dsh-logicprobe 0.3.1 → 0.5.0

package/skills/logicprobe/references/concurrency-risk-guide.md

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Concurrency Risk Mining Guide
+
+logicprobe does **not** prove concurrency safety. It mines design documents and plans for concurrency-related claims so they are either explicitly verified with dedicated tools or marked as unverified.
+
+## When to use
+
+**Prerequisite: confirm the verification target actually has concurrency requirements or behavior** — multiple threads, async tasks, interrupts, shared state, or parallel execution. Do not run concurrency mining on purely sequential designs just because a generic word like "parallel" or "atomic" appears.
+
+Use when a document contains:
+
+- "thread-safe", "lock-free", "wait-free", "no data race", "race-free"
+- "race condition", "data race", "atomic", "synchronized"
+- "mutex", "semaphore", "spinlock", "reentrant", "interrupt-safe"
+- "concurrent", "parallel", "multi-threaded", "shared variable", "shared memory"
+
+## DSH tool
+
+```text
+logicprobe_concurrency_scan text="..."
+```
+
+Returns:
+
+- `CONCURRENCY_ABSOLUTE_CLAIM` (error) for guarantees like "thread-safe" / "lock-free" / "no data race"
+- `CONCURRENCY_KEYWORD` (warning) for risk-related terms like "race condition" / "shared memory" / "mutex"
+
+## Manual mining checklist
+
+- [ ] Scan for absolute concurrency safety claims.
+- [ ] For each absolute claim, require dedicated evidence: TSan report, model-checking result, formal proof, or a clear design argument.
+- [ ] If no evidence exists, mark the claim `UNVERIFIED` and escalate to concurrency analysis.
+- [ ] Do not treat "uses mutex" as "thread-safe" — synchronization primitives are not proof.
+
+## Interrupt safety
+
+Interrupt safety is a first-class concurrency dimension in embedded/real-time designs. The scan treats the following as interrupt-related risk points:
+
+- `interrupt-safe`, `ISR-safe` → absolute claims (error)
+- `interrupt safety`, `interrupt context`, `ISR`, `IRQ`, `NMI`, `critical section`
+- `disable_irq`, `enable_irq`, `spin_lock_irqsave` → warning, verify pairing and nesting
+
+Manual checklist:
+
+- [ ] If the design claims "interrupt-safe", require evidence: critical sections, IRQ disable windows, atomic operations, or formal reasoning.
+- [ ] Check that `disable_irq` / `enable_irq` are paired on all paths.
+- [ ] Check that ISR-context code does not call blocking/sleeping primitives.
+- [ ] Check that shared variables between ISR and thread context are protected (atomic, critical section, or lock-free protocol).
+
+## Escalation targets
+
+- C/C++: ThreadSanitizer, Helgrind
+- Java: JCStress, Java PathFinder
+- General: TLA+, SPIN, Alloy
+- Rust: loom, Shuttle

package/skills/logicprobe/references/dsh-model-schema.md

@@ -1,104 +1,145 @@
-# DSH Model Schema v1 — logicprobe_verify
-
-The dsh-native `logicprobe_verify` tool accepts a structured JSON model. The engine runs 14 checks (S1-S7 structural, A1-A7 adversarial) and returns a JSON report. Guards and updates are structured data — no code strings, no arbitrary execution.
-
-## Top-level model
-
-```json
-{
-  "schemaVersion": 1,
-  "init": "INIT",
-  "states": [{ "id": "INIT" }, { "id": "ACTIVE", "terminal": true }],
-  "transitions": [
-    { "from": "INIT", "event": "go", "to": "ACTIVE" }
-  ],
-  "variables": [],
-  "invariants": [],
-  "concurrentPairs": [],
-  "boundaryChecks": [],
-  "resourcePairs": []
-}
-```
-
-| Field | Required | Meaning |
-|---|---|---|
-| `schemaVersion` | yes | Must be `1` |
-| `init` | yes | Initial state id |
-| `states` | yes | `{ id, terminal? }`; `terminal` exempts S2/S3/S5/A1 |
-| `transitions` | yes | `{ from, event, to, guard?, updates? }` |
-| `variables` | no | `{ name, kind: integer\|boolean, init, min?, max? }` |
-| `invariants` | no | See invariant kinds below |
-| `concurrentPairs` | no | `["eventA", "eventB"]` pairs for A2 |
-| `boundaryChecks` | no | `{ variable, values: number[] }` for A5 |
-| `resourcePairs` | no | `{ resource, acquireEvent, releaseEvent, failEvent? }` for A4/A6 |
-
-## Guards
-
-A guard is exactly one of:
-
-```json
-{ "variable": "retry", "op": "<", "value": 3 }
-{ "all": [ { "variable": "armed", "op": "==", "value": true }, { "variable": "retry", "op": ">", "value": 0 } ] }
-{ "any": [ { "variable": "mode", "op": "==", "value": 1 }, { "variable": "mode", "op": "==", "value": 2 } ] }
-{ "not": { "variable": "locked", "op": "==", "value": true } }
-```
-
-- Boolean variables only support `==` / `!=`.
-- A transition with **no guard** is the default/else branch for its `(from, event)` group. It fires only when no guarded branch in that group is true.
-- Multiple true guards in one `(from, event)` group are reported as S4 nondeterminism; a group with guards and no default must be exhaustive or S6 flags the missing branch.
-
-## Updates
-
-```json
-{ "variable": "retry", "op": "inc", "value": 1 }
-{ "variable": "retry", "op": "set", "value": 0 }
-{ "variable": "retry", "op": "dec", "value": 1 }
-```
-
-`inc`/`dec` default to 1 when `value` is omitted. `set` defaults to 0.
-
-## Invariants
-
-| Kind | Shape | Checks |
-|---|---|---|
-| `never-states` | `{ states: ["ERROR"] }` | No reachable runtime state may be in the forbidden set |
-| `var-in-range` | `{ variable, min?, max? }` | Every reachable runtime state keeps the variable in range |
-| `event-before-state` | `{ event: "power_ready", state: "ACTIVE" }` | Every path entering `state` must have passed through `event` first |
-
-A7 reports the shortest violating path for each failed invariant. An empty path means the initial state already violates it.
-
-## Permission presets and interaction mode
-
-| Preset | sandbox | approval | logicprobe behavior |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `workspace-write` | workspace-write | ask | Evidence stays in workspace; model confirmation defaults to ask |
-| `danger-full-access` | danger-full-access | never | Full file access; interaction resolves to auto; never request sandbox escalation |
-| custom | any | any | The session folds the last `sandbox/mode` and `approval/policy` events; interaction follows approval only |
-
-In `interaction=auto`, do NOT call `ask_user_question` for model confirmation. Round-trip the extracted model into a transition table, compare it against the source extraction, and mark the report `UNCONFIRMED`.
-
-## Minimal example
-
-```json
-{
-  "schemaVersion": 1,
-  "init": "INIT",
-  "states": [
-    { "id": "INIT" },
-    { "id": "RETRY" },
-    { "id": "FATAL", "terminal": true }
-  ],
-  "transitions": [
-    { "from": "INIT", "event": "timeout", "guard": { "variable": "retry", "op": "<", "value": 3 }, "to": "RETRY", "updates": [{ "variable": "retry", "op": "inc" }] },
-    { "from": "INIT", "event": "timeout", "guard": { "variable": "retry", "op": ">=", "value": 3 }, "to": "FATAL" }
-  ],
-  "variables": [{ "name": "retry", "kind": "integer", "init": 0, "min": 0, "max": 3 }],
-  "boundaryChecks": [{ "variable": "retry", "values": [0, 1, 2, 3] }]
-}
-```
-
-## Limits
-
-- State-space exploration caps at `maxStates` (default 10000); larger guards/domains may report truncation instead of a false pass.
-- A3 samples the first `maxPermutationEvents` events (default 5).
-- The engine is a finite-state model checker. It cannot prove properties of the real implementation; follow with code-level review.
+# DSH Model Schema v1 — logicprobe_verify
+
+The dsh-native `logicprobe_verify` tool accepts a structured JSON model. The engine runs 19 checks (S1-S8 structural, A1-A11 adversarial) and returns a JSON report. When `beforeModel` is supplied, it also runs D1-D4 before/after regression checks. Guards and updates are structured data — no code strings, no arbitrary execution.
+
+## Top-level model
+
+```json
+{
+  "schemaVersion": 1,
+  "init": "INIT",
+  "states": [{ "id": "INIT" }, { "id": "ACTIVE", "terminal": true }],
+  "transitions": [
+    { "from": "INIT", "event": "go", "to": "ACTIVE" }
+  ],
+  "variables": [],
+  "invariants": [],
+  "concurrentPairs": [],
+  "boundaryChecks": [],
+  "resourcePairs": [],
+  "idempotentEvents": []
+}
+```
+
+| Field | Required | Meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `schemaVersion` | yes | Must be `1` |
+| `init` | yes | Initial state id |
+| `states` | yes | `{ id, terminal? }`; `terminal` exempts S2/S3/S5/A1 |
+| `transitions` | yes | `{ from, event, to, guard?, updates? }` |
+| `variables` | no | `{ name, kind: integer\|boolean, init, min?, max?, monotonic? }` |
+| `invariants` | no | See invariant kinds below |
+| `concurrentPairs` | no | `["eventA", "eventB"]` pairs for A2 |
+| `boundaryChecks` | no | `{ variable, values: number[] }` for A5 |
+| `resourcePairs` | no | `{ resource, acquireEvent, releaseEvent, failEvent? }` for A4/A6 |
+| `idempotentEvents` | no | Events that must be replay-safe; verified by A8 |
+
+## Guards
+
+A guard is exactly one of:
+
+```json
+{ "variable": "retry", "op": "<", "value": 3 }
+{ "all": [ { "variable": "armed", "op": "==", "value": true }, { "variable": "retry", "op": ">", "value": 0 } ] }
+{ "any": [ { "variable": "mode", "op": "==", "value": 1 }, { "variable": "mode", "op": "==", "value": 2 } ] }
+{ "not": { "variable": "locked", "op": "==", "value": true } }
+```
+
+- Boolean variables only support `==` / `!=`.
+- A transition with **no guard** is the default/else branch for its `(from, event)` group. It fires only when no guarded branch in that group is true.
+- Multiple true guards in one `(from, event)` group are reported as S4 nondeterminism; a group with guards and no default must be exhaustive or S6 flags the missing branch.
+
+## Updates
+
+```json
+{ "variable": "retry", "op": "inc", "value": 1 }
+{ "variable": "retry", "op": "set", "value": 0 }
+{ "variable": "retry", "op": "dec", "value": 1 }
+```
+
+`inc`/`dec` default to 1 when `value` is omitted. `set` defaults to 0.
+
+## Invariants
+
+| Kind | Shape | Checks |
+|---|---|---|
+| `never-states` | `{ states: ["ERROR"] }` | No reachable runtime state may be in the forbidden set |
+| `var-in-range` | `{ variable, min?, max? }` | Every reachable runtime state keeps the variable in range |
+| `event-before-state` | `{ event: "power_ready", state: "ACTIVE" }` | Every path entering `state` must have passed through `event` first |
+| `leads-to` | `{ from: "MIGRATING", to: "DONE" }` | Every path from `from` must eventually reach `to` |
+| `sequence` | `{ events: ["backup", "modify", "commit"] }` | Events must occur in the given order |
+| `atomicity` | `{ events: ["write"], commit: "commit", rollback?: "rollback" }` | Atomic group must end with commit/rollback before leaving scope |
+
+A7 reports the shortest violating path for each failed invariant. An empty path means the initial state already violates it.
+
+## Permission presets and interaction mode
+
+| Preset | sandbox | approval | logicprobe behavior |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `workspace-write` | workspace-write | ask | Evidence stays in workspace; model confirmation defaults to ask |
+| `danger-full-access` | danger-full-access | never | Full file access; interaction resolves to auto; never request sandbox escalation |
+| custom | any | any | The session folds the last `sandbox/mode` and `approval/policy` events; interaction follows approval only |
+
+In `interaction=auto`, do NOT call `ask_user_question` for model confirmation. Round-trip the extracted model into a transition table, compare it against the source extraction, and mark the report `UNCONFIRMED`.
+
+## Minimal example
+
+```json
+{
+  "schemaVersion": 1,
+  "init": "INIT",
+  "states": [
+    { "id": "INIT" },
+    { "id": "RETRY" },
+    { "id": "FATAL", "terminal": true }
+  ],
+  "transitions": [
+    { "from": "INIT", "event": "timeout", "guard": { "variable": "retry", "op": "<", "value": 3 }, "to": "RETRY", "updates": [{ "variable": "retry", "op": "inc" }] },
+    { "from": "INIT", "event": "timeout", "guard": { "variable": "retry", "op": ">=", "value": 3 }, "to": "FATAL" }
+  ],
+  "variables": [{ "name": "retry", "kind": "integer", "init": 0, "min": 0, "max": 3 }],
+  "boundaryChecks": [{ "variable": "retry", "values": [0, 1, 2, 3] }]
+}
+```
+
+## Before/after comparison (D1-D4)
+
+When `beforeModel` is passed to `logicprobe_verify`, the engine treats `model` as AFTER and runs four extra checks after S1-A11:
+
+| Check | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| D1 Behavioral Preservation | Every BEFORE (state, event) that could fire must still be fireable from the mapped AFTER state |
+| D2 Invariant Continuity | Every BEFORE invariant (mapped through `stateMapping`) must still hold in AFTER |
+| D3 Regression Delta | Lists added/removed states, events, and transitions |
+| D4 Deadlock/Liveness Regression | New deadlock states or closed SCCs not present in BEFORE |
+
+`stateMapping` maps BEFORE state ids to AFTER state ids. Omit it when state names are unchanged.
+
+Example tool call shape:
+
+```json
+{
+  "model": { "...": "AFTER LogicModelV1" },
+  "beforeModel": { "...": "BEFORE LogicModelV1" },
+  "stateMapping": { "OLD_INIT": "INIT", "OLD_ACTIVE": "ACTIVE" }
+}
+```
+
+The report's `comparison` object includes both model hashes, state/transition counts, and delta arrays.
+
+## Idempotent replay (A8)
+
+List events that must be idempotent in `idempotentEvents`. For every reachable state, applying the event twice must produce the same state as applying it once. This is useful for retries, webhook redelivery, and migration replay.
+
+## Advanced constraints (S8, A9-A11)
+
+- **S8 Monotonic Variables**: declare `monotonic: "inc"|"dec"` on a variable; updates must not move in the opposite direction.
+- **A9 Leads-To**: `{ kind: "leads-to", from, to }` — every path from `from` must eventually reach `to`.
+- **A10 Sequence**: `{ kind: "sequence", events }` — events must appear in order.
+- **A11 Atomicity**: `{ kind: "atomicity", events, commit, rollback? }` — once an atomic event starts, the machine must reach commit/rollback before leaving the atomic scope or terminating.
+
+## Limits
+
+- State-space exploration caps at `maxStates` (default 10000); larger guards/domains may report truncation instead of a false pass.
+- A3 samples the first `maxPermutationEvents` events (default 5).
+- The engine is a finite-state model checker. It cannot prove properties of the real implementation; follow with code-level review.