emdash 0.12.0 → 0.13.0

package/dist/normalize-CN5kRSMC.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+//#region src/media/normalize.ts
+const INTERNAL_MEDIA_PREFIX = "/_emdash/api/media/file/";
+const URL_PATTERN = /^https?:\/\//;
+/**
+* Normalize a media field value into a consistent MediaValue shape.
+*
+* - `null`/`undefined` → `null`
+* - Bare URL string → `{ provider: "external", id: "", src: url }`
+* - Bare internal media URL → resolved via local provider's `get()`
+* - Bare local media ID → resolved via local provider's `get()`
+* - Object with `provider` + `id` → enriched with missing fields from provider
+*/
+async function normalizeMediaValue(value, getProvider) {
+	if (value == null) return null;
+	if (typeof value === "string") return normalizeStringUrl(value, getProvider);
+	if (!isRecord(value)) return null;
+	if (!("id" in value) && !("src" in value)) return null;
+	const provider = (typeof value.provider === "string" ? value.provider : void 0) || "local";
+	const id = typeof value.id === "string" ? value.id : "";
+	if (provider === "external") return recordToMediaValue(value);
+	const result = {
+		...recordToMediaValue(value),
+		provider
+	};
+	if (provider === "local") delete result.src;
+	const needsDimensions = result.width == null || result.height == null;
+	const needsStorageKey = provider === "local" && !result.meta?.storageKey;
+	const needsFileInfo = !result.mimeType || !result.filename;
+	if (!(needsDimensions || needsStorageKey || needsFileInfo) || !id) return result;
+	const mediaProvider = getProvider(provider);
+	if (!mediaProvider?.get) return result;
+	let providerItem;
+	try {
+		providerItem = await mediaProvider.get(id);
+	} catch {
+		return result;
+	}
+	if (!providerItem) return result;
+	return mergeProviderData(result, providerItem);
+}
+async function normalizeStringUrl(url, getProvider) {
+	if (url.startsWith(INTERNAL_MEDIA_PREFIX)) return resolveInternalUrl(url, getProvider);
+	if (URL_PATTERN.test(url)) return Promise.resolve({
+		provider: "external",
+		id: "",
+		src: url
+	});
+	const localMedia = await resolveLocalId(url, getProvider);
+	if (localMedia) return localMedia;
+	return {
+		provider: "external",
+		id: "",
+		src: url
+	};
+}
+async function resolveInternalUrl(url, getProvider) {
+	const storageKey = url.slice(24);
+	const localProvider = getProvider("local");
+	if (!localProvider?.get) return {
+		provider: "external",
+		id: "",
+		src: url
+	};
+	let item;
+	try {
+		item = await localProvider.get(storageKey);
+	} catch {
+		return {
+			provider: "external",
+			id: "",
+			src: url
+		};
+	}
+	if (!item) return {
+		provider: "external",
+		id: "",
+		src: url
+	};
+	return {
+		provider: "local",
+		id: item.id,
+		filename: item.filename,
+		mimeType: item.mimeType,
+		width: item.width,
+		height: item.height,
+		alt: item.alt,
+		meta: item.meta
+	};
+}
+async function resolveLocalId(id, getProvider) {
+	const localProvider = getProvider("local");
+	if (!localProvider?.get) return null;
+	let item;
+	try {
+		item = await localProvider.get(id);
+	} catch {
+		return null;
+	}
+	if (!item) return null;
+	return {
+		provider: "local",
+		id: item.id,
+		filename: item.filename,
+		mimeType: item.mimeType,
+		width: item.width,
+		height: item.height,
+		alt: item.alt,
+		meta: item.meta
+	};
+}
+/**
+* Merge provider data into an existing MediaValue, preserving caller-supplied fields.
+* Caller `alt` takes priority over provider `alt` (per-usage, not per-image).
+*/
+function mergeProviderData(existing, item) {
+	const result = { ...existing };
+	if (result.width == null && item.width != null) result.width = item.width;
+	if (result.height == null && item.height != null) result.height = item.height;
+	if (!result.filename && item.filename) result.filename = item.filename;
+	if (!result.mimeType && item.mimeType) result.mimeType = item.mimeType;
+	if (!result.alt && item.alt) result.alt = item.alt;
+	if (item.meta) result.meta = {
+		...item.meta,
+		...result.meta
+	};
+	return result;
+}
+function isRecord(value) {
+	return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+/**
+* Extract known MediaValue fields from a runtime-checked record.
+* Avoids unsafe `as MediaValue` cast by reading each property explicitly.
+*/
+function recordToMediaValue(obj) {
+	const result = { id: typeof obj.id === "string" ? obj.id : "" };
+	if (typeof obj.provider === "string") result.provider = obj.provider;
+	if (typeof obj.src === "string") result.src = obj.src;
+	if (typeof obj.previewUrl === "string") result.previewUrl = obj.previewUrl;
+	if (typeof obj.filename === "string") result.filename = obj.filename;
+	if (typeof obj.mimeType === "string") result.mimeType = obj.mimeType;
+	if (typeof obj.width === "number") result.width = obj.width;
+	if (typeof obj.height === "number") result.height = obj.height;
+	if (typeof obj.alt === "string") result.alt = obj.alt;
+	if (isRecord(obj.meta)) result.meta = obj.meta;
+	return result;
+}
+
+//#endregion
+export { normalizeMediaValue as t };
+//# sourceMappingURL=normalize-CN5kRSMC.mjs.map

package/dist/normalize-CN5kRSMC.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"normalize-CN5kRSMC.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/media/normalize.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Media Value Normalization\n *\n * Normalizes media field values into a consistent shape regardless of\n * creation path (seed scripts, media picker, WP import, URL input).\n *\n * Called at content create/update time when a media provider is available,\n * filling in missing dimensions, storageKey, mimeType, and filename from\n * the provider's `get()` method.\n */\n\nimport type { MediaProvider, MediaProviderItem, MediaValue } from \"./types.js\";\n\nexport const INTERNAL_MEDIA_PREFIX = \"/_emdash/api/media/file/\";\nconst URL_PATTERN = /^https?:\\/\\//;\n\n/**\n * Normalize a media field value into a consistent MediaValue shape.\n *\n * - `null`/`undefined` → `null`\n * - Bare URL string → `{ provider: \"external\", id: \"\", src: url }`\n * - Bare internal media URL → resolved via local provider's `get()`\n * - Bare local media ID → resolved via local provider's `get()`\n * - Object with `provider` + `id` → enriched with missing fields from provider\n */\nexport async function normalizeMediaValue(\n\tvalue: unknown,\n\tgetProvider: (id: string) => MediaProvider | undefined,\n): Promise<MediaValue | null> {\n\tif (value == null) return null;\n\n\t// Bare string URL\n\tif (typeof value === \"string\") {\n\t\treturn normalizeStringUrl(value, getProvider);\n\t}\n\n\t// Not an object — can't normalize\n\tif (!isRecord(value)) return null;\n\n\t// Must have at least an id to be a valid media value\n\tif (!(\"id\" in value) && !(\"src\" in value)) return null;\n\n\tconst provider = (typeof value.provider === \"string\" ? value.provider : undefined) || \"local\";\n\tconst id = typeof value.id === \"string\" ? value.id : \"\";\n\n\t// External URLs — return as-is, no server-side dimension detection\n\tif (provider === \"external\") {\n\t\treturn recordToMediaValue(value);\n\t}\n\n\t// Build the base value from the input\n\tconst result: MediaValue = { ...recordToMediaValue(value), provider };\n\n\t// For local media, strip `src` — it's derived at display time from storageKey\n\tif (provider === \"local\") {\n\t\tdelete result.src;\n\t}\n\n\t// Determine if we need to call the provider\n\tconst needsDimensions = result.width == null || result.height == null;\n\tconst needsStorageKey = provider === \"local\" && !result.meta?.storageKey;\n\tconst needsFileInfo = !result.mimeType || !result.filename;\n\tconst needsLookup = needsDimensions || needsStorageKey || needsFileInfo;\n\n\tif (!needsLookup || !id) return result;\n\n\t// Try to enrich from provider\n\tconst mediaProvider = getProvider(provider);\n\tif (!mediaProvider?.get) return result;\n\n\tlet providerItem: MediaProviderItem | null;\n\ttry {\n\t\tproviderItem = await mediaProvider.get(id);\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn result;\n\t}\n\n\tif (!providerItem) return result;\n\n\treturn mergeProviderData(result, providerItem);\n}\n\nasync function normalizeStringUrl(\n\turl: string,\n\tgetProvider: (id: string) => MediaProvider | undefined,\n): Promise<MediaValue | null> {\n\t// Internal media URL — try to resolve via local provider\n\tif (url.startsWith(INTERNAL_MEDIA_PREFIX)) {\n\t\treturn resolveInternalUrl(url, getProvider);\n\t}\n\n\t// External HTTP(S) URL\n\tif (URL_PATTERN.test(url)) {\n\t\treturn Promise.resolve({\n\t\t\tprovider: \"external\",\n\t\t\tid: \"\",\n\t\t\tsrc: url,\n\t\t});\n\t}\n\n\tconst localMedia = await resolveLocalId(url, getProvider);\n\tif (localMedia) return localMedia;\n\n\t// Unrecognized string — preserve legacy behavior and treat as external\n\treturn {\n\t\tprovider: \"external\",\n\t\tid: \"\",\n\t\tsrc: url,\n\t};\n}\n\nasync function resolveInternalUrl(\n\turl: string,\n\tgetProvider: (id: string) => MediaProvider | undefined,\n): Promise<MediaValue> {\n\tconst storageKey = url.slice(INTERNAL_MEDIA_PREFIX.length);\n\tconst localProvider = getProvider(\"local\");\n\n\tif (!localProvider?.get) {\n\t\treturn { provider: \"external\", id: \"\", src: url };\n\t}\n\n\tlet item: MediaProviderItem | null;\n\ttry {\n\t\titem = await localProvider.get(storageKey);\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn { provider: \"external\", id: \"\", src: url };\n\t}\n\n\tif (!item) {\n\t\treturn { provider: \"external\", id: \"\", src: url };\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tprovider: \"local\",\n\t\tid: item.id,\n\t\tfilename: item.filename,\n\t\tmimeType: item.mimeType,\n\t\twidth: item.width,\n\t\theight: item.height,\n\t\talt: item.alt,\n\t\tmeta: item.meta,\n\t};\n}\n\nasync function resolveLocalId(\n\tid: string,\n\tgetProvider: (id: string) => MediaProvider | undefined,\n): Promise<MediaValue | null> {\n\tconst localProvider = getProvider(\"local\");\n\n\tif (!localProvider?.get) return null;\n\n\tlet item: MediaProviderItem | null;\n\ttry {\n\t\titem = await localProvider.get(id);\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn null;\n\t}\n\n\tif (!item) return null;\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tprovider: \"local\",\n\t\tid: item.id,\n\t\tfilename: item.filename,\n\t\tmimeType: item.mimeType,\n\t\twidth: item.width,\n\t\theight: item.height,\n\t\talt: item.alt,\n\t\tmeta: item.meta,\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Merge provider data into an existing MediaValue, preserving caller-supplied fields.\n * Caller `alt` takes priority over provider `alt` (per-usage, not per-image).\n */\nfunction mergeProviderData(existing: MediaValue, item: MediaProviderItem): MediaValue {\n\tconst result = { ...existing };\n\n\t// Fill missing dimensions\n\tif (result.width == null && item.width != null) result.width = item.width;\n\tif (result.height == null && item.height != null) result.height = item.height;\n\n\t// Fill missing file info\n\tif (!result.filename && item.filename) result.filename = item.filename;\n\tif (!result.mimeType && item.mimeType) result.mimeType = item.mimeType;\n\n\t// Fill missing alt (provider alt is fallback, not override)\n\tif (!result.alt && item.alt) result.alt = item.alt;\n\n\t// Fill missing meta (merge, don't replace)\n\tif (item.meta) {\n\t\tresult.meta = { ...item.meta, ...result.meta };\n\t}\n\n\treturn result;\n}\n\nfunction isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {\n\treturn typeof value === \"object\" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract known MediaValue fields from a runtime-checked record.\n * Avoids unsafe `as MediaValue` cast by reading each property explicitly.\n */\nfunction recordToMediaValue(obj: Record<string, unknown>): MediaValue {\n\tconst result: MediaValue = {\n\t\tid: typeof obj.id === \"string\" ? obj.id : \"\",\n\t};\n\tif (typeof obj.provider === \"string\") result.provider = obj.provider;\n\tif (typeof obj.src === \"string\") result.src = obj.src;\n\tif (typeof obj.previewUrl === \"string\") result.previewUrl = obj.previewUrl;\n\tif (typeof obj.filename === \"string\") result.filename = obj.filename;\n\tif (typeof obj.mimeType === \"string\") result.mimeType = obj.mimeType;\n\tif (typeof obj.width === \"number\") result.width = obj.width;\n\tif (typeof obj.height === \"number\") result.height = obj.height;\n\tif (typeof obj.alt === \"string\") result.alt = obj.alt;\n\tif (isRecord(obj.meta)) result.meta = obj.meta;\n\treturn result;\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAaA,MAAa,wBAAwB;AACrC,MAAM,cAAc;;;;;;;;;;AAWpB,eAAsB,oBACrB,OACA,aAC6B;AAC7B,KAAI,SAAS,KAAM,QAAO;AAG1B,KAAI,OAAO,UAAU,SACpB,QAAO,mBAAmB,OAAO,YAAY;AAI9C,KAAI,CAAC,SAAS,MAAM,CAAE,QAAO;AAG7B,KAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,OAAQ,QAAO;CAElD,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM,aAAa,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW,WAAc;CACtF,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AAGrD,KAAI,aAAa,WAChB,QAAO,mBAAmB,MAAM;CAIjC,MAAM,SAAqB;EAAE,GAAG,mBAAmB,MAAM;EAAE;EAAU;AAGrE,KAAI,aAAa,QAChB,QAAO,OAAO;CAIf,MAAM,kBAAkB,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,OAAO,UAAU;CACjE,MAAM,kBAAkB,aAAa,WAAW,CAAC,OAAO,MAAM;CAC9D,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO;AAGlD,KAAI,EAFgB,mBAAmB,mBAAmB,kBAEtC,CAAC,GAAI,QAAO;CAGhC,MAAM,gBAAgB,YAAY,SAAS;AAC3C,KAAI,CAAC,eAAe,IAAK,QAAO;CAEhC,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACH,iBAAe,MAAM,cAAc,IAAI,GAAG;SACnC;AACP,SAAO;;AAGR,KAAI,CAAC,aAAc,QAAO;AAE1B,QAAO,kBAAkB,QAAQ,aAAa;;AAG/C,eAAe,mBACd,KACA,aAC6B;AAE7B,KAAI,IAAI,WAAW,sBAAsB,CACxC,QAAO,mBAAmB,KAAK,YAAY;AAI5C,KAAI,YAAY,KAAK,IAAI,CACxB,QAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;EACtB,UAAU;EACV,IAAI;EACJ,KAAK;EACL,CAAC;CAGH,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,eAAe,KAAK,YAAY;AACzD,KAAI,WAAY,QAAO;AAGvB,QAAO;EACN,UAAU;EACV,IAAI;EACJ,KAAK;EACL;;AAGF,eAAe,mBACd,KACA,aACsB;CACtB,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,MAAM,GAA6B;CAC1D,MAAM,gBAAgB,YAAY,QAAQ;AAE1C,KAAI,CAAC,eAAe,IACnB,QAAO;EAAE,UAAU;EAAY,IAAI;EAAI,KAAK;EAAK;CAGlD,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACH,SAAO,MAAM,cAAc,IAAI,WAAW;SACnC;AACP,SAAO;GAAE,UAAU;GAAY,IAAI;GAAI,KAAK;GAAK;;AAGlD,KAAI,CAAC,KACJ,QAAO;EAAE,UAAU;EAAY,IAAI;EAAI,KAAK;EAAK;AAGlD,QAAO;EACN,UAAU;EACV,IAAI,KAAK;EACT,UAAU,KAAK;EACf,UAAU,KAAK;EACf,OAAO,KAAK;EACZ,QAAQ,KAAK;EACb,KAAK,KAAK;EACV,MAAM,KAAK;EACX;;AAGF,eAAe,eACd,IACA,aAC6B;CAC7B,MAAM,gBAAgB,YAAY,QAAQ;AAE1C,KAAI,CAAC,eAAe,IAAK,QAAO;CAEhC,IAAI;AACJ,KAAI;AACH,SAAO,MAAM,cAAc,IAAI,GAAG;SAC3B;AACP,SAAO;;AAGR,KAAI,CAAC,KAAM,QAAO;AAElB,QAAO;EACN,UAAU;EACV,IAAI,KAAK;EACT,UAAU,KAAK;EACf,UAAU,KAAK;EACf,OAAO,KAAK;EACZ,QAAQ,KAAK;EACb,KAAK,KAAK;EACV,MAAM,KAAK;EACX;;;;;;AAOF,SAAS,kBAAkB,UAAsB,MAAqC;CACrF,MAAM,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,UAAU;AAG9B,KAAI,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS,KAAM,QAAO,QAAQ,KAAK;AACpE,KAAI,OAAO,UAAU,QAAQ,KAAK,UAAU,KAAM,QAAO,SAAS,KAAK;AAGvE,KAAI,CAAC,OAAO,YAAY,KAAK,SAAU,QAAO,WAAW,KAAK;AAC9D,KAAI,CAAC,OAAO,YAAY,KAAK,SAAU,QAAO,WAAW,KAAK;AAG9D,KAAI,CAAC,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,IAAK,QAAO,MAAM,KAAK;AAG/C,KAAI,KAAK,KACR,QAAO,OAAO;EAAE,GAAG,KAAK;EAAM,GAAG,OAAO;EAAM;AAG/C,QAAO;;AAGR,SAAS,SAAS,OAAkD;AACnE,QAAO,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,UAAU,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;;;;;;AAO5E,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAA0C;CACrE,MAAM,SAAqB,EAC1B,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,WAAW,IAAI,KAAK,IAC1C;AACD,KAAI,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,SAAU,QAAO,WAAW,IAAI;AAC5D,KAAI,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAU,QAAO,MAAM,IAAI;AAClD,KAAI,OAAO,IAAI,eAAe,SAAU,QAAO,aAAa,IAAI;AAChE,KAAI,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,SAAU,QAAO,WAAW,IAAI;AAC5D,KAAI,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,SAAU,QAAO,WAAW,IAAI;AAC5D,KAAI,OAAO,IAAI,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO,QAAQ,IAAI;AACtD,KAAI,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,SAAU,QAAO,SAAS,IAAI;AACxD,KAAI,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAU,QAAO,MAAM,IAAI;AAClD,KAAI,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,CAAE,QAAO,OAAO,IAAI;AAC1C,QAAO"}

package/dist/oauth-authorization-62GmpGIH.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+import { t as withTransaction } from "./transaction-NQj4VJ7Z.mjs";
+import { a as hashApiToken, n as VALID_SCOPES, r as generatePrefixedToken, t as TOKEN_PREFIXES } from "./api-tokens-D3C9v02m.mjs";
+import { c as validateRedirectUri, o as lookupOAuthClient, s as validateClientRedirectUri } from "./oauth-clients-D_B0_-Bz.mjs";
+import { t as lookupUserRoleAndStatus } from "./oauth-user-lookup-meyS2oB1.mjs";
+import { clampScopes, computeS256Challenge, secureCompare } from "@emdash-cms/auth";
+import { generateCodeVerifier } from "arctic";
+
+//#region src/api/handlers/oauth-authorization.ts
+/**
+* OAuth 2.1 Authorization Code + PKCE handlers.
+*
+* Implements the server side of the authorization code grant for MCP clients
+* (Claude Desktop, VS Code, etc.) per the MCP authorization spec (draft).
+*
+* Uses arctic for PKCE challenge generation and @emdash-cms/auth for token
+* utilities. Token infrastructure is shared with the device flow.
+*/
+/** Authorization codes expire after 10 minutes (RFC 6749 §4.1.2 recommends short-lived) */
+const AUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDS = 600;
+/** Access token TTL: 1 hour */
+const ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 3600;
+/** Refresh token TTL: 90 days */
+const REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 2160 * 60 * 60;
+function expiresAt(seconds) {
+	return new Date(Date.now() + seconds * 1e3).toISOString();
+}
+/**
+* Validate and normalize scopes. Returns validated scope list.
+*/
+function normalizeScopes(requested) {
+	if (!requested) return [];
+	const validSet = new Set(VALID_SCOPES);
+	return requested.split(" ").filter(Boolean).filter((s) => validSet.has(s));
+}
+/**
+* Process an authorization request after the user approves consent.
+*
+* Generates an authorization code, stores it with the PKCE challenge,
+* and returns the redirect URL with the code appended.
+*
+* Scopes are clamped to the user's role to prevent scope escalation.
+*/
+async function handleAuthorizationApproval(db, userId, userRole, params) {
+	try {
+		if (params.response_type !== "code") return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "UNSUPPORTED_RESPONSE_TYPE",
+				message: "Only response_type=code is supported"
+			}
+		};
+		const uriError = validateRedirectUri(params.redirect_uri);
+		if (uriError) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "INVALID_REDIRECT_URI",
+				message: uriError
+			}
+		};
+		const client = await lookupOAuthClient(db, params.client_id);
+		if (!client) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "INVALID_CLIENT",
+				message: "Unknown client_id"
+			}
+		};
+		const clientUriError = validateClientRedirectUri(params.redirect_uri, client.redirectUris);
+		if (clientUriError) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "INVALID_REDIRECT_URI",
+				message: clientUriError
+			}
+		};
+		if (params.code_challenge_method !== "S256") return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "INVALID_REQUEST",
+				message: "Only S256 code_challenge_method is supported"
+			}
+		};
+		if (!params.code_challenge) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "INVALID_REQUEST",
+				message: "code_challenge is required"
+			}
+		};
+		const userScopes = clampScopes(normalizeScopes(params.scope), userRole);
+		const clientScopes = client.scopes;
+		const scopes = clientScopes?.length ? userScopes.filter((s) => clientScopes.includes(s)) : userScopes;
+		if (scopes.length === 0) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "INVALID_SCOPE",
+				message: "No valid scopes requested"
+			}
+		};
+		const code = generateCodeVerifier();
+		const codeHash = hashApiToken(code);
+		await db.insertInto("_emdash_authorization_codes").values({
+			code_hash: codeHash,
+			client_id: params.client_id,
+			redirect_uri: params.redirect_uri,
+			user_id: userId,
+			scopes: JSON.stringify(scopes),
+			code_challenge: params.code_challenge,
+			code_challenge_method: params.code_challenge_method,
+			resource: params.resource ?? null,
+			expires_at: expiresAt(AUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDS)
+		}).execute();
+		const redirectUrl = new URL(params.redirect_uri);
+		redirectUrl.searchParams.set("code", code);
+		if (params.state) redirectUrl.searchParams.set("state", params.state);
+		return {
+			success: true,
+			data: { redirect_url: redirectUrl.toString() }
+		};
+	} catch (error) {
+		console.error("Authorization error:", error);
+		return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "AUTHORIZATION_ERROR",
+				message: "Failed to process authorization"
+			}
+		};
+	}
+}
+/**
+* Exchange an authorization code for access + refresh tokens.
+*
+* Validates the code, verifies PKCE, and issues tokens using the same
+* infrastructure as the device flow (ec_oat_*, ec_ort_*).
+*/
+async function handleAuthorizationCodeExchange(db, params) {
+	try {
+		if (params.grant_type !== "authorization_code") return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "unsupported_grant_type",
+				message: "Invalid grant_type"
+			}
+		};
+		const codeHash = hashApiToken(params.code);
+		const row = await db.deleteFrom("_emdash_authorization_codes").where("code_hash", "=", codeHash).returningAll().executeTakeFirst();
+		if (!row) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "invalid_grant",
+				message: "Invalid authorization code"
+			}
+		};
+		if (new Date(row.expires_at) < /* @__PURE__ */ new Date()) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "invalid_grant",
+				message: "Authorization code expired"
+			}
+		};
+		if (row.redirect_uri !== params.redirect_uri) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "invalid_grant",
+				message: "redirect_uri mismatch"
+			}
+		};
+		if (row.client_id !== params.client_id) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "invalid_grant",
+				message: "client_id mismatch"
+			}
+		};
+		if (!secureCompare(computeS256Challenge(params.code_verifier), row.code_challenge)) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "invalid_grant",
+				message: "PKCE verification failed"
+			}
+		};
+		if (row.resource && params.resource && row.resource !== params.resource) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "invalid_grant",
+				message: "resource mismatch"
+			}
+		};
+		const userInfo = await lookupUserRoleAndStatus(db, row.user_id);
+		if (!userInfo) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "invalid_grant",
+				message: "User not found"
+			}
+		};
+		if (userInfo.disabled) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "invalid_grant",
+				message: "User account is disabled"
+			}
+		};
+		let scopes = clampScopes(JSON.parse(row.scopes), userInfo.role);
+		const client = await lookupOAuthClient(db, row.client_id);
+		if (client?.scopes?.length) scopes = scopes.filter((s) => client.scopes.includes(s));
+		if (scopes.length === 0) return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "invalid_grant",
+				message: "User role no longer supports any of the requested scopes"
+			}
+		};
+		const accessToken = generatePrefixedToken(TOKEN_PREFIXES.OAUTH_ACCESS);
+		const accessExpires = expiresAt(ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS);
+		const refreshToken = generatePrefixedToken(TOKEN_PREFIXES.OAUTH_REFRESH);
+		const refreshExpires = expiresAt(REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS);
+		await withTransaction(db, async (trx) => {
+			await trx.insertInto("_emdash_oauth_tokens").values({
+				token_hash: accessToken.hash,
+				token_type: "access",
+				user_id: row.user_id,
+				scopes: JSON.stringify(scopes),
+				client_type: "mcp",
+				expires_at: accessExpires,
+				refresh_token_hash: refreshToken.hash,
+				client_id: row.client_id
+			}).execute();
+			await trx.insertInto("_emdash_oauth_tokens").values({
+				token_hash: refreshToken.hash,
+				token_type: "refresh",
+				user_id: row.user_id,
+				scopes: JSON.stringify(scopes),
+				client_type: "mcp",
+				expires_at: refreshExpires,
+				refresh_token_hash: null,
+				client_id: row.client_id
+			}).execute();
+		});
+		return {
+			success: true,
+			data: {
+				access_token: accessToken.raw,
+				refresh_token: refreshToken.raw,
+				token_type: "Bearer",
+				expires_in: ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS,
+				scope: scopes.join(" ")
+			}
+		};
+	} catch (error) {
+		console.error("Token exchange error:", error);
+		return {
+			success: false,
+			error: {
+				code: "TOKEN_EXCHANGE_ERROR",
+				message: "Failed to exchange authorization code"
+			}
+		};
+	}
+}
+/**
+* Build the authorization denied redirect URL.
+*/
+function buildDeniedRedirect(redirectUri, state) {
+	const url = new URL(redirectUri);
+	url.searchParams.set("error", "access_denied");
+	url.searchParams.set("error_description", "The user denied the authorization request");
+	if (state) url.searchParams.set("state", state);
+	return url.toString();
+}
+
+//#endregion
+export { handleAuthorizationApproval as n, handleAuthorizationCodeExchange as r, buildDeniedRedirect as t };
+//# sourceMappingURL=oauth-authorization-62GmpGIH.mjs.map

package/dist/oauth-authorization-62GmpGIH.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"oauth-authorization-62GmpGIH.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/api/handlers/oauth-authorization.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * OAuth 2.1 Authorization Code + PKCE handlers.\n *\n * Implements the server side of the authorization code grant for MCP clients\n * (Claude Desktop, VS Code, etc.) per the MCP authorization spec (draft).\n *\n * Uses arctic for PKCE challenge generation and @emdash-cms/auth for token\n * utilities. Token infrastructure is shared with the device flow.\n */\n\nimport { clampScopes, computeS256Challenge, secureCompare } from \"@emdash-cms/auth\";\nimport type { RoleLevel } from \"@emdash-cms/auth\";\nimport { generateCodeVerifier } from \"arctic\";\nimport type { Kysely } from \"kysely\";\n\nimport {\n\tgeneratePrefixedToken,\n\thashApiToken,\n\tTOKEN_PREFIXES,\n\tVALID_SCOPES,\n} from \"../../auth/api-tokens.js\";\nimport { withTransaction } from \"../../database/transaction.js\";\nimport type { Database } from \"../../database/types.js\";\nimport { validateRedirectUri } from \"../oauth/redirect-uri.js\";\nimport type { ApiResult } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { lookupOAuthClient, validateClientRedirectUri } from \"./oauth-clients.js\";\nimport { lookupUserRoleAndStatus } from \"./oauth-user-lookup.js\";\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Constants\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Authorization codes expire after 10 minutes (RFC 6749 §4.1.2 recommends short-lived) */\nconst AUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDS = 10 * 60;\n\n/** Access token TTL: 1 hour */\nconst ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 60 * 60;\n\n/** Refresh token TTL: 90 days */\nconst REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 90 * 24 * 60 * 60;\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Types\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface AuthorizationParams {\n\tresponse_type: string;\n\tclient_id: string;\n\tredirect_uri: string;\n\tscope?: string;\n\tstate?: string;\n\tcode_challenge: string;\n\tcode_challenge_method: string;\n\tresource?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface TokenExchangeParams {\n\tgrant_type: string;\n\tcode: string;\n\tredirect_uri: string;\n\tclient_id: string;\n\tcode_verifier: string;\n\tresource?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface TokenResponse {\n\taccess_token: string;\n\trefresh_token: string;\n\ttoken_type: \"Bearer\";\n\texpires_in: number;\n\tscope: string;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Helpers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nfunction expiresAt(seconds: number): string {\n\treturn new Date(Date.now() + seconds * 1000).toISOString();\n}\n\nexport { validateRedirectUri };\n\n/**\n * Validate and normalize scopes. Returns validated scope list.\n */\nfunction normalizeScopes(requested?: string): string[] {\n\tif (!requested) return [];\n\n\tconst validSet = new Set<string>(VALID_SCOPES);\n\tconst scopes = requested\n\t\t.split(\" \")\n\t\t.filter(Boolean)\n\t\t.filter((s) => validSet.has(s));\n\n\treturn scopes;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Handlers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Process an authorization request after the user approves consent.\n *\n * Generates an authorization code, stores it with the PKCE challenge,\n * and returns the redirect URL with the code appended.\n *\n * Scopes are clamped to the user's role to prevent scope escalation.\n */\nexport async function handleAuthorizationApproval(\n\tdb: Kysely<Database>,\n\tuserId: string,\n\tuserRole: RoleLevel,\n\tparams: AuthorizationParams,\n): Promise<ApiResult<{ redirect_url: string }>> {\n\ttry {\n\t\t// Validate response_type\n\t\tif (params.response_type !== \"code\") {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: {\n\t\t\t\t\tcode: \"UNSUPPORTED_RESPONSE_TYPE\",\n\t\t\t\t\tmessage: \"Only response_type=code is supported\",\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Validate redirect_uri scheme/host (basic security check)\n\t\tconst uriError = validateRedirectUri(params.redirect_uri);\n\t\tif (uriError) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"INVALID_REDIRECT_URI\", message: uriError },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Look up the registered OAuth client\n\t\tconst client = await lookupOAuthClient(db, params.client_id);\n\t\tif (!client) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: {\n\t\t\t\t\tcode: \"INVALID_CLIENT\",\n\t\t\t\t\tmessage: \"Unknown client_id\",\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Validate redirect_uri against client's registered URIs\n\t\tconst clientUriError = validateClientRedirectUri(params.redirect_uri, client.redirectUris);\n\t\tif (clientUriError) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"INVALID_REDIRECT_URI\", message: clientUriError },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Validate code_challenge_method\n\t\tif (params.code_challenge_method !== \"S256\") {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: {\n\t\t\t\t\tcode: \"INVALID_REQUEST\",\n\t\t\t\t\tmessage: \"Only S256 code_challenge_method is supported\",\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Validate code_challenge is present\n\t\tif (!params.code_challenge) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"INVALID_REQUEST\", message: \"code_challenge is required\" },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Validate scopes, then clamp to user's role\n\t\tconst userScopes = clampScopes(normalizeScopes(params.scope), userRole);\n\n\t\t// SEC-41: Intersect with client's registered scopes (if restricted).\n\t\t// A client registered with scopes: [\"content:read\"] should never receive\n\t\t// admin or schema:write, regardless of the approving user's role.\n\t\tconst clientScopes = client.scopes;\n\t\tconst scopes = clientScopes?.length\n\t\t\t? userScopes.filter((s: string) => clientScopes.includes(s))\n\t\t\t: userScopes;\n\n\t\tif (scopes.length === 0) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"INVALID_SCOPE\", message: \"No valid scopes requested\" },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Generate authorization code (high entropy, base64url)\n\t\tconst code = generateCodeVerifier(); // 32 bytes random, base64url\n\t\tconst codeHash = hashApiToken(code);\n\n\t\t// Store the authorization code\n\t\tawait db\n\t\t\t.insertInto(\"_emdash_authorization_codes\")\n\t\t\t.values({\n\t\t\t\tcode_hash: codeHash,\n\t\t\t\tclient_id: params.client_id,\n\t\t\t\tredirect_uri: params.redirect_uri,\n\t\t\t\tuser_id: userId,\n\t\t\t\tscopes: JSON.stringify(scopes),\n\t\t\t\tcode_challenge: params.code_challenge,\n\t\t\t\tcode_challenge_method: params.code_challenge_method,\n\t\t\t\tresource: params.resource ?? null,\n\t\t\t\texpires_at: expiresAt(AUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDS),\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t.execute();\n\n\t\t// Build the redirect URL\n\t\tconst redirectUrl = new URL(params.redirect_uri);\n\t\tredirectUrl.searchParams.set(\"code\", code);\n\t\tif (params.state) {\n\t\t\tredirectUrl.searchParams.set(\"state\", params.state);\n\t\t}\n\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\tdata: { redirect_url: redirectUrl.toString() },\n\t\t};\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tconsole.error(\"Authorization error:\", error);\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\terror: {\n\t\t\t\tcode: \"AUTHORIZATION_ERROR\",\n\t\t\t\tmessage: \"Failed to process authorization\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Exchange an authorization code for access + refresh tokens.\n *\n * Validates the code, verifies PKCE, and issues tokens using the same\n * infrastructure as the device flow (ec_oat_*, ec_ort_*).\n */\nexport async function handleAuthorizationCodeExchange(\n\tdb: Kysely<Database>,\n\tparams: TokenExchangeParams,\n): Promise<ApiResult<TokenResponse>> {\n\ttry {\n\t\t// Validate grant_type\n\t\tif (params.grant_type !== \"authorization_code\") {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"unsupported_grant_type\", message: \"Invalid grant_type\" },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// SEC-39: Atomically consume the authorization code using DELETE...RETURNING.\n\t\t// This prevents TOCTOU double-exchange: two concurrent requests with the\n\t\t// same code will race on the DELETE, and only one will get a row back.\n\t\tconst codeHash = hashApiToken(params.code);\n\n\t\tconst row = await db\n\t\t\t.deleteFrom(\"_emdash_authorization_codes\")\n\t\t\t.where(\"code_hash\", \"=\", codeHash)\n\t\t\t.returningAll()\n\t\t\t.executeTakeFirst();\n\n\t\tif (!row) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"invalid_grant\", message: \"Invalid authorization code\" },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Check expiry\n\t\tif (new Date(row.expires_at) < new Date()) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"invalid_grant\", message: \"Authorization code expired\" },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Verify redirect_uri matches exactly\n\t\tif (row.redirect_uri !== params.redirect_uri) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"invalid_grant\", message: \"redirect_uri mismatch\" },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Verify client_id matches\n\t\tif (row.client_id !== params.client_id) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"invalid_grant\", message: \"client_id mismatch\" },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// PKCE verification: SHA256(code_verifier) must match stored code_challenge\n\t\t// Use constant-time comparison to prevent timing side-channels\n\t\tconst derivedChallenge = computeS256Challenge(params.code_verifier);\n\t\tif (!secureCompare(derivedChallenge, row.code_challenge)) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"invalid_grant\", message: \"PKCE verification failed\" },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Verify resource matches (if stored)\n\t\tif (row.resource && params.resource && row.resource !== params.resource) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"invalid_grant\", message: \"resource mismatch\" },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Revalidate user role before issuing tokens (same pattern as handleTokenRefresh).\n\t\t// The user's role may have changed since the authorization code was issued.\n\t\tconst userInfo = await lookupUserRoleAndStatus(db, row.user_id);\n\t\tif (!userInfo) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"invalid_grant\", message: \"User not found\" },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (userInfo.disabled) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: { code: \"invalid_grant\", message: \"User account is disabled\" },\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Re-clamp scopes against the user's current role\n\t\tconst storedScopes = JSON.parse(row.scopes) as string[];\n\t\tlet scopes = clampScopes(storedScopes, userInfo.role);\n\n\t\t// Intersect with client's registered scopes (if restricted)\n\t\tconst client = await lookupOAuthClient(db, row.client_id);\n\t\tif (client?.scopes?.length) {\n\t\t\tscopes = scopes.filter((s: string) => client.scopes!.includes(s));\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (scopes.length === 0) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\t\terror: {\n\t\t\t\t\tcode: \"invalid_grant\",\n\t\t\t\t\tmessage: \"User role no longer supports any of the requested scopes\",\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Issue tokens (same as device flow)\n\t\tconst accessToken = generatePrefixedToken(TOKEN_PREFIXES.OAUTH_ACCESS);\n\t\tconst accessExpires = expiresAt(ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS);\n\n\t\tconst refreshToken = generatePrefixedToken(TOKEN_PREFIXES.OAUTH_REFRESH);\n\t\tconst refreshExpires = expiresAt(REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS);\n\n\t\t// Atomically store both tokens in a transaction\n\t\tawait withTransaction(db, async (trx) => {\n\t\t\tawait trx\n\t\t\t\t.insertInto(\"_emdash_oauth_tokens\")\n\t\t\t\t.values({\n\t\t\t\t\ttoken_hash: accessToken.hash,\n\t\t\t\t\ttoken_type: \"access\",\n\t\t\t\t\tuser_id: row.user_id,\n\t\t\t\t\tscopes: JSON.stringify(scopes),\n\t\t\t\t\tclient_type: \"mcp\",\n\t\t\t\t\texpires_at: accessExpires,\n\t\t\t\t\trefresh_token_hash: refreshToken.hash,\n\t\t\t\t\tclient_id: row.client_id,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t.execute();\n\n\t\t\tawait trx\n\t\t\t\t.insertInto(\"_emdash_oauth_tokens\")\n\t\t\t\t.values({\n\t\t\t\t\ttoken_hash: refreshToken.hash,\n\t\t\t\t\ttoken_type: \"refresh\",\n\t\t\t\t\tuser_id: row.user_id,\n\t\t\t\t\tscopes: JSON.stringify(scopes),\n\t\t\t\t\tclient_type: \"mcp\",\n\t\t\t\t\texpires_at: refreshExpires,\n\t\t\t\t\trefresh_token_hash: null,\n\t\t\t\t\tclient_id: row.client_id,\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t\t.execute();\n\t\t});\n\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tsuccess: true,\n\t\t\tdata: {\n\t\t\t\taccess_token: accessToken.raw,\n\t\t\t\trefresh_token: refreshToken.raw,\n\t\t\t\ttoken_type: \"Bearer\",\n\t\t\t\texpires_in: ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS,\n\t\t\t\tscope: scopes.join(\" \"),\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tconsole.error(\"Token exchange error:\", error);\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tsuccess: false,\n\t\t\terror: {\n\t\t\t\tcode: \"TOKEN_EXCHANGE_ERROR\",\n\t\t\t\tmessage: \"Failed to exchange authorization code\",\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the authorization denied redirect URL.\n */\nexport function buildDeniedRedirect(redirectUri: string, state?: string): string {\n\tconst url = new URL(redirectUri);\n\turl.searchParams.set(\"error\", \"access_denied\");\n\turl.searchParams.set(\"error_description\", \"The user denied the authorization request\");\n\tif (state) {\n\t\turl.searchParams.set(\"state\", state);\n\t}\n\treturn url.toString();\n}\n\n/**\n * Clean up expired authorization codes.\n */\nexport async function cleanupExpiredAuthorizationCodes(db: Kysely<Database>): Promise<number> {\n\tconst result = await db\n\t\t.deleteFrom(\"_emdash_authorization_codes\")\n\t\t.where(\"expires_at\", \"<\", new Date().toISOString())\n\t\t.executeTakeFirst();\n\n\treturn 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