dsh-vibe-math 2.1.0 → 2.2.0

package/audit-v5-sensitivity.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+// ============================================================
+// V5 SENSITIVITY PROBES — prove the suites are not vacuous.
+//
+// Each probe copies vibe-math-v5.js, applies ONE targeted mutation that breaks a
+// specific guarantee, and runs the referencing suite against the mutated copy. A probe
+// PASSES when the suite goes RED (non-zero exit) — i.e. the assertions really do detect
+// that break. A probe that stays green means the suite has a blind spot.
+//
+// The prompt-integrity block below exists because the 2026-09 field test found a bug
+// that 123 tool-level assertions could not see: every member's brief named the WRONG
+// member. Any guarantee about the TEXT a member reads must have a probe that proves
+// prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs detects its violation.
+//
+// Run: node audit-v5-sensitivity.mjs
+// ============================================================
+import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
+import { join } from 'node:path'
+import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
+
+const SRC = new URL('./vibe-math-v5/vibe-math-v5.js', import.meta.url)
+const TESTS = {
+  selfdrive: fileURLToPath(new URL('./selfdrive-v5.mjs', import.meta.url)),
+  round2: fileURLToPath(new URL('./e2e-v5-round2.test.mjs', import.meta.url)),
+  prompt: fileURLToPath(new URL('./prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs', import.meta.url)),
+}
+const original = readFileSync(SRC, 'utf8')
+const REPO = fileURLToPath(new URL('.', import.meta.url))
+const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'v5-sens-'))
+
+// Each probe: { name, ref, guarantee, from, to }
+// `from` must occur exactly once, so a mutation can never quietly hit the wrong site.
+const probes = [
+  {
+    // The m floor is enforced by THREE cooperating checks (an early `bTrue + bFalse < m`
+    // return, the conflict check, and a final `bTrue >= m`), so a single weakened check is
+    // masked by the others and is a SEMANTICALLY INERT mutation — it must never be used as
+    // a probe (it would look like a "blind spot"). Forcing the quorum itself to 1 breaks
+    // the rule on every path at once, which is exactly the guarantee under test.
+    name: 'quorum-forced-to-one',
+    ref: 'selfdrive-v5.mjs',
+    guarantee: '④ only >= m boolean votes may verify (m must be min(quorumCap, |voters|))',
+    from: "      return Math.max(1, Math.min(cap, voterCount()))",
+    to: "      return 1",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'abstention-counts-as-true',
+    ref: 'selfdrive-v5.mjs',
+    guarantee: '⑤ an abstention must NOT count toward the quorum',
+    from: "        else if (p === 0) bFalse += 1\n        else abstain += 1",
+    to: "        else if (p === 0) bFalse += 1\n        else { abstain += 1; bTrue += 1 }",
+  },
+  {
+    // `judgeVerdict` checks the m floor, then the conflict, then the floor again, and each
+    // guard masks the next — so deleting a guard is inert. The behaviour-changing break is
+    // letting a CONFLICT pass as a verdict, which is what this mutation does.
+    name: 'conflict-allowed',
+    ref: 'selfdrive-v5.mjs',
+    guarantee: '④ a conflicting 1 vs 0 must BLOCK the verdict',
+    from: "        return Object.assign(base, { outcome: 'undecided', reason: 'conflicting assertions (true=' + bTrue + ', false=' + bFalse + ')' })",
+    to: "        return Object.assign(base, { outcome: 'true', reason: 'conflicting assertions (true=' + bTrue + ', false=' + bFalse + ')' })",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'temp-worker-can-vote',
+    ref: 'selfdrive-v5.mjs',
+    guarantee: '⑦ a temp worker must NOT be able to vote',
+    from: "      if (member.kind === 'temp') {\n        // Temp workers have no vote",
+    to: "      if (false) {\n        // Temp workers have no vote",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'academician-gate-removed',
+    ref: 'selfdrive-v5.mjs',
+    guarantee: '⑬ only the academician may assign tasks',
+    from: "        return { ok: false, code: 'V5_NOT_ACADEMICIAN', message: 'only the academician (or the office) can assign tasks' }",
+    to: "        return { ok: false, code: 'NO_GATE', message: 'x' }",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'spawn-not-registered-inflight',
+    ref: 'selfdrive-v5.mjs',
+    guarantee: '⑯ the founding turn must be registered in-flight or its end is dropped',
+    from: "      inflight.set(started.childId, shortId())",
+    to: "",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'group-chat-not-fanned-out',
+    ref: 'selfdrive-v5.mjs',
+    guarantee: '③ group chat must reach every other member',
+    from: "      if (to === 'all' || to === '') targets = activeMembers().filter((m) => m.id !== from)",
+    to: "      if (to === 'all' || to === '') targets = activeMembers().filter((m) => m.id !== from).slice(0, 1)",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'verify-round-advances-anyway',
+    ref: 'selfdrive-v5.mjs',
+    guarantee: '④ a round must not advance without every voter answering',
+    from: "      const missing = need.filter((id) => !vs.votes[id])\n      if (missing.length) {",
+    to: "      const missing = need.filter((id) => !vs.votes[id])\n      if (false) {",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'fire-does-not-release',
+    ref: 'selfdrive-v5.mjs',
+    guarantee: '⑨ firing must really release the resident child',
+    from: "          if (typeof subagents.drainContinuableChildren === 'function') await subagents.drainContinuableChildren(rootAgent, [target.childId])",
+    to: "          if (false) await subagents.drainContinuableChildren(rootAgent, [target.childId])",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'solve-vote-not-unanimous',
+    ref: 'selfdrive-v5.mjs',
+    guarantee: '⑥ the institute must not stop unless EVERY voter agrees',
+    from: "      if (!vs.every((id) => solveVotes.get(id) === true)) return false",
+    to: "      if (false) return false",
+  },
+  // ── probes added after the round-2 audit found these defects ──────────────
+  {
+    name: 'fallback-state-never-loaded',
+    ref: 'e2e-v5-round2.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '⑰ the file fallback must LOAD persisted state before any read (restart safety)',
+    from: "      if (backend.kind === 'file' && typeof backend.load === 'function') await backend.load()",
+    to: "      if (false) await backend.load()",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'solve-vote-never-re-evaluated',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '⑥ a solve vote landing OUTSIDE a meeting must still stop the institute',
+    // The anchor must include the CALL. An `if (false)` inserted before the comment would
+    // leave the real `await checkSolved()` below it untouched — an inert mutation that
+    // would masquerade as a blind spot.
+    from: "      solveVotes.set(memberId, val === true)\n      // Evaluate the stop condition on EVERY solve vote, not only when a meeting\n      // finalizes. A vote that lands after the meeting closed — a late reply, or an\n      // ordinary round carrying vote_solved — would otherwise be recorded and never\n      // read, leaving a unanimously-concluded institute running forever.\n      await checkSolved()",
+    to: "      solveVotes.set(memberId, val === true)",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'proposal-only-kicks-scheduler',
+    ref: 'selfdrive-v5.mjs',
+    guarantee: '④ a proposal must actually START, not just ask the scheduler to try',
+    from: "      await armNextVerify()\n      if (!hasVerifyInFlight()) await scheduleNext()",
+    to: "      await scheduleNext()",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'begin-not-exclusive',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '⑱ a second proposal must QUEUE, never start a concurrent ballot',
+    from: "      if (beginLock) return\n      if (currentVerify()) return\n      beginLock = true",
+    to: "      beginLock = true",
+  },
+  // NOTE — a probe for `continueMeetingRound`'s `if (finalizeLock) { armHeartbeat(); return }`
+  // re-arm was REMOVED, not because the re-arm is unnecessary but because the state it
+  // guards is UNREACHABLE, so no black-box probe can detect its removal:
+  //   · `schedulePass` handles a live meeting BEFORE it looks at a verification, and
+  //   · `startMeeting` parks any meeting while `hasVerifyInFlight()`,
+  // so a meeting and a running verify settlement can never overlap. The re-arm stays in
+  // the code as cheap insurance against a future ordering change; leaving a probe that can
+  // never go red would be a false "detection" and is worse than no probe.
+  {
+    name: 'meeting-never-finalized',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '⑲ a meeting that collected every input must actually finalize and write its minutes',
+    from: "      finalizeLock = 'meeting'\n      try {\n        await finalizeMeeting(meeting)",
+    to: "      finalizeLock = 'meeting'\n      try {\n        meeting = null",
+  },
+
+  // ── PROMPT / INTERACTION INTEGRITY PROBES ────────────────────────────────
+  // These are the probes that would have caught the 2026-09 field-test bug. Every one
+  // of them breaks something a member READS (identity, roster, framing, persona), and
+  // prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs must go RED for each.
+  {
+    name: 'brief-names-the-last-woken-member',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '⑳ a prompt\'s [状态] block must name the member it is sent to (the exact field bug: briefs named the previous member)',
+    from: "    function stateBlock(member) {\n      return briefBlock(member)\n    }",
+    to: "    function stateBlock(member) {\n      return briefBlock(memberById(currentMember) || activeMembers()[0] || member)\n    }",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'joiner-absent-from-own-roster',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '⑳ a founding brief must show the roster INCLUDING its reader (roster committed before the prompt is built)',
+    from: "      member.phase = 'active'\n      member.childId = ''\n      await putMember(member)",
+    to: "      member.childId = ''\n      await putMember(member)",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'inbox-message-delivered-twice',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '㉑ one prompt must not deliver the same message twice',
+    from: "      if (pending.length) await ackPending(pending)\n      const base = typeof baseFn === 'function' ? baseFn() : baseFn",
+    to: "      const base = typeof baseFn === 'function' ? baseFn() : baseFn\n      if (pending.length) await ackPending(pending)",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'charter-rewritten-on-resume',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '㉒ the charter is frozen at hire; a resume must not rewrite the induction snapshot',
+    from: "      const persona = member.persona || memberPersona(member)",
+    to: "      const persona = memberPersona(member)",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'resume-framed-as-induction',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '㉓ a rebuilt session must not be told it just joined the institute',
+    from: "      const resume = mode === 'resume'",
+    to: "      const resume = false",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'meeting-proposal-misattributed',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '㉔ a relayed message must carry its TRUE sender, never the last-woken member',
+    from: "          await say(callerId, { to: 'voters', kind: 'voters', text: '提议开会：「' + agenda + '」（' + kind + '）' })",
+    to: "          await say(academicianId() || callerId, { to: 'voters', kind: 'voters', text: '提议开会：「' + agenda + '」（' + kind + '）' })",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'office-impersonates-a-member',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '㉕ the office/host caller must resolve to the office, not to a guessed member',
+    // The FAITHFUL regression mutation: restore the old "answer with whoever this session
+    // woke last" fallback, which made the office's own assignments resolve to a random
+    // researcher and be refused as V5_NOT_ACADEMICIAN.
+    from: "        try { if (rootOf(agent) === agent) return 'office' } catch (e) { /* fall through */ }",
+    to: "        if (currentMember && memberById(currentMember)) return currentMember",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'office-assignment-framed-as-academician',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '㉖ an assignment must be framed by its true origin (office vs academician)',
+    from: "      if (m.kind === 'assign') return (m.from === 'office' ? '【所办分派】' : '【院士分派】') + m.text",
+    to: "      if (m.kind === 'assign') return '【院士分派】' + m.text",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'nudge-mislabelled-as-assignment',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '㉗ a nudge is supervision, not an assignment, and must say so',
+    from: "        to, kind: 'nudge',",
+    to: "        to, kind: 'assign',",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'framework-notice-sent-as-self-message',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '㉘ framework feedback must actually reach the member (not be refused as a self-message)',
+    from: "      return await say('framework', { to: memberId, kind: 'notice', text: String(text) })",
+    to: "      return await say(memberId, { to: memberId, kind: 'notice', text: String(text) })",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'failed-member-hidden',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '㉙ a member that failed to provision must be visible in [未就位]',
+    from: "      if (absent.length) b.push('[未就位] ' + absent.map((m) => m.id + '（' + m.phase + '）').join('、'))",
+    to: "      if (false) b.push('[未就位] ' + absent.map((m) => m.id + '（' + m.phase + '）').join('、'))",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'leaderless-charter-invents-a-leader',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '㉚ with academician:false no charter may name a leader who does not exist',
+    from: "      const a = academicianId()\n      const L = [",
+    to: "      const a = 'acad'\n      const L = [",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'reply-spec-hides-the-objection-channel',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '㉛ every field the framework honours must be documented in the reply spec',
+    from: "      L.push('  \"reject_assign\": {\"task_id\":\"t-3\",\"why\":\"你对这项分派的异议理由\"}",
+    to: "      if (false) L.push('  \"reject_assign\": {\"task_id\":\"t-3\",\"why\":\"你对这项分派的异议理由\"}",
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'task-owner-rewoken-unpaced',
+    ref: 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs',
+    guarantee: '㉜ a task owner must be pushed on a paced cadence, not in an unbounded tight loop',
+    from: "        if ((now() - (lastActiveAt.get(m.id) || 0)) < idleMs) continue",
+    to: "        if (false) continue",
+  },
+]
+
+let probesPassed = 0
+let probesFailed = 0
+console.log('-- V5 sensitivity probes --')
+console.log('(a probe passes when breaking the guarantee turns the suite RED)')
+console.log('')
+
+for (const p of probes) {
+  const occurrences = original.split(p.from).length - 1
+  if (occurrences !== 1) {
+    console.error('  SETUP-FAIL - ' + p.name + ': anchor matched ' + occurrences + ' times (need exactly 1)')
+    probesFailed++
+    continue
+  }
+  const mutated = original.replace(p.from, p.to)
+  const file = join(dir, p.name + '.js')
+  writeFileSync(file, mutated, 'utf8')
+  const testPath = TESTS[p.ref === 'e2e-v5-round2.test.mjs' ? 'round2'
+    : p.ref === 'prompt-v5-integrity.test.mjs' ? 'prompt' : 'selfdrive']
+  const r = spawnSync(process.execPath, [testPath], {
+    env: Object.assign({}, process.env, { V5_PLUGIN: file }),
+    encoding: 'utf8',
+    cwd: REPO,
+  })
+  const red = r.status !== 0
+  if (red) {
+    probesPassed++
+    console.log('  ok - ' + p.name + ' [' + p.ref + '] => suite went RED as required  [' + p.guarantee + ']')
+  } else {
+    probesFailed++
+    console.error('  BLIND SPOT - ' + p.name + ' [' + p.ref + '] => suite stayed GREEN, so it does NOT detect: ' + p.guarantee)
+  }
+}
+
+rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+console.log('')
+console.log('sensitivity: ' + probesPassed + ' probes detected the break, ' + probesFailed + ' blind spots')
+if (probesFailed) process.exit(1)
+console.log('ALL PROBES RED AS REQUIRED')
+process.exit(0)