emdash 0.29.0 → 0.30.0

package/dist/{single-flight-cache-DEtW-OEG.mjs.map → single-flight-cache-C2exrGAi.mjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"single-flight-cache-DEtW-OEG.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/utils/single-flight-cache.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Global-scope async value cache with single-flight and poison-immunity.\n *\n * Built for the \"compute once for the lifetime of the JS global scope, read\n * on every request\" caches (site settings, search-health verification, ...).\n * That global scope is the process on Node and the isolate on Cloudflare\n * Workers — this helper is platform-neutral; the hazard it defends against is\n * specific to workerd but the cache itself is not.\n *\n * These caches must coalesce concurrent cold reads into one query — but the\n * obvious way to do that, caching the in-flight *promise* on a global and\n * awaiting it from later requests, is unsafe on workerd: if the request that\n * created the promise is cancelled mid-await (client disconnect, context\n * teardown), its continuation never runs, so the promise neither resolves nor\n * rejects. Every later request that awaits that shared promise then hangs\n * until the isolate is evicted (observed as 524s at the 100s wall, near-zero\n * CPU). A `.catch`/`.finally` that clears the cache doesn't help — a cancelled\n * request settles neither way.\n *\n * This cache stores the resolved *value* (not a promise) and coalesces via\n * `initWithLock`: one request becomes the owner and runs `fetch`, everyone\n * else polls for the published value and never awaits the owner's promise.\n * A cancelled owner can therefore never strand a waiter — the worst case is\n * the lock looks held until `deadlineMs`, then the next caller reclaims. The\n * owner's `fetch` is also anchored (waitUntil) so a cancelled originator's\n * query still completes and populates the cache, and bounded by\n * `ownerTimeoutMs` so a genuinely stuck fetch reclaims instead of hanging.\n *\n * Invalidation bumps `version`; reads compare against the version captured at\n * call time and refetch on mismatch.\n */\n\nimport { createInitLock, type InitLock, initWithLock } from \"./init-lock.js\";\n\nexport interface SingleFlightCache<T> {\n\t/** Last resolved value, valid only when `hasValue` is true. */\n\tvalue: T | null;\n\t/**\n\t * Presence flag, separate from `value` so that falsy/`undefined`/`void`\n\t * results cache correctly (a plain null check can't distinguish \"cached\n\t * undefined\" from \"never fetched\").\n\t */\n\thasValue: boolean;\n\t/** Invalidation counter; bumped by `invalidateSingleFlightCache`. */\n\tversion: number;\n\t/** The `version` the cached value was fetched at. */\n\tvalueVersion: number;\n\t/** Reclaimable single-flight lock (see init-lock.ts). */\n\tlock: InitLock;\n}\n\nexport function createSingleFlightCache<T>(): SingleFlightCache<T> {\n\treturn { value: null, hasValue: false, version: 0, valueVersion: -1, lock: createInitLock() };\n}\n\n/**\n * Force the next `singleFlightCached` call to refetch. An in-flight owner\n * fetched at the old version will not publish into the new version, so its\n * result is ignored by subsequent reads.\n */\nexport function invalidateSingleFlightCache(cache: SingleFlightCache<unknown>): void {\n\tcache.version++;\n\tcache.hasValue = false;\n\tcache.value = null;\n\tcache.valueVersion = -1;\n\t// Free the single-flight lock so a reader at the new version starts the\n\t// refetch immediately instead of waiting out a stale owner's deadline. A\n\t// still-running old-version owner can neither publish into the new version\n\t// (version gate) nor clobber a new owner (claim gate), so releasing here\n\t// is safe; the worst case is one brief duplicate fetch.\n\tcache.lock.ownerStartedAt = null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Headroom between the owner's own timeout and the waiter reclaim deadline.\n * The reclaim deadline must sit *above* `ownerTimeoutMs` so a slow-but-live\n * owner times out (and releases the lock) before a waiter would reclaim it —\n * otherwise a fetch slower than the deadline is superseded before it can\n * publish, and steady traffic turns that into a self-sustaining stampede.\n */\nconst RECLAIM_HEADROOM_MS = 5_000;\n\nexport interface SingleFlightCachedOptions {\n\t/**\n\t * Hand the in-flight fetch to the host's lifetime extender (waitUntil via\n\t * `after()`), so a cancelled originating request still drives it to\n\t * completion and populates the cache.\n\t */\n\tanchor?: (promise: Promise<void>) => void;\n\t/** Reclaim the single-flight lock if the owner holds it past this. */\n\tdeadlineMs?: number;\n\t/** Waiter poll interval. */\n\tpollMs?: number;\n\t/** Waiter gives up and throws after this long rather than hanging. */\n\tmaxWaitMs?: number;\n\t/**\n\t * Bound the owner's own `fetch`: if it doesn't settle within this, the\n\t * owner rejects (and releases the lock) instead of waiting indefinitely.\n\t * The anchored copy keeps running, so a slow-but-live fetch can still\n\t * publish for a later caller. Omit to leave the owner unbounded.\n\t */\n\townerTimeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/** Boxed cache hit so a `void`/falsy value is still distinguishable from a miss. */\ninterface Box<T> {\n\tv: T;\n}\n\nfunction withTimeout<T>(promise: Promise<T>, ms: number): Promise<T> {\n\treturn new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tconst timer = setTimeout(() => {\n\t\t\treject(new Error(`singleFlightCached: owner fetch exceeded ${ms}ms`));\n\t\t}, ms);\n\t\t// Settle from the underlying promise (whichever wins the race with the\n\t\t// timer), and always clear the timer so a resolved fetch doesn't leave\n\t\t// a pending timeout holding the isolate alive.\n\t\tpromise.then(resolve, reject).finally(() => {\n\t\t\tclearTimeout(timer);\n\t\t});\n\t});\n}\n\n/**\n * Return the cached value for `cache`, computing it via `fetch` under a\n * single-flight lock on a miss. Concurrent callers coalesce onto one fetch;\n * a cancelled owner cannot poison later callers (see file header).\n */\nexport function singleFlightCached<T>(\n\tcache: SingleFlightCache<T>,\n\tfetch: () => Promise<T>,\n\toptions: SingleFlightCachedOptions = {},\n): Promise<T> {\n\t// Capture the version once: a value published at this version satisfies\n\t// this call; an invalidation that lands mid-fetch makes the published\n\t// value stale for *later* calls (which captured the newer version) but\n\t// still valid for this one.\n\tconst versionAtCall = cache.version;\n\n\t// Ignore a non-positive / non-finite owner timeout rather than letting it\n\t// degenerate into an instant-reject (setTimeout coerces NaN/0 to ~0ms).\n\tconst ownerTimeoutMs =\n\t\toptions.ownerTimeoutMs !== undefined &&\n\t\tNumber.isFinite(options.ownerTimeoutMs) &&\n\t\toptions.ownerTimeoutMs > 0\n\t\t\t? options.ownerTimeoutMs\n\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t// Keep the reclaim deadline above the owner timeout (see RECLAIM_HEADROOM_MS):\n\t// the owner's own timeout, not a waiter reclaim, is the primary release.\n\tconst deadlineMs =\n\t\townerTimeoutMs === undefined\n\t\t\t? options.deadlineMs\n\t\t\t: Math.max(options.deadlineMs ?? 0, ownerTimeoutMs + RECLAIM_HEADROOM_MS);\n\n\treturn initWithLock<Box<T>>(\n\t\tcache.lock,\n\t\t() =>\n\t\t\tcache.hasValue && cache.valueVersion === versionAtCall\n\t\t\t\t? // eslint-disable-next-line typescript/no-unsafe-type-assertion -- hasValue gates that `value` holds a real T\n\t\t\t\t\t({ v: cache.value as T } satisfies Box<T>)\n\t\t\t\t: null,\n\t\t(isCurrentClaim) => {\n\t\t\t// The real work, anchored independently so a cancelled owner's\n\t\t\t// fetch still settles and publishes. Publication is gated on the\n\t\t\t// claim so a reclaimed slow owner can't clobber the reclaimer's\n\t\t\t// value (same contract as initWithLock's own callers).\n\t\t\tconst real = (async (): Promise<Box<T>> => {\n\t\t\t\tconst value = await fetch();\n\t\t\t\tif (isCurrentClaim()) {\n\t\t\t\t\tcache.value = value;\n\t\t\t\t\tcache.hasValue = true;\n\t\t\t\t\tcache.valueVersion = versionAtCall;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn { v: value };\n\t\t\t})();\n\t\t\t// Anchor the real fetch (not the timeout race): this is what must\n\t\t\t// survive a cancelled owner and run to publication. initWithLock is\n\t\t\t// left to manage only the lock; we don't double-anchor.\n\t\t\toptions.anchor?.(\n\t\t\t\treal.then(\n\t\t\t\t\t() => undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\t() => undefined,\n\t\t\t\t),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\treturn ownerTimeoutMs === undefined ? real : withTimeout(real, ownerTimeoutMs);\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdeadlineMs,\n\t\t\tpollMs: options.pollMs,\n\t\t\tmaxWaitMs: options.maxWaitMs,\n\t\t},\n\t).then((box) => box.v);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmDA,SAAgB,0BAAmD;AAClE,QAAO;EAAE,OAAO;EAAM,UAAU;EAAO,SAAS;EAAG,cAAc;EAAI,MAAM,gBAAgB;EAAE;;;;;;;AAQ9F,SAAgB,4BAA4B,OAAyC;AACpF,OAAM;AACN,OAAM,WAAW;AACjB,OAAM,QAAQ;AACd,OAAM,eAAe;AAMrB,OAAM,KAAK,iBAAiB;;;;;;;;;AAU7B,MAAM,sBAAsB;AA6B5B,SAAS,YAAe,SAAqB,IAAwB;AACpE,QAAO,IAAI,SAAY,SAAS,WAAW;EAC1C,MAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAC9B,0BAAO,IAAI,MAAM,4CAA4C,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;KACnE,GAAG;AAIN,UAAQ,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc;AAC3C,gBAAa,MAAM;IAClB;GACD;;;;;;;AAQH,SAAgB,mBACf,OACA,OACA,UAAqC,EAAE,EAC1B;CAKb,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM;CAI5B,MAAM,iBACL,QAAQ,mBAAmB,UAC3B,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,eAAe,IACvC,QAAQ,iBAAiB,IACtB,QAAQ,iBACR;CAIJ,MAAM,aACL,mBAAmB,SAChB,QAAQ,aACR,KAAK,IAAI,QAAQ,cAAc,GAAG,iBAAiB,oBAAoB;AAE3E,QAAO,aACN,MAAM,YAEL,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,iBAAiB,gBAEtC,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,OAAY,GACvB,OACH,mBAAmB;EAKnB,MAAM,QAAQ,YAA6B;GAC1C,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,OAAO;AAC3B,OAAI,gBAAgB,EAAE;AACrB,UAAM,QAAQ;AACd,UAAM,WAAW;AACjB,UAAM,eAAe;;AAEtB,UAAO,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO;MAChB;AAIJ,UAAQ,SACP,KAAK,WACE,cACA,OACN,CACD;AACD,SAAO,mBAAmB,SAAY,OAAO,YAAY,MAAM,eAAe;IAE/E;EACC;EACA,QAAQ,QAAQ;EAChB,WAAW,QAAQ;EACnB,CACD,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE"}
+{"version":3,"file":"single-flight-cache-C2exrGAi.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/utils/single-flight-cache.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Global-scope async value cache with single-flight and poison-immunity.\n *\n * Built for the \"compute once for the lifetime of the JS global scope, read\n * on every request\" caches (site settings, search-health verification, ...).\n * That global scope is the process on Node and the isolate on Cloudflare\n * Workers — this helper is platform-neutral; the hazard it defends against is\n * specific to workerd but the cache itself is not.\n *\n * These caches must coalesce concurrent cold reads into one query — but the\n * obvious way to do that, caching the in-flight *promise* on a global and\n * awaiting it from later requests, is unsafe on workerd: if the request that\n * created the promise is cancelled mid-await (client disconnect, context\n * teardown), its continuation never runs, so the promise neither resolves nor\n * rejects. Every later request that awaits that shared promise then hangs\n * until the isolate is evicted (observed as 524s at the 100s wall, near-zero\n * CPU). A `.catch`/`.finally` that clears the cache doesn't help — a cancelled\n * request settles neither way.\n *\n * This cache stores the resolved *value* (not a promise) and coalesces via\n * `initWithLock`: one request becomes the owner and runs `fetch`, everyone\n * else polls for the published value and never awaits the owner's promise.\n * A cancelled owner can therefore never strand a waiter — the worst case is\n * the lock looks held until `deadlineMs`, then the next caller reclaims. The\n * owner's `fetch` is also anchored (waitUntil) so a cancelled originator's\n * query still completes and populates the cache, and bounded by\n * `ownerTimeoutMs` so a genuinely stuck fetch reclaims instead of hanging.\n *\n * Invalidation bumps `version`; reads compare against the version captured at\n * call time and refetch on mismatch.\n */\n\nimport { createInitLock, type InitLock, initWithLock } from \"./init-lock.js\";\n\nexport interface SingleFlightCache<T> {\n\t/** Last resolved value, valid only when `hasValue` is true. */\n\tvalue: T | null;\n\t/**\n\t * Presence flag, separate from `value` so that falsy/`undefined`/`void`\n\t * results cache correctly (a plain null check can't distinguish \"cached\n\t * undefined\" from \"never fetched\").\n\t */\n\thasValue: boolean;\n\t/** Invalidation counter; bumped by `invalidateSingleFlightCache`. */\n\tversion: number;\n\t/** The `version` the cached value was fetched at. */\n\tvalueVersion: number;\n\t/** Reclaimable single-flight lock (see init-lock.ts). */\n\tlock: InitLock;\n}\n\nexport function createSingleFlightCache<T>(): SingleFlightCache<T> {\n\treturn { value: null, hasValue: false, version: 0, valueVersion: -1, lock: createInitLock() };\n}\n\n/**\n * Force the next `singleFlightCached` call to refetch. An in-flight owner\n * fetched at the old version will not publish into the new version, so its\n * result is ignored by subsequent reads.\n */\nexport function invalidateSingleFlightCache(cache: SingleFlightCache<unknown>): void {\n\tcache.version++;\n\tcache.hasValue = false;\n\tcache.value = null;\n\tcache.valueVersion = -1;\n\t// Free the single-flight lock so a reader at the new version starts the\n\t// refetch immediately instead of waiting out a stale owner's deadline. A\n\t// still-running old-version owner can neither publish into the new version\n\t// (version gate) nor clobber a new owner (claim gate), so releasing here\n\t// is safe; the worst case is one brief duplicate fetch.\n\tcache.lock.ownerStartedAt = null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Headroom between the owner's own timeout and the waiter reclaim deadline.\n * The reclaim deadline must sit *above* `ownerTimeoutMs` so a slow-but-live\n * owner times out (and releases the lock) before a waiter would reclaim it —\n * otherwise a fetch slower than the deadline is superseded before it can\n * publish, and steady traffic turns that into a self-sustaining stampede.\n */\nconst RECLAIM_HEADROOM_MS = 5_000;\n\nexport interface SingleFlightCachedOptions {\n\t/**\n\t * Hand the in-flight fetch to the host's lifetime extender (waitUntil via\n\t * `after()`), so a cancelled originating request still drives it to\n\t * completion and populates the cache.\n\t */\n\tanchor?: (promise: Promise<void>) => void;\n\t/** Reclaim the single-flight lock if the owner holds it past this. */\n\tdeadlineMs?: number;\n\t/** Waiter poll interval. */\n\tpollMs?: number;\n\t/** Waiter gives up and throws after this long rather than hanging. */\n\tmaxWaitMs?: number;\n\t/**\n\t * Bound the owner's own `fetch`: if it doesn't settle within this, the\n\t * owner rejects (and releases the lock) instead of waiting indefinitely.\n\t * The anchored copy keeps running, so a slow-but-live fetch can still\n\t * publish for a later caller. Omit to leave the owner unbounded.\n\t */\n\townerTimeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/** Boxed cache hit so a `void`/falsy value is still distinguishable from a miss. */\ninterface Box<T> {\n\tv: T;\n}\n\nfunction withTimeout<T>(promise: Promise<T>, ms: number): Promise<T> {\n\treturn new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tconst timer = setTimeout(() => {\n\t\t\treject(new Error(`singleFlightCached: owner fetch exceeded ${ms}ms`));\n\t\t}, ms);\n\t\t// Settle from the underlying promise (whichever wins the race with the\n\t\t// timer), and always clear the timer so a resolved fetch doesn't leave\n\t\t// a pending timeout holding the isolate alive.\n\t\tpromise.then(resolve, reject).finally(() => {\n\t\t\tclearTimeout(timer);\n\t\t});\n\t});\n}\n\n/**\n * Return the cached value for `cache`, computing it via `fetch` under a\n * single-flight lock on a miss. Concurrent callers coalesce onto one fetch;\n * a cancelled owner cannot poison later callers (see file header).\n */\nexport function singleFlightCached<T>(\n\tcache: SingleFlightCache<T>,\n\tfetch: () => Promise<T>,\n\toptions: SingleFlightCachedOptions = {},\n): Promise<T> {\n\t// Capture the version once: a value published at this version satisfies\n\t// this call; an invalidation that lands mid-fetch makes the published\n\t// value stale for *later* calls (which captured the newer version) but\n\t// still valid for this one.\n\tconst versionAtCall = cache.version;\n\n\t// Ignore a non-positive / non-finite owner timeout rather than letting it\n\t// degenerate into an instant-reject (setTimeout coerces NaN/0 to ~0ms).\n\tconst ownerTimeoutMs =\n\t\toptions.ownerTimeoutMs !== undefined &&\n\t\tNumber.isFinite(options.ownerTimeoutMs) &&\n\t\toptions.ownerTimeoutMs > 0\n\t\t\t? options.ownerTimeoutMs\n\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t// Keep the reclaim deadline above the owner timeout (see RECLAIM_HEADROOM_MS):\n\t// the owner's own timeout, not a waiter reclaim, is the primary release.\n\tconst deadlineMs =\n\t\townerTimeoutMs === undefined\n\t\t\t? options.deadlineMs\n\t\t\t: Math.max(options.deadlineMs ?? 0, ownerTimeoutMs + RECLAIM_HEADROOM_MS);\n\n\treturn initWithLock<Box<T>>(\n\t\tcache.lock,\n\t\t() =>\n\t\t\tcache.hasValue && cache.valueVersion === versionAtCall\n\t\t\t\t? // eslint-disable-next-line typescript/no-unsafe-type-assertion -- hasValue gates that `value` holds a real T\n\t\t\t\t\t({ v: cache.value as T } satisfies Box<T>)\n\t\t\t\t: null,\n\t\t(isCurrentClaim) => {\n\t\t\t// The real work, anchored independently so a cancelled owner's\n\t\t\t// fetch still settles and publishes. Publication is gated on the\n\t\t\t// claim so a reclaimed slow owner can't clobber the reclaimer's\n\t\t\t// value (same contract as initWithLock's own callers).\n\t\t\tconst real = (async (): Promise<Box<T>> => {\n\t\t\t\tconst value = await fetch();\n\t\t\t\tif (isCurrentClaim()) {\n\t\t\t\t\tcache.value = value;\n\t\t\t\t\tcache.hasValue = true;\n\t\t\t\t\tcache.valueVersion = versionAtCall;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn { v: value };\n\t\t\t})();\n\t\t\t// Anchor the real fetch (not the timeout race): this is what must\n\t\t\t// survive a cancelled owner and run to publication. initWithLock is\n\t\t\t// left to manage only the lock; we don't double-anchor.\n\t\t\toptions.anchor?.(\n\t\t\t\treal.then(\n\t\t\t\t\t() => undefined,\n\t\t\t\t\t() => undefined,\n\t\t\t\t),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\treturn ownerTimeoutMs === undefined ? real : withTimeout(real, ownerTimeoutMs);\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdeadlineMs,\n\t\t\tpollMs: options.pollMs,\n\t\t\tmaxWaitMs: options.maxWaitMs,\n\t\t},\n\t).then((box) => box.v);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmDA,SAAgB,0BAAmD;AAClE,QAAO;EAAE,OAAO;EAAM,UAAU;EAAO,SAAS;EAAG,cAAc;EAAI,MAAM,gBAAgB;EAAE;;;;;;;AAQ9F,SAAgB,4BAA4B,OAAyC;AACpF,OAAM;AACN,OAAM,WAAW;AACjB,OAAM,QAAQ;AACd,OAAM,eAAe;AAMrB,OAAM,KAAK,iBAAiB;;;;;;;;;AAU7B,MAAM,sBAAsB;AA6B5B,SAAS,YAAe,SAAqB,IAAwB;AACpE,QAAO,IAAI,SAAY,SAAS,WAAW;EAC1C,MAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAC9B,0BAAO,IAAI,MAAM,4CAA4C,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;KACnE,GAAG;AAIN,UAAQ,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc;AAC3C,gBAAa,MAAM;IAClB;GACD;;;;;;;AAQH,SAAgB,mBACf,OACA,OACA,UAAqC,EAAE,EAC1B;CAKb,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM;CAI5B,MAAM,iBACL,QAAQ,mBAAmB,UAC3B,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,eAAe,IACvC,QAAQ,iBAAiB,IACtB,QAAQ,iBACR;CAIJ,MAAM,aACL,mBAAmB,SAChB,QAAQ,aACR,KAAK,IAAI,QAAQ,cAAc,GAAG,iBAAiB,oBAAoB;AAE3E,QAAO,aACN,MAAM,YAEL,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,iBAAiB,gBAEtC,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,OAAY,GACvB,OACH,mBAAmB;EAKnB,MAAM,QAAQ,YAA6B;GAC1C,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,OAAO;AAC3B,OAAI,gBAAgB,EAAE;AACrB,UAAM,QAAQ;AACd,UAAM,WAAW;AACjB,UAAM,eAAe;;AAEtB,UAAO,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO;MAChB;AAIJ,UAAQ,SACP,KAAK,WACE,cACA,OACN,CACD;AACD,SAAO,mBAAmB,SAAY,OAAO,YAAY,MAAM,eAAe;IAE/E;EACC;EACA,QAAQ,QAAQ;EAChB,WAAW,QAAQ;EACnB,CACD,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE"}

package/dist/{site-url-CcLy5D5s.mjs → site-url-NGJT6NTU.mjs}

@@ -10,4 +10,4 @@ async function getSiteBaseUrl(db, request) {
 
 //#endregion
 export { getSiteBaseUrl as t };
-//# sourceMappingURL=site-url-CcLy5D5s.mjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=site-url-NGJT6NTU.mjs.map

package/dist/{site-url-CcLy5D5s.mjs.map → site-url-NGJT6NTU.mjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"site-url-CcLy5D5s.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/api/site-url.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Resolve the canonical site base URL for use in outbound links (emails, etc.).\n *\n * Uses the stored `emdash:site_url` (set during setup on the real domain)\n * so that Host header spoofing in later requests cannot redirect users to\n * attacker-controlled domains.\n *\n * Falls back to the request URL only if no stored value exists (pre-setup).\n */\n\nimport type { Kysely } from \"kysely\";\n\nimport { OptionsRepository } from \"../database/repositories/options.js\";\nimport type { Database } from \"../database/types.js\";\n\nexport async function getSiteBaseUrl(db: Kysely<Database>, request: Request): Promise<string> {\n\tconst options = new OptionsRepository(db);\n\tconst storedUrl = await options.get<string>(\"emdash:site_url\");\n\tif (storedUrl) {\n\t\treturn `${storedUrl}/_emdash`;\n\t}\n\t// Fallback: derive from request (only reached before setup completes)\n\tconst url = new URL(request.url);\n\treturn `${url.protocol}//${url.host}/_emdash`;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AAeA,eAAsB,eAAe,IAAsB,SAAmC;CAE7F,MAAM,YAAY,MADF,IAAI,kBAAkB,GAAG,CACT,IAAY,kBAAkB;AAC9D,KAAI,UACH,QAAO,GAAG,UAAU;CAGrB,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI;AAChC,QAAO,GAAG,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK"}
+{"version":3,"file":"site-url-NGJT6NTU.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/api/site-url.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Resolve the canonical site base URL for use in outbound links (emails, etc.).\n *\n * Uses the stored `emdash:site_url` (set during setup on the real domain)\n * so that Host header spoofing in later requests cannot redirect users to\n * attacker-controlled domains.\n *\n * Falls back to the request URL only if no stored value exists (pre-setup).\n */\n\nimport type { Kysely } from \"kysely\";\n\nimport { OptionsRepository } from \"../database/repositories/options.js\";\nimport type { Database } from \"../database/types.js\";\n\nexport async function getSiteBaseUrl(db: Kysely<Database>, request: Request): Promise<string> {\n\tconst options = new OptionsRepository(db);\n\tconst storedUrl = await options.get<string>(\"emdash:site_url\");\n\tif (storedUrl) {\n\t\treturn `${storedUrl}/_emdash`;\n\t}\n\t// Fallback: derive from request (only reached before setup completes)\n\tconst url = new URL(request.url);\n\treturn `${url.protocol}//${url.host}/_emdash`;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;AAeA,eAAsB,eAAe,IAAsB,SAAmC;CAE7F,MAAM,YAAY,MADF,IAAI,kBAAkB,GAAG,CACT,IAAY,kBAAkB;AAC9D,KAAI,UACH,QAAO,GAAG,UAAU;CAGrB,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI;AAChC,QAAO,GAAG,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK"}

package/dist/snapshot-BdpUJKD-.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+import { sql } from "kysely";
+
+//#region src/api/handlers/snapshot.ts
+/**
+* Verify HMAC-SHA256 preview signature using crypto.subtle.
+* Returns true if the signature is valid and not expired.
+*/
+async function verifyPreviewSignature(source, exp, sig, secret) {
+	if (exp < Date.now() / 1e3) return false;
+	const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+	const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", encoder.encode(secret), {
+		name: "HMAC",
+		hash: "SHA-256"
+	}, false, ["verify"]);
+	const sigBytes = new Uint8Array(sig.length / 2);
+	for (let i = 0; i < sig.length; i += 2) sigBytes[i / 2] = parseInt(sig.substring(i, i + 2), 16);
+	return crypto.subtle.verify("HMAC", key, sigBytes, encoder.encode(`${source}:${exp}`));
+}
+/**
+* Parse an X-Preview-Signature header value into its components.
+*
+* Format: "source:exp:sig" where source is a URL (contains colons),
+* exp is a unix timestamp, and sig is 64 hex chars.
+*
+* Parses from the right since source URLs contain colons.
+*
+* @returns Parsed components, or null if the format is invalid
+*/
+function parsePreviewSignatureHeader(header) {
+	const lastColon = header.lastIndexOf(":");
+	if (lastColon <= 0) return null;
+	const sig = header.substring(lastColon + 1);
+	if (sig.length !== 64) return null;
+	const rest = header.substring(0, lastColon);
+	const secondLastColon = rest.lastIndexOf(":");
+	if (secondLastColon <= 0) return null;
+	const source = rest.substring(0, secondLastColon);
+	const exp = parseInt(rest.substring(secondLastColon + 1), 10);
+	if (isNaN(exp) || source.length === 0) return null;
+	return {
+		source,
+		exp,
+		sig
+	};
+}
+const MEDIA_FILE_PREFIX = "/_emdash/api/media/file/";
+/**
+* Parse a JSON string value and inject `src` for local media objects.
+* Returns the original string if it's not a local media value.
+*/
+function injectMediaSrc(jsonStr, origin) {
+	try {
+		const obj = JSON.parse(jsonStr);
+		if (typeof obj !== "object" || obj === null || Array.isArray(obj)) return jsonStr;
+		if (injectMediaSrcInto(obj, origin)) return JSON.stringify(obj);
+		return jsonStr;
+	} catch {
+		return jsonStr;
+	}
+}
+function isRecord(value) {
+	return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+/**
+* Recursively walk an object and inject `src` into local media values.
+* Returns true if any modifications were made.
+*/
+function injectMediaSrcInto(obj, origin) {
+	let modified = false;
+	if ((obj.provider === "local" || !obj.provider && obj.id && obj.meta) && !obj.src) {
+		const storageKey = (isRecord(obj.meta) ? obj.meta : void 0)?.storageKey ?? obj.id;
+		if (typeof storageKey === "string" && storageKey) {
+			obj.src = `${origin}${MEDIA_FILE_PREFIX}${storageKey}`;
+			modified = true;
+		}
+	}
+	for (const value of Object.values(obj)) if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+		for (const item of value) if (isRecord(item)) {
+			if (injectMediaSrcInto(item, origin)) modified = true;
+		}
+	} else if (isRecord(value)) {
+		if (injectMediaSrcInto(value, origin)) modified = true;
+	}
+	return modified;
+}
+/**
+* Safe identifier pattern for snapshot table names.
+* More permissive than validateIdentifier() — allows leading underscores
+* (needed for system tables like _emdash_collections).
+*/
+const SAFE_TABLE_NAME = /^[a-z_][a-z0-9_]*$/;
+/**
+* System tables included in snapshots.
+* Content tables (ec_*) are discovered dynamically.
+*/
+const SYSTEM_TABLES = [
+	"_emdash_collections",
+	"_emdash_fields",
+	"_emdash_taxonomy_defs",
+	"_emdash_menus",
+	"_emdash_menu_items",
+	"_emdash_sections",
+	"_emdash_widget_areas",
+	"_emdash_widgets",
+	"_emdash_seo",
+	"_emdash_migrations",
+	"taxonomies",
+	"content_taxonomies",
+	"media",
+	"options",
+	"revisions"
+];
+/**
+* Table name prefixes excluded from snapshots (auth/security data).
+*/
+const EXCLUDED_PREFIXES = [
+	"_emdash_api_tokens",
+	"_emdash_oauth_tokens",
+	"_emdash_authorization_codes",
+	"_emdash_device_codes",
+	"_emdash_migrations_lock",
+	"_plugin_",
+	"users",
+	"sessions",
+	"credentials",
+	"challenges"
+];
+/**
+* Options key prefixes safe for inclusion in snapshots.
+*
+* The options table contains plugin secrets (plugin:*), passkey challenges
+* (emdash:passkey_pending:*), and setup state that must not leak to
+* preview databases. Only site-level rendering settings are needed.
+*/
+const SAFE_OPTIONS_PREFIXES = ["site:"];
+function isExcluded(tableName) {
+	return EXCLUDED_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => tableName.startsWith(prefix));
+}
+/**
+* Generate a portable database snapshot.
+*
+* Discovers ec_* content tables dynamically, exports system tables
+* needed for rendering, and includes schema info for table recreation.
+*/
+async function generateSnapshot(db, options) {
+	const includeDrafts = options?.includeDrafts ?? false;
+	const includeTrashed = options?.includeTrashed ?? false;
+	const optionPrefixes = options?.optionPrefixes ?? SAFE_OPTIONS_PREFIXES;
+	const allTables = [...(await sql`
+		SELECT name FROM sqlite_master
+		WHERE type = 'table'
+		AND name LIKE 'ec_%'
+		ORDER BY name
+	`.execute(db)).rows.map((r) => r.name), ...SYSTEM_TABLES];
+	const tables = {};
+	const schema = {};
+	for (const tableName of allTables) {
+		if (isExcluded(tableName)) continue;
+		if (!SAFE_TABLE_NAME.test(tableName)) continue;
+		try {
+			const pragmaResult = await sql`
+				PRAGMA table_info(${sql.raw(`"${tableName}"`)})
+			`.execute(db);
+			if (pragmaResult.rows.length === 0) continue;
+			const columns = pragmaResult.rows.map((r) => r.name);
+			const types = {};
+			for (const row of pragmaResult.rows) types[row.name] = row.type || "TEXT";
+			schema[tableName] = {
+				columns,
+				types
+			};
+			let rows;
+			if (tableName.startsWith("ec_")) if (includeTrashed) rows = (await sql`
+						SELECT * FROM ${sql.raw(`"${tableName}"`)}
+					`.execute(db)).rows;
+			else if (includeDrafts) rows = (await sql`
+						SELECT * FROM ${sql.raw(`"${tableName}"`)}
+						WHERE deleted_at IS NULL
+					`.execute(db)).rows;
+			else rows = (await sql`
+						SELECT * FROM ${sql.raw(`"${tableName}"`)}
+						WHERE deleted_at IS NULL
+						AND (status = 'published' OR (status = 'scheduled' AND scheduled_at <= strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ', 'now')))
+					`.execute(db)).rows;
+			else if (tableName === "options") rows = (await sql`
+					SELECT * FROM ${sql.raw(`"${tableName}"`)}
+				`.execute(db)).rows.filter((row) => {
+				const name = typeof row.name === "string" ? row.name : "";
+				return optionPrefixes.some((prefix) => name.startsWith(prefix));
+			});
+			else rows = (await sql`
+					SELECT * FROM ${sql.raw(`"${tableName}"`)}
+				`.execute(db)).rows;
+			if (rows.length > 0) tables[tableName] = rows;
+		} catch {}
+	}
+	if (options?.origin) {
+		const origin = options.origin;
+		for (const [tableName, rows] of Object.entries(tables)) {
+			if (!tableName.startsWith("ec_")) continue;
+			for (const row of rows) for (const [col, value] of Object.entries(row)) {
+				if (typeof value !== "string" || !value.startsWith("{")) continue;
+				row[col] = injectMediaSrc(value, origin);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return {
+		tables,
+		schema,
+		generatedAt: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()
+	};
+}
+
+//#endregion
+export { parsePreviewSignatureHeader as n, verifyPreviewSignature as r, generateSnapshot as t };
+//# sourceMappingURL=snapshot-BdpUJKD-.mjs.map

package/dist/snapshot-BdpUJKD-.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"snapshot-BdpUJKD-.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/api/handlers/snapshot.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Snapshot handler — generates a portable database snapshot.\n *\n * Returns all content tables, schema definitions, and supporting data\n * needed to render content in an isolated preview database.\n *\n * Used by:\n * - DO preview database (EmDashPreviewDB.populateFromSnapshot)\n * - Future: CLI export, backup, site migration\n */\n\nimport type { Kysely } from \"kysely\";\nimport { sql } from \"kysely\";\n\nimport type { Database } from \"../../database/types.js\";\n\n// ─�� Preview signature verification ──────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Verify HMAC-SHA256 preview signature using crypto.subtle.\n * Returns true if the signature is valid and not expired.\n */\nexport async function verifyPreviewSignature(\n\tsource: string,\n\texp: number,\n\tsig: string,\n\tsecret: string,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n\tif (exp < Date.now() / 1000) return false;\n\n\tconst encoder = new TextEncoder();\n\tconst key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n\t\t\"raw\",\n\t\tencoder.encode(secret),\n\t\t{ name: \"HMAC\", hash: \"SHA-256\" },\n\t\tfalse,\n\t\t[\"verify\"],\n\t);\n\n\tconst sigBytes = new Uint8Array(sig.length / 2);\n\tfor (let i = 0; i < sig.length; i += 2) {\n\t\tsigBytes[i / 2] = parseInt(sig.substring(i, i + 2), 16);\n\t}\n\n\treturn crypto.subtle.verify(\"HMAC\", key, sigBytes, encoder.encode(`${source}:${exp}`));\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse an X-Preview-Signature header value into its components.\n *\n * Format: \"source:exp:sig\" where source is a URL (contains colons),\n * exp is a unix timestamp, and sig is 64 hex chars.\n *\n * Parses from the right since source URLs contain colons.\n *\n * @returns Parsed components, or null if the format is invalid\n */\nexport function parsePreviewSignatureHeader(\n\theader: string,\n): { source: string; exp: number; sig: string } | null {\n\tconst lastColon = header.lastIndexOf(\":\");\n\tif (lastColon <= 0) return null;\n\n\tconst sig = header.substring(lastColon + 1);\n\tif (sig.length !== 64) return null;\n\n\tconst rest = header.substring(0, lastColon);\n\tconst secondLastColon = rest.lastIndexOf(\":\");\n\tif (secondLastColon <= 0) return null;\n\n\tconst source = rest.substring(0, secondLastColon);\n\tconst exp = parseInt(rest.substring(secondLastColon + 1), 10);\n\n\tif (isNaN(exp) || source.length === 0) return null;\n\n\treturn { source, exp, sig };\n}\n\n// ── Media URL rewriting ─────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst MEDIA_FILE_PREFIX = \"/_emdash/api/media/file/\";\n\n/**\n * Parse a JSON string value and inject `src` for local media objects.\n * Returns the original string if it's not a local media value.\n */\nfunction injectMediaSrc(jsonStr: string, origin: string): string {\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst obj = JSON.parse(jsonStr);\n\t\tif (typeof obj !== \"object\" || obj === null || Array.isArray(obj)) return jsonStr;\n\t\tif (injectMediaSrcInto(obj, origin)) {\n\t\t\treturn JSON.stringify(obj);\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn jsonStr;\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn jsonStr;\n\t}\n}\n\nfunction isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {\n\treturn typeof value === \"object\" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);\n}\n\n/**\n * Recursively walk an object and inject `src` into local media values.\n * Returns true if any modifications were made.\n */\nfunction injectMediaSrcInto(obj: Record<string, unknown>, origin: string): boolean {\n\tlet modified = false;\n\n\t// Check if this object itself is a local media value\n\tif ((obj.provider === \"local\" || (!obj.provider && obj.id && obj.meta)) && !obj.src) {\n\t\tconst meta = isRecord(obj.meta) ? obj.meta : undefined;\n\t\tconst storageKey = meta?.storageKey ?? obj.id;\n\t\tif (typeof storageKey === \"string\" && storageKey) {\n\t\t\tobj.src = `${origin}${MEDIA_FILE_PREFIX}${storageKey}`;\n\t\t\tmodified = true;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Recurse into nested objects/arrays (e.g. Portable Text with image blocks)\n\tfor (const value of Object.values(obj)) {\n\t\tif (Array.isArray(value)) {\n\t\t\tfor (const item of value) {\n\t\t\t\tif (isRecord(item)) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (injectMediaSrcInto(item, origin)) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmodified = true;\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else if (isRecord(value)) {\n\t\t\tif (injectMediaSrcInto(value, origin)) {\n\t\t\t\tmodified = true;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn modified;\n}\n\n// ── Snapshot generation ─────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Safe identifier pattern for snapshot table names.\n * More permissive than validateIdentifier() — allows leading underscores\n * (needed for system tables like _emdash_collections).\n */\nconst SAFE_TABLE_NAME = /^[a-z_][a-z0-9_]*$/;\n\n/** Snapshot shape consumed by the DO preview database */\nexport interface Snapshot {\n\ttables: Record<string, Record<string, unknown>[]>;\n\tschema: Record<\n\t\tstring,\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tcolumns: string[];\n\t\t\ttypes?: Record<string, string>;\n\t\t}\n\t>;\n\tgeneratedAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * System tables included in snapshots.\n * Content tables (ec_*) are discovered dynamically.\n */\nconst SYSTEM_TABLES = [\n\t\"_emdash_collections\",\n\t\"_emdash_fields\",\n\t\"_emdash_taxonomy_defs\",\n\t\"_emdash_menus\",\n\t\"_emdash_menu_items\",\n\t\"_emdash_sections\",\n\t\"_emdash_widget_areas\",\n\t\"_emdash_widgets\",\n\t\"_emdash_seo\",\n\t\"_emdash_migrations\",\n\t\"taxonomies\",\n\t\"content_taxonomies\",\n\t\"media\",\n\t\"options\",\n\t\"revisions\",\n];\n\n/**\n * Table name prefixes excluded from snapshots (auth/security data).\n */\nconst EXCLUDED_PREFIXES = [\n\t\"_emdash_api_tokens\",\n\t\"_emdash_oauth_tokens\",\n\t\"_emdash_authorization_codes\",\n\t\"_emdash_device_codes\",\n\t\"_emdash_migrations_lock\",\n\t\"_plugin_\",\n\t\"users\",\n\t\"sessions\",\n\t\"credentials\",\n\t\"challenges\",\n];\n\n/**\n * Options key prefixes safe for inclusion in snapshots.\n *\n * The options table contains plugin secrets (plugin:*), passkey challenges\n * (emdash:passkey_pending:*), and setup state that must not leak to\n * preview databases. Only site-level rendering settings are needed.\n */\nconst SAFE_OPTIONS_PREFIXES = [\"site:\"];\n\nfunction isExcluded(tableName: string): boolean {\n\treturn EXCLUDED_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => tableName.startsWith(prefix));\n}\n\n/** Column info from PRAGMA table_info */\ninterface ColumnInfo {\n\tname: string;\n\ttype: string;\n}\n\nexport interface GenerateSnapshotOptions {\n\t/** Include draft and scheduled content (default: false) */\n\tincludeDrafts?: boolean;\n\t/** Include trashed content (deleted_at set). Used by backups (default: false) */\n\tincludeTrashed?: boolean;\n\t/** Origin URL for absolutizing local media URLs (e.g. \"https://mysite.com\") */\n\torigin?: string;\n\t/**\n\t * Allowlist of options-table key prefixes to include (default:\n\t * `SAFE_OPTIONS_PREFIXES`). Callers widening this must never include a\n\t * prefix that matches secrets (`emdash:preview_secret`, `plugin:`,\n\t * `emdash:passkey_pending:`) — the output may be user-downloadable.\n\t */\n\toptionPrefixes?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Generate a portable database snapshot.\n *\n * Discovers ec_* content tables dynamically, exports system tables\n * needed for rendering, and includes schema info for table recreation.\n */\nexport async function generateSnapshot(\n\tdb: Kysely<Database>,\n\toptions?: GenerateSnapshotOptions,\n): Promise<Snapshot> {\n\tconst includeDrafts = options?.includeDrafts ?? false;\n\tconst includeTrashed = options?.includeTrashed ?? false;\n\tconst optionPrefixes = options?.optionPrefixes ?? SAFE_OPTIONS_PREFIXES;\n\n\t// Discover all ec_* content tables\n\tconst tableResult = await sql<{ name: string }>`\n\t\tSELECT name FROM sqlite_master\n\t\tWHERE type = 'table'\n\t\tAND name LIKE 'ec_%'\n\t\tORDER BY name\n\t`.execute(db);\n\n\tconst contentTables = tableResult.rows.map((r) => r.name);\n\n\t// Build list of all tables to export\n\tconst allTables = [...contentTables, ...SYSTEM_TABLES];\n\n\tconst tables: Record<string, Record<string, unknown>[]> = {};\n\tconst schema: Record<string, { columns: string[]; types?: Record<string, string> }> = {};\n\n\tfor (const tableName of allTables) {\n\t\tif (isExcluded(tableName)) continue;\n\n\t\t// Validate identifier before interpolating into sql.raw().\n\t\t// SYSTEM_TABLES are hardcoded and safe, but ec_* names come from\n\t\t// sqlite_master and must be validated.\n\t\tif (!SAFE_TABLE_NAME.test(tableName)) continue;\n\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t// Get column info via PRAGMA\n\t\t\tconst pragmaResult = await sql<ColumnInfo>`\n\t\t\t\tPRAGMA table_info(${sql.raw(`\"${tableName}\"`)})\n\t\t\t`.execute(db);\n\n\t\t\tif (pragmaResult.rows.length === 0) continue;\n\n\t\t\tconst columns = pragmaResult.rows.map((r) => r.name);\n\t\t\tconst types: Record<string, string> = {};\n\t\t\tfor (const row of pragmaResult.rows) {\n\t\t\t\ttypes[row.name] = row.type || \"TEXT\";\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tschema[tableName] = { columns, types };\n\n\t\t\t// Fetch rows\n\t\t\tlet rows: Record<string, unknown>[];\n\n\t\t\tif (tableName.startsWith(\"ec_\")) {\n\t\t\t\tif (includeTrashed) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Everything, including trash — full-fidelity backup export\n\t\t\t\t\trows = (\n\t\t\t\t\t\tawait sql<Record<string, unknown>>`\n\t\t\t\t\t\tSELECT * FROM ${sql.raw(`\"${tableName}\"`)}\n\t\t\t\t\t`.execute(db)\n\t\t\t\t\t).rows;\n\t\t\t\t} else if (includeDrafts) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Include all non-deleted content (published, draft, scheduled)\n\t\t\t\t\trows = (\n\t\t\t\t\t\tawait sql<Record<string, unknown>>`\n\t\t\t\t\t\tSELECT * FROM ${sql.raw(`\"${tableName}\"`)}\n\t\t\t\t\t\tWHERE deleted_at IS NULL\n\t\t\t\t\t`.execute(db)\n\t\t\t\t\t).rows;\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Only export published content\n\t\t\t\t\trows = (\n\t\t\t\t\t\tawait sql<Record<string, unknown>>`\n\t\t\t\t\t\tSELECT * FROM ${sql.raw(`\"${tableName}\"`)}\n\t\t\t\t\t\tWHERE deleted_at IS NULL\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAND (status = 'published' OR (status = 'scheduled' AND scheduled_at <= strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ', 'now')))\n\t\t\t\t\t`.execute(db)\n\t\t\t\t\t).rows;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t} else if (tableName === \"options\") {\n\t\t\t\t// Filter options to safe rendering-only prefixes.\n\t\t\t\t// Excludes plugin secrets, passkey challenges, and setup state.\n\t\t\t\trows = (\n\t\t\t\t\tawait sql<Record<string, unknown>>`\n\t\t\t\t\tSELECT * FROM ${sql.raw(`\"${tableName}\"`)}\n\t\t\t\t`.execute(db)\n\t\t\t\t).rows.filter((row) => {\n\t\t\t\t\tconst name = typeof row.name === \"string\" ? 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package/dist/{ssrf-TrKYJAy0.mjs → ssrf-CviKqWmq.mjs}

@@ -329,4 +329,4 @@ function stripCredentialHeaders(init) {
 
 //#endregion
 export { validateExternalUrl as a, stripCredentialHeaders as i, resolveAndValidateExternalUrl as n, ssrfSafeFetch as r, SsrfError as t };
-//# sourceMappingURL=ssrf-TrKYJAy0.mjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=ssrf-CviKqWmq.mjs.map

package/dist/{ssrf-TrKYJAy0.mjs.map → ssrf-CviKqWmq.mjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"ssrf-TrKYJAy0.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/security/ssrf.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * SSRF protection for import URLs.\n *\n * Validates that URLs don't target internal/private network addresses.\n * Applied before any fetch() call in the import pipeline.\n */\n\nconst IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_DOTTED_PATTERN = /^::ffff:(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)$/i;\nconst IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_HEX_PATTERN = /^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\nconst IPV4_TRANSLATED_HEX_PATTERN = /^::ffff:0:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\nconst IPV6_EXPANDED_MAPPED_PATTERN =\n\t/^0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\n\n/**\n * IPv4-compatible (deprecated) addresses: ::XXXX:XXXX\n *\n * The WHATWG URL parser normalizes [::127.0.0.1] to [::7f00:1] (no ffff prefix).\n * These are deprecated but still parsed, and bypass the ffff-based checks.\n */\nconst IPV4_COMPATIBLE_HEX_PATTERN = /^::([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\n\n/**\n * NAT64 prefix (RFC 6052): 64:ff9b::XXXX:XXXX\n *\n * Used by NAT64 gateways to embed IPv4 addresses in IPv6.\n * [64:ff9b::127.0.0.1] normalizes to [64:ff9b::7f00:1].\n */\nconst NAT64_HEX_PATTERN = /^64:ff9b::([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\n\nconst IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN = /^\\[|\\]$/g;\n\n/** Match fc00::/7 ULA — first byte 0xfc or 0xfd followed by any byte. */\nconst IPV6_ULA_FC_PATTERN = /^fc[0-9a-f]{2}:/;\nconst IPV6_ULA_FD_PATTERN = /^fd[0-9a-f]{2}:/;\n\n/** Strip trailing dots from an FQDN-form hostname (\"localhost.\" -> \"localhost\"). */\nconst TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN = /\\.+$/;\n\n/**\n * Private and reserved IP ranges that should never be fetched.\n *\n * Includes:\n * - Loopback (127.0.0.0/8)\n * - Private (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)\n * - Link-local (169.254.0.0/16)\n * - Cloud metadata (169.254.169.254 — AWS/GCP/Azure)\n * - IPv6 loopback and link-local\n */\nconst BLOCKED_PATTERNS: Array<{ start: number; end: number }> = [\n\t// 127.0.0.0/8 — loopback\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(127, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(127, 255, 255, 255) },\n\t// 10.0.0.0/8 — private\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(10, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(10, 255, 255, 255) },\n\t// 172.16.0.0/12 — private\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(172, 16, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(172, 31, 255, 255) },\n\t// 192.168.0.0/16 — private\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 255, 255) },\n\t// 169.254.0.0/16 — link-local (includes cloud metadata endpoint)\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 255, 255) },\n\t// 0.0.0.0/8 — current network\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(0, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(0, 255, 255, 255) },\n];\n\n// Bracket-stripped form is used for lookups (validateExternalUrl strips\n// brackets from parsed.hostname before checking), so \"::1\" appears here\n// without brackets. The \"::1\" case is already covered by isPrivateIp, but\n// keeping it here makes the intent explicit and gives a clearer error\n// message for the common `http://[::1]/` form.\nconst BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES = new Set([\n\t\"localhost\",\n\t\"metadata.google.internal\",\n\t\"metadata.google\",\n\t\"::1\",\n]);\n\n/**\n * Wildcard DNS services that publicly resolve arbitrary IPs embedded in the\n * hostname. Commonly used in local dev and by SSRF exploit tooling to bypass\n * hostname-only blocklists (e.g. 127.0.0.1.nip.io -> 127.0.0.1).\n *\n * Matched case-insensitively as a suffix, so both the apex and any subdomain\n * are blocked.\n */\nconst BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES = [\n\t\"nip.io\",\n\t\"sslip.io\",\n\t\"xip.io\",\n\t\"traefik.me\",\n\t\"lvh.me\",\n\t\"localtest.me\",\n];\n\n/** Blocked URL schemes */\nconst ALLOWED_SCHEMES = new Set([\"http:\", \"https:\"]);\n\nfunction ip4ToNum(a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number): number {\n\treturn ((a << 24) | (b << 16) | (c << 8) | d) >>> 0;\n}\n\nfunction parseIpv4(ip: string): number | null {\n\tconst parts = ip.split(\".\");\n\tif (parts.length !== 4) return null;\n\n\tconst nums = parts.map(Number);\n\tif (nums.some((n) => isNaN(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return null;\n\n\treturn ip4ToNum(nums[0], nums[1], nums[2], nums[3]);\n}\n\n/**\n * Convert IPv4-mapped/translated IPv6 addresses from hex form back to IPv4.\n *\n * The WHATWG URL parser normalizes dotted-decimal to hex:\n *   [::ffff:127.0.0.1] -> [::ffff:7f00:1]\n *   [::ffff:169.254.169.254] -> [::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]\n *\n * Without this conversion, the hex forms bypass isPrivateIp() regex checks.\n */\nexport function normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(ip: string): string | null {\n\t// Match hex-form IPv4-mapped IPv6: ::ffff:XXXX:XXXX\n\tlet match = ip.match(IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_HEX_PATTERN);\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match IPv4-translated (RFC 6052): ::ffff:0:XXXX:XXXX\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(IPV4_TRANSLATED_HEX_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match fully expanded form: 0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:ffff:XXXX:XXXX\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(IPV6_EXPANDED_MAPPED_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match IPv4-compatible (deprecated) form: ::XXXX:XXXX (no ffff prefix)\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(IPV4_COMPATIBLE_HEX_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match NAT64 prefix (RFC 6052): 64:ff9b::XXXX:XXXX\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(NAT64_HEX_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (match) {\n\t\tconst high = parseInt(match[1] ?? \"\", 16);\n\t\tconst low = parseInt(match[2] ?? \"\", 16);\n\t\treturn `${(high >> 8) & 0xff}.${high & 0xff}.${(low >> 8) & 0xff}.${low & 0xff}`;\n\t}\n\treturn null;\n}\n\nfunction isPrivateIp(ip: string): boolean {\n\t// Normalize IPv6 strings to lowercase. `new URL().hostname` already\n\t// lowercases, but resolver output (from DoH or an injected resolver) may\n\t// not. Without this, \"FE80::1\" bypasses the link-local check.\n\tconst normalized = ip.toLowerCase();\n\n\t// Handle IPv6 loopback\n\tif (normalized === \"::1\" || normalized === \"::ffff:127.0.0.1\") return true;\n\n\t// Handle IPv4-mapped IPv6 in hex form (WHATWG URL parser normalizes to this)\n\t// e.g. ::ffff:7f00:1 -> 127.0.0.1, ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe -> 169.254.169.254\n\tconst hexIpv4 = normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(normalized);\n\tif (hexIpv4) return isPrivateIp(hexIpv4);\n\n\t// Handle IPv4-mapped IPv6 in dotted-decimal form\n\tconst v4Match = normalized.match(IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_DOTTED_PATTERN);\n\tconst ipv4 = v4Match ? v4Match[1] : normalized;\n\n\tconst num = parseIpv4(ipv4);\n\tif (num === null) {\n\t\t// If we can't parse it, block IPv6 addresses that look internal.\n\t\t// fc00::/7 is Unique Local (first byte 0xfc or 0xfd), fe80::/10 is\n\t\t// link-local. Only match when followed by hex digit + colon to avoid\n\t\t// collisions with hypothetical non-address strings.\n\t\treturn (\n\t\t\tnormalized.startsWith(\"fe80:\") ||\n\t\t\tIPV6_ULA_FC_PATTERN.test(normalized) ||\n\t\t\tIPV6_ULA_FD_PATTERN.test(normalized)\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\treturn BLOCKED_PATTERNS.some((range) => num >= range.start && num <= range.end);\n}\n\n/**\n * Error thrown when SSRF protection blocks a URL.\n */\nexport class SsrfError extends Error {\n\tcode = \"SSRF_BLOCKED\" as const;\n\n\tconstructor(message: string) {\n\t\tsuper(message);\n\t\tthis.name = \"SsrfError\";\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate that a URL is safe to fetch (not targeting internal networks).\n *\n * Checks:\n * 1. URL is well-formed with http/https scheme\n * 2. Hostname is not a known internal name (localhost, metadata endpoints)\n * 3. If hostname is an IP literal, it's not in a private range\n *\n * Note: DNS rebinding attacks are not fully mitigated (hostname could resolve\n * to a private IP). Full protection requires resolving DNS and checking the IP\n * before connecting, which needs a custom fetch implementation. This covers\n * the most common SSRF vectors.\n *\n * @throws SsrfError if the URL targets an internal address\n */\n/** Maximum number of redirects to follow in ssrfSafeFetch */\nconst MAX_REDIRECTS = 5;\n\nexport function validateExternalUrl(url: string): URL {\n\tlet parsed: URL;\n\ttry {\n\t\tparsed = new URL(url);\n\t} catch {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Invalid URL\");\n\t}\n\n\t// Only allow http/https\n\tif (!ALLOWED_SCHEMES.has(parsed.protocol)) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(`Scheme '${parsed.protocol}' is not allowed`);\n\t}\n\n\t// Strip brackets from IPv6 hostname\n\tconst hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// Normalize the hostname for blocklist matching: lowercase + strip any\n\t// trailing dots. 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Use the\n\t// normalized form so \"127.0.0.1..\" and friends don't bypass parseIpv4\n\t// (which rejects extra trailing dots).\n\tif (isPrivateIp(normalizedHost)) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"URLs targeting private IP addresses are not allowed\");\n\t}\n\n\treturn parsed;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// DNS-aware validation\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * A resolver that maps a hostname to a list of IPv4/IPv6 addresses.\n * Injectable so callers can swap in OS-level DNS on Node, stub it in tests,\n * or point to a different DoH endpoint.\n */\nexport type DnsResolver = (hostname: string) => Promise<string[]>;\n\n/**\n * Module-level default resolver. Tests can swap this with a stub so fetch\n * mocks don't see unexpected DoH round-trips. Production code should leave\n * it alone.\n */\nlet defaultResolver: DnsResolver | null = null;\n\n/** Override the default DNS resolver. Returns the previous value. */\nexport function setDefaultDnsResolver(resolver: DnsResolver | null): DnsResolver | null {\n\tconst previous = defaultResolver;\n\tdefaultResolver = resolver;\n\treturn previous;\n}\n\n/** Timeout for a single DoH request, in milliseconds. */\nconst DOH_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000;\n\n/** Default DoH endpoint — Cloudflare's public resolver. */\nconst DEFAULT_DOH_URL = \"https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query\";\n\ninterface DohAnswer {\n\tdata: string;\n}\n\ninterface DohResponse {\n\tStatus: number;\n\tAnswer: DohAnswer[];\n}\n\nfunction hasProperty<K extends string>(obj: unknown, key: K): obj is Record<K, unknown> {\n\treturn typeof obj === \"object\" && obj !== null && key in obj;\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow an unknown JSON body to a DohResponse shape we can read safely.\n * Throws if the body doesn't look like a DoH response — a malformed body is\n * indistinguishable from a failure and must not be silently treated as empty.\n */\nfunction parseDohResponse(raw: unknown): DohResponse {\n\tif (!hasProperty(raw, \"Status\") || typeof raw.Status !== \"number\") {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\"DoH response missing Status field\");\n\t}\n\tconst answers: DohAnswer[] = [];\n\tif (hasProperty(raw, \"Answer\") && Array.isArray(raw.Answer)) {\n\t\tfor (const entry of raw.Answer) {\n\t\t\tif (hasProperty(entry, \"data\") && typeof entry.data === \"string\") {\n\t\t\t\tanswers.push({ data: entry.data });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn { Status: raw.Status, Answer: answers };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve a hostname via DNS over HTTPS (Cloudflare). Returns all A and AAAA\n * records. Works in both Workers and Node without requiring node:dns.\n *\n * Fails closed: any network error, non-2xx response, or DNS rcode != 0\n * causes a rejected promise so the calling validator treats it as a block.\n */\nexport const cloudflareDohResolver: DnsResolver = async (hostname) => {\n\tasync function query(type: \"A\" | \"AAAA\"): Promise<string[]> {\n\t\tconst params = new URLSearchParams({ name: hostname, type });\n\t\tconst controller = new AbortController();\n\t\tconst timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), DOH_TIMEOUT_MS);\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst response = await globalThis.fetch(`${DEFAULT_DOH_URL}?${params.toString()}`, {\n\t\t\t\theaders: { Accept: \"application/dns-json\" },\n\t\t\t\tsignal: controller.signal,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tif (!response.ok) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(`DoH lookup failed: ${response.status}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst raw = await response.json();\n\t\t\tconst body = parseDohResponse(raw);\n\t\t\t// NXDOMAIN (3) is a legitimate \"does not exist\" — treat as empty.\n\t\t\t// Any other non-zero status (SERVFAIL=2, REFUSED=5, etc.) is\n\t\t\t// ambiguous and could be a split-view attacker hiding records\n\t\t\t// from our resolver. Fail closed.\n\t\t\tif (body.Status === 3) return [];\n\t\t\tif (body.Status !== 0) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(`DoH ${type} lookup failed: rcode=${body.Status}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// DoH Answer arrays often include CNAME records alongside A/AAAA\n\t\t\t// records. Their `data` is a hostname, not an IP. Filter to just\n\t\t\t// IP literals so isPrivateIp sees real addresses.\n\t\t\treturn body.Answer.map((a) => a.data).filter(isIpLiteral);\n\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\tclearTimeout(timeout);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tconst [a, aaaa] = await Promise.all([query(\"A\"), query(\"AAAA\")]);\n\treturn [...a, ...aaaa];\n};\n\n/**\n * Validate a URL and resolve its hostname to check the actual IPs against\n * the private-range blocklist. This catches DNS rebinding attacks using\n * attacker-controlled domains that publicly resolve to private addresses,\n * and wildcard DNS services like nip.io used by exploit tooling.\n *\n * Runs `validateExternalUrl` first for cheap pre-flight checks (scheme,\n * literal IP, known-bad hostnames). Then resolves the hostname and rejects\n * if ANY returned address is private.\n *\n * Fails closed: if resolution fails or returns no records, throws SsrfError.\n *\n * **Caveats.** This does NOT fully close the TOCTOU between check and\n * connect. Attacks that still work against this layer include:\n *\n * - TTL=0 rebind: authoritative server returns public IP to the check, then\n *   private IP to the subsequent fetch() a few milliseconds later.\n * - Split-view via EDNS Client Subnet or source-IP inspection: the\n *   authoritative server returns public IP to Cloudflare's DoH resolver and\n *   private IP to the victim's own resolver (used by fetch()).\n * - Host-file overrides or split-horizon corporate DNS on self-hosted Node.\n * - Attacker-controlled rebinding services the caller has allowlisted.\n *\n * The only complete defense is a network-layer egress firewall. On\n * Cloudflare Workers, the platform fetch pipeline provides most of that.\n * On self-hosted Node, operators must restrict egress themselves.\n */\nexport async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(\n\turl: string,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver },\n): Promise<URL> {\n\tconst parsed = validateExternalUrl(url);\n\n\t// Strip brackets from IPv6 hostnames\n\tconst hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// If the hostname is already an IP literal, validateExternalUrl has\n\t// already checked it against the private-range list. Skip DNS.\n\tif (isIpLiteral(hostname)) {\n\t\treturn parsed;\n\t}\n\n\tconst resolver = options?.resolver ?? defaultResolver ?? cloudflareDohResolver;\n\n\tlet addresses: string[];\n\ttry {\n\t\taddresses = await resolver(hostname);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\n\t\t\t`Could not resolve hostname: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tif (addresses.length === 0) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolved to no addresses\");\n\t}\n\n\tfor (const ip of addresses) {\n\t\tif (isPrivateIp(ip)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolves to a private IP address\");\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn parsed;\n}\n\n/** True when a string looks like an IPv4 or IPv6 literal. */\nfunction isIpLiteral(host: string): boolean {\n\tif (parseIpv4(host) !== null) return true;\n\t// Very loose IPv6 heuristic — matches anything with a colon, which is\n\t// never valid in DNS hostnames, so this is safe.\n\treturn host.includes(\":\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch a URL with SSRF protection on redirects.\n *\n * Uses `redirect: \"manual\"` to intercept redirects and re-validate each\n * redirect target against SSRF rules before following it. This prevents\n * an attacker from setting up an allowed external URL that redirects to\n * an internal IP (e.g. 169.254.169.254 for cloud metadata).\n *\n * @throws SsrfError if the initial URL or any redirect target is internal\n */\n/** Headers that must be stripped when a redirect crosses origins */\nconst CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = [\"authorization\", \"cookie\", \"proxy-authorization\"];\n\nexport async function ssrfSafeFetch(\n\turl: string,\n\tinit?: RequestInit,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver },\n): Promise<Response> {\n\tlet currentUrl = url;\n\tlet currentInit = init;\n\n\tfor (let i = 0; i <= MAX_REDIRECTS; i++) {\n\t\tawait resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(currentUrl, options);\n\n\t\tconst response = await globalThis.fetch(currentUrl, {\n\t\t\t...currentInit,\n\t\t\tredirect: \"manual\",\n\t\t});\n\n\t\t// Not a redirect -- return directly\n\t\tif (response.status < 300 || response.status >= 400) {\n\t\t\treturn response;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Extract redirect target\n\t\tconst 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Commonly used in local dev and by SSRF exploit tooling to bypass\n * hostname-only blocklists (e.g. 127.0.0.1.nip.io -> 127.0.0.1).\n *\n * Matched case-insensitively as a suffix, so both the apex and any subdomain\n * are blocked.\n */\nconst BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES = [\n\t\"nip.io\",\n\t\"sslip.io\",\n\t\"xip.io\",\n\t\"traefik.me\",\n\t\"lvh.me\",\n\t\"localtest.me\",\n];\n\n/** Blocked URL schemes */\nconst ALLOWED_SCHEMES = new Set([\"http:\", \"https:\"]);\n\nfunction ip4ToNum(a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number): number {\n\treturn ((a << 24) | (b << 16) | (c << 8) | d) >>> 0;\n}\n\nfunction parseIpv4(ip: string): number | null {\n\tconst parts = ip.split(\".\");\n\tif (parts.length !== 4) return null;\n\n\tconst nums = parts.map(Number);\n\tif (nums.some((n) => isNaN(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return null;\n\n\treturn ip4ToNum(nums[0], nums[1], nums[2], nums[3]);\n}\n\n/**\n * Convert IPv4-mapped/translated IPv6 addresses from hex form back to IPv4.\n *\n * The WHATWG URL parser normalizes dotted-decimal to hex:\n *   [::ffff:127.0.0.1] -> [::ffff:7f00:1]\n *   [::ffff:169.254.169.254] -> [::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]\n *\n * Without this conversion, the hex forms bypass isPrivateIp() regex checks.\n */\nexport function normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(ip: string): string | null {\n\t// Match hex-form IPv4-mapped IPv6: ::ffff:XXXX:XXXX\n\tlet match = ip.match(IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_HEX_PATTERN);\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match IPv4-translated (RFC 6052): ::ffff:0:XXXX:XXXX\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(IPV4_TRANSLATED_HEX_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match fully expanded form: 0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:ffff:XXXX:XXXX\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(IPV6_EXPANDED_MAPPED_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match IPv4-compatible (deprecated) form: ::XXXX:XXXX (no ffff prefix)\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(IPV4_COMPATIBLE_HEX_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match NAT64 prefix (RFC 6052): 64:ff9b::XXXX:XXXX\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(NAT64_HEX_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (match) {\n\t\tconst high = parseInt(match[1] ?? \"\", 16);\n\t\tconst low = parseInt(match[2] ?? \"\", 16);\n\t\treturn `${(high >> 8) & 0xff}.${high & 0xff}.${(low >> 8) & 0xff}.${low & 0xff}`;\n\t}\n\treturn null;\n}\n\nfunction isPrivateIp(ip: string): boolean {\n\t// Normalize IPv6 strings to lowercase. `new URL().hostname` already\n\t// lowercases, but resolver output (from DoH or an injected resolver) may\n\t// not. Without this, \"FE80::1\" bypasses the link-local check.\n\tconst normalized = ip.toLowerCase();\n\n\t// Handle IPv6 loopback\n\tif (normalized === \"::1\" || normalized === \"::ffff:127.0.0.1\") return true;\n\n\t// Handle IPv4-mapped IPv6 in hex form (WHATWG URL parser normalizes to this)\n\t// e.g. ::ffff:7f00:1 -> 127.0.0.1, ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe -> 169.254.169.254\n\tconst hexIpv4 = normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(normalized);\n\tif (hexIpv4) return isPrivateIp(hexIpv4);\n\n\t// Handle IPv4-mapped IPv6 in dotted-decimal form\n\tconst v4Match = normalized.match(IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_DOTTED_PATTERN);\n\tconst ipv4 = v4Match ? v4Match[1] : normalized;\n\n\tconst num = parseIpv4(ipv4);\n\tif (num === null) {\n\t\t// If we can't parse it, block IPv6 addresses that look internal.\n\t\t// fc00::/7 is Unique Local (first byte 0xfc or 0xfd), fe80::/10 is\n\t\t// link-local. Only match when followed by hex digit + colon to avoid\n\t\t// collisions with hypothetical non-address strings.\n\t\treturn (\n\t\t\tnormalized.startsWith(\"fe80:\") ||\n\t\t\tIPV6_ULA_FC_PATTERN.test(normalized) ||\n\t\t\tIPV6_ULA_FD_PATTERN.test(normalized)\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\treturn BLOCKED_PATTERNS.some((range) => num >= range.start && num <= range.end);\n}\n\n/**\n * Error thrown when SSRF protection blocks a URL.\n */\nexport class SsrfError extends Error {\n\tcode = \"SSRF_BLOCKED\" as const;\n\n\tconstructor(message: string) {\n\t\tsuper(message);\n\t\tthis.name = \"SsrfError\";\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate that a URL is safe to fetch (not targeting internal networks).\n *\n * Checks:\n * 1. URL is well-formed with http/https scheme\n * 2. Hostname is not a known internal name (localhost, metadata endpoints)\n * 3. If hostname is an IP literal, it's not in a private range\n *\n * Note: DNS rebinding attacks are not fully mitigated (hostname could resolve\n * to a private IP). Full protection requires resolving DNS and checking the IP\n * before connecting, which needs a custom fetch implementation. This covers\n * the most common SSRF vectors.\n *\n * @throws SsrfError if the URL targets an internal address\n */\n/** Maximum number of redirects to follow in ssrfSafeFetch */\nconst MAX_REDIRECTS = 5;\n\nexport function validateExternalUrl(url: string): URL {\n\tlet parsed: URL;\n\ttry {\n\t\tparsed = new URL(url);\n\t} catch {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Invalid URL\");\n\t}\n\n\t// Only allow http/https\n\tif (!ALLOWED_SCHEMES.has(parsed.protocol)) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(`Scheme '${parsed.protocol}' is not allowed`);\n\t}\n\n\t// Strip brackets from IPv6 hostname\n\tconst hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// Normalize the hostname for blocklist matching: lowercase + strip any\n\t// trailing dots. 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Returns the previous value. */\nexport function setDefaultDnsResolver(resolver: DnsResolver | null): DnsResolver | null {\n\tconst previous = defaultResolver;\n\tdefaultResolver = resolver;\n\treturn previous;\n}\n\n/** Timeout for a single DoH request, in milliseconds. */\nconst DOH_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000;\n\n/** Default DoH endpoint — Cloudflare's public resolver. */\nconst DEFAULT_DOH_URL = \"https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query\";\n\ninterface DohAnswer {\n\tdata: string;\n}\n\ninterface DohResponse {\n\tStatus: number;\n\tAnswer: DohAnswer[];\n}\n\nfunction hasProperty<K extends string>(obj: unknown, key: K): obj is Record<K, unknown> {\n\treturn typeof obj === \"object\" && obj !== null && key in obj;\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow an unknown JSON body to a DohResponse shape we can read safely.\n * Throws if the body doesn't look like a DoH response — a malformed body is\n * indistinguishable from a failure and must not be silently treated as empty.\n */\nfunction parseDohResponse(raw: unknown): DohResponse {\n\tif (!hasProperty(raw, \"Status\") || typeof raw.Status !== \"number\") {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\"DoH response missing Status field\");\n\t}\n\tconst answers: DohAnswer[] = [];\n\tif (hasProperty(raw, \"Answer\") && Array.isArray(raw.Answer)) {\n\t\tfor (const entry of raw.Answer) {\n\t\t\tif (hasProperty(entry, \"data\") && typeof entry.data === \"string\") {\n\t\t\t\tanswers.push({ data: entry.data });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn { Status: raw.Status, Answer: answers };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve a hostname via DNS over HTTPS (Cloudflare). Returns all A and AAAA\n * records. Works in both Workers and Node without requiring node:dns.\n *\n * Fails closed: any network error, non-2xx response, or DNS rcode != 0\n * causes a rejected promise so the calling validator treats it as a block.\n */\nexport const cloudflareDohResolver: DnsResolver = async (hostname) => {\n\tasync function query(type: \"A\" | \"AAAA\"): Promise<string[]> {\n\t\tconst params = new URLSearchParams({ name: hostname, type });\n\t\tconst controller = new AbortController();\n\t\tconst timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), DOH_TIMEOUT_MS);\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst response = await globalThis.fetch(`${DEFAULT_DOH_URL}?${params.toString()}`, {\n\t\t\t\theaders: { Accept: \"application/dns-json\" },\n\t\t\t\tsignal: controller.signal,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tif (!response.ok) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(`DoH lookup failed: ${response.status}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst raw = await response.json();\n\t\t\tconst body = parseDohResponse(raw);\n\t\t\t// NXDOMAIN (3) is a legitimate \"does not exist\" — treat as empty.\n\t\t\t// Any other non-zero status (SERVFAIL=2, REFUSED=5, etc.) is\n\t\t\t// ambiguous and could be a split-view attacker hiding records\n\t\t\t// from our resolver. Fail closed.\n\t\t\tif (body.Status === 3) return [];\n\t\t\tif (body.Status !== 0) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(`DoH ${type} lookup failed: rcode=${body.Status}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// DoH Answer arrays often include CNAME records alongside A/AAAA\n\t\t\t// records. Their `data` is a hostname, not an IP. Filter to just\n\t\t\t// IP literals so isPrivateIp sees real addresses.\n\t\t\treturn body.Answer.map((a) => a.data).filter(isIpLiteral);\n\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\tclearTimeout(timeout);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tconst [a, aaaa] = await Promise.all([query(\"A\"), query(\"AAAA\")]);\n\treturn [...a, ...aaaa];\n};\n\n/**\n * Validate a URL and resolve its hostname to check the actual IPs against\n * the private-range blocklist. This catches DNS rebinding attacks using\n * attacker-controlled domains that publicly resolve to private addresses,\n * and wildcard DNS services like nip.io used by exploit tooling.\n *\n * Runs `validateExternalUrl` first for cheap pre-flight checks (scheme,\n * literal IP, known-bad hostnames). Then resolves the hostname and rejects\n * if ANY returned address is private.\n *\n * Fails closed: if resolution fails or returns no records, throws SsrfError.\n *\n * **Caveats.** This does NOT fully close the TOCTOU between check and\n * connect. Attacks that still work against this layer include:\n *\n * - TTL=0 rebind: authoritative server returns public IP to the check, then\n *   private IP to the subsequent fetch() a few milliseconds later.\n * - Split-view via EDNS Client Subnet or source-IP inspection: the\n *   authoritative server returns public IP to Cloudflare's DoH resolver and\n *   private IP to the victim's own resolver (used by fetch()).\n * - Host-file overrides or split-horizon corporate DNS on self-hosted Node.\n * - Attacker-controlled rebinding services the caller has allowlisted.\n *\n * The only complete defense is a network-layer egress firewall. On\n * Cloudflare Workers, the platform fetch pipeline provides most of that.\n * On self-hosted Node, operators must restrict egress themselves.\n */\nexport async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(\n\turl: string,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver },\n): Promise<URL> {\n\tconst parsed = validateExternalUrl(url);\n\n\t// Strip brackets from IPv6 hostnames\n\tconst hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// If the hostname is already an IP literal, validateExternalUrl has\n\t// already checked it against the private-range list. Skip DNS.\n\tif (isIpLiteral(hostname)) {\n\t\treturn parsed;\n\t}\n\n\tconst resolver = options?.resolver ?? defaultResolver ?? cloudflareDohResolver;\n\n\tlet addresses: string[];\n\ttry {\n\t\taddresses = await resolver(hostname);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\n\t\t\t`Could not resolve hostname: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tif (addresses.length === 0) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolved to no addresses\");\n\t}\n\n\tfor (const ip of addresses) {\n\t\tif (isPrivateIp(ip)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolves to a private IP address\");\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn parsed;\n}\n\n/** True when a string looks like an IPv4 or IPv6 literal. */\nfunction isIpLiteral(host: string): boolean {\n\tif (parseIpv4(host) !== null) return true;\n\t// Very loose IPv6 heuristic — matches anything with a colon, which is\n\t// never valid in DNS hostnames, so this is safe.\n\treturn host.includes(\":\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch a URL with SSRF protection on redirects.\n *\n * Uses `redirect: \"manual\"` to intercept redirects and re-validate each\n * redirect target against SSRF rules before following it. This prevents\n * an attacker from setting up an allowed external URL that redirects to\n * an internal IP (e.g. 169.254.169.254 for cloud metadata).\n *\n * @throws SsrfError if the initial URL or any redirect target is internal\n */\n/** Headers that must be stripped when a redirect crosses origins */\nconst CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = [\"authorization\", \"cookie\", \"proxy-authorization\"];\n\nexport async function ssrfSafeFetch(\n\turl: string,\n\tinit?: RequestInit,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver },\n): Promise<Response> {\n\tlet currentUrl = url;\n\tlet currentInit = init;\n\n\tfor (let i = 0; i <= MAX_REDIRECTS; i++) {\n\t\tawait resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(currentUrl, options);\n\n\t\tconst response = await globalThis.fetch(currentUrl, {\n\t\t\t...currentInit,\n\t\t\tredirect: \"manual\",\n\t\t});\n\n\t\t// Not a redirect -- return directly\n\t\tif (response.status < 300 || response.status >= 400) {\n\t\t\treturn response;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Extract redirect target\n\t\tconst location = response.headers.get(\"Location\");\n\t\tif (!location) {\n\t\t\treturn response;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Resolve relative redirects against the current URL\n\t\tconst previousOrigin = new URL(currentUrl).origin;\n\t\tcurrentUrl = new URL(location, currentUrl).href;\n\t\tconst nextOrigin = new URL(currentUrl).origin;\n\n\t\t// Strip credential headers on cross-origin redirects\n\t\tif (previousOrigin !== nextOrigin && currentInit) {\n\t\t\tcurrentInit = stripCredentialHeaders(currentInit);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tthrow new SsrfError(`Too many redirects (max ${MAX_REDIRECTS})`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Return a copy of init with credential headers removed.\n */\nexport function stripCredentialHeaders(init: RequestInit): RequestInit {\n\tif (!init.headers) return init;\n\n\tconst headers = new Headers(init.headers);\n\tfor (const name of CREDENTIAL_HEADERS) {\n\t\theaders.delete(name);\n\t}\n\n\treturn { ...init, headers 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package/dist/state-xxv6ZTMv.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+//#region src/plugins/state.ts
+function toPluginStatus(value) {
+	if (value === "active") return "active";
+	return "inactive";
+}
+function toPluginSource(value) {
+	if (value === "marketplace") return "marketplace";
+	if (value === "registry") return "registry";
+	return "config";
+}
+/**
+* Repository for plugin state in the database
+*/
+var PluginStateRepository = class {
+	constructor(db) {
+		this.db = db;
+	}
+	/**
+	* Get state for a specific plugin
+	*/
+	async get(pluginId) {
+		const row = await this.db.selectFrom("_plugin_state").selectAll().where("plugin_id", "=", pluginId).executeTakeFirst();
+		if (!row) return null;
+		return rowToPluginState(row);
+	}
+	/**
+	* Get all plugin states
+	*/
+	async getAll() {
+		return (await this.db.selectFrom("_plugin_state").selectAll().execute()).map(rowToPluginState);
+	}
+	/**
+	* Get all marketplace-installed plugin states
+	*/
+	async getMarketplacePlugins() {
+		return (await this.db.selectFrom("_plugin_state").selectAll().where("source", "=", "marketplace").execute()).map(rowToPluginState);
+	}
+	/**
+	* Get all registry-installed plugin states.
+	*
+	* The runtime's registry sync path uses this to discover which
+	* registry plugins should be loaded into the sandbox on this worker.
+	*/
+	async getRegistryPlugins() {
+		return (await this.db.selectFrom("_plugin_state").selectAll().where("source", "=", "registry").execute()).map(rowToPluginState);
+	}
+	/**
+	* Create or update plugin state
+	*/
+	async upsert(pluginId, version, status, opts) {
+		const now = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
+		const existing = await this.get(pluginId);
+		if (existing) {
+			const updates = {
+				status,
+				version
+			};
+			if (status === "active" && existing.status !== "active") updates.activated_at = now;
+			else if (status === "inactive" && existing.status !== "inactive") updates.deactivated_at = now;
+			if (opts?.source) updates.source = opts.source;
+			if (opts?.marketplaceVersion !== void 0) updates.marketplace_version = opts.marketplaceVersion;
+			if (opts?.displayName !== void 0) updates.display_name = opts.displayName;
+			if (opts?.description !== void 0) updates.description = opts.description;
+			if (opts?.registryPublisherDid !== void 0) updates.registry_publisher_did = opts.registryPublisherDid;
+			if (opts?.registrySlug !== void 0) updates.registry_slug = opts.registrySlug;
+			if (opts?.mcpToolsEnabled !== void 0) updates.mcp_tools_enabled = opts.mcpToolsEnabled ? 1 : 0;
+			if (opts?.mcpToolsConsent !== void 0) updates.mcp_tools_consent = opts.mcpToolsConsent;
+			await this.db.updateTable("_plugin_state").set(updates).where("plugin_id", "=", pluginId).execute();
+		} else await this.db.insertInto("_plugin_state").values({
+			plugin_id: pluginId,
+			status,
+			version,
+			installed_at: now,
+			activated_at: status === "active" ? now : null,
+			deactivated_at: null,
+			data: null,
+			source: opts?.source ?? "config",
+			marketplace_version: opts?.marketplaceVersion ?? null,
+			display_name: opts?.displayName ?? null,
+			description: opts?.description ?? null,
+			registry_publisher_did: opts?.registryPublisherDid ?? null,
+			registry_slug: opts?.registrySlug ?? null,
+			mcp_tools_enabled: opts?.mcpToolsEnabled ? 1 : 0,
+			mcp_tools_consent: opts?.mcpToolsConsent ?? null
+		}).execute();
+		return await this.get(pluginId);
+	}
+	/**
+	* Enable a plugin
+	*/
+	async enable(pluginId, version) {
+		return this.upsert(pluginId, version, "active");
+	}
+	/**
+	* Disable a plugin
+	*/
+	async disable(pluginId, version) {
+		return this.upsert(pluginId, version, "inactive");
+	}
+	/**
+	* Delete plugin state
+	*/
+	async delete(pluginId) {
+		return ((await this.db.deleteFrom("_plugin_state").where("plugin_id", "=", pluginId).executeTakeFirst()).numDeletedRows ?? 0) > 0;
+	}
+};
+function rowToPluginState(row) {
+	return {
+		pluginId: row.plugin_id,
+		status: toPluginStatus(row.status),
+		version: row.version,
+		installedAt: new Date(row.installed_at),
+		activatedAt: row.activated_at ? new Date(row.activated_at) : null,
+		deactivatedAt: row.deactivated_at ? new Date(row.deactivated_at) : null,
+		source: toPluginSource(row.source),
+		marketplaceVersion: row.marketplace_version ?? null,
+		displayName: row.display_name ?? null,
+		description: row.description ?? null,
+		registryPublisherDid: row.registry_publisher_did ?? null,
+		registrySlug: row.registry_slug ?? null,
+		mcpToolsEnabled: row.mcp_tools_enabled === 1,
+		mcpToolsConsent: row.mcp_tools_consent ?? null
+	};
+}
+
+//#endregion
+export { PluginStateRepository as t };
+//# sourceMappingURL=state-xxv6ZTMv.mjs.map

package/dist/state-xxv6ZTMv.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"state-xxv6ZTMv.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/plugins/state.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Plugin State Repository\n *\n * Database-backed storage for plugin activation state.\n * Used by the admin API to persist plugin enable/disable across restarts.\n */\n\nimport type { Kysely } from \"kysely\";\n\nimport type { Database } from \"../database/types.js\";\n\nexport type PluginStatus = \"active\" | \"inactive\";\nexport type PluginSource = \"config\" | \"marketplace\" | \"registry\";\n\nfunction toPluginStatus(value: string): PluginStatus {\n\tif (value === \"active\") return \"active\";\n\treturn \"inactive\";\n}\n\nfunction toPluginSource(value: string | undefined | null): PluginSource {\n\tif (value === \"marketplace\") return \"marketplace\";\n\tif (value === \"registry\") return \"registry\";\n\treturn \"config\";\n}\n\nexport interface PluginState {\n\tpluginId: string;\n\tstatus: PluginStatus;\n\tversion: string;\n\tinstalledAt: Date;\n\tactivatedAt: Date | null;\n\tdeactivatedAt: Date | null;\n\tsource: PluginSource;\n\tmarketplaceVersion: string | null;\n\tdisplayName: string | null;\n\tdescription: string | null;\n\t/**\n\t * Publisher DID this plugin was published under. Populated only when\n\t * `source === \"registry\"`; null otherwise.\n\t */\n\tregistryPublisherDid: string | null;\n\t/**\n\t * Slug under which the plugin was published in the publisher's repo\n\t * (the rkey of the `pm.fair.package.profile` record). Populated only\n\t * when `source === \"registry\"`; null otherwise.\n\t *\n\t * The opaque `pluginId` for registry installs is derived from\n\t * `(registryPublisherDid, registrySlug)` -- see\n\t * `packages/core/src/registry/plugin-id.ts`.\n\t */\n\tregistrySlug: string | null;\n\tmcpToolsEnabled: boolean;\n\tmcpToolsConsent: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Repository for plugin state in the database\n */\nexport class PluginStateRepository {\n\tconstructor(private db: Kysely<Database>) {}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Get state for a specific plugin\n\t */\n\tasync get(pluginId: string): Promise<PluginState | null> {\n\t\tconst row = await this.db\n\t\t\t.selectFrom(\"_plugin_state\")\n\t\t\t.selectAll()\n\t\t\t.where(\"plugin_id\", \"=\", pluginId)\n\t\t\t.executeTakeFirst();\n\n\t\tif (!row) return null;\n\n\t\treturn rowToPluginState(row);\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Get all plugin states\n\t */\n\tasync getAll(): Promise<PluginState[]> {\n\t\tconst rows = await this.db.selectFrom(\"_plugin_state\").selectAll().execute();\n\t\treturn rows.map(rowToPluginState);\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Get all marketplace-installed plugin states\n\t */\n\tasync getMarketplacePlugins(): Promise<PluginState[]> {\n\t\tconst rows = await this.db\n\t\t\t.selectFrom(\"_plugin_state\")\n\t\t\t.selectAll()\n\t\t\t.where(\"source\", \"=\", \"marketplace\")\n\t\t\t.execute();\n\t\treturn rows.map(rowToPluginState);\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Get all registry-installed plugin states.\n\t *\n\t * The runtime's registry sync path uses this to discover which\n\t * registry plugins should be loaded into the sandbox on this worker.\n\t */\n\tasync getRegistryPlugins(): Promise<PluginState[]> {\n\t\tconst rows = await this.db\n\t\t\t.selectFrom(\"_plugin_state\")\n\t\t\t.selectAll()\n\t\t\t.where(\"source\", \"=\", \"registry\")\n\t\t\t.execute();\n\t\treturn rows.map(rowToPluginState);\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Create or update plugin state\n\t */\n\tasync upsert(\n\t\tpluginId: string,\n\t\tversion: string,\n\t\tstatus: PluginStatus,\n\t\topts?: {\n\t\t\tsource?: PluginSource;\n\t\t\tmarketplaceVersion?: string;\n\t\t\tdisplayName?: string;\n\t\t\tdescription?: string;\n\t\t\tregistryPublisherDid?: string;\n\t\t\tregistrySlug?: string;\n\t\t\tmcpToolsEnabled?: boolean;\n\t\t\tmcpToolsConsent?: string | null;\n\t\t},\n\t): Promise<PluginState> {\n\t\tconst now = new Date().toISOString();\n\t\tconst existing = await this.get(pluginId);\n\n\t\tif (existing) {\n\t\t\t// Update existing state\n\t\t\tconst updates: Record<string, string | number | null> = {\n\t\t\t\tstatus,\n\t\t\t\tversion,\n\t\t\t};\n\n\t\t\tif (status === \"active\" && existing.status !== \"active\") {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.activated_at = now;\n\t\t\t} else if (status === \"inactive\" && existing.status !== \"inactive\") {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.deactivated_at = now;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tif (opts?.source) updates.source = opts.source;\n\t\t\tif (opts?.marketplaceVersion !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.marketplace_version = opts.marketplaceVersion;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (opts?.displayName !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.display_name = opts.displayName;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (opts?.description !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.description = opts.description;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (opts?.registryPublisherDid !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.registry_publisher_did = opts.registryPublisherDid;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (opts?.registrySlug !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.registry_slug = opts.registrySlug;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (opts?.mcpToolsEnabled !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.mcp_tools_enabled = opts.mcpToolsEnabled ? 1 : 0;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (opts?.mcpToolsConsent !== undefined) {\n\t\t\t\tupdates.mcp_tools_consent = opts.mcpToolsConsent;\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tawait this.db\n\t\t\t\t.updateTable(\"_plugin_state\")\n\t\t\t\t.set(updates)\n\t\t\t\t.where(\"plugin_id\", \"=\", pluginId)\n\t\t\t\t.execute();\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// Create new state\n\t\t\tawait this.db\n\t\t\t\t.insertInto(\"_plugin_state\")\n\t\t\t\t.values({\n\t\t\t\t\tplugin_id: pluginId,\n\t\t\t\t\tstatus,\n\t\t\t\t\tversion,\n\t\t\t\t\tinstalled_at: now,\n\t\t\t\t\tactivated_at: status === \"active\" ? now : null,\n\t\t\t\t\tdeactivated_at: null,\n\t\t\t\t\tdata: null,\n\t\t\t\t\tsource: opts?.source ?? \"config\",\n\t\t\t\t\tmarketplace_version: opts?.marketplaceVersion ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\tdisplay_name: opts?.displayName ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\tdescription: opts?.description ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\tregistry_publisher_did: opts?.registryPublisherDid ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\tregistry_slug: opts?.registrySlug ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t\tmcp_tools_enabled: opts?.mcpToolsEnabled ? 1 : 0,\n\t\t\t\t\tmcp_tools_consent: opts?.mcpToolsConsent ?? null,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t.execute();\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn (await this.get(pluginId))!;\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Enable a plugin\n\t */\n\tasync enable(pluginId: string, version: string): Promise<PluginState> {\n\t\treturn this.upsert(pluginId, version, \"active\");\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Disable a plugin\n\t */\n\tasync disable(pluginId: string, version: string): Promise<PluginState> {\n\t\treturn this.upsert(pluginId, version, \"inactive\");\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Delete plugin state\n\t */\n\tasync delete(pluginId: string): Promise<boolean> {\n\t\tconst result = await this.db\n\t\t\t.deleteFrom(\"_plugin_state\")\n\t\t\t.where(\"plugin_id\", \"=\", pluginId)\n\t\t\t.executeTakeFirst();\n\n\t\treturn (result.numDeletedRows ?? 0) > 0;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Internal: map a `_plugin_state` row to the public `PluginState` shape.\n *\n * Kept at module scope so the three select paths (`get`, `getAll`,\n * `getMarketplacePlugins`, `getRegistryPlugins`) stay byte-identical in\n * their handling of nullable columns -- adding a new column to the table\n * means changing this function and nothing else.\n */\ninterface PluginStateRow {\n\tplugin_id: string;\n\tstatus: string;\n\tversion: string;\n\tinstalled_at: string;\n\tactivated_at: string | null;\n\tdeactivated_at: string | null;\n\tsource: string;\n\tmarketplace_version: string | null;\n\tdisplay_name: string | null;\n\tdescription: string | null;\n\tregistry_publisher_did: string | null;\n\tregistry_slug: string | null;\n\tmcp_tools_enabled: number;\n\tmcp_tools_consent: string | null;\n}\n\nfunction rowToPluginState(row: PluginStateRow): PluginState {\n\treturn {\n\t\tpluginId: row.plugin_id,\n\t\tstatus: toPluginStatus(row.status),\n\t\tversion: row.version,\n\t\tinstalledAt: new Date(row.installed_at),\n\t\tactivatedAt: row.activated_at ? 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package/dist/{status-D3Gy1Zc6.mjs → status-COfycGIU.mjs}

@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ function isTerminalStatus(type) {
 
 //#endregion
 export { isTerminalStatus as n, REDIRECT_RULE_STATUSES as t };
-//# sourceMappingURL=status-D3Gy1Zc6.mjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=status-COfycGIU.mjs.map

package/dist/{status-D3Gy1Zc6.mjs.map → status-COfycGIU.mjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/storage/local.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as ListOptions, d as Storage, l as SignedUploadOptions, n as DownloadResult, o as ListResult, p as UploadResult, s as LocalStorageConfig, u as SignedUploadUrl } from "../types-Cm4Cz-8M.mjs";
+import { a as ListOptions, d as Storage, l as SignedUploadOptions, n as DownloadResult, o as ListResult, p as UploadResult, s as LocalStorageConfig, u as SignedUploadUrl } from "../types-B97jg3aW.mjs";
 
 //#region src/storage/local.d.ts
 /**

package/dist/storage/local.mjs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { t as EmDashStorageError } from "../types-BNZsPL9z.mjs";
+import { t as EmDashStorageError } from "../types-BD40g7zz.mjs";
 import mime from "mime/lite";
 import { createReadStream, existsSync } from "node:fs";
 import * as path from "node:path";