emdash 0.11.1 → 0.13.0

package/dist/{apply-Ded_1vng.mjs → apply-v4DBgjPw.mjs}

@@ -1,567 +1,20 @@
-import { i as __exportAll } from "./runner-DIcU2UCC.mjs";
+import { i as __exportAll } from "./runner-DdnQIwz_.mjs";
 import { n as getI18nConfig } from "./config-CVssduLe.mjs";
-import { r as RevisionRepository, t as ContentRepository } from "./content-CERxPUN0.mjs";
-import { t as MediaRepository } from "./media-1fFhub9c.mjs";
-import { t as TaxonomyRepository } from "./taxonomy-D6NvlKo8.mjs";
-import { t as OptionsRepository } from "./options-nPxWnrya.mjs";
-import { t as withTransaction } from "./transaction-D44LBXvU.mjs";
-import { t as RedirectRepository } from "./redirect-C5H7VGIX.mjs";
-import { t as BylineRepository } from "./byline-gFn1r0vA.mjs";
-import { n as requestCached, t as peekRequestCache } from "./request-cache-D4I69LeL.mjs";
-import { i as FTSManager, n as SchemaRegistry } from "./registry-Do34mz_P.mjs";
-import { r as getDb } from "./loader-ou_PXAjg.mjs";
-import { t as validateSeed } from "./validate-UK4Ja1uo.mjs";
+import { r as RevisionRepository, t as ContentRepository } from "./content-D6YG26WG.mjs";
+import { t as MediaRepository } from "./media-Dg7he9uK.mjs";
+import { t as TaxonomyRepository } from "./taxonomy-wPfusMK9.mjs";
+import { t as withTransaction } from "./transaction-NQj4VJ7Z.mjs";
+import { t as RedirectRepository } from "./redirect-DkaDxq8e.mjs";
+import { t as BylineRepository } from "./byline-D09BaS4j.mjs";
+import { t as FTSManager } from "./fts-manager-B633C-kQ.mjs";
+import { n as SchemaRegistry } from "./registry-BnCeHYsf.mjs";
+import { s as setSiteSettings } from "./settings-xQKsWnzQ.mjs";
+import { a as validateExternalUrl, r as ssrfSafeFetch } from "./ssrf-DzFN_qV-.mjs";
+import { t as validateSeed } from "./validate-DlFxcVVK.mjs";
 import { ulid } from "ulidx";
 import { imageSize } from "image-size";
 import mime from "mime/lite";
 
-//#region src/settings/index.ts
-/** Prefix for site settings in the options table */
-const SETTINGS_PREFIX = "site:";
-const SITE_SETTINGS_CACHE_KEY = Symbol.for("emdash:site-settings");
-const g = globalThis;
-const holder = g[SITE_SETTINGS_CACHE_KEY] ?? (() => {
-	const h = {
-		version: 0,
-		cached: null,
-		cachedVersion: -1
-	};
-	g[SITE_SETTINGS_CACHE_KEY] = h;
-	return h;
-})();
-/**
-* Bump the isolate-wide site-settings cache version, forcing the next
-* `getSiteSettings()` to re-query the database.
-*
-* Called from every `site:*` write path. Other isolates still serve their
-* own cached copy until they expire — staleness bounded by isolate lifetime.
-*/
-function invalidateSiteSettingsCache() {
-	holder.version++;
-	holder.cached = null;
-	holder.cachedVersion = -1;
-}
-/**
-* Type guard for MediaReference values
-*/
-function isMediaReference(value) {
-	return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && "mediaId" in value;
-}
-/**
-* Resolve a media reference to include the full URL plus content metadata.
-*
-* Pulls `mimeType` and intrinsic dimensions from the media row so callers
-* can emit correct head tags (e.g. `<link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml">`,
-* which Chromium requires when the URL has no `.svg` extension) without
-* a second round-trip to the media table.
-*/
-async function resolveMediaReference(mediaRef, db, _storage) {
-	if (!mediaRef?.mediaId) return mediaRef;
-	try {
-		const media = await new MediaRepository(db).findById(mediaRef.mediaId);
-		if (media) return {
-			...mediaRef,
-			url: `/_emdash/api/media/file/${media.storageKey}`,
-			contentType: media.mimeType,
-			...media.width !== null ? { width: media.width } : {},
-			...media.height !== null ? { height: media.height } : {}
-		};
-	} catch {}
-	return mediaRef;
-}
-/**
-* Get a single site setting by key
-*
-* Returns `undefined` if the setting has not been configured.
-* For media settings (logo, favicon), the URL is resolved automatically.
-*
-* @param key - The setting key (e.g., "title", "logo", "social")
-* @returns The setting value, or undefined if not set
-*
-* @example
-* ```ts
-* import { getSiteSetting } from "emdash";
-*
-* const title = await getSiteSetting("title");
-* const logo = await getSiteSetting("logo");
-* console.log(logo?.url); // Resolved URL
-* ```
-*/
-async function getSiteSetting(key) {
-	const primed = peekRequestCache("siteSettings");
-	if (primed) return (await primed)[key];
-	return requestCached(`siteSetting:${key}`, async () => {
-		return getSiteSettingWithDb(key, await getDb());
-	});
-}
-/**
-* Get a single site setting by key (with explicit db)
-*
-* @internal Use `getSiteSetting()` in templates. This variant is for admin routes
-* that already have a database handle.
-*/
-async function getSiteSettingWithDb(key, db, storage = null) {
-	const value = await new OptionsRepository(db).get(`${SETTINGS_PREFIX}${key}`);
-	if (!value) return;
-	if ((key === "logo" || key === "favicon") && isMediaReference(value)) return await resolveMediaReference(value, db, storage);
-	return value;
-}
-/**
-* Get all site settings
-*
-* Returns all configured settings. Unset values are undefined.
-* Media references (logo/favicon) are resolved to include URLs.
-*
-* @example
-* ```ts
-* import { getSiteSettings } from "emdash";
-*
-* const settings = await getSiteSettings();
-* console.log(settings.title); // "My Site"
-* console.log(settings.logo?.url); // "/_emdash/api/media/file/abc123"
-* ```
-*/
-function getSiteSettings() {
-	return requestCached("siteSettings", () => {
-		const versionAtCall = holder.version;
-		if (holder.cached && holder.cachedVersion === versionAtCall) return holder.cached;
-		const fetchPromise = (async () => {
-			return getSiteSettingsWithDb(await getDb());
-		})().catch((error) => {
-			if (holder.cached === fetchPromise) {
-				holder.cached = null;
-				holder.cachedVersion = -1;
-			}
-			throw error;
-		});
-		holder.cached = fetchPromise;
-		holder.cachedVersion = versionAtCall;
-		return fetchPromise;
-	});
-}
-/**
-* Get all site settings (with explicit db)
-*
-* @internal Use `getSiteSettings()` in templates. This variant is for admin routes
-* that already have a database handle.
-*/
-async function getSiteSettingsWithDb(db, storage = null) {
-	const allOptions = await new OptionsRepository(db).getByPrefix(SETTINGS_PREFIX);
-	const settings = {};
-	for (const [key, value] of allOptions) {
-		const settingKey = key.replace(SETTINGS_PREFIX, "");
-		settings[settingKey] = value;
-	}
-	const typedSettings = settings;
-	if (typedSettings.logo) typedSettings.logo = await resolveMediaReference(typedSettings.logo, db, storage);
-	if (typedSettings.favicon) typedSettings.favicon = await resolveMediaReference(typedSettings.favicon, db, storage);
-	return typedSettings;
-}
-/**
-* Set site settings (internal function used by admin API)
-*
-* Merges provided settings with existing ones. Only provided fields are updated.
-* Media references should include just the mediaId; URLs are resolved on read.
-*
-* @param settings - Partial settings object with values to update
-* @param db - Kysely database instance
-* @returns Promise that resolves when settings are saved
-*
-* @internal
-*
-* @example
-* ```ts
-* // Update multiple settings at once
-* await setSiteSettings({
-*   title: "My Site",
-*   tagline: "Welcome",
-*   logo: { mediaId: "med_123", alt: "Logo" }
-* }, db);
-* ```
-*/
-async function setSiteSettings(settings, db) {
-	const options = new OptionsRepository(db);
-	const updates = {};
-	for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(settings)) if (value !== void 0) updates[`${SETTINGS_PREFIX}${key}`] = value;
-	try {
-		await options.setMany(updates);
-	} finally {
-		invalidateSiteSettingsCache();
-	}
-}
-/**
-* Get a single plugin setting by key.
-*
-* Plugin settings are stored in the options table under
-* `plugin:<pluginId>:settings:<key>`.
-*/
-async function getPluginSetting(pluginId, key) {
-	return getPluginSettingWithDb(pluginId, key, await getDb());
-}
-/**
-* Get a single plugin setting by key (with explicit db).
-*
-* @internal Use `getPluginSetting()` in templates and plugin rendering code.
-*/
-async function getPluginSettingWithDb(pluginId, key, db) {
-	return await new OptionsRepository(db).get(`plugin:${pluginId}:settings:${key}`) ?? void 0;
-}
-/**
-* Get all persisted plugin settings for a plugin.
-*
-* Defaults declared in `admin.settingsSchema` are not materialized
-* automatically; callers should apply their own fallback defaults.
-*/
-async function getPluginSettings(pluginId) {
-	return getPluginSettingsWithDb(pluginId, await getDb());
-}
-/**
-* Get all persisted plugin settings for a plugin (with explicit db).
-*
-* @internal Use `getPluginSettings()` in templates and plugin rendering code.
-*/
-async function getPluginSettingsWithDb(pluginId, db) {
-	const prefix = `plugin:${pluginId}:settings:`;
-	const allOptions = await new OptionsRepository(db).getByPrefix(prefix);
-	const settings = {};
-	for (const [key, value] of allOptions) {
-		if (!key.startsWith(prefix)) continue;
-		settings[key.slice(prefix.length)] = value;
-	}
-	return settings;
-}
-
-//#endregion
-//#region src/import/ssrf.ts
-/**
-* SSRF protection for import URLs.
-*
-* Validates that URLs don't target internal/private network addresses.
-* Applied before any fetch() call in the import pipeline.
-*/
-const IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_DOTTED_PATTERN = /^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/i;
-const IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_HEX_PATTERN = /^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;
-const IPV4_TRANSLATED_HEX_PATTERN = /^::ffff:0:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;
-const IPV6_EXPANDED_MAPPED_PATTERN = /^0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;
-/**
-* IPv4-compatible (deprecated) addresses: ::XXXX:XXXX
-*
-* The WHATWG URL parser normalizes [::127.0.0.1] to [::7f00:1] (no ffff prefix).
-* These are deprecated but still parsed, and bypass the ffff-based checks.
-*/
-const IPV4_COMPATIBLE_HEX_PATTERN = /^::([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;
-/**
-* NAT64 prefix (RFC 6052): 64:ff9b::XXXX:XXXX
-*
-* Used by NAT64 gateways to embed IPv4 addresses in IPv6.
-* [64:ff9b::127.0.0.1] normalizes to [64:ff9b::7f00:1].
-*/
-const NAT64_HEX_PATTERN = /^64:ff9b::([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;
-const IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN = /^\[|\]$/g;
-/** Match fc00::/7 ULA — first byte 0xfc or 0xfd followed by any byte. */
-const IPV6_ULA_FC_PATTERN = /^fc[0-9a-f]{2}:/;
-const IPV6_ULA_FD_PATTERN = /^fd[0-9a-f]{2}:/;
-/** Strip trailing dots from an FQDN-form hostname ("localhost." -> "localhost"). */
-const TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN = /\.+$/;
-/**
-* Private and reserved IP ranges that should never be fetched.
-*
-* Includes:
-* - Loopback (127.0.0.0/8)
-* - Private (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
-* - Link-local (169.254.0.0/16)
-* - Cloud metadata (169.254.169.254 — AWS/GCP/Azure)
-* - IPv6 loopback and link-local
-*/
-const BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
-	{
-		start: ip4ToNum(127, 0, 0, 0),
-		end: ip4ToNum(127, 255, 255, 255)
-	},
-	{
-		start: ip4ToNum(10, 0, 0, 0),
-		end: ip4ToNum(10, 255, 255, 255)
-	},
-	{
-		start: ip4ToNum(172, 16, 0, 0),
-		end: ip4ToNum(172, 31, 255, 255)
-	},
-	{
-		start: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 0, 0),
-		end: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 255, 255)
-	},
-	{
-		start: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 0, 0),
-		end: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 255, 255)
-	},
-	{
-		start: ip4ToNum(0, 0, 0, 0),
-		end: ip4ToNum(0, 255, 255, 255)
-	}
-];
-const BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES = new Set([
-	"localhost",
-	"metadata.google.internal",
-	"metadata.google",
-	"::1"
-]);
-/**
-* Wildcard DNS services that publicly resolve arbitrary IPs embedded in the
-* hostname. Commonly used in local dev and by SSRF exploit tooling to bypass
-* hostname-only blocklists (e.g. 127.0.0.1.nip.io -> 127.0.0.1).
-*
-* Matched case-insensitively as a suffix, so both the apex and any subdomain
-* are blocked.
-*/
-const BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES = [
-	"nip.io",
-	"sslip.io",
-	"xip.io",
-	"traefik.me",
-	"lvh.me",
-	"localtest.me"
-];
-/** Blocked URL schemes */
-const ALLOWED_SCHEMES = new Set(["http:", "https:"]);
-function ip4ToNum(a, b, c, d) {
-	return (a << 24 | b << 16 | c << 8 | d) >>> 0;
-}
-function parseIpv4(ip) {
-	const parts = ip.split(".");
-	if (parts.length !== 4) return null;
-	const nums = parts.map(Number);
-	if (nums.some((n) => isNaN(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return null;
-	return ip4ToNum(nums[0], nums[1], nums[2], nums[3]);
-}
-/**
-* Convert IPv4-mapped/translated IPv6 addresses from hex form back to IPv4.
-*
-* The WHATWG URL parser normalizes dotted-decimal to hex:
-*   [::ffff:127.0.0.1] -> [::ffff:7f00:1]
-*   [::ffff:169.254.169.254] -> [::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]
-*
-* Without this conversion, the hex forms bypass isPrivateIp() regex checks.
-*/
-function normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(ip) {
-	let match = ip.match(IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_HEX_PATTERN);
-	if (!match) match = ip.match(IPV4_TRANSLATED_HEX_PATTERN);
-	if (!match) match = ip.match(IPV6_EXPANDED_MAPPED_PATTERN);
-	if (!match) match = ip.match(IPV4_COMPATIBLE_HEX_PATTERN);
-	if (!match) match = ip.match(NAT64_HEX_PATTERN);
-	if (match) {
-		const high = parseInt(match[1] ?? "", 16);
-		const low = parseInt(match[2] ?? "", 16);
-		return `${high >> 8 & 255}.${high & 255}.${low >> 8 & 255}.${low & 255}`;
-	}
-	return null;
-}
-function isPrivateIp(ip) {
-	const normalized = ip.toLowerCase();
-	if (normalized === "::1" || normalized === "::ffff:127.0.0.1") return true;
-	const hexIpv4 = normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(normalized);
-	if (hexIpv4) return isPrivateIp(hexIpv4);
-	const v4Match = normalized.match(IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_DOTTED_PATTERN);
-	const num = parseIpv4(v4Match ? v4Match[1] : normalized);
-	if (num === null) return normalized.startsWith("fe80:") || IPV6_ULA_FC_PATTERN.test(normalized) || IPV6_ULA_FD_PATTERN.test(normalized);
-	return BLOCKED_PATTERNS.some((range) => num >= range.start && num <= range.end);
-}
-/**
-* Error thrown when SSRF protection blocks a URL.
-*/
-var SsrfError = class extends Error {
-	code = "SSRF_BLOCKED";
-	constructor(message) {
-		super(message);
-		this.name = "SsrfError";
-	}
-};
-/**
-* Validate that a URL is safe to fetch (not targeting internal networks).
-*
-* Checks:
-* 1. URL is well-formed with http/https scheme
-* 2. Hostname is not a known internal name (localhost, metadata endpoints)
-* 3. If hostname is an IP literal, it's not in a private range
-*
-* Note: DNS rebinding attacks are not fully mitigated (hostname could resolve
-* to a private IP). Full protection requires resolving DNS and checking the IP
-* before connecting, which needs a custom fetch implementation. This covers
-* the most common SSRF vectors.
-*
-* @throws SsrfError if the URL targets an internal address
-*/
-/** Maximum number of redirects to follow in ssrfSafeFetch */
-const MAX_REDIRECTS = 5;
-function validateExternalUrl(url) {
-	let parsed;
-	try {
-		parsed = new URL(url);
-	} catch {
-		throw new SsrfError("Invalid URL");
-	}
-	if (!ALLOWED_SCHEMES.has(parsed.protocol)) throw new SsrfError(`Scheme '${parsed.protocol}' is not allowed`);
-	const normalizedHost = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, "").toLowerCase().replace(TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN, "");
-	if (BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES.has(normalizedHost)) throw new SsrfError("URLs targeting internal hosts are not allowed");
-	for (const suffix of BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES) if (normalizedHost === suffix || normalizedHost.endsWith(`.${suffix}`)) throw new SsrfError("URLs targeting wildcard DNS services are not allowed");
-	if (isPrivateIp(normalizedHost)) throw new SsrfError("URLs targeting private IP addresses are not allowed");
-	return parsed;
-}
-/**
-* Module-level default resolver. Tests can swap this with a stub so fetch
-* mocks don't see unexpected DoH round-trips. Production code should leave
-* it alone.
-*/
-let defaultResolver = null;
-/** Timeout for a single DoH request, in milliseconds. */
-const DOH_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e3;
-/** Default DoH endpoint — Cloudflare's public resolver. */
-const DEFAULT_DOH_URL = "https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query";
-function hasProperty(obj, key) {
-	return typeof obj === "object" && obj !== null && key in obj;
-}
-/**
-* Narrow an unknown JSON body to a DohResponse shape we can read safely.
-* Throws if the body doesn't look like a DoH response — a malformed body is
-* indistinguishable from a failure and must not be silently treated as empty.
-*/
-function parseDohResponse(raw) {
-	if (!hasProperty(raw, "Status") || typeof raw.Status !== "number") throw new Error("DoH response missing Status field");
-	const answers = [];
-	if (hasProperty(raw, "Answer") && Array.isArray(raw.Answer)) {
-		for (const entry of raw.Answer) if (hasProperty(entry, "data") && typeof entry.data === "string") answers.push({ data: entry.data });
-	}
-	return {
-		Status: raw.Status,
-		Answer: answers
-	};
-}
-/**
-* Resolve a hostname via DNS over HTTPS (Cloudflare). Returns all A and AAAA
-* records. Works in both Workers and Node without requiring node:dns.
-*
-* Fails closed: any network error, non-2xx response, or DNS rcode != 0
-* causes a rejected promise so the calling validator treats it as a block.
-*/
-const cloudflareDohResolver = async (hostname) => {
-	async function query(type) {
-		const params = new URLSearchParams({
-			name: hostname,
-			type
-		});
-		const controller = new AbortController();
-		const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), DOH_TIMEOUT_MS);
-		try {
-			const response = await globalThis.fetch(`${DEFAULT_DOH_URL}?${params.toString()}`, {
-				headers: { Accept: "application/dns-json" },
-				signal: controller.signal
-			});
-			if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`DoH lookup failed: ${response.status}`);
-			const body = parseDohResponse(await response.json());
-			if (body.Status === 3) return [];
-			if (body.Status !== 0) throw new Error(`DoH ${type} lookup failed: rcode=${body.Status}`);
-			return body.Answer.map((a) => a.data).filter(isIpLiteral);
-		} finally {
-			clearTimeout(timeout);
-		}
-	}
-	const [a, aaaa] = await Promise.all([query("A"), query("AAAA")]);
-	return [...a, ...aaaa];
-};
-/**
-* Validate a URL and resolve its hostname to check the actual IPs against
-* the private-range blocklist. This catches DNS rebinding attacks using
-* attacker-controlled domains that publicly resolve to private addresses,
-* and wildcard DNS services like nip.io used by exploit tooling.
-*
-* Runs `validateExternalUrl` first for cheap pre-flight checks (scheme,
-* literal IP, known-bad hostnames). Then resolves the hostname and rejects
-* if ANY returned address is private.
-*
-* Fails closed: if resolution fails or returns no records, throws SsrfError.
-*
-* **Caveats.** This does NOT fully close the TOCTOU between check and
-* connect. Attacks that still work against this layer include:
-*
-* - TTL=0 rebind: authoritative server returns public IP to the check, then
-*   private IP to the subsequent fetch() a few milliseconds later.
-* - Split-view via EDNS Client Subnet or source-IP inspection: the
-*   authoritative server returns public IP to Cloudflare's DoH resolver and
-*   private IP to the victim's own resolver (used by fetch()).
-* - Host-file overrides or split-horizon corporate DNS on self-hosted Node.
-* - Attacker-controlled rebinding services the caller has allowlisted.
-*
-* The only complete defense is a network-layer egress firewall. On
-* Cloudflare Workers, the platform fetch pipeline provides most of that.
-* On self-hosted Node, operators must restrict egress themselves.
-*/
-async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(url, options) {
-	const parsed = validateExternalUrl(url);
-	const hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, "");
-	if (isIpLiteral(hostname)) return parsed;
-	const resolver = options?.resolver ?? defaultResolver ?? cloudflareDohResolver;
-	let addresses;
-	try {
-		addresses = await resolver(hostname);
-	} catch (error) {
-		throw new SsrfError(`Could not resolve hostname: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`);
-	}
-	if (addresses.length === 0) throw new SsrfError("Hostname resolved to no addresses");
-	for (const ip of addresses) if (isPrivateIp(ip)) throw new SsrfError("Hostname resolves to a private IP address");
-	return parsed;
-}
-/** True when a string looks like an IPv4 or IPv6 literal. */
-function isIpLiteral(host) {
-	if (parseIpv4(host) !== null) return true;
-	return host.includes(":");
-}
-/**
-* Fetch a URL with SSRF protection on redirects.
-*
-* Uses `redirect: "manual"` to intercept redirects and re-validate each
-* redirect target against SSRF rules before following it. This prevents
-* an attacker from setting up an allowed external URL that redirects to
-* an internal IP (e.g. 169.254.169.254 for cloud metadata).
-*
-* @throws SsrfError if the initial URL or any redirect target is internal
-*/
-/** Headers that must be stripped when a redirect crosses origins */
-const CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = [
-	"authorization",
-	"cookie",
-	"proxy-authorization"
-];
-async function ssrfSafeFetch(url, init, options) {
-	let currentUrl = url;
-	let currentInit = init;
-	for (let i = 0; i <= MAX_REDIRECTS; i++) {
-		await resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(currentUrl, options);
-		const response = await globalThis.fetch(currentUrl, {
-			...currentInit,
-			redirect: "manual"
-		});
-		if (response.status < 300 || response.status >= 400) return response;
-		const location = response.headers.get("Location");
-		if (!location) return response;
-		const previousOrigin = new URL(currentUrl).origin;
-		currentUrl = new URL(location, currentUrl).href;
-		if (previousOrigin !== new URL(currentUrl).origin && currentInit) currentInit = stripCredentialHeaders(currentInit);
-	}
-	throw new SsrfError(`Too many redirects (max ${MAX_REDIRECTS})`);
-}
-/**
-* Return a copy of init with credential headers removed.
-*/
-function stripCredentialHeaders(init) {
-	if (!init.headers) return init;
-	const headers = new Headers(init.headers);
-	for (const name of CREDENTIAL_HEADERS) headers.delete(name);
-	return {
-		...init,
-		headers
-	};
-}
-
-//#endregion
 //#region src/seed/apply.ts
 /**
 * Seed engine - applies seed files to database
@@ -1043,9 +496,9 @@ async function applySeed(db, seed, options = {}) {
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	const { invalidateBylineCache } = await import("./bylines-DTFI8nDM.mjs").then((n) => n.t);
-	const { invalidateRedirectCache } = await import("./cache-BAJbeoZ8.mjs").then((n) => n.t);
-	const { invalidateUrlPatternCache } = await import("./query-8c_meo_K.mjs").then((n) => n.o);
+	const { invalidateBylineCache } = await import("./bylines-BTM2xtP8.mjs").then((n) => n.t);
+	const { invalidateRedirectCache } = await import("./cache-CXCpjWiL.mjs").then((n) => n.t);
+	const { invalidateUrlPatternCache } = await import("./query-axZmO6Tn.mjs").then((n) => n.o);
 	invalidateBylineCache();
 	invalidateRedirectCache();
 	invalidateUrlPatternCache();
@@ -1129,7 +582,7 @@ async function applyContentTaxonomies(db, collectionSlug, contentId, entry, isUp
 	if (isUpdate) await db.deleteFrom("content_taxonomies").where("collection", "=", collectionSlug).where("entry_id", "=", contentId).execute();
 	if (!entry.taxonomies) {
 		if (isUpdate) {
-			const { invalidateTermCache } = await import("./taxonomies-Bw76xAxo.mjs").then((n) => n.u);
+			const { invalidateTermCache } = await import("./taxonomies-Cn9UpaR2.mjs").then((n) => n.u);
 			invalidateTermCache();
 		}
 		return;
@@ -1141,7 +594,7 @@ async function applyContentTaxonomies(db, collectionSlug, contentId, entry, isUp
 			if (term) await termRepo.attachToEntry(collectionSlug, contentId, term.id);
 		}
 	}
-	const { invalidateTermCache } = await import("./taxonomies-Bw76xAxo.mjs").then((n) => n.u);
+	const { invalidateTermCache } = await import("./taxonomies-Cn9UpaR2.mjs").then((n) => n.u);
 	invalidateTermCache();
 }
 /**
@@ -1387,5 +840,5 @@ function getImageDimensions(buffer) {
 }
 
 //#endregion
-export { ssrfSafeFetch as a, getPluginSetting as c, getSiteSettings as d, setSiteSettings as f, resolveAndValidateExternalUrl as i, getPluginSettings as l, apply_exports as n, stripCredentialHeaders as o, SsrfError as r, validateExternalUrl as s, applySeed as t, getSiteSetting as u };
-//# sourceMappingURL=apply-Ded_1vng.mjs.map
+export { apply_exports as n, applySeed as t };
+//# sourceMappingURL=apply-v4DBgjPw.mjs.map