dsh-boost 0.0.0-stage → 0.1.1

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Files changed (110) hide show
  1. package/LICENSE +202 -0
  2. package/NOTICE +29 -0
  3. package/README.en.md +526 -0
  4. package/README.md +444 -2
  5. package/cordis.patch.yml +40 -0
  6. package/dist/admission/fixed-cost.d.ts +23 -0
  7. package/dist/admission/fixed-cost.js +61 -0
  8. package/dist/admission/fixed-cost.js.map +1 -0
  9. package/dist/admission/ledger.d.ts +113 -0
  10. package/dist/admission/ledger.js +176 -0
  11. package/dist/admission/ledger.js.map +1 -0
  12. package/dist/admission/retrieval.d.ts +65 -0
  13. package/dist/admission/retrieval.js +162 -0
  14. package/dist/admission/retrieval.js.map +1 -0
  15. package/dist/admission/usage.d.ts +75 -0
  16. package/dist/admission/usage.js +124 -0
  17. package/dist/admission/usage.js.map +1 -0
  18. package/dist/config.d.ts +43 -0
  19. package/dist/config.js +103 -0
  20. package/dist/config.js.map +1 -0
  21. package/dist/gate/binding.d.ts +113 -0
  22. package/dist/gate/binding.js +297 -0
  23. package/dist/gate/binding.js.map +1 -0
  24. package/dist/gate/decide.d.ts +82 -0
  25. package/dist/gate/decide.js +163 -0
  26. package/dist/gate/decide.js.map +1 -0
  27. package/dist/gate/guard.d.ts +69 -0
  28. package/dist/gate/guard.js +195 -0
  29. package/dist/gate/guard.js.map +1 -0
  30. package/dist/gate/invalidate.d.ts +112 -0
  31. package/dist/gate/invalidate.js +111 -0
  32. package/dist/gate/invalidate.js.map +1 -0
  33. package/dist/gate/plan.d.ts +86 -0
  34. package/dist/gate/plan.js +222 -0
  35. package/dist/gate/plan.js.map +1 -0
  36. package/dist/hooks/clock.d.ts +68 -0
  37. package/dist/hooks/clock.js +82 -0
  38. package/dist/hooks/clock.js.map +1 -0
  39. package/dist/hooks/execute.d.ts +79 -0
  40. package/dist/hooks/execute.js +128 -0
  41. package/dist/hooks/execute.js.map +1 -0
  42. package/dist/hooks/llm-stream.d.ts +283 -0
  43. package/dist/hooks/llm-stream.js +1086 -0
  44. package/dist/hooks/llm-stream.js.map +1 -0
  45. package/dist/hooks/pending.d.ts +89 -0
  46. package/dist/hooks/pending.js +115 -0
  47. package/dist/hooks/pending.js.map +1 -0
  48. package/dist/hooks/post-execute.d.ts +257 -0
  49. package/dist/hooks/post-execute.js +1950 -0
  50. package/dist/hooks/post-execute.js.map +1 -0
  51. package/dist/hooks/session-state.d.ts +158 -0
  52. package/dist/hooks/session-state.js +168 -0
  53. package/dist/hooks/session-state.js.map +1 -0
  54. package/dist/hooks/synthesize.d.ts +74 -0
  55. package/dist/hooks/synthesize.js +100 -0
  56. package/dist/hooks/synthesize.js.map +1 -0
  57. package/dist/host/loader.d.ts +23 -0
  58. package/dist/host/loader.js +31 -0
  59. package/dist/host/loader.js.map +1 -0
  60. package/dist/host/platform.d.ts +18 -0
  61. package/dist/host/platform.js +19 -0
  62. package/dist/host/platform.js.map +1 -0
  63. package/dist/host/root.d.ts +25 -0
  64. package/dist/host/root.js +64 -0
  65. package/dist/host/root.js.map +1 -0
  66. package/dist/index.d.ts +13 -0
  67. package/dist/index.js +984 -0
  68. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -0
  69. package/dist/projection/apply.d.ts +174 -0
  70. package/dist/projection/apply.js +137 -0
  71. package/dist/projection/apply.js.map +1 -0
  72. package/dist/projection/canonicalise.d.ts +43 -0
  73. package/dist/projection/canonicalise.js +43 -0
  74. package/dist/projection/canonicalise.js.map +1 -0
  75. package/dist/projection/counters.d.ts +65 -0
  76. package/dist/projection/counters.js +88 -0
  77. package/dist/projection/counters.js.map +1 -0
  78. package/dist/projection/truncate.d.ts +47 -0
  79. package/dist/projection/truncate.js +57 -0
  80. package/dist/projection/truncate.js.map +1 -0
  81. package/dist/prompt/protocol.d.ts +45 -0
  82. package/dist/prompt/protocol.js +56 -0
  83. package/dist/prompt/protocol.js.map +1 -0
  84. package/dist/receipts/store.d.ts +198 -0
  85. package/dist/receipts/store.js +734 -0
  86. package/dist/receipts/store.js.map +1 -0
  87. package/dist/scope/doc.d.ts +117 -0
  88. package/dist/scope/doc.js +158 -0
  89. package/dist/scope/doc.js.map +1 -0
  90. package/dist/scope/resolve.d.ts +91 -0
  91. package/dist/scope/resolve.js +146 -0
  92. package/dist/scope/resolve.js.map +1 -0
  93. package/dist/scope/store.d.ts +135 -0
  94. package/dist/scope/store.js +573 -0
  95. package/dist/scope/store.js.map +1 -0
  96. package/dist/selector/jev.d.ts +93 -0
  97. package/dist/selector/jev.js +171 -0
  98. package/dist/selector/jev.js.map +1 -0
  99. package/dist/tools/boost.d.ts +380 -0
  100. package/dist/tools/boost.js +801 -0
  101. package/dist/tools/boost.js.map +1 -0
  102. package/dist/tools/family.d.ts +26 -0
  103. package/dist/tools/family.js +26 -0
  104. package/dist/tools/family.js.map +1 -0
  105. package/dist/types.d.ts +130 -0
  106. package/dist/types.js +21 -0
  107. package/dist/types.js.map +1 -0
  108. package/locale/en.json +6 -0
  109. package/locale/zh.json +6 -0
  110. package/package.json +75 -4
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Guard evaluation: the zero-token admission check on a receipt.
3
+ *
4
+ * A guard is a predicate over the canonical receipt a call produced. It is the
5
+ * only verification the fast path gets, so the rule is fail-closed: every
6
+ * ambiguity — a pointer that is not RFC 6901, a segment that cannot name an
7
+ * array element, a path that runs into a scalar, a value of the wrong type —
8
+ * is `fail`, never `pass`, and no path throws.
9
+ *
10
+ * `ok` reads `isError`, never the text, and only a literal `ok: true` passes.
11
+ * `text_contains` / `text_not_contains` are byte-faithful, case-sensitive
12
+ * `String#includes` checks on the canonical text: no trim, no normalisation,
13
+ * no regex.
14
+ *
15
+ * The evaluators do not rely on `parsePlan` having rejected bad guards: within
16
+ * the forms, `ok` must be literally `true`, an empty `text_contains` operand
17
+ * is a `fail` rather than vacuously true (`text_not_contains: ''` is already
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+ * vacuously false), and a non-object guard is a `fail` instead of a throw.
19
+ *
20
+ * `json_equals` parses the whole text as JSON and walks the pointer by hand.
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+ * A pointer is `''` (the whole document) or starts with `/`; anything else is
22
+ * malformed. Resolution follows only own properties (`Object.hasOwn`), so
23
+ * `/__proto__` and `/constructor` cannot read an inherited value. An array
24
+ * accepts only canonical decimal indices (`0`, `12` — not `01`, `1.0`, `-`,
25
+ * ` 1` or `+1`) that are inside its length, and a segment applied to a
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+ * non-container fails. Escapes are RFC 6901: `~1` is `/` and `~0` is `~`
27
+ * (`~01` is therefore the literal `~1`), and any other `~` sequence is
28
+ * malformed even when the raw segment is a real key.
29
+ *
30
+ * Comparison is `===`, deliberately not `==`: `1` is not `'1'`, and `true` is
31
+ * not `1`. JSON cannot produce `NaN`, and `null`, arrays and objects can never
32
+ * equal a `string | number | boolean`, so a resolved value of one of those
33
+ * kinds fails. A JSON parse error is a `fail` value, not an exception.
34
+ *
35
+ * `GuardResult` includes `'unknown'` because the task interface names it, but
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+ * no v1 guard form is undecidable: this module returns only `'pass'` or
37
+ * `'fail'`. There is no fifth form (`exit_code` / `stderr_empty` are forbidden
38
+ * by design §5.2), so a guard matching none of the four forms fails closed.
39
+ *
40
+ * Within the gate's contract, guards come from `parsePlan` (exactly one form
41
+ * key per guard) and receipts from `canonicalise`; the defensive checks above
42
+ * are this module's floor, not a full re-validation of either input. A receipt
43
+ * is never projected here — guards read the canonical original.
44
+ *
45
+ * @module dsh-boost/gate/guard
46
+ */
47
+ import type { CanonicalReceipt } from '../projection/canonicalise.js';
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+ import type { Guard } from './plan.js';
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+ /**
50
+ * Outcome of one guard. `'unknown'` is part of the agreed interface but is
51
+ * never produced: every guard form v1 accepts is decidable.
52
+ */
53
+ export type GuardResult = 'pass' | 'fail' | 'unknown';
54
+ /**
55
+ * Evaluate one guard. Dispatch is by presence of the form key, so a guard
56
+ * matching none of the four forms falls through to `fail` instead of passing.
57
+ * A non-object guard fails before dispatch: the `in` operator would throw, and
58
+ * throwing would abort the turn instead of falling back to the model.
59
+ */
60
+ export declare function evaluateGuard(g: Guard, r: CanonicalReceipt): GuardResult;
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+ /**
62
+ * Evaluate guards left to right and stop at the first failure. An empty list
63
+ * passes vacuously. `failed` is the exact guard object passed in, so a caller
64
+ * can identify which guard rejected the receipt.
65
+ */
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+ export declare function evaluateAll(guards: Guard[], r: CanonicalReceipt): {
67
+ ok: boolean;
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+ failed?: Guard;
69
+ };
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Guard evaluation: the zero-token admission check on a receipt.
3
+ *
4
+ * A guard is a predicate over the canonical receipt a call produced. It is the
5
+ * only verification the fast path gets, so the rule is fail-closed: every
6
+ * ambiguity — a pointer that is not RFC 6901, a segment that cannot name an
7
+ * array element, a path that runs into a scalar, a value of the wrong type —
8
+ * is `fail`, never `pass`, and no path throws.
9
+ *
10
+ * `ok` reads `isError`, never the text, and only a literal `ok: true` passes.
11
+ * `text_contains` / `text_not_contains` are byte-faithful, case-sensitive
12
+ * `String#includes` checks on the canonical text: no trim, no normalisation,
13
+ * no regex.
14
+ *
15
+ * The evaluators do not rely on `parsePlan` having rejected bad guards: within
16
+ * the forms, `ok` must be literally `true`, an empty `text_contains` operand
17
+ * is a `fail` rather than vacuously true (`text_not_contains: ''` is already
18
+ * vacuously false), and a non-object guard is a `fail` instead of a throw.
19
+ *
20
+ * `json_equals` parses the whole text as JSON and walks the pointer by hand.
21
+ * A pointer is `''` (the whole document) or starts with `/`; anything else is
22
+ * malformed. Resolution follows only own properties (`Object.hasOwn`), so
23
+ * `/__proto__` and `/constructor` cannot read an inherited value. An array
24
+ * accepts only canonical decimal indices (`0`, `12` — not `01`, `1.0`, `-`,
25
+ * ` 1` or `+1`) that are inside its length, and a segment applied to a
26
+ * non-container fails. Escapes are RFC 6901: `~1` is `/` and `~0` is `~`
27
+ * (`~01` is therefore the literal `~1`), and any other `~` sequence is
28
+ * malformed even when the raw segment is a real key.
29
+ *
30
+ * Comparison is `===`, deliberately not `==`: `1` is not `'1'`, and `true` is
31
+ * not `1`. JSON cannot produce `NaN`, and `null`, arrays and objects can never
32
+ * equal a `string | number | boolean`, so a resolved value of one of those
33
+ * kinds fails. A JSON parse error is a `fail` value, not an exception.
34
+ *
35
+ * `GuardResult` includes `'unknown'` because the task interface names it, but
36
+ * no v1 guard form is undecidable: this module returns only `'pass'` or
37
+ * `'fail'`. There is no fifth form (`exit_code` / `stderr_empty` are forbidden
38
+ * by design §5.2), so a guard matching none of the four forms fails closed.
39
+ *
40
+ * Within the gate's contract, guards come from `parsePlan` (exactly one form
41
+ * key per guard) and receipts from `canonicalise`; the defensive checks above
42
+ * are this module's floor, not a full re-validation of either input. A receipt
43
+ * is never projected here — guards read the canonical original.
44
+ *
45
+ * @module dsh-boost/gate/guard
46
+ */
47
+ /** The one place a predicate becomes a verdict. */
48
+ function verdict(holds) {
49
+ return holds ? 'pass' : 'fail';
50
+ }
51
+ /**
52
+ * `ok` asserts the receipt is not an error. The value must be the literal
53
+ * `true`: a hand-built `{ ok: false }` (or `1`, or `'no'`) asserting an error
54
+ * must not be read as "success is fine".
55
+ */
56
+ function evaluateOk(g, r) {
57
+ return verdict(g.ok === true && !r.isError);
58
+ }
59
+ /**
60
+ * Case-sensitive substring presence, on the canonical text exactly as
61
+ * received. An empty operand would be true for every text and could smuggle a
62
+ * constant through `guard-trivial`, so it fails closed here too.
63
+ */
64
+ function evaluateContains(g, r) {
65
+ return verdict(g.text_contains.length > 0 && r.text.includes(g.text_contains));
66
+ }
67
+ /** Case-sensitive substring absence; used to exclude error footers and stacks. */
68
+ function evaluateNotContains(g, r) {
69
+ return verdict(!r.text.includes(g.text_not_contains));
70
+ }
71
+ /** A canonical array index: unsigned, no leading zero, no decimal, no padding. */
72
+ const ARRAY_INDEX = /^(?:0|[1-9][0-9]*)$/;
73
+ /**
74
+ * Decode one RFC 6901 reference token. `~0` is `~` and `~1` is `/`; scanning
75
+ * left to right makes `~01` the literal `~1` (the replacement order the RFC
76
+ * prescribes). A `~` followed by anything else, including the end of the
77
+ * segment, is malformed and yields `undefined`.
78
+ */
79
+ function decodeSegment(segment) {
80
+ let decoded = '';
81
+ for (let i = 0; i < segment.length; i += 1) {
82
+ const char = segment[i];
83
+ if (char !== '~') {
84
+ decoded += char;
85
+ continue;
86
+ }
87
+ const escaped = segment[i + 1];
88
+ if (escaped === '0')
89
+ decoded += '~';
90
+ else if (escaped === '1')
91
+ decoded += '/';
92
+ else
93
+ return undefined;
94
+ i += 1;
95
+ }
96
+ return decoded;
97
+ }
98
+ /**
99
+ * Resolve one already-decoded segment. Objects accept any own key; arrays
100
+ * accept only a canonical decimal index inside their length. Both use
101
+ * `Object.hasOwn`, so an inherited property never resolves, and both refuse to
102
+ * descend into a primitive (`null`, string, number, boolean).
103
+ */
104
+ function resolveSegment(target, segment) {
105
+ if (Array.isArray(target)) {
106
+ if (!ARRAY_INDEX.test(segment))
107
+ return { found: false };
108
+ const index = Number(segment);
109
+ if (index >= target.length)
110
+ return { found: false };
111
+ if (!Object.hasOwn(target, segment))
112
+ return { found: false };
113
+ return { found: true, value: target[index] };
114
+ }
115
+ if (typeof target !== 'object' || target === null)
116
+ return { found: false };
117
+ if (!Object.hasOwn(target, segment))
118
+ return { found: false };
119
+ return { found: true, value: target[segment] };
120
+ }
121
+ /**
122
+ * Resolve an RFC 6901 pointer against an already-parsed JSON document.
123
+ *
124
+ * `''` is the whole document; any other pointer must start with `/`. The empty
125
+ * pointer is handled before splitting, so the whole-document case never enters
126
+ * the array-index rule (`''.split('/').slice(1)` would be `[]` anyway, but the
127
+ * early return states the intent). Missing keys, malformed escapes,
128
+ * non-canonical or out-of-range array indices, and hops through scalars all
129
+ * return `found: false` — this function never throws.
130
+ */
131
+ function resolvePointer(document, pointer) {
132
+ if (pointer === '')
133
+ return { found: true, value: document };
134
+ if (!pointer.startsWith('/'))
135
+ return { found: false };
136
+ let current = document;
137
+ for (const raw of pointer.split('/').slice(1)) {
138
+ const segment = decodeSegment(raw);
139
+ if (segment === undefined)
140
+ return { found: false };
141
+ const next = resolveSegment(current, segment);
142
+ if (!next.found)
143
+ return { found: false };
144
+ current = next.value;
145
+ }
146
+ return { found: true, value: current };
147
+ }
148
+ /**
149
+ * Parse the canonical text, resolve the pointer, and compare with `===`.
150
+ * A parse error, a malformed pointer, a missing path, or a non-scalar target is
151
+ * `fail`; there is no coercion between JSON types.
152
+ */
153
+ function evaluateJsonEquals(g, r) {
154
+ let document;
155
+ try {
156
+ document = JSON.parse(r.text);
157
+ }
158
+ catch {
159
+ return 'fail';
160
+ }
161
+ const resolved = resolvePointer(document, g.json_equals.pointer);
162
+ return verdict(resolved.found && resolved.value === g.json_equals.value);
163
+ }
164
+ /**
165
+ * Evaluate one guard. Dispatch is by presence of the form key, so a guard
166
+ * matching none of the four forms falls through to `fail` instead of passing.
167
+ * A non-object guard fails before dispatch: the `in` operator would throw, and
168
+ * throwing would abort the turn instead of falling back to the model.
169
+ */
170
+ export function evaluateGuard(g, r) {
171
+ if (typeof g !== 'object' || g === null)
172
+ return 'fail';
173
+ if ('ok' in g)
174
+ return evaluateOk(g, r);
175
+ if ('text_contains' in g)
176
+ return evaluateContains(g, r);
177
+ if ('text_not_contains' in g)
178
+ return evaluateNotContains(g, r);
179
+ if ('json_equals' in g)
180
+ return evaluateJsonEquals(g, r);
181
+ return 'fail';
182
+ }
183
+ /**
184
+ * Evaluate guards left to right and stop at the first failure. An empty list
185
+ * passes vacuously. `failed` is the exact guard object passed in, so a caller
186
+ * can identify which guard rejected the receipt.
187
+ */
188
+ export function evaluateAll(guards, r) {
189
+ for (const guard of guards) {
190
+ if (evaluateGuard(guard, r) !== 'pass')
191
+ return { ok: false, failed: guard };
192
+ }
193
+ return { ok: true };
194
+ }
195
+ //# sourceMappingURL=guard.js.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
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It is the\n * only verification the fast path gets, so the rule is fail-closed: every\n * ambiguity — a pointer that is not RFC 6901, a segment that cannot name an\n * array element, a path that runs into a scalar, a value of the wrong type —\n * is `fail`, never `pass`, and no path throws.\n *\n * `ok` reads `isError`, never the text, and only a literal `ok: true` passes.\n * `text_contains` / `text_not_contains` are byte-faithful, case-sensitive\n * `String#includes` checks on the canonical text: no trim, no normalisation,\n * no regex.\n *\n * The evaluators do not rely on `parsePlan` having rejected bad guards: within\n * the forms, `ok` must be literally `true`, an empty `text_contains` operand\n * is a `fail` rather than vacuously true (`text_not_contains: ''` is already\n * vacuously false), and a non-object guard is a `fail` instead of a throw.\n *\n * `json_equals` parses the whole text as JSON and walks the pointer by hand.\n * A pointer is `''` (the whole document) or starts with `/`; anything else is\n * malformed. Resolution follows only own properties (`Object.hasOwn`), so\n * `/__proto__` and `/constructor` cannot read an inherited value. An array\n * accepts only canonical decimal indices (`0`, `12` — not `01`, `1.0`, `-`,\n * ` 1` or `+1`) that are inside its length, and a segment applied to a\n * non-container fails. Escapes are RFC 6901: `~1` is `/` and `~0` is `~`\n * (`~01` is therefore the literal `~1`), and any other `~` sequence is\n * malformed even when the raw segment is a real key.\n *\n * Comparison is `===`, deliberately not `==`: `1` is not `'1'`, and `true` is\n * not `1`. JSON cannot produce `NaN`, and `null`, arrays and objects can never\n * equal a `string | number | boolean`, so a resolved value of one of those\n * kinds fails. A JSON parse error is a `fail` value, not an exception.\n *\n * `GuardResult` includes `'unknown'` because the task interface names it, but\n * no v1 guard form is undecidable: this module returns only `'pass'` or\n * `'fail'`. There is no fifth form (`exit_code` / `stderr_empty` are forbidden\n * by design §5.2), so a guard matching none of the four forms fails closed.\n *\n * Within the gate's contract, guards come from `parsePlan` (exactly one form\n * key per guard) and receipts from `canonicalise`; the defensive checks above\n * are this module's floor, not a full re-validation of either input. A receipt\n * is never projected here — guards read the canonical original.\n *\n * @module dsh-boost/gate/guard\n */\n\nimport type { CanonicalReceipt } from '../projection/canonicalise.js'\nimport type { Guard } from './plan.js'\n\n/**\n * Outcome of one guard. `'unknown'` is part of the agreed interface but is\n * never produced: every guard form v1 accepts is decidable.\n */\nexport type GuardResult = 'pass' | 'fail' | 'unknown'\n\n/** The one place a predicate becomes a verdict. */\nfunction verdict(holds: boolean): GuardResult {\n return holds ? 'pass' : 'fail'\n}\n\n/**\n * `ok` asserts the receipt is not an error. The value must be the literal\n * `true`: a hand-built `{ ok: false }` (or `1`, or `'no'`) asserting an error\n * must not be read as \"success is fine\".\n */\nfunction evaluateOk(g: { ok: true }, r: CanonicalReceipt): GuardResult {\n return verdict(g.ok === true && !r.isError)\n}\n\n/**\n * Case-sensitive substring presence, on the canonical text exactly as\n * received. An empty operand would be true for every text and could smuggle a\n * constant through `guard-trivial`, so it fails closed here too.\n */\nfunction evaluateContains(g: { text_contains: string }, r: CanonicalReceipt): GuardResult {\n return verdict(g.text_contains.length > 0 && r.text.includes(g.text_contains))\n}\n\n/** Case-sensitive substring absence; used to exclude error footers and stacks. */\nfunction evaluateNotContains(g: { text_not_contains: string }, r: CanonicalReceipt): GuardResult {\n return verdict(!r.text.includes(g.text_not_contains))\n}\n\n/** A canonical array index: unsigned, no leading zero, no decimal, no padding. */\nconst ARRAY_INDEX = /^(?:0|[1-9][0-9]*)$/\n\n/**\n * Decode one RFC 6901 reference token. `~0` is `~` and `~1` is `/`; scanning\n * left to right makes `~01` the literal `~1` (the replacement order the RFC\n * prescribes). A `~` followed by anything else, including the end of the\n * segment, is malformed and yields `undefined`.\n */\nfunction decodeSegment(segment: string): string | undefined {\n let decoded = ''\n for (let i = 0; i < segment.length; i += 1) {\n const char = segment[i]\n if (char !== '~') {\n decoded += char\n continue\n }\n const escaped = segment[i + 1]\n if (escaped === '0') decoded += '~'\n else if (escaped === '1') decoded += '/'\n else return undefined\n i += 1\n }\n return decoded\n}\n\n/** A pointer walk either yields a value or misses; JSON cannot produce `undefined`. */\ntype Resolved = { found: true; value: unknown } | { found: false }\n\n/**\n * Resolve one already-decoded segment. Objects accept any own key; arrays\n * accept only a canonical decimal index inside their length. Both use\n * `Object.hasOwn`, so an inherited property never resolves, and both refuse to\n * descend into a primitive (`null`, string, number, boolean).\n */\nfunction resolveSegment(target: unknown, segment: string): Resolved {\n if (Array.isArray(target)) {\n if (!ARRAY_INDEX.test(segment)) return { found: false }\n const index = Number(segment)\n if (index >= target.length) return { found: false }\n if (!Object.hasOwn(target, segment)) return { found: false }\n return { found: true, value: target[index] }\n }\n if (typeof target !== 'object' || target === null) return { found: false }\n if (!Object.hasOwn(target, segment)) return { found: false }\n return { found: true, value: (target as Record<string, unknown>)[segment] }\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve an RFC 6901 pointer against an already-parsed JSON document.\n *\n * `''` is the whole document; any other pointer must start with `/`. The empty\n * pointer is handled before splitting, so the whole-document case never enters\n * the array-index rule (`''.split('/').slice(1)` would be `[]` anyway, but the\n * early return states the intent). Missing keys, malformed escapes,\n * non-canonical or out-of-range array indices, and hops through scalars all\n * return `found: false` — this function never throws.\n */\nfunction resolvePointer(document: unknown, pointer: string): Resolved {\n if (pointer === '') return { found: true, value: document }\n if (!pointer.startsWith('/')) return { found: false }\n let current = document\n for (const raw of pointer.split('/').slice(1)) {\n const segment = decodeSegment(raw)\n if (segment === undefined) return { found: false }\n const next = resolveSegment(current, segment)\n if (!next.found) return { found: false }\n current = next.value\n }\n return { found: true, value: current }\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse the canonical text, resolve the pointer, and compare with `===`.\n * A parse error, a malformed pointer, a missing path, or a non-scalar target is\n * `fail`; there is no coercion between JSON types.\n */\nfunction evaluateJsonEquals(\n g: { json_equals: { pointer: string; value: string | number | boolean } },\n r: CanonicalReceipt,\n): GuardResult {\n let document: unknown\n try {\n document = JSON.parse(r.text)\n } catch {\n return 'fail'\n }\n const resolved = resolvePointer(document, g.json_equals.pointer)\n return verdict(resolved.found && resolved.value === g.json_equals.value)\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluate one guard. Dispatch is by presence of the form key, so a guard\n * matching none of the four forms falls through to `fail` instead of passing.\n * A non-object guard fails before dispatch: the `in` operator would throw, and\n * throwing would abort the turn instead of falling back to the model.\n */\nexport function evaluateGuard(g: Guard, r: CanonicalReceipt): GuardResult {\n if (typeof g !== 'object' || g === null) return 'fail'\n if ('ok' in g) return evaluateOk(g, r)\n if ('text_contains' in g) return evaluateContains(g, r)\n if ('text_not_contains' in g) return evaluateNotContains(g, r)\n if ('json_equals' in g) return evaluateJsonEquals(g, r)\n return 'fail'\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluate guards left to right and stop at the first failure. An empty list\n * passes vacuously. `failed` is the exact guard object passed in, so a caller\n * can identify which guard rejected the receipt.\n */\nexport function evaluateAll(guards: Guard[], r: CanonicalReceipt): { ok: boolean; failed?: Guard } {\n for (const guard of guards) {\n if (evaluateGuard(guard, r) !== 'pass') return { ok: false, failed: guard }\n }\n return { ok: true }\n}\n"]}
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * External invalidation sources and the double-projection guard.
3
+ *
4
+ * These are **pure predicates over a text the caller supplies**. They do not
5
+ * read the session, the history, or any host service, and they cannot by
6
+ * themselves observe that the host rewrote anything: only a caller that holds
7
+ * the anchored receipt's current text can.
8
+ *
9
+ * The host has two external rewrite sources (design §5.2-7):
10
+ *
11
+ * - the tool-result pruner replaces an oversized **session surface node's**
12
+ * middle in place with a fixed marker, at a step boundary before a model
13
+ * request;
14
+ * - compaction replaces older history with a summary, so a stored anchor no
15
+ * longer names any text the model can see.
16
+ *
17
+ * Either way the anchor is stale: projecting from it would emit a value out of
18
+ * text the model can no longer see, and a guard evaluated against the old text
19
+ * would claim a check the model never gets. Both must abandon the decision and
20
+ * fall back to the main model (design §5.2-3).
21
+ *
22
+ * **Where each source is observable.** The pruner never touches the object
23
+ * flowing through the `tools/post-execute` waterfall — it rewrites surface
24
+ * nodes before a model request (`dsh-compaction-basic`). A `post-execute`
25
+ * listener therefore cannot see the pruner's output, and `looksPruned` there
26
+ * only catches a receipt whose **tool output itself** happens to contain the
27
+ * 39-byte literal (for example, a `read` of a session log). That is a safe
28
+ * conservative outcome, not pruner detection. The caller that can observe a
29
+ * pruned or compacted receipt is the **model-request path** (`llm/stream`,
30
+ * `options.messages`); the stream hook owns that identity check with its own
31
+ * anchor probes plus `looksPruned` below. Nothing here claims the
32
+ * post-execute call site detects the host pruner or compaction.
33
+ *
34
+ * The second guard is independent and simpler: a receipt that already carries
35
+ * the host spill footer has been retained once already, so projecting it again
36
+ * would hide the original twice and point the model at a second-hand footer.
37
+ * The notice predicate is injected rather than imported — the host's spill
38
+ * policy is an optional peer and its recognition rule belongs to the caller.
39
+ *
40
+ * Everything here is pure: a string comparison, a predicate call, and a plain
41
+ * session-keyed map with no persistence, timers, or I/O. The hook that consumes
42
+ * these functions must never throw (the host turns a throwing listener into a
43
+ * tool error and loses the real output, `dsh-tools/lib/pipeline.js:538-550`),
44
+ * so the hook wraps the calls; these functions themselves are total — a
45
+ * malformed anchor record yields `undefined`, never a `TypeError`.
46
+ *
47
+ * @module dsh-boost/gate/invalidate
48
+ */
49
+ /**
50
+ * The host pruner's exact replacement marker.
51
+ *
52
+ * Verified against the installed package rather than copied from the plan:
53
+ * `@deepseek-ai/dsh-compaction-tool-result-pruner@0.2.2-rc.4`, source
54
+ * `src/config.ts:7` (`export const PRUNE_MARKER = '\n\n[... tool result middle
55
+ * pruned ...]\n\n'`), compiled as `lib/index.js:8`. It matches the plan's
56
+ * literal exactly. Do not "clean up" the surrounding blank lines: they are part
57
+ * of the injected span and of this comparison.
58
+ */
59
+ export declare const PRUNE_MARKER = "\n\n[... tool result middle pruned ...]\n\n";
60
+ /**
61
+ * What the decision path remembers about one substitution step.
62
+ *
63
+ * `anchors` maps a receipt id to the canonical original text as it arrived;
64
+ * `stepId` names the step the anchors belong to. This is an anchor record, not
65
+ * a dispatch queue: the pending-substitution queue stores its own entry, and
66
+ * the same post-execute decision writes both.
67
+ */
68
+ export interface ReceiptAnchors {
69
+ stepId: string;
70
+ anchors: Record<string, string>;
71
+ }
72
+ /**
73
+ * Per-session receipt anchors.
74
+ *
75
+ * A plain `Map` behind three methods: no persistence, no timers, no I/O. It is
76
+ * written by the decision path and read by the invalidation check, both in
77
+ * `post-execute`; Task 23b fills it.
78
+ */
79
+ export declare class AnchorStore {
80
+ private readonly bySession;
81
+ /** Remember `a` as the pending anchors for `sessionId`, replacing any earlier record. */
82
+ set(sessionId: string, a: ReceiptAnchors): void;
83
+ /** The pending anchors for `sessionId`, or `undefined` when there is none. */
84
+ get(sessionId: string): ReceiptAnchors | undefined;
85
+ /** Drop the pending anchors for `sessionId`; clearing an absent key is a no-op. */
86
+ clear(sessionId: string): void;
87
+ }
88
+ /**
89
+ * Whether this text contains the host pruner's marker.
90
+ *
91
+ * Exactly `text.includes(PRUNE_MARKER)` — no prefix matching, no regex, no
92
+ * trimming. This is the whole detection: a caller that can see a pruned
93
+ * surface node (the model-request path) uses it, while a caller that cannot
94
+ * (post-execute) only catches a tool output that literally contains the marker.
95
+ * If the host ever changes the wording this returns `false` and detection fails
96
+ * in the safe direction: at worst the plugin prunes one more time than needed,
97
+ * and a stale anchor is never let through, because an anchor/text mismatch
98
+ * still raises `compaction-reset` on the path that can establish the identity.
99
+ * A near miss in ordinary output is likewise not a prune, so text that merely
100
+ * looks like the marker is left alone.
101
+ */
102
+ export declare function looksPruned(text: string): boolean;
103
+ /**
104
+ * Whether the receipt already carries the host spill footer.
105
+ *
106
+ * The answer is the injected predicate's: the caller owns the recognition rule
107
+ * (Task 23b/T25 supply the host's `hasSpillNotice` through a dynamic import),
108
+ * and this module must not import `@deepseek-ai/dsh-spill-policy` — it is an
109
+ * optional peer, and a static import would make the degraded path unreachable.
110
+ * Injecting it also keeps the guard testable without a host.
111
+ */
112
+ export declare function alreadySpilled(text: string, hasNotice: (t: string) => boolean): boolean;
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * External invalidation sources and the double-projection guard.
3
+ *
4
+ * These are **pure predicates over a text the caller supplies**. They do not
5
+ * read the session, the history, or any host service, and they cannot by
6
+ * themselves observe that the host rewrote anything: only a caller that holds
7
+ * the anchored receipt's current text can.
8
+ *
9
+ * The host has two external rewrite sources (design §5.2-7):
10
+ *
11
+ * - the tool-result pruner replaces an oversized **session surface node's**
12
+ * middle in place with a fixed marker, at a step boundary before a model
13
+ * request;
14
+ * - compaction replaces older history with a summary, so a stored anchor no
15
+ * longer names any text the model can see.
16
+ *
17
+ * Either way the anchor is stale: projecting from it would emit a value out of
18
+ * text the model can no longer see, and a guard evaluated against the old text
19
+ * would claim a check the model never gets. Both must abandon the decision and
20
+ * fall back to the main model (design §5.2-3).
21
+ *
22
+ * **Where each source is observable.** The pruner never touches the object
23
+ * flowing through the `tools/post-execute` waterfall — it rewrites surface
24
+ * nodes before a model request (`dsh-compaction-basic`). A `post-execute`
25
+ * listener therefore cannot see the pruner's output, and `looksPruned` there
26
+ * only catches a receipt whose **tool output itself** happens to contain the
27
+ * 39-byte literal (for example, a `read` of a session log). That is a safe
28
+ * conservative outcome, not pruner detection. The caller that can observe a
29
+ * pruned or compacted receipt is the **model-request path** (`llm/stream`,
30
+ * `options.messages`); the stream hook owns that identity check with its own
31
+ * anchor probes plus `looksPruned` below. Nothing here claims the
32
+ * post-execute call site detects the host pruner or compaction.
33
+ *
34
+ * The second guard is independent and simpler: a receipt that already carries
35
+ * the host spill footer has been retained once already, so projecting it again
36
+ * would hide the original twice and point the model at a second-hand footer.
37
+ * The notice predicate is injected rather than imported — the host's spill
38
+ * policy is an optional peer and its recognition rule belongs to the caller.
39
+ *
40
+ * Everything here is pure: a string comparison, a predicate call, and a plain
41
+ * session-keyed map with no persistence, timers, or I/O. The hook that consumes
42
+ * these functions must never throw (the host turns a throwing listener into a
43
+ * tool error and loses the real output, `dsh-tools/lib/pipeline.js:538-550`),
44
+ * so the hook wraps the calls; these functions themselves are total — a
45
+ * malformed anchor record yields `undefined`, never a `TypeError`.
46
+ *
47
+ * @module dsh-boost/gate/invalidate
48
+ */
49
+ /**
50
+ * The host pruner's exact replacement marker.
51
+ *
52
+ * Verified against the installed package rather than copied from the plan:
53
+ * `@deepseek-ai/dsh-compaction-tool-result-pruner@0.2.2-rc.4`, source
54
+ * `src/config.ts:7` (`export const PRUNE_MARKER = '\n\n[... tool result middle
55
+ * pruned ...]\n\n'`), compiled as `lib/index.js:8`. It matches the plan's
56
+ * literal exactly. Do not "clean up" the surrounding blank lines: they are part
57
+ * of the injected span and of this comparison.
58
+ */
59
+ export const PRUNE_MARKER = '\n\n[... tool result middle pruned ...]\n\n';
60
+ /**
61
+ * Per-session receipt anchors.
62
+ *
63
+ * A plain `Map` behind three methods: no persistence, no timers, no I/O. It is
64
+ * written by the decision path and read by the invalidation check, both in
65
+ * `post-execute`; Task 23b fills it.
66
+ */
67
+ export class AnchorStore {
68
+ bySession = new Map();
69
+ /** Remember `a` as the pending anchors for `sessionId`, replacing any earlier record. */
70
+ set(sessionId, a) {
71
+ this.bySession.set(sessionId, a);
72
+ }
73
+ /** The pending anchors for `sessionId`, or `undefined` when there is none. */
74
+ get(sessionId) {
75
+ return this.bySession.get(sessionId);
76
+ }
77
+ /** Drop the pending anchors for `sessionId`; clearing an absent key is a no-op. */
78
+ clear(sessionId) {
79
+ this.bySession.delete(sessionId);
80
+ }
81
+ }
82
+ /**
83
+ * Whether this text contains the host pruner's marker.
84
+ *
85
+ * Exactly `text.includes(PRUNE_MARKER)` — no prefix matching, no regex, no
86
+ * trimming. This is the whole detection: a caller that can see a pruned
87
+ * surface node (the model-request path) uses it, while a caller that cannot
88
+ * (post-execute) only catches a tool output that literally contains the marker.
89
+ * If the host ever changes the wording this returns `false` and detection fails
90
+ * in the safe direction: at worst the plugin prunes one more time than needed,
91
+ * and a stale anchor is never let through, because an anchor/text mismatch
92
+ * still raises `compaction-reset` on the path that can establish the identity.
93
+ * A near miss in ordinary output is likewise not a prune, so text that merely
94
+ * looks like the marker is left alone.
95
+ */
96
+ export function looksPruned(text) {
97
+ return text.includes(PRUNE_MARKER);
98
+ }
99
+ /**
100
+ * Whether the receipt already carries the host spill footer.
101
+ *
102
+ * The answer is the injected predicate's: the caller owns the recognition rule
103
+ * (Task 23b/T25 supply the host's `hasSpillNotice` through a dynamic import),
104
+ * and this module must not import `@deepseek-ai/dsh-spill-policy` — it is an
105
+ * optional peer, and a static import would make the degraded path unreachable.
106
+ * Injecting it also keeps the guard testable without a host.
107
+ */
108
+ export function alreadySpilled(text, hasNotice) {
109
+ return hasNotice(text);
110
+ }
111
+ //# sourceMappingURL=invalidate.js.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"invalidate.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/gate/invalidate.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA+CG;AAEH;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,6CAA6C,CAAA;AAezE;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,WAAW;IACL,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,EAA0B,CAAA;IAE9D,yFAAyF;IACzF,GAAG,CAAC,SAAiB,EAAE,CAAiB;QACtC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;IAClC,CAAC;IAED,8EAA8E;IAC9E,GAAG,CAAC,SAAiB;QACnB,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAA;IACtC,CAAC;IAED,mFAAmF;IACnF,KAAK,CAAC,SAAiB;QACrB,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAA;IAClC,CAAC;CACF;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,WAAW,CAAC,IAAY;IACtC,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAA;AACpC,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,CAAC,IAAY,EAAE,SAAiC;IAC5E,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAA;AACxB,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * External invalidation sources and the double-projection guard.\n *\n * These are **pure predicates over a text the caller supplies**. They do not\n * read the session, the history, or any host service, and they cannot by\n * themselves observe that the host rewrote anything: only a caller that holds\n * the anchored receipt's current text can.\n *\n * The host has two external rewrite sources (design §5.2-7):\n *\n * - the tool-result pruner replaces an oversized **session surface node's**\n * middle in place with a fixed marker, at a step boundary before a model\n * request;\n * - compaction replaces older history with a summary, so a stored anchor no\n * longer names any text the model can see.\n *\n * Either way the anchor is stale: projecting from it would emit a value out of\n * text the model can no longer see, and a guard evaluated against the old text\n * would claim a check the model never gets. Both must abandon the decision and\n * fall back to the main model (design §5.2-3).\n *\n * **Where each source is observable.** The pruner never touches the object\n * flowing through the `tools/post-execute` waterfall — it rewrites surface\n * nodes before a model request (`dsh-compaction-basic`). A `post-execute`\n * listener therefore cannot see the pruner's output, and `looksPruned` there\n * only catches a receipt whose **tool output itself** happens to contain the\n * 39-byte literal (for example, a `read` of a session log). That is a safe\n * conservative outcome, not pruner detection. The caller that can observe a\n * pruned or compacted receipt is the **model-request path** (`llm/stream`,\n * `options.messages`); the stream hook owns that identity check with its own\n * anchor probes plus `looksPruned` below. Nothing here claims the\n * post-execute call site detects the host pruner or compaction.\n *\n * The second guard is independent and simpler: a receipt that already carries\n * the host spill footer has been retained once already, so projecting it again\n * would hide the original twice and point the model at a second-hand footer.\n * The notice predicate is injected rather than imported — the host's spill\n * policy is an optional peer and its recognition rule belongs to the caller.\n *\n * Everything here is pure: a string comparison, a predicate call, and a plain\n * session-keyed map with no persistence, timers, or I/O. The hook that consumes\n * these functions must never throw (the host turns a throwing listener into a\n * tool error and loses the real output, `dsh-tools/lib/pipeline.js:538-550`),\n * so the hook wraps the calls; these functions themselves are total — a\n * malformed anchor record yields `undefined`, never a `TypeError`.\n *\n * @module dsh-boost/gate/invalidate\n */\n\n/**\n * The host pruner's exact replacement marker.\n *\n * Verified against the installed package rather than copied from the plan:\n * `@deepseek-ai/dsh-compaction-tool-result-pruner@0.2.2-rc.4`, source\n * `src/config.ts:7` (`export const PRUNE_MARKER = '\\n\\n[... tool result middle\n * pruned ...]\\n\\n'`), compiled as `lib/index.js:8`. It matches the plan's\n * literal exactly. Do not \"clean up\" the surrounding blank lines: they are part\n * of the injected span and of this comparison.\n */\nexport const PRUNE_MARKER = '\\n\\n[... tool result middle pruned ...]\\n\\n'\n\n/**\n * What the decision path remembers about one substitution step.\n *\n * `anchors` maps a receipt id to the canonical original text as it arrived;\n * `stepId` names the step the anchors belong to. This is an anchor record, not\n * a dispatch queue: the pending-substitution queue stores its own entry, and\n * the same post-execute decision writes both.\n */\nexport interface ReceiptAnchors {\n stepId: string\n anchors: Record<string, string>\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-session receipt anchors.\n *\n * A plain `Map` behind three methods: no persistence, no timers, no I/O. It is\n * written by the decision path and read by the invalidation check, both in\n * `post-execute`; Task 23b fills it.\n */\nexport class AnchorStore {\n private readonly bySession = new Map<string, ReceiptAnchors>()\n\n /** Remember `a` as the pending anchors for `sessionId`, replacing any earlier record. */\n set(sessionId: string, a: ReceiptAnchors): void {\n this.bySession.set(sessionId, a)\n }\n\n /** The pending anchors for `sessionId`, or `undefined` when there is none. */\n get(sessionId: string): ReceiptAnchors | undefined {\n return this.bySession.get(sessionId)\n }\n\n /** Drop the pending anchors for `sessionId`; clearing an absent key is a no-op. */\n clear(sessionId: string): void {\n this.bySession.delete(sessionId)\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether this text contains the host pruner's marker.\n *\n * Exactly `text.includes(PRUNE_MARKER)` — no prefix matching, no regex, no\n * trimming. This is the whole detection: a caller that can see a pruned\n * surface node (the model-request path) uses it, while a caller that cannot\n * (post-execute) only catches a tool output that literally contains the marker.\n * If the host ever changes the wording this returns `false` and detection fails\n * in the safe direction: at worst the plugin prunes one more time than needed,\n * and a stale anchor is never let through, because an anchor/text mismatch\n * still raises `compaction-reset` on the path that can establish the identity.\n * A near miss in ordinary output is likewise not a prune, so text that merely\n * looks like the marker is left alone.\n */\nexport function looksPruned(text: string): boolean {\n return text.includes(PRUNE_MARKER)\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether the receipt already carries the host spill footer.\n *\n * The answer is the injected predicate's: the caller owns the recognition rule\n * (Task 23b/T25 supply the host's `hasSpillNotice` through a dynamic import),\n * and this module must not import `@deepseek-ai/dsh-spill-policy` — it is an\n * optional peer, and a static import would make the degraded path unreachable.\n * Injecting it also keeps the guard testable without a host.\n */\nexport function alreadySpilled(text: string, hasNotice: (t: string) => boolean): boolean {\n return hasNotice(text)\n}\n\n"]}
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Plan parsing: model-written text becomes typed candidates.
3
+ *
4
+ * The model may write one `<CHISEL_PLAN>` block listing candidate tool calls.
5
+ * This module is the only place that text becomes data; guard evaluation,
6
+ * binding and the selector all trust what it returns, so parsing is strict:
7
+ * a document either yields a fully validated plan or exactly one error code
8
+ * (`no-plan`, `bad-json`, `bad-shape`). Nothing is ever thrown and no partial
9
+ * plan escapes.
10
+ *
11
+ * Only the first block counts. The block is located with two linear `indexOf`
12
+ * scans (opening tag, then the next closing tag); a pathological document with
13
+ * many unterminated openers must not stall the event loop. A second block is
14
+ * ignored even when the first is malformed, and an opening tag without its
15
+ * closing tag is not a block at all (`no-plan`).
16
+ *
17
+ * "Only literals" is enforced against what JSON can carry: `JSON.parse` cannot
18
+ * produce a function, so the rule reduces to "`args` may contain no
19
+ * `$`-prefixed key other than `$public`". That restriction covers the whole
20
+ * `args` tree, including inside a `$public` subtree; the sanctioned template
21
+ * (`{ after, field }`, with `$scalar`/`$single` as *values*) has no nested
22
+ * `$`-prefixed key, so the two rules never conflict. The `$public` subtree is
23
+ * otherwise preserved verbatim: its `after`/`field` semantics are validated by
24
+ * binding (task 12), not here. A root-level `$public` (the whole `args` object
25
+ * replaced by a scalar) is also left to binding to reject.
26
+ *
27
+ * Candidate ids are single capital ASCII letters (`A`–`Z`) because the
28
+ * selector answers with exactly one character equal to a candidate id; that
29
+ * also means a plan with more than 26 candidates is rejected. `tool` must be
30
+ * non-empty after trimming. `args` is capped at 64 levels of nesting and may
31
+ * not use the prototype-affecting keys `__proto__`, `constructor` or
32
+ * `prototype`: those collide in receipt hashing today and would pollute any
33
+ * future merge of `args`.
34
+ *
35
+ * @module dsh-boost/gate/plan
36
+ */
37
+ /** A deterministic receipt predicate. `ok` alone is trivial (design §5.2). */
38
+ export type Guard = {
39
+ ok: true;
40
+ } | {
41
+ text_contains: string;
42
+ } | {
43
+ text_not_contains: string;
44
+ } | {
45
+ json_equals: {
46
+ pointer: string;
47
+ value: string | number | boolean;
48
+ };
49
+ };
50
+ /** One tool call the model proposed. */
51
+ export interface Candidate {
52
+ id: string;
53
+ tool: string;
54
+ args: Record<string, unknown>;
55
+ guards: Guard[];
56
+ }
57
+ /** A parsed plan: documentation plus the candidate steps. */
58
+ export interface Plan {
59
+ goal: string;
60
+ steps: Candidate[];
61
+ }
62
+ /** Why a document did not yield a plan. */
63
+ type PlanError = 'no-plan' | 'bad-json' | 'bad-shape';
64
+ /**
65
+ * Parse the first `<CHISEL_PLAN>` block out of one model response.
66
+ *
67
+ * Returns `{ plan }` only when the whole block is understood: a non-empty
68
+ * `steps` array whose ids are unique capital letters, each with a non-empty
69
+ * tool, a literal `args` object and decodable guards. Everything else collapses
70
+ * to one error code, so callers can never act on half a plan. `goal` is
71
+ * documentation: a missing or non-string value becomes `''`, never an error.
72
+ */
73
+ export declare function parsePlan(text: string): {
74
+ plan: Plan;
75
+ } | {
76
+ error: PlanError;
77
+ };
78
+ /**
79
+ * Whether a candidate has nothing to check.
80
+ *
81
+ * True when every guard is `{ ok: true }`, including the empty array: nothing
82
+ * to check means nothing to check. Any non-`ok` guard makes the candidate
83
+ * non-trivial, which is what substitution requires (design §5.2, `guard-trivial`).
84
+ */
85
+ export declare function isTrivial(c: Candidate): boolean;
86
+ export {};