dompurify 3.4.13 → 3.4.15
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +10 -2
- package/dist/purify.cjs.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.cjs.js +360 -126
- package/dist/purify.cjs.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.es.d.mts +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.es.mjs +360 -126
- package/dist/purify.es.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.js +360 -126
- package/dist/purify.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.min.js +2 -2
- package/dist/purify.min.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/attrs.ts +2 -0
- package/src/purify.ts +442 -210
- package/src/types.ts +2 -5
package/dist/purify.js
CHANGED
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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1
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-
/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.
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1
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+
/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.15 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.15/LICENSE */
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(function (global, factory) {
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typeof exports === 'object' && typeof module !== 'undefined' ? module.exports = factory() :
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@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@
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const text = freeze(['#text']);
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const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
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-
const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dominant-baseline', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-orientation', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
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const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dominant-baseline', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'pointer-events', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-orientation', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'vector-effect', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
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const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
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const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
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@@ -358,6 +358,37 @@
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documentFragment: 11,
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notation: 12 // Deprecated
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};
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/* HTML-namespace elements whose child text nodes are serialized *literally*
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(unescaped) by the HTML fragment-serialization algorithm. Two reparse-mXSS
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shapes ride on that literal serialization:
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(a) an element child - a tree the HTML parser can never build, but the DOM
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API and an XML/XHTML parse can - after which a `</tag>`-bearing text
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sibling breaks the element open on reparse; and
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(b) text-only content that already carries the element's OWN end tag, e.g.
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`<style>...</style><img onerror=x>` built as a node, which the literal
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serializer emits verbatim for the HTML parser to re-open.
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Shape (a) is handled by the firstElementChild branch in _isUnsafeNode; shape
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(b) by the LITERAL_TEXT_CLOSE probe. Both read textContent (the raw-serialized
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form for these elements) rather than innerHTML, because an XML/XHTML working
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document serializes innerHTML with `<` escaped, which silently blinds the
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innerHTML-based probes (rule 1's second probe and FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE) there.
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`script` is never allow-listed, but is kept here so the guard matches the
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serializer's own literal-text list exactly. */
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const LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENT_NAMES = ['style', 'script', 'xmp', 'iframe', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'plaintext', 'noscript'];
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const LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS = freeze(addToSet({}, LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENT_NAMES));
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/* Per-element end-tag matcher. On an HTML reparse the ONLY token that
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terminates a literal-text element's raw content is its own end tag; a foreign
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literal-text close (e.g. `</xmp>` sitting inside `<style>`) does not break
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out, so matching is per-element, not a shared alternation. The lookahead
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requires an HTML tag-name terminator (whitespace, `/` or `>`) so a longer
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name such as `</styles` is not mistaken for `</style`. */
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const LITERAL_TEXT_CLOSE = function () {
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const map = {};
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arrayForEach(LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENT_NAMES, name => {
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map[name] = seal(new RegExp('</' + name + '(?=[\\t\\n\\f\\r />])', 'i'));
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});
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return freeze(map);
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}();
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const getGlobal = function getGlobal() {
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return typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window;
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};
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@@ -427,10 +458,25 @@
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const _resolveSetOption = function _resolveSetOption(cfg, key, fallback, options) {
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return objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, key) && arrayIsArray(cfg[key]) ? addToSet(options.base ? clone(options.base) : {}, cfg[key], options.transform) : fallback;
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};
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/**
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* Resolve an object-valued configuration option: a prototype-free clone
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* of cfg[key] when it is an own, truthy object property, else a fresh
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* fallback built by makeFallback (fresh on every parse, so a previous
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* parse can never leak state into the next one).
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*
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* @param cfg the cloned, prototype-free configuration object
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* @param key the configuration property to read
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* @param makeFallback builds the fallback value when the option is absent
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* @returns the resolved object
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*/
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const _resolveObjectOption = function _resolveObjectOption(cfg, key, makeFallback) {
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const value = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, key) ? cfg[key] : undefined;
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return value && typeof value === 'object' ? clone(value) : makeFallback();
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};
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function createDOMPurify() {
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let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
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const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
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DOMPurify.version = '3.4.
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DOMPurify.version = '3.4.15';
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DOMPurify.removed = [];
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if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
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// Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
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const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;
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const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');
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const remove = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'remove');
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// Clobber-safe Attr-node removal. On an HTMLFormElement a descendant named
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// "removeAttributeNode" shadows the prototype method via
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// [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns], so element.removeAttributeNode(attr) throws.
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// Calling the cached Element.prototype method with the element as the
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// receiver removes the exact live Attr node regardless of the shadowing.
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const removeAttributeNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'removeAttributeNode');
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const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');
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const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');
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const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');
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@@ -462,6 +514,16 @@
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const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
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const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
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const getOwnerDocument = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'ownerDocument') : null;
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/* Clobber-safe nodeType / nodeName reads through the cached Node.prototype
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getters, with a direct-property fallback for environments that lack
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Node.prototype. Sites that need a different fallback (e.g. _isClobbered
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returns early on a null name) intentionally keep their own reads. */
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const _readNodeType = function _readNodeType(node) {
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return getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
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};
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const _readNodeName = function _readNodeName(node) {
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return getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : node.nodeName;
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};
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// As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
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// new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
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// (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
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@@ -784,9 +846,11 @@
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IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
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IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = isRegex(cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP) ? cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP : IS_ALLOWED_URI; // Default regexp
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NAMESPACE = typeof cfg.NAMESPACE === 'string' ? cfg.NAMESPACE : HTML_NAMESPACE; // Default HTML namespace
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MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS =
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-
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MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = _resolveObjectOption(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS', () => addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS) // Default built-in map
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);
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HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = _resolveObjectOption(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS', () => addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS) // Default built-in map
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);
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const customElementHandling = _resolveObjectOption(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING', () => create(null));
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CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null);
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if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'tagNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.tagNameCheck)) {
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CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = customElementHandling.tagNameCheck; // Default undefined
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@@ -853,15 +917,6 @@
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addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
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}
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}
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856
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if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR)) {
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addToSet(URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
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}
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if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
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860
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if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
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FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
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}
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addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
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864
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}
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if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
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if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
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FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
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@@ -1096,6 +1151,32 @@
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}
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}
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};
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/**
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* _stripAttributeNode
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*
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* Remove a single Attr node case/namespace-exactly on an attribute-teardown
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* path. Name-based removeAttribute() ASCII-lowercases its lookup key for an
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* HTML element in an HTML document and so silently misses a case-preserved
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* handler (e.g. `ONERROR` off an XML/XHTML import) - the same defect
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* _removeAttribute() was fixed for, which a name-based call would reintroduce
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* on these IN_PLACE teardown paths. Unlike _removeAttribute this does not
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* record into DOMPurify.removed: the neutralize passes intentionally do not
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* book-keep. A clobbered/detached node falls back to best-effort name-based
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* removal.
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*
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* @param element the element to strip the attribute from
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* @param attribute the Attr node to remove
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* @param name the attribute's name, for the fallback path
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*/
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1171
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+
const _stripAttributeNode = function _stripAttributeNode(element, attribute, name) {
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1172
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+
try {
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1173
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removeAttributeNode(element, attribute);
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1174
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} catch (_) {
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1175
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try {
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element.removeAttribute(name);
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1177
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} catch (_) {}
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1178
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}
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};
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/**
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1100
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* _neutralizeRoot
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1101
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*
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@@ -1140,11 +1221,7 @@
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const attribute = attributes[i];
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const name = attribute && attribute.name;
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if (typeof name === 'string') {
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1143
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-
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|
1144
|
-
root.removeAttribute(name);
|
|
1145
|
-
} catch (_) {
|
|
1146
|
-
/* Clobbered removeAttribute — ignore (fail-closed best effort) */
|
|
1147
|
-
}
|
|
1224
|
+
_stripAttributeNode(root, attribute, name);
|
|
1148
1225
|
}
|
|
1149
1226
|
}
|
|
1150
1227
|
}
|
|
@@ -1152,22 +1229,51 @@
|
|
|
1152
1229
|
/**
|
|
1153
1230
|
* _removeAttribute
|
|
1154
1231
|
*
|
|
1232
|
+
* Name-based getAttributeNode()/removeAttribute() ASCII-lowercase their
|
|
1233
|
+
* lookup key for HTML elements in an HTML document, so they silently miss an
|
|
1234
|
+
* attribute whose stored qualified name still contains uppercase ASCII
|
|
1235
|
+
* letters. That happens when the node came from a case-preserving source
|
|
1236
|
+
* (an XML/XHTML document imported via importNode(), or createAttributeNS()),
|
|
1237
|
+
* where e.g. `ONERROR` survives the walk: the policy check lowercases to
|
|
1238
|
+
* `onerror` and rejects it, but `removeAttribute('ONERROR')` looks up
|
|
1239
|
+
* `onerror` and finds nothing. Remove the exact Attr node instead, which is
|
|
1240
|
+
* case- and namespace-exact, and fall back to name-based removal only when
|
|
1241
|
+
* the caller could not supply the node.
|
|
1242
|
+
*
|
|
1155
1243
|
* @param name an Attribute name
|
|
1156
1244
|
* @param element a DOM node
|
|
1245
|
+
* @param attr the exact Attr node to remove, when the caller has it
|
|
1157
1246
|
*/
|
|
1158
|
-
const _removeAttribute = function _removeAttribute(name, element) {
|
|
1247
|
+
const _removeAttribute = function _removeAttribute(name, element, attr) {
|
|
1248
|
+
if (!attr) {
|
|
1249
|
+
try {
|
|
1250
|
+
attr = element.getAttributeNode(name);
|
|
1251
|
+
} catch (_) {
|
|
1252
|
+
attr = null;
|
|
1253
|
+
}
|
|
1254
|
+
}
|
|
1255
|
+
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
|
|
1256
|
+
attribute: attr || null,
|
|
1257
|
+
from: element
|
|
1258
|
+
});
|
|
1159
1259
|
try {
|
|
1160
|
-
|
|
1161
|
-
|
|
1162
|
-
|
|
1163
|
-
|
|
1260
|
+
if (attr) {
|
|
1261
|
+
removeAttributeNode(element, attr);
|
|
1262
|
+
} else {
|
|
1263
|
+
element.removeAttribute(name);
|
|
1264
|
+
}
|
|
1164
1265
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
1165
|
-
|
|
1166
|
-
|
|
1167
|
-
|
|
1168
|
-
|
|
1266
|
+
/* Clobbered or already-detached node - best-effort fall back to a
|
|
1267
|
+
name-based removal so the "is" handling below still runs. Note this
|
|
1268
|
+
fallback ASCII-lowercases its lookup key in an HTML document and so
|
|
1269
|
+
cannot reach a case-preserved attribute name; the cached
|
|
1270
|
+
removeAttributeNode() above is what removes those, and a clobbered
|
|
1271
|
+
form is already removed wholesale by _isClobbered() before reaching
|
|
1272
|
+
here. */
|
|
1273
|
+
try {
|
|
1274
|
+
element.removeAttribute(name);
|
|
1275
|
+
} catch (_) {}
|
|
1169
1276
|
}
|
|
1170
|
-
element.removeAttribute(name);
|
|
1171
1277
|
// We void attribute values for unremovable "is" attributes
|
|
1172
1278
|
if (name === 'is') {
|
|
1173
1279
|
if (RETURN_DOM || RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
|
|
@@ -1202,11 +1308,7 @@
|
|
|
1202
1308
|
if (typeof name !== 'string' || ALLOWED_ATTR[transformCaseFunc(name)]) {
|
|
1203
1309
|
continue;
|
|
1204
1310
|
}
|
|
1205
|
-
|
|
1206
|
-
element.removeAttribute(name);
|
|
1207
|
-
} catch (_) {
|
|
1208
|
-
/* Clobbered removeAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
|
|
1209
|
-
}
|
|
1311
|
+
_stripAttributeNode(element, attribute, name);
|
|
1210
1312
|
}
|
|
1211
1313
|
};
|
|
1212
1314
|
/**
|
|
@@ -1235,7 +1337,7 @@
|
|
|
1235
1337
|
const stack = [root];
|
|
1236
1338
|
while (stack.length > 0) {
|
|
1237
1339
|
const node = stack.pop();
|
|
1238
|
-
const nodeType =
|
|
1340
|
+
const nodeType = _readNodeType(node);
|
|
1239
1341
|
if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
|
|
1240
1342
|
_stripDisallowedAttributes(node);
|
|
1241
1343
|
}
|
|
@@ -1282,6 +1384,26 @@
|
|
|
1282
1384
|
*
|
|
1283
1385
|
* @param root the in-place root to sweep
|
|
1284
1386
|
*/
|
|
1387
|
+
/**
|
|
1388
|
+
* Central policy for declarative-partial-updates patch-linkage attributes,
|
|
1389
|
+
* shared by the _neutralizePatchLinkage pre-pass and _isValidAttribute so
|
|
1390
|
+
* the two sites cannot drift: `patchsrc` always links, `for` links
|
|
1391
|
+
* everywhere except on <label>/<output>, and the whole policy is gated on
|
|
1392
|
+
* SAFE_FOR_XML (see the rationale block in _isValidAttribute).
|
|
1393
|
+
*
|
|
1394
|
+
* @param lcName the transformCaseFunc'd attribute name
|
|
1395
|
+
* @param lcTag the transformCaseFunc'd tag name of the carrying element
|
|
1396
|
+
* @return true if the attribute is patch linkage and must be dropped
|
|
1397
|
+
*/
|
|
1398
|
+
const _isPatchLinkageAttribute = function _isPatchLinkageAttribute(lcName, lcTag) {
|
|
1399
|
+
if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
|
|
1400
|
+
return false;
|
|
1401
|
+
}
|
|
1402
|
+
if (lcName === 'patchsrc') {
|
|
1403
|
+
return true;
|
|
1404
|
+
}
|
|
1405
|
+
return lcName === 'for' && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output';
|
|
1406
|
+
};
|
|
1285
1407
|
const _neutralizePatchLinkage = function _neutralizePatchLinkage(root) {
|
|
1286
1408
|
if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
|
|
1287
1409
|
return;
|
|
@@ -1289,7 +1411,7 @@
|
|
|
1289
1411
|
const stack = [root];
|
|
1290
1412
|
while (stack.length > 0) {
|
|
1291
1413
|
const node = stack.pop();
|
|
1292
|
-
const nodeType =
|
|
1414
|
+
const nodeType = _readNodeType(node);
|
|
1293
1415
|
/* Remove range markers (the target side of a patch linkage): every
|
|
1294
1416
|
processing instruction, and any markup-bearing comment. */
|
|
1295
1417
|
if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction || nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, node.data)) {
|
|
@@ -1303,12 +1425,12 @@
|
|
|
1303
1425
|
/* Strip patch-source attributes (the source side) off elements. */
|
|
1304
1426
|
if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
|
|
1305
1427
|
const element = node;
|
|
1306
|
-
const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(
|
|
1428
|
+
const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(_readNodeName(node));
|
|
1307
1429
|
try {
|
|
1308
1430
|
if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('patchsrc')) {
|
|
1309
1431
|
element.removeAttribute('patchsrc');
|
|
1310
1432
|
}
|
|
1311
|
-
if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('for') &&
|
|
1433
|
+
if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('for') && _isPatchLinkageAttribute('for', lcTag)) {
|
|
1312
1434
|
element.removeAttribute('for');
|
|
1313
1435
|
}
|
|
1314
1436
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
@@ -1483,7 +1605,17 @@
|
|
|
1483
1605
|
// makes the direct read diverge from the cached read; a clean form
|
|
1484
1606
|
// (same-realm OR foreign-realm) has both reads pointing at the same
|
|
1485
1607
|
// canonical NamedNodeMap.
|
|
1486
|
-
element.attributes !== getAttributes(element) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' ||
|
|
1608
|
+
element.attributes !== getAttributes(element) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' ||
|
|
1609
|
+
// A form descendant named "removeAttributeNode" or "getAttributeNode"
|
|
1610
|
+
// shadows these Attr-node methods via [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns].
|
|
1611
|
+
// _removeAttribute() / _stripAttributeNode() reach for
|
|
1612
|
+
// element.removeAttributeNode(attr) first; when it is shadowed the call
|
|
1613
|
+
// throws and the name-based fallback element.removeAttribute(name)
|
|
1614
|
+
// ASCII-lowercases its lookup key in an HTML document, silently missing
|
|
1615
|
+
// a case-preserved event-handler attribute (e.g. an ONANIMATIONSTART
|
|
1616
|
+
// that reached the sanitizer through an XML/XHTML parse). Flag the form
|
|
1617
|
+
// so it is removed wholesale, exactly as for the other shadowed methods.
|
|
1618
|
+
typeof element.removeAttributeNode !== 'function' || typeof element.getAttributeNode !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' ||
|
|
1487
1619
|
// NodeType clobbering probe. Cached Node.prototype.nodeType getter
|
|
1488
1620
|
// returns the integer 1 for any Element regardless of realm; direct
|
|
1489
1621
|
// read on a clobbered form (e.g. <input name="nodeType">) returns
|
|
@@ -1570,8 +1702,16 @@
|
|
|
1570
1702
|
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.hasChildNodes() && !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.textContent) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
|
|
1571
1703
|
return true;
|
|
1572
1704
|
}
|
|
1573
|
-
/* Remove
|
|
1574
|
-
|
|
1705
|
+
/* Remove rawtext/literal-text elements whose literal serialization
|
|
1706
|
+
re-opens markup on an HTML reparse - shapes (a) and (b) documented at
|
|
1707
|
+
LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS. Both are invisible to rule 1 above (which
|
|
1708
|
+
self-disables once there is an element child, and whose second probe
|
|
1709
|
+
reads the innerHTML an XML/XHTML document serializes escaped), which
|
|
1710
|
+
is why both probes here read textContent instead. Previously only
|
|
1711
|
+
`style`-with-element-child was covered; every element in
|
|
1712
|
+
LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS shares this literal serialization and is
|
|
1713
|
+
equally affected. */
|
|
1714
|
+
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE && LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS[tagName] && (_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) || typeof currentNode.textContent === 'string' && regExpTest(LITERAL_TEXT_CLOSE[tagName], currentNode.textContent))) {
|
|
1575
1715
|
return true;
|
|
1576
1716
|
}
|
|
1577
1717
|
/* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
|
|
@@ -1584,6 +1724,30 @@
|
|
|
1584
1724
|
}
|
|
1585
1725
|
return false;
|
|
1586
1726
|
};
|
|
1727
|
+
/**
|
|
1728
|
+
* Evaluate a CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING check (a RegExp or a predicate
|
|
1729
|
+
* function, per the validation in _parseConfig) against a name.
|
|
1730
|
+
* Additional arguments are forwarded to predicate functions - the
|
|
1731
|
+
* attributeNameCheck predicate receives the tag name as its second
|
|
1732
|
+
* argument. A null/absent check never matches.
|
|
1733
|
+
*
|
|
1734
|
+
* @param check the configured tagNameCheck / attributeNameCheck value
|
|
1735
|
+
* @param name the name to test
|
|
1736
|
+
* @param args extra arguments forwarded to a predicate function
|
|
1737
|
+
* @return true if the check matches the name
|
|
1738
|
+
*/
|
|
1739
|
+
const _matchesNameCheck = function _matchesNameCheck(check, name) {
|
|
1740
|
+
if (check instanceof RegExp) {
|
|
1741
|
+
return regExpTest(check, name);
|
|
1742
|
+
}
|
|
1743
|
+
if (check instanceof Function) {
|
|
1744
|
+
for (var _len = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len > 2 ? _len - 2 : 0), _key = 2; _key < _len; _key++) {
|
|
1745
|
+
args[_key - 2] = arguments[_key];
|
|
1746
|
+
}
|
|
1747
|
+
return Boolean(check(name, ...args));
|
|
1748
|
+
}
|
|
1749
|
+
return false;
|
|
1750
|
+
};
|
|
1587
1751
|
/**
|
|
1588
1752
|
* Handle a node whose tag is forbidden or not allowlisted: keep
|
|
1589
1753
|
* allowed custom elements (false return exits _sanitizeElements
|
|
@@ -1603,13 +1767,8 @@
|
|
|
1603
1767
|
*/
|
|
1604
1768
|
const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root) {
|
|
1605
1769
|
/* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
|
|
1606
|
-
if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
|
|
1607
|
-
|
|
1608
|
-
return false;
|
|
1609
|
-
}
|
|
1610
|
-
if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)) {
|
|
1611
|
-
return false;
|
|
1612
|
-
}
|
|
1770
|
+
if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName) && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
|
|
1771
|
+
return false;
|
|
1613
1772
|
}
|
|
1614
1773
|
/* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
|
|
1615
1774
|
Use the cached prototype getters exclusively — the previous code
|
|
@@ -1671,6 +1830,46 @@
|
|
|
1671
1830
|
}
|
|
1672
1831
|
return set === defaultSet || set === setConfigSet ? clone(set) : set;
|
|
1673
1832
|
};
|
|
1833
|
+
/**
|
|
1834
|
+
* Shared guard for a node that a hook has detached from the walk tree,
|
|
1835
|
+
* used after each element-hook site in _sanitizeElements. Detaching is a
|
|
1836
|
+
* long-standing user pattern (issue #469; draw.io-style foreignObject
|
|
1837
|
+
* filtering). Per the cached, unclobberable parentNode getter the node is
|
|
1838
|
+
* genuinely out of the tree, so it can reach neither the serialized
|
|
1839
|
+
* output nor an IN_PLACE live tree; treat it as removed and stop
|
|
1840
|
+
* processing it. Without this guard, the unsafe-node / namespace checks
|
|
1841
|
+
* would call _forceRemove on a parentless node and hit the REPORT-3
|
|
1842
|
+
* fail-closed throw — which exists for nodes DOMPurify wants gone but
|
|
1843
|
+
* *cannot* detach (clobbered / parentless roots), the opposite of a node
|
|
1844
|
+
* that is already safely gone. The walk root is exempt: a detached
|
|
1845
|
+
* IN_PLACE root is legitimate input and must still be fully sanitized,
|
|
1846
|
+
* and a kill-decision on it must keep hitting the REPORT-3 throw.
|
|
1847
|
+
*
|
|
1848
|
+
* Nodes detached by hooks stay the hook's responsibility for placement:
|
|
1849
|
+
* they are not recorded in DOMPurify.removed, so the post-walk IN_PLACE
|
|
1850
|
+
* pass (which iterates DOMPurify.removed) does not reach them. But a
|
|
1851
|
+
* hook-detached subtree can still hold a queued resource-event handler -
|
|
1852
|
+
* e.g. an <img onload> that began loading when the caller built the live
|
|
1853
|
+
* tree - which fires in page scope after sanitize returns even though the
|
|
1854
|
+
* handler never reached the returned tree. That is the audit-5 F1 hazard,
|
|
1855
|
+
* and the documented node.remove() hook pattern walks straight into it.
|
|
1856
|
+
* So on the IN_PLACE path we neutralize the detached subtree inline,
|
|
1857
|
+
* stripping its non-allow-listed attributes before returning, exactly as
|
|
1858
|
+
* the post-walk pass does for _forceRemove'd subtrees.
|
|
1859
|
+
*
|
|
1860
|
+
* @param currentNode the node a hook may have detached
|
|
1861
|
+
* @param root the current walk root
|
|
1862
|
+
* @return true if the node is detached and now handled, false otherwise
|
|
1863
|
+
*/
|
|
1864
|
+
const _handleHookDetachedNode = function _handleHookDetachedNode(currentNode, root) {
|
|
1865
|
+
if (currentNode === root || getParentNode(currentNode) !== null) {
|
|
1866
|
+
return false;
|
|
1867
|
+
}
|
|
1868
|
+
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
1869
|
+
_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
|
|
1870
|
+
}
|
|
1871
|
+
return true;
|
|
1872
|
+
};
|
|
1674
1873
|
/**
|
|
1675
1874
|
* _sanitizeElements
|
|
1676
1875
|
*
|
|
@@ -1680,18 +1879,12 @@
|
|
|
1680
1879
|
* @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
|
|
1681
1880
|
* @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
|
|
1682
1881
|
*/
|
|
1683
|
-
// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
|
|
1684
1882
|
const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode, root) {
|
|
1685
1883
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
1686
1884
|
_executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
|
|
1687
|
-
/* A hook may have detached the node - treat it as removed (see
|
|
1688
|
-
|
|
1689
|
-
|
|
1690
|
-
resource handler on it cannot fire in page scope after we return. */
|
|
1691
|
-
if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
|
|
1692
|
-
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
1693
|
-
_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
|
|
1694
|
-
}
|
|
1885
|
+
/* A hook may have detached the node - treat it as removed (see
|
|
1886
|
+
_handleHookDetachedNode for the full rationale). */
|
|
1887
|
+
if (_handleHookDetachedNode(currentNode, root)) {
|
|
1695
1888
|
return true;
|
|
1696
1889
|
}
|
|
1697
1890
|
/* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
|
|
@@ -1700,7 +1893,7 @@
|
|
|
1700
1893
|
return true;
|
|
1701
1894
|
}
|
|
1702
1895
|
/* Now let's check the element's type and name */
|
|
1703
|
-
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(
|
|
1896
|
+
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(_readNodeName(currentNode));
|
|
1704
1897
|
/* Close the pre-walk clone-guard's timing gap: an uponSanitizeElement
|
|
1705
1898
|
hook may have been installed after that guard sampled the hook arrays
|
|
1706
1899
|
(e.g. lazily from beforeSanitizeElements), leaving ALLOWED_TAGS still
|
|
@@ -1712,34 +1905,9 @@
|
|
|
1712
1905
|
tagName,
|
|
1713
1906
|
allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
|
|
1714
1907
|
});
|
|
1715
|
-
/*
|
|
1716
|
-
|
|
1717
|
-
|
|
1718
|
-
genuinely out of the tree, so it can reach neither the serialized
|
|
1719
|
-
output nor an IN_PLACE live tree; treat it as removed and stop
|
|
1720
|
-
processing it. Without this guard, the unsafe-node / namespace
|
|
1721
|
-
checks below would call _forceRemove on a parentless node and hit
|
|
1722
|
-
the REPORT-3 fail-closed throw — which exists for nodes DOMPurify
|
|
1723
|
-
wants gone but *cannot* detach (clobbered / parentless roots), the
|
|
1724
|
-
opposite of a node that is already safely gone. The walk root is
|
|
1725
|
-
exempt: a detached IN_PLACE root is legitimate input and must still
|
|
1726
|
-
be fully sanitized, and a kill-decision on it must keep hitting the
|
|
1727
|
-
REPORT-3 throw. Nodes detached by hooks stay the hook's
|
|
1728
|
-
responsibility for placement: they are not recorded in
|
|
1729
|
-
DOMPurify.removed, so the post-walk IN_PLACE pass (which iterates
|
|
1730
|
-
DOMPurify.removed) does not reach them. But a hook-detached subtree
|
|
1731
|
-
can still hold a queued resource-event handler - e.g. an <img onload>
|
|
1732
|
-
that began loading when the caller built the live tree - which fires
|
|
1733
|
-
in page scope after sanitize returns even though the handler never
|
|
1734
|
-
reached the returned tree. That is the audit-5 F1 hazard, and the
|
|
1735
|
-
documented node.remove() hook pattern walks straight into it. So on
|
|
1736
|
-
the IN_PLACE path we neutralize the detached subtree inline here,
|
|
1737
|
-
stripping its non-allow-listed attributes before returning, exactly
|
|
1738
|
-
as the post-walk pass does for _forceRemove'd subtrees. */
|
|
1739
|
-
if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
|
|
1740
|
-
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
1741
|
-
_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
|
|
1742
|
-
}
|
|
1908
|
+
/* The uponSanitizeElement hook may have detached the node, exactly as
|
|
1909
|
+
above (see _handleHookDetachedNode for the full rationale). */
|
|
1910
|
+
if (_handleHookDetachedNode(currentNode, root)) {
|
|
1743
1911
|
return true;
|
|
1744
1912
|
}
|
|
1745
1913
|
/* Remove mXSS vectors, processing instructions and risky comments */
|
|
@@ -1772,7 +1940,7 @@
|
|
|
1772
1940
|
bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different
|
|
1773
1941
|
realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace
|
|
1774
1942
|
slip past the namespace check entirely. */
|
|
1775
|
-
const nt =
|
|
1943
|
+
const nt = _readNodeType(currentNode);
|
|
1776
1944
|
if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
|
|
1777
1945
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
1778
1946
|
return true;
|
|
@@ -1832,10 +2000,7 @@
|
|
|
1832
2000
|
other structural-threat checks and stays overridable, consistent with
|
|
1833
2001
|
the rest of the codebase. PI range markers are already removed by
|
|
1834
2002
|
_isUnsafeNode. */
|
|
1835
|
-
if (
|
|
1836
|
-
return false;
|
|
1837
|
-
}
|
|
1838
|
-
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'for' && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
|
|
2003
|
+
if (_isPatchLinkageAttribute(lcName, lcTag)) {
|
|
1839
2004
|
return false;
|
|
1840
2005
|
}
|
|
1841
2006
|
/* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
|
|
@@ -1847,22 +2012,54 @@
|
|
|
1847
2012
|
(https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
|
|
1848
2013
|
XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
|
|
1849
2014
|
We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
|
|
1850
|
-
if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName))
|
|
1851
|
-
|
|
1852
|
-
|
|
1853
|
-
|
|
1854
|
-
|
|
1855
|
-
|
|
1856
|
-
|
|
1857
|
-
|
|
1858
|
-
|
|
1859
|
-
|
|
1860
|
-
|
|
1861
|
-
|
|
1862
|
-
|
|
1863
|
-
|
|
1864
|
-
|
|
1865
|
-
|
|
2015
|
+
if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName)) {
|
|
2016
|
+
return true;
|
|
2017
|
+
}
|
|
2018
|
+
/* Allow valid aria-* attributes, the value is always URI safe */
|
|
2019
|
+
if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR$1, lcName)) {
|
|
2020
|
+
return true;
|
|
2021
|
+
}
|
|
2022
|
+
/* A name outside the allowlist is acceptable on custom-element terms
|
|
2023
|
+
only. The value checks below are intentionally skipped in that case:
|
|
2024
|
+
if the user supplied a tagNameCheck we also allow derived custom
|
|
2025
|
+
elements using the same test, and attributes passing the configured
|
|
2026
|
+
attributeNameCheck are allowed as custom elements define these at
|
|
2027
|
+
their own discretion. */
|
|
2028
|
+
if (!nameIsPermitted) {
|
|
2029
|
+
return (
|
|
2030
|
+
// Condition a) covers a basically valid custom element tag name whose
|
|
2031
|
+
// tag passes the configured tagNameCheck and whose attribute name
|
|
2032
|
+
// passes the configured attributeNameCheck ...
|
|
2033
|
+
_isBasicCustomElement(lcTag) && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, lcTag) && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck, lcName, lcTag) ||
|
|
2034
|
+
// Condition b) covers an `is` attribute whose value passes the
|
|
2035
|
+
// configured tagNameCheck while customized built-in elements are
|
|
2036
|
+
// allowed.
|
|
2037
|
+
lcName === 'is' && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, value)
|
|
2038
|
+
);
|
|
2039
|
+
}
|
|
2040
|
+
/* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
|
|
2041
|
+
if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) {
|
|
2042
|
+
return true;
|
|
2043
|
+
}
|
|
2044
|
+
/* Check no script, data or unknown possibly unsafe URI
|
|
2045
|
+
unless we know URI values are safe for that attribute */
|
|
2046
|
+
if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) {
|
|
2047
|
+
return true;
|
|
2048
|
+
}
|
|
2049
|
+
/* Keep image data URIs alive if src/xlink:href is allowed */
|
|
2050
|
+
/* Further prevent gadget XSS for dynamically built script tags */
|
|
2051
|
+
if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) {
|
|
2052
|
+
return true;
|
|
2053
|
+
}
|
|
2054
|
+
/* Allow unknown protocols: This provides support for links that
|
|
2055
|
+
are handled by protocol handlers which may be unknown ahead of
|
|
2056
|
+
time, e.g. fb:, spotify: */
|
|
2057
|
+
if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) {
|
|
2058
|
+
return true;
|
|
2059
|
+
}
|
|
2060
|
+
/* Only an empty (binary) value remains safe at this point;
|
|
2061
|
+
anything else is presumed unsafe, do not add it back */
|
|
2062
|
+
return !value;
|
|
1866
2063
|
};
|
|
1867
2064
|
/* Names the HTML spec reserves from valid-custom-element-name; these must
|
|
1868
2065
|
* never be treated as basic custom elements even when a permissive
|
|
@@ -1909,15 +2106,25 @@
|
|
|
1909
2106
|
/**
|
|
1910
2107
|
* Write a modified attribute value back onto the element. On
|
|
1911
2108
|
* success, re-probe for clobbering introduced by the new value and
|
|
1912
|
-
* remove the element when found; otherwise
|
|
1913
|
-
*
|
|
1914
|
-
*
|
|
2109
|
+
* remove the element when found; otherwise, when this writeback is the
|
|
2110
|
+
* recreate half of the SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS remove-and-recreate, pop the
|
|
2111
|
+
* removal entry that path recorded so it does not show as removed. On
|
|
1915
2112
|
* failure, remove the attribute instead.
|
|
1916
2113
|
*
|
|
2114
|
+
* Returns true only on a clean write (the value was set and the new value
|
|
2115
|
+
* introduced no clobbering). The caller uses that, together with its own
|
|
2116
|
+
* knowledge of whether this attribute pushed a DOMPurify.removed record, to
|
|
2117
|
+
* decide whether to pop that record. The pop must happen ONLY for the
|
|
2118
|
+
* named-prop remove-and-recreate; popping on any other value change (trim,
|
|
2119
|
+
* template scrubbing, Trusted Types) would consume an unrelated _forceRemove
|
|
2120
|
+
* subtree-cleanup record and let that detached subtree keep a live event
|
|
2121
|
+
* handler through the IN_PLACE neutralization pass (SO-001).
|
|
2122
|
+
*
|
|
1917
2123
|
* @param currentNode the element carrying the attribute
|
|
1918
2124
|
* @param name the attribute name as present on the element
|
|
1919
2125
|
* @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
|
|
1920
2126
|
* @param value the new attribute value
|
|
2127
|
+
* @return true if the value was written without introducing clobbering
|
|
1921
2128
|
*/
|
|
1922
2129
|
const _setAttributeValue = function _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value) {
|
|
1923
2130
|
try {
|
|
@@ -1929,11 +2136,12 @@
|
|
|
1929
2136
|
}
|
|
1930
2137
|
if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
|
|
1931
2138
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
1932
|
-
|
|
1933
|
-
arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
|
|
2139
|
+
return false;
|
|
1934
2140
|
}
|
|
2141
|
+
return true;
|
|
1935
2142
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
1936
2143
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
2144
|
+
return false;
|
|
1937
2145
|
}
|
|
1938
2146
|
};
|
|
1939
2147
|
/**
|
|
@@ -1946,6 +2154,7 @@
|
|
|
1946
2154
|
*
|
|
1947
2155
|
* @param currentNode to sanitize
|
|
1948
2156
|
*/
|
|
2157
|
+
// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
|
|
1949
2158
|
const _sanitizeAttributes = function _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode) {
|
|
1950
2159
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
1951
2160
|
_executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
|
|
@@ -1975,6 +2184,15 @@
|
|
|
1975
2184
|
const lcName = transformCaseFunc(name);
|
|
1976
2185
|
const initValue = attrValue;
|
|
1977
2186
|
let value = name === 'value' ? initValue : stringTrim(initValue);
|
|
2187
|
+
/* Tracks whether this specific attribute pushed a DOMPurify.removed
|
|
2188
|
+
record that a later _setAttributeValue() writeback is expected to pop
|
|
2189
|
+
back off (the SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS remove-and-recreate below is the
|
|
2190
|
+
only path that does). A value that merely changed via trim, template
|
|
2191
|
+
scrubbing, or Trusted Types pushes no such record, so its writeback
|
|
2192
|
+
must NOT pop — otherwise it consumes an unrelated _forceRemove subtree
|
|
2193
|
+
record and that detached subtree escapes the IN_PLACE handler-
|
|
2194
|
+
neutralization pass (SO-001). */
|
|
2195
|
+
let recreatedNamedProp = false;
|
|
1978
2196
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
1979
2197
|
hookEvent.attrName = lcName;
|
|
1980
2198
|
hookEvent.attrValue = value;
|
|
@@ -1987,20 +2205,23 @@
|
|
|
1987
2205
|
*/
|
|
1988
2206
|
if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && stringIndexOf(value, SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX) !== 0) {
|
|
1989
2207
|
// Remove the attribute with this value
|
|
1990
|
-
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
2208
|
+
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
|
|
1991
2209
|
// Prefix the value and later re-create the attribute with the sanitized value
|
|
1992
2210
|
value = SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX + value;
|
|
2211
|
+
// This attribute owns the record just pushed; its recreate writeback
|
|
2212
|
+
// is the one allowed to pop it back off.
|
|
2213
|
+
recreatedNamedProp = true;
|
|
1993
2214
|
}
|
|
1994
2215
|
// Else: already prefixed, leave the attribute alone — the prefix is
|
|
1995
2216
|
// itself the clobbering protection, and re-applying it is incorrect.
|
|
1996
2217
|
/* Work around a security issue with comments inside attributes */
|
|
1997
2218
|
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && regExpTest(/((--!?|])>)|<\/(style|script|title|xmp|textarea|noscript|iframe|noembed|noframes)/i, value)) {
|
|
1998
|
-
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
2219
|
+
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
|
|
1999
2220
|
continue;
|
|
2000
2221
|
}
|
|
2001
2222
|
/* Make sure we cannot easily use animated hrefs, even if animations are allowed */
|
|
2002
2223
|
if (lcName === 'attributename' && stringMatch(value, 'href')) {
|
|
2003
|
-
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
2224
|
+
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
|
|
2004
2225
|
continue;
|
|
2005
2226
|
}
|
|
2006
2227
|
/* Did the hooks force-keep the attribute? */
|
|
@@ -2009,12 +2230,12 @@
|
|
|
2009
2230
|
}
|
|
2010
2231
|
/* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
|
|
2011
2232
|
if (!hookEvent.keepAttr) {
|
|
2012
|
-
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
2233
|
+
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
|
|
2013
2234
|
continue;
|
|
2014
2235
|
}
|
|
2015
2236
|
/* Work around a security issue in jQuery 3.0 */
|
|
2016
2237
|
if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(SELF_CLOSING_TAG, value)) {
|
|
2017
|
-
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
2238
|
+
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
|
|
2018
2239
|
continue;
|
|
2019
2240
|
}
|
|
2020
2241
|
/* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
|
|
@@ -2023,14 +2244,21 @@
|
|
|
2023
2244
|
}
|
|
2024
2245
|
/* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */
|
|
2025
2246
|
if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {
|
|
2026
|
-
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
2247
|
+
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
|
|
2027
2248
|
continue;
|
|
2028
2249
|
}
|
|
2029
2250
|
/* Handle attributes that require Trusted Types */
|
|
2030
2251
|
value = _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value);
|
|
2031
2252
|
/* Handle invalid data-* attribute set by try-catching it */
|
|
2032
2253
|
if (value !== initValue) {
|
|
2033
|
-
_setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value);
|
|
2254
|
+
const cleanWrite = _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value);
|
|
2255
|
+
/* Only the named-prop remove-and-recreate owns a DOMPurify.removed
|
|
2256
|
+
record to pop; a plain trim/template/Trusted-Types writeback owns
|
|
2257
|
+
none, so popping here would drop an unrelated subtree's cleanup
|
|
2258
|
+
record (SO-001). */
|
|
2259
|
+
if (cleanWrite && recreatedNamedProp) {
|
|
2260
|
+
arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
|
|
2261
|
+
}
|
|
2034
2262
|
}
|
|
2035
2263
|
}
|
|
2036
2264
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
@@ -2070,8 +2298,7 @@
|
|
|
2070
2298
|
Walk it explicitly. The nodeType guard avoids reading
|
|
2071
2299
|
shadowRoot off text / comment / CDATA / PI nodes that the
|
|
2072
2300
|
iterator also surfaces. */
|
|
2073
|
-
|
|
2074
|
-
if (shadowNodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
|
|
2301
|
+
if (_readNodeType(shadowNode) === NODE_TYPE.element) {
|
|
2075
2302
|
const innerSr = getShadowRoot(shadowNode);
|
|
2076
2303
|
if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
|
|
2077
2304
|
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(innerSr);
|
|
@@ -2129,7 +2356,7 @@
|
|
|
2129
2356
|
continue;
|
|
2130
2357
|
}
|
|
2131
2358
|
const node = item.node;
|
|
2132
|
-
const nodeType =
|
|
2359
|
+
const nodeType = _readNodeType(node);
|
|
2133
2360
|
const isElement = nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element;
|
|
2134
2361
|
/* (pushed last → processed first) Children, snapshotted in reverse so
|
|
2135
2362
|
the first child is processed first. Snapshotting matters because a
|
|
@@ -2251,7 +2478,7 @@
|
|
|
2251
2478
|
child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
|
|
2252
2479
|
the property and let this check skip the root-allowlist
|
|
2253
2480
|
validation entirely. */
|
|
2254
|
-
const nn =
|
|
2481
|
+
const nn = _readNodeName(dirty);
|
|
2255
2482
|
if (typeof nn === 'string') {
|
|
2256
2483
|
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
|
|
2257
2484
|
if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
|
|
@@ -2307,8 +2534,15 @@
|
|
|
2307
2534
|
them before the main iterator runs, since the iterator does not
|
|
2308
2535
|
descend into shadow trees. The walk routes every read through a
|
|
2309
2536
|
cached prototype getter so clobbering descendants on a form root
|
|
2310
|
-
cannot hide a shadow host from this pass.
|
|
2311
|
-
|
|
2537
|
+
cannot hide a shadow host from this pass.
|
|
2538
|
+
Traverse from `body`, not `importedNode`: when importedNode is a
|
|
2539
|
+
DocumentFragment, the appendChild() above moves its children into
|
|
2540
|
+
`body` and leaves the fragment empty, so walking importedNode would
|
|
2541
|
+
scan nothing and miss every attached shadow host now under `body`
|
|
2542
|
+
(SO-003). In the BODY/HTML branches `body === importedNode`, so this
|
|
2543
|
+
is equivalent there; in the element branch `body` contains the
|
|
2544
|
+
appended element and its descendants. `body` covers all three. */
|
|
2545
|
+
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(body);
|
|
2312
2546
|
} else {
|
|
2313
2547
|
/* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
|
|
2314
2548
|
if (!RETURN_DOM && !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
|