dsh-plugin-auth 0.1.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +205 -0
- package/bin/dsh-auth.js +179 -0
- package/cordis.patch.yml +26 -0
- package/package.json +32 -0
- package/src/gate.js +127 -0
- package/src/index.js +267 -0
- package/src/lockout.js +79 -0
- package/src/login-page.js +180 -0
- package/src/passwords.js +112 -0
- package/src/paths.js +41 -0
- package/src/policy.js +103 -0
- package/src/sessions.js +130 -0
- package/src/users.js +129 -0
package/README.md
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# dsh-plugin-auth
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Enterprise username/password authentication gate for the **dsh** (DeepSeek Harness) Web UI.
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Out-of-tree plugin — **no core changes**. Once installed into the `web` profile, every page, API
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route, `/plugins` asset, and WebSocket upgrade requires a logged-in session. Unauthenticated
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navigations are redirected to a self-contained login page; unauthenticated API/XHR calls get `401`.
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The login page uses Simplified Chinese (`zh-CN`) and follows the operating system's light/dark
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preference with the same palette and control geometry as the dsh Web UI; CLI and JSON API output
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remain compatible.
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> The stock Web UI ships only a DNS-rebinding "browser trust fence" (`isTrustedApiRequest`), which the
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> source explicitly notes **is not an authentication layer**. This plugin adds the missing gate.
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## How it works
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The plugin's default export is `class AuthWebServer extends WebServer`. A bundle composition patch
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(`cordis.patch.yml`) **disables** the stock `webserver` row and **inserts** a row that re-provides the
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`webServer` service from this subclass — so the plugin becomes the *sole* provider and every consumer
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registration flows through it:
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- `register` / `registerFallback` / `registerUpgrade` are overridden to wrap each handler in an auth
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gate, then delegate to `super.*`. One choke point covers the SPA fallback, `/api`, `/plugins`,
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upgrades, and any route added later.
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- The plugin's own `/__auth/*` surface (login page, login/logout, status) is registered with
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`super.register` in the constructor, so it stays **ungated** and reachable while logged out.
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- The subclass truly re-provides `webServer` (`super(ctx, 'webServer')` is inherited) and the insert row
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keeps `inject: [webStartup]` and the `{host, port}` config, so downstream `web-runtime` and
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`connection` rows still resolve.
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## Requirements
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- Node `^22.19 || >=24` (matches dsh).
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- A dsh checkout/profile where the peers resolve: `@deepseek-ai/cordis` and
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`@deepseek-ai/dsh-host-webserver`. Both are in the `web` profile's dependency closure already,
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and the profile's module fallback (`healProfilesModuleFallback`) links them next to the plugin.
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- The plugin **deliberately does not declare these as `peerDependencies`**. It subclasses the
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harness's *own* `WebServer` (the `webServer`-service provider) and must share the harness's exact
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`WebServer` **and** `cordis` module instances. Declaring `"*"` peers makes pnpm fetch a stale
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published copy from the registry, install it inside the plugin's dependency closure, and *shadow*
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the profile fallback — the subclass then extends the wrong build (an older one that provides
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`httpServer`, not `webServer`, bound to a different `cordis`), so boot fails with every web
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consumer "pending (waiting for service: webServer)". Leaving the peers undeclared lets Node's
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parent-walk resolve them to the fallback — the same instances the loader uses.
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## Install from npm
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The public npm package is the recommended installation path once a release is published. dsh forwards
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the package spec to pnpm and automatically adds the package to the profile layer list because this package
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declares `dsh.bundle`:
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```bash
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# install the exact release into the web profile
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dsh plugin --profile web add -w dsh-plugin-auth@0.1.2
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# create the first admin before first boot (writes $DSH_HOME/auth/users.json)
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dsh plugin --profile web exec dsh-auth add-user admin
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# confirm the auth-webserver layer resolved and the stock webserver is disabled
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dsh --profile web --dump-config
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```
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`dsh-plugin-auth` deliberately has no `peerDependencies`: the dsh profile supplies the exact
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`@deepseek-ai/cordis` and `@deepseek-ai/dsh-host-webserver` instances required by the subclass.
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## Install from a tarball
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Use a tarball for local development or when the package is not available from a registry. The tarball's
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realpath lands inside the profile tree, which lets its peer imports resolve through the profile module
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fallback; a `link:` to an external directory would put the realpath outside the tree and fail to resolve:
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```bash
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# from the plugin directory
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npm pack # → dsh-plugin-auth-<version>.tgz
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# create the first admin BEFORE first boot (writes $DSH_HOME/auth/users.json)
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node bin/dsh-auth.js add-user admin
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# install into the web profile.
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# -w is REQUIRED: a dsh profile is a pnpm workspace root (packages: - .), and
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# adding a dependency to a workspace root without -w fails ERR_PNPM_ADDING_TO_ROOT.
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pnpm dsh plugin --profile web add -w ./dsh-plugin-auth-<version>.tgz
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```
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### Pre-flight (go / no-go)
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Before starting the server, confirm the composition resolved and the peer imports work:
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```bash
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dsh --profile web --dump-config
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```
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The dump must show the `webserver` row with `disabled: true` and exactly one inserted `auth-webserver`
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row — with no "module resolution failed" errors. A resolution failure here fails loud; fix the install
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(use a tarball, not a directory link) before booting.
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### Start
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```bash
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pnpm dsh web # binds 127.0.0.1:3080 by default
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pnpm dsh web --port 8080 # if 3080 is taken (e.g. a stale dsh still running)
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```
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Open `http://127.0.0.1:3080` → you are redirected to `/__auth/login`. After signing in you reach the
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app; `/api` and `/plugins` work as normal.
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> If boot fails with `EADDRINUSE ... 127.0.0.1:3080`, another process (often a stale `dsh web` from a
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> previous run) already holds the port. Stop it, or start on a different `--port`. This is a distinct
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> failure from the composition error below — it means the gate *did* activate and tried to bind.
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## CLI: `dsh-auth`
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Credentials live in `$DSH_HOME/auth/users.json` (atomic write, mode `0600` where POSIX modes apply) and
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are managed **offline** — never through the Web settings UI. Passwords are read from the TTY with echo
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masked, or from bootstrap env vars for non-interactive provisioning.
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```
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dsh-auth add-user <username> Create a user (prompts for a password).
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dsh-auth passwd <username> Change a user's password.
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dsh-auth list List users (with disabled flag + last-updated).
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dsh-auth remove <username> Delete a user.
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dsh-auth disable <username> Disable a user (keeps the record; blocks login).
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dsh-auth enable <username> Re-enable a disabled user.
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```
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Environment:
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- `DSH_HOME` — auth data root (default `~/.dsh`); data in `$DSH_HOME/auth`.
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- `DSH_AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_USER` — username for non-interactive `add-user`.
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- `DSH_AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD` — password for non-interactive `add-user` / `passwd`.
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Passwords must be at least 12 characters and include at least 3 of: lowercase, uppercase, digit, symbol.
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## Configuration (`$DSH_HOME/auth/config.json`, optional)
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All keys are optional; out-of-range or wrong-typed values silently fall back to the secure default, so a
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malformed file can never weaken the gate past sane bounds.
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| Key | Default | Meaning |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `sessionAbsoluteTtlMs` | `43200000` (12h) | Hard session lifetime cap. |
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| `sessionIdleTtlMs` | `7200000` (2h) | Sliding idle window. |
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| `sweepIntervalMs` | `300000` (5m) | Background expired-session sweep cadence. |
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| `lockoutThreshold` | `5` | Consecutive failures (per username+IP) before lockout. |
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| `lockoutBaseMs` | `30000` | First lockout duration. |
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| `lockoutMaxMs` | `900000` (15m) | Exponential-backoff cap. |
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| `lockoutWindowMs` | `900000` (15m) | Idle time after which the failure counter resets. |
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| `minPasswordLength` | `12` | Minimum password length (floor 8). |
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| `secure` | `false` | `true` behind TLS: sets `Secure` + `__Host-` cookie, forces `Path=/`. |
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| `sameSite` | `"Strict"` | Cookie `SameSite` (`Strict` or `Lax`). |
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| `cookiePath` | `"/"` | Cookie `Path`. |
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| `trustedOrigins` | `[]` | Extra `Origin` values accepted on state-changing POSTs. |
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| `scrypt` | `{N:16384,r:8,p:1,keylen:64,maxmem:64MiB}` | Password hashing cost. |
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> **Behind a TLS reverse proxy**, set `"secure": true` so the session cookie gets `Secure` and the
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> `__Host-` prefix. On plain loopback HTTP the cookie cannot be `Secure` (browsers would drop it).
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## Security notes
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- **Passwords:** scrypt with a per-user random salt, self-describing cost params, constant-time compare.
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Unknown/disabled users are verified against a fixed dummy record so there is no timing/enumeration
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oracle.
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- **Sessions:** 256-bit random tokens, `HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/` cookies, absolute + sliding
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expiry, login-time token rotation (anti-fixation), logout revocation, background sweep.
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- **Brute force:** per-(username, IP) lockout with exponential backoff; a legit user on another IP is
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unaffected by an attacker's failures.
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- **CSRF:** state-changing POSTs require a same-origin `Origin`/`Referer` (or a `trustedOrigins` entry);
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default-deny when both are absent. This backs up `SameSite=Strict`.
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- **Open redirect:** the post-login `next` target is reduced to a safe single-slash local path.
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- **Audit:** login success/failure/lockout/logout are logged via `ctx.logger` with username + IP (never
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the password).
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## Scope & tradeoffs (by design)
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- Local username/password only — no SSO, no 2FA.
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- Sessions are **in-memory**: a dsh restart requires everyone to log in again.
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- No separate CSRF token — `SameSite=Strict` + Origin check is the chosen defense.
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- `src/paths.js` is **self-contained** (it re-implements the `$DSH_HOME` → `~/.dsh` resolution rather
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than importing `@deepseek-ai/dsh-home-paths`). This keeps the offline CLI working without the harness
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on the module path and removes that package from the runtime peer set; only
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`@deepseek-ai/dsh-host-webserver` is imported at runtime.
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## Composition ordering caveat
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This bundle disables the stock `webserver` row. Any *later* composition layer (the profile's own
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`cordis.patch.yml`, `$DSH_HOME/cordis.patch.yml`, or `--patch`) that flips `webserver` back to
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`disabled: false` would create two providers of `webServer` and boot fails **loud** (duplicate service),
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not silently. Don't re-enable the stock row while this plugin is installed.
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## Development / tests
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```bash
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node --test
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```
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The unit suites (policy, passwords, sessions, lockout, gate, login-page, users) are pure and run
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standalone. `tests/integration.test.js` needs the runtime peers (`@deepseek-ai/cordis`,
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`@deepseek-ai/dsh-host-webserver`); when they are not installed it **skips** with a reason. Run it inside
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a built harness checkout to exercise the real subclass over HTTP.
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## License
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MIT
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package/bin/dsh-auth.js
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#!/usr/bin/env node
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// @ts-check
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/**
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* dsh-auth — offline credential management for dsh-plugin-auth.
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*
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* Commands: add-user, passwd, list, remove, disable, enable.
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* Writes $DSH_HOME/auth/users.json (atomic, mode 0600). Passwords are read from
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* the TTY with echo masked, or from DSH_AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_USER/PASSWORD for
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* non-interactive provisioning. Credentials never touch the Web settings UI.
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*/
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import process from 'node:process'
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import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
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import { createInterface } from 'node:readline'
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import { createUserStore } from '../src/users.js'
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import { hashPassword, assessPasswordStrength } from '../src/passwords.js'
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import { resolvePolicy } from '../src/policy.js'
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import { usersFile, configFile } from '../src/paths.js'
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const CTRL_C = String.fromCharCode(3)
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const CTRL_D = String.fromCharCode(4)
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const DEL = String.fromCharCode(127)
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function loadPolicy() {
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try {
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return resolvePolicy(JSON.parse(readFileSync(configFile(), 'utf8')))
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} catch {
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return resolvePolicy({})
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}
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}
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/** Read one visible line (used for the username). */
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function prompt(query) {
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return new Promise((resolve) => {
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const rl = createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout })
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rl.question(query, (ans) => {
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rl.close()
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resolve(ans.trim())
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})
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})
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}
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/** Read one line with echo masked (raw mode on a TTY; plain read otherwise). */
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function promptHidden(query) {
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return new Promise((resolve) => {
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const { stdin, stdout } = process
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stdout.write(query)
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const wasRaw = Boolean(stdin.isRaw)
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if (stdin.isTTY) stdin.setRawMode(true)
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stdin.resume()
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let input = ''
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const onData = (buf) => {
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for (const ch of buf.toString('utf8')) {
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if (ch === '\n' || ch === '\r' || ch === CTRL_D) {
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if (stdin.isTTY) stdin.setRawMode(wasRaw)
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stdin.pause()
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stdin.removeListener('data', onData)
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stdout.write('\n')
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resolve(input)
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return
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} else if (ch === CTRL_C) {
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if (stdin.isTTY) stdin.setRawMode(wasRaw)
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stdout.write('\n')
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process.exit(130)
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+
} else if (ch === DEL || ch === '\b') {
|
|
66
|
+
input = input.slice(0, -1)
|
|
67
|
+
} else if (ch >= ' ') {
|
|
68
|
+
input += ch
|
|
69
|
+
}
|
|
70
|
+
}
|
|
71
|
+
}
|
|
72
|
+
stdin.on('data', onData)
|
|
73
|
+
})
|
|
74
|
+
}
|
|
75
|
+
|
|
76
|
+
function fail(message) {
|
|
77
|
+
console.error(`dsh-auth: ${message}`)
|
|
78
|
+
process.exit(1)
|
|
79
|
+
}
|
|
80
|
+
|
|
81
|
+
/** Resolve and validate a new password from the TTY (or bootstrap env). */
|
|
82
|
+
async function readNewPassword(policy) {
|
|
83
|
+
const bootstrap = process.env.DSH_AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD
|
|
84
|
+
let pw
|
|
85
|
+
if (bootstrap) {
|
|
86
|
+
pw = bootstrap
|
|
87
|
+
} else {
|
|
88
|
+
pw = await promptHidden('Password: ')
|
|
89
|
+
const confirm = await promptHidden('Confirm password: ')
|
|
90
|
+
if (pw !== confirm) fail('passwords do not match')
|
|
91
|
+
}
|
|
92
|
+
const strength = assessPasswordStrength(pw, { minLength: policy.minPasswordLength })
|
|
93
|
+
if (!strength.ok) fail(strength.reason)
|
|
94
|
+
return pw
|
|
95
|
+
}
|
|
96
|
+
const USAGE = `Usage: dsh-auth <command> [username]
|
|
97
|
+
|
|
98
|
+
Commands:
|
|
99
|
+
add-user <username> Create a user (prompts for a password).
|
|
100
|
+
passwd <username> Change a user's password.
|
|
101
|
+
list List users.
|
|
102
|
+
remove <username> Delete a user.
|
|
103
|
+
disable <username> Disable a user (keeps the record; blocks login).
|
|
104
|
+
enable <username> Re-enable a disabled user.
|
|
105
|
+
|
|
106
|
+
Environment:
|
|
107
|
+
DSH_HOME Auth data root (default ~/.dsh); data in $DSH_HOME/auth.
|
|
108
|
+
DSH_AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_USER Username for non-interactive add-user.
|
|
109
|
+
DSH_AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD Password for non-interactive add-user/passwd.
|
|
110
|
+
`
|
|
111
|
+
|
|
112
|
+
async function main() {
|
|
113
|
+
const [cmd, argUser] = process.argv.slice(2)
|
|
114
|
+
const store = createUserStore({ path: usersFile() })
|
|
115
|
+
const policy = loadPolicy()
|
|
116
|
+
|
|
117
|
+
switch (cmd) {
|
|
118
|
+
case 'add-user': {
|
|
119
|
+
const username = (argUser || process.env.DSH_AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_USER || '').trim() || (await prompt('Username: '))
|
|
120
|
+
if (!username) fail('username required')
|
|
121
|
+
if (await store.getUser(username)) fail(`user "${username}" already exists (use passwd to change it)`)
|
|
122
|
+
const password = await readNewPassword(policy)
|
|
123
|
+
const record = await hashPassword(password, policy.scrypt)
|
|
124
|
+
await store.upsertUser(username, { password: record, disabled: false })
|
|
125
|
+
console.log(`Created user "${username}" in ${usersFile()}`)
|
|
126
|
+
break
|
|
127
|
+
}
|
|
128
|
+
case 'passwd': {
|
|
129
|
+
const username = (argUser || '').trim()
|
|
130
|
+
if (!username) fail('username required')
|
|
131
|
+
if (!(await store.getUser(username))) fail(`no such user "${username}"`)
|
|
132
|
+
const password = await readNewPassword(policy)
|
|
133
|
+
const record = await hashPassword(password, policy.scrypt)
|
|
134
|
+
await store.upsertUser(username, { password: record })
|
|
135
|
+
console.log(`Updated password for "${username}"`)
|
|
136
|
+
break
|
|
137
|
+
}
|
|
138
|
+
case 'list': {
|
|
139
|
+
const users = await store.listUsers()
|
|
140
|
+
if (users.length === 0) {
|
|
141
|
+
console.log(`No users yet (${usersFile()})`)
|
|
142
|
+
break
|
|
143
|
+
}
|
|
144
|
+
users.sort((a, b) => a.username.localeCompare(b.username))
|
|
145
|
+
for (const u of users) {
|
|
146
|
+
const when = u.updatedAt ? new Date(u.updatedAt).toISOString() : '-'
|
|
147
|
+
console.log(`${u.disabled ? '[disabled] ' : ''}${u.username}\t${when}`)
|
|
148
|
+
}
|
|
149
|
+
break
|
|
150
|
+
}
|
|
151
|
+
case 'remove': {
|
|
152
|
+
const username = (argUser || '').trim()
|
|
153
|
+
if (!username) fail('username required')
|
|
154
|
+
const ok = await store.removeUser(username)
|
|
155
|
+
if (!ok) fail(`no such user "${username}"`)
|
|
156
|
+
console.log(`Removed "${username}"`)
|
|
157
|
+
break
|
|
158
|
+
}
|
|
159
|
+
case 'disable':
|
|
160
|
+
case 'enable': {
|
|
161
|
+
const username = (argUser || '').trim()
|
|
162
|
+
if (!username) fail('username required')
|
|
163
|
+
const ok = await store.setDisabled(username, cmd === 'disable')
|
|
164
|
+
if (!ok) fail(`no such user "${username}"`)
|
|
165
|
+
console.log(`${cmd === 'disable' ? 'Disabled' : 'Enabled'} "${username}"`)
|
|
166
|
+
break
|
|
167
|
+
}
|
|
168
|
+
case undefined:
|
|
169
|
+
case '-h':
|
|
170
|
+
case '--help':
|
|
171
|
+
process.stdout.write(USAGE)
|
|
172
|
+
break
|
|
173
|
+
default:
|
|
174
|
+
process.stderr.write(USAGE)
|
|
175
|
+
process.exit(2)
|
|
176
|
+
}
|
|
177
|
+
}
|
|
178
|
+
|
|
179
|
+
main().catch((err) => fail(err?.message || String(err)))
|
package/cordis.patch.yml
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# dsh-plugin-auth composition patch.
|
|
2
|
+
#
|
|
3
|
+
# Applied as a bundle layer AFTER @deepseek-ai/dsh-web-app. It makes this plugin
|
|
4
|
+
# the SOLE provider of the `webServer` service by:
|
|
5
|
+
# 1. disabling the stock webserver row (no fiber, no provide), and
|
|
6
|
+
# 2. inserting an auth-webserver row that RE-PROVIDES `webServer` via a
|
|
7
|
+
# subclass of the stock WebServer (src/index.js default export).
|
|
8
|
+
#
|
|
9
|
+
# Hard contract (do not drop): the insert row MUST keep `inject: [webStartup]`
|
|
10
|
+
# and the {host,port} config. Downstream rows — web-runtime (@deepseek-ai/dsh-web-app)
|
|
11
|
+
# and connection — depend on `webServer` being provided and bound; a row that
|
|
12
|
+
# fails to re-provide it leaves them PENDING and boot fails loud.
|
|
13
|
+
#
|
|
14
|
+
# The row `name` is the installed package name and must resolve as a module
|
|
15
|
+
# specifier from the profile (install via tarball; see README "Install").
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
- id: webserver
|
|
18
|
+
disabled: true
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
- insert:
|
|
21
|
+
- id: auth-webserver
|
|
22
|
+
name: dsh-plugin-auth
|
|
23
|
+
inject: [webStartup]
|
|
24
|
+
config:
|
|
25
|
+
host: !!js ctx.webStartup.host ?? '127.0.0.1'
|
|
26
|
+
port: !!js ctx.webStartup.port ?? 3080
|
package/package.json
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{
|
|
2
|
+
"name": "dsh-plugin-auth",
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.1.2",
|
|
4
|
+
"description": "Enterprise username/password authentication gate for the dsh Web UI. Out-of-tree plugin — no core changes; requires login before any page or API is reachable.",
|
|
5
|
+
"type": "module",
|
|
6
|
+
"license": "MIT",
|
|
7
|
+
"main": "./src/index.js",
|
|
8
|
+
"exports": {
|
|
9
|
+
".": "./src/index.js",
|
|
10
|
+
"./package.json": "./package.json"
|
|
11
|
+
},
|
|
12
|
+
"bin": {
|
|
13
|
+
"dsh-auth": "./bin/dsh-auth.js"
|
|
14
|
+
},
|
|
15
|
+
"files": [
|
|
16
|
+
"src",
|
|
17
|
+
"bin",
|
|
18
|
+
"cordis.patch.yml",
|
|
19
|
+
"README.md"
|
|
20
|
+
],
|
|
21
|
+
"engines": {
|
|
22
|
+
"node": "^22.19 || >=24"
|
|
23
|
+
},
|
|
24
|
+
"scripts": {
|
|
25
|
+
"test": "node --test"
|
|
26
|
+
},
|
|
27
|
+
"dsh": {
|
|
28
|
+
"bundle": {
|
|
29
|
+
"patch": "./cordis.patch.yml"
|
|
30
|
+
}
|
|
31
|
+
}
|
|
32
|
+
}
|
package/src/gate.js
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
// @ts-check
|
|
2
|
+
/**
|
|
3
|
+
* The authentication gate: cookie parsing, the allow/deny decision tree, POST
|
|
4
|
+
* same-origin validation, and session-cookie serialization. Pure module (no
|
|
5
|
+
* peer imports) — it operates on plain {method, url, headers} request shapes and
|
|
6
|
+
* node:http-style response objects, so it is fully unit-testable with fakes.
|
|
7
|
+
*/
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
import { cookieName } from './policy.js'
|
|
10
|
+
import { sanitizeNext } from './login-page.js'
|
|
11
|
+
|
|
12
|
+
/**
|
|
13
|
+
* Parse a Cookie header into a name→value map.
|
|
14
|
+
* @param {unknown} header
|
|
15
|
+
* @returns {Record<string, string>}
|
|
16
|
+
*/
|
|
17
|
+
export function parseCookies(header) {
|
|
18
|
+
/** @type {Record<string, string>} */
|
|
19
|
+
const out = {}
|
|
20
|
+
if (typeof header !== 'string') return out
|
|
21
|
+
for (const part of header.split(';')) {
|
|
22
|
+
const eq = part.indexOf('=')
|
|
23
|
+
if (eq < 0) continue
|
|
24
|
+
const key = part.slice(0, eq).trim()
|
|
25
|
+
if (!key) continue
|
|
26
|
+
let val = part.slice(eq + 1).trim()
|
|
27
|
+
if (val.startsWith('"') && val.endsWith('"')) val = val.slice(1, -1)
|
|
28
|
+
try {
|
|
29
|
+
out[key] = decodeURIComponent(val)
|
|
30
|
+
} catch {
|
|
31
|
+
out[key] = val
|
|
32
|
+
}
|
|
33
|
+
}
|
|
34
|
+
return out
|
|
35
|
+
}
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
/** Read the session token from the request cookies. */
|
|
38
|
+
export function readSessionToken(req, policy) {
|
|
39
|
+
const cookies = parseCookies(req.headers?.['cookie'])
|
|
40
|
+
return cookies[cookieName(policy)]
|
|
41
|
+
}
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
/**
|
|
44
|
+
* Resolve the session for a request.
|
|
45
|
+
* @returns {{authenticated: boolean, token?: string, session?: import('./sessions.js').SessionRecord}}
|
|
46
|
+
*/
|
|
47
|
+
export function evaluate(req, sessions, policy) {
|
|
48
|
+
const token = readSessionToken(req, policy)
|
|
49
|
+
if (!token) return { authenticated: false }
|
|
50
|
+
const session = sessions.validate(token)
|
|
51
|
+
if (!session) return { authenticated: false, token }
|
|
52
|
+
return { authenticated: true, token, session }
|
|
53
|
+
}
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
55
|
+
/** A navigation-type GET/HEAD wants an HTML page, so denial should redirect. */
|
|
56
|
+
export function isNavigationGet(req) {
|
|
57
|
+
const method = (req.method || 'GET').toUpperCase()
|
|
58
|
+
if (method !== 'GET' && method !== 'HEAD') return false
|
|
59
|
+
const mode = req.headers?.['sec-fetch-mode']
|
|
60
|
+
if (typeof mode === 'string' && mode.length) return mode === 'navigate'
|
|
61
|
+
const accept = String(req.headers?.['accept'] || '')
|
|
62
|
+
return accept.includes('text/html')
|
|
63
|
+
}
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
/**
|
|
66
|
+
* Deny an unauthenticated HTTP request: 302 to the login page for navigations
|
|
67
|
+
* (preserving the target as ?next), 401 JSON for everything else (API/XHR/POST).
|
|
68
|
+
*/
|
|
69
|
+
export function deny(req, res, policy) {
|
|
70
|
+
if (isNavigationGet(req)) {
|
|
71
|
+
const next = sanitizeNext(req.url)
|
|
72
|
+
const location = `/__auth/login?next=${encodeURIComponent(next)}`
|
|
73
|
+
res.writeHead(302, { Location: location, 'Cache-Control': 'no-store' })
|
|
74
|
+
res.end()
|
|
75
|
+
return
|
|
76
|
+
}
|
|
77
|
+
const body = JSON.stringify({ error: 'unauthenticated', login: '/__auth/login' })
|
|
78
|
+
res.writeHead(401, {
|
|
79
|
+
'content-type': 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
|
|
80
|
+
'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
|
|
81
|
+
'WWW-Authenticate': 'Session realm="dsh"',
|
|
82
|
+
})
|
|
83
|
+
res.end(body)
|
|
84
|
+
}
|
|
85
|
+
|
|
86
|
+
/**
|
|
87
|
+
* Same-origin check for state-changing POSTs. Requires Origin (or, failing
|
|
88
|
+
* that, Referer) to match the request Host, or to be in policy.trustedOrigins.
|
|
89
|
+
* Absent both headers, it denies (default-deny). This backs up SameSite=Strict.
|
|
90
|
+
*/
|
|
91
|
+
export function isSameOrigin(req, policy) {
|
|
92
|
+
const host = req.headers?.['host']
|
|
93
|
+
const origin = req.headers?.['origin']
|
|
94
|
+
if (typeof origin === 'string' && origin.length) {
|
|
95
|
+
if (Array.isArray(policy.trustedOrigins) && policy.trustedOrigins.includes(origin)) return true
|
|
96
|
+
try {
|
|
97
|
+
if (host && new URL(origin).host === host) return true
|
|
98
|
+
} catch {
|
|
99
|
+
/* malformed Origin → fall through to deny */
|
|
100
|
+
}
|
|
101
|
+
return false
|
|
102
|
+
}
|
|
103
|
+
const referer = req.headers?.['referer']
|
|
104
|
+
if (typeof referer === 'string' && referer.length) {
|
|
105
|
+
try {
|
|
106
|
+
if (host && new URL(referer).host === host) return true
|
|
107
|
+
} catch {
|
|
108
|
+
/* malformed Referer → deny */
|
|
109
|
+
}
|
|
110
|
+
return false
|
|
111
|
+
}
|
|
112
|
+
return false
|
|
113
|
+
}
|
|
114
|
+
|
|
115
|
+
/** Serialize the Set-Cookie value that establishes a session. */
|
|
116
|
+
export function serializeSessionCookie(token, policy) {
|
|
117
|
+
const parts = [`${cookieName(policy)}=${token}`, `Path=${policy.cookiePath}`, 'HttpOnly', `SameSite=${policy.sameSite}`]
|
|
118
|
+
if (policy.secure) parts.push('Secure')
|
|
119
|
+
return parts.join('; ')
|
|
120
|
+
}
|
|
121
|
+
|
|
122
|
+
/** Serialize the Set-Cookie value that clears the session cookie. */
|
|
123
|
+
export function serializeClearCookie(policy) {
|
|
124
|
+
const parts = [`${cookieName(policy)}=`, `Path=${policy.cookiePath}`, 'HttpOnly', `SameSite=${policy.sameSite}`, 'Max-Age=0']
|
|
125
|
+
if (policy.secure) parts.push('Secure')
|
|
126
|
+
return parts.join('; ')
|
|
127
|
+
}
|