emdash 0.37.0 → 0.39.0

package/dist/ssrf-5sIM5jzl.mjs

@@ -1,349 +0,0 @@
-//#region src/security/ssrf.ts
-/**
-* SSRF protection for import URLs.
-*
-* Validates that URLs don't target internal/private network addresses.
-* Applied before any fetch() call in the import pipeline.
-*/
-const IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_DOTTED_PATTERN = /^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/i;
-const IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_HEX_PATTERN = /^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;
-const IPV4_TRANSLATED_HEX_PATTERN = /^::ffff:0:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;
-const IPV6_EXPANDED_MAPPED_PATTERN = /^0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;
-/**
-* IPv4-compatible (deprecated) addresses: ::XXXX:XXXX
-*
-* The WHATWG URL parser normalizes [::127.0.0.1] to [::7f00:1] (no ffff prefix).
-* These are deprecated but still parsed, and bypass the ffff-based checks.
-*/
-const IPV4_COMPATIBLE_HEX_PATTERN = /^::([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;
-/**
-* NAT64 prefix (RFC 6052): 64:ff9b::XXXX:XXXX
-*
-* Used by NAT64 gateways to embed IPv4 addresses in IPv6.
-* [64:ff9b::127.0.0.1] normalizes to [64:ff9b::7f00:1].
-*/
-const NAT64_HEX_PATTERN = /^64:ff9b::([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;
-const IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN = /^\[|\]$/g;
-/** Match fc00::/7 ULA — first byte 0xfc or 0xfd followed by any byte. */
-const IPV6_ULA_FC_PATTERN = /^fc[0-9a-f]{2}:/;
-const IPV6_ULA_FD_PATTERN = /^fd[0-9a-f]{2}:/;
-/** Strip trailing dots from an FQDN-form hostname ("localhost." -> "localhost"). */
-const TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN = /\.+$/;
-/**
-* Private and reserved IP ranges that should never be fetched.
-*
-* Includes:
-* - Loopback (127.0.0.0/8)
-* - Private (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
-* - Link-local (169.254.0.0/16)
-* - Cloud metadata (169.254.169.254 — AWS/GCP/Azure)
-* - IPv6 loopback and link-local
-*/
-const BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
-	{
-		start: ip4ToNum(127, 0, 0, 0),
-		end: ip4ToNum(127, 255, 255, 255)
-	},
-	{
-		start: ip4ToNum(10, 0, 0, 0),
-		end: ip4ToNum(10, 255, 255, 255)
-	},
-	{
-		start: ip4ToNum(172, 16, 0, 0),
-		end: ip4ToNum(172, 31, 255, 255)
-	},
-	{
-		start: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 0, 0),
-		end: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 255, 255)
-	},
-	{
-		start: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 0, 0),
-		end: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 255, 255)
-	},
-	{
-		start: ip4ToNum(0, 0, 0, 0),
-		end: ip4ToNum(0, 255, 255, 255)
-	}
-];
-const BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES = new Set([
-	"localhost",
-	"metadata.google.internal",
-	"metadata.google",
-	"::1"
-]);
-/**
-* Wildcard DNS services that publicly resolve arbitrary IPs embedded in the
-* hostname. Commonly used in local dev and by SSRF exploit tooling to bypass
-* hostname-only blocklists (e.g. 127.0.0.1.nip.io -> 127.0.0.1).
-*
-* Matched case-insensitively as a suffix, so both the apex and any subdomain
-* are blocked.
-*/
-const BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES = [
-	"nip.io",
-	"sslip.io",
-	"xip.io",
-	"traefik.me",
-	"lvh.me",
-	"localtest.me"
-];
-/** Blocked URL schemes */
-const ALLOWED_SCHEMES = new Set(["http:", "https:"]);
-function ip4ToNum(a, b, c, d) {
-	return (a << 24 | b << 16 | c << 8 | d) >>> 0;
-}
-function parseIpv4(ip) {
-	const parts = ip.split(".");
-	if (parts.length !== 4) return null;
-	const nums = parts.map(Number);
-	if (nums.some((n) => isNaN(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return null;
-	return ip4ToNum(nums[0], nums[1], nums[2], nums[3]);
-}
-/**
-* Convert IPv4-mapped/translated IPv6 addresses from hex form back to IPv4.
-*
-* The WHATWG URL parser normalizes dotted-decimal to hex:
-*   [::ffff:127.0.0.1] -> [::ffff:7f00:1]
-*   [::ffff:169.254.169.254] -> [::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]
-*
-* Without this conversion, the hex forms bypass isPrivateIp() regex checks.
-*/
-function normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(ip) {
-	let match = ip.match(IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_HEX_PATTERN);
-	if (!match) match = ip.match(IPV4_TRANSLATED_HEX_PATTERN);
-	if (!match) match = ip.match(IPV6_EXPANDED_MAPPED_PATTERN);
-	if (!match) match = ip.match(IPV4_COMPATIBLE_HEX_PATTERN);
-	if (!match) match = ip.match(NAT64_HEX_PATTERN);
-	if (match) {
-		const high = parseInt(match[1] ?? "", 16);
-		const low = parseInt(match[2] ?? "", 16);
-		return `${high >> 8 & 255}.${high & 255}.${low >> 8 & 255}.${low & 255}`;
-	}
-	return null;
-}
-function isPrivateIp(ip) {
-	const normalized = ip.toLowerCase();
-	if (normalized === "::1" || normalized === "::ffff:127.0.0.1") return true;
-	const hexIpv4 = normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(normalized);
-	if (hexIpv4) return isPrivateIp(hexIpv4);
-	const v4Match = normalized.match(IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_DOTTED_PATTERN);
-	const num = parseIpv4(v4Match ? v4Match[1] : normalized);
-	if (num === null) return normalized.startsWith("fe80:") || IPV6_ULA_FC_PATTERN.test(normalized) || IPV6_ULA_FD_PATTERN.test(normalized);
-	return BLOCKED_PATTERNS.some((range) => num >= range.start && num <= range.end);
-}
-/**
-* Error thrown when SSRF protection blocks a URL.
-*/
-var SsrfError = class extends Error {
-	code = "SSRF_BLOCKED";
-	constructor(message) {
-		super(message);
-		this.name = "SsrfError";
-	}
-};
-/**
-* Validate that a URL is safe to fetch (not targeting internal networks).
-*
-* Checks:
-* 1. URL is well-formed with http/https scheme
-* 2. Hostname is not a known internal name (localhost, metadata endpoints)
-* 3. If hostname is an IP literal, it's not in a private range
-*
-* Note: DNS rebinding attacks are not fully mitigated (hostname could resolve
-* to a private IP). Full protection requires resolving DNS and checking the IP
-* before connecting, which needs a custom fetch implementation. This covers
-* the most common SSRF vectors.
-*
-* @throws SsrfError if the URL targets an internal address
-*/
-/** Maximum number of redirects to follow in ssrfSafeFetch */
-const MAX_REDIRECTS = 5;
-function validateExternalUrl(url) {
-	let parsed;
-	try {
-		parsed = new URL(url);
-	} catch {
-		throw new SsrfError("Invalid URL");
-	}
-	if (!ALLOWED_SCHEMES.has(parsed.protocol)) throw new SsrfError(`Scheme '${parsed.protocol}' is not allowed`);
-	const normalizedHost = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, "").toLowerCase().replace(TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN, "");
-	if (BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES.has(normalizedHost)) throw new SsrfError("URLs targeting internal hosts are not allowed");
-	for (const suffix of BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES) if (normalizedHost === suffix || normalizedHost.endsWith(`.${suffix}`)) throw new SsrfError("URLs targeting wildcard DNS services are not allowed");
-	if (isPrivateIp(normalizedHost)) throw new SsrfError("URLs targeting private IP addresses are not allowed");
-	return parsed;
-}
-/**
-* Module-level default resolver. Tests can swap this with a stub so fetch
-* mocks don't see unexpected DoH round-trips. Production code should leave
-* it alone.
-*/
-let defaultResolver = null;
-/** Timeout for a single DoH request, in milliseconds. */
-const DOH_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e3;
-/** Default DoH endpoint — Cloudflare's public resolver. */
-const DEFAULT_DOH_URL = "https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query";
-function hasProperty(obj, key) {
-	return typeof obj === "object" && obj !== null && key in obj;
-}
-/**
-* Narrow an unknown JSON body to a DohResponse shape we can read safely.
-* Throws if the body doesn't look like a DoH response — a malformed body is
-* indistinguishable from a failure and must not be silently treated as empty.
-*/
-function parseDohResponse(raw) {
-	if (!hasProperty(raw, "Status") || typeof raw.Status !== "number") throw new Error("DoH response missing Status field");
-	const answers = [];
-	if (hasProperty(raw, "Answer") && Array.isArray(raw.Answer)) {
-		for (const entry of raw.Answer) if (hasProperty(entry, "data") && typeof entry.data === "string") answers.push({ data: entry.data });
-	}
-	return {
-		Status: raw.Status,
-		Answer: answers
-	};
-}
-/**
-* Resolve a hostname via DNS over HTTPS (Cloudflare). Returns all A and AAAA
-* records. Works in both Workers and Node without requiring node:dns.
-*
-* Fails closed: any network error, non-2xx response, or DNS rcode != 0
-* causes a rejected promise so the calling validator treats it as a block.
-*/
-const cloudflareDohResolver = async (hostname) => {
-	async function query(type) {
-		const params = new URLSearchParams({
-			name: hostname,
-			type
-		});
-		const controller = new AbortController();
-		const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), DOH_TIMEOUT_MS);
-		try {
-			const response = await globalThis.fetch(`${DEFAULT_DOH_URL}?${params.toString()}`, {
-				headers: { Accept: "application/dns-json" },
-				signal: controller.signal
-			});
-			if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`DoH lookup failed: ${response.status}`);
-			const body = parseDohResponse(await response.json());
-			if (body.Status === 3) return [];
-			if (body.Status !== 0) throw new Error(`DoH ${type} lookup failed: rcode=${body.Status}`);
-			return body.Answer.map((a) => a.data).filter(isIpLiteral);
-		} finally {
-			clearTimeout(timeout);
-		}
-	}
-	const [a, aaaa] = await Promise.all([query("A"), query("AAAA")]);
-	return [...a, ...aaaa];
-};
-/**
-* Validate a URL and resolve its hostname to check the actual IPs against
-* the private-range blocklist. This catches DNS rebinding attacks using
-* attacker-controlled domains that publicly resolve to private addresses,
-* and wildcard DNS services like nip.io used by exploit tooling.
-*
-* Runs `validateExternalUrl` first for cheap pre-flight checks (scheme,
-* literal IP, known-bad hostnames). Then resolves the hostname and rejects
-* if ANY returned address is private.
-*
-* Fails closed: if resolution fails or returns no records, throws SsrfError.
-*
-* **Caveats.** This does NOT fully close the TOCTOU between check and
-* connect. Attacks that still work against this layer include:
-*
-* - TTL=0 rebind: authoritative server returns public IP to the check, then
-*   private IP to the subsequent fetch() a few milliseconds later.
-* - Split-view via EDNS Client Subnet or source-IP inspection: the
-*   authoritative server returns public IP to Cloudflare's DoH resolver and
-*   private IP to the victim's own resolver (used by fetch()).
-* - Host-file overrides or split-horizon corporate DNS on self-hosted Node.
-* - Attacker-controlled rebinding services the caller has allowlisted.
-*
-* The only complete defense is a network-layer egress firewall. On
-* Cloudflare Workers, the platform fetch pipeline provides most of that.
-* On self-hosted Node, operators must restrict egress themselves.
-*/
-async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(url, options) {
-	return (await resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget(url, options)).url;
-}
-/**
-* Validate a URL and return the exact public addresses approved for the
-* subsequent connection.
-*/
-async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget(url, options) {
-	const parsed = validateExternalUrl(url);
-	const hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, "");
-	if (isIpLiteral(hostname)) return {
-		url: parsed,
-		addresses: [hostname]
-	};
-	const resolver = options?.resolver ?? defaultResolver ?? cloudflareDohResolver;
-	let addresses;
-	try {
-		addresses = await resolver(hostname);
-	} catch (error) {
-		throw new SsrfError(`Could not resolve hostname: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`);
-	}
-	if (addresses.length === 0) throw new SsrfError("Hostname resolved to no addresses");
-	for (const ip of addresses) {
-		if (!isIpLiteral(ip)) throw new SsrfError("Hostname resolver returned a non-IP address");
-		if (isPrivateIp(ip)) throw new SsrfError("Hostname resolves to a private IP address");
-	}
-	return {
-		url: parsed,
-		addresses
-	};
-}
-/** True when a string looks like an IPv4 or IPv6 literal. */
-function isIpLiteral(host) {
-	if (parseIpv4(host) !== null) return true;
-	return host.includes(":");
-}
-/**
-* Fetch a URL with SSRF protection on redirects.
-*
-* Uses `redirect: "manual"` to intercept redirects and re-validate each
-* redirect target against SSRF rules before following it. This prevents
-* an attacker from setting up an allowed external URL that redirects to
-* an internal IP (e.g. 169.254.169.254 for cloud metadata).
-*
-* @throws SsrfError if the initial URL or any redirect target is internal
-*/
-/** Headers that must be stripped when a redirect crosses origins */
-const CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = [
-	"authorization",
-	"cookie",
-	"proxy-authorization"
-];
-async function ssrfSafeFetch(url, init, options) {
-	let currentUrl = url;
-	let currentInit = init;
-	for (let i = 0; i <= MAX_REDIRECTS; i++) {
-		const validated = await resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(currentUrl, options);
-		if (options?.httpsOnly === true && validated.protocol !== "https:") throw new SsrfError("Only HTTPS URLs are allowed");
-		const response = await globalThis.fetch(currentUrl, {
-			...currentInit,
-			redirect: "manual"
-		});
-		if (response.status < 300 || response.status >= 400) return response;
-		const location = response.headers.get("Location");
-		if (!location) return response;
-		const previousOrigin = new URL(currentUrl).origin;
-		currentUrl = new URL(location, currentUrl).href;
-		if (previousOrigin !== new URL(currentUrl).origin && currentInit) currentInit = stripCredentialHeaders(currentInit);
-	}
-	throw new SsrfError(`Too many redirects (max ${MAX_REDIRECTS})`);
-}
-/**
-* Return a copy of init with credential headers removed.
-*/
-function stripCredentialHeaders(init) {
-	if (!init.headers) return init;
-	const headers = new Headers(init.headers);
-	for (const name of CREDENTIAL_HEADERS) headers.delete(name);
-	return {
-		...init,
-		headers
-	};
-}
-
-//#endregion
-export { ssrfSafeFetch as a, resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget as i, cloudflareDohResolver as n, stripCredentialHeaders as o, resolveAndValidateExternalUrl as r, validateExternalUrl as s, SsrfError as t };
-//# sourceMappingURL=ssrf-5sIM5jzl.mjs.map

package/dist/ssrf-5sIM5jzl.mjs.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"ssrf-5sIM5jzl.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/security/ssrf.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * SSRF protection for import URLs.\n *\n * Validates that URLs don't target internal/private network addresses.\n * Applied before any fetch() call in the import pipeline.\n */\n\nconst IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_DOTTED_PATTERN = /^::ffff:(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)$/i;\nconst IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_HEX_PATTERN = /^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\nconst IPV4_TRANSLATED_HEX_PATTERN = /^::ffff:0:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\nconst IPV6_EXPANDED_MAPPED_PATTERN =\n\t/^0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\n\n/**\n * IPv4-compatible (deprecated) addresses: ::XXXX:XXXX\n *\n * The WHATWG URL parser normalizes [::127.0.0.1] to [::7f00:1] (no ffff prefix).\n * These are deprecated but still parsed, and bypass the ffff-based checks.\n */\nconst IPV4_COMPATIBLE_HEX_PATTERN = /^::([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\n\n/**\n * NAT64 prefix (RFC 6052): 64:ff9b::XXXX:XXXX\n *\n * Used by NAT64 gateways to embed IPv4 addresses in IPv6.\n * [64:ff9b::127.0.0.1] normalizes to [64:ff9b::7f00:1].\n */\nconst NAT64_HEX_PATTERN = /^64:ff9b::([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\n\nconst IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN = /^\\[|\\]$/g;\n\n/** Match fc00::/7 ULA — first byte 0xfc or 0xfd followed by any byte. */\nconst IPV6_ULA_FC_PATTERN = /^fc[0-9a-f]{2}:/;\nconst IPV6_ULA_FD_PATTERN = /^fd[0-9a-f]{2}:/;\n\n/** Strip trailing dots from an FQDN-form hostname (\"localhost.\" -> \"localhost\"). */\nconst TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN = /\\.+$/;\n\n/**\n * Private and reserved IP ranges that should never be fetched.\n *\n * Includes:\n * - Loopback (127.0.0.0/8)\n * - Private (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)\n * - Link-local (169.254.0.0/16)\n * - Cloud metadata (169.254.169.254 — AWS/GCP/Azure)\n * - IPv6 loopback and link-local\n */\nconst BLOCKED_PATTERNS: Array<{ start: number; end: number }> = [\n\t// 127.0.0.0/8 — loopback\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(127, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(127, 255, 255, 255) },\n\t// 10.0.0.0/8 — private\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(10, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(10, 255, 255, 255) },\n\t// 172.16.0.0/12 — private\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(172, 16, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(172, 31, 255, 255) },\n\t// 192.168.0.0/16 — private\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 255, 255) },\n\t// 169.254.0.0/16 — link-local (includes cloud metadata endpoint)\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 255, 255) },\n\t// 0.0.0.0/8 — current network\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(0, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(0, 255, 255, 255) },\n];\n\n// Bracket-stripped form is used for lookups (validateExternalUrl strips\n// brackets from parsed.hostname before checking), so \"::1\" appears here\n// without brackets. The \"::1\" case is already covered by isPrivateIp, but\n// keeping it here makes the intent explicit and gives a clearer error\n// message for the common `http://[::1]/` form.\nconst BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES = new Set([\n\t\"localhost\",\n\t\"metadata.google.internal\",\n\t\"metadata.google\",\n\t\"::1\",\n]);\n\n/**\n * Wildcard DNS services that publicly resolve arbitrary IPs embedded in the\n * hostname. Commonly used in local dev and by SSRF exploit tooling to bypass\n * hostname-only blocklists (e.g. 127.0.0.1.nip.io -> 127.0.0.1).\n *\n * Matched case-insensitively as a suffix, so both the apex and any subdomain\n * are blocked.\n */\nconst BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES = [\n\t\"nip.io\",\n\t\"sslip.io\",\n\t\"xip.io\",\n\t\"traefik.me\",\n\t\"lvh.me\",\n\t\"localtest.me\",\n];\n\n/** Blocked URL schemes */\nconst ALLOWED_SCHEMES = new Set([\"http:\", \"https:\"]);\n\nfunction ip4ToNum(a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number): number {\n\treturn ((a << 24) | (b << 16) | (c << 8) | d) >>> 0;\n}\n\nfunction parseIpv4(ip: string): number | null {\n\tconst parts = ip.split(\".\");\n\tif (parts.length !== 4) return null;\n\n\tconst nums = parts.map(Number);\n\tif (nums.some((n) => isNaN(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return null;\n\n\treturn ip4ToNum(nums[0], nums[1], nums[2], nums[3]);\n}\n\n/**\n * Convert IPv4-mapped/translated IPv6 addresses from hex form back to IPv4.\n *\n * The WHATWG URL parser normalizes dotted-decimal to hex:\n *   [::ffff:127.0.0.1] -> [::ffff:7f00:1]\n *   [::ffff:169.254.169.254] -> [::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]\n *\n * Without this conversion, the hex forms bypass isPrivateIp() regex checks.\n */\nexport function normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(ip: string): string | null {\n\t// Match hex-form IPv4-mapped IPv6: ::ffff:XXXX:XXXX\n\tlet match = ip.match(IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_HEX_PATTERN);\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match IPv4-translated (RFC 6052): ::ffff:0:XXXX:XXXX\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(IPV4_TRANSLATED_HEX_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match fully expanded form: 0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:ffff:XXXX:XXXX\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(IPV6_EXPANDED_MAPPED_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match IPv4-compatible (deprecated) form: ::XXXX:XXXX (no ffff prefix)\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(IPV4_COMPATIBLE_HEX_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match NAT64 prefix (RFC 6052): 64:ff9b::XXXX:XXXX\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(NAT64_HEX_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (match) {\n\t\tconst high = parseInt(match[1] ?? \"\", 16);\n\t\tconst low = parseInt(match[2] ?? \"\", 16);\n\t\treturn `${(high >> 8) & 0xff}.${high & 0xff}.${(low >> 8) & 0xff}.${low & 0xff}`;\n\t}\n\treturn null;\n}\n\nfunction isPrivateIp(ip: string): boolean {\n\t// Normalize IPv6 strings to lowercase. `new URL().hostname` already\n\t// lowercases, but resolver output (from DoH or an injected resolver) may\n\t// not. Without this, \"FE80::1\" bypasses the link-local check.\n\tconst normalized = ip.toLowerCase();\n\n\t// Handle IPv6 loopback\n\tif (normalized === \"::1\" || normalized === \"::ffff:127.0.0.1\") return true;\n\n\t// Handle IPv4-mapped IPv6 in hex form (WHATWG URL parser normalizes to this)\n\t// e.g. ::ffff:7f00:1 -> 127.0.0.1, ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe -> 169.254.169.254\n\tconst hexIpv4 = normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(normalized);\n\tif (hexIpv4) return isPrivateIp(hexIpv4);\n\n\t// Handle IPv4-mapped IPv6 in dotted-decimal form\n\tconst v4Match = normalized.match(IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_DOTTED_PATTERN);\n\tconst ipv4 = v4Match ? v4Match[1] : normalized;\n\n\tconst num = parseIpv4(ipv4);\n\tif (num === null) {\n\t\t// If we can't parse it, block IPv6 addresses that look internal.\n\t\t// fc00::/7 is Unique Local (first byte 0xfc or 0xfd), fe80::/10 is\n\t\t// link-local. Only match when followed by hex digit + colon to avoid\n\t\t// collisions with hypothetical non-address strings.\n\t\treturn (\n\t\t\tnormalized.startsWith(\"fe80:\") ||\n\t\t\tIPV6_ULA_FC_PATTERN.test(normalized) ||\n\t\t\tIPV6_ULA_FD_PATTERN.test(normalized)\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\treturn BLOCKED_PATTERNS.some((range) => num >= range.start && num <= range.end);\n}\n\n/**\n * Error thrown when SSRF protection blocks a URL.\n */\nexport class SsrfError extends Error {\n\tcode = \"SSRF_BLOCKED\" as const;\n\n\tconstructor(message: string) {\n\t\tsuper(message);\n\t\tthis.name = \"SsrfError\";\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate that a URL is safe to fetch (not targeting internal networks).\n *\n * Checks:\n * 1. URL is well-formed with http/https scheme\n * 2. Hostname is not a known internal name (localhost, metadata endpoints)\n * 3. If hostname is an IP literal, it's not in a private range\n *\n * Note: DNS rebinding attacks are not fully mitigated (hostname could resolve\n * to a private IP). Full protection requires resolving DNS and checking the IP\n * before connecting, which needs a custom fetch implementation. This covers\n * the most common SSRF vectors.\n *\n * @throws SsrfError if the URL targets an internal address\n */\n/** Maximum number of redirects to follow in ssrfSafeFetch */\nconst MAX_REDIRECTS = 5;\n\nexport function validateExternalUrl(url: string): URL {\n\tlet parsed: URL;\n\ttry {\n\t\tparsed = new URL(url);\n\t} catch {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Invalid URL\");\n\t}\n\n\t// Only allow http/https\n\tif (!ALLOWED_SCHEMES.has(parsed.protocol)) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(`Scheme '${parsed.protocol}' is not allowed`);\n\t}\n\n\t// Strip brackets from IPv6 hostname\n\tconst hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// Normalize the hostname for blocklist matching: lowercase + strip any\n\t// trailing dots. WHATWG preserves trailing dots on .hostname, so without\n\t// this normalization \"localhost.\" and \"nip.io.\" bypass the checks.\n\tconst normalizedHost = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// Check against known internal hostnames\n\tif (BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES.has(normalizedHost)) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"URLs targeting internal hosts are not allowed\");\n\t}\n\n\t// Check against wildcard DNS services used by SSRF tooling to bypass\n\t// hostname-only checks. Match the apex and any subdomain.\n\tfor (const suffix of BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES) {\n\t\tif (normalizedHost === suffix || normalizedHost.endsWith(`.${suffix}`)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"URLs targeting wildcard DNS services are not allowed\");\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if hostname is an IP address in a private range. Use the\n\t// normalized form so \"127.0.0.1..\" and friends don't bypass parseIpv4\n\t// (which rejects extra trailing dots).\n\tif (isPrivateIp(normalizedHost)) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"URLs targeting private IP addresses are not allowed\");\n\t}\n\n\treturn parsed;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// DNS-aware validation\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * A resolver that maps a hostname to a list of IPv4/IPv6 addresses.\n * Injectable so callers can swap in OS-level DNS on Node, stub it in tests,\n * or point to a different DoH endpoint.\n */\nexport type DnsResolver = (hostname: string) => Promise<string[]>;\n\n/**\n * Module-level default resolver. Tests can swap this with a stub so fetch\n * mocks don't see unexpected DoH round-trips. Production code should leave\n * it alone.\n */\nlet defaultResolver: DnsResolver | null = null;\n\n/** Override the default DNS resolver. Returns the previous value. */\nexport function setDefaultDnsResolver(resolver: DnsResolver | null): DnsResolver | null {\n\tconst previous = defaultResolver;\n\tdefaultResolver = resolver;\n\treturn previous;\n}\n\n/** Timeout for a single DoH request, in milliseconds. */\nconst DOH_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000;\n\n/** Default DoH endpoint — Cloudflare's public resolver. */\nconst DEFAULT_DOH_URL = \"https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query\";\n\ninterface DohAnswer {\n\tdata: string;\n}\n\ninterface DohResponse {\n\tStatus: number;\n\tAnswer: DohAnswer[];\n}\n\nfunction hasProperty<K extends string>(obj: unknown, key: K): obj is Record<K, unknown> {\n\treturn typeof obj === \"object\" && obj !== null && key in obj;\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow an unknown JSON body to a DohResponse shape we can read safely.\n * Throws if the body doesn't look like a DoH response — a malformed body is\n * indistinguishable from a failure and must not be silently treated as empty.\n */\nfunction parseDohResponse(raw: unknown): DohResponse {\n\tif (!hasProperty(raw, \"Status\") || typeof raw.Status !== \"number\") {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\"DoH response missing Status field\");\n\t}\n\tconst answers: DohAnswer[] = [];\n\tif (hasProperty(raw, \"Answer\") && Array.isArray(raw.Answer)) {\n\t\tfor (const entry of raw.Answer) {\n\t\t\tif (hasProperty(entry, \"data\") && typeof entry.data === \"string\") {\n\t\t\t\tanswers.push({ data: entry.data });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn { Status: raw.Status, Answer: answers };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve a hostname via DNS over HTTPS (Cloudflare). Returns all A and AAAA\n * records. Works in both Workers and Node without requiring node:dns.\n *\n * Fails closed: any network error, non-2xx response, or DNS rcode != 0\n * causes a rejected promise so the calling validator treats it as a block.\n */\nexport const cloudflareDohResolver: DnsResolver = async (hostname) => {\n\tasync function query(type: \"A\" | \"AAAA\"): Promise<string[]> {\n\t\tconst params = new URLSearchParams({ name: hostname, type });\n\t\tconst controller = new AbortController();\n\t\tconst timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), DOH_TIMEOUT_MS);\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst response = await globalThis.fetch(`${DEFAULT_DOH_URL}?${params.toString()}`, {\n\t\t\t\theaders: { Accept: \"application/dns-json\" },\n\t\t\t\tsignal: controller.signal,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tif (!response.ok) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(`DoH lookup failed: ${response.status}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst raw = await response.json();\n\t\t\tconst body = parseDohResponse(raw);\n\t\t\t// NXDOMAIN (3) is a legitimate \"does not exist\" — treat as empty.\n\t\t\t// Any other non-zero status (SERVFAIL=2, REFUSED=5, etc.) is\n\t\t\t// ambiguous and could be a split-view attacker hiding records\n\t\t\t// from our resolver. Fail closed.\n\t\t\tif (body.Status === 3) return [];\n\t\t\tif (body.Status !== 0) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(`DoH ${type} lookup failed: rcode=${body.Status}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// DoH Answer arrays often include CNAME records alongside A/AAAA\n\t\t\t// records. Their `data` is a hostname, not an IP. Filter to just\n\t\t\t// IP literals so isPrivateIp sees real addresses.\n\t\t\treturn body.Answer.map((a) => a.data).filter(isIpLiteral);\n\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\tclearTimeout(timeout);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tconst [a, aaaa] = await Promise.all([query(\"A\"), query(\"AAAA\")]);\n\treturn [...a, ...aaaa];\n};\n\n/**\n * Validate a URL and resolve its hostname to check the actual IPs against\n * the private-range blocklist. This catches DNS rebinding attacks using\n * attacker-controlled domains that publicly resolve to private addresses,\n * and wildcard DNS services like nip.io used by exploit tooling.\n *\n * Runs `validateExternalUrl` first for cheap pre-flight checks (scheme,\n * literal IP, known-bad hostnames). Then resolves the hostname and rejects\n * if ANY returned address is private.\n *\n * Fails closed: if resolution fails or returns no records, throws SsrfError.\n *\n * **Caveats.** This does NOT fully close the TOCTOU between check and\n * connect. Attacks that still work against this layer include:\n *\n * - TTL=0 rebind: authoritative server returns public IP to the check, then\n *   private IP to the subsequent fetch() a few milliseconds later.\n * - Split-view via EDNS Client Subnet or source-IP inspection: the\n *   authoritative server returns public IP to Cloudflare's DoH resolver and\n *   private IP to the victim's own resolver (used by fetch()).\n * - Host-file overrides or split-horizon corporate DNS on self-hosted Node.\n * - Attacker-controlled rebinding services the caller has allowlisted.\n *\n * The only complete defense is a network-layer egress firewall. On\n * Cloudflare Workers, the platform fetch pipeline provides most of that.\n * On self-hosted Node, operators must restrict egress themselves.\n */\nexport async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(\n\turl: string,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver },\n): Promise<URL> {\n\treturn (await resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget(url, options)).url;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedExternalUrlTarget {\n\turl: URL;\n\taddresses: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate a URL and return the exact public addresses approved for the\n * subsequent connection.\n */\nexport async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget(\n\turl: string,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver },\n): Promise<ResolvedExternalUrlTarget> {\n\tconst parsed = validateExternalUrl(url);\n\n\t// Strip brackets from IPv6 hostnames\n\tconst hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// If the hostname is already an IP literal, validateExternalUrl has\n\t// already checked it against the private-range list. Skip DNS.\n\tif (isIpLiteral(hostname)) {\n\t\treturn { url: parsed, addresses: [hostname] };\n\t}\n\n\tconst resolver = options?.resolver ?? defaultResolver ?? cloudflareDohResolver;\n\n\tlet addresses: string[];\n\ttry {\n\t\taddresses = await resolver(hostname);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\n\t\t\t`Could not resolve hostname: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tif (addresses.length === 0) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolved to no addresses\");\n\t}\n\n\tfor (const ip of addresses) {\n\t\tif (!isIpLiteral(ip)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolver returned a non-IP address\");\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (isPrivateIp(ip)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolves to a private IP address\");\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn { url: parsed, addresses };\n}\n\n/** True when a string looks like an IPv4 or IPv6 literal. */\nfunction isIpLiteral(host: string): boolean {\n\tif (parseIpv4(host) !== null) return true;\n\t// Very loose IPv6 heuristic — matches anything with a colon, which is\n\t// never valid in DNS hostnames, so this is safe.\n\treturn host.includes(\":\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch a URL with SSRF protection on redirects.\n *\n * Uses `redirect: \"manual\"` to intercept redirects and re-validate each\n * redirect target against SSRF rules before following it. This prevents\n * an attacker from setting up an allowed external URL that redirects to\n * an internal IP (e.g. 169.254.169.254 for cloud metadata).\n *\n * @throws SsrfError if the initial URL or any redirect target is internal\n */\n/** Headers that must be stripped when a redirect crosses origins */\nconst CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = [\"authorization\", \"cookie\", \"proxy-authorization\"];\n\nexport async function ssrfSafeFetch(\n\turl: string,\n\tinit?: RequestInit,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver; httpsOnly?: boolean },\n): Promise<Response> {\n\tlet currentUrl = url;\n\tlet currentInit = init;\n\n\tfor (let i = 0; i <= MAX_REDIRECTS; i++) {\n\t\tconst validated = await resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(currentUrl, options);\n\t\tif (options?.httpsOnly === true && validated.protocol !== \"https:\") {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Only HTTPS URLs are allowed\");\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst response = await globalThis.fetch(currentUrl, {\n\t\t\t...currentInit,\n\t\t\tredirect: \"manual\",\n\t\t});\n\n\t\t// Not a redirect -- return directly\n\t\tif (response.status < 300 || response.status >= 400) {\n\t\t\treturn response;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Extract redirect target\n\t\tconst location = response.headers.get(\"Location\");\n\t\tif (!location) {\n\t\t\treturn response;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Resolve relative redirects against the current URL\n\t\tconst previousOrigin = new URL(currentUrl).origin;\n\t\tcurrentUrl = new URL(location, currentUrl).href;\n\t\tconst nextOrigin = new URL(currentUrl).origin;\n\n\t\t// Strip credential headers on cross-origin redirects\n\t\tif (previousOrigin !== nextOrigin && currentInit) {\n\t\t\tcurrentInit = stripCredentialHeaders(currentInit);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tthrow new SsrfError(`Too many redirects (max ${MAX_REDIRECTS})`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Return a copy of init with credential headers removed.\n */\nexport function stripCredentialHeaders(init: RequestInit): RequestInit {\n\tif (!init.headers) return init;\n\n\tconst headers = new Headers(init.headers);\n\tfor (const name of CREDENTIAL_HEADERS) {\n\t\theaders.delete(name);\n\t}\n\n\treturn { ...init, headers };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;AAOA,MAAM,kCAAkC;AACxC,MAAM,+BAA+B;AACrC,MAAM,8BAA8B;AACpC,MAAM,+BACL;;;;;;;AAQD,MAAM,8BAA8B;;;;;;;AAQpC,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAE1B,MAAM,uBAAuB;;AAG7B,MAAM,sBAAsB;AAC5B,MAAM,sBAAsB;;AAG5B,MAAM,uBAAuB;;;;;;;;;;;AAY7B,MAAM,mBAA0D;CAE/D;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAEpE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAElE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAEpE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAEtE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAEtE;EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE;EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;EAAE;CAChE;AAOD,MAAM,oBAAoB,IAAI,IAAI;CACjC;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA,CAAC;;;;;;;;;AAUF,MAAM,4BAA4B;CACjC;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;CACA;;AAGD,MAAM,kBAAkB,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC;AAEpD,SAAS,SAAS,GAAW,GAAW,GAAW,GAAmB;AACrE,SAAS,KAAK,KAAO,KAAK,KAAO,KAAK,IAAK,OAAO;;AAGnD,SAAS,UAAU,IAA2B;CAC7C,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI;AAC3B,KAAI,MAAM,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;CAE/B,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO;AAC9B,KAAI,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,CAAE,QAAO;AAE3D,QAAO,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG;;;;;;;;;;;AAYpD,SAAgB,0BAA0B,IAA2B;CAEpE,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,6BAA6B;AAClD,KAAI,CAAC,MAEJ,SAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,4BAA4B;AAE9C,KAAI,CAAC,MAEJ,SAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,6BAA6B;AAE/C,KAAI,CAAC,MAEJ,SAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,4BAA4B;AAE9C,KAAI,CAAC,MAEJ,SAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,kBAAkB;AAEpC,KAAI,OAAO;EACV,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;EACzC,MAAM,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;AACxC,SAAO,GAAI,QAAQ,IAAK,IAAK,GAAG,OAAO,IAAK,GAAI,OAAO,IAAK,IAAK,GAAG,MAAM;;AAE3E,QAAO;;AAGR,SAAS,YAAY,IAAqB;CAIzC,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,aAAa;AAGnC,KAAI,eAAe,SAAS,eAAe,mBAAoB,QAAO;CAItE,MAAM,UAAU,0BAA0B,WAAW;AACrD,KAAI,QAAS,QAAO,YAAY,QAAQ;CAGxC,MAAM,UAAU,WAAW,MAAM,gCAAgC;CAGjE,MAAM,MAAM,UAFC,UAAU,QAAQ,KAAK,WAET;AAC3B,KAAI,QAAQ,KAKX,QACC,WAAW,WAAW,QAAQ,IAC9B,oBAAoB,KAAK,WAAW,IACpC,oBAAoB,KAAK,WAAW;AAItC,QAAO,iBAAiB,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;;;;;AAMhF,IAAa,YAAb,cAA+B,MAAM;CACpC,OAAO;CAEP,YAAY,SAAiB;AAC5B,QAAM,QAAQ;AACd,OAAK,OAAO;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoBd,MAAM,gBAAgB;AAEtB,SAAgB,oBAAoB,KAAkB;CACrD,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACH,WAAS,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI;SACd;AACP,QAAM,IAAI,UAAU,cAAc;;AAInC,KAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,CACxC,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,WAAW,OAAO,SAAS,kBAAkB;CASlE,MAAM,iBALW,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,sBAAsB,GAAG,CAKlC,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,sBAAsB,GAAG;AAG/E,KAAI,kBAAkB,IAAI,eAAe,CACxC,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,gDAAgD;AAKrE,MAAK,MAAM,UAAU,0BACpB,KAAI,mBAAmB,UAAU,eAAe,SAAS,IAAI,SAAS,CACrE,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,uDAAuD;AAO7E,KAAI,YAAY,eAAe,CAC9B,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,sDAAsD;AAG3E,QAAO;;;;;;;AAmBR,IAAI,kBAAsC;;AAU1C,MAAM,iBAAiB;;AAGvB,MAAM,kBAAkB;AAWxB,SAAS,YAA8B,KAAc,KAAmC;AACvF,QAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO;;;;;;;AAQ1D,SAAS,iBAAiB,KAA2B;AACpD,KAAI,CAAC,YAAY,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,SACxD,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,oCAAoC;CAErD,MAAM,UAAuB,EAAE;AAC/B,KAAI,YAAY,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,EAC1D;OAAK,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,OACvB,KAAI,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,SACvD,SAAQ,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;;AAIrC,QAAO;EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI;EAAQ,QAAQ;EAAS;;;;;;;;;AAU/C,MAAa,wBAAqC,OAAO,aAAa;CACrE,eAAe,MAAM,MAAuC;EAC3D,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,gBAAgB;GAAE,MAAM;GAAU;GAAM,CAAC;EAC5D,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,iBAAiB;EACxC,MAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,WAAW,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe;AACpE,MAAI;GACH,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,GAAG,gBAAgB,GAAG,OAAO,UAAU,IAAI;IAClF,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,wBAAwB;IAC3C,QAAQ,WAAW;IACnB,CAAC;AACF,OAAI,CAAC,SAAS,GACb,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,sBAAsB,SAAS,SAAS;GAGzD,MAAM,OAAO,iBADD,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,CACC;AAKlC,OAAI,KAAK,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE;AAChC,OAAI,KAAK,WAAW,EACnB,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,wBAAwB,KAAK,SAAS;AAKnE,UAAO,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,YAAY;YAChD;AACT,gBAAa,QAAQ;;;CAIvB,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;AAChE,QAAO,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA8BvB,eAAsB,8BACrB,KACA,SACe;AACf,SAAQ,MAAM,oCAAoC,KAAK,QAAQ,EAAE;;;;;;AAYlE,eAAsB,oCACrB,KACA,SACqC;CACrC,MAAM,SAAS,oBAAoB,IAAI;CAGvC,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,sBAAsB,GAAG;AAIlE,KAAI,YAAY,SAAS,CACxB,QAAO;EAAE,KAAK;EAAQ,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS;EAAE;CAG9C,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,YAAY,mBAAmB;CAEzD,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACH,cAAY,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS;UAC5B,OAAO;AACf,QAAM,IAAI,UACT,+BAA+B,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM,GACrF;;AAGF,KAAI,UAAU,WAAW,EACxB,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,oCAAoC;AAGzD,MAAK,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,YAAY,GAAG,CACnB,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,8CAA8C;AAEnE,MAAI,YAAY,GAAG,CAClB,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,4CAA4C;;AAIlE,QAAO;EAAE,KAAK;EAAQ;EAAW;;;AAIlC,SAAS,YAAY,MAAuB;AAC3C,KAAI,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,KAAM,QAAO;AAGrC,QAAO,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAc1B,MAAM,qBAAqB;CAAC;CAAiB;CAAU;CAAsB;AAE7E,eAAsB,cACrB,KACA,MACA,SACoB;CACpB,IAAI,aAAa;CACjB,IAAI,cAAc;AAElB,MAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,eAAe,KAAK;EACxC,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,8BAA8B,YAAY,QAAQ;AAC1E,MAAI,SAAS,cAAc,QAAQ,UAAU,aAAa,SACzD,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,8BAA8B;EAGnD,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,YAAY;GACnD,GAAG;GACH,UAAU;GACV,CAAC;AAGF,MAAI,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,SAAS,UAAU,IAC/C,QAAO;EAIR,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW;AACjD,MAAI,CAAC,SACJ,QAAO;EAIR,MAAM,iBAAiB,IAAI,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC;AAC3C,eAAa,IAAI,IAAI,UAAU,WAAW,CAAC;AAI3C,MAAI,mBAHe,IAAI,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,UAGF,YACpC,eAAc,uBAAuB,YAAY;;AAInD,OAAM,IAAI,UAAU,2BAA2B,cAAc,GAAG;;;;;AAMjE,SAAgB,uBAAuB,MAAgC;AACtE,KAAI,CAAC,KAAK,QAAS,QAAO;CAE1B,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ;AACzC,MAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,mBAClB,SAAQ,OAAO,KAAK;AAGrB,QAAO;EAAE,GAAG;EAAM;EAAS"}

package/dist/state-BpFVsJZB.mjs

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
-//#region src/plugins/state.ts
-const TIMEZONE_SUFFIX = /(?:z|[+-]\d{2}(?::?\d{2})?)$/i;
-const HOUR_OFFSET_SUFFIX = /\d{2}:\d{2}(?::\d{2}(?:\.\d+)?)?[+-]\d{2}$/i;
-function parseDatabaseTimestamp(value) {
-	let normalized = value.trim().replace(" ", "T");
-	if (HOUR_OFFSET_SUFFIX.test(normalized)) normalized += ":00";
-	else if (!TIMEZONE_SUFFIX.test(normalized)) normalized += "Z";
-	return new Date(normalized);
-}
-function toPluginStatus(value) {
-	if (value === "active") return "active";
-	return "inactive";
-}
-function toPluginSource(value) {
-	if (value === "marketplace") return "marketplace";
-	if (value === "registry") return "registry";
-	return "config";
-}
-/**
-* Repository for plugin state in the database
-*/
-var PluginStateRepository = class {
-	constructor(db) {
-		this.db = db;
-	}
-	/**
-	* Get state for a specific plugin
-	*/
-	async get(pluginId) {
-		const row = await this.db.selectFrom("_plugin_state").selectAll().where("plugin_id", "=", pluginId).executeTakeFirst();
-		if (!row) return null;
-		return rowToPluginState(row);
-	}
-	/**
-	* Get all plugin states
-	*/
-	async getAll() {
-		return (await this.db.selectFrom("_plugin_state").selectAll().execute()).map(rowToPluginState);
-	}
-	/**
-	* Get all marketplace-installed plugin states
-	*/
-	async getMarketplacePlugins() {
-		return (await this.db.selectFrom("_plugin_state").selectAll().where("source", "=", "marketplace").execute()).map(rowToPluginState);
-	}
-	/**
-	* Get all registry-installed plugin states.
-	*
-	* The runtime's registry sync path uses this to discover which
-	* registry plugins should be loaded into the sandbox on this worker.
-	*/
-	async getRegistryPlugins() {
-		return (await this.db.selectFrom("_plugin_state").selectAll().where("source", "=", "registry").execute()).map(rowToPluginState);
-	}
-	/**
-	* Create or update plugin state
-	*/
-	async upsert(pluginId, version, status, opts) {
-		const now = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
-		const existing = await this.get(pluginId);
-		if (existing) {
-			const updates = {
-				status,
-				version
-			};
-			if (status === "active" && existing.status !== "active") updates.activated_at = now;
-			else if (status === "inactive" && existing.status !== "inactive") updates.deactivated_at = now;
-			if (opts?.source) updates.source = opts.source;
-			if (opts?.marketplaceVersion !== void 0) updates.marketplace_version = opts.marketplaceVersion;
-			if (opts?.displayName !== void 0) updates.display_name = opts.displayName;
-			if (opts?.description !== void 0) updates.description = opts.description;
-			if (opts?.registryPublisherDid !== void 0) updates.registry_publisher_did = opts.registryPublisherDid;
-			if (opts?.registrySlug !== void 0) updates.registry_slug = opts.registrySlug;
-			if (opts?.mcpToolsEnabled !== void 0) updates.mcp_tools_enabled = opts.mcpToolsEnabled ? 1 : 0;
-			if (opts?.mcpToolsConsent !== void 0) updates.mcp_tools_consent = opts.mcpToolsConsent;
-			await this.db.updateTable("_plugin_state").set(updates).where("plugin_id", "=", pluginId).execute();
-		} else await this.db.insertInto("_plugin_state").values({
-			plugin_id: pluginId,
-			status,
-			version,
-			installed_at: now,
-			activated_at: status === "active" ? now : null,
-			deactivated_at: null,
-			data: null,
-			source: opts?.source ?? "config",
-			marketplace_version: opts?.marketplaceVersion ?? null,
-			display_name: opts?.displayName ?? null,
-			description: opts?.description ?? null,
-			registry_publisher_did: opts?.registryPublisherDid ?? null,
-			registry_slug: opts?.registrySlug ?? null,
-			mcp_tools_enabled: opts?.mcpToolsEnabled ? 1 : 0,
-			mcp_tools_consent: opts?.mcpToolsConsent ?? null
-		}).execute();
-		return await this.get(pluginId);
-	}
-	/**
-	* Enable a plugin
-	*/
-	async enable(pluginId, version) {
-		return this.upsert(pluginId, version, "active");
-	}
-	/**
-	* Disable a plugin
-	*/
-	async disable(pluginId, version) {
-		return this.upsert(pluginId, version, "inactive");
-	}
-	/**
-	* Delete plugin state
-	*/
-	async delete(pluginId) {
-		return ((await this.db.deleteFrom("_plugin_state").where("plugin_id", "=", pluginId).executeTakeFirst()).numDeletedRows ?? 0) > 0;
-	}
-};
-function rowToPluginState(row) {
-	return {
-		pluginId: row.plugin_id,
-		status: toPluginStatus(row.status),
-		version: row.version,
-		installedAt: parseDatabaseTimestamp(row.installed_at),
-		activatedAt: row.activated_at ? parseDatabaseTimestamp(row.activated_at) : null,
-		deactivatedAt: row.deactivated_at ? parseDatabaseTimestamp(row.deactivated_at) : null,
-		source: toPluginSource(row.source),
-		marketplaceVersion: row.marketplace_version ?? null,
-		displayName: row.display_name ?? null,
-		description: row.description ?? null,
-		registryPublisherDid: row.registry_publisher_did ?? null,
-		registrySlug: row.registry_slug ?? null,
-		mcpToolsEnabled: row.mcp_tools_enabled === 1,
-		mcpToolsConsent: row.mcp_tools_consent ?? null
-	};
-}
-
-//#endregion
-export { PluginStateRepository as t };
-//# sourceMappingURL=state-BpFVsJZB.mjs.map

package/dist/state-BpFVsJZB.mjs.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"state-BpFVsJZB.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/plugins/state.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Plugin State Repository\n *\n * Database-backed storage for plugin activation state.\n * Used by the admin API to persist plugin enable/disable across restarts.\n */\n\nimport type { Kysely } from \"kysely\";\n\nimport type { Database } from \"../database/types.js\";\n\nexport type PluginStatus = \"active\" | \"inactive\";\nexport type PluginSource = \"config\" | \"marketplace\" | \"registry\";\n\nconst TIMEZONE_SUFFIX = /(?:z|[+-]\\d{2}(?::?\\d{2})?)$/i;\nconst HOUR_OFFSET_SUFFIX = /\\d{2}:\\d{2}(?::\\d{2}(?:\\.\\d+)?)?[+-]\\d{2}$/i;\n\nfunction parseDatabaseTimestamp(value: string): Date {\n\tlet normalized = value.trim().replace(\" \", \"T\");\n\tif (HOUR_OFFSET_SUFFIX.test(normalized)) normalized += \":00\";\n\telse if (!TIMEZONE_SUFFIX.test(normalized)) normalized += \"Z\";\n\treturn new Date(normalized);\n}\n\nfunction toPluginStatus(value: string): PluginStatus {\n\tif (value === \"active\") return \"active\";\n\treturn \"inactive\";\n}\n\nfunction toPluginSource(value: string | undefined | null): PluginSource {\n\tif (value === \"marketplace\") return \"marketplace\";\n\tif (value === \"registry\") return \"registry\";\n\treturn \"config\";\n}\n\nexport interface PluginState {\n\tpluginId: string;\n\tstatus: PluginStatus;\n\tversion: string;\n\tinstalledAt: Date;\n\tactivatedAt: Date | null;\n\tdeactivatedAt: Date | null;\n\tsource: PluginSource;\n\tmarketplaceVersion: string | null;\n\tdisplayName: string | null;\n\tdescription: string | null;\n\t/**\n\t * Publisher DID this plugin was published under. Populated only when\n\t * `source === \"registry\"`; null otherwise.\n\t */\n\tregistryPublisherDid: string | null;\n\t/**\n\t * Slug under which the plugin was published in the publisher's repo\n\t * (the rkey of the `pm.fair.package.profile` record). Populated only\n\t * when `source === \"registry\"`; null otherwise.\n\t *\n\t * The opaque `pluginId` for registry installs is derived from\n\t * `(registryPublisherDid, registrySlug)` -- see\n\t * `packages/core/src/registry/plugin-id.ts`.\n\t */\n\tregistrySlug: string | null;\n\tmcpToolsEnabled: boolean;\n\tmcpToolsConsent: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Repository for plugin state in the database\n */\nexport class PluginStateRepository {\n\tconstructor(private db: Kysely<Database>) {}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Get state for a specific plugin\n\t */\n\tasync get(pluginId: string): Promise<PluginState | null> {\n\t\tconst row = await this.db\n\t\t\t.selectFrom(\"_plugin_state\")\n\t\t\t.selectAll()\n\t\t\t.where(\"plugin_id\", \"=\", pluginId)\n\t\t\t.executeTakeFirst();\n\n\t\tif (!row) return null;\n\n\t\treturn rowToPluginState(row);\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Get all plugin states\n\t */\n\tasync getAll(): Promise<PluginState[]> {\n\t\tconst rows = await this.db.selectFrom(\"_plugin_state\").selectAll().execute();\n\t\treturn rows.map(rowToPluginState);\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Get all marketplace-installed plugin states\n\t */\n\tasync getMarketplacePlugins(): Promise<PluginState[]> {\n\t\tconst rows = await this.db\n\t\t\t.selectFrom(\"_plugin_state\")\n\t\t\t.selectAll()\n\t\t\t.where(\"source\", \"=\", \"marketplace\")\n\t\t\t.execute();\n\t\treturn rows.map(rowToPluginState);\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Get all registry-installed plugin states.\n\t *\n\t * The runtime's registry sync path uses this to discover which\n\t * registry plugins should be loaded into the sandbox on this worker.\n\t */\n\tasync getRegistryPlugins(): Promise<PluginState[]> {\n\t\tconst rows = await this.db\n\t\t\t.selectFrom(\"_plugin_state\")\n\t\t\t.selectAll()\n\t\t\t.where(\"source\", \"=\", \"registry\")\n\t\t\t.execute();\n\t\treturn rows.map(rowToPluginState);\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Create or update plugin state\n\t */\n\tasync upsert(\n\t\tpluginId: string,\n\t\tversion: string,\n\t\tstatus: PluginStatus,\n\t\topts?: {\n\t\t\tsource?: PluginSource;\n\t\t\tmarketplaceVersion?: string;\n\t\t\tdisplayName?: string;\n\t\t\tdescription?: string;\n\t\t\tregistryPublisherDid?: string;\n\t\t\tregistrySlug?: string;\n\t\t\tmcpToolsEnabled?: boolean;\n\t\t\tmcpToolsConsent?: string | null;\n\t\t},\n\t): Promise<PluginState> {\n\t\tconst now = new Date().toISOString();\n\t\tconst existing = await this.get(pluginId);\n\n\t\tif (existing) {\n\t\t\t// Update existing state\n\t\t\tconst updates: Record<string, string | number | null> = {\n\t\t\t\tstatus,\n\t\t\t\tversion,\n\t\t\t};\n\n\t\t\tif (status === \"active\" && existing.status !== \"active\") {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.activated_at = now;\n\t\t\t} else if (status === \"inactive\" && existing.status !== \"inactive\") {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.deactivated_at = now;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif (opts?.source) updates.source = opts.source;\n\t\t\tif (opts?.marketplaceVersion !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.marketplace_version = opts.marketplaceVersion;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (opts?.displayName !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.display_name = opts.displayName;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (opts?.description !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.description = opts.description;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (opts?.registryPublisherDid !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.registry_publisher_did = opts.registryPublisherDid;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (opts?.registrySlug !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.registry_slug = opts.registrySlug;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (opts?.mcpToolsEnabled !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.mcp_tools_enabled = opts.mcpToolsEnabled ? 1 : 0;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (opts?.mcpToolsConsent !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.mcp_tools_consent = opts.mcpToolsConsent;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tawait this.db\n\t\t\t\t.updateTable(\"_plugin_state\")\n\t\t\t\t.set(updates)\n\t\t\t\t.where(\"plugin_id\", \"=\", pluginId)\n\t\t\t\t.execute();\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// Create new state\n\t\t\tawait this.db\n\t\t\t\t.insertInto(\"_plugin_state\")\n\t\t\t\t.values({\n\t\t\t\t\tplugin_id: pluginId,\n\t\t\t\t\tstatus,\n\t\t\t\t\tversion,\n\t\t\t\t\tinstalled_at: now,\n\t\t\t\t\tactivated_at: status === \"active\" ? now : null,\n\t\t\t\t\tdeactivated_at: null,\n\t\t\t\t\tdata: null,\n\t\t\t\t\tsource: opts?.source ?? \"config\",\n\t\t\t\t\tmarketplace_version: opts?.marketplaceVersion ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\tdisplay_name: opts?.displayName ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\tdescription: opts?.description ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\tregistry_publisher_did: opts?.registryPublisherDid ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\tregistry_slug: opts?.registrySlug ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\tmcp_tools_enabled: opts?.mcpToolsEnabled ? 1 : 0,\n\t\t\t\t\tmcp_tools_consent: opts?.mcpToolsConsent ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t.execute();\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn (await this.get(pluginId))!;\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Enable a plugin\n\t */\n\tasync enable(pluginId: string, version: string): Promise<PluginState> {\n\t\treturn this.upsert(pluginId, version, \"active\");\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Disable a plugin\n\t */\n\tasync disable(pluginId: string, version: string): Promise<PluginState> {\n\t\treturn this.upsert(pluginId, version, \"inactive\");\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Delete plugin state\n\t */\n\tasync delete(pluginId: string): Promise<boolean> {\n\t\tconst result = await this.db\n\t\t\t.deleteFrom(\"_plugin_state\")\n\t\t\t.where(\"plugin_id\", \"=\", pluginId)\n\t\t\t.executeTakeFirst();\n\n\t\treturn (result.numDeletedRows ?? 0) > 0;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Internal: map a `_plugin_state` row to the public `PluginState` shape.\n *\n * Kept at module scope so the three select paths (`get`, `getAll`,\n * `getMarketplacePlugins`, `getRegistryPlugins`) stay byte-identical in\n * their handling of nullable columns -- adding a new column to the table\n * means changing this function and nothing else.\n */\ninterface PluginStateRow {\n\tplugin_id: string;\n\tstatus: string;\n\tversion: string;\n\tinstalled_at: string;\n\tactivated_at: string | null;\n\tdeactivated_at: string | null;\n\tsource: string;\n\tmarketplace_version: string | null;\n\tdisplay_name: string | null;\n\tdescription: string | null;\n\tregistry_publisher_did: string | null;\n\tregistry_slug: string | null;\n\tmcp_tools_enabled: number;\n\tmcp_tools_consent: string | null;\n}\n\nfunction rowToPluginState(row: PluginStateRow): PluginState {\n\treturn {\n\t\tpluginId: row.plugin_id,\n\t\tstatus: toPluginStatus(row.status),\n\t\tversion: row.version,\n\t\tinstalledAt: parseDatabaseTimestamp(row.installed_at),\n\t\tactivatedAt: row.activated_at ? parseDatabaseTimestamp(row.activated_at) : null,\n\t\tdeactivatedAt: row.deactivated_at ? parseDatabaseTimestamp(row.deactivated_at) : null,\n\t\tsource: toPluginSource(row.source),\n\t\tmarketplaceVersion: row.marketplace_version ?? null,\n\t\tdisplayName: row.display_name ?? null,\n\t\tdescription: row.description ?? null,\n\t\tregistryPublisherDid: row.registry_publisher_did ?? null,\n\t\tregistrySlug: row.registry_slug ?? null,\n\t\tmcpToolsEnabled: row.mcp_tools_enabled === 1,\n\t\tmcpToolsConsent: row.mcp_tools_consent ?? null,\n\t};\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAcA,MAAM,kBAAkB;AACxB,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAE3B,SAAS,uBAAuB,OAAqB;CACpD,IAAI,aAAa,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI;AAC/C,KAAI,mBAAmB,KAAK,WAAW,CAAE,eAAc;UAC9C,CAAC,gBAAgB,KAAK,WAAW,CAAE,eAAc;AAC1D,QAAO,IAAI,KAAK,WAAW;;AAG5B,SAAS,eAAe,OAA6B;AACpD,KAAI,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AAC/B,QAAO;;AAGR,SAAS,eAAe,OAAgD;AACvE,KAAI,UAAU,cAAe,QAAO;AACpC,KAAI,UAAU,WAAY,QAAO;AACjC,QAAO;;;;;AAoCR,IAAa,wBAAb,MAAmC;CAClC,YAAY,AAAQ,IAAsB;EAAtB;;;;;CAKpB,MAAM,IAAI,UAA+C;EACxD,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,GACrB,WAAW,gBAAgB,CAC3B,WAAW,CACX,MAAM,aAAa,KAAK,SAAS,CACjC,kBAAkB;AAEpB,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO;AAEjB,SAAO,iBAAiB,IAAI;;;;;CAM7B,MAAM,SAAiC;AAEtC,UADa,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,WAAW,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS,EAChE,IAAI,iBAAiB;;;;;CAMlC,MAAM,wBAAgD;AAMrD,UALa,MAAM,KAAK,GACtB,WAAW,gBAAgB,CAC3B,WAAW,CACX,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,cAAc,CACnC,SAAS,EACC,IAAI,iBAAiB;;;;;;;;CASlC,MAAM,qBAA6C;AAMlD,UALa,MAAM,KAAK,GACtB,WAAW,gBAAgB,CAC3B,WAAW,CACX,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,WAAW,CAChC,SAAS,EACC,IAAI,iBAAiB;;;;;CAMlC,MAAM,OACL,UACA,SACA,QACA,MAUuB;EACvB,MAAM,uBAAM,IAAI,MAAM,EAAC,aAAa;EACpC,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS;AAEzC,MAAI,UAAU;GAEb,MAAM,UAAkD;IACvD;IACA;IACA;AAED,OAAI,WAAW,YAAY,SAAS,WAAW,SAC9C,SAAQ,eAAe;YACb,WAAW,cAAc,SAAS,WAAW,WACvD,SAAQ,iBAAiB;AAG1B,OAAI,MAAM,OAAQ,SAAQ,SAAS,KAAK;AACxC,OAAI,MAAM,uBAAuB,OAChC,SAAQ,sBAAsB,KAAK;AAEpC,OAAI,MAAM,gBAAgB,OACzB,SAAQ,eAAe,KAAK;AAE7B,OAAI,MAAM,gBAAgB,OACzB,SAAQ,cAAc,KAAK;AAE5B,OAAI,MAAM,yBAAyB,OAClC,SAAQ,yBAAyB,KAAK;AAEvC,OAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB,OAC1B,SAAQ,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAE9B,OAAI,MAAM,oBAAoB,OAC7B,SAAQ,oBAAoB,KAAK,kBAAkB,IAAI;AAExD,OAAI,MAAM,oBAAoB,OAC7B,SAAQ,oBAAoB,KAAK;AAGlC,SAAM,KAAK,GACT,YAAY,gBAAgB,CAC5B,IAAI,QAAQ,CACZ,MAAM,aAAa,KAAK,SAAS,CACjC,SAAS;QAGX,OAAM,KAAK,GACT,WAAW,gBAAgB,CAC3B,OAAO;GACP,WAAW;GACX;GACA;GACA,cAAc;GACd,cAAc,WAAW,WAAW,MAAM;GAC1C,gBAAgB;GAChB,MAAM;GACN,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU;GACxB,qBAAqB,MAAM,sBAAsB;GACjD,cAAc,MAAM,eAAe;GACnC,aAAa,MAAM,eAAe;GAClC,wBAAwB,MAAM,wBAAwB;GACtD,eAAe,MAAM,gBAAgB;GACrC,mBAAmB,MAAM,kBAAkB,IAAI;GAC/C,mBAAmB,MAAM,mBAAmB;GAC5C,CAAC,CACD,SAAS;AAGZ,SAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS;;;;;CAMjC,MAAM,OAAO,UAAkB,SAAuC;AACrE,SAAO,KAAK,OAAO,UAAU,SAAS,SAAS;;;;;CAMhD,MAAM,QAAQ,UAAkB,SAAuC;AACtE,SAAO,KAAK,OAAO,UAAU,SAAS,WAAW;;;;;CAMlD,MAAM,OAAO,UAAoC;AAMhD,WALe,MAAM,KAAK,GACxB,WAAW,gBAAgB,CAC3B,MAAM,aAAa,KAAK,SAAS,CACjC,kBAAkB,EAEL,kBAAkB,KAAK;;;AA6BxC,SAAS,iBAAiB,KAAkC;AAC3D,QAAO;EACN,UAAU,IAAI;EACd,QAAQ,eAAe,IAAI,OAAO;EAClC,SAAS,IAAI;EACb,aAAa,uBAAuB,IAAI,aAAa;EACrD,aAAa,IAAI,eAAe,uBAAuB,IAAI,aAAa,GAAG;EAC3E,eAAe,IAAI,iBAAiB,uBAAuB,IAAI,eAAe,GAAG;EACjF,QAAQ,eAAe,IAAI,OAAO;EAClC,oBAAoB,IAAI,uBAAuB;EAC/C,aAAa,IAAI,gBAAgB;EACjC,aAAa,IAAI,eAAe;EAChC,sBAAsB,IAAI,0BAA0B;EACpD,cAAc,IAAI,iBAAiB;EACnC,iBAAiB,IAAI,sBAAsB;EAC3C,iBAAiB,IAAI,qBAAqB;EAC1C"}

package/dist/status-B777-dXz.mjs

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-//#region src/redirects/status.ts
-/**
-* Redirect rule status codes.
-*
-* A redirect rule's `type` is either a *redirect* status (issues a `Location`
-* header) or a *terminal* status (serves the status with no target). Terminal
-* statuses let editors mark a URL as intentionally gone:
-* - `410 Gone` — permanently and intentionally deleted (Google deindexes it
-*   faster than a 404).
-* - `451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons`.
-*/
-/** Statuses that issue an HTTP redirect (require a destination). */
-const REDIRECT_STATUSES = [
-	301,
-	302,
-	307,
-	308
-];
-/** Terminal statuses that serve a status with no `Location` / no destination. */
-const TERMINAL_STATUSES = [410, 451];
-/** All values accepted as a redirect rule `type`. */
-const REDIRECT_RULE_STATUSES = [...REDIRECT_STATUSES, ...TERMINAL_STATUSES];
-/** True for terminal statuses (410/451) — served directly, with no target. */
-function isTerminalStatus(type) {
-	return TERMINAL_STATUSES.includes(type);
-}
-
-//#endregion
-export { isTerminalStatus as n, REDIRECT_RULE_STATUSES as t };
-//# sourceMappingURL=status-B777-dXz.mjs.map

package/dist/status-B777-dXz.mjs.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"status-B777-dXz.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/redirects/status.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Redirect rule status codes.\n *\n * A redirect rule's `type` is either a *redirect* status (issues a `Location`\n * header) or a *terminal* status (serves the status with no target). Terminal\n * statuses let editors mark a URL as intentionally gone:\n * - `410 Gone` — permanently and intentionally deleted (Google deindexes it\n *   faster than a 404).\n * - `451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons`.\n */\n\n/** Statuses that issue an HTTP redirect (require a destination). */\nexport const REDIRECT_STATUSES = [301, 302, 307, 308] as const;\n\n/** Terminal statuses that serve a status with no `Location` / no destination. */\nexport const TERMINAL_STATUSES = [410, 451] as const;\n\n/** All values accepted as a redirect rule `type`. */\nexport const REDIRECT_RULE_STATUSES: readonly number[] = [\n\t...REDIRECT_STATUSES,\n\t...TERMINAL_STATUSES,\n];\n\n/** True for terminal statuses (410/451) — served directly, with no target. */\nexport function isTerminalStatus(type: number): boolean {\n\treturn (TERMINAL_STATUSES as readonly number[]).includes(type);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;AAYA,MAAa,oBAAoB;CAAC;CAAK;CAAK;CAAK;CAAI;;AAGrD,MAAa,oBAAoB,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI;;AAG3C,MAAa,yBAA4C,CACxD,GAAG,mBACH,GAAG,kBACH;;AAGD,SAAgB,iBAAiB,MAAuB;AACvD,QAAQ,kBAAwC,SAAS,KAAK"}

package/dist/target-BmR0iTwz.mjs

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-//#region src/migrations/target.ts
-const ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/;
-function encodeHex(bytes) {
-	return Array.from(bytes, (byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
-}
-async function createMigrationTarget(kind, label, identity) {
-	const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify({
-		kind,
-		identity
-	}));
-	const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", encoded);
-	return {
-		kind,
-		label,
-		fingerprint: encodeHex(new Uint8Array(digest))
-	};
-}
-function requireMigrationEnvironment(name, env) {
-	if (typeof name !== "string" || !ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE_PATTERN.test(name)) throw new Error("Migration credential environment variable name is invalid.");
-	const value = env[name];
-	if (!value) throw new Error(`Migration credential environment variable ${name} is not set.`);
-	return value;
-}
-
-//#endregion
-export { requireMigrationEnvironment as n, createMigrationTarget as t };
-//# sourceMappingURL=target-BmR0iTwz.mjs.map

package/dist/target-BmR0iTwz.mjs.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"target-BmR0iTwz.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/migrations/target.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { MigrationTarget } from \"./protocol.js\";\n\nconst ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/;\n\nfunction encodeHex(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n\treturn Array.from(bytes, (byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, \"0\")).join(\"\");\n}\n\nexport async function createMigrationTarget(\n\tkind: string,\n\tlabel: string,\n\tidentity: readonly string[],\n): Promise<MigrationTarget> {\n\tconst encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify({ kind, identity }));\n\tconst digest = await crypto.subtle.digest(\"SHA-256\", encoded);\n\treturn {\n\t\tkind,\n\t\tlabel,\n\t\tfingerprint: encodeHex(new Uint8Array(digest)),\n\t};\n}\n\nexport function requireMigrationEnvironment(\n\tname: unknown,\n\tenv: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>,\n): string {\n\tif (typeof name !== \"string\" || !ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE_PATTERN.test(name)) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\"Migration credential environment variable name is invalid.\");\n\t}\n\tconst value = env[name];\n\tif (!value) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(`Migration credential environment variable ${name} is not set.`);\n\t}\n\treturn value;\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAEA,MAAM,+BAA+B;AAErC,SAAS,UAAU,OAA2B;AAC7C,QAAO,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG;;AAGhF,eAAsB,sBACrB,MACA,OACA,UAC2B;CAC3B,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,aAAa,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU;EAAE;EAAM;EAAU,CAAC,CAAC;CAC5E,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,QAAQ;AAC7D,QAAO;EACN;EACA;EACA,aAAa,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,OAAO,CAAC;EAC9C;;AAGF,SAAgB,4BACf,MACA,KACS;AACT,KAAI,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,CAAC,6BAA6B,KAAK,KAAK,CACvE,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,6DAA6D;CAE9E,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI;AAClB,KAAI,CAAC,MACJ,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,6CAA6C,KAAK,cAAc;AAEjF,QAAO"}