,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,YAAY;GACnD,GAAG;GACH,UAAU;GACV,CAAC;AAGF,MAAI,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,SAAS,UAAU,IAC/C,QAAO;EAIR,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW;AACjD,MAAI,CAAC,SACJ,QAAO;EAIR,MAAM,iBAAiB,IAAI,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC;AAC3C,eAAa,IAAI,IAAI,UAAU,WAAW,CAAC;AAI3C,MAAI,mBAHe,IAAI,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,UAGF,YACpC,eAAc,uBAAuB,YAAY;;AAInD,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,2BAA2B,cAAc,GAAG;;;;;AAMjE,SAAgB,uBAAuB,MAAgC;AACtE,KAAI,CAAC,KAAK,QAAS,QAAO;CAE1B,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ;AACzC,MAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,mBAClB,SAAQ,OAAO,KAAK;AAGrB,QAAO;EAAE,GAAG;EAAM;EAAS"}