dsh-chief 1.3.0 → 1.4.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +42 -12
- package/README.en.md +143 -116
- package/README.md +134 -142
- package/api-routes.js +19 -2
- package/board-actions.js +72 -1
- package/board-schema.js +1 -1
- package/chief-approvals.js +241 -81
- package/chief-archives.js +35 -0
- package/chief-commands.js +615 -108
- package/chief-executor.js +279 -555
- package/chief-network.js +157 -8
- package/chief-review.js +33 -1
- package/chief-state.js +497 -81
- package/chief-view.js +21 -6
- package/client.js +1953 -506
- package/model-tools.js +78 -2
- package/package.json +35 -24
- package/runtime-hooks.js +108 -2
- package/safety/audit-log.js +95 -0
- package/safety/command-analyzer.js +339 -0
- package/safety/guard-walls.js +993 -0
- package/safety/index.js +78 -0
- package/safety/invariant-guards.js +280 -0
- package/safety/path-guard.js +227 -0
- package/safety/policy-engine.js +387 -0
- package/safety/policy-plugin.js +391 -0
- package/safety/tool-gate.js +278 -0
- package/subagent-runtime.js +9 -2
package/chief-executor.js
CHANGED
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@@ -1,121 +1,98 @@
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import fs from 'node:fs'
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import path from 'node:path'
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import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'
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'auto-review': 'strategist',
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chief: 'chief',
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'chief-of-staff': 'chief',
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l3: 'chief',
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}
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export function normalizePermissionMode(raw, opts = {}) {
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const v = String(raw || '').trim().toLowerCase()
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const hasAck = Boolean(opts && opts.hasChiefRiskAck)
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const requireAck = Boolean(opts && opts.requireAck)
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if (v === 'danger-full-access') {
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return hasAck ? 'chief' : DEFAULT_CHIEF_PERMISSION_MODE
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}
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const mapped = PERM_ALIAS_MAP[v] || DEFAULT_CHIEF_PERMISSION_MODE
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if (mapped === 'chief' && requireAck && !hasAck) {
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return DEFAULT_CHIEF_PERMISSION_MODE
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}
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return mapped
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}
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export function permissionRank(mode) {
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const norm = normalizePermissionMode(mode)
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return (CHIEF_PERMISSION_META[norm] && CHIEF_PERMISSION_META[norm].rank) ?? 0
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import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks'
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import {
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CHIEF_PERMISSION_MODES,
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DEFAULT_CHIEF_PERMISSION_MODE,
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CHIEF_PERMISSION_META,
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normalizePermissionMode,
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permissionRank,
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getToolOpClass,
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resolveRoleCapabilities,
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buildCapabilityScope,
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verifyCapabilityScope,
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HUMAN_BOUNDS_CONFIRM_TOKEN,
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safeRealpath,
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isPathInsideWorkspace,
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hasWindowsReservedDeviceName,
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hasForbiddenNtfsAds,
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isSensitiveCredentialPath,
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validateWorkspacePath,
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verifyBoundsWriteAuth,
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decodeEncodedPowerShell,
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normalizeCommandForSecurity,
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splitCompoundCommand,
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extractInlineScriptPayloads,
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analyzeCommand,
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HARD_GUARD_RULE_IDS,
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isDestructiveShellCommand,
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commandTouchesSensitiveCredential,
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checkForbiddenBounds,
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evaluateSafetyGuardHardRules,
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FORBIDDEN_WEAKENING_KEYS,
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validatePolicyPlugin,
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validatePolicyPluginList,
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evaluatePolicyPlugins,
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evaluateChiefPermissionGate,
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evaluateUnifiedToolGate,
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GUARD_WALL_RULE_TYPES,
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GUARD_WALL_SCOPES,
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guardWallsFilePath,
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validateGuardWallInput,
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normalizeGuardWall,
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isGuardWallActiveForCwd,
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listGuardWalls,
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mutateGuardWalls,
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evaluateGuardWalls,
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evaluatePreExecuteDefense,
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redactAuditText,
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} from './safety/index.js'
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export {
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CHIEF_PERMISSION_MODES,
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DEFAULT_CHIEF_PERMISSION_MODE,
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CHIEF_PERMISSION_META,
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normalizePermissionMode,
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permissionRank,
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getToolOpClass,
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resolveRoleCapabilities,
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buildCapabilityScope,
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verifyCapabilityScope,
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HUMAN_BOUNDS_CONFIRM_TOKEN,
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safeRealpath,
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isPathInsideWorkspace,
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hasWindowsReservedDeviceName,
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hasForbiddenNtfsAds,
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isSensitiveCredentialPath,
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validateWorkspacePath,
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verifyBoundsWriteAuth,
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decodeEncodedPowerShell,
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normalizeCommandForSecurity,
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splitCompoundCommand,
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extractInlineScriptPayloads,
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analyzeCommand,
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HARD_GUARD_RULE_IDS,
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isDestructiveShellCommand,
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commandTouchesSensitiveCredential,
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checkForbiddenBounds,
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evaluateSafetyGuardHardRules,
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FORBIDDEN_WEAKENING_KEYS,
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validatePolicyPlugin,
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validatePolicyPluginList,
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evaluatePolicyPlugins,
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evaluateChiefPermissionGate,
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evaluateUnifiedToolGate,
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GUARD_WALL_RULE_TYPES,
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GUARD_WALL_SCOPES,
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guardWallsFilePath,
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validateGuardWallInput,
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normalizeGuardWall,
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isGuardWallActiveForCwd,
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listGuardWalls,
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mutateGuardWalls,
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evaluateGuardWalls,
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evaluatePreExecuteDefense,
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}
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export const CHIEF_TOOLS_PROMPT_GUIDE = [
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return s.slice(0, head) + `\n...[已截断 ${s.length - maxBytes} 字符]...\n` + s.slice(-tail)
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}
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function safeRealpath(targetPath) {
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try {
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return fs.realpathSync.native ? fs.realpathSync.native(targetPath) : fs.realpathSync(targetPath)
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} catch {
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return path.resolve(targetPath)
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}
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}
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export function isPathInsideWorkspace(workspaceRoot, targetPath) {
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if (!workspaceRoot || !targetPath) return false
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const rootAbs = safeRealpath(workspaceRoot)
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let probe = path.resolve(rootAbs, targetPath)
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if (!fs.existsSync(probe)) {
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const parent = path.dirname(probe)
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probe = fs.existsSync(parent) ? path.join(safeRealpath(parent), path.basename(probe)) : path.resolve(probe)
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} else {
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probe = safeRealpath(probe)
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}
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const cmpRoot = process.platform === 'win32' ? rootAbs.toLowerCase() : rootAbs
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const cmpTarget = process.platform === 'win32' ? probe.toLowerCase() : probe
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const rel = path.relative(cmpRoot, cmpTarget)
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return rel === '' || (!rel.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(rel))
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}
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const SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_BASENAMES = /^(?:\.+env(?:\.[a-z0-9_-]+)?|\.credentials(?:\.[a-z0-9_-]+)?|\.(?:git-credentials|npmrc|pypirc|netrc))$/i
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const SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_FULLPATH = /(?:id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_ecdsa|id_dsa|\.pem$|\.p12$|\.pfx$|credentials\.json$|secrets?\.(?:json|ya?ml)$)/i
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function isSensitiveNameOrStream(candidate) {
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const s = String(candidate || '').trim()
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if (!s || s === '$DATA') return false
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const slashNorm = s.replace(/\\/g, '/').toLowerCase()
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const base = path.basename(slashNorm)
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if (SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_BASENAMES.test(base)) return true
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if (SENSITIVE_CREDENTIAL_FULLPATH.test(slashNorm)) return true
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return false
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}
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function resolveWithSymlinkTarget(filePath) {
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const out = []
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const raw = String(filePath || '').trim()
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if (!raw) return out
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out.push(raw)
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try {
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const abs = path.resolve(raw)
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out.push(abs)
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try {
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const lst = fs.lstatSync(abs)
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if (lst.isSymbolicLink()) {
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const linkTarget = fs.readlinkSync(abs)
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out.push(linkTarget)
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out.push(path.resolve(path.dirname(abs), linkTarget))
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}
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} catch {}
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out.push(safeRealpath(abs))
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const parent = path.dirname(abs)
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if (fs.existsSync(parent)) {
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out.push(path.join(safeRealpath(parent), path.basename(abs)))
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}
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} catch {}
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return out
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}
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function isSensitiveCredentialPath(filePath) {
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const candidates = resolveWithSymlinkTarget(filePath)
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for (const cand of candidates) {
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if (isSensitiveNameOrStream(cand)) return true
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// Strip Windows drive letter `C:` then inspect any NTFS Alternate Data Streams (`file.txt:.env:$DATA`)
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const withoutDrive = String(cand || '').replace(/^[a-zA-Z]:(?=[\\/]|$)/, '')
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if (withoutDrive.includes(':')) {
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for (const streamPart of withoutDrive.split(':')) {
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if (isSensitiveNameOrStream(streamPart)) return true
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}
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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function decodeEncodedPowerShell(command) {
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const decodedParts = []
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const raw = String(command || '')
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const re = /(?:^|\s)-(?:e|ec|en|enc|enco|encod|encode|encoded|encodedc|encodedco|encodedcom|encodedcomm|encodedcomma|encodedcomman|encodedcommand)\s+([A-Za-z0-9+/=]{8,})/gi
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let m
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while ((m = re.exec(raw)) !== null) {
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try {
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const buf = Buffer.from(m[1], 'base64')
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for (const enc of ['utf16le', 'utf8']) {
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const rawTxt = buf.toString(enc)
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if (/[\x00-\x08\x0e-\x1f\ufffd]/.test(rawTxt)) continue
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const txt = rawTxt.trim()
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if (txt.length >= 3 && /^[ -~\t\r\n\u4e00-\u9fff]+$/.test(txt)) {
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decodedParts.push(txt)
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}
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}
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} catch {}
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}
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return decodedParts.join(' ')
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}
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function extractCanonicalToolSubcommands(text) {
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const extras = []
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const s = String(text || '')
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const gitValFlags = new Set(['-c', '--git-dir', '--work-tree', '--namespace', '--config-env', '--exec-path', '-p', '--paginate'])
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const gitRe = /\bgit(?:\.exe)?\s+([^\n;|&`]+)/gi
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let gm
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while ((gm = gitRe.exec(s)) !== null) {
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const tokens = gm[1].trim().split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean)
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let i = 0
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while (i < tokens.length) {
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const tok = tokens[i]
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if (tok === '-C' || gitValFlags.has(tok)) {
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i += 2
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continue
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}
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if (tok.startsWith('-')) {
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-
i += 1
|
|
377
|
-
continue
|
|
378
|
-
}
|
|
379
|
-
break
|
|
380
|
-
}
|
|
381
|
-
if (i < tokens.length) {
|
|
382
|
-
const rest = tokens.slice(i).join(' ')
|
|
383
|
-
extras.push(`git ${tokens[i]}`, `git ${rest}`)
|
|
384
|
-
}
|
|
385
|
-
}
|
|
386
|
-
const npmRe = /\bnpm(?:\.cmd|\.exe)?\s+([^\n;|&`]+)/gi
|
|
387
|
-
let nm
|
|
388
|
-
while ((nm = npmRe.exec(s)) !== null) {
|
|
389
|
-
const tokens = nm[1].trim().split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean)
|
|
390
|
-
let i = 0
|
|
391
|
-
while (i < tokens.length && tokens[i].startsWith('-')) {
|
|
392
|
-
i += (tokens[i] === '--registry' || tokens[i] === '--tag' || tokens[i] === '--prefix') ? 2 : 1
|
|
393
|
-
}
|
|
394
|
-
if (i < tokens.length) {
|
|
395
|
-
extras.push(`npm ${tokens.slice(i).join(' ')}`)
|
|
396
|
-
}
|
|
397
|
-
}
|
|
398
|
-
return extras.join(' ')
|
|
399
|
-
}
|
|
400
|
-
|
|
401
|
-
export function normalizeCommandForSecurity(command) {
|
|
402
|
-
const nfkc = String(command || '').normalize('NFKC')
|
|
403
|
-
if (!nfkc) return ''
|
|
404
|
-
const psDecoded = decodeEncodedPowerShell(nfkc)
|
|
405
|
-
const base = psDecoded ? `${nfkc} ${psDecoded}` : nfkc
|
|
406
|
-
const concatCollapsed = base.replace(/(['"`])\s*\+\s*\1/g, '')
|
|
407
|
-
const escapedQuotesUnwrapped = concatCollapsed.replace(/\\(["'`])/g, '$1').replace(/["'`]/g, '')
|
|
408
|
-
const caretCollapsed = escapedQuotesUnwrapped.replace(/\^([a-zA-Z0-9_.-])/g, '$1')
|
|
409
|
-
const quoteStripped = concatCollapsed.replace(/["'`]/g, '')
|
|
410
|
-
const shellUnescaped = caretCollapsed.replace(/\\([ \t!$&()*,.;<>?@[\]^`{|}~])/g, '$1')
|
|
411
|
-
const spaceCollapsed = shellUnescaped.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim()
|
|
412
|
-
const canonicalTools = [
|
|
413
|
-
extractCanonicalToolSubcommands(spaceCollapsed),
|
|
414
|
-
extractCanonicalToolSubcommands(caretCollapsed.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim()),
|
|
415
|
-
].filter(Boolean).join(' ')
|
|
416
|
-
return [nfkc, psDecoded, concatCollapsed, quoteStripped, escapedQuotesUnwrapped, caretCollapsed, spaceCollapsed, canonicalTools]
|
|
417
|
-
.filter(Boolean)
|
|
418
|
-
.join(' \n ')
|
|
419
|
-
}
|
|
420
|
-
|
|
421
|
-
const DESTRUCTIVE_COMMAND_PATTERNS = [
|
|
422
|
-
/\brm\s+-[a-z]*(?:r[a-z]*f|f[a-z]*r)[a-z]*\s+(?:\/(?:etc|usr|bin|sbin|var|lib|boot|dev|proc|sys|root|home|\*)?(?=$|[\s/])|~|\*|\.\.)/i,
|
|
423
|
-
/\bgit\s+(?:reset\s+--hard|clean\s+-[a-z]*f[a-z]*d|push\s+(?:--force|-f)\b)/i,
|
|
424
|
-
/\b(?:format|diskpart|cipher\s+\/w|bcdedit)\b/i,
|
|
425
|
-
/\bdel\s+\/[fqs][^\n]*[a-z]:\\/i,
|
|
426
|
-
/\bRemove-Item\b[^\n]*-Recurse[^\n]*-Force[^\n]*(?:[a-z]:\\|\*)/i,
|
|
427
|
-
/\b(?:shutdown(?:\.exe)?|restart-computer|stop-computer|mkfs|dd\s+if=.*of=\/dev\/)\b/i,
|
|
428
|
-
/\breg(?:\.exe)?\s+delete\s+(?:hklm|hkcr|hkcu\\software\\microsoft)\b/i,
|
|
429
|
-
/\bdrop\s+(?:database|schema)\b/i,
|
|
430
|
-
]
|
|
431
|
-
|
|
432
|
-
function isDestructiveShellCommand(command) {
|
|
433
|
-
const raw = String(command || '').trim()
|
|
434
|
-
if (!raw) return false
|
|
435
|
-
const norm = normalizeCommandForSecurity(raw)
|
|
436
|
-
return DESTRUCTIVE_COMMAND_PATTERNS.some(re => re.test(raw) || re.test(norm))
|
|
437
|
-
}
|
|
438
|
-
|
|
439
|
-
function commandTouchesSensitiveCredential(command) {
|
|
440
|
-
const raw = String(command || '')
|
|
441
|
-
if (!raw.trim()) return false
|
|
442
|
-
const norm = normalizeCommandForSecurity(raw)
|
|
443
|
-
const varExpanded = norm
|
|
444
|
-
.replace(/%[A-Za-z0-9_]+%/g, '/')
|
|
445
|
-
.replace(/\$env:[A-Za-z0-9_]+/gi, '/')
|
|
446
|
-
.replace(/\$\{[A-Za-z0-9_]+\}/g, '/')
|
|
447
|
-
const re = /(?:^|[\s"'=/\\:;>|&])(?:\.+env(?:\.[a-z0-9_-]+)?|\.credentials(?:\.[a-z0-9_-]+)?|\.(?:git-credentials|npmrc|pypirc|netrc)|id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_ecdsa|id_dsa|[a-z0-9_.-]+\.(?:pem|p12|pfx))(?:$|[\s"';&|><)\r\n])/i
|
|
448
|
-
return re.test(raw) || re.test(norm) || re.test(varExpanded)
|
|
449
|
-
}
|
|
450
|
-
|
|
451
|
-
/**
|
|
452
|
-
* 无论当前处于何种权限级别(包括 danger-full-access),都坚决守住用户在看板中设定的禁止红线。
|
|
453
|
-
*/
|
|
454
|
-
export function checkForbiddenBounds(board, actionDesc = '', commandOrPath = '', extraContent = '') {
|
|
455
|
-
const forbidden = [
|
|
456
|
-
...((board && board.bounds && Array.isArray(board.bounds.forbidden)) ? board.bounds.forbidden : []),
|
|
457
|
-
...((board && board.pinnedBounds && Array.isArray(board.pinnedBounds.forbidden)) ? board.pinnedBounds.forbidden : []),
|
|
458
|
-
]
|
|
459
|
-
if (!forbidden.length) return { blocked: false }
|
|
460
|
-
const primary = String(commandOrPath || '')
|
|
461
|
-
const normCmd = normalizeCommandForSecurity(primary)
|
|
462
|
-
const contentSample = String(extraContent || '').slice(0, 8192).normalize('NFKC')
|
|
463
|
-
const haystack = [
|
|
464
|
-
String(actionDesc || ''),
|
|
465
|
-
primary,
|
|
466
|
-
primary.replace(/\\/g, '/'),
|
|
467
|
-
normCmd,
|
|
468
|
-
normCmd.replace(/\\/g, '/'),
|
|
469
|
-
contentSample,
|
|
470
|
-
contentSample.replace(/\\/g, '/'),
|
|
471
|
-
].join(' \n ').toLowerCase()
|
|
472
|
-
|
|
473
|
-
for (const rule of forbidden) {
|
|
474
|
-
const rText = String(rule || '').trim()
|
|
475
|
-
if (!rText) continue
|
|
476
|
-
const ruleNorm = rText.replace(/\\/g, '/')
|
|
477
|
-
const ruleLower = ruleNorm.toLowerCase()
|
|
478
|
-
|
|
479
|
-
// 1. 提取反引号或引号内的受禁命令或路径字面量,如 `git push`、`npm publish`、"secret.env"
|
|
480
|
-
const quoted = [
|
|
481
|
-
...[...ruleNorm.matchAll(/`([^`]{2,80})`/g)].map(m => m[1]),
|
|
482
|
-
...[...ruleNorm.matchAll(/["'「『]([^"'」』]{2,80})["'」』]/g)].map(m => m[1]),
|
|
483
|
-
].map(s => s.trim().toLowerCase())
|
|
484
|
-
for (const token of quoted) {
|
|
485
|
-
if (token && haystack.includes(token)) {
|
|
486
|
-
return { blocked: true, matchedRule: rText, trigger: token }
|
|
487
|
-
}
|
|
488
|
-
}
|
|
489
|
-
|
|
490
|
-
// 2. 提取不带反引号的文件名、路径片段、点文件或扩展名(如 secret.env、src/auth.js、package.json、.env)
|
|
491
|
-
const pathTokens = [...ruleLower.matchAll(/(?:[a-z0-9_.-]+\/[a-z0-9_.\-\/]+|\.[a-z0-9_-]{2,16}|[a-z0-9_-]{2,40}\.[a-z0-9]{1,10})/g)]
|
|
492
|
-
.map(m => m[0].trim())
|
|
493
|
-
for (const tok of pathTokens) {
|
|
494
|
-
if (tok && tok.length >= 3 && haystack.includes(tok)) {
|
|
495
|
-
return { blocked: true, matchedRule: rText, trigger: tok }
|
|
496
|
-
}
|
|
497
|
-
}
|
|
498
|
-
|
|
499
|
-
// 3. 匹配常见高危动词组合
|
|
500
|
-
const dangerousCmds = [
|
|
501
|
-
'git push',
|
|
502
|
-
'npm publish',
|
|
503
|
-
'git reset --hard',
|
|
504
|
-
'rm -rf',
|
|
505
|
-
'del /f',
|
|
506
|
-
'format ',
|
|
507
|
-
'drop table',
|
|
508
|
-
'drop database',
|
|
509
|
-
]
|
|
510
|
-
for (const cmdTok of dangerousCmds) {
|
|
511
|
-
if (ruleLower.includes(cmdTok) && haystack.includes(cmdTok)) {
|
|
512
|
-
return { blocked: true, matchedRule: rText, trigger: cmdTok }
|
|
513
|
-
}
|
|
514
|
-
}
|
|
515
|
-
|
|
516
|
-
// 4. 若用户直接写了极短裸禁止词(去前缀后 >= 4 字符的命令行或目录标记)
|
|
517
|
-
const stripped = ruleLower
|
|
518
|
-
.replace(/^(?:严禁|禁止|不得|切勿|不要|不能|不可|不允许|勿|do\s+not|never|forbid)\s*/i, '')
|
|
519
|
-
.replace(/^(?:改动|修改|编辑|写入|删除|覆盖|执行|运行|推送|发布|触碰)\s*/i, '')
|
|
520
|
-
.trim()
|
|
521
|
-
if (stripped.length >= 4 && /^[a-z0-9_.\-\/:\s]{4,64}$/.test(stripped) && haystack.includes(stripped)) {
|
|
522
|
-
return { blocked: true, matchedRule: rText, trigger: stripped }
|
|
523
|
-
}
|
|
524
|
-
}
|
|
525
|
-
return { blocked: false }
|
|
526
|
-
}
|
|
527
|
-
|
|
528
239
|
function runSubprocess(command, cwd, timeoutMs = 20_000) {
|
|
529
240
|
return new Promise((resolve) => {
|
|
530
241
|
const clampedTimeout = Math.min(45_000, Math.max(2_000, Number(timeoutMs) || 20_000))
|
|
@@ -672,174 +383,6 @@ function runRgSearch(rootDir, pattern, maxHits = 30) {
|
|
|
672
383
|
})
|
|
673
384
|
}
|
|
674
385
|
|
|
675
|
-
export function getToolOpClass(tool) {
|
|
676
|
-
switch (String(tool || '').trim()) {
|
|
677
|
-
case 'read_file':
|
|
678
|
-
case 'list_dir':
|
|
679
|
-
case 'search_files':
|
|
680
|
-
return 'read'
|
|
681
|
-
case 'request_permission_elevation':
|
|
682
|
-
return 'elevation_request'
|
|
683
|
-
case 'archive_write':
|
|
684
|
-
return 'chief_system'
|
|
685
|
-
case 'write_file':
|
|
686
|
-
case 'edit_file':
|
|
687
|
-
case 'run_command':
|
|
688
|
-
return 'workspace'
|
|
689
|
-
case 'subagent_dispatch':
|
|
690
|
-
case 'subagent_steer':
|
|
691
|
-
case 'subagent_interrupt':
|
|
692
|
-
case 'main_agent_control':
|
|
693
|
-
case 'session_compact':
|
|
694
|
-
return 'workflow'
|
|
695
|
-
default:
|
|
696
|
-
return 'workflow'
|
|
697
|
-
}
|
|
698
|
-
}
|
|
699
|
-
|
|
700
|
-
/** 安全卫兵硬性规则:优先于四级权限判定,L3 与逐项放行均不可绕过。 */
|
|
701
|
-
export function evaluateSafetyGuardHardRules({
|
|
702
|
-
tool = '',
|
|
703
|
-
opClass = '',
|
|
704
|
-
targetPath = '',
|
|
705
|
-
command = '',
|
|
706
|
-
content = '',
|
|
707
|
-
target = '',
|
|
708
|
-
replacement = '',
|
|
709
|
-
extraContent = '',
|
|
710
|
-
args = null,
|
|
711
|
-
board = null,
|
|
712
|
-
} = {}) {
|
|
713
|
-
const argObj = args && typeof args === 'object' ? args : {}
|
|
714
|
-
const resolvedPath = targetPath || (typeof argObj.path === 'string' ? argObj.path : '')
|
|
715
|
-
const resolvedCommand = command || (typeof argObj.command === 'string' ? argObj.command : (typeof argObj.cmd === 'string' ? argObj.cmd : ''))
|
|
716
|
-
|
|
717
|
-
if (resolvedPath && isSensitiveCredentialPath(resolvedPath)) {
|
|
718
|
-
return {
|
|
719
|
-
blocked: true,
|
|
720
|
-
stage: 'safety_guard',
|
|
721
|
-
rule: 'sensitive_credential',
|
|
722
|
-
reason: `安全卫兵拦截访问敏感凭据文件:${path.basename(resolvedPath)}`,
|
|
723
|
-
badge: '🛡️ 卫兵拦凭据',
|
|
724
|
-
}
|
|
725
|
-
}
|
|
726
|
-
if (resolvedCommand && commandTouchesSensitiveCredential(resolvedCommand)) {
|
|
727
|
-
return {
|
|
728
|
-
blocked: true,
|
|
729
|
-
stage: 'safety_guard',
|
|
730
|
-
rule: 'sensitive_credential_cmd',
|
|
731
|
-
reason: '安全卫兵拦截触及敏感凭据路径(.env / .credentials / 私钥证书)的终端命令',
|
|
732
|
-
badge: '🛡️ 卫兵拦凭据命令',
|
|
733
|
-
}
|
|
734
|
-
}
|
|
735
|
-
if (resolvedCommand && isDestructiveShellCommand(resolvedCommand)) {
|
|
736
|
-
return {
|
|
737
|
-
blocked: true,
|
|
738
|
-
stage: 'safety_guard',
|
|
739
|
-
rule: 'destructive_command',
|
|
740
|
-
reason: `安全卫兵拦截高危毁灭性系统命令:${clamp(resolvedCommand, 80)}`,
|
|
741
|
-
badge: '🛡️ 卫兵拦高危命令',
|
|
742
|
-
}
|
|
743
|
-
}
|
|
744
|
-
if (opClass !== 'read' && opClass !== 'elevation_request') {
|
|
745
|
-
const checkInput = resolvedPath || resolvedCommand
|
|
746
|
-
const payloadParts = [
|
|
747
|
-
content,
|
|
748
|
-
target,
|
|
749
|
-
replacement,
|
|
750
|
-
extraContent,
|
|
751
|
-
argObj.content,
|
|
752
|
-
argObj.target,
|
|
753
|
-
argObj.replacement,
|
|
754
|
-
argObj.prompt,
|
|
755
|
-
argObj.message,
|
|
756
|
-
argObj.text,
|
|
757
|
-
argObj.body,
|
|
758
|
-
]
|
|
759
|
-
.filter(v => v !== undefined && v !== null && String(v).trim())
|
|
760
|
-
.map(v => String(v).slice(0, 8192))
|
|
761
|
-
const mergedExtra = payloadParts.join('\n').slice(0, 12_288)
|
|
762
|
-
const boundCheck = checkForbiddenBounds(board, tool, checkInput, mergedExtra)
|
|
763
|
-
if (boundCheck.blocked) {
|
|
764
|
-
return {
|
|
765
|
-
blocked: true,
|
|
766
|
-
stage: 'safety_guard',
|
|
767
|
-
rule: 'forbidden_bound',
|
|
768
|
-
matchedRule: boundCheck.matchedRule,
|
|
769
|
-
reason: `安全卫兵命中禁止红线【${boundCheck.matchedRule}】,坚决拦截:${clamp(checkInput || tool, 80)}`,
|
|
770
|
-
badge: '🛡️ 卫兵拦红线',
|
|
771
|
-
}
|
|
772
|
-
}
|
|
773
|
-
}
|
|
774
|
-
return { blocked: false }
|
|
775
|
-
}
|
|
776
|
-
|
|
777
|
-
/** 四级权限门禁判定:advisor(L0) / assistant(L1) / strategist(L2) / chief(L3)。 */
|
|
778
|
-
export function evaluateChiefPermissionGate({
|
|
779
|
-
permissionMode = DEFAULT_CHIEF_PERMISSION_MODE,
|
|
780
|
-
hasChiefRiskAck = false,
|
|
781
|
-
opClass = 'read',
|
|
782
|
-
tool = '',
|
|
783
|
-
approvedOnce = false,
|
|
784
|
-
} = {}) {
|
|
785
|
-
const mode = normalizePermissionMode(permissionMode, { requireAck: true, hasChiefRiskAck })
|
|
786
|
-
const meta = CHIEF_PERMISSION_META[mode] || CHIEF_PERMISSION_META.advisor
|
|
787
|
-
|
|
788
|
-
if (opClass === 'read' || opClass === 'elevation_request') {
|
|
789
|
-
return { decision: 'allow', mode }
|
|
790
|
-
}
|
|
791
|
-
|
|
792
|
-
if (opClass === 'chief_system') {
|
|
793
|
-
if (mode === 'advisor') {
|
|
794
|
-
return {
|
|
795
|
-
decision: 'deny_mode',
|
|
796
|
-
mode,
|
|
797
|
-
requiredMode: 'assistant',
|
|
798
|
-
error: '当前处于「L0 · 顾问模式(只读)」,仅允许分析与建议,不能修改参谋记忆、档案或看板配置。可向用户申请提权至「L1 · 助手模式」。',
|
|
799
|
-
badge: '🔒 L0禁改参谋系统',
|
|
800
|
-
}
|
|
801
|
-
}
|
|
802
|
-
return { decision: 'allow', mode }
|
|
803
|
-
}
|
|
804
|
-
|
|
805
|
-
// 'workspace' or 'workflow'
|
|
806
|
-
if (mode === 'advisor' || mode === 'assistant') {
|
|
807
|
-
const targetDesc = opClass === 'workspace' ? '修改项目工作区或执行系统命令' : '调整主对话及子代理工作流'
|
|
808
|
-
return {
|
|
809
|
-
decision: 'deny_mode',
|
|
810
|
-
mode,
|
|
811
|
-
requiredMode: 'strategist',
|
|
812
|
-
error: `当前处于「${meta.level} · ${meta.title}」,禁止${targetDesc}(${tool})。如需执行,请向用户申请提权至「L2 · 参谋模式(逐项授权)」或「L3 · 参谋长模式」。`,
|
|
813
|
-
badge: `🔒 ${meta.level}禁止操作`,
|
|
814
|
-
}
|
|
815
|
-
}
|
|
816
|
-
|
|
817
|
-
if (mode === 'strategist') {
|
|
818
|
-
if (approvedOnce) {
|
|
819
|
-
return { decision: 'allow_approved', mode }
|
|
820
|
-
}
|
|
821
|
-
return {
|
|
822
|
-
decision: 'require_approval',
|
|
823
|
-
mode,
|
|
824
|
-
requiredMode: 'strategist',
|
|
825
|
-
error: '「L2 · 参谋模式」要求先通过操作授权弹窗由用户逐项确认。',
|
|
826
|
-
badge: '🛡️ 待逐项确认',
|
|
827
|
-
}
|
|
828
|
-
}
|
|
829
|
-
|
|
830
|
-
// mode === 'chief'
|
|
831
|
-
if (!hasChiefRiskAck) {
|
|
832
|
-
return {
|
|
833
|
-
decision: 'deny_unacknowledged_l3',
|
|
834
|
-
mode: 'advisor',
|
|
835
|
-
requiredMode: 'chief',
|
|
836
|
-
error: '未检测到「L3 · 参谋长模式」风险知悉确认状态(chiefRiskAck),后端拒绝高权限自主执行。',
|
|
837
|
-
badge: '🛡️ L3未授权拦截',
|
|
838
|
-
}
|
|
839
|
-
}
|
|
840
|
-
return { decision: 'allow', mode: 'chief' }
|
|
841
|
-
}
|
|
842
|
-
|
|
843
386
|
function displayRelTarget(cwd, rawTarget) {
|
|
844
387
|
const raw = String(rawTarget || '').trim()
|
|
845
388
|
if (!raw) return '工作区'
|
|
@@ -968,22 +511,28 @@ export function describeControlledOperationMeta(tool, args = {}, cwd = '') {
|
|
|
968
511
|
* 用户模式 -> 操作请求 -> 安全卫兵硬性规则 -> 权限判定 -> 执行器 -> 审计日志
|
|
969
512
|
*/
|
|
970
513
|
export async function executeChiefToolCall(deps, call, execCtx = {}) {
|
|
514
|
+
const startedAt = performance.now()
|
|
971
515
|
const tool = String(call && (call.tool || call.name) || '').trim()
|
|
972
516
|
const args = (call && call.args && typeof call.args === 'object') ? call.args : (call && typeof call === 'object' ? call : {})
|
|
973
517
|
const hasChiefRiskAck = Boolean(execCtx.hasChiefRiskAck)
|
|
518
|
+
const policyPlugins = Array.isArray(execCtx.policyPlugins) ? execCtx.policyPlugins : []
|
|
974
519
|
const permissionMode = normalizePermissionMode(execCtx.permissionMode, { requireAck: true, hasChiefRiskAck })
|
|
975
520
|
const cwd = String(execCtx.cwd || process.cwd())
|
|
976
521
|
const rootId = String(execCtx.rootId || '')
|
|
977
522
|
const board = execCtx.board || {}
|
|
978
523
|
const readOnlyToolsOnly = Boolean(execCtx.readOnlyToolsOnly)
|
|
979
524
|
const approvedOnce = Boolean(execCtx.approvedOnce)
|
|
525
|
+
const capabilityScope = execCtx.capabilityScope || null
|
|
980
526
|
|
|
981
527
|
const writeAudit = (entry) => {
|
|
982
528
|
if (typeof execCtx.recordAuditFn === 'function') {
|
|
983
529
|
try {
|
|
530
|
+
const durationMs = Math.max(0, Math.round(performance.now() - startedAt))
|
|
984
531
|
execCtx.recordAuditFn({
|
|
985
532
|
mode: permissionMode,
|
|
986
533
|
tool,
|
|
534
|
+
durationMs,
|
|
535
|
+
summary: redactAuditText(entry.summary || entry.reason || '', 220),
|
|
987
536
|
by: execCtx.by || 'chief',
|
|
988
537
|
...entry,
|
|
989
538
|
})
|
|
@@ -1004,7 +553,7 @@ export async function executeChiefToolCall(deps, call, execCtx = {}) {
|
|
|
1004
553
|
|
|
1005
554
|
const opClass = getToolOpClass(tool)
|
|
1006
555
|
if (readOnlyToolsOnly && opClass !== 'read') {
|
|
1007
|
-
writeAudit({ stage: 'read_only_guard', decision: 'denied', operation: tool, target: '', reason: '后台复盘仅允许只读核验', outcome: 'blocked' })
|
|
556
|
+
writeAudit({ stage: 'read_only_guard', rule: 'read_only_guard', decision: 'denied', operation: tool, target: '', reason: '后台复盘仅允许只读核验', outcome: 'blocked' })
|
|
1008
557
|
return deny(`后台复盘轮次仅允许只读核验工具(${tool} 已跳过)`)
|
|
1009
558
|
}
|
|
1010
559
|
|
|
@@ -1014,7 +563,7 @@ export async function executeChiefToolCall(deps, call, execCtx = {}) {
|
|
|
1014
563
|
const resolvedAbsTarget = rawTargetPath ? path.resolve(cwd, rawTargetPath) : ''
|
|
1015
564
|
const rawCommand = tool === 'run_command' ? String(args.command || args.cmd || '').trim() : ''
|
|
1016
565
|
|
|
1017
|
-
// Stage 3:
|
|
566
|
+
// Stage 3: 安全卫兵硬性规则(优先于任何权限等级、策略插件与逐项批准)
|
|
1018
567
|
const guardRes = evaluateSafetyGuardHardRules({
|
|
1019
568
|
tool,
|
|
1020
569
|
opClass,
|
|
@@ -1027,26 +576,128 @@ export async function executeChiefToolCall(deps, call, execCtx = {}) {
|
|
|
1027
576
|
if (guardRes.blocked) {
|
|
1028
577
|
writeAudit({
|
|
1029
578
|
stage: 'safety_guard',
|
|
579
|
+
rule: guardRes.rule || 'hard_guard',
|
|
1030
580
|
decision: 'blocked',
|
|
1031
581
|
operation: tool,
|
|
1032
582
|
target: displayRelTarget(cwd, resolvedAbsTarget) || clamp(rawCommand, 80) || tool,
|
|
1033
583
|
reason: guardRes.reason,
|
|
1034
584
|
outcome: 'blocked',
|
|
1035
585
|
})
|
|
1036
|
-
return deny(guardRes.reason, guardRes.badge, { blockedBySafetyGuard: true })
|
|
586
|
+
return deny(guardRes.reason, guardRes.badge, { blockedBySafetyGuard: true, rule: guardRes.rule || 'hard_guard' })
|
|
1037
587
|
}
|
|
1038
588
|
|
|
1039
|
-
// Stage
|
|
589
|
+
// Stage 3.5: 动态物理驻墙检验(同样不受 L3 与逐项放行绕过,require_approval_cmd 转为弹窗确认)
|
|
590
|
+
const wallRes = evaluateGuardWalls({
|
|
591
|
+
tool,
|
|
592
|
+
opClass,
|
|
593
|
+
targetPath: resolvedAbsTarget,
|
|
594
|
+
command: rawCommand,
|
|
595
|
+
args,
|
|
596
|
+
cwd,
|
|
597
|
+
})
|
|
598
|
+
if (wallRes.decision === 'block') {
|
|
599
|
+
writeAudit({
|
|
600
|
+
stage: 'guard_wall',
|
|
601
|
+
rule: wallRes.rule || 'guard_wall_block',
|
|
602
|
+
decision: 'blocked',
|
|
603
|
+
operation: tool,
|
|
604
|
+
target: displayRelTarget(cwd, resolvedAbsTarget) || clamp(rawCommand, 80) || tool,
|
|
605
|
+
reason: wallRes.reason,
|
|
606
|
+
outcome: 'blocked',
|
|
607
|
+
})
|
|
608
|
+
return deny(wallRes.reason, wallRes.badge || '🧱 物理墙拦截', {
|
|
609
|
+
blockedByGuardWall: true,
|
|
610
|
+
blockedBySafetyGuard: true,
|
|
611
|
+
rule: wallRes.rule || 'guard_wall_block',
|
|
612
|
+
wallId: wallRes.wallId,
|
|
613
|
+
})
|
|
614
|
+
}
|
|
615
|
+
if (wallRes.decision === 'require_approval' && !approvedOnce) {
|
|
616
|
+
const meta = describeControlledOperationMeta(tool, args, cwd)
|
|
617
|
+
const computedScope = buildCapabilityScope({ kind: 'tool', tool, args, cwd })
|
|
618
|
+
const approvalObj = typeof execCtx.queueApprovalFn === 'function'
|
|
619
|
+
? await execCtx.queueApprovalFn({
|
|
620
|
+
category: meta.category,
|
|
621
|
+
operationLabel: meta.operationLabel,
|
|
622
|
+
targetLabel: meta.targetLabel,
|
|
623
|
+
reason: wallRes.reason,
|
|
624
|
+
impact: meta.impact,
|
|
625
|
+
preview: meta.preview,
|
|
626
|
+
kind: 'tool',
|
|
627
|
+
capabilityScope: computedScope,
|
|
628
|
+
payload: { tool, args: { ...args }, cwd, rootId, sessionId: execCtx.sessionId || rootId },
|
|
629
|
+
by: execCtx.by || 'guard_wall',
|
|
630
|
+
})
|
|
631
|
+
: null
|
|
632
|
+
writeAudit({
|
|
633
|
+
stage: 'guard_wall',
|
|
634
|
+
rule: wallRes.rule || 'guard_wall_require_approval',
|
|
635
|
+
decision: 'pending_approval',
|
|
636
|
+
operation: meta.operationLabel,
|
|
637
|
+
target: meta.targetLabel,
|
|
638
|
+
reason: wallRes.reason,
|
|
639
|
+
outcome: 'pending',
|
|
640
|
+
})
|
|
641
|
+
return {
|
|
642
|
+
tool,
|
|
643
|
+
ok: false,
|
|
644
|
+
pendingApproval: true,
|
|
645
|
+
approvalId: (approvalObj && approvalObj.id) || '',
|
|
646
|
+
approval: approvalObj || null,
|
|
647
|
+
error: `${wallRes.reason}。已为您弹出「操作授权请求」弹窗,等待点击「允许本次操作」。`,
|
|
648
|
+
badge: wallRes.badge || '🧱 物理墙待确认',
|
|
649
|
+
}
|
|
650
|
+
}
|
|
651
|
+
|
|
652
|
+
// Stage 4: 四级权限 + capabilities + Policy Plugin + 单次作用域判定
|
|
1040
653
|
const gateRes = evaluateChiefPermissionGate({
|
|
1041
654
|
permissionMode,
|
|
1042
655
|
hasChiefRiskAck,
|
|
1043
656
|
opClass,
|
|
1044
657
|
tool,
|
|
1045
658
|
approvedOnce,
|
|
659
|
+
capabilityScope,
|
|
660
|
+
actualRequest: { kind: 'tool', tool, args, cwd },
|
|
661
|
+
policyPlugins,
|
|
662
|
+
targetPath: resolvedAbsTarget,
|
|
663
|
+
command: rawCommand,
|
|
664
|
+
cwd,
|
|
1046
665
|
})
|
|
666
|
+
if (gateRes.decision === 'deny_policy_plugin') {
|
|
667
|
+
writeAudit({
|
|
668
|
+
stage: 'policy_plugin',
|
|
669
|
+
rule: gateRes.rule || 'policy_plugin',
|
|
670
|
+
decision: 'blocked',
|
|
671
|
+
operation: tool,
|
|
672
|
+
target: rawTargetPath || clamp(rawCommand, 60) || tool,
|
|
673
|
+
reason: gateRes.error,
|
|
674
|
+
outcome: 'blocked',
|
|
675
|
+
})
|
|
676
|
+
return deny(gateRes.error, gateRes.badge, {
|
|
677
|
+
blockedByPolicyPlugin: true,
|
|
678
|
+
pluginId: gateRes.pluginId || '',
|
|
679
|
+
rule: gateRes.rule || 'policy_plugin',
|
|
680
|
+
})
|
|
681
|
+
}
|
|
682
|
+
if (gateRes.decision === 'deny_scope_mismatch') {
|
|
683
|
+
writeAudit({
|
|
684
|
+
stage: 'scope_guard',
|
|
685
|
+
rule: gateRes.rule || 'capability_scope_mismatch',
|
|
686
|
+
decision: 'rejected',
|
|
687
|
+
operation: tool,
|
|
688
|
+
target: rawTargetPath || clamp(rawCommand, 60) || tool,
|
|
689
|
+
reason: gateRes.error,
|
|
690
|
+
outcome: 'rejected',
|
|
691
|
+
})
|
|
692
|
+
return deny(gateRes.error, gateRes.badge, {
|
|
693
|
+
deniedByScopeMismatch: true,
|
|
694
|
+
rule: gateRes.rule || 'capability_scope_mismatch',
|
|
695
|
+
})
|
|
696
|
+
}
|
|
1047
697
|
if (gateRes.decision === 'deny_mode' || gateRes.decision === 'deny_unacknowledged_l3') {
|
|
1048
698
|
writeAudit({
|
|
1049
699
|
stage: 'permission_gate',
|
|
700
|
+
rule: gateRes.rule || gateRes.decision,
|
|
1050
701
|
decision: gateRes.decision,
|
|
1051
702
|
operation: tool,
|
|
1052
703
|
target: rawTargetPath || clamp(rawCommand, 60) || String(args.agent || args.op || tool),
|
|
@@ -1061,6 +712,7 @@ export async function executeChiefToolCall(deps, call, execCtx = {}) {
|
|
|
1061
712
|
}
|
|
1062
713
|
if (gateRes.decision === 'require_approval') {
|
|
1063
714
|
const meta = describeControlledOperationMeta(tool, args, cwd)
|
|
715
|
+
const computedScope = buildCapabilityScope({ kind: 'tool', tool, args, cwd })
|
|
1064
716
|
const approvalObj = typeof execCtx.queueApprovalFn === 'function'
|
|
1065
717
|
? await execCtx.queueApprovalFn({
|
|
1066
718
|
category: meta.category,
|
|
@@ -1070,12 +722,14 @@ export async function executeChiefToolCall(deps, call, execCtx = {}) {
|
|
|
1070
722
|
impact: meta.impact,
|
|
1071
723
|
preview: meta.preview,
|
|
1072
724
|
kind: 'tool',
|
|
725
|
+
capabilityScope: computedScope,
|
|
1073
726
|
payload: { tool, args: { ...args }, cwd, rootId, sessionId: execCtx.sessionId || rootId },
|
|
1074
727
|
by: execCtx.by || 'chief',
|
|
1075
728
|
})
|
|
1076
729
|
: null
|
|
1077
730
|
writeAudit({
|
|
1078
731
|
stage: 'permission_gate',
|
|
732
|
+
rule: gateRes.rule || 'require_approval',
|
|
1079
733
|
decision: 'pending_approval',
|
|
1080
734
|
operation: meta.operationLabel,
|
|
1081
735
|
target: meta.targetLabel,
|
|
@@ -1088,15 +742,41 @@ export async function executeChiefToolCall(deps, call, execCtx = {}) {
|
|
|
1088
742
|
pendingApproval: true,
|
|
1089
743
|
approvalId: (approvalObj && approvalObj.id) || '',
|
|
1090
744
|
approval: approvalObj || null,
|
|
1091
|
-
error:
|
|
745
|
+
error: `当前处于「${CHIEF_PERMISSION_META[gateRes.mode]?.level || 'L2'} · ${CHIEF_PERMISSION_META[gateRes.mode]?.title || '参谋模式'}」,操作「${meta.operationLabel} → ${meta.targetLabel}」已提交操作授权弹窗,等待用户点击「允许本次操作」。`,
|
|
1092
746
|
badge: `🛡️ 待确认 ${clamp(meta.targetLabel, 18)}`,
|
|
1093
747
|
}
|
|
1094
748
|
}
|
|
1095
749
|
|
|
1096
|
-
// Stage 5:
|
|
750
|
+
// Stage 5: 执行器(包含写入路径能力前缀二次确认)
|
|
751
|
+
const allowedWritePrefixes = gateRes && gateRes.capabilities && Array.isArray(gateRes.capabilities.fsWritePrefixes)
|
|
752
|
+
? gateRes.capabilities.fsWritePrefixes
|
|
753
|
+
: null
|
|
754
|
+
if ((tool === 'write_file' || tool === 'edit_file') && rawTargetPath) {
|
|
755
|
+
const writePathCheck = validateWorkspacePath(cwd, resolvedAbsTarget, {
|
|
756
|
+
mode: 'write',
|
|
757
|
+
allowedSubPrefixes: allowedWritePrefixes,
|
|
758
|
+
})
|
|
759
|
+
if (writePathCheck.blocked) {
|
|
760
|
+
writeAudit({
|
|
761
|
+
stage: writePathCheck.stage || 'safety_guard',
|
|
762
|
+
rule: writePathCheck.rule || 'workspace_write_denied',
|
|
763
|
+
decision: 'blocked',
|
|
764
|
+
operation: tool,
|
|
765
|
+
target: displayRelTarget(cwd, resolvedAbsTarget),
|
|
766
|
+
reason: writePathCheck.reason,
|
|
767
|
+
outcome: 'blocked',
|
|
768
|
+
})
|
|
769
|
+
return deny(writePathCheck.reason, writePathCheck.badge, {
|
|
770
|
+
blockedBySafetyGuard: writePathCheck.stage === 'safety_guard',
|
|
771
|
+
rule: writePathCheck.rule,
|
|
772
|
+
})
|
|
773
|
+
}
|
|
774
|
+
}
|
|
775
|
+
|
|
1097
776
|
const finish = (res, opLabel, targetLabel) => {
|
|
1098
777
|
writeAudit({
|
|
1099
778
|
stage: 'executor',
|
|
779
|
+
rule: approvedOnce ? 'approved_once' : 'role_allow',
|
|
1100
780
|
decision: approvedOnce ? 'executed_approved' : 'executed',
|
|
1101
781
|
operation: opLabel || tool,
|
|
1102
782
|
target: targetLabel || '',
|
|
@@ -1409,10 +1089,12 @@ export async function runChiefAgenticLoop(deps, {
|
|
|
1409
1089
|
allowTextFallbackOnVisionMiss = false,
|
|
1410
1090
|
permissionMode = DEFAULT_CHIEF_PERMISSION_MODE,
|
|
1411
1091
|
hasChiefRiskAck = false,
|
|
1092
|
+
policyPlugins = [],
|
|
1412
1093
|
board = null,
|
|
1413
1094
|
maxSteps = 4,
|
|
1414
1095
|
readOnlyToolsOnly = false,
|
|
1415
1096
|
disableTools = false,
|
|
1097
|
+
lazyDeferWorkspaceWritesToLead = false,
|
|
1416
1098
|
callLlmFn,
|
|
1417
1099
|
extractJsonFn,
|
|
1418
1100
|
upsertArchiveFn,
|
|
@@ -1490,12 +1172,54 @@ export async function runChiefAgenticLoop(deps, {
|
|
|
1490
1172
|
ranToolsOnLastStep = true
|
|
1491
1173
|
const stepOutputs = []
|
|
1492
1174
|
for (const c of calls) {
|
|
1175
|
+
const cToolName = String(c && (c.tool || c.name) || '').trim()
|
|
1176
|
+
if (
|
|
1177
|
+
lazyDeferWorkspaceWritesToLead
|
|
1178
|
+
&& (cToolName === 'write_file' || cToolName === 'edit_file' || cToolName === 'run_command')
|
|
1179
|
+
) {
|
|
1180
|
+
const preDef = evaluatePreExecuteDefense({
|
|
1181
|
+
tool: cToolName,
|
|
1182
|
+
args: (c && c.args && typeof c.args === 'object') ? c.args : {},
|
|
1183
|
+
cwd,
|
|
1184
|
+
board,
|
|
1185
|
+
})
|
|
1186
|
+
if (!preDef || preDef.decision !== 'deny') {
|
|
1187
|
+
if (typeof recordAuditFn === 'function') {
|
|
1188
|
+
try {
|
|
1189
|
+
recordAuditFn({
|
|
1190
|
+
mode: perm,
|
|
1191
|
+
stage: 'lazy_intervention',
|
|
1192
|
+
rule: 'lead_first_defer',
|
|
1193
|
+
decision: 'deferred_to_lead',
|
|
1194
|
+
operation: cToolName,
|
|
1195
|
+
target: clamp(String((c.args && (c.args.path || c.args.command || c.args.cmd)) || cToolName), 80),
|
|
1196
|
+
reason: '懒介入机制生效:主对话在线且用户未指定参谋长亲自操作,改为派发 @lead 执行请求',
|
|
1197
|
+
outcome: 'deferred',
|
|
1198
|
+
by: 'chief',
|
|
1199
|
+
})
|
|
1200
|
+
} catch {}
|
|
1201
|
+
}
|
|
1202
|
+
const deferRes = {
|
|
1203
|
+
tool: cToolName,
|
|
1204
|
+
ok: false,
|
|
1205
|
+
denied: true,
|
|
1206
|
+
deferredByLazyIntervention: true,
|
|
1207
|
+
badge: '🤝 懒介入转主对话',
|
|
1208
|
+
error: '懒介入机制生效:当前主对话 (@lead) 在线可用且用户未指定参谋长亲自操刀,已遏制直接改动工作区或跑终端命令。请去掉工作区 toolCalls,改为在最终 JSON 的 relays 中向 target="lead" 下发结构化执行请求!',
|
|
1209
|
+
}
|
|
1210
|
+
toolRecords.push({ step: step + 1, call: c, result: deferRes })
|
|
1211
|
+
if (!toolBadges.includes(deferRes.badge)) toolBadges.push(deferRes.badge)
|
|
1212
|
+
stepOutputs.push({ tool: cToolName, args: c.args || {}, result: deferRes })
|
|
1213
|
+
continue
|
|
1214
|
+
}
|
|
1215
|
+
}
|
|
1493
1216
|
const execRes = await executeChiefToolCall(deps, c, {
|
|
1494
1217
|
rootId,
|
|
1495
1218
|
sessionId: sessionId || rootId,
|
|
1496
1219
|
cwd,
|
|
1497
1220
|
permissionMode: perm,
|
|
1498
1221
|
hasChiefRiskAck,
|
|
1222
|
+
policyPlugins,
|
|
1499
1223
|
board,
|
|
1500
1224
|
readOnlyToolsOnly,
|
|
1501
1225
|
upsertArchiveFn,
|