dsh-vision-router 3.1.5 → 3.2.1

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Files changed (47) hide show
  1. package/README.md +6 -6
  2. package/README.zh.md +6 -6
  3. package/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +107 -0
  4. package/assets/licenses/apache-2.0.txt +202 -0
  5. package/assets/licenses/moxcms-BSD-3-Clause.txt +26 -0
  6. package/assets/licenses/roots-BSD-2-Clause.txt +24 -0
  7. package/assets/licenses/unicode-ident-Unicode-3.0.txt +39 -0
  8. package/assets/licenses/vtracer-MIT.txt +25 -0
  9. package/assets/licenses/zlib-rs-Zlib.txt +19 -0
  10. package/cordis.patch.yml +8 -15
  11. package/docs/architecture/dsh-support-window-3.1-historical.md +98 -0
  12. package/docs/architecture/dsh-support-window.md +30 -83
  13. package/docs/architecture/dvr32-host-retirement.md +194 -0
  14. package/docs/ci-archive/README.md +3 -0
  15. package/docs/ci-archive/minimum-host-settings-persistence.legacy.js +118 -0
  16. package/docs/compatibility/dsh-0.2.2-rc2-audit.md +40 -0
  17. package/docs/compliance/vtracer-alpha4-provenance.md +47 -0
  18. package/docs/compliance/vtracer-alpha4-reconstructed-Cargo.lock +567 -0
  19. package/docs/compliance/vtracer-alpha4-rust-inventory.json +421 -0
  20. package/docs/compliance/vtracer-alpha4-rust-license-texts.md +13018 -0
  21. package/docs/progressive-tools-cache.md +4 -0
  22. package/docs/releases/v3.2.0-rc.0.md +16 -0
  23. package/docs/releases/v3.2.0.md +38 -0
  24. package/docs/releases/v3.2.1.md +21 -0
  25. package/docs/remote-settings.md +83 -8
  26. package/index.js +55 -57
  27. package/lib/client.js +13 -13
  28. package/lib/core-primitives.js +69 -187
  29. package/lib/doctor-cli-p0.js +14 -1
  30. package/lib/doctor-cli.js +70 -2
  31. package/lib/doctor-runtime.js +8 -3
  32. package/lib/doctor.js +57 -1
  33. package/lib/dsh-support-window.js +80 -31
  34. package/lib/grounding-box-recovery.js +76 -0
  35. package/lib/grounding-coordinate-runtime.js +10 -0
  36. package/lib/remote-settings-bridge.js +93 -57
  37. package/lib/remote-settings-risk-client-boundary.js +2 -2
  38. package/lib/runtime-i18n.js +4 -4
  39. package/lib/settings-client-017-compat.js +4 -2
  40. package/lib/settings-ia-client-prelude.js +26 -10
  41. package/lib/trace-vtracer-worker.js +163 -0
  42. package/lib/web/dsh-settings-017-root-transport.js +52 -6
  43. package/lib/web-capability-boundary.js +6 -0
  44. package/package.json +21 -26
  45. package/presets/README.md +0 -9
  46. package/presets/web-connection-ready/index.mjs +0 -48
  47. package/presets/web-connection-ready/package.json +0 -6
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ Vision Router 默认让完整视觉工具表从会话开始就保持稳定。正
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  开启后,平时只暴露 `vision_activate`,首次需要时再挂载完整视觉工具;默认关闭时,完整视觉工具从一开始就常驻。视觉工具本身的能力不变。
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+ **重要时序约束(DSH 0.2.x):** 宿主会在模型步骤开始前冻结本批可执行工具列表。因此纯文字任务中请先单独调用 `vision_activate`,等待该次调用完成,再在**下一模型步骤**调用 `vision_describe` 等深度工具;同一批并行调用会被宿主拒绝为 `UNKNOWN_TOOL`。图片消息正常会在模型步骤前提前挂载工具。首次激活完成后,工具注册会保持到插件 Fiber 卸载,并非仅对当前会话单独挂载。
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+
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  ## English
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  Vision Router keeps the complete vision tool schema stable from the beginning of a session by default. Normal DSH bundle installs provide this composition layer:
@@ -55,3 +57,5 @@ Progressive exposure remains available as an advanced opt-in. If minimizing the
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  `progressiveTools` determines which tools are registered at plugin startup, so it is a **boot-time setting**; do not rely on changing this field through live Web settings. Restart DSH after changing the profile patch.
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  When enabled, only `vision_activate` is exposed initially and the complete vision tool set mounts on first use. With the default disabled mode, the complete vision tool set is present from the start. The vision capabilities themselves are unchanged.
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+
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+ **DSH 0.2.x step-snapshot contract:** The Host freezes the callable tool set at the start of each model step. On text-only turns, call `vision_activate` **alone**, wait for its result, and use `vision_describe` or another deep tool **in the next model step**. Batching the activation and deep-tool calls together produces Host `UNKNOWN_TOOL`. Image turns normally mount the tools before step admission. Once mounted, registration persists until the plugin Fiber is disposed; it is not scoped only to the current conversation.
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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+ # v3.2.0-rc.0 — Host and Node compatibility retirement
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+
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+ **Pre-release publication status:** This document describes the 3.2.0-rc.0 candidate. It becomes a published opt-in prerelease **only after** the protected workflow verifies the exact npm `next` tarball, immutable GitHub prerelease, assets and provenance. A branch name or source tag alone is not a published upgrade. This RC does not replace npm stable `latest`.
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+
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+ - Minimum DSH 0.2.1-rc.5 and Node.js 24.9.0; currently recommended DSH 0.2.2-rc.1.
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+ - DSH 0.1.x and 0.2.0, earlier 0.2.1 RCs and Node 22 are retired from this new DVR minor.
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+ - DSH exclusively owns Host Connection authentication, API and trustedHosts; DVR private readiness bridge removed. A minimal webServer injection-order patch remains to preserve third-party RPC routes (Windows 405 regression).
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+ - The modules/webServer ordering shim and DVR recompose guard remain until separately qualified.
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+ - Retire the conflicting anonymous-user-id and storage-domain optional peer declarations, but **retain one optional DSH LLM peer** as a legacy refusal guard: official DSH 0.2.0-rc.2 ignores `engines.dsh` and otherwise incorrectly admits this new plugin. Supported rc5/rc1 Hosts gate by `engines.dsh`. Strict pnpm installs with either RC now pass without manually adding anonymous-user-id; `sharp` stays optional.
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+ - Historic session, Settings and attachment data are not deleted; user-owned custom profile patches require separate review.
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+ - **Host historical data caveat:** DSH 0.2.1-rc.5 may reject released v0 `subagent/descriptor` version-2 records, and 0.2.2-rc.1 still rejects unnormalized legacy `permission/preset.origin` records. These are separate upstream persistence-reader issues, not DVR migration fixes. Never assert full history compatibility without a target-Host read-only migration acceptance test; do not edit live session logs.
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+ - Release workflow validation now uses Node 24.21 instead of retired Node 22. RC builds use npm `next` plus GitHub prerelease, not `latest`; unreviewed prerelease channels fail before immutable Git tagging. A green PR does not authorize a real publish.
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+ - Verified on the candidate branch: 66 GitHub CI checks succeeded (two conditionally skipped; SHA c142fcb) for DSH rc5/rc1 and three OSes; an additional manually dispatched Linux/macOS/Windows 100MP stress matrix passed on the same commit. These are engineering results, not a published release.
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+ - Existing profiles with manual Connection overrides must pass the new **`doctor --upgrade-preflight` (fail-closed on known profile blockers)** and the [read-only upgrade preflight](../architecture/dvr32-host-retirement.md#upgrade-preflight-and-safe-rollback-for-existing-profiles). This Host-retirement change itself does not rewrite user-owned profile patches, session, image or Settings stores.
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+ - Windows real-Host reload probes return the expected HTTP statuses within a 5-second bound, with isolated 1.5–2.1-second tail latencies; UI bundle switch can render an intermediate state before a subsequent read converges. Neither is evidence of a persistent 404 or permanent inverse switch.
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+ - **Opt-in release boundary:** Protected prerelease workflow and exact-commit verification are mandatory before any publication claim. Users must not auto-migrate existing Profiles or historical Session data to validate this RC. #792 screenshot root cause is still unconfirmed; upstream #806 stale-Fiber HMR remains open even though the DVR-specific 404 trigger is mitigated.
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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+ # v3.2.0 — Host and Node compatibility retirement / Host 与 Node 兼容窗口调整
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+
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+ This is the curated **stable** v3.2.0 release note. Actual publication is established only by the successful protected Release workflow, the immutable GitHub Release and the matching npm `latest` artifact; a source branch or tag alone is not a publication. / 本文是 3.2.0 正式版发布说明,是否发布成功须以受保护 Release 流水线、GitHub Release 和 npm `latest` 同一构建产物核验为准。
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+
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+ ## Compatibility / 兼容性
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+
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+ - Minimum DSH `>=0.2.1-rc.5 <0.3.0-0` and Node.js `>=24.9.0`. Validated exact Host sources include DSH 0.2.1-rc.5 and 0.2.2-rc.1. Supported version-range admission is **not** a claim that every future DSH build has been tested.
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+ - DSH 0.1.x, 0.2.0, earlier 0.2.1 RCs and Node 22 are no longer supported **by DVR 3.2**. Existing DVR 3.1.5 users can remain on their current working version while preparing the Host migration.
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+ - DSH retains ownership of Connection authorization, API and trustedHosts. DVR removes its private readiness bridge and retains only a minimal `webStartup`/`webServer` injection-order patch required for independent third-party RPC routes; fully removing that ordering patch produced a reproducible Windows HTTP 405.
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+ - One optional DSH LLM peer remains to prevent installation under old DSH 0.2.0-rc.2, which ignores `engines.dsh`. Strict pnpm dependency checks passed for both pinned supported Host lines.
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+
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+ ## Stability and release security / 稳定性与发布安全
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+
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+ - Includes visual-provider timeout and cancellation safeguards, proper fallback and model routing, progressive vision deep-tool activation, bounded grounding checks, and Windows/macOS/Linux real Host / Desktop regressions.
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+ - Release verification tests, reproducible build, exact-source cross-platform Host gates, CodeQL and HOL security passed on the candidate main commit, subject to fresh checks on the final release-only metadata commit.
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+ - The preceding v3.2.0-rc.0 publication **failed before npm**: the OIDC-only publish job had no `node_modules` while `scripts/release-channel.mjs` imported `semver`. PR #813 made the CLI dependency-free; PR #817 closed macOS/Windows path-alias silent-success risks. The preexisting `v3.2.0-rc.0` tag stays immutable and is not republished.
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+ - Stable v3.2.0 must use the protected `Release` workflow with `tag=v3.2.0` and an exact, fully checked `main` SHA. The workflow maps stable versions to npm `latest`, verifies the tarball against the pre-tag candidate, signs/checks provenance, then publishes the GitHub Release with matching assets. Never publish manually to bypass these gates.
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+
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+ ## Upgrading an existing installation / 已有安装升级
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+
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+ 1. Confirm Node >=24.9.0 and the actual DSH Host version meets the new floor. Prefer an exact-tested Host; do not assume untested 0.2.x releases have equivalent behavior.
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+ 2. Run the **read-only** `doctor --upgrade-preflight` before upgrading. It rejects known legacy Connection overlays, private readiness bridges, floating GitHub-version references and older Node; a pass does **not** guarantee complete historical data compatibility.
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+ 3. Back up profile, Settings, image/attachment state and historical Session records; separately read-validate the copied records with the **target** DSH Host before changing a working profile. User-owned custom patches require manual review. Do not edit or normalize the live Session event log.
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+ 4. Keep the prior known-good DVR 3.1.5 / Host environment available for rollback if real startup, Vision, Desktop reload, or data restoration fails. No automatic profile or Session migration/deletion is performed by this release.
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+
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+ ## Known boundaries / 已知边界
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+
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+ - Older DSH persistence formats, including released v0 `permission/preset.origin` and older `subagent/descriptor` records, can fail in particular Host readers. This is an upstream Host migration issue, not a DVR-owned session rewrite. Do not promise a universally lossless upgrade.
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+ - The separate upstream DSH stale-Fiber/HMR defect remains open; the DVR-specific reload/404 trigger is mitigated, not the entire Host lifecycle issue. The original reported Windows raw JS/CSS screenshot and certain user-field failures have not been conclusively attributed to DVR.
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+ - Non-loopback network, reverse proxy, untested custom profiles and future DSH releases are not universally certified by loopback CI. The default cloud Vision fallback sends image content to remote providers unless strictly local-only is configured.
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+
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+ ## 发布说明摘要(中文)
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+
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+ - **支持范围**:DSH >=0.2.1-rc.5、Node >=24.9;3.2 不再支持旧 DSH、Node 22,原先正常工作的 3.1.5 可暂不升级。
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+ - **核心调整**:Connection 权限归还 DSH,保留保障其他插件 RPC 的必要顺序补丁,延续视觉链稳定性、深度工具和跨平台回归保护。
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+ - **升级原则**:先运行只读升级预检、备份旧配置与会话、针对目标 Host 单独验收、保留回滚;不自动改写历史数据。
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+ - **上游已知问题**:历史 Session 读取、HMR/Fiber 等不宣称已由本插件全部修复。
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+ - **发布校验**:直接走修复后的受保护稳定版 Release 工作流,检查 npm `latest`、GitHub Release、包哈希及来源证明的一致性。
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+ # v3.2.1 — Settings recovery, VTracer and RC2 Host qualification / 设置恢复、VTracer 与 RC2 兼容验收
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+
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+ **Status / 状态:** This is the curated stable v3.2.1 **release candidate note**. A successful protected Release workflow, GitHub Release, npm `latest` and matching package/provenance are necessary before it may be called published. / 本文是 v3.2.1 正式候选发布说明;实际发布必须以受保护 Release 工作流、GitHub Release、npm `latest` 和一致的包体及来源证明为准。
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+
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+ ## Since v3.2.0 / 相对 v3.2.0 的变化
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+
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+ - **Settings bridge recovery (#823, #828):** Unify the opt-in local/authorized remote configuration path, eliminate conflicting compatibility-script ordering, and mount the native provider settings bridge through the correct Host lifecycle. Reinforce authentication, redaction, permission boundaries and Settings save/readback/reload regression coverage. / 统一本地及经授权的远程设置通道,修复兼容脚本加载顺序和原生设置服务挂载时序,补齐认证、脱敏、权限和设置保存/回读/重载验证。
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+ - **SVG trace backend (#829):** Replace `potrace → jimp → @jimp/core` with pinned `@visioncortex/vtracer@1.0.0-alpha.4` WASM in an isolated Worker. Preserve the public `vision_trace` entry point while improving dependency/license provenance checks and image-quality test coverage. The trace renderer changes, so SVG path geometry and output may differ from v3.2.0. / 将 SVG 追踪依赖从 Potrace/Jimp 换为固定版本的 VTracer WASM Worker;保留公开工具入口,强化依赖许可与输出质量测试。生成的 SVG 路径形状可能与旧版不同。
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+ - **Exact DSH 0.2.2-rc.2 acceptance (#830):** Pin official upstream source SHA and verify Session atomic-batch per-event semantics, route ownership, three-OS Host contracts, Chromium Settings and paste flows, macOS and Windows real Desktop, candidate tarball installation, and separately diagnose immutable published 3.2.0 on the real RC2 CLI/Web Host. / 固定 RC2 上游精确提交,对批量事件、路由、三端、真实浏览器/桌面、候选安装包及历史 npm 包做独立验收。
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+ - **CI supply-chain maintenance (#824, #825):** Upgrade pinned CodeQL SARIF uploader and pnpm/action-setup; cover all 30 relevant workflows including the new RC2 gate. / 更新 CodeQL 与 pnpm Actions 固定 SHA,覆盖全部相关工作流。
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+
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+ ## Compatibility and safe upgrade / 兼容边界与安全升级
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+
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+ - **No support-floor relaxation:** DSH `>=0.2.1-rc.5 <0.3.0-0` and Node.js `>=24.9.0` remain required. DSH `0.2.1-rc.3` and `0.2.0-rc.2` are **not** compatible with DVR 3.2.x; do not bypass the Host's engine admission checks. / 最低要求不变,较旧 DSH 版本明确不支持,不建议越过安装器的兼容检查。
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+ - Run the read-only `doctor --upgrade-preflight`, back up your current DSH profile, Settings, attachments and important historical Session records, and preserve a known-good rollback path. DVR does not automatically rewrite or delete Host-owned history. / 升级前只读预检、备份、核验重要会话并保留回滚;插件不自动清理或改写 Host 数据。
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+ - Official real Host/CLI/Web and macOS/Windows Desktop gates were run on supported exact source lines. **Third-party Dataelem Desktop's generation installer remains a separate path**: removing the Jimp chain addresses the identified dependency closure trigger but is **not evidence of a successful installation of the new npm release in that installer**. Its upstream issue and fix review remain independent. / 官方安装和第三方代际安装器须分开评价;移除 Jimp 是源码层解决已知依赖链,不代表第三方安装路径已获实测认证。
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+ - No change to the default cloud-vision image egress: the anonymous fallback can transmit image content to a remote provider unless strict local-only mode is selected. / 默认云端视觉链仍可能将图片传给第三方;涉敏内容应启用严格纯本地配置。
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+ ## Release integrity / 发布完整性
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+
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+ The final candidate must pass fresh main-commit CI and the protected workflow's frozen-lockfile install, build, lint, typecheck, tests, reproducible build, exact published file inventory, SHA/signing/provenance and npm `latest` versus GitHub Release cross-check. Never infer publication merely from this document or a Git tag. / 最终提交须重新通过 CI 与受保护发布门禁,对 npm 与 GitHub 的同一包体、哈希和来源证明作交叉核验。
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- # Remote Vision Router settings
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+ # Vision Router settings: one configuration, two Host transports
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- Vision Router uses a dedicated DSH Connection RPC channel at `/vision-router-settings/*` because the global DSH settings/credentials plane is intentionally loopback-only.
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+ Vision Router has **one** Host-owned `vision-router` configuration namespace and
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+ one schema, revision check and persistence authority. It needs two transport
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+ adapters for historical DSH browser APIs, **not two different sets of editable
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+ configuration fields**:
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- Remote editing is off by default. When a Vision Router settings page is opened through a DSH trusted host while the permission is still disabled, the page shows an explicit risk confirmation. Cancelling leaves remote editing disabled and writes nothing. Confirming enables only `allowRemoteSettings`, then reloads the scoped Vision Router settings immediately. The same permission can still be enabled or revoked from the loopback settings page.
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+ - **Local Web / official Desktop:** `settingsScope` when supported, otherwise
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+ the local ConfigEditor-backed `/_dsh/vision-router/local-settings` bridge.
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+ The latter is strictly local-only and checks both transport provenance and
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+ the Host's authenticated browser-session rejection result before any read or
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+ write. No user-facing remote risk prompt is needed.
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+ - **Remote Web:** `/vision-router-settings/*` over DSH Connection RPC.
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+ The authenticated Host carrier is mandatory, and the first disabled
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+ `describe` triggers the user's explicit risk notice. Accepting persists
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+ `allowRemoteSettings=true` in the Host profile and immediately refreshes
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+ the settings. Once enabled, ordinary DVR configuration fields have the same
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+ editability as on the local page.
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- DSH `trustedHosts` protects the browser carrier against Host/Origin/DNS-rebinding attacks; it is **not user authentication**. Enable remote editing only when you trust the clients that can reach the DSH instance. Ordinary remote mutations remain restricted to the explicit Vision Router allow-list. Credential-bearing HTTP providers, local Ollama/LM Studio configuration, artifact paths and every other field not present in that allow-list stay unavailable remotely. `allowRemoteSettings` itself is not added to the ordinary mutation allow-list: it can be enabled only through the explicit risk-confirmation flow (or from the loopback settings page).
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+ The remote transport does **not** maintain a separate capability allow-list for
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+ ordinary configuration. Network and proxy overrides, local Ollama / LM Studio
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+ definitions, HTTP provider settings, route names, desktop screenshot preference
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+ and the `localOnlyVision` privacy switch use the same Host schema and
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+ authoritative revisioned mutation path after the acknowledgement. The local-only
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+ privacy switch is visible remotely, so take special care when changing it:
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+ disabling it can permit image traffic to cloud vision providers. A remote change
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+ does not itself grant operating-system screen-recording permission.
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- The transport contract differs across supported DSH generations without changing that security model. On the rc.8 Connection contract, Vision Router registers the dedicated channel with the required per-channel `{ authority: 'trusted-host' }` option. Newer Connection contracts expose the carrier-level `requestRejection()` / BrowserAuth fence and `rpc.handle()` no longer accepts a channel authority option; Vision Router feature-detects that carrier and registers with the modern two-argument form. The remote field allow-list and `allowRemoteSettings` gate remain authoritative in both cases.
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+ `allowRemoteSettings` itself is **not** an ordinary remote mutation: it is
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+ enabled by the risk-confirmation flow and can be revoked from the local settings
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+ page. It remains opt-in and off by default. Revocation takes effect on the
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+ next RPC request; it does not erase the prior acknowledgement from history.
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+ The acknowledgement is a UX safeguard, **not authentication or proof of local
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+ presence**. DSH `trustedHosts` alone is likewise *not* authentication.
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+ Browser-session authentication, Host/Origin policy, and the Connection RPC
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+ contract are the actual access controls.
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- If DSH is behind Nginx, Caddy or another reverse proxy, forward `/vision-router-settings/*` to the same DSH origin in addition to the normal DSH routes. The UI detects a 404 on this channel and shows this requirement directly.
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+ ## Sensitive information and remaining local capabilities
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- **Reverse-proxy security:** Follow the [upstream DSH public deployment contract](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/d743267388641bc76f17c45ce8b4c231aed1d32c/docs/user/guide/public-deployments.md): preserve the **browser-facing `Host`** on proxy requests; do **not** rewrite it to `localhost` or `127.0.0.1` when forwarding remote traffic to a loopback DSH listener. DSH Host/Origin checks and its signed browser session authenticate accepted requests, but do **not** attest that a user is physically local. Vision Router grants local-only diagnostics, permission changes and self-update tokens only to requests classified as local. It conservatively treats loopback TCP requests carrying `Forwarded`, `X-Forwarded-*`, `X-Real-IP`, `Via` or common client-IP proxy headers as **remote for local-only actions**, regardless of an apparent localhost `Host`.
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+ Settings descriptions are requested from DSH with
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+ `describe({ redactSecrets: true })`. The remote view additionally masks
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+ secret-shaped properties and URL username/password and secret query parameters
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+ (e.g., in a proxy URL). API-key environment names such as `apiKeyEnv` are
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+ references, not actual credential values. A just-submitted secret-bearing field
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+ may be echoed **only** in that caller's successful, exact-value write response
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+ to support readback; subsequent reads remain redacted. If editing a URL
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+ containing masked username/password or secret query parameters, re-enter
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+ those values first: the server rejects saving a redaction placeholder rather
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+ than silently replacing the real credential. Never treat the complete
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+ settings view as a credential-export endpoint.
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- **Limit:** Forwarding headers can be absent, stripped or forged; they are only negative evidence, **never positive proof of physical-local origin**. An untrusted proxy that rewrites the browser `Host` to localhost and strips all forwarding evidence is indistinguishable from a genuine local browser using the current DSH Host request contract. Do not expose such a topology. Restrict upstream listener access, preserve external `Host`, configure DSH `trustedHosts` explicitly, and keep local-only actions on a direct trusted loopback UI. The broader local-presence attestation gap remains tracked in [Issue #680](https://github.com/ysr666/dsh-vision-router/issues/680).
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+ A full settings editor **does not** grant access to separate Host capabilities
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+ such as reading/opening log files, plugin self-update, local connection probes,
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+ local diagnostic mutation endpoints, local file access, or OS permission
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+ prompts. Those routes retain independent server-side local-only restrictions.
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+ The `/_dsh/vision-router/local-settings` compatibility endpoint is not an
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+ alternate remote route and must never be forwarded for external use.
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+
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+ ## DSH transport compatibility and proxy security
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+
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+ Legacy DSH Connection RPC requires the explicit
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+ `{ authority: 'trusted-host' }` registration option; modern DSH uses
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+ `connection.requestRejection()` and Host-owned BrowserAuth/Origin checks with
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+ a two-argument `rpc.handle()`. DVR feature-detects this semantic contract.
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+ Neither case exposes unauthenticated remote configuration.
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+
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+ If using Nginx/Caddy, forward `/vision-router-settings/*` to the same DSH origin
68
+ as the rest of the app. A 404 on this channel means the proxy or plugin runtime
69
+ has not registered/forwarded that route, **not** that the risk prompt needs to be
70
+ clicked again.
71
+
72
+ Follow the [official DSH reverse proxy deployment contract](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/d743267388641bc76f17c45ce8b4c231aed1d32c/docs/user/guide/public-deployments.md):
73
+ preserve the browser-facing `Host`, explicitly configure trusted hosts, and
74
+ use HTTPS. The Host's signed browser session authenticates accepted requests
75
+ but cannot prove a user is physically present at the machine. A reverse proxy
76
+ that changes the Host to localhost and removes all forwarding provenance can
77
+ defeat software-only local-presence inference; do not expose that topology.
78
+ See [Issue #680](https://github.com/ysr666/dsh-vision-router/issues/680).
79
+
80
+ ## Regression coverage
81
+
82
+ The settings contract tests cover both compatibility-wrapper load orders
83
+ (Issue #822), local ConfigEditor read/write/reconciliation, request-origin and
84
+ BrowserAuth rejection, remote permission-disabled and consented flows, live
85
+ permission revocation, full configuration admission, prototype/resource guards,
86
+ secret redaction, and independent local-only system operations.
87
+
88
+ Historical release and architecture notes describing a remote field allow-list
89
+ document the behavior **at the time of those releases**; this document describes
90
+ the updated behavior after the unified-settings change.
package/index.js CHANGED
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ import {
151
151
  import { currentVisionExecutionOrder } from './lib/vision-execution-order.js'
152
152
  import { applyVisionExecutionOrder } from './lib/vision-execution-order-apply.js'
153
153
  import { currentVisionTurnBudgetSignal } from './lib/turn-budget-context.js'
154
+ import { parseGroundingBoxResponse, assessGroundingBox } from './lib/grounding-box-recovery.js'
154
155
  import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'
155
156
  import {
156
157
  normalizeStructuredBootstrapResult,
@@ -314,10 +315,10 @@ export const Config = z.object({
314
315
  ocrEngine: z.union(['auto', 'tesseract', 'vision']).default('auto'),
315
316
  proxy: z.string().default(''),
316
317
  proxyHosts: z.array(z.string()).default([...DEFAULT_PROXY_HOSTS]),
317
- // Remote browsers are intentionally unable to use DSH's broad settings.*
318
- // plane. This narrow Vision Router bridge is opt-in and still uses DSH's
319
- // trusted-host transport fence. Only a loopback/local settings page may
320
- // change this permission; the remote bridge rejects writes to the field.
318
+ // DSH versions expose different browser Settings transports. DVR's remote
319
+ // RPC is opt-in, but once acknowledged it edits the same Host-owned config
320
+ // namespace and schema as the local browser. The permission itself is
321
+ // managed by risk confirmation or local revocation, not ordinary remote writes.
321
322
  allowRemoteSettings: z.boolean().default(false),
322
323
  // Privacy policy switch: when enabled, Vision Router executes image-model
323
324
  // requests only against loopback visual endpoints (Ollama, LM Studio, or
@@ -3906,60 +3907,52 @@ ctx.logger?.info(
3906
3907
  const { bytes, mediaType } = await readImageBytes(exec, args.image)
3907
3908
  const { width, height } = await imageDims(bytes)
3908
3909
  if (width <= 0 || height <= 0) throw new Error('vision_ground: could not read image dimensions')
3910
+ const target = String(args.target).slice(0, 500)
3911
+ // Internal-only frame metadata comes from the trusted framing runtime,
3912
+ // not the user's tool schema. The model sees exact content bounds.
3913
+ const content = args.__dvrGroundingContentRect
3914
+ const frameHint = content &&
3915
+ [content.x1, content.y1, content.x2, content.y2].every(Number.isInteger)
3916
+ ? `The supplied image is a letterboxed ${width}x${height} frame with BLACK padding. ` +
3917
+ `Only x=[${content.x1},${content.x2}] and y=[${content.y1},${content.y2}] contain image pixels. ` +
3918
+ 'Never return a box in the source image dimensions or black padding. '
3919
+ : ''
3909
3920
  const instruction =
3910
- `Target to locate: "${String(args.target).slice(0, 500)}". ` +
3911
- `The image is ${width}x${height} pixels. Return ONE JSON object with integer fields ` +
3921
+ `Target to locate: "${target}". ` +
3922
+ `The image is ${width}x${height} pixels. ` + frameHint +
3923
+ `Return ONE JSON object with integer fields ` +
3912
3924
  `{"x1":...,"y1":...,"x2":...,"y2":...} — the tight bounding box of that target in ` +
3913
- `ORIGINAL image pixels (0 <= x1 < x2 <= ${width}, 0 <= y1 < y2 <= ${height}). ` +
3925
+ `the pixels of the image you received (0 <= x1 < x2 <= ${width}, 0 <= y1 < y2 <= ${height}). ` +
3914
3926
  `Output only the JSON object.`
3915
3927
  const vision = await answerVisionForTool(exec, bytes, mediaType, instruction)
3916
3928
  if (vision.ok === false) return JSON.stringify(vision)
3917
- const text = vision.text
3918
- const parsed = extractJson(text)
3919
- const box = parsed !== undefined ? parseBox(parsed) : undefined
3920
- if (box === undefined) {
3921
- throw new Error(`vision_ground: the vision model did not return a valid box. Raw output: ${text.slice(0, 500)}`)
3922
- }
3923
- let clamped = {
3924
- x1: Math.max(0, Math.min(box.x1, width - 1)),
3925
- y1: Math.max(0, Math.min(box.y1, height - 1)),
3926
- x2: Math.max(1, Math.min(box.x2, width)),
3927
- y2: Math.max(1, Math.min(box.y2, height)),
3928
- }
3929
- if (clamped.x2 - clamped.x1 < 2 || clamped.y2 - clamped.y1 < 2) {
3930
- // Some vision models answer with a degenerate sliver (e.g. 1px wide)
3931
- // instead of the target's box. Demand the full box once more before
3932
- // giving up.
3929
+ let assessment = assessGroundingBox(
3930
+ parseGroundingBoxResponse(vision.text), width, height, content,
3931
+ )
3932
+ if (!assessment.ok) {
3933
+ // A single correction only, including near-JSON, degenerate, and
3934
+ // wrong coordinate-space outputs. Both calls share the existing
3935
+ // turn-scoped signal/budget, provider policy, and abort behavior.
3933
3936
  const retry = await answerVisionForTool(
3934
- exec,
3935
- bytes,
3936
- mediaType,
3937
- `Your previous box ${JSON.stringify(clamped)} was a degenerate sliver, not the target. ` +
3938
- `Return ONE JSON object with the FULL tight bounding box of the target in ORIGINAL ` +
3939
- `image pixels (0 <= x1 < x2 <= ${width}, 0 <= y1 < y2 <= ${height}). Output only the JSON object.`,
3937
+ exec, bytes, mediaType,
3938
+ `Your preceding answer was invalid (${assessment.reason}). ` +
3939
+ `Locate the same target: "${target}". ` + frameHint +
3940
+ `Return one strictly valid JSON object with integer x1,y1,x2,y2 ` +
3941
+ `inside the received ${width}x${height} frame, without black padding. ` +
3942
+ 'Do not reuse the previous coordinates unless verified against the image. No prose.',
3940
3943
  )
3941
3944
  if (retry.ok === false) return JSON.stringify(retry)
3942
- const retryParsed = extractJson(retry.text)
3943
- const retryBox = retryParsed !== undefined ? parseBox(retryParsed) : undefined
3944
- if (retryBox === undefined) {
3945
- throw new Error(
3946
- `vision_ground: the vision model returned a degenerate box (${clamped.x1},${clamped.y1},${clamped.x2},${clamped.y2}) ` +
3947
- `and the retry returned no valid box. Raw output: ${retry.text.slice(0, 500)}`,
3948
- )
3949
- }
3950
- clamped = {
3951
- x1: Math.max(0, Math.min(retryBox.x1, width - 1)),
3952
- y1: Math.max(0, Math.min(retryBox.y1, height - 1)),
3953
- x2: Math.max(1, Math.min(retryBox.x2, width)),
3954
- y2: Math.max(1, Math.min(retryBox.y2, height)),
3955
- }
3956
- if (clamped.x2 - clamped.x1 < 2 || clamped.y2 - clamped.y1 < 2) {
3945
+ assessment = assessGroundingBox(
3946
+ parseGroundingBoxResponse(retry.text), width, height, content,
3947
+ )
3948
+ if (!assessment.ok) {
3957
3949
  throw new Error(
3958
- `vision_ground: the vision model returned only degenerate boxes for a ${width}x${height} image. ` +
3959
- `Last raw output: ${retry.text.slice(0, 500)}`,
3950
+ `vision_ground: no valid bounding box after one correction (${assessment.reason}). ` +
3951
+ `Last model output: ${String(retry.text).slice(0, 500)}`,
3960
3952
  )
3961
3953
  }
3962
3954
  }
3955
+ const clamped = assessment.box
3963
3956
  const result = { ...clamped, width, height }
3964
3957
  if (args.annotate !== false) {
3965
3958
  const annotated = await annotateBoxBuffer(bytes, clamped)
@@ -4727,8 +4720,8 @@ ctx.logger?.info(
4727
4720
  deepToolDefs.push({
4728
4721
  name: 'vision_trace',
4729
4722
  description:
4730
- 'Vectorize an image (icon/logo) into an SVG via a local potrace pipeline (no Python). ' +
4731
- 'Default: COLOR-preserving vectorization — one path per dominant color with fill="#rrggbb". ' +
4723
+ 'Vectorize an image (icon/logo) into an SVG via a local VTracer/WASM worker (no Python). ' +
4724
+ 'Default: color-preserving vectorization with a limited color palette. ' +
4732
4725
  'Set color=false for the layered grayscale posterization, where `steps` (1-16, default 4) ' +
4733
4726
  'controls levels. Writes the SVG as an artifact.',
4734
4727
  parameters: {
@@ -4768,16 +4761,21 @@ ctx.logger?.info(
4768
4761
  const colors = Number.isInteger(args.colors) && args.colors > 0 ? Math.min(args.colors, 16) : 8
4769
4762
  const raw = await sharp(traceBytes, { failOn: 'none' }).ensureAlpha().raw().toBuffer({ resolveWithObject: true })
4770
4763
  throwIfVisionTaskAborted(taskSignal)
4771
- const palette = quantizeColors(raw.data, colors)
4772
- colorCount = palette.length
4773
- svg = await posterizeSvgColor(raw.data, raw.info, palette, timeoutMs(), { signal: taskSignal })
4764
+ // User-facing colors is a strict maximum, not an exact
4765
+ // palette. VTracer chooses the colors for better gradient/alpha
4766
+ // fidelity; explicit palette callers use the separate array form.
4767
+ svg = await posterizeSvgColor(raw.data, raw.info, colors, timeoutMs(), { signal: taskSignal })
4768
+ colorCount = Math.min(colors, new Set(
4769
+ [...svg.matchAll(/<path\b[^>]*\bfill="(#[0-9a-fA-F]{6})"/g)]
4770
+ .map((match) => match[1].toLowerCase()),
4771
+ ).size)
4774
4772
  } else {
4775
4773
  svg = await posterizeSvg(traceBytes, steps, 'dominant', timeoutMs(), { signal: taskSignal })
4776
4774
  }
4777
4775
  } catch (error) {
4778
4776
  throwIfVisionTaskAborted(taskSignal, error)
4779
4777
  throw new Error(
4780
- `vision_trace: potrace failed (${error && error.message ? error.message : String(error)})`,
4778
+ `vision_trace: vectorization failed (${error && error.message ? error.message : String(error)})`,
4781
4779
  )
4782
4780
  }
4783
4781
  throwIfVisionTaskAborted(taskSignal)
@@ -4948,7 +4946,7 @@ ctx.logger?.info(
4948
4946
  let deepActive = false
4949
4947
  const deepDisposers = []
4950
4948
  activateDeepTools = () => {
4951
- if (deepActive) return '视觉深看工具已在挂载状态。'
4949
+ if (deepActive) return '视觉深看工具已在挂载状态。请在下一模型步骤调用深度工具,不要与 vision_activate 同批并行调用。'
4952
4950
  deepActive = true
4953
4951
  try {
4954
4952
  for (const def of deepToolDefs) {
@@ -4997,7 +4995,7 @@ ctx.logger?.info(
4997
4995
  '视觉深看工具已挂载:vision_bootstrap(结构化预识别)、vision_describe(看图问答)、vision_ground(像素定位)、vision_detect(元素清单)、' +
4998
4996
  'vision_materialize(附件落盘)、vision_crop(裁剪放大)、vision_pixel_diff(像素对比验证)、vision_colors(取色)、' +
4999
4997
  'vision_ocr(文字识别)、vision_trace(SVG 矢量化)、vision_extract_foreground(抠图)、' +
5000
- 'vision_html_screenshot(页面截图)。现在可以直接调用已启用的工具。' +
4998
+ 'vision_html_screenshot(页面截图)。本次激活调用结束后,下一模型步骤才可调用深度工具;不要在同一批并行工具调用中同时请求 vision_activate 和 vision_describe 等深度工具。' +
5001
4999
  '注意:vision_ocr 只用于读取图片文字;视觉工具返回 ok:false 后端不可用结果时,不要改问法重复调用,继续文本任务。'
5002
5000
  )
5003
5001
  }
@@ -5024,7 +5022,7 @@ ctx.logger?.info(
5024
5022
  description:
5025
5023
  'Mount the deep vision tools (vision_bootstrap / vision_describe / vision_ground / vision_detect / vision_materialize / vision_crop / ' +
5026
5024
  'vision_pixel_diff / vision_colors / vision_ocr / vision_trace / ' +
5027
- 'vision_extract_foreground / vision_present / vision_html_screenshot) for this session. Desktop screenshot remains disabled until the user explicitly opts in through Vision Router settings. They mount ' +
5025
+ 'vision_extract_foreground / vision_present / vision_html_screenshot) for subsequent model steps. Do not call any deep vision tool in the same parallel tool batch as vision_activate: DSH freezes the callable tool set before executing that batch. Desktop screenshot remains disabled until the user explicitly opts in through Vision Router settings. They mount ' +
5028
5026
  'automatically on image turns; call this only when you need them on a text-only turn.',
5029
5027
  parameters: { type: 'object', properties: {}, additionalProperties: false },
5030
5028
  output: stringOutput,
@@ -5052,8 +5050,8 @@ ctx.logger?.info(
5052
5050
  '# 视觉深看工具(vision-tools)\n\n' +
5053
5051
  '当任务需要像素级视觉操作——照着图写 UI、定位元素、裁剪放大细看、像素对比验证还原结果、' +
5054
5052
  '提取配色、识别图中文字、矢量化图标、抠图、把生成图片安全展示给用户或给页面截图——时使用本套工具。' +
5055
- '图片消息会自动挂载它们;纯文字任务需要时可调用 `vision_activate`(只需一次)。\n' +
5056
- 'Use these tools for pixel-level vision work. They auto-mount on image turns; on text-only turns call `vision_activate` once if needed. When structured bootstrap is enabled, call `vision_bootstrap` first, then MUST call at least 1 evidence/deepening vision tool before answering; after that use more tools as needed.\n\n' +
5053
+ '图片消息会自动挂载它们;纯文字任务需要时先单独调用 `vision_activate`,等待这一批调用结束,下一模型步骤再调用深看工具;不可同批并行调用。\n' +
5054
+ 'Use these tools for pixel-level vision work. They auto-mount on image turns. On text-only turns, call `vision_activate` alone, wait for its result, then use deep tools in a subsequent model step; never batch activation and deep-tool calls together. When structured bootstrap is enabled, call `vision_bootstrap` first, then MUST call at least 1 evidence/deepening vision tool before answering; after that use more tools as needed.\n\n' +
5057
5055
  '1. 定位与细看:`vision_ground` 定位 → `vision_crop` 裁剪放大 → `vision_describe` 细看;盘点页面元素用 `vision_detect`(编号清单+框,可引用“元素 #n”);\n' +
5058
5056
  '2. 还原验证循环(本插件招牌流程):参考图 → 实现 → `vision_html_screenshot` 截图 → `vision_pixel_diff` 度量差异 → 修复 → 再截图,迭代到差异收敛(0% 是常见终点);长页面用 `fullPage: true` 一次截整页并拿到 `pageHeight`;\n' +
5059
5057
  '3. 其余按需取用:配色用 `vision_colors`,文字用 `vision_ocr`,图标矢量化用 `vision_trace`,纯色背景抠图用 `vision_extract_foreground`,本地 HTML 截图用 `vision_html_screenshot`(长页面加 `fullPage: true` 截整页);\n' +
package/lib/client.js CHANGED
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ openLogFolder,
199
199
  remoteSettingsInitializingTitle: '远程设置正在初始化',
200
200
  remoteSettingsInitializingBody: 'Vision Router 设置命名空间尚未就绪,页面会自动重试。',
201
201
  remoteSettingsProxyBody: '远程设置路由返回 404。若使用 Nginx/Caddy/其他反向代理,请同时转发 /vision-router-settings/* 到 DSH。',
202
- remoteSafeScopeHint: '远程页面只允许修改低风险偏好;网络、凭据、本地后端、产物目录、桌面截图和宿主路由等设置只能在 DSH 本机修改。',
202
+ remoteSafeScopeHint: '远程页面已启用完整配置,设置仍由 DSH Host 校验和持久保存。',
203
203
  settingsConflict: '设置已被另一端修改。已刷新最新配置,请确认你的修改后重新保存。',
204
204
  overridden: '已覆盖',
205
205
  reset: '恢复默认',
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ openLogFolder,
312
312
  proxyLabel: '视觉专用代理覆盖',
313
313
  proxyHint: '留空即沿用 DSH/Host 网络路径。仅需单独覆盖视觉请求时填写,如 http://127.0.0.1:10808 或 socks5://127.0.0.1:10808;兼容旧配置 socks5h://。修改即时生效。',
314
314
  allowRemoteSettingsLabel: '允许可信 Host 远程修改设置',
315
- allowRemoteSettingsHint: '默认关闭。仅在你信任能访问该 DSH 实例的客户端时开启;trustedHosts 不是身份认证。远程端仅能修改明确列入白名单的低风险偏好,网络、凭据、本地后端、产物目录、桌面截图和宿主路由始终只能在本机修改。',
315
+ allowRemoteSettingsHint: '默认关闭。仅在你信任能访问该 DSH 实例的客户端时开启;trustedHosts 不是身份认证。首次确认后,经过 DSH 认证的远程浏览器也可修改完整的 Vision Router 配置;已保存的凭据不会以明文回显。',
316
316
  proxyHostsLabel: '视觉代理覆盖域名(每行一个)',
317
317
  proxyHostsHint: '仅在上方填写视觉专用代理时生效;这些域名使用插件覆盖,其余请求继续沿用 DSH/Host 网络路径。留空清除覆盖。',
318
318
  saveFailed: '保存失败:部分配置未写入。未写入的修改已保留,请重试。',
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ openLogFolder,
485
485
  remoteSettingsInitializingTitle: 'Remote settings are initializing',
486
486
  remoteSettingsInitializingBody: 'The Vision Router settings namespace is not ready yet. This page will retry automatically.',
487
487
  remoteSettingsProxyBody: 'The remote-settings route returned 404. If DSH is behind Nginx, Caddy, or another reverse proxy, also forward /vision-router-settings/* to DSH.',
488
- remoteSafeScopeHint: 'Remote pages can change low-risk preferences only. Network, credentials, local backends, artifact paths, desktop capture, and host routing remain loopback-only.',
488
+ remoteSafeScopeHint: 'Remote settings are enabled for this authenticated DSH browser. Changes use the same Host settings schema and persistence as local settings.',
489
489
  settingsConflict: 'Settings changed on another client. The latest values were refreshed; review your draft and save again.',
490
490
  overridden: 'Overridden',
491
491
  reset: 'Reset',
@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ openLogFolder,
598
598
  proxyLabel: 'Vision-only proxy override',
599
599
  proxyHint: 'Leave empty to follow the DSH/Host network path. Set only to override vision requests, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:10808 or socks5://127.0.0.1:10808; legacy socks5h:// values are supported. Applies immediately.',
600
600
  allowRemoteSettingsLabel: 'Allow trusted-host remote settings',
601
- allowRemoteSettingsHint: 'Off by default. Enable only when you trust clients that can reach this DSH instance; trustedHosts is not authentication. Remote clients can change only explicitly allow-listed low-risk preferences; network, credentials, local backends, artifact paths, desktop capture, and host routing remain loopback-only.',
601
+ allowRemoteSettingsHint: 'Off by default. Enable only when you trust clients that can reach this DSH instance; trustedHosts is not authentication. After a one-time confirmation, DSH-authenticated remote browsers can edit the full Vision Router configuration; stored credentials are not echoed as plaintext.',
602
602
  proxyHostsLabel: 'Vision proxy override hosts (one per line)',
603
603
  proxyHostsHint: 'Used only when the vision-only proxy override above is set. These hosts use the plugin override; all other requests keep the DSH/Host network path. Empty clears the override.',
604
604
  saveFailed: 'Save failed: some changes were not written. Unwritten changes were kept; please retry.',
@@ -4234,7 +4234,7 @@ openLogFolder,
4234
4234
  depthCapField(),
4235
4235
  // Local vision is a primary capability. Keep the heavy editors
4236
4236
  // collapsed by default, but make the entry obvious at a glance.
4237
- !remoteMode ? h('div', {
4237
+ h('div', {
4238
4238
  className: 'vr-group vr-local-group' + (showLocalVision ? ' vr-local-group-open' : ''),
4239
4239
  },
4240
4240
  h('button', {
@@ -4253,8 +4253,8 @@ openLogFolder,
4253
4253
  localLmStudioEditor(),
4254
4254
  )
4255
4255
  : null,
4256
- ) : null,
4257
- !remoteMode ? toggleField('desktopScreenshot') : null,
4256
+ ),
4257
+ toggleField('desktopScreenshot'),
4258
4258
  h('p', { className: 'vr-hint' }, t('defaultChainNote')),
4259
4259
  visionCaps.status === 'loading'
4260
4260
  ? h('p', { className: 'vr-hint' }, t('visionCapsLoading'))
@@ -4335,18 +4335,18 @@ openLogFolder,
4335
4335
  h('p', { className: 'vr-group-title' }, t('groupCost')),
4336
4336
  COST_TOGGLE_KEYS.map((key) => toggleField(key)),
4337
4337
  ),
4338
- !remoteMode ? h('div', { className: 'vr-group' },
4338
+ h('div', { className: 'vr-group' },
4339
4339
  h('p', { className: 'vr-group-title' }, t('groupNetwork')),
4340
4340
  h('p', { className: 'vr-hint' }, t('networkAuthorityHint')),
4341
- toggleField('allowRemoteSettings'),
4341
+ !remoteMode ? toggleField('allowRemoteSettings') : null,
4342
4342
  textField('proxy', t('proxyLabel'), t('proxyHint'), false),
4343
4343
  textField('proxyHosts', t('proxyHostsLabel'), t('proxyHostsHint'), true),
4344
- ) : null,
4344
+ ),
4345
4345
  h('div', { className: 'vr-group' },
4346
4346
  h('p', { className: 'vr-group-title' }, t('groupDeveloper')),
4347
4347
  h('p', { className: 'vr-hint' }, t('developerHint')),
4348
- !remoteMode ? DEVELOPER_TOGGLE_KEYS.map((key) => toggleField(key)) : null,
4349
- !remoteMode ? stealthNotice() : null,
4348
+ DEVELOPER_TOGGLE_KEYS.map((key) => toggleField(key)),
4349
+ stealthNotice(),
4350
4350
  h('p', { className: 'vr-group-title' }, t('groupWrappers')),
4351
4351
  catalogReady
4352
4352
  ? wrappersEditor()
@@ -4356,7 +4356,7 @@ openLogFolder,
4356
4356
  ? extraVisionModelsEditor()
4357
4357
  : textField('extraVisionModels', t('extraVisionModelsLabel'), t('extraVisionModelsHint'), true),
4358
4358
  h('p', { className: 'vr-group-title' }, t('groupRoutes')),
4359
- !remoteMode ? TEXT_KEYS.map((key) => textField(key, t(LABEL_KEY[key]), t(HINT_KEY[key]), false)) : null,
4359
+ TEXT_KEYS.map((key) => textField(key, t(LABEL_KEY[key]), t(HINT_KEY[key]), false)),
4360
4360
  ),
4361
4361
  )
4362
4362
  : null,