dsh-multi-folder 0.2.1 → 0.2.3

package/docs/design.md

@@ -46,9 +46,13 @@ A listener on the `tools/execute` around-dispatch waterfall handles `write`, `ed
      default pipeline, which raises the canonical abort error.
    The result carries the same canonical value/content shapes as the shipped tools, so
    downstream presentation keeps working.
-5. Anything else — unknown tools, paths outside every secondary directory, escalation
-   arguments (`sandbox_permissions`), missing optional services (`shell`, `jobs`),
-   or any error — falls through to `next()` and the default pipeline.
+5. Anything else — unknown tools, paths outside every secondary directory, missing
+   optional services (`shell`, `jobs`), or a failure **before** the target is
+   resolved into a secondary directory (path resolution, config lookup, service
+   lookup) — falls through to `next()` and the default pipeline. An explicit
+   escalation request (`sandbox_permissions` carrying a non-empty mode string) also
+   belongs to the default pipeline, which owns the approval flow; a `null`/empty
+   value is not a request and is intercepted normally.
 
 **Why mode parity is free:** the mode field of the standing policy is never touched.
 The DSH sandbox backends treat the per-call policy as fully specified and fence by its
@@ -77,7 +81,17 @@ at apply time can yield `undefined` when the provider row activates later. There
   handler and the `multiFolder/*` remote endpoints) with an explicit
   `workspace-write` policy rooted at the config directory.
 - A per-process cache keyed by normalized workspace path hydrates lazily (on
-  `agent/created`, `agent/pre-step`, and `tools/execute`).
+  `agent/created`, `agent/pre-step`, and `tools/execute`). On the interception
+  path hydration is **awaited**, not fire-and-forget: a first call that landed
+  before the config read resolved would otherwise see an empty cache, fall
+  through to the default pipeline, and be fenced against the PRIMARY workspace
+  root — a spurious `[sandbox: file access denied under workspace-write mode]`
+  for a secondary-directory mutation. `loadDirs` caches, so only the first call
+  pays the read. Because `sandbox-policy` realpath-canonicalizes the policy
+  workspace root while hydration is keyed by the session cwd **as spelled in
+  the header**, a workspace reached through a symlinked/junctioned ancestor can
+  spell the two differently; the interception consults BOTH keys (and the
+  config guard checks both config-path spellings) before falling through.
 - One shared **core** (`coreList` / `coreAdd` / `coreRemove` / `coreSet`)
   implements validation, canonicalization, sanitization, cache write-through,
   and persistence. The command channel and the remote channel both call it, so
@@ -259,10 +273,12 @@ window.__ModuleLoader__.load({
   Lifting this to real multi-root confinement needs an upstream change
   (`SandboxExecutionPolicy` carrying extra write roots and the ACL runner
   accepting several workspace write SIDs).
-- Intercepted secondary-directory writes bypass the fs observation policy: they emit
-  no `fs/observed` event and do not participate in the `fs/write-intent` intent guard.
-  This is deliberate — secondary directories sit outside the primary workspace's
-  observation domain.
+- Intercepted secondary-directory mutations do not participate in the
+  `fs/write-intent` / `fs/edit-intent` intent guards (the interception calls
+  the backend unconditionally, as a full replacement of the tool body), but
+  they DO emit `fs/observed` with a presence observation after success, exactly
+  like the shipped tools — so the observation layer stays coherent with the
+  file content a re-rooted write/edit produced.
 - `presentationMeta` is not computed on the short-circuit path; tool cards fall back to
   their default presentation.
 - `sandbox_permissions` escalation on `pwsh`/`bash` calls in secondary directories is

package/lib/index.js

@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@
  *    here with the session's standing sandbox policy re-rooted to that
  *    directory — identical semantics to the primary workspace in every mode
  *    (read-only denies, workspace-write allows, danger-full-access allows).
+ *    Interception OWNS such a call from the moment its target is resolved
+ *    inside a secondary directory: an interception failure is reported as the
+ *    call's own error and NEVER falls through to the default pipeline, which
+ *    fences every call against the PRIMARY workspace root and would therefore
+ *    turn any ordinary failure (a missing `old_string`, a locked target, an
+ *    unreadable file) into the spurious
+ *    `[sandbox: file access denied under workspace-write mode]` marker.
+ *    Interception hydrates the configuration AWAITED (never a fire-and-forget
+ *    read) and looks the dirs up by BOTH the policy root and the header cwd
+ *    spelling, so a cold first call and a symlinked workspace cannot fall
+ *    through to the default pipeline and surface a spurious workspace-write
+ *    denial for a secondary-directory mutation. Successful write/edit
+ *    short-circuits emit `fs/observed` like the shipped tools.
  *    Background shell runs (`run_in_background: true`) register with the
  *    generic jobs runtime (`ctx.jobs`) under the same re-rooted policy,
  *    mirroring the shipped pwsh/bash tools so `job_output` / `job_kill` and
@@ -538,43 +551,116 @@ export function apply(ctx) {
     return read.delta + (read.delta.length > 0 && !read.delta.endsWith('\n') ? '\n' : '') + notices.join('\n')
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Model-facing failure for a call the interception OWNS (see the ownership
+   * rule below). A claimed call is never handed back to the default pipeline,
+   * so its real error reaches the model in the shipped tools' error envelope —
+   * `Error: <message>` plus the `FS_*` code — instead of the primary-rooted
+   * sandbox denial. A genuine sandbox denial (read-only mode) keeps the standard
+   * marker plus the one-shot escalation hint, exactly as the shipped
+   * `write`/`edit` tools render it, so the escalation flow is unchanged.
+   */
+  const ownedFailure = (error, policy) => {
+    const code = error && typeof error.code === 'string' && error.code.length > 0 ? error.code : undefined
+    const message =
+      code === 'FS_SANDBOX_DENIED'
+        ? '[sandbox: file access denied under ' + policy.mode + ' mode]\n' +
+          '[sandbox: escalation available \u2014 retry this exact operation once with sandbox_permissions ' +
+          '(the narrowest wider mode that suffices) + justification; the approval prompt asks the user]'
+        : String(error && error.message ? error.message : error)
+    return {
+      isError: true,
+      error: { message, ...(code === undefined ? {} : { info: { code } }) },
+      content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'Error: ' + message }],
+    }
+  }
+
   ctx.on('tools/execute', async (exec, next) => {
-    if (exec.agent && exec.agent.session && exec.agent.session.header) {
-      hydrate(exec.agent.session.header.cwd)
+    // Hydration must be AWAITED on the interception path, not fire-and-forget:
+    // a first call that arrives before the config read resolves would see an
+    // empty dirs cache, fall through to the default pipeline, and be fenced
+    // against the PRIMARY workspace root — surfacing as a spurious
+    // `[sandbox: file access denied under workspace-write mode]` for a
+    // secondary-directory write/edit. `loadDirs` caches, so only the first
+    // call pays the read.
+    const headerCwd =
+      exec.agent && exec.agent.session && exec.agent.session.header
+        ? exec.agent.session.header.cwd
+        : undefined
+    if (typeof headerCwd === 'string' && headerCwd.length > 0) {
+      await loadDirs(headerCwd)
     }
     if (!INTERCEPT_TOOLS.has(exec.name)) return next()
+    // Non-null once the call's target has been resolved into a configured
+    // secondary directory: from that point the interception OWNS the call and a
+    // failure must be reported as this call's error, never handed back to the
+    // default pipeline (which fences against the PRIMARY workspace root and
+    // would answer any failure with the spurious workspace-write denial).
+    let owned = null
     try {
       const args = exec.arguments
       const standing = sandboxPolicy.resolve(exec.agent ? { session: exec.agent.session } : {})
       const primary = standing.workspaceRoot
-      // An explicit escalation request belongs to the default pipeline.
-      if (args && args.sandbox_permissions !== undefined) return next()
+      // An explicit escalation request belongs to the default pipeline (it owns
+      // the approval flow). Only a non-empty mode string is a request: a
+      // null/empty value is not, and must not hand a secondary-directory
+      // mutation to the primary-rooted pipeline.
+      if (args && typeof args.sandbox_permissions === 'string' && args.sandbox_permissions.length > 0) return next()
+      // The policy root is realpath-canonicalized by sandbox-policy while
+      // hydration is keyed by the session cwd as spelled in the header; on a
+      // workspace reached through a symlinked/junctioned ancestor the two
+      // spellings differ, so consult both keys before falling through.
+      const dirs =
+        dirsForSync(primary) ??
+        (typeof headerCwd === 'string' && headerCwd.length > 0 ? dirsForSync(headerCwd) : null)
 
       if (exec.name === 'write' || exec.name === 'edit') {
         const filePath = args && typeof args.file_path === 'string' ? args.file_path : null
         if (filePath === null) return next()
         // Resolve first so `..`, symlinks, and case differences canonicalize
         // before containment matching (same cwd the shipped tools use).
-        const target = await fs.resolve(filePath, { cwd: primary })
+        let target
+        try {
+          target = await fs.resolve(filePath, { cwd: primary })
+        } catch (error) {
+          // An unresolvable ABSOLUTE path that is lexically inside a secondary
+          // directory is still this plugin's call to answer: the default pipeline
+          // would resolve it against the PRIMARY root and report the sandbox
+          // denial, hiding the resolution failure.
+          if (dirs !== null && isAbsolute(filePath)) {
+            const rawHit = longestRootFirst(dirs).find((d) => pathInside(filePath, d))
+            if (rawHit !== undefined) return ownedFailure(error, { ...standing, workspaceRoot: rawHit })
+          }
+          return next()
+        }
         const abs = fs.processPath(target)
         // Security boundary: configuration is user-managed. Reject direct
         // write/edit attempts against the host-owned config file, even before
-        // any directory matching.
-        if (wsKey(abs) === wsKey(configPathFor(primary))) {
+        // any directory matching. Both spellings of the workspace key are
+        // checked (see the dirs lookup above).
+        const guardHits = new Set(
+          [primary, headerCwd].filter((p) => typeof p === 'string' && p.length > 0).map((p) => wsKey(configPathFor(p))),
+        )
+        if (guardHits.has(wsKey(abs))) {
           return {
             isError: true,
             error: { message: 'multi-folder configuration is user-managed' },
             content: [{ type: 'text', text: CONFIG_GUARD_TEXT }],
           }
         }
-        const dirs = dirsForSync(primary)
         if (dirs === null) return next()
         const hit = longestRootFirst(dirs).find((d) => pathInside(abs, d))
         if (hit === undefined) return next()
         const policy = { ...standing, workspaceRoot: hit }
 
         if (exec.name === 'write') {
+          owned = { policy }
           const outcome = await fs.writeText(target, String(args.content), undefined, exec.signal, policy)
+          // Keep the observation layer coherent with the shipped write tool's
+          // contract: a successful create/update is a presence observation.
+          if (typeof ctx.emit === 'function') {
+            ctx.emit('fs/observed', target, { kind: 'present', version: outcome.version }, exec)
+          }
           const displayPath = displayPathOf(target, filePath)
           const value = {
             path: displayPath,
@@ -596,6 +682,7 @@ export function apply(ctx) {
         const newString = args && typeof args.new_string === 'string' ? args.new_string : null
         if (oldString === null || newString === null) return next()
         const replaceAll = args.replace_all === true
+        owned = { policy }
         const outcome = await fs.editText(
           target,
           { oldString, newString, replaceAll },
@@ -603,6 +690,9 @@ export function apply(ctx) {
           exec.signal,
           policy,
         )
+        if (typeof ctx.emit === 'function') {
+          ctx.emit('fs/observed', target, { kind: 'present', version: outcome.version }, exec)
+        }
         const displayPath = displayPathOf(target, filePath)
         const value = { path: displayPath, before: outcome.before, after: outcome.after }
         const text = replaceAll
@@ -614,7 +704,6 @@ export function apply(ctx) {
       if (exec.name === 'pwsh' || exec.name === 'bash') {
         const shell = ctx.get('shell')
         if (shell === undefined) return next()
-        const dirs = dirsForSync(primary)
         if (dirs === null) return next()
         const rawWorkdir = args && typeof args.workdir === 'string' ? args.workdir : null
         const joined = rawWorkdir === null
@@ -650,6 +739,7 @@ export function apply(ctx) {
           if (exec.signal && exec.signal.aborted) return next()
           const jobs = ctx.get('jobs')
           if (jobs === undefined) return next()
+          owned = { policy }
           const jobId = jobs.start({
             kind: exec.name,
             label: String(args.command),
@@ -670,6 +760,7 @@ export function apply(ctx) {
           }
         }
 
+        owned = { policy }
         const result = await shell.run(shell.resolve({ ...request, signal: exec.signal }))
         if (result.aborted) {
           return {
@@ -710,9 +801,14 @@ export function apply(ctx) {
         return { isError: false, value, content: [{ type: 'text', text: shellRender(value) }] }
       }
       return next()
-    } catch {
-      // Any interception failure falls back to the default pipeline.
-      return next()
+    } catch (error) {
+      // A failure BEFORE the call was claimed (path resolution, config lookup,
+      // shell service lookup) falls back to the default pipeline. A failure
+      // AFTER the claim — the mutation or the shell run itself — does not: the
+      // default pipeline fences the call against the PRIMARY workspace root, so
+      // it could only answer with the spurious workspace-write denial and would
+      // hide the real cause (for example a missing `old_string`).
+      return owned === null ? next() : ownedFailure(error, owned.policy)
     }
   })
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "dsh-multi-folder",
-  "version": "0.2.1",
+  "version": "0.2.3",
   "description": "DeepSeek Harness plugin: secondary working directories for a project. The agent keeps the primary workspace as cwd, gains equal write/exec permissions on configured secondary directories under workspace-write mode, and is notified of configuration changes at the next message boundary. Configurable from the session header AND from the session-creation page (before the first message) through a sessionless multiFolder remote API.",
   "keywords": [
     "dsh-plugin",
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@
     "compatibility": {
       "node": ">=20",
       "dshReleases": {
+        "0.1.2-alpha.5": "compatible",
+        "0.1.2-alpha.4": "compatible",
+        "0.1.2-alpha.3": "compatible",
+        "0.1.2-alpha.2": "compatible",
         "0.1.1-rc.2": "incompatible",
         "0.1.2-alpha.1": "compatible"
       }