dsh-vision-router 3.2.0 → 3.3.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +6 -6
- package/README.zh.md +21 -6
- package/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +167 -0
- package/assets/licenses/apache-2.0.txt +202 -0
- package/assets/licenses/llvm-mingw-LICENSE.txt +279 -0
- package/assets/licenses/mingw-w64-runtime-COPYING.txt +265 -0
- package/assets/licenses/moxcms-BSD-3-Clause.txt +26 -0
- package/assets/licenses/ncnn-LICENSE.txt +86 -0
- package/assets/licenses/roots-BSD-2-Clause.txt +24 -0
- package/assets/licenses/unicode-ident-Unicode-3.0.txt +39 -0
- package/assets/licenses/vtracer-MIT.txt +25 -0
- package/assets/licenses/zlib-rs-Zlib.txt +19 -0
- package/docs/architecture/dsh-support-window.md +25 -6
- package/docs/compatibility/dsh-0.2.2-rc2-audit.md +40 -0
- package/docs/compatibility/dsh-0.2.2-rc3-audit.md +131 -0
- package/docs/compliance/vtracer-alpha4-provenance.md +47 -0
- package/docs/compliance/vtracer-alpha4-reconstructed-Cargo.lock +567 -0
- package/docs/compliance/vtracer-alpha4-rust-inventory.json +421 -0
- package/docs/compliance/vtracer-alpha4-rust-license-texts.md +13018 -0
- package/docs/releases/v3.2.1.md +21 -0
- package/docs/releases/v3.2.2.md +25 -0
- package/docs/releases/v3.3.0.md +34 -0
- package/docs/remote-settings.md +83 -8
- package/index.js +280 -169
- package/lib/client.js +17 -17
- package/lib/core-primitives.js +155 -214
- package/lib/dsh-support-window.js +6 -3
- package/lib/native-ocr-annotation-risk.js +33 -0
- package/lib/native-ocr-canary.js +156 -0
- package/lib/native-ocr-chemistry-review.js +37 -0
- package/lib/native-ocr-document.js +243 -0
- package/lib/native-ocr-installation.js +17 -0
- package/lib/native-ocr-integrity.js +93 -0
- package/lib/native-ocr-question-labels.js +167 -0
- package/lib/native-ocr-supervisor.js +268 -0
- package/lib/remote-settings-bridge.js +93 -57
- package/lib/remote-settings-risk-client-boundary.js +2 -2
- package/lib/runtime-reliability.js +7 -0
- package/lib/session-query-readers.js +8 -2
- package/lib/session-vision-attachment-index.js +61 -14
- package/lib/settings-client-017-compat.js +4 -2
- package/lib/settings-ia-client-prelude.js +26 -10
- package/lib/tesseract-image-preprocess.js +35 -0
- package/lib/trace-vtracer-process-runtime.js +133 -0
- package/lib/trace-vtracer-process.js +43 -0
- package/lib/trace-vtracer-worker.js +163 -0
- package/lib/vision-attachment-handle-runtime.js +11 -2
- package/lib/vision-backend-runtime-policy.js +5 -3
- package/lib/vision-image-input-reader.js +67 -0
- package/lib/vision-image-input-verdict.js +24 -3
- package/lib/vision-tool-runtime-boundary.js +7 -10
- package/lib/vision-tool-stage.js +58 -0
- package/lib/web/dsh-settings-017-root-transport.js +52 -6
- package/lib/web-capability-boundary.js +6 -0
- package/package.json +10 -6
- package/scripts/install-native-ocr.mjs +144 -0
|
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Conservative question-heading recovery for photographed Chinese textbooks.
|
|
3
|
+
* Runs only on OCR observations: no image-specific expected answers are injected.
|
|
4
|
+
*/
|
|
5
|
+
const chinese = String.raw`\\p{Script=Han}`;
|
|
6
|
+
const headingPattern = /^\s*(1[0-2]|[1-9])[..、]\s*(?=\S)/u;
|
|
7
|
+
const attachedPattern = /^\s*(1[0-2]|[1-9])\s*(\p{Script=Han}.{3,})/u;
|
|
8
|
+
const marginPattern = /^\s*(1[0-2]|[1-9])([..、]?)\s*(\p{Script=Han}.{3,})/u;
|
|
9
|
+
const compact = (s) => s.normalize('NFKC').replace(/∆/gu,'Δ')
|
|
10
|
+
.replace(/[^\p{L}\p{N}]/gu, '').toLowerCase();
|
|
11
|
+
const midpoint = (box) => (box[1] + box[3]) / 2;
|
|
12
|
+
function oneCharacterDisagreement(a,b) {
|
|
13
|
+
if (a.length < 5 || b.length < 5) return false
|
|
14
|
+
const n = Math.min(7,a.length,b.length)
|
|
15
|
+
let edits=0
|
|
16
|
+
for(let i=0;i<n;i++) if(a[i]!==b[i]) edits++
|
|
17
|
+
return edits===1
|
|
18
|
+
}
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
function prefixEditDistance(a,b) {
|
|
21
|
+
const n=Math.min(7,Array.from(a).length,Array.from(b).length)
|
|
22
|
+
const x=Array.from(a).slice(0,n), y=Array.from(b).slice(0,n)
|
|
23
|
+
const dist=Array.from({length:y.length+1},(_,i)=>i)
|
|
24
|
+
for(const c of x) {
|
|
25
|
+
const next=[dist[0]+1]
|
|
26
|
+
for(let j=0;j<y.length;j++) {
|
|
27
|
+
next.push(Math.min(next[j]+1,dist[j+1]+1,dist[j]+(c===y[j]?0:1)))
|
|
28
|
+
}
|
|
29
|
+
for(let j=0;j<next.length;j++)dist[j]=next[j]
|
|
30
|
+
}
|
|
31
|
+
return dist.at(-1)
|
|
32
|
+
}
|
|
33
|
+
function anchorNumber(region) {
|
|
34
|
+
const m = String(region.text ?? '').match(headingPattern);
|
|
35
|
+
return m ? Number(m[1]) : null;
|
|
36
|
+
}
|
|
37
|
+
|
|
38
|
+
function isSandwichedBetweenConsecutiveHeadings(regions,target,n) {
|
|
39
|
+
const y=midpoint(target.box)
|
|
40
|
+
return regions.some(r=>midpoint(r.box)<y-8 && anchorNumber(r)===n-1) &&
|
|
41
|
+
regions.some(r=>midpoint(r.box)>y+8 && anchorNumber(r)===n+1)
|
|
42
|
+
}
|
|
43
|
+
function sequentiallyPlausible(regions, target, value) {
|
|
44
|
+
const y = midpoint(target.box);
|
|
45
|
+
const earlier = regions.filter(r => r !== target && midpoint(r.box) < y - 8)
|
|
46
|
+
.map(anchorNumber).filter(Number.isFinite);
|
|
47
|
+
const later = regions.filter(r => r !== target && midpoint(r.box) > y + 8)
|
|
48
|
+
.map(anchorNumber).filter(Number.isFinite);
|
|
49
|
+
const previous = earlier.length ? Math.max(...earlier) : null;
|
|
50
|
+
const next = later.length ? Math.min(...later) : null;
|
|
51
|
+
// Do not manufacture a number from an isolated OCR hallucination.
|
|
52
|
+
// Require a preceding observed heading, then strictly increasing order.
|
|
53
|
+
return previous !== null && value > previous &&
|
|
54
|
+
(next === null || value < next) &&
|
|
55
|
+
(next === null || value - previous <= 3);
|
|
56
|
+
}
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
58
|
+
function reconcileOneMissingFormulaDigit(row,n,marginBody,label) {
|
|
59
|
+
// Only a single missing digit may be inserted into an observed chemical
|
|
60
|
+
// formula. Never invent a decimal point or substitute an uncertain digit.
|
|
61
|
+
if(label.confidence < 0.95 || row.confidence < 0.90) return false
|
|
62
|
+
const alternatives=marginBody.match(/[A-Z]\d+[A-Z]\d+(?:[A-Z]\d*)*/g) ?? []
|
|
63
|
+
for(const observed of alternatives) {
|
|
64
|
+
if(row.text.includes(observed)) continue
|
|
65
|
+
for(let k=0;k<observed.length;k++) {
|
|
66
|
+
if(!/[0-9]/.test(observed[k]))continue
|
|
67
|
+
const missing=observed.slice(0,k)+observed.slice(k+1)
|
|
68
|
+
const occurrence=row.text.indexOf(missing)
|
|
69
|
+
if(occurrence<0 || row.text.indexOf(missing,occurrence+1)>=0)continue
|
|
70
|
+
const proposed=row.text.slice(0,occurrence)+observed+row.text.slice(occurrence+missing.length)
|
|
71
|
+
const reference=compact(n+'. '+marginBody)
|
|
72
|
+
if(reference.length < 10 || !compact(proposed).startsWith(reference.slice(0,Math.min(15,reference.length)))) continue
|
|
73
|
+
row.text=proposed
|
|
74
|
+
row.uncertain=true
|
|
75
|
+
row.formulaDigitReconciled=true
|
|
76
|
+
row.formulaRecoveryEvidence={from:missing,to:observed,sourceConfidence:label.confidence}
|
|
77
|
+
return true
|
|
78
|
+
}
|
|
79
|
+
}
|
|
80
|
+
return false
|
|
81
|
+
}
|
|
82
|
+
export function recoverPhotoQuestionHeadings(regions, leftMarginLabels = []) {
|
|
83
|
+
const recovered = [];
|
|
84
|
+
const rejected = [];
|
|
85
|
+
const byY = [...leftMarginLabels].sort((a, b) => midpoint(a.box) - midpoint(b.box));
|
|
86
|
+
|
|
87
|
+
// Recover a missing separator only when digit + Chinese text are already
|
|
88
|
+
// present in the main OCR line and surrounding headings agree.
|
|
89
|
+
for (const row of regions) {
|
|
90
|
+
if (anchorNumber(row) !== null) continue;
|
|
91
|
+
const m = String(row.text ?? '').match(attachedPattern);
|
|
92
|
+
if (!m) continue; // 2C8H18 is a chemical coefficient, NOT question 2
|
|
93
|
+
const n = Number(m[1]);
|
|
94
|
+
if (!sequentiallyPlausible(regions, row, n)) {
|
|
95
|
+
rejected.push({ number: n, reason: 'heading_sequence_conflict' });
|
|
96
|
+
continue;
|
|
97
|
+
}
|
|
98
|
+
row.text = n + '. ' + m[2];
|
|
99
|
+
row.uncertain = true;
|
|
100
|
+
row.numberRecovered = true;
|
|
101
|
+
row.numberRecoveryMethod = 'inline_digit_context';
|
|
102
|
+
recovered.push(n);
|
|
103
|
+
}
|
|
104
|
+
|
|
105
|
+
for (const label of byY) {
|
|
106
|
+
if (!Number.isFinite(label?.confidence) || label.confidence < 0.85 ||
|
|
107
|
+
!Array.isArray(label.box) || label.box.length !== 4) continue;
|
|
108
|
+
const m = String(label.text ?? '').match(marginPattern);
|
|
109
|
+
if (!m) continue;
|
|
110
|
+
const n = Number(m[1]);
|
|
111
|
+
const fragment = compact(m[3]).slice(0, 7);
|
|
112
|
+
if (fragment.length < 4) continue;
|
|
113
|
+
const y = midpoint(label.box);
|
|
114
|
+
const hits = regions.filter(row => {
|
|
115
|
+
if (!Array.isArray(row.box) || row.box.length !== 4) return false;
|
|
116
|
+
if (Math.abs(midpoint(row.box) - y) > 14) return false;
|
|
117
|
+
const body = compact(row.text).replace(/^\d{1,2}/, '');
|
|
118
|
+
return body.startsWith(fragment.slice(0, 4)) ||
|
|
119
|
+
body.includes(fragment.slice(0, 6)) ||
|
|
120
|
+
(row.confidence >= 0.85 && (
|
|
121
|
+
oneCharacterDisagreement(body,fragment) ||
|
|
122
|
+
(isSandwichedBetweenConsecutiveHeadings(regions,row,n) &&
|
|
123
|
+
prefixEditDistance(body,fragment)<=2)
|
|
124
|
+
));
|
|
125
|
+
});
|
|
126
|
+
if (hits.length !== 1) continue;
|
|
127
|
+
const target = hits[0];
|
|
128
|
+
const existing = anchorNumber(target);
|
|
129
|
+
if (existing === n) continue;
|
|
130
|
+
if (existing !== null) {
|
|
131
|
+
target.uncertain = true;
|
|
132
|
+
rejected.push({ number: n, reason: 'observed_number_conflict' });
|
|
133
|
+
continue;
|
|
134
|
+
}
|
|
135
|
+
if (!sequentiallyPlausible(regions, target, n)) {
|
|
136
|
+
rejected.push({ number: n, reason: 'heading_sequence_conflict' });
|
|
137
|
+
continue;
|
|
138
|
+
}
|
|
139
|
+
// A number without a printed/recognized period can be accepted only
|
|
140
|
+
// with monotonic neighboring evidence, and remains uncertain.
|
|
141
|
+
const original = target.text;
|
|
142
|
+
const fuzzyUsed = !compact(original).replace(/^\d{1,2}/,'')
|
|
143
|
+
.startsWith(fragment.slice(0,4));
|
|
144
|
+
target.text = n + '. ' + original.trim();
|
|
145
|
+
target.uncertain = target.uncertain || !m[2] || fuzzyUsed;
|
|
146
|
+
target.numberRecoveryDisagreement = fuzzyUsed;
|
|
147
|
+
target.numberRecovered = true;
|
|
148
|
+
target.numberRecoveryMethod = 'margin_correlated';
|
|
149
|
+
target.numberRawEvidence = label.text;
|
|
150
|
+
recovered.push(n);
|
|
151
|
+
}
|
|
152
|
+
const formulaReconciled=[]
|
|
153
|
+
// Compare the beginning of a line with the independent high-resolution
|
|
154
|
+
// left-margin view, including lines whose heading was already present.
|
|
155
|
+
for(const label of byY) {
|
|
156
|
+
const m=String(label.text??'').match(marginPattern)
|
|
157
|
+
if(!m)continue
|
|
158
|
+
const n=Number(m[1]),y=midpoint(label.box)
|
|
159
|
+
const hits=regions.filter(row=>anchorNumber(row)===n &&
|
|
160
|
+
Math.abs(midpoint(row.box)-y)<=14)
|
|
161
|
+
if(hits.length!==1)continue
|
|
162
|
+
if(reconcileOneMissingFormulaDigit(hits[0],n,m[3],label)){
|
|
163
|
+
formulaReconciled.push(n)
|
|
164
|
+
}
|
|
165
|
+
}
|
|
166
|
+
return { regions, recovered, rejected, formulaReconciled };
|
|
167
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'
|
|
2
|
+
import { isAbsolute } from 'node:path'
|
|
3
|
+
import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks'
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 12_000
|
|
6
|
+
const MAX_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000
|
|
7
|
+
const MAX_INPUT_BYTES = 24 * 1024 * 1024
|
|
8
|
+
const MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
|
|
9
|
+
const MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS = 4_000_000
|
|
10
|
+
const MAX_IMAGE_SIDE = 4096
|
|
11
|
+
const MAX_ACTIVE_WORKERS = 2
|
|
12
|
+
const MAX_QUEUED_WORKERS = 16
|
|
13
|
+
let activeWorkers = 0
|
|
14
|
+
const waitingWorkers = []
|
|
15
|
+
|
|
16
|
+
function releaseNextWorker() {
|
|
17
|
+
while (waitingWorkers.length > 0) {
|
|
18
|
+
const next = waitingWorkers.shift()
|
|
19
|
+
if (next.finished) continue
|
|
20
|
+
next.finished = true
|
|
21
|
+
clearTimeout(next.timer)
|
|
22
|
+
next.signal?.removeEventListener('abort', next.abort)
|
|
23
|
+
activeWorkers++
|
|
24
|
+
next.resolve(makeReleaseWorker())
|
|
25
|
+
break
|
|
26
|
+
}
|
|
27
|
+
}
|
|
28
|
+
function makeReleaseWorker() {
|
|
29
|
+
let used = false
|
|
30
|
+
return () => {
|
|
31
|
+
if (used) return
|
|
32
|
+
used = true
|
|
33
|
+
activeWorkers--
|
|
34
|
+
releaseNextWorker()
|
|
35
|
+
}
|
|
36
|
+
}
|
|
37
|
+
function acquireWorker(signal, waitMs) {
|
|
38
|
+
if (signal?.aborted) return Promise.reject(error('OCR_CANCELLED', 'OCR cancelled'))
|
|
39
|
+
if (activeWorkers < MAX_ACTIVE_WORKERS) {
|
|
40
|
+
activeWorkers++
|
|
41
|
+
return Promise.resolve(makeReleaseWorker())
|
|
42
|
+
}
|
|
43
|
+
if (waitingWorkers.length >= MAX_QUEUED_WORKERS) {
|
|
44
|
+
return Promise.reject(error('OCR_BUSY', 'local OCR worker queue is full'))
|
|
45
|
+
}
|
|
46
|
+
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
|
47
|
+
const task = { resolve, reject, signal, finished: false, timer: undefined, abort: undefined }
|
|
48
|
+
const fail = (code, message) => {
|
|
49
|
+
if (task.finished) return
|
|
50
|
+
task.finished = true
|
|
51
|
+
clearTimeout(task.timer)
|
|
52
|
+
signal?.removeEventListener('abort', task.abort)
|
|
53
|
+
const index = waitingWorkers.indexOf(task)
|
|
54
|
+
if (index !== -1) waitingWorkers.splice(index, 1)
|
|
55
|
+
reject(error(code, message))
|
|
56
|
+
}
|
|
57
|
+
task.abort = () => fail('OCR_CANCELLED', 'OCR cancelled')
|
|
58
|
+
task.timer = setTimeout(() => fail('OCR_QUEUE_TIMEOUT', 'local OCR queue deadline exhausted'), waitMs)
|
|
59
|
+
task.timer.unref?.()
|
|
60
|
+
waitingWorkers.push(task)
|
|
61
|
+
signal?.addEventListener('abort', task.abort, { once: true })
|
|
62
|
+
if (signal?.aborted) task.abort()
|
|
63
|
+
})
|
|
64
|
+
}
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
/**
|
|
67
|
+
* In-memory, validated RGB24 transport for the native worker.
|
|
68
|
+
* Image decoders remain Host-owned (sharp); native inference never parses
|
|
69
|
+
* arbitrary PNG/JPEG/WebP bytes or reads user-controlled filesystem paths.
|
|
70
|
+
*/
|
|
71
|
+
export function encodeNativeOcrRgbFrame(rgb, width, height) {
|
|
72
|
+
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(width) || !Number.isSafeInteger(height) ||
|
|
73
|
+
width < 1 || height < 1 ||
|
|
74
|
+
width > MAX_IMAGE_SIDE || height > MAX_IMAGE_SIDE ||
|
|
75
|
+
width * height > MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS) {
|
|
76
|
+
throw error('OCR_INVALID_DIMENSIONS', 'invalid local OCR image dimensions')
|
|
77
|
+
}
|
|
78
|
+
if (!(rgb instanceof Uint8Array) || rgb.byteLength !== width * height * 3) {
|
|
79
|
+
throw error('OCR_INVALID_RGB', 'invalid local OCR RGB pixel buffer')
|
|
80
|
+
}
|
|
81
|
+
const frame = Buffer.allocUnsafe(20 + rgb.byteLength)
|
|
82
|
+
frame.write('DVR3OCR1', 0, 'ascii')
|
|
83
|
+
frame.writeUInt32LE(width, 8)
|
|
84
|
+
frame.writeUInt32LE(height, 12)
|
|
85
|
+
frame.writeUInt32LE(rgb.byteLength, 16)
|
|
86
|
+
frame.set(rgb, 20)
|
|
87
|
+
return frame
|
|
88
|
+
}
|
|
89
|
+
|
|
90
|
+
export class LocalOcrProcessError extends Error {
|
|
91
|
+
constructor(code, message) {
|
|
92
|
+
super(message)
|
|
93
|
+
this.name = 'LocalOcrProcessError'
|
|
94
|
+
this.code = code
|
|
95
|
+
}
|
|
96
|
+
}
|
|
97
|
+
|
|
98
|
+
function error(code, message) {
|
|
99
|
+
return new LocalOcrProcessError(code, message)
|
|
100
|
+
}
|
|
101
|
+
|
|
102
|
+
function isValidOcrResult(value) {
|
|
103
|
+
return value !== null &&
|
|
104
|
+
typeof value === 'object' &&
|
|
105
|
+
!Array.isArray(value) &&
|
|
106
|
+
typeof value.text === 'string' &&
|
|
107
|
+
value.text.length <= 250_000 &&
|
|
108
|
+
(value.confidence === undefined || (
|
|
109
|
+
typeof value.confidence === 'number' &&
|
|
110
|
+
Number.isFinite(value.confidence) &&
|
|
111
|
+
value.confidence >= 0 && value.confidence <= 1
|
|
112
|
+
)) &&
|
|
113
|
+
(value.uncertain === undefined || typeof value.uncertain === 'boolean')
|
|
114
|
+
}
|
|
115
|
+
|
|
116
|
+
/**
|
|
117
|
+
* Experimental stability boundary. Does not enable/replace the production OCR engine.
|
|
118
|
+
* The caller must provide a trusted, package-owned absolute executable path.
|
|
119
|
+
* The native executable reads image bytes from stdin and writes one JSON result to stdout.
|
|
120
|
+
*
|
|
121
|
+
* No shell, no image path, no implicit cloud fallback, no inherited credentials.
|
|
122
|
+
*/
|
|
123
|
+
function runIsolatedLocalOcrProcess(imageBytes, {
|
|
124
|
+
executable,
|
|
125
|
+
args = [],
|
|
126
|
+
timeoutMs = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS,
|
|
127
|
+
signal,
|
|
128
|
+
maxOutputBytes = MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES,
|
|
129
|
+
} = {}) {
|
|
130
|
+
if (!Buffer.isBuffer(imageBytes) || imageBytes.length === 0 || imageBytes.length > MAX_INPUT_BYTES) {
|
|
131
|
+
return Promise.reject(error('OCR_INVALID_INPUT', 'invalid OCR image size'))
|
|
132
|
+
}
|
|
133
|
+
if (typeof executable !== 'string' || !isAbsolute(executable) || executable.includes('\0')) {
|
|
134
|
+
return Promise.reject(error('OCR_UNTRUSTED_RUNNER', 'OCR executable path must be absolute and trusted'))
|
|
135
|
+
}
|
|
136
|
+
if (!Array.isArray(args) || args.some((value) => typeof value !== 'string' || value.includes('\0'))) {
|
|
137
|
+
return Promise.reject(error('OCR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS', 'invalid OCR executable arguments'))
|
|
138
|
+
}
|
|
139
|
+
if (!Number.isFinite(timeoutMs) || timeoutMs <= 0) {
|
|
140
|
+
return Promise.reject(error('OCR_INVALID_TIMEOUT', 'invalid OCR timeout'))
|
|
141
|
+
}
|
|
142
|
+
const deadlineMs = Math.max(1, Math.min(Math.floor(timeoutMs), MAX_TIMEOUT_MS))
|
|
143
|
+
const limit = Number.isSafeInteger(maxOutputBytes) && maxOutputBytes > 0
|
|
144
|
+
? Math.min(maxOutputBytes, MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES)
|
|
145
|
+
: MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES
|
|
146
|
+
if (signal?.aborted) return Promise.reject(error('OCR_CANCELLED', 'OCR cancelled'))
|
|
147
|
+
|
|
148
|
+
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
|
149
|
+
let done = false
|
|
150
|
+
let child
|
|
151
|
+
let timer
|
|
152
|
+
let size = 0
|
|
153
|
+
const buffers = []
|
|
154
|
+
let spawnFailure = false
|
|
155
|
+
|
|
156
|
+
const terminate = () => {
|
|
157
|
+
try { child?.kill('SIGKILL') } catch {}
|
|
158
|
+
}
|
|
159
|
+
const abort = () => {
|
|
160
|
+
terminate()
|
|
161
|
+
settle(error('OCR_CANCELLED', 'OCR cancelled'))
|
|
162
|
+
}
|
|
163
|
+
const settle = (failure, result) => {
|
|
164
|
+
if (done) return
|
|
165
|
+
done = true
|
|
166
|
+
if (timer !== undefined) clearTimeout(timer)
|
|
167
|
+
signal?.removeEventListener('abort', abort)
|
|
168
|
+
if (failure) reject(failure)
|
|
169
|
+
else resolve(result)
|
|
170
|
+
}
|
|
171
|
+
|
|
172
|
+
try {
|
|
173
|
+
// Limit the environment to OS runtime variables, not secrets or user-provided
|
|
174
|
+
// proxy/configuration variables. The executable MUST be bundled and self-contained.
|
|
175
|
+
const env = {}
|
|
176
|
+
for (const name of ['SystemRoot', 'WINDIR', 'TEMP', 'TMP', 'TMPDIR', 'HOME', 'LANG', 'LC_ALL']) {
|
|
177
|
+
if (typeof process.env[name] === 'string') env[name] = process.env[name]
|
|
178
|
+
}
|
|
179
|
+
// Linux worker registers PR_SET_PDEATHSIG before reading RGB input.
|
|
180
|
+
// A non-secret expected PID closes the fork/exec vs parent-SIGKILL race.
|
|
181
|
+
if (process.platform === 'linux') env.DVR_OCR_PARENT_PID = String(process.pid)
|
|
182
|
+
child = spawn(executable, args, {
|
|
183
|
+
shell: false,
|
|
184
|
+
windowsHide: true,
|
|
185
|
+
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
|
|
186
|
+
env,
|
|
187
|
+
})
|
|
188
|
+
} catch {
|
|
189
|
+
settle(error('OCR_SPAWN_FAILED', 'unable to start local OCR worker'))
|
|
190
|
+
return
|
|
191
|
+
}
|
|
192
|
+
|
|
193
|
+
signal?.addEventListener('abort', abort, { once: true })
|
|
194
|
+
timer = setTimeout(() => {
|
|
195
|
+
terminate()
|
|
196
|
+
settle(error('OCR_TIMEOUT', 'local OCR worker exceeded its deadline'))
|
|
197
|
+
}, deadlineMs)
|
|
198
|
+
timer.unref?.()
|
|
199
|
+
|
|
200
|
+
child.on('error', () => {
|
|
201
|
+
spawnFailure = true
|
|
202
|
+
settle(error('OCR_SPAWN_FAILED', 'unable to start local OCR worker'))
|
|
203
|
+
})
|
|
204
|
+
// Some platforms write EPIPE after the worker exits early. Its exit status,
|
|
205
|
+
// not this stream error, determines the OCR result.
|
|
206
|
+
child.stdin.on('error', () => {})
|
|
207
|
+
child.stderr.on('data', () => {}) // Never leak native stderr or sensitive images.
|
|
208
|
+
child.stdout.on('data', (chunk) => {
|
|
209
|
+
if (done) return
|
|
210
|
+
size += chunk.length
|
|
211
|
+
if (size > limit) {
|
|
212
|
+
terminate()
|
|
213
|
+
settle(error('OCR_OUTPUT_LIMIT', 'local OCR output exceeded the size limit'))
|
|
214
|
+
return
|
|
215
|
+
}
|
|
216
|
+
buffers.push(chunk)
|
|
217
|
+
})
|
|
218
|
+
child.on('close', (exitCode, exitSignal) => {
|
|
219
|
+
if (done) return
|
|
220
|
+
if (spawnFailure || exitCode !== 0 || exitSignal !== null) {
|
|
221
|
+
settle(error('OCR_WORKER_FAILED', 'local OCR worker exited unsuccessfully'))
|
|
222
|
+
return
|
|
223
|
+
}
|
|
224
|
+
try {
|
|
225
|
+
const result = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(buffers, size).toString('utf8'))
|
|
226
|
+
if (!isValidOcrResult(result)) {
|
|
227
|
+
settle(error('OCR_INVALID_RESULT', 'local OCR returned an invalid result'))
|
|
228
|
+
return
|
|
229
|
+
}
|
|
230
|
+
settle(undefined, { ...result, engine: 'ncnn' })
|
|
231
|
+
} catch {
|
|
232
|
+
settle(error('OCR_INVALID_RESULT', 'local OCR returned invalid JSON'))
|
|
233
|
+
}
|
|
234
|
+
})
|
|
235
|
+
if (signal?.aborted) {
|
|
236
|
+
abort()
|
|
237
|
+
return
|
|
238
|
+
}
|
|
239
|
+
child.stdin.end(imageBytes)
|
|
240
|
+
})
|
|
241
|
+
}
|
|
242
|
+
|
|
243
|
+
/**
|
|
244
|
+
* At most two native model instances can execute simultaneously. All other
|
|
245
|
+
* requests wait in a bounded, abortable FIFO. This protects the Host against
|
|
246
|
+
* a burst of 100+ concurrent images creating hundreds of native model copies.
|
|
247
|
+
*/
|
|
248
|
+
export async function runIsolatedLocalOcr(imageBytes, options = {}) {
|
|
249
|
+
const timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS
|
|
250
|
+
if (!Number.isFinite(timeoutMs) || timeoutMs <= 0) {
|
|
251
|
+
throw error('OCR_INVALID_TIMEOUT', 'invalid OCR timeout')
|
|
252
|
+
}
|
|
253
|
+
const budgetMs = Math.max(1, Math.min(Math.floor(timeoutMs), MAX_TIMEOUT_MS))
|
|
254
|
+
const started = performance.now()
|
|
255
|
+
const release = await acquireWorker(options.signal, budgetMs)
|
|
256
|
+
try {
|
|
257
|
+
const remainingMs = budgetMs - (performance.now() - started)
|
|
258
|
+
if (remainingMs <= 0) {
|
|
259
|
+
throw error('OCR_QUEUE_TIMEOUT', 'local OCR queue deadline exhausted')
|
|
260
|
+
}
|
|
261
|
+
return await runIsolatedLocalOcrProcess(imageBytes, {
|
|
262
|
+
...options,
|
|
263
|
+
timeoutMs: remainingMs,
|
|
264
|
+
})
|
|
265
|
+
} finally {
|
|
266
|
+
release()
|
|
267
|
+
}
|
|
268
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -11,53 +11,71 @@ export const REMOTE_SETTINGS_CHANNEL = '/vision-router-settings'
|
|
|
11
11
|
export const REMOTE_SETTINGS_PERMISSION = 'allowRemoteSettings'
|
|
12
12
|
export const REMOTE_SETTINGS_AUTHORIZE_ENDPOINT = 'authorize'
|
|
13
13
|
|
|
14
|
-
// Remote
|
|
15
|
-
//
|
|
16
|
-
//
|
|
17
|
-
|
|
18
|
-
|
|
19
|
-
|
|
20
|
-
|
|
21
|
-
'routingMode',
|
|
22
|
-
'routingPreference',
|
|
23
|
-
'backgroundBenchmarking',
|
|
24
|
-
'textProvider',
|
|
25
|
-
'tool',
|
|
26
|
-
'structuredVisionBootstrap',
|
|
27
|
-
'visionDepth',
|
|
28
|
-
'visionDepthMaxCalls',
|
|
29
|
-
'guidanceOverrides',
|
|
30
|
-
'progressiveTools',
|
|
31
|
-
'autoActivateOnImage',
|
|
32
|
-
'extraVisionModels',
|
|
33
|
-
'rewriteImages',
|
|
34
|
-
'downscale',
|
|
35
|
-
'downscaleMaxPixels',
|
|
36
|
-
'cache',
|
|
37
|
-
'cacheTtlSeconds',
|
|
38
|
-
'cacheMaxEntries',
|
|
39
|
-
'timeoutMs',
|
|
40
|
-
'visionTaskTimeoutMs',
|
|
41
|
-
'visionTurnBudgetMs',
|
|
42
|
-
'ocrTimeoutMs',
|
|
43
|
-
'ocrEngine',
|
|
44
|
-
'localOnlyVision',
|
|
45
|
-
'freeFallback',
|
|
46
|
-
'freeCloudFirst',
|
|
47
|
-
'autoWrapProviders',
|
|
48
|
-
'wrappedProviders',
|
|
49
|
-
'onboardingSeen',
|
|
50
|
-
])
|
|
14
|
+
// Remote settings are an opt-in view of the *same* Host-owned DVR namespace.
|
|
15
|
+
// No second field allow-list: after the once-per-profile risk acknowledgement,
|
|
16
|
+
// DSH-authenticated clients can edit any ordinary field admitted by the Host
|
|
17
|
+
// schema. The permission flag itself is managed through the explicit
|
|
18
|
+
// risk-confirmation/revocation flow, not as an ordinary settings mutation.
|
|
19
|
+
const REDACTED = '[REDACTED]'
|
|
20
|
+
const SECRET_KEY = /(?:password|passwd|private.?key|(?:api|access|refresh).?token|token|secret|credential|api.?key|authorization)/i
|
|
51
21
|
|
|
52
|
-
|
|
53
|
-
|
|
54
|
-
|
|
55
|
-
|
|
56
|
-
|
|
57
|
-
)
|
|
22
|
+
function redactUrl(value) {
|
|
23
|
+
if (typeof value !== 'string' || !/^[a-z][a-z\d+.-]*:\/\//i.test(value)) return value
|
|
24
|
+
try {
|
|
25
|
+
const url = new URL(value)
|
|
26
|
+
let changed = false
|
|
27
|
+
if (url.username || url.password) {
|
|
28
|
+
url.username = REDACTED
|
|
29
|
+
url.password = REDACTED
|
|
30
|
+
changed = true
|
|
31
|
+
}
|
|
32
|
+
for (const key of url.searchParams.keys()) {
|
|
33
|
+
if (SECRET_KEY.test(key)) { url.searchParams.set(key, REDACTED); changed = true }
|
|
34
|
+
}
|
|
35
|
+
return changed ? url.toString() : value
|
|
36
|
+
} catch { return value }
|
|
37
|
+
}
|
|
58
38
|
|
|
59
|
-
|
|
60
|
-
|
|
39
|
+
function containsRedactedCredential(value, field = '') {
|
|
40
|
+
// A remote descriptor may contain a redacted proxy or endpoint URL. If a
|
|
41
|
+
// user edits that form field and re-saves it, a masked placeholder is NOT a
|
|
42
|
+
// credential and must never overwrite the original value in Host settings.
|
|
43
|
+
if (field !== 'apiKeyEnv' && field !== 'credentialRef' &&
|
|
44
|
+
SECRET_KEY.test(field) && value === REDACTED) return true
|
|
45
|
+
if (typeof value === 'string' && /^[a-z][a-z\d+.-]*:\/\//i.test(value)) {
|
|
46
|
+
try {
|
|
47
|
+
const url = new URL(value)
|
|
48
|
+
if ([url.username, url.password].some((part) => {
|
|
49
|
+
try { return decodeURIComponent(part) === REDACTED } catch { return true }
|
|
50
|
+
})) return true
|
|
51
|
+
for (const [key, part] of url.searchParams) {
|
|
52
|
+
if (SECRET_KEY.test(key) && part === REDACTED) return true
|
|
53
|
+
}
|
|
54
|
+
} catch { /* Leave malformed URLs to the Host schema. */ }
|
|
55
|
+
}
|
|
56
|
+
if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.some((part) => containsRedactedCredential(part))
|
|
57
|
+
if (value && typeof value === 'object') {
|
|
58
|
+
return Object.entries(value).some(([key, part]) => containsRedactedCredential(part, key))
|
|
59
|
+
}
|
|
60
|
+
return false
|
|
61
|
+
}
|
|
62
|
+
|
|
63
|
+
function safeSettingsValue(value, field = '') {
|
|
64
|
+
// The DSH descriptor is already Host-redacted. These additional guards
|
|
65
|
+
// cover plain-text proxy URL userinfo and future nested secret-shaped fields
|
|
66
|
+
// without reintroducing a field-level *capability* allow-list.
|
|
67
|
+
if (field !== 'apiKeyEnv' && field !== 'credentialRef' && SECRET_KEY.test(field)) return REDACTED
|
|
68
|
+
if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map((item) => safeSettingsValue(item))
|
|
69
|
+
if (value && typeof value === 'object') {
|
|
70
|
+
const out = {}
|
|
71
|
+
for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value)) {
|
|
72
|
+
if (key === '__proto__' || key === 'constructor' || key === 'prototype') continue
|
|
73
|
+
out[key] = safeSettingsValue(item, key)
|
|
74
|
+
}
|
|
75
|
+
return out
|
|
76
|
+
}
|
|
77
|
+
return redactUrl(value)
|
|
78
|
+
}
|
|
61
79
|
|
|
62
80
|
function badRequest(message) {
|
|
63
81
|
return { ok: false, error: { code: 'bad-request', message, details: { issues: [] } } }
|
|
@@ -67,12 +85,12 @@ function settingsRejected(message) {
|
|
|
67
85
|
return { ok: false, error: { code: 'settings-rejected', message, details: { ns: SETTINGS_NS } } }
|
|
68
86
|
}
|
|
69
87
|
|
|
70
|
-
function project(value
|
|
88
|
+
function project(value) {
|
|
71
89
|
if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) return undefined
|
|
72
|
-
const out =
|
|
73
|
-
|
|
74
|
-
|
|
75
|
-
|
|
90
|
+
const out = safeSettingsValue(value)
|
|
91
|
+
// Permission is not a normal remote-editable field. The authenticated
|
|
92
|
+
// describe envelope already exposes enabled/disabled state explicitly.
|
|
93
|
+
delete out[REMOTE_SETTINGS_PERMISSION]
|
|
76
94
|
return out
|
|
77
95
|
}
|
|
78
96
|
|
|
@@ -112,12 +130,15 @@ function validateMutation(payload, descriptor) {
|
|
|
112
130
|
if (!Array.isArray(op.path) || op.path.length !== 1 || typeof op.path[0] !== 'string' || op.path[0] === '') return { error: 'remote settings may edit one top-level field at a time' }
|
|
113
131
|
const field = op.path[0]
|
|
114
132
|
if (field === '__proto__' || field === 'prototype' || field === 'constructor') return { error: 'unsafe settings field name' }
|
|
115
|
-
if (
|
|
133
|
+
if (field === REMOTE_SETTINGS_PERMISSION) return { error: 'Remote permission is managed by risk confirmation and local revocation' }
|
|
116
134
|
const value = descriptor && descriptor.value
|
|
117
135
|
if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value) || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(value, field)) return { error: 'unknown Vision Router settings field ' + JSON.stringify(field) }
|
|
118
136
|
if (op.op === 'set') {
|
|
119
137
|
const budgetError = remoteConfigFieldAdmissionError(field, op.value)
|
|
120
138
|
if (budgetError) return { error: budgetError }
|
|
139
|
+
if (containsRedactedCredential(op.value, field)) {
|
|
140
|
+
return { error: 'masked credentials cannot be saved; re-enter the credential value before editing this field' }
|
|
141
|
+
}
|
|
121
142
|
}
|
|
122
143
|
return { ops: [op], expectedRevision }
|
|
123
144
|
}
|
|
@@ -144,10 +165,10 @@ function conflictResult(error) {
|
|
|
144
165
|
* `acceptedRisk === true` is an acknowledgement bit for the UX flow, not an
|
|
145
166
|
* authentication/authorization credential, proof of local presence, challenge
|
|
146
167
|
* response, one-time secret, or administrator approval. Do not strengthen this
|
|
147
|
-
* endpoint into a second
|
|
148
|
-
*
|
|
149
|
-
*
|
|
150
|
-
* name
|
|
168
|
+
* endpoint into a second authentication mechanism. Security is enforced by
|
|
169
|
+
* the DSH-authenticated Connection carrier, the persisted opt-in, the Host
|
|
170
|
+
* schema and resource bounds. Sensitive stored values are redacted on reads.
|
|
171
|
+
* The historical RPC name "authorize" does not mean user authentication.
|
|
151
172
|
*/
|
|
152
173
|
export async function authorizeRemoteSettingsAfterRiskConfirmation(settings, payload, logger) {
|
|
153
174
|
if (!payload || typeof payload !== 'object' || Array.isArray(payload) || payload.acceptedRisk !== true) {
|
|
@@ -248,8 +269,23 @@ export function createVisionRouterRemoteSettingsHandler(settings, logger) {
|
|
|
248
269
|
logger?.warn?.('vision-router: remote settings mutation rejected: %s', error?.message ?? String(error))
|
|
249
270
|
return settingsRejected(error?.message ?? 'Vision Router settings write was rejected')
|
|
250
271
|
}
|
|
251
|
-
try {
|
|
252
|
-
|
|
272
|
+
try {
|
|
273
|
+
const after = namespaceDescriptor(settings)
|
|
274
|
+
const result = accessSnapshot(settings)
|
|
275
|
+
if (validated.ops[0].op === 'set' && result.enabled && after) {
|
|
276
|
+
const field = validated.ops[0].path[0]
|
|
277
|
+
const requested = validated.ops[0].value
|
|
278
|
+
const persisted = after.value?.[field]
|
|
279
|
+
// The Host may normalize values. Only echo what this caller already
|
|
280
|
+
// provided if the authoritative persisted value matches exactly.
|
|
281
|
+
if (JSON.stringify(persisted) === JSON.stringify(requested)
|
|
282
|
+
&& JSON.stringify(result.view.value[field]) !== JSON.stringify(requested)) {
|
|
283
|
+
result.view.value[field] = structuredClone(requested)
|
|
284
|
+
if (Object.hasOwn(after.user ?? {}, field)) result.view.user[field] = structuredClone(requested)
|
|
285
|
+
}
|
|
286
|
+
}
|
|
287
|
+
return { ok: true, value: result }
|
|
288
|
+
} catch { return settingsRejected('Vision Router settings changed but the refreshed view could not be read') }
|
|
253
289
|
}
|
|
254
290
|
}
|
|
255
291
|
|
|
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ export function createRemoteSettingsRiskClientBoundary(rawOptions) {
|
|
|
39
39
|
|
|
40
40
|
function riskMessage() {
|
|
41
41
|
return chineseLocale()
|
|
42
|
-
? '
|
|
43
|
-
: 'Enable remote settings?\n\nThis page is accessing DSH through a remote address. After
|
|
42
|
+
? '启用完整远程设置?\n\n当前页面通过远程地址访问 DSH。确认后,通过 DSH 登录认证且能访问该 Host 的客户端可修改完整的 Vision Router 普通配置,包括代理/网络出口、HTTP Provider、本地 Ollama / LM Studio、产物路径、仅本地视觉策略和桌面截图开关。这些修改会影响运行 DSH 的设备和图片数据流向。\n\n已保存的密钥和 URL 凭据不会以明文回显,但远程用户可以替换相应配置。远程修改桌面截图开关不会自动授予操作系统录屏权限;打开仅本地视觉之前,云端识图仍可能上传图片。\n\nDSH trustedHosts 本身不是身份认证,风险确认也不是身份认证。请只在信任 DSH 登录用户及网络访问环境时继续。\n\n确定允许远程修改完整配置吗?'
|
|
43
|
+
: 'Enable full remote settings?\n\nThis page is accessing DSH through a remote address. After confirmation, clients authenticated to DSH that can reach this Host can edit the full ordinary Vision Router configuration, including proxy/network egress, HTTP providers, local Ollama / LM Studio, artifact paths, the Local-only vision policy and the desktop-capture toggle. Changes affect the machine running DSH and where image data may be sent.\n\nSaved keys and URL credentials are not echoed in plaintext, but remote users can replace their configuration. Editing the capture toggle does not grant OS screen-recording permission. Cloud vision may still upload images until Local-only vision is enabled.\n\nDSH trustedHosts is not authentication, and this risk confirmation is not authentication. Continue only if you trust the authenticated DSH users and network access.\n\nAllow full remote configuration edits?'
|
|
44
44
|
}
|
|
45
45
|
|
|
46
46
|
function isLoopbackLocation(locationLike) {
|
|
@@ -165,6 +165,13 @@ export async function describeCacheKey(ctx, args = {}, exec, revision = 0) {
|
|
|
165
165
|
hash.update(`revision:${revision}\n`)
|
|
166
166
|
const paths = Array.isArray(args.paths) ? args.paths : []
|
|
167
167
|
const attachments = Array.isArray(args.attachmentIds) ? args.attachmentIds : []
|
|
168
|
+
// Cache hits bypass the actual tool executor, including its Session-owned
|
|
169
|
+
// attachment authorization. Until authorization can be proved at this outer
|
|
170
|
+
// boundary, never cache any upload-identity input (including the paths alias).
|
|
171
|
+
// Ordinary paths remain cacheable only after fs.resolve/readBytes succeeds.
|
|
172
|
+
if (attachments.length > 0 || paths.some((input) => /^sha256:/i.test(String(input).trim()))) {
|
|
173
|
+
return undefined
|
|
174
|
+
}
|
|
168
175
|
const fs = ctx?.get?.('fs')
|
|
169
176
|
const cwd = exec?.agent?.session?.header?.cwd
|
|
170
177
|
const signal = exec?.signal
|