dsh-remote 0.8.71 → 0.8.73

package/lib/credential.js

@@ -1,263 +1,263 @@
-// dsh-remote — optional OS-keychain password storage.
-// Machines keep their password in the OS credential store instead of the
-// plaintext machines.json when the user enables "加密保存密码" per machine.
-// Every backend is best-effort: any failure resolves to {ok:false} and the
-// caller (persistPassword) falls back to plaintext + a user-visible warning
-// (the feature must never block connecting, and must never silently drop the
-// credential — issue #30).
-//
-// Backends:
-//   darwin  → `security` (login keychain, generic password)
-//   win32   → DPAPI via PowerShell (CurrentUser scope), files under
-//             $DSH_HOME/remote-workspaces/.secrets/
-//   linux   → `secret-tool` (libsecret / gnome-keyring), optional
-//   else    → unsupported (plain)
-import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'
-import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs'
-import { join as joinPath } from 'node:path'
-
-const SERVICE = 'dsh-remote'
-const TIMEOUT = 8000
-
-// Windows PowerShell 5.1 does not preload System.Security, so
-// [System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData] is "not found" until the assembly
-// is added (issue #30: without this the whole DPAPI call failed and the caller
-// silently lost the password). `-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue` keeps the line
-// harmless on PowerShell 7, where the type is already available.
-const PS_SECURITY_ASSEMBLY = 'Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Security -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue;'
-
-/**
- * Run a helper and resolve with its trimmed stdout.
- *
- * WHY `spawn` and not `execFile(..., { input })`: measured on a real Ubuntu box
- * with a real gnome-keyring, `secret-tool store` given its password through
- * `execFile`'s `input` option **never saw EOF**, blocked on the read, and was
- * killed by this timeout — so on Linux "encrypt the password" always failed after
- * 8 seconds with the useless message "Command failed: secret-tool store …" (empty
- * stderr) and the credential was dropped. The same command with an explicitly
- * ended stdin (`spawn` + `stdin.end()`, or `sh -c '… < file'`) finishes in ~20ms.
- * Nothing in this module needs the extra `execFile` machinery, so stdin is now
- * always closed explicitly and the child's stderr is carried on the error (the old
- * path dropped it, which is why the failure had no reason attached).
- */
-function run(bin, args, input) {
-  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-    let child
-    try {
-      child = spawn(bin, args, { stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'] })
-    } catch (err) {
-      reject(err)
-      return
-    }
-    let out = ''
-    let errOut = ''
-    let settled = false
-    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
-      if (settled) return
-      settled = true
-      try { child.kill('SIGTERM') } catch { /* already gone */ }
-      const err = new Error(`${bin} timed out after ${TIMEOUT}ms`)
-      err.stderr = errOut
-      err.code = 'ETIMEDOUT'
-      reject(err)
-    }, TIMEOUT)
-    const done = (err, value) => {
-      if (settled) return
-      settled = true
-      clearTimeout(timer)
-      if (err) reject(err); else resolve(value)
-    }
-    child.on('error', (err) => done(err))
-    child.on('close', (code) => {
-      if (code === 0) return done(null, out.trim())
-      const err = new Error(`${bin} exited with ${code}${errOut.trim() ? ': ' + errOut.trim().slice(0, 300) : ''}`)
-      err.code = code
-      err.stderr = errOut
-      done(err)
-    })
-    child.stdout.on('data', (d) => { out += d })
-    child.stderr.on('data', (d) => { errOut += d })
-    // Always end stdin: a helper that reads a secret from stdin needs EOF, and one
-    // that does not must not inherit an open pipe.
-    try { child.stdin.end(input == null ? '' : String(input)) } catch { /* closed early */ }
-  })
-}
-
-export function platformBackend() {
-  if (process.platform === 'darwin') return 'keychain'
-  if (process.platform === 'win32') return 'windows'
-  return 'secret' // linux (secret-tool may be absent → falls back)
-}
-
-function account(machineId) {
-  // Only machine ids are stored; sanitize just in case.
-  return String(machineId || '').replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]/g, '_')
-}
-
-/** Redact a failed command's diagnostics: execFile puts the FULL command line
- * (which carries the password as an argv) into `err.message`, and this string is
- * shown in the settings UI — so the secret must never survive it. */
-function safeReason(err, password) {
-  const raw = [err && err.stderr, err && err.message, err && err.code]
-    .filter(Boolean).map(String).join(' ')
-  const secret = String(password == null ? '' : password)
-  const scrubbed = secret ? raw.split(secret).join('***') : raw
-  return scrubbed.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim().slice(0, 300)
-}
-
-/** PowerShell one-liner that DPAPI-protects a password (CurrentUser scope).
- *  Exported because the issue #30 fix (the mandatory Add-Type preamble) is only
- *  observable here — a Windows host cannot be exercised from the test suite. */
-export function dpapiProtectScript(password) {
-  return PS_SECURITY_ASSEMBLY +
-    `$p='${String(password).replace(/'/g, "''")}';` +
-    `$s=[System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData]::Protect([Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($p),$null,[System.Security.Cryptography.DataProtectionScope]::CurrentUser);` +
-    `[Convert]::ToBase64String($s)`
-}
-
-/** PowerShell one-liner that reverses dpapiProtectScript(). */
-export function dpapiUnprotectScript(b64) {
-  return PS_SECURITY_ASSEMBLY +
-    `$s=[Convert]::FromBase64String('${String(b64).replace(/'/g, "''")}');` +
-    `[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData]::Unprotect($s,$null,[System.Security.Cryptography.DataProtectionScope]::CurrentUser))`
-}
-
-/** Save a password to the OS store. Resolves {ok, backend, error} — ok:false on
- * any failure (caller falls back to plaintext). `error` is a password-free
- * diagnostic for the UI. */
-export async function saveSecret(machineId, password, secretsDir) {
-  const acc = account(machineId)
-  try {
-    if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
-      await run('security', ['add-generic-password', '-U', '-s', SERVICE, '-a', acc, '-w', String(password)])
-      return { ok: true, backend: 'keychain', error: '' }
-    }
-    if (process.platform === 'win32') {
-      // DPAPI-encrypt and store under the harness home.
-      const script = dpapiProtectScript(password)
-      const b64 = await run('powershell', ['-NoProfile', '-STA', '-Command', script])
-      if (!b64) return { ok: false, backend: 'windows', error: 'DPAPI returned no ciphertext' }
-      mkdirSync(secretsDir || '.', { recursive: true })
-      writeFileSync(joinPath(secretsDir || '.', acc + '.bin'), b64, 'utf8')
-      return { ok: true, backend: 'windows', error: '' }
-    }
-    if (process.platform === 'linux') {
-      await run('secret-tool', ['store', '--label=' + SERVICE, 'service', SERVICE, 'account', acc], String(password) + '\n')
-      return { ok: true, backend: 'secret', error: '' }
-    }
-  } catch (err) {
-    return { ok: false, backend: platformBackend(), error: safeReason(err, password) || 'secret store write failed' }
-  }
-  return { ok: false, backend: platformBackend(), error: `unsupported platform: ${process.platform}` }
-}
-
-/** Decide where a machine password is persisted (issue #30).
- *
- * The contract the settings UI relies on: a password is NEVER silently dropped.
- * Historically that guarantee was upheld by falling back to PLAINTEXT in
- * machines.json, which is a bad trade in one specific way: the user asked for
- * encryption, the store failed, and the secret ended up less protected than if
- * they had never asked. Worse, a locked keychain / missing secret-tool is
- * exactly the moment when quietly writing a password to a world-readable file
- * on disk is most likely to go unnoticed.
- *
- * So the fallback is a POLICY, not a fixed behaviour (`onStoreFailure`):
- *
- *   `refuse`  (default) — do not store the password at all. The machine is
- *             saved WITHOUT a credential and the caller reports how to fix the
- *             store; the user retypes (or connects) and nothing lands in
- *             plaintext by accident. `stored: 'none'` makes that explicit.
- *   `plain`   — the legacy behaviour: write it to machines.json and raise
- *             `warning: 'secret-store-failed'`. Opt-in only, for users who
- *             genuinely prefer a working machine over the storage guarantee.
- *
- * An explicit `backend: 'plain'` still means plain by REQUEST (the user turned
- * encryption off), and is unaffected by this policy.
- *
- * `save` is injectable so both paths are unit-testable on any platform.
- *
- * @param {object} arg
- * @param {string} arg.backend - the platform backend name ('keychain'|'windows'|'secret'|'plain').
- * @param {string} arg.machineId
- * @param {string} arg.password
- * @param {string} [arg.secretsDir]
- * @param {'refuse'|'plain'} [arg.onStoreFailure] - see above.
- * @param {Function} [arg.save] - injectable secure-store writer.
- * @returns {Promise<{stored:'secret'|'plain'|'none', credentialBackend:string, password:string, warning:string, error:string}>}
- */
-export async function persistPassword({
-  backend, machineId, password, secretsDir,
-  onStoreFailure = 'refuse',
-  save = saveSecret,
-}) {
-  const pw = password == null ? '' : String(password)
-  const want = backend && backend !== 'plain' ? backend : 'plain'
-  if (!pw) return { stored: 'none', credentialBackend: want, password: '', warning: '', error: '' }
-  if (want === 'plain') return { stored: 'plain', credentialBackend: 'plain', password: pw, warning: '', error: '' }
-  let res
-  try {
-    res = await save(machineId, pw, secretsDir)
-  } catch (err) {
-    res = { ok: false, error: safeReason(err, pw) }
-  }
-  if (res && res.ok) {
-    return { stored: 'secret', credentialBackend: res.backend || want, password: '', warning: '', error: '' }
-  }
-  const error = String((res && res.error) || '') || 'secret store write failed'
-  if (onStoreFailure === 'plain') {
-    return {
-      stored: 'plain',
-      credentialBackend: 'plain',
-      password: pw,
-      warning: 'secret-store-failed',
-      error,
-    }
-  }
-  // Default: refuse. Nothing is written, and the caller surfaces the store
-  // failure plus the platform-specific repair hint instead of a silent downgrade.
-  return {
-    stored: 'none',
-    credentialBackend: want,
-    password: '',
-    warning: 'secret-store-refused',
-    error,
-  }
-}
-
-/** Fetch a stored password. Resolves string|null. */
-export async function getSecret(machineId, secretsDir) {
-  const acc = account(machineId)
-  try {
-    if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
-      return await run('security', ['find-generic-password', '-s', SERVICE, '-a', acc, '-w'])
-    }
-    if (process.platform === 'win32') {
-      const b64 = readFileSync(joinPath(secretsDir || '.', acc + '.bin'), 'utf8').trim()
-      if (!b64) return null
-      const script = dpapiUnprotectScript(b64)
-      return await run('powershell', ['-NoProfile', '-STA', '-Command', script])
-    }
-    if (process.platform === 'linux') {
-      return await run('secret-tool', ['lookup', 'service', SERVICE, 'account', acc])
-    }
-  } catch { /* fall through */ }
-  return null
-}
-
-/** Delete a stored password (idempotent). */
-export async function deleteSecret(machineId, secretsDir) {
-  const acc = account(machineId)
-  try {
-    if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
-      await run('security', ['delete-generic-password', '-s', SERVICE, '-a', acc]).catch(() => {})
-      return
-    }
-    if (process.platform === 'win32') {
-      try { unlinkSync(joinPath(secretsDir || '.', acc + '.bin')) } catch { /* absent */ }
-      return
-    }
-    if (process.platform === 'linux') {
-      await run('secret-tool', ['clear', 'service', SERVICE, 'account', acc]).catch(() => {})
-    }
-  } catch { /* best effort */ }
-}
+// dsh-remote — optional OS-keychain password storage.
+// Machines keep their password in the OS credential store instead of the
+// plaintext machines.json when the user enables "加密保存密码" per machine.
+// Every backend is best-effort: any failure resolves to {ok:false} and the
+// caller (persistPassword) falls back to plaintext + a user-visible warning
+// (the feature must never block connecting, and must never silently drop the
+// credential — issue #30).
+//
+// Backends:
+//   darwin  → `security` (login keychain, generic password)
+//   win32   → DPAPI via PowerShell (CurrentUser scope), files under
+//             $DSH_HOME/remote-workspaces/.secrets/
+//   linux   → `secret-tool` (libsecret / gnome-keyring), optional
+//   else    → unsupported (plain)
+import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'
+import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { join as joinPath } from 'node:path'
+
+const SERVICE = 'dsh-remote'
+const TIMEOUT = 8000
+
+// Windows PowerShell 5.1 does not preload System.Security, so
+// [System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData] is "not found" until the assembly
+// is added (issue #30: without this the whole DPAPI call failed and the caller
+// silently lost the password). `-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue` keeps the line
+// harmless on PowerShell 7, where the type is already available.
+const PS_SECURITY_ASSEMBLY = 'Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Security -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue;'
+
+/**
+ * Run a helper and resolve with its trimmed stdout.
+ *
+ * WHY `spawn` and not `execFile(..., { input })`: measured on a real Ubuntu box
+ * with a real gnome-keyring, `secret-tool store` given its password through
+ * `execFile`'s `input` option **never saw EOF**, blocked on the read, and was
+ * killed by this timeout — so on Linux "encrypt the password" always failed after
+ * 8 seconds with the useless message "Command failed: secret-tool store …" (empty
+ * stderr) and the credential was dropped. The same command with an explicitly
+ * ended stdin (`spawn` + `stdin.end()`, or `sh -c '… < file'`) finishes in ~20ms.
+ * Nothing in this module needs the extra `execFile` machinery, so stdin is now
+ * always closed explicitly and the child's stderr is carried on the error (the old
+ * path dropped it, which is why the failure had no reason attached).
+ */
+function run(bin, args, input) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    let child
+    try {
+      child = spawn(bin, args, { stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'] })
+    } catch (err) {
+      reject(err)
+      return
+    }
+    let out = ''
+    let errOut = ''
+    let settled = false
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      if (settled) return
+      settled = true
+      try { child.kill('SIGTERM') } catch { /* already gone */ }
+      const err = new Error(`${bin} timed out after ${TIMEOUT}ms`)
+      err.stderr = errOut
+      err.code = 'ETIMEDOUT'
+      reject(err)
+    }, TIMEOUT)
+    const done = (err, value) => {
+      if (settled) return
+      settled = true
+      clearTimeout(timer)
+      if (err) reject(err); else resolve(value)
+    }
+    child.on('error', (err) => done(err))
+    child.on('close', (code) => {
+      if (code === 0) return done(null, out.trim())
+      const err = new Error(`${bin} exited with ${code}${errOut.trim() ? ': ' + errOut.trim().slice(0, 300) : ''}`)
+      err.code = code
+      err.stderr = errOut
+      done(err)
+    })
+    child.stdout.on('data', (d) => { out += d })
+    child.stderr.on('data', (d) => { errOut += d })
+    // Always end stdin: a helper that reads a secret from stdin needs EOF, and one
+    // that does not must not inherit an open pipe.
+    try { child.stdin.end(input == null ? '' : String(input)) } catch { /* closed early */ }
+  })
+}
+
+export function platformBackend() {
+  if (process.platform === 'darwin') return 'keychain'
+  if (process.platform === 'win32') return 'windows'
+  return 'secret' // linux (secret-tool may be absent → falls back)
+}
+
+function account(machineId) {
+  // Only machine ids are stored; sanitize just in case.
+  return String(machineId || '').replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]/g, '_')
+}
+
+/** Redact a failed command's diagnostics: execFile puts the FULL command line
+ * (which carries the password as an argv) into `err.message`, and this string is
+ * shown in the settings UI — so the secret must never survive it. */
+function safeReason(err, password) {
+  const raw = [err && err.stderr, err && err.message, err && err.code]
+    .filter(Boolean).map(String).join(' ')
+  const secret = String(password == null ? '' : password)
+  const scrubbed = secret ? raw.split(secret).join('***') : raw
+  return scrubbed.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim().slice(0, 300)
+}
+
+/** PowerShell one-liner that DPAPI-protects a password (CurrentUser scope).
+ *  Exported because the issue #30 fix (the mandatory Add-Type preamble) is only
+ *  observable here — a Windows host cannot be exercised from the test suite. */
+export function dpapiProtectScript(password) {
+  return PS_SECURITY_ASSEMBLY +
+    `$p='${String(password).replace(/'/g, "''")}';` +
+    `$s=[System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData]::Protect([Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($p),$null,[System.Security.Cryptography.DataProtectionScope]::CurrentUser);` +
+    `[Convert]::ToBase64String($s)`
+}
+
+/** PowerShell one-liner that reverses dpapiProtectScript(). */
+export function dpapiUnprotectScript(b64) {
+  return PS_SECURITY_ASSEMBLY +
+    `$s=[Convert]::FromBase64String('${String(b64).replace(/'/g, "''")}');` +
+    `[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData]::Unprotect($s,$null,[System.Security.Cryptography.DataProtectionScope]::CurrentUser))`
+}
+
+/** Save a password to the OS store. Resolves {ok, backend, error} — ok:false on
+ * any failure (caller falls back to plaintext). `error` is a password-free
+ * diagnostic for the UI. */
+export async function saveSecret(machineId, password, secretsDir) {
+  const acc = account(machineId)
+  try {
+    if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
+      await run('security', ['add-generic-password', '-U', '-s', SERVICE, '-a', acc, '-w', String(password)])
+      return { ok: true, backend: 'keychain', error: '' }
+    }
+    if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+      // DPAPI-encrypt and store under the harness home.
+      const script = dpapiProtectScript(password)
+      const b64 = await run('powershell', ['-NoProfile', '-STA', '-Command', script])
+      if (!b64) return { ok: false, backend: 'windows', error: 'DPAPI returned no ciphertext' }
+      mkdirSync(secretsDir || '.', { recursive: true })
+      writeFileSync(joinPath(secretsDir || '.', acc + '.bin'), b64, 'utf8')
+      return { ok: true, backend: 'windows', error: '' }
+    }
+    if (process.platform === 'linux') {
+      await run('secret-tool', ['store', '--label=' + SERVICE, 'service', SERVICE, 'account', acc], String(password) + '\n')
+      return { ok: true, backend: 'secret', error: '' }
+    }
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { ok: false, backend: platformBackend(), error: safeReason(err, password) || 'secret store write failed' }
+  }
+  return { ok: false, backend: platformBackend(), error: `unsupported platform: ${process.platform}` }
+}
+
+/** Decide where a machine password is persisted (issue #30).
+ *
+ * The contract the settings UI relies on: a password is NEVER silently dropped.
+ * Historically that guarantee was upheld by falling back to PLAINTEXT in
+ * machines.json, which is a bad trade in one specific way: the user asked for
+ * encryption, the store failed, and the secret ended up less protected than if
+ * they had never asked. Worse, a locked keychain / missing secret-tool is
+ * exactly the moment when quietly writing a password to a world-readable file
+ * on disk is most likely to go unnoticed.
+ *
+ * So the fallback is a POLICY, not a fixed behaviour (`onStoreFailure`):
+ *
+ *   `refuse`  (default) — do not store the password at all. The machine is
+ *             saved WITHOUT a credential and the caller reports how to fix the
+ *             store; the user retypes (or connects) and nothing lands in
+ *             plaintext by accident. `stored: 'none'` makes that explicit.
+ *   `plain`   — the legacy behaviour: write it to machines.json and raise
+ *             `warning: 'secret-store-failed'`. Opt-in only, for users who
+ *             genuinely prefer a working machine over the storage guarantee.
+ *
+ * An explicit `backend: 'plain'` still means plain by REQUEST (the user turned
+ * encryption off), and is unaffected by this policy.
+ *
+ * `save` is injectable so both paths are unit-testable on any platform.
+ *
+ * @param {object} arg
+ * @param {string} arg.backend - the platform backend name ('keychain'|'windows'|'secret'|'plain').
+ * @param {string} arg.machineId
+ * @param {string} arg.password
+ * @param {string} [arg.secretsDir]
+ * @param {'refuse'|'plain'} [arg.onStoreFailure] - see above.
+ * @param {Function} [arg.save] - injectable secure-store writer.
+ * @returns {Promise<{stored:'secret'|'plain'|'none', credentialBackend:string, password:string, warning:string, error:string}>}
+ */
+export async function persistPassword({
+  backend, machineId, password, secretsDir,
+  onStoreFailure = 'refuse',
+  save = saveSecret,
+}) {
+  const pw = password == null ? '' : String(password)
+  const want = backend && backend !== 'plain' ? backend : 'plain'
+  if (!pw) return { stored: 'none', credentialBackend: want, password: '', warning: '', error: '' }
+  if (want === 'plain') return { stored: 'plain', credentialBackend: 'plain', password: pw, warning: '', error: '' }
+  let res
+  try {
+    res = await save(machineId, pw, secretsDir)
+  } catch (err) {
+    res = { ok: false, error: safeReason(err, pw) }
+  }
+  if (res && res.ok) {
+    return { stored: 'secret', credentialBackend: res.backend || want, password: '', warning: '', error: '' }
+  }
+  const error = String((res && res.error) || '') || 'secret store write failed'
+  if (onStoreFailure === 'plain') {
+    return {
+      stored: 'plain',
+      credentialBackend: 'plain',
+      password: pw,
+      warning: 'secret-store-failed',
+      error,
+    }
+  }
+  // Default: refuse. Nothing is written, and the caller surfaces the store
+  // failure plus the platform-specific repair hint instead of a silent downgrade.
+  return {
+    stored: 'none',
+    credentialBackend: want,
+    password: '',
+    warning: 'secret-store-refused',
+    error,
+  }
+}
+
+/** Fetch a stored password. Resolves string|null. */
+export async function getSecret(machineId, secretsDir) {
+  const acc = account(machineId)
+  try {
+    if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
+      return await run('security', ['find-generic-password', '-s', SERVICE, '-a', acc, '-w'])
+    }
+    if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+      const b64 = readFileSync(joinPath(secretsDir || '.', acc + '.bin'), 'utf8').trim()
+      if (!b64) return null
+      const script = dpapiUnprotectScript(b64)
+      return await run('powershell', ['-NoProfile', '-STA', '-Command', script])
+    }
+    if (process.platform === 'linux') {
+      return await run('secret-tool', ['lookup', 'service', SERVICE, 'account', acc])
+    }
+  } catch { /* fall through */ }
+  return null
+}
+
+/** Delete a stored password (idempotent). */
+export async function deleteSecret(machineId, secretsDir) {
+  const acc = account(machineId)
+  try {
+    if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
+      await run('security', ['delete-generic-password', '-s', SERVICE, '-a', acc]).catch(() => {})
+      return
+    }
+    if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+      try { unlinkSync(joinPath(secretsDir || '.', acc + '.bin')) } catch { /* absent */ }
+      return
+    }
+    if (process.platform === 'linux') {
+      await run('secret-tool', ['clear', 'service', SERVICE, 'account', acc]).catch(() => {})
+    }
+  } catch { /* best effort */ }
+}