dsh-plugin-wsl-env 0.2.0 → 0.4.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -12,8 +12,302 @@ reference below points at that record's numbering.
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [0.4.0] - 2026-10-03
+
+One theme: the enterprise review's remediation cycle completes. The
+security-decision layer gains its own peer-free module and unit tests, the
+coverage gate measures every unit file again, the fallback invariant is probed
+for real, and the file tools pick up the audit's fixes — a killed write no
+longer strands state, large reads stream instead of staging, `/tmp` writes
+land where readers read, cross-distro workdirs are refused, the resident's
+Windows environment is pinned, and `maskWindowsDrive` offers the interop
+mitigation.
+
+### Added
+
+- **The filesystem provider's policy decisions are a peer-free module with
+  their own unit tests.** The security-decision layer — which paths are
+  refused for naming another distro, which mode denies a mutation outright,
+  which write guards refuse which intents, how a substrate failure maps onto
+  the surfaced refusal, and whether a mutation routes to the confined
+  resident — used to live inline in `lib/index.js`, a file no unit test can
+  import. It is now `lib/fs-decisions.js` (pure in, refusal descriptor out,
+  byte-identical messages), with `test/fs-decisions.test.mjs` covering every
+  branch, and `lib/index.js` delegating at one `FsError` choke point.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **The fallback invariant is now probed, not just promised.** PARITY.md's
+  hard rule — "`agent: false` must behave like the pre-agent release" — cited
+  a probe leg that did not exist, and spelled the key as `wsl.agent: 'off'`
+  when it is a boolean. `test/probe/agent.sh` now runs the same operations
+  through the resident AND through the one-shot `wsl.exe` path and compares
+  outcomes: exit code and stdout bytes (including `$`-metacharacters), stderr
+  and working directory, and NUL/CRLF binary safety. All three legs pass
+  against a real distro; the doc now names the key correctly and describes
+  what the probe actually compares.
+
+- **The coverage gate measures every unit file again.** `test:coverage` listed
+  six of the sixteen test files — the thresholds (85/85/70) were met by the
+  narrowed set while the full suite sat at 82.45% branches, so branch
+  regressions anywhere outside the six were invisible to the gate that claimed
+  to guard them. The gate now runs the whole unit suite (95.83% lines / 85.95%
+  branches / 91.01% functions), which got there the honest way: new tests for
+  the seams the audit found dark — the deny-dialect classification,
+  aborted-signal mapping, the transport env pin, handshake mismatch, protocol
+  garbage, cwd rejections, pre-aborted signals, idle retirement, mid-flight
+  over-cap buffers, failed rebuilds, watcher teardown and error paths, the
+  cross-distro workdir predicate, staging sweeps, setuid publication, and the
+  real-`/tmp` consistency the file tools now have.
+
+- **Reading a large file no longer copies its remainder to a temp file for
+  every window.** `fs_read` staged `tail -c +offset` to disk before `head`
+  took the requested bytes — so a full read of a 1 GB file performed ~1000
+  window round trips AND ~500 GB of aggregate temp-file writes inside the
+  distro, and a window that took over 30 seconds died as an opaque
+  "distro I/O failure". The remainder now streams through a `tail | head`
+  pipe (the request's own bound is the only staging), read failures still
+  classify through the same stderr dialect, and windowed reads are verified
+  byte-exact including the final partial window.
+- **A request the transport cannot deliver now fails its caller instead of
+  stranding it.** `writeLines` used to drop a frame silently when the
+  `wsl.exe` process was gone (a thin race between exit handling and the next
+  request), leaving a pending entry nothing would ever answer — the caller
+  waited forever when it had no timeout, and the watchdog had no process
+  left to kill. An undeliverable frame now rejects with
+  `AgentUnavailableError` ("the agent exited before the request could be
+  sent; it never ran"), the rebuild relay fails undeliverable re-sends the
+  same way, and `close()` no longer writes `SHUTDOWN` into an ended stdin
+  (whose async write-after-end error could crash the process during its own
+  shutdown).
+
+- **A confined write to `/tmp` now lands in the distro's real `/tmp`, where
+  every reader reads.** The fence grants `/tmp` as a writable root, but the
+  confined resident's profile mounted an ephemeral tmpfs over it — so the
+  write reported success into a private tmpfs, the read tools (unconfined)
+  could not see it, the post-write stat produced a `missing:` version that
+  made the next edit fail with `FS_STALE_VERSION`, and the file evaporated
+  when the resident retired. The file-writes resident's profile now binds the
+  real `/tmp` read-write (`realTmp`, on by default for the confined factory):
+  the write lands where the fence said it would, reads and edits agree, and
+  user terminals see the file. Commands keep their ephemeral per-run tmpfs —
+  the fresh-temp-area property (and its anti-poisoning guarantee) is
+  unchanged, so a command still cannot see files the write tools placed in
+  `/tmp` — the documented command-vs-tools split, now safe in both
+  directions. Verified live: confined write → plain read returns the content;
+  a confined `cat` still reports it absent, as documented.
+
+- **A killed write no longer leaves its staging directory in your files.** A
+  `KILL`/`SIGTERM` mid-write could not be trapped, so the private 0700
+  staging dir (`.<name>.<pid>.<rand>.tmpdir`) sat in the target's own
+  directory forever — and listings showed the debris to the model. The EXIT
+  trap now removes the in-flight staging along with the agent's temp dir, and
+  each write sweeps the target directory's leftovers whose creating agent's
+  PID (it rides the name) is no longer running — a live agent's staging is
+  left alone, PID reuse included.
+- **A write to a typo'd path refuses instead of materializing the chain.**
+  The staging `mkdir -p` silently created every missing parent directory and
+  reported success, where the peer's Node-fs publication fails `ENOENT` —
+  masking model errors as wins. Parents are no longer created: the refusal is
+  `FS_NOT_FOUND`, an existing directory stays fine, and a concurrent creator
+  of the directory still wins.
+- **Setuid, setgid and sticky bits survive an overwrite or edit.** The mode
+  was masked to `0o777` at the stat parse and again at the write, so a
+  `4755` binary became `755` and a `1777` directory file lost its sticky bit
+  — while LIMITATIONS claimed the bits were kept. The full mode now rides
+  stat and write end-to-end (`0o7777`), matching the share substrate's
+  `chmod --reference` behaviour.
+
+- **A shell command whose workdir names another WSL distro is refused, where
+  it used to run in the pinned distro against whatever tree shares the path.**
+  `toLinuxPath` strips a `\\wsl.localhost\<name>\…` UNC's distro name, and the
+  shell executor never compared it — so a `debian` workspace's commands ran
+  inside the pinned `ubuntu`, silently, while the fs side refused the same
+  workspace with `FS_OUTSIDE_DISTRO` ("open a session in that distro" — which
+  the user had done). The shell now refuses with the fs side's wording, and
+  the shell-env facts stay silent for a foreign-distro session instead of
+  presenting another distro's home and shell as this session's.
+
+- **The resident agent no longer inherits the Windows environment's WSLENV
+  forwarding.** Spawned bare, `wsl.exe` carried this process's whole
+  environment with it, and whatever the user's `WSLENV` names — dev machines
+  routinely route secrets (`GITHUB_TOKEN/u` is the documented example) — was
+  forwarded into the distro, where every model command inherited it. The
+  transport's Windows env is now pinned: the essentials `wsl.exe` itself
+  needs, the managed `DSH_*` facts, `WSL_UTF8=1`, and a `WSLENV` that names
+  only the managed entries with their original flags. Verified live: a secret
+  injected on the Windows side with a forwarding flag appears zero times in
+  the distro environment. `forwardEnv` remains one-shot-only today — the
+  resident path never forwarded it, and the pin keeps that posture instead of
+  widening it silently.
+
+### Added
+
+- **`maskWindowsDrive` on `wsl-shell` and `wsl-fs`** — the mitigation knob for
+  the interop hole the sandbox has always documented. The confined profile
+  mounts an empty tmpfs over `/mnt`, so the Windows drive's files cannot be
+  read or exfiltrated by a "sandboxed" command and its executables cannot be
+  launched through interop (the path by which such a command reaches your full
+  Windows token). Honest limits, stated wherever the key is: binfmt interop
+  dispatches on file content, so a command that can write the workspace can
+  still write an executable there and run it — enforcement stays `partial`,
+  the result's sandbox fact now carries `windowsDrive: "masked" | "visible"`
+  so the model can see which posture it runs under, and the only complete
+  closure is distro-level (`[interop] enabled=false` in `wsl.conf`). Default
+  `false`: the drive stays visible unless you ask for the mask.
+
+## [0.3.0] - 2026-10-03
+
+One theme: the file tools move into the distro. The `substrate: "agent"` I/O
+substrate and its kernel-enforced confined writes land together with the
+enterprise review that hardened them — the watchdog that killed the shared
+agent for a queue it never chose to join, the output captures nothing bounded,
+a root listing that sheared the first character off every child's name, and an
+overwrite guard that stopped at the host.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **One file carries one version string, whichever op answered.** `stat` and
+  `list` built their versions from different producers: the stat op used the
+  distro's `stat` directives (uutils `stat` rounds timestamps to microseconds)
+  while the list walk used `find -printf` (nanosecond-exact), so the same file
+  yielded two different version strings and a list-derived guard failed
+  against its own stat. `fs_stat` now reads through the same `find -printf`
+  the list walk uses — one producer, one string — and `find -L`'s habit of
+  reporting a dangling link as the link itself is refused the way the `stat`
+  it replaced was, so a dangling link still stats to null like the peer's.
+
+- **An overwrite or edit now re-verifies its version distro-side, one syscall
+  before the rename.** The module header claimed the mutation guard "survives
+  to the write", but the no-replace link guarded only `createIfAbsent`: an
+  overwrite or edit checked the version host-side and then published with an
+  unconditional `mv -f`, so a concurrent writer (an editor save, `git stash`,
+  another session) that landed between the model's stat and the publish was
+  silently clobbered with no `FS_STALE_VERSION`. The `write` op now carries
+  the version the write was based on (a `replaceIfVersion` guard's version,
+  or the stat an edit was read against), and the agent re-verifies it with a
+  fresh stat from the SAME producer `fs_stat` uses — refusing with
+  `FS_STALE_VERSION` ("file changed since it was read", or "file no longer
+  exists") while the concurrent writer's content stays untouched and no
+  staging debris is left behind. The window narrows from a host round trip to
+  kernel-adjacent — the honest wording, here and in the module headers,
+  LIMITATIONS.md and ARCHITECTURE.md, is that only the create case is closed
+  outright.
+
+- **The agent command path now enforces the output budget it always
+  advertised.** `maxOutputBytes` rode the config schema but nothing else: the
+  agent captured a command's whole stdout and stderr and base64ed both into
+  one RES line — multi-gigabyte output meant multi-gigabyte dash command
+  substitutions in the distro and a multi-gigabyte host line, with the result
+  claiming `truncated: false` all the way. The EXEC frame now carries the
+  caller's per-stream budget (`wsl-shell`'s `maxOutputBytes`, wired from the
+  agent execution path); the agent cuts each stream at it — only the first
+  bytes are encoded, so distro AND host memory are bounded — and the RES line
+  reports which streams were cut, which the handle surfaces as honest
+  per-stream `truncated` flags (a guarded-create synthesis and frames without
+  a budget still read `false`). The host also defends itself against a broken
+  or hostile agent: the unbounded readline accumulator is replaced with a
+  bounded line splitter that kills the transport when one stdout line exceeds
+  the protocol cap instead of buffering it whole.
+
+- **A short-budget request queued behind a long one no longer kills the shared
+  agent — and an in-flight command is never silently re-run.** Two defects
+  shared one root: the host armed each request's watchdog at SUBMISSION and
+  let it kill the one `wsl.exe` carrying every pending request, and the
+  rebuild relay then replayed all carried frames verbatim. In the default
+  configuration the 10 s `DSH_WSL_PORTS` poller (8 s budget, shared agent) did
+  exactly this against any command longer than ~21 s: the poll's watchdog
+  killed the transport, the command died mid-flight, and the rebuild
+  **re-executed it from scratch** — both callers seeing success (measured: a
+  killed `sleep 40` ran twice). Three changes close it: the agent answers
+  `ACK|<id>` when it dequeues a request and the host arms the watchdog there,
+  so queue time never spends a budget (wire protocol v3 — sync the runtime
+  copy and restart the app, an old agent fails the handshake loudly instead of
+  misbehaving quietly); the rebuild relays only provably read-only FS frames
+  (`stat`/`lstat`/`list`/`realpath`/`read`), failing an in-flight EXEC or
+  `write` with "its state is unknown — inspect the distro before retrying"
+  instead of re-running it; and an abort now addresses the request's CURRENT
+  id, so a relayed request's KILL (and map cleanup) can no longer miss. The
+  watchdog-vs-queue experiment now ends with the long command executed exactly
+  once and the transport alive.
+- **A root listing kept every child's name whole.** `listChildren` sliced each
+  `find` record at `parent.length + 1`, which against the bare `/` parent
+  sheared the first character off every name (`/etc` → `tc`), and a write to a
+  listed child then created `/tc`. The exact prefix is stripped instead, and
+  the child join owes its own slash, so `listDir` on
+  `\\wsl.localhost\<distro>\` names `/etc`, `/home`, `/usr` correctly.
+
+### Added
+
+- **`substrate: "agent"` — the filesystem's in-distro I/O substrate.** `wsl-fs`
+  gains a `substrate` key, default `agent`: the file tools are served through
+  the resident in-distro agent instead of the 9p share — identities are
+  distro-side `realpath`s, symlinks resolve where they live (no retry
+  machinery, `/etc/os-release` just works), mode bits are native, and a
+  mutation guard survives to the write's no-replace publication — the
+  check-then-write window the share documents closes, exactly as on a Linux
+  host. `substrate: "share"` is the opt-out that keeps the previous behaviour
+  byte for byte. Both substrates fence writes with the same host-side policy
+  check, so this changes fidelity and posture, not enforcement. Known
+  differences are in LIMITATIONS.md (notably: new files publish at 0600, the
+  peer's own POSIX semantics, where the share took the umask 0644), and an
+  agent outage fails with `FS_IO_ERROR` naming the substrate rather than
+  degrading to share semantics. Layers: FS operation frames on the agent wire
+  protocol (v3, `agent/wsl-agent.sh`), fsio-over-agent mechanics
+  (`lib/fsio-agent.js`), provider-shaped orchestration (`lib/fs-substrate.js`),
+  and the provider branch (`lib/index.js`). The pure text mechanics are
+  replicated from upstream pending the fsio export proposed in
+  docs/UPSTREAM-FSIO-EXPORT.md. Probed live: `npm run probe:substrate`.
+- **Stage two: kernel-enforced confined writes.** On the agent substrate, a
+  mutation under a confined policy rides its own long-lived resident — one
+  agent per (distro, mode, workspace), spawned inside the bwrap profile that
+  binds exactly what the mode grants (`lib/agent-confined.js`, `argvPrefix` on
+  the agent wire). The kernel now refuses what the host-side check would have,
+  so a check bug cannot become a write outside the workspace; a mount-table
+  refusal surfaces as `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED`, the command path's dialect, and a
+  distro without usable bwrap refuses confined writes with the bootstrap
+  command instead of downgrading. Escalated (`danger-full-access`) writes ride
+  the plain resident, and a policy change simply addresses a different key —
+  the previous resident retires through its idle timer. Probed live: the
+  confined write inside the workspace lands, and the one outside it is refused
+  by the kernel (`probe:substrate`).
+
 ### Fixed
 
+- **Every mutation on the agent substrate failed: the confined resident's command
+  had no program** — `confinedAgent()` built the resident's `argvPrefix` from the
+  raw profile arguments, so the transport handed `wsl.exe` a command beginning at
+  `--ro-bind` instead of `bwrap --ro-bind`. The resident exited 1 during its
+  handshake, and every write, edit and guarded create on `substrate: "agent"`
+  failed with `FS_IO_ERROR: the distro file substrate is unavailable: agent exited
+  during handshake (code=1 signal=none)` while reads kept working. Both confinement
+  sites now assemble the command through the import-free `lib/bwrap.js`, which is
+  what `test/agent.test.mjs` asserts; the same bug stayed invisible because
+  `test/probe/substrate.sh` inlined a *third*, correct copy of those arguments —
+  it now imports the production builder, so the probe fails with the provider.
+- **`WslFileSystem` could not build its agent substrate at all: a constructor
+  field shadowed the method of the same name** — the constructor's
+  `this.agentSubstrate = undefined` (the cache) overwrote the prototype's
+  `async agentSubstrate()` (the accessor), so the first file operation that needed
+  the agent threw `this.agentSubstrate is not a function`, which is how a GUI
+  session failed its turn in the Desktop app. The cache is now
+  `this.agentSubstrateInstance`, named after the sibling `this.agentInstance`, and
+  `lib/index.js`'s instance fields no longer collide with any class member.
+- **A schemastery member the pinned peer does not publish took the `wsl` preset
+  down in the Desktop app** — `WslFileSystem.Config` declared
+  `substrate: z.enum(["share", "agent"])`, and `@deepseek-ai/schemastery` 3.18.4
+  (what every `@deepseek-ai/dsh-*` peer pins as `~3.18.4`) publishes no `enum`. A
+  Config schema is a class field, so the call ran while `lib/index.js` was still
+  being imported: the loader logs the `TypeError` and leaves that row with no
+  fiber, which the preset audit renders as `never started` — naming neither the
+  member nor the file, and only for `wsl-shell` and `wsl-fs`, the two rows that
+  load `lib/index.js`. The preset therefore failed to activate, so the app
+  reported `2 row(s) did not activate` for those two ids. Now
+  `z.union(["share", "agent"])`: same `agent` default, and a bad value still
+  fails with `expected "share" | "agent" but got "bogus"`. Measured against the
+  app's own runtime, both entries import; `test/syntax.mjs` now checks every
+  `z.<member>` in `lib/` against the pinned peer's surface, which fails on
+  `z.enum` and passes on `z.union`.
 - **`truncated` missing from the agent path's output streams** — the bash tool's
   canonical result copies the field unconditionally (`canonicalBashResult`), so an
   `undefined` failed the wire's lossless-JSON snapshot and EVERY shell tool call

package/README.md

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ Override a row by id in `$DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>/cordis.patch.yml`. The keys w
 | `wsl-fs` | `distro` | `''` | as above |
 | | `restrictToDistro` | `true` | refuse a path in **another distro**'s share; `/mnt/c` is inside this distro and is not affected. Refused with `FS_OUTSIDE_DISTRO`, which is not a sandbox denial and cannot be lifted by wider permissions |
 | | `sandbox` | `true` | check `writeText` and `editText` against the policy |
+| | `substrate` | `agent` | which I/O substrate serves the file tools: `agent` — the resident in-distro agent, where reads, writes and identities run on ext4 (native symlinks and mode bits; the write guard survives to publication, kernel-enforced under a confined policy); `share` — the opt-out: the Windows-side host stack over the 9p share. Both fence writes with the same policy; see [LIMITATIONS.md](docs/LIMITATIONS.md) for what changes |
 | `directory-picker-wsl` | `includeHostHome` | `true` | also list the Windows home directory |
 | `subprocess-wsl` | `distro` | `''` | which distro the GUI terminal opens in |
 
@@ -118,6 +119,7 @@ npm run probe:sandbox        # measure inside the distro what bubblewrap does an
 npm run probe                # filesystem probe against a real distro (Windows + WSL only)
 npm run probe:sandbox-shell  # boot a real harness and drive the confined executor
 npm run probe:terminal       # open a PTY through the terminal provider
+npm run probe:substrate      # drive the agent filesystem substrate over a real wsl.exe transport (from inside the distro)
 npm run probe:missing-wsl    # boot a profile whose wslPath cannot start (Windows + WSL only)
 npm run probe:picker         # list the picker's root level, refusals and its cap (Windows + WSL only)
 npm run probe:mode           # which POSIX-mode facts survive the share (Windows node only)