dsh-perm-gate 2.0.0 → 2.1.2

package/lib/proxy.js

@@ -0,0 +1,529 @@
+/**
+ * The built-in local HTTP/CONNECT proxy for dsh-perm-gate.
+ *
+ * The process-level network gate for shell subprocess traffic. Bash/pwsh
+ * children inherit `HTTP(S)_PROXY`/`ALL_PROXY` environment variables
+ * pointing here, and the proxy adjudicates EVERY connection target against
+ * the loaded network rules and the active policy mode.
+ *
+ * Boundaries:
+ * - DSH's `ctx.sandbox` enforces file effects only; network interception
+ *   is entirely this plugin's job.
+ * - The proxy has no session context, so `ask` decisions degrade to
+ *   block + audit (web tools get the real approval seam at pre-execute).
+ * - Bind failures degrade gracefully: warn + continue without proxy.
+ */
+import { createServer, request as httpRequest } from 'node:http';
+import { request as httpsRequest } from 'node:https';
+import { connect } from 'node:net';
+import { lookup } from 'node:dns/promises';
+import { blockMessage, isIpLiteral } from './network.js';
+// ─── Constants ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/** Proxy env var names the injector sets/restores (upper + lower for mixed-ecosystem CLIs). */
+export const PROXY_ENV_NAMES = ['HTTP_PROXY', 'HTTPS_PROXY', 'ALL_PROXY', 'http_proxy', 'https_proxy', 'all_proxy'];
+/** NO_PROXY env var names cleared by the injector. */
+export const NO_PROXY_ENV_NAMES = ['NO_PROXY', 'no_proxy'];
+/** Default DNS lookup bound (ms). A black-holed resolver must not hang a CONNECT. */
+export const DNS_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000;
+/** Default connection-setup bound (ms) — slowloris guard. */
+export const HEADERS_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;
+/** Default cap on concurrent accepted connections. */
+export const MAX_CONNECTIONS = 256;
+/** Bound on how long close() waits for a server to finish closing (ms). */
+export const CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000;
+// ─── NetworkProxy ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * The local HTTP/CONNECT policy proxy. Binds on demand; every live tunnel
+ * socket is tracked and destroyed on close so updates and uninstalls leave
+ * no orphaned connections.
+ */
+export class NetworkProxy {
+    options;
+    server;
+    sockets = new Set();
+    recent = [];
+    stats = { denied: 0, askBlocked: 0 };
+    actualPort = 0;
+    /** In-flight start(); guards against a second concurrent bind. */
+    starting;
+    /** Set by close(); a bind resolving afterwards tears itself down. */
+    closed = false;
+    constructor(options) {
+        this.options = options;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Logger sink that can never throw. The logger is called from inside
+     * 'error' handlers, so a throwing logger would itself become an
+     * unhandled error and defeat the whole point of the guard.
+     */
+    safeWarn(message) {
+        try {
+            this.options.logger.warn(message);
+        }
+        catch {
+            // A logger that throws must never escalate into a host crash.
+        }
+    }
+    /** The bound port (valid after start resolves). */
+    get port() {
+        return this.actualPort;
+    }
+    /** Deny/ask blocks recorded since mount, newest first. */
+    recentBlocks() {
+        return this.recent;
+    }
+    /** Cumulative block counters. */
+    blockStats() {
+        return { ...this.stats };
+    }
+    /** Number of active sockets (tunnels + client connections). */
+    activeSocketCount() {
+        return this.sockets.size;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Bind the server and return the actual port.
+     * On bind failure: warns and returns -1 (degraded mode — no proxy).
+     * Concurrent calls share the single in-flight bind.
+     */
+    async start() {
+        if (this.starting !== undefined)
+            return this.starting;
+        this.starting = this.bind();
+        try {
+            return await this.starting;
+        }
+        finally {
+            this.starting = undefined;
+        }
+    }
+    async bind() {
+        const server = createServer((req, res) => {
+            // The request arrived: lift the pre-request idle bound.
+            req.socket.setTimeout(0);
+            this.handleRequest(req, res).catch((err) => {
+                this.safeWarn(`[dsh-perm-gate] proxy request error: ${String(err)}`);
+            });
+        });
+        server.on('connect', (req, socket, head) => {
+            // CONNECT parsed: lift the pre-request idle bound so the tunnel may
+            // stay open for as long as the client needs.
+            ;
+            socket.setTimeout(0);
+            this.handleConnect(req, socket, head).catch((err) => {
+                this.safeWarn(`[dsh-perm-gate] proxy connect error: ${String(err)}`);
+                if (!socket.destroyed)
+                    socket.destroy();
+            });
+        });
+        server.on('error', (error) => {
+            this.safeWarn(`[dsh-perm-gate] proxy server error: ${String(error)}`);
+        });
+        // T2.9 safety: catch client socket errors that slip through individual
+        // request handlers (ECONNRESET after 403, etc.) — never crash the host.
+        server.on('clientError', (err, socket) => {
+            if (err && err.code !== 'ECONNRESET' && err.message !== 'socket hang up') {
+                this.safeWarn(`[dsh-perm-gate] proxy clientError: ${String(err)}`);
+            }
+            if (!socket.destroyed)
+                socket.destroy();
+        });
+        // ULTIMATE safety net: every accepted socket gets an error handler the
+        // moment it connects, before any request/CONNECT parsing. Without this,
+        // any socket-level error (ECONNRESET from a client that received a 403
+        // block and hung up) becomes an unhandled 'error' event and kills the
+        // entire DSH process. A policy proxy must NEVER take down its host.
+        server.on('connection', (socket) => {
+            socket.on('error', (err) => {
+                if (err && err.code !== 'ECONNRESET' && err.message !== 'socket hang up') {
+                    this.safeWarn(`[dsh-perm-gate] proxy socket error: ${String(err)}`);
+                }
+                if (!socket.destroyed)
+                    socket.destroy();
+            });
+            socket.setTimeout(this.options.headersTimeoutMs ?? HEADERS_TIMEOUT_MS, () => {
+                socket.destroy();
+            });
+        });
+        this.server = server;
+        // Slowloris guard: bound the connection-setup phase. A peer that opens a
+        // socket and dribbles headers would otherwise hold a connection forever.
+        // CONNECT is emitted as soon as headers parse, so this protects setup
+        // without touching the (legitimately long-lived) tunnel phase.
+        server.headersTimeout = this.options.headersTimeoutMs ?? HEADERS_TIMEOUT_MS;
+        // Bounded concurrency: a policy proxy must not accumulate unbounded
+        // sockets. Excess connections are refused by the server rather than
+        // growing the tracked set without limit.
+        server.maxConnections = this.options.maxConnections ?? MAX_CONNECTIONS;
+        try {
+            const port = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+                const onError = (error) => {
+                    server.off('listening', onListening);
+                    reject(error);
+                };
+                const onListening = () => {
+                    server.off('error', onError);
+                    const address = server.address();
+                    resolve(address.port);
+                };
+                server.once('error', onError);
+                server.once('listening', onListening);
+                server.listen(this.options.port, this.options.bind);
+            });
+            this.actualPort = port;
+            // close() landed while the bind was in flight: this server is already
+            // orphaned, so tear it down here rather than leaving a listening socket
+            // (and a rewritten environment) behind.
+            if (this.closed) {
+                this.actualPort = 0;
+                this.server = undefined;
+                try {
+                    server.close();
+                }
+                catch { /* never started */ }
+                return -1;
+            }
+            return port;
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            // T2.9: Bind failure degradation — warn + continue without proxy.
+            this.safeWarn(`[dsh-perm-gate] proxy bind failed (port ${this.options.port}): ${String(error)} — continuing without network proxy`);
+            this.server = undefined;
+            this.actualPort = -1;
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Stop the server and destroy every tunnel socket.
+     *
+     * Safe against a concurrent (in-flight) {@link start}: the `closed` flag
+     * makes a bind that resolves after this call tear itself down instead of
+     * leaving an orphaned listening server behind.
+     */
+    async close() {
+        this.closed = true;
+        // An in-flight bind owns the server handle. Let it settle first: it sees
+        // `closed` and tears itself down, so we never race a close against a
+        // server that has not finished listening (whose close callback may never
+        // fire).
+        const pending = this.starting;
+        if (pending !== undefined) {
+            try {
+                await pending;
+            }
+            catch { /* start() reports -1 on failure */ }
+        }
+        const server = this.server;
+        this.server = undefined;
+        for (const socket of this.sockets)
+            socket.destroy();
+        this.sockets.clear();
+        this.actualPort = 0;
+        if (server === undefined)
+            return;
+        await new Promise((resolve) => {
+            let settled = false;
+            const done = () => { if (!settled) {
+                settled = true;
+                resolve();
+            } };
+            try {
+                server.close(done);
+            }
+            catch {
+                done();
+                return;
+            }
+            // Bounded: a server that never started listening can leave the close
+            // callback pending forever, and close() must always resolve.
+            const timer = setTimeout(done, CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS);
+            timer.unref?.();
+        });
+    }
+    // ─── HTTP proxy ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    async handleRequest(req, res) {
+        // Attach error handlers IMMEDIATELY (before any async work): a client that
+        // receives a 403 block closes its socket with RST, and the resulting
+        // ECONNRESET on req/res must never reach an unhandled 'error' event.
+        const suppressStreamError = (err) => {
+            if (err && err.code !== 'ECONNRESET' && err.message !== 'socket hang up') {
+                this.safeWarn(`[dsh-perm-gate] proxy stream error: ${String(err)}`);
+            }
+        };
+        req.on('error', suppressStreamError);
+        res.on('error', suppressStreamError);
+        const target = parseUrlTarget(req.url ?? '');
+        if (target === undefined || target.scheme === undefined) {
+            res.writeHead(404, { 'content-type': 'text/plain' });
+            res.end('[dsh-perm-gate] proxy: only absolute-form proxy requests are served\n');
+            return;
+        }
+        await this.forwardOrBlock(res, target, () => {
+            const upstream = new URL(req.url);
+            const send = upstream.protocol === 'https:' ? httpsRequest : httpRequest;
+            const proxyReq = send(upstream.href, { method: req.method, headers: req.headers }, (proxyRes) => {
+                res.writeHead(proxyRes.statusCode ?? 502, proxyRes.headers);
+                proxyRes.pipe(res);
+            });
+            proxyReq.on('error', (error) => {
+                if (!res.headersSent) {
+                    res.writeHead(502, { 'content-type': 'text/plain' });
+                    res.end(`[network: upstream error] ${String(error)}\n`);
+                }
+                else {
+                    res.destroy();
+                }
+            });
+            // Suppress ECONNRESET from client closing after receiving 403/502.
+            req.on('error', (err) => {
+                if (err && err.code !== 'ECONNRESET') {
+                    this.safeWarn(`[dsh-perm-gate] proxy req error: ${String(err)}`);
+                }
+            });
+            req.pipe(proxyReq);
+        });
+    }
+    // ─── CONNECT tunnel ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    async handleConnect(req, socket, head) {
+        // T2.8/T2.9 safety: attach error handler IMMEDIATELY to prevent unhandled
+        // errors from crashing the host process. Client may RST at any point
+        // (e.g. after receiving a 403 block), and upstream may fail to connect.
+        const tunnel = {};
+        const suppressError = (err) => {
+            // Suppress ECONNRESET / EPIPE after a 403 block — expected behavior.
+            // Only log unexpected errors.
+            if (err && err.code !== 'ECONNRESET' && err.message !== 'socket hang up') {
+                this.safeWarn(`[dsh-perm-gate] proxy connect error: ${String(err)}`);
+            }
+        };
+        socket.on('error', (err) => {
+            suppressError(err);
+            tunnel.upstream?.destroy();
+        });
+        const target = connectTarget(req.url ?? '');
+        if (target === undefined) {
+            socket.end('HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n');
+            return;
+        }
+        const decision = await this.resolveDecision(target);
+        if (decision.action !== 'allow') {
+            this.recordBlock(decision, target);
+            const body = blockMessage(decision);
+            socket.end(`HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\r\ncontent-type: text/plain\r\ncontent-length: ${Buffer.byteLength(body)}\r\n\r\n${body}`);
+            return;
+        }
+        const upstream = connect(target.port ?? 443, target.host);
+        tunnel.upstream = upstream;
+        this.sockets.add(socket);
+        this.sockets.add(upstream);
+        const cleanup = () => {
+            this.sockets.delete(socket);
+            this.sockets.delete(upstream);
+        };
+        socket.on('close', cleanup);
+        upstream.on('close', cleanup);
+        upstream.on('error', (err) => {
+            suppressError(err);
+            socket.destroy();
+        });
+        upstream.once('connect', () => {
+            socket.write('HTTP/1.1 200 Connection Established\r\n\r\n');
+            if (head.length > 0)
+                upstream.write(head);
+            upstream.pipe(socket);
+            socket.pipe(upstream);
+        });
+    }
+    // ─── Decision pipeline ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+    async forwardOrBlock(res, target, forward) {
+        const decision = await this.resolveDecision(target);
+        if (decision.action !== 'allow') {
+            this.recordBlock(decision, target);
+            const body = blockMessage(decision);
+            res.writeHead(403, { 'content-type': 'text/plain; charset=utf-8', 'content-length': Buffer.byteLength(body) });
+            res.end(body);
+            return;
+        }
+        forward();
+    }
+    /**
+     * DNS-resolve a hostname so `ips`-scoped rules see real addresses, then
+     * decide. Resolution failure → decide on the literal name.
+     *
+     * The lookup is **time-bounded**: an unbounded `lookup()` on a black-holed
+     * resolver would hold the CONNECT socket open indefinitely, so a slow
+     * resolver degrades to literal-name evaluation instead of hanging the
+     * client. `ips`-scoped rules simply cannot fire in that case.
+     */
+    async decideWithResolution(target) {
+        if (!isIpLiteral(target.host)) {
+            try {
+                const addresses = await withTimeout(lookup(target.host, { all: true, verbatim: true }), this.options.dnsTimeoutMs ?? DNS_TIMEOUT_MS);
+                const resolved = addresses.map((entry) => entry.address);
+                if (resolved.length > 0) {
+                    return await this.options.decide({ ...target, ips: [...target.ips, ...resolved] });
+                }
+            }
+            catch {
+                // Unresolvable or too slow: decide on the literal name.
+            }
+        }
+        return await this.options.decide(target);
+    }
+    /**
+     * The final decision for one target: the rule/mode verdict, then — only for
+     * an `ask` — the interactive approval seam.
+     *
+     * Escalation is deliberately narrow:
+     * - A `deny` verdict is NEVER escalated. Approving a connection can widen
+     *   reach for a target no rule allows, but it can never override a rule that
+     *   says no. The rule review stays authoritative.
+     * - An escalation that throws, is absent, or returns anything but `allow`
+     *   leaves the verdict blocked.
+     */
+    async resolveDecision(target) {
+        const decision = await this.decideWithResolution(target);
+        if (decision.action !== 'ask')
+            return decision;
+        const escalate = this.options.escalate;
+        if (escalate === undefined)
+            return decision;
+        let verdict = 'deny';
+        try {
+            verdict = await escalate(target, decision);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            this.safeWarn(`[dsh-perm-gate] network escalation failed: ${String(error)}`);
+            verdict = 'deny';
+        }
+        if (verdict !== 'allow')
+            return decision;
+        // Approved: the connection proceeds, and the audit keeps the rule context
+        // that produced the ask (`matched` / `ruleIndex` are preserved).
+        return { ...decision, action: 'allow' };
+    }
+    // ─── Block recording ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    recordBlock(decision, target) {
+        const attribution = this.options.attribution?.();
+        const record = {
+            time: Date.now(),
+            tool: attribution?.tool ?? 'subprocess',
+            attributed: attribution !== undefined,
+            ...(attribution?.callId !== undefined ? { callId: attribution.callId } : {}),
+            domain: target.host,
+            ...(target.scheme !== undefined ? { scheme: target.scheme } : {}),
+            ...(target.port !== undefined ? { port: target.port } : {}),
+            action: decision.action === 'ask' ? 'ask' : 'deny',
+            mode: decision.mode,
+            matched: decision.matched,
+            source: decision.source ?? '',
+            ...(decision.ruleIndex !== undefined ? { ruleIndex: decision.ruleIndex } : {}),
+            ...(decision.rule !== undefined ? { reason: decision.rule.reason } : {}),
+        };
+        if (record.action === 'deny')
+            this.stats.denied += 1;
+        else
+            this.stats.askBlocked += 1;
+        this.recent.unshift(record);
+        if (this.recent.length > this.options.maxRecent)
+            this.recent.length = this.options.maxRecent;
+        this.safeWarn(`[dsh-perm-gate] network ${record.action === 'deny' ? 'denied' : 'ask-blocked'} ${target.scheme ?? '?'}://${target.host}${target.port !== undefined ? `:${target.port}` : ''} (mode ${decision.mode}${decision.matched ? `, rule ${(decision.ruleIndex ?? 0) + 1}` : ', mode default'})`);
+        try {
+            this.options.onBlock?.(record, attribution);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            this.safeWarn(`[dsh-perm-gate] network block hook failed: ${String(error)}`);
+        }
+    }
+}
+// ─── Environment injection ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * Inject proxy environment variables for subprocesses and return a disposer
+ * restoring every previous value exactly.
+ *
+ * The snapshot pass covers EVERY name BEFORE any write: on Windows
+ * `process.env` is case-insensitive, so writing `HTTP_PROXY` mid-loop
+ * would poison the later snapshot of `http_proxy`.
+ *
+ * @param port - the bound proxy port.
+ * @param noProxy - `'clear'` empties NO_PROXY so policy cannot be bypassed;
+ *                  `'preserve'` keeps ambient values.
+ * @returns the restore disposer.
+ */
+export function injectProxyEnv(port, noProxy) {
+    const previous = new Map();
+    const value = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
+    // Snapshot ALL names before any write.
+    for (const name of PROXY_ENV_NAMES)
+        previous.set(name, process.env[name]);
+    if (noProxy === 'clear') {
+        for (const name of NO_PROXY_ENV_NAMES)
+            previous.set(name, process.env[name]);
+    }
+    // Write proxy env.
+    for (const name of PROXY_ENV_NAMES)
+        process.env[name] = value;
+    if (noProxy === 'clear') {
+        for (const name of NO_PROXY_ENV_NAMES)
+            process.env[name] = '';
+    }
+    // Return restore disposer.
+    return () => {
+        for (const name of PROXY_ENV_NAMES) {
+            const old = previous.get(name);
+            if (old === undefined)
+                delete process.env[name];
+            else
+                process.env[name] = old;
+        }
+        if (noProxy === 'clear') {
+            for (const name of NO_PROXY_ENV_NAMES) {
+                const old = previous.get(name);
+                if (old === undefined)
+                    delete process.env[name];
+                else
+                    process.env[name] = old;
+            }
+        }
+    };
+}
+// ─── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/** Parse a CONNECT authority (`host:port`) into an https target. */
+function connectTarget(authority) {
+    const colon = authority.lastIndexOf(':');
+    if (colon <= 0)
+        return undefined;
+    const host = authority.slice(0, colon).replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '').toLowerCase().replace(/\.+$/, '');
+    const port = Number(authority.slice(colon + 1));
+    if (host.length === 0 || !Number.isInteger(port) || port < 1 || port > 65535)
+        return undefined;
+    return { scheme: 'https', host, port, ips: isIpLiteral(host) ? [host] : [] };
+}
+/** Parse a URL string into a NetworkTarget. */
+function parseUrlTarget(url) {
+    try {
+        const u = new URL(url);
+        const host = u.hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.+$/, '');
+        if (host.length === 0)
+            return undefined;
+        const port = u.port !== '' ? Number(u.port) : (u.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : u.protocol === 'http:' ? 80 : undefined);
+        return {
+            host,
+            port: port !== undefined && Number.isFinite(port) ? port : undefined,
+            scheme: u.protocol.replace(/:$/, ''),
+            ips: isIpLiteral(host) ? [host] : [],
+        };
+    }
+    catch {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Reject after `ms` if `promise` has not settled. The timer is always
+ * cleared, so a resolved lookup leaves nothing behind.
+ */
+function withTimeout(promise, ms) {
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error(`DNS lookup exceeded ${ms}ms`)), ms);
+        promise.then((value) => { clearTimeout(timer); resolve(value); }, (error) => { clearTimeout(timer); reject(error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error))); });
+    });
+}

package/lib/risk.js

@@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ const RISK_SYSTEM_PROMPT = [
     '  {"risk":"risky","category":"<category>","reason":"short"}',
     '',
     'category must be exactly one of:',
-    '  deletion  — deletes or overwrites data that cannot be regenerated',
+    '  deletion  — deletes or overwrites data that cannot be regenerated (IMPORTANT: see exclusion rules below)',
     '  credential — creates/modifies/exposes credentials, keys, tokens, auth config',
-    '  remote    — affects remote systems, production, databases, messaging, billing, publishing',
+    '  remote    — WRITES to or MODIFIES remote systems (git push, git deploy, kubectl apply, terraform apply, production database writes, messaging, billing, publishing). Must have a write/modify/delete effect on the remote side.',
     '  system    — system-level paths or configuration (/etc, /usr, boot items), shutdown/reboot',
     '  bulk      — mass overwrite of many files, formatting, dd-style irreversible writes',
     '  neutral   — none of the above clearly applies (ordinary edits outside the obvious scope, or you are unsure but see no hard-risk sign)',
@@ -54,6 +54,17 @@ const RISK_SYSTEM_PROMPT = [
     '- safe is only for reversible, in-scope operations that touch no sensitive resource.',
     '- When unsure between safe and neutral, answer neutral; never guess safe.',
     '- Judge the operation content, not merely its location.',
+    '',
+    'DELETION exclusion rules (these override the deletion category):',
+    '- Cleanup of temporary files, build outputs, or failed clone directories is SAFE — even if using rm/rmdir/Remove-Item. Look for temp paths: paths containing "temp", "tmp", "test-clone", "node_modules", ".cache", "dist", "build", or numbered/timestamped directories.',
+    '- Removal of session-local artifacts (files the session itself created) is SAFE.',
+    '- rm -rf on node_modules, .next, __pycache__, .pytest_cache, .git, dist, build is SAFE — these are always regenerable.',
+    '- Deletion inside the workspace that targets non-existent or already-empty paths is SAFE (idempotent cleanup).',
+    '- Only flag as deletion when the target is: (a) user data with no backup, (b) configuration files, (c) database records, (d) files outside the workspace that were not created by this session, or (e) a destructive rm -rf on a directory containing unique, irreplaceable content.',
+    '',
+    'READ-ONLY remote operations are safe: git fetch, git pull, git clone, git log, git diff, git status, git show, npm install (read-only), pip install (read-only), apt-get update, curl/wget (read, no write flag).',
+    '- Operations that only READ from remote systems without modifying them are safe, even if they involve network traffic.',
+    '- Only flag as remote when the operation WRITES, DEPLOYS, PUSHES, or DELETES on the remote side.',
 ].join('\n');
 /** Parse one assistant message into a verdict; anything off-protocol → undefined (caller retries/fails). */
 export function parseRiskVerdict(content) {
@@ -92,9 +103,20 @@ export async function classifyRisk(cfg, req, nowFetch = fetch) {
 }
 /** The bounded user prompt for one risk grading (shared by every transport). */
 export function riskUserText(req) {
+    // Enrich the prompt with full path context so the LLM can judge
+    // whether a deletion targets a temporary/build artifact vs real data.
+    const args = (req.args ?? {});
+    const enriched = { ...args };
+    // Surface the working directory if present (helps LLM see temp paths).
+    if (typeof enriched.cwd === 'string' && enriched.cwd !== '') {
+        enriched.__cwd = enriched.cwd;
+    }
+    if (typeof enriched.workdir === 'string' && enriched.workdir !== '') {
+        enriched.__cwd = enriched.workdir;
+    }
     return JSON.stringify({
         tool: req.tool,
-        args: req.args ?? {},
+        args: enriched,
         reason: req.reason,
         instruction: 'Reply strictly as one JSON object: {"risk":"safe"} or {"risk":"risky","category":"..."} plus a short "reason".',
     });

package/lib/rule-chain.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+import { type PermissionsDoc, type CompiledRuleset, type CompileOptions } from './rule.js';
+export interface RuleChainConfig {
+    /** The rules file name to search for (e.g. `rules.yml`). */
+    readonly rulesFile: string;
+    /** Whether to search up directory ancestors from cwd. Default false. */
+    readonly searchUp?: boolean;
+    /** Fallback path when no file is found in the chain. */
+    readonly fallbackPath?: string;
+    /** Error policy for malformed files: `fail` (throw) or `warn` (skip). Default fail. */
+    readonly badFilePolicy?: 'fail' | 'warn';
+    /** Maximum number of files in the chain. Default 10. */
+    readonly maxChainLength?: number;
+}
+export interface ChainEntry {
+    /** Absolute path to the rules file. */
+    readonly path: string;
+    /** Content hash (compile-cache key). */
+    readonly hash: string;
+    /** Parsed document. */
+    readonly doc: PermissionsDoc;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve the rule chain: find all applicable rules files and merge them.
+ *
+ * @param cwd - The workspace root directory.
+ * @param config - Chain configuration.
+ * @param opts - Compile options forwarded to each file's compiler.
+ * @returns The merged compiled ruleset.
+ */
+export declare function resolveRuleChain(cwd: string, config: RuleChainConfig, opts?: CompileOptions): CompiledRuleset;
+/**
+ * Get or create a compiled ruleset from the cache.
+ * Returns the cached version if the hash matches; otherwise compiles fresh.
+ */
+export declare function cachedCompile(text: string, opts?: CompileOptions): CompiledRuleset;
+/** Clear the compile cache (used in tests and on reload). */
+export declare function clearCompileCache(): void;
+/** Current compile cache size (diagnostics). */
+export declare function compileCacheSize(): number;