dompurify 3.4.12 → 3.4.14

package/dist/purify.cjs.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.12 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.12/LICENSE */
+/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.14 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.14/LICENSE */
 
 'use strict';
 
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ const mathMlDisallowed = freeze(['maction', 'maligngroup', 'malignmark', 'mlongd
 const text = freeze(['#text']);
 
 const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
-const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dominant-baseline', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-orientation', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
+const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dominant-baseline', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'pointer-events', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-orientation', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'vector-effect', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
 const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
 const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
 
@@ -354,6 +354,37 @@ const NODE_TYPE = {
   documentFragment: 11,
   notation: 12 // Deprecated
 };
+/* HTML-namespace elements whose child text nodes are serialized *literally*
+   (unescaped) by the HTML fragment-serialization algorithm. Two reparse-mXSS
+   shapes ride on that literal serialization:
+     (a) an element child - a tree the HTML parser can never build, but the DOM
+         API and an XML/XHTML parse can - after which a `</tag>`-bearing text
+         sibling breaks the element open on reparse; and
+     (b) text-only content that already carries the element's OWN end tag, e.g.
+         `<style>...</style><img onerror=x>` built as a node, which the literal
+         serializer emits verbatim for the HTML parser to re-open.
+   Shape (a) is handled by the firstElementChild branch in _isUnsafeNode; shape
+   (b) by the LITERAL_TEXT_CLOSE probe. Both read textContent (the raw-serialized
+   form for these elements) rather than innerHTML, because an XML/XHTML working
+   document serializes innerHTML with `<` escaped, which silently blinds the
+   innerHTML-based probes (rule 1's second probe and FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE) there.
+   `script` is never allow-listed, but is kept here so the guard matches the
+   serializer's own literal-text list exactly. */
+const LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENT_NAMES = ['style', 'script', 'xmp', 'iframe', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'plaintext', 'noscript'];
+const LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS = freeze(addToSet({}, LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENT_NAMES));
+/* Per-element end-tag matcher. On an HTML reparse the ONLY token that
+   terminates a literal-text element's raw content is its own end tag; a foreign
+   literal-text close (e.g. `</xmp>` sitting inside `<style>`) does not break
+   out, so matching is per-element, not a shared alternation. The lookahead
+   requires an HTML tag-name terminator (whitespace, `/` or `>`) so a longer
+   name such as `</styles` is not mistaken for `</style`. */
+const LITERAL_TEXT_CLOSE = function () {
+  const map = {};
+  arrayForEach(LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENT_NAMES, name => {
+    map[name] = seal(new RegExp('</' + name + '(?=[\\t\\n\\f\\r />])', 'i'));
+  });
+  return freeze(map);
+}();
 const getGlobal = function getGlobal() {
   return typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window;
 };
@@ -423,10 +454,25 @@ const _createHooksMap = function _createHooksMap() {
 const _resolveSetOption = function _resolveSetOption(cfg, key, fallback, options) {
   return objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, key) && arrayIsArray(cfg[key]) ? addToSet(options.base ? clone(options.base) : {}, cfg[key], options.transform) : fallback;
 };
+/**
+ * Resolve an object-valued configuration option: a prototype-free clone
+ * of cfg[key] when it is an own, truthy object property, else a fresh
+ * fallback built by makeFallback (fresh on every parse, so a previous
+ * parse can never leak state into the next one).
+ *
+ * @param cfg the cloned, prototype-free configuration object
+ * @param key the configuration property to read
+ * @param makeFallback builds the fallback value when the option is absent
+ * @returns the resolved object
+ */
+const _resolveObjectOption = function _resolveObjectOption(cfg, key, makeFallback) {
+  const value = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, key) ? cfg[key] : undefined;
+  return value && typeof value === 'object' ? clone(value) : makeFallback();
+};
 function createDOMPurify() {
   let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
   const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
-  DOMPurify.version = '3.4.12';
+  DOMPurify.version = '3.4.14';
   DOMPurify.removed = [];
   if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
     // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
@@ -457,6 +503,17 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
   const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
   const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
   const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
+  const getOwnerDocument = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'ownerDocument') : null;
+  /* Clobber-safe nodeType / nodeName reads through the cached Node.prototype
+     getters, with a direct-property fallback for environments that lack
+     Node.prototype. Sites that need a different fallback (e.g. _isClobbered
+     returns early on a null name) intentionally keep their own reads. */
+  const _readNodeType = function _readNodeType(node) {
+    return getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
+  };
+  const _readNodeName = function _readNodeName(node) {
+    return getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : node.nodeName;
+  };
   // As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
   // new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
   // (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
@@ -779,9 +836,11 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
     IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
     IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = isRegex(cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP) ? cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP : IS_ALLOWED_URI; // Default regexp
     NAMESPACE = typeof cfg.NAMESPACE === 'string' ? cfg.NAMESPACE : HTML_NAMESPACE; // Default HTML namespace
-    MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS); // Default built-in map
-    HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS); // Default built-in map
-    const customElementHandling = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING') && cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING === 'object' ? clone(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING) : create(null);
+    MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = _resolveObjectOption(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS', () => addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS) // Default built-in map
+    );
+    HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = _resolveObjectOption(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS', () => addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS) // Default built-in map
+    );
+    const customElementHandling = _resolveObjectOption(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING', () => create(null));
     CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null);
     if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'tagNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.tagNameCheck)) {
       CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = customElementHandling.tagNameCheck; // Default undefined
@@ -848,15 +907,6 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
         addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
       }
     }
-    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR)) {
-      addToSet(URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
-    }
-    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
-      if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
-        FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
-      }
-      addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
-    }
     if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
       if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
         FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
@@ -1091,6 +1141,32 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
       }
     }
   };
+  /**
+   * _stripAttributeNode
+   *
+   * Remove a single Attr node case/namespace-exactly on an attribute-teardown
+   * path. Name-based removeAttribute() ASCII-lowercases its lookup key for an
+   * HTML element in an HTML document and so silently misses a case-preserved
+   * handler (e.g. `ONERROR` off an XML/XHTML import) - the same defect
+   * _removeAttribute() was fixed for, which a name-based call would reintroduce
+   * on these IN_PLACE teardown paths. Unlike _removeAttribute this does not
+   * record into DOMPurify.removed: the neutralize passes intentionally do not
+   * book-keep. A clobbered/detached node falls back to best-effort name-based
+   * removal.
+   *
+   * @param element the element to strip the attribute from
+   * @param attribute the Attr node to remove
+   * @param name the attribute's name, for the fallback path
+   */
+  const _stripAttributeNode = function _stripAttributeNode(element, attribute, name) {
+    try {
+      element.removeAttributeNode(attribute);
+    } catch (_) {
+      try {
+        element.removeAttribute(name);
+      } catch (_) {}
+    }
+  };
   /**
    * _neutralizeRoot
    *
@@ -1135,11 +1211,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
         const attribute = attributes[i];
         const name = attribute && attribute.name;
         if (typeof name === 'string') {
-          try {
-            root.removeAttribute(name);
-          } catch (_) {
-            /* Clobbered removeAttribute — ignore (fail-closed best effort) */
-          }
+          _stripAttributeNode(root, attribute, name);
         }
       }
     }
@@ -1147,22 +1219,46 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
   /**
    * _removeAttribute
    *
+   * Name-based getAttributeNode()/removeAttribute() ASCII-lowercase their
+   * lookup key for HTML elements in an HTML document, so they silently miss an
+   * attribute whose stored qualified name still contains uppercase ASCII
+   * letters. That happens when the node came from a case-preserving source
+   * (an XML/XHTML document imported via importNode(), or createAttributeNS()),
+   * where e.g. `ONERROR` survives the walk: the policy check lowercases to
+   * `onerror` and rejects it, but `removeAttribute('ONERROR')` looks up
+   * `onerror` and finds nothing. Remove the exact Attr node instead, which is
+   * case- and namespace-exact, and fall back to name-based removal only when
+   * the caller could not supply the node.
+   *
    * @param name an Attribute name
    * @param element a DOM node
+   * @param attr the exact Attr node to remove, when the caller has it
    */
-  const _removeAttribute = function _removeAttribute(name, element) {
+  const _removeAttribute = function _removeAttribute(name, element, attr) {
+    if (!attr) {
+      try {
+        attr = element.getAttributeNode(name);
+      } catch (_) {
+        attr = null;
+      }
+    }
+    arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
+      attribute: attr || null,
+      from: element
+    });
     try {
-      arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
-        attribute: element.getAttributeNode(name),
-        from: element
-      });
+      if (attr) {
+        element.removeAttributeNode(attr);
+      } else {
+        element.removeAttribute(name);
+      }
     } catch (_) {
-      arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
-        attribute: null,
-        from: element
-      });
+      /* Clobbered or already-detached node - best-effort fall back to a
+         name-based removal so the "is" handling below still runs. */
+      try {
+        element.removeAttribute(name);
+      } catch (_) {}
     }
-    element.removeAttribute(name);
     // We void attribute values for unremovable "is" attributes
     if (name === 'is') {
       if (RETURN_DOM || RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
@@ -1197,11 +1293,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
       if (typeof name !== 'string' || ALLOWED_ATTR[transformCaseFunc(name)]) {
         continue;
       }
-      try {
-        element.removeAttribute(name);
-      } catch (_) {
-        /* Clobbered removeAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
-      }
+      _stripAttributeNode(element, attribute, name);
     }
   };
   /**
@@ -1230,7 +1322,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
     const stack = [root];
     while (stack.length > 0) {
       const node = stack.pop();
-      const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
+      const nodeType = _readNodeType(node);
       if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
         _stripDisallowedAttributes(node);
       }
@@ -1277,6 +1369,26 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
    *
    * @param root the in-place root to sweep
    */
+  /**
+   * Central policy for declarative-partial-updates patch-linkage attributes,
+   * shared by the _neutralizePatchLinkage pre-pass and _isValidAttribute so
+   * the two sites cannot drift: `patchsrc` always links, `for` links
+   * everywhere except on <label>/<output>, and the whole policy is gated on
+   * SAFE_FOR_XML (see the rationale block in _isValidAttribute).
+   *
+   * @param lcName the transformCaseFunc'd attribute name
+   * @param lcTag the transformCaseFunc'd tag name of the carrying element
+   * @return true if the attribute is patch linkage and must be dropped
+   */
+  const _isPatchLinkageAttribute = function _isPatchLinkageAttribute(lcName, lcTag) {
+    if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (lcName === 'patchsrc') {
+      return true;
+    }
+    return lcName === 'for' && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output';
+  };
   const _neutralizePatchLinkage = function _neutralizePatchLinkage(root) {
     if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
       return;
@@ -1284,7 +1396,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
     const stack = [root];
     while (stack.length > 0) {
       const node = stack.pop();
-      const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
+      const nodeType = _readNodeType(node);
       /* Remove range markers (the target side of a patch linkage): every
          processing instruction, and any markup-bearing comment. */
       if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction || nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, node.data)) {
@@ -1298,12 +1410,12 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
       /* Strip patch-source attributes (the source side) off elements. */
       if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
         const element = node;
-        const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : node.nodeName);
+        const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(_readNodeName(node));
         try {
           if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('patchsrc')) {
             element.removeAttribute('patchsrc');
           }
-          if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('for') && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
+          if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('for') && _isPatchLinkageAttribute('for', lcTag)) {
             element.removeAttribute('for');
           }
         } catch (_) {
@@ -1375,7 +1487,17 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
    * @return The created NodeIterator
    */
   const _createNodeIterator = function _createNodeIterator(root) {
-    return createNodeIterator.call(root.ownerDocument || root, root,
+    /* Read ownerDocument through the cached Node.prototype getter, never the
+       direct property. HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns], so a
+       clobbering child (<input name="ownerDocument"> or a form-associated
+       external input) shadows the prototype getter and makes a direct read
+       return that <input>. createNodeIterator.call(<input>, ...) then throws
+       "Illegal invocation", and on the IN_PLACE path that throw lands before
+       the walk's fail-closed barrier - leaving the caller's live tree, with
+       any already-armed handler in it, un-neutralized. The cached getter
+       returns the real Document regardless of the clobber. */
+    const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(root) : root.ownerDocument;
+    return createNodeIterator.call(doc || root, root,
     // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
     NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
   };
@@ -1415,7 +1537,11 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
   const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
     var _node$querySelectorAl;
     node.normalize();
-    const walker = createNodeIterator.call(node.ownerDocument || node, node,
+    /* Clobber-safe ownerDocument read, same reasoning as _createNodeIterator:
+       under SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES this runs on the live IN_PLACE root, which may
+       carry a form-named-getter override of ownerDocument. */
+    const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(node) : node.ownerDocument;
+    const walker = createNodeIterator.call(doc || node, node,
     // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
     NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
     let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
@@ -1551,8 +1677,16 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
     if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.hasChildNodes() && !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.textContent) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
       return true;
     }
-    /* Remove risky CSS construction leading to mXSS */
-    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE && tagName === 'style' && _isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild)) {
+    /* Remove rawtext/literal-text elements whose literal serialization
+       re-opens markup on an HTML reparse - shapes (a) and (b) documented at
+       LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS. Both are invisible to rule 1 above (which
+       self-disables once there is an element child, and whose second probe
+       reads the innerHTML an XML/XHTML document serializes escaped), which
+       is why both probes here read textContent instead. Previously only
+       `style`-with-element-child was covered; every element in
+       LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS shares this literal serialization and is
+       equally affected. */
+    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE && LITERAL_TEXT_ELEMENTS[tagName] && (_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) || typeof currentNode.textContent === 'string' && regExpTest(LITERAL_TEXT_CLOSE[tagName], currentNode.textContent))) {
       return true;
     }
     /* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
@@ -1565,6 +1699,30 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
     }
     return false;
   };
+  /**
+   * Evaluate a CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING check (a RegExp or a predicate
+   * function, per the validation in _parseConfig) against a name.
+   * Additional arguments are forwarded to predicate functions - the
+   * attributeNameCheck predicate receives the tag name as its second
+   * argument. A null/absent check never matches.
+   *
+   * @param check the configured tagNameCheck / attributeNameCheck value
+   * @param name the name to test
+   * @param args extra arguments forwarded to a predicate function
+   * @return true if the check matches the name
+   */
+  const _matchesNameCheck = function _matchesNameCheck(check, name) {
+    if (check instanceof RegExp) {
+      return regExpTest(check, name);
+    }
+    if (check instanceof Function) {
+      for (var _len = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len > 2 ? _len - 2 : 0), _key = 2; _key < _len; _key++) {
+        args[_key - 2] = arguments[_key];
+      }
+      return Boolean(check(name, ...args));
+    }
+    return false;
+  };
   /**
    * Handle a node whose tag is forbidden or not allowlisted: keep
    * allowed custom elements (false return exits _sanitizeElements
@@ -1582,15 +1740,10 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
    * @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
    * @return true if the node was removed, false if kept
    */
-  const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName) {
+  const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root) {
     /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
-    if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
-      if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
-        return false;
-      }
-      if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)) {
-        return false;
-      }
+    if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName) && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
+      return false;
     }
     /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
          Use the cached prototype getters exclusively — the previous code
@@ -1605,27 +1758,26 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
       const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
       if (childNodes && parentNode) {
         const childCount = childNodes.length;
-        /* In-place: hoist the *original* children so the iterator visits
-             and sanitises them through the same allowlist pass as every other
-             node. The caller built the tree in the live document, so the
-             originals carry already-queued resource events (`<img onerror>`,
-             `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, …); cloning would leave
-             those originals detached but still armed, firing in page scope
-             while the returned tree looked clean. Moving is safe in-place: the
-             root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never the node
-             being removed, which keeps `parentNode` inside the iterator root
-             and the relocated child inside the serialised tree.
-                      Otherwise (string / DOM-copy paths): clone. The iterator is rooted
-             at — and the result serialised from — `body`, so a restrictive
-             ALLOWED_TAGS that removes `body` itself must leave its content in
-             place, which only cloning does; and those paths parse into an
-             inert document, so their discarded originals never had a queued
-             event to neutralise.
+        /* Hoist by moving each child up one level rather than deep-cloning
+             it. Moving transfers every descendant exactly once, so a chain of
+             nested disallowed elements costs O(n) instead of the O(n^2) that
+             re-cloning the shrinking subtree at each level produced; it also
+             empties the removed original, so `DOMPurify.removed` no longer
+             pins whole subtrees. Moving preserves the in-place guarantee too:
+             an original carrying already-queued resource events (`<img
+             onerror>`, `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, …) is
+             relocated and sanitised rather than left detached but still armed.
+                      The sole case that must clone is removing the walk root itself.
+             The result is serialised from the root's subtree, so a restrictive
+             ALLOWED_TAGS that strips the root (`body` on the string path) must
+             leave the content inside it, which only cloning does. In IN_PLACE
+             the root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never removed
+             here, so that path always takes the move branch.
                       `childNodes` is live; a tail-to-head walk keeps `childNodes[i]`
              valid whether we move (drops the trailing entry) or clone (leaves
              the list intact). */
         for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
-          const hoisted = IN_PLACE ? childNodes[i] : cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
+          const hoisted = currentNode === root ? cloneNode(childNodes[i], true) : childNodes[i];
           parentNode.insertBefore(hoisted, getNextSibling(currentNode));
         }
       }
@@ -1633,6 +1785,66 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
     _forceRemove(currentNode);
     return true;
   };
+  /**
+   * Fork a hook-mutable allowlist off its shared binding the first time a
+   * (possibly lazily-installed) uponSanitize* hook is about to see it, so the
+   * hook cannot widen the per-instance default or the setConfig binding by
+   * reference and leak past the call. Returns the set unchanged once it is
+   * already call-local, so repeated calls across elements are idempotent.
+   *
+   * @param hookList the uponSanitize* hook array for this event
+   * @param set the current ALLOWED_TAGS / ALLOWED_ATTR binding
+   * @param defaultSet the per-instance DEFAULT_ALLOWED_* constant
+   * @param setConfigSet the captured setConfig() binding, or null
+   * @return a call-local clone if a hook is present and set is still shared,
+   *   else set unchanged
+   */
+  const _forkSharedAllowlist = function _forkSharedAllowlist(hookList, set, defaultSet, setConfigSet) {
+    if (hookList.length === 0) {
+      return set;
+    }
+    return set === defaultSet || set === setConfigSet ? clone(set) : set;
+  };
+  /**
+   * Shared guard for a node that a hook has detached from the walk tree,
+   * used after each element-hook site in _sanitizeElements. Detaching is a
+   * long-standing user pattern (issue #469; draw.io-style foreignObject
+   * filtering). Per the cached, unclobberable parentNode getter the node is
+   * genuinely out of the tree, so it can reach neither the serialized
+   * output nor an IN_PLACE live tree; treat it as removed and stop
+   * processing it. Without this guard, the unsafe-node / namespace checks
+   * would call _forceRemove on a parentless node and hit the REPORT-3
+   * fail-closed throw — which exists for nodes DOMPurify wants gone but
+   * *cannot* detach (clobbered / parentless roots), the opposite of a node
+   * that is already safely gone. The walk root is exempt: a detached
+   * IN_PLACE root is legitimate input and must still be fully sanitized,
+   * and a kill-decision on it must keep hitting the REPORT-3 throw.
+   *
+   * Nodes detached by hooks stay the hook's responsibility for placement:
+   * they are not recorded in DOMPurify.removed, so the post-walk IN_PLACE
+   * pass (which iterates DOMPurify.removed) does not reach them. But a
+   * hook-detached subtree can still hold a queued resource-event handler -
+   * e.g. an <img onload> that began loading when the caller built the live
+   * tree - which fires in page scope after sanitize returns even though the
+   * handler never reached the returned tree. That is the audit-5 F1 hazard,
+   * and the documented node.remove() hook pattern walks straight into it.
+   * So on the IN_PLACE path we neutralize the detached subtree inline,
+   * stripping its non-allow-listed attributes before returning, exactly as
+   * the post-walk pass does for _forceRemove'd subtrees.
+   *
+   * @param currentNode the node a hook may have detached
+   * @param root the current walk root
+   * @return true if the node is detached and now handled, false otherwise
+   */
+  const _handleHookDetachedNode = function _handleHookDetachedNode(currentNode, root) {
+    if (currentNode === root || getParentNode(currentNode) !== null) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (IN_PLACE) {
+      _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
+    }
+    return true;
+  };
   /**
    * _sanitizeElements
    *
@@ -1642,13 +1854,12 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
    * @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
    * @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
    */
-  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
   const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode, root) {
     /* Execute a hook if present */
     _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
-    /* A hook may have detached the node — treat it as removed (see the
-       detached-node comment after the uponSanitizeElement hook below). */
-    if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
+    /* A hook may have detached the node - treat it as removed (see
+       _handleHookDetachedNode for the full rationale). */
+    if (_handleHookDetachedNode(currentNode, root)) {
       return true;
     }
     /* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
@@ -1657,28 +1868,21 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
       return true;
     }
     /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
-    const tagName = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeName);
+    const tagName = transformCaseFunc(_readNodeName(currentNode));
+    /* Close the pre-walk clone-guard's timing gap: an uponSanitizeElement
+       hook may have been installed after that guard sampled the hook arrays
+       (e.g. lazily from beforeSanitizeElements), leaving ALLOWED_TAGS still
+       aliasing a shared binding that a widening hook would mutate by
+       reference. Fork it before exposing it to the hook. */
+    ALLOWED_TAGS = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, ALLOWED_TAGS, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS);
     /* Execute a hook if present */
     _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
       tagName,
       allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
     });
-    /* A hook may have detached the node from the tree — a long-standing
-       user pattern (issue #469; draw.io-style foreignObject filtering).
-       Per the cached, unclobberable parentNode getter the node is
-       genuinely out of the tree, so it can reach neither the serialized
-       output nor an IN_PLACE live tree; treat it as removed and stop
-       processing it. Without this guard, the unsafe-node / namespace
-       checks below would call _forceRemove on a parentless node and hit
-       the REPORT-3 fail-closed throw — which exists for nodes DOMPurify
-       wants gone but *cannot* detach (clobbered / parentless roots), the
-       opposite of a node that is already safely gone. The walk root is
-       exempt: a detached IN_PLACE root is legitimate input and must still
-       be fully sanitized, and a kill-decision on it must keep hitting the
-       REPORT-3 throw. Nodes detached by hooks are the hook's
-       responsibility: they are not recorded in DOMPurify.removed and are
-       not neutralized by the post-walk IN_PLACE pass. */
-    if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
+    /* The uponSanitizeElement hook may have detached the node, exactly as
+       above (see _handleHookDetachedNode for the full rationale). */
+    if (_handleHookDetachedNode(currentNode, root)) {
       return true;
     }
     /* Remove mXSS vectors, processing instructions and risky comments */
@@ -1688,7 +1892,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
     }
     /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
     if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
-      const removed = _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName);
+      const removed = _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root);
       /* A false return means the node is a custom element kept via
          CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING - the only keep path through
          _sanitizeDisallowedNode. Run afterSanitizeElements on it so the
@@ -1711,7 +1915,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
        bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different
        realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace
        slip past the namespace check entirely. */
-    const nt = getNodeType ? getNodeType(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeType;
+    const nt = _readNodeType(currentNode);
     if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
       _forceRemove(currentNode);
       return true;
@@ -1771,10 +1975,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
        other structural-threat checks and stays overridable, consistent with
        the rest of the codebase. PI range markers are already removed by
        _isUnsafeNode. */
-    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'patchsrc') {
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'for' && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
+    if (_isPatchLinkageAttribute(lcName, lcTag)) {
       return false;
     }
     /* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
@@ -1786,22 +1987,54 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
         (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
         XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
         We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
-    if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (!nameIsPermitted) {
-      if (
-      // First condition does a very basic check if a) it's basically a valid custom element tagname AND
-      // b) if the tagName passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
-      // and c) if the attribute name passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck
-      _isBasicCustomElement(lcTag) && (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, lcTag) || CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(lcTag)) && (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck, lcName) || CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck(lcName, lcTag)) ||
-      // Alternative, second condition checks if it's an `is`-attribute, AND
-      // the value passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
-      lcName === 'is' && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements && (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, value) || CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(value))) ; else {
-        return false;
-      }
-      /* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
-    } else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) ; else if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) ; else if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) ; else if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) ; else if (value) {
-      return false;
-    } else ;
-    return true;
+    if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    /* Allow valid aria-* attributes, the value is always URI safe */
+    if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR$1, lcName)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    /* A name outside the allowlist is acceptable on custom-element terms
+       only. The value checks below are intentionally skipped in that case:
+       if the user supplied a tagNameCheck we also allow derived custom
+       elements using the same test, and attributes passing the configured
+       attributeNameCheck are allowed as custom elements define these at
+       their own discretion. */
+    if (!nameIsPermitted) {
+      return (
+        // Condition a) covers a basically valid custom element tag name whose
+        // tag passes the configured tagNameCheck and whose attribute name
+        // passes the configured attributeNameCheck ...
+        _isBasicCustomElement(lcTag) && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, lcTag) && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck, lcName, lcTag) ||
+        // Condition b) covers an `is` attribute whose value passes the
+        // configured tagNameCheck while customized built-in elements are
+        // allowed.
+        lcName === 'is' && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements && _matchesNameCheck(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, value)
+      );
+    }
+    /* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
+    if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    /* Check no script, data or unknown possibly unsafe URI
+        unless we know URI values are safe for that attribute */
+    if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    /* Keep image data URIs alive if src/xlink:href is allowed */
+    /* Further prevent gadget XSS for dynamically built script tags */
+    if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    /* Allow unknown protocols: This provides support for links that
+        are handled by protocol handlers which may be unknown ahead of
+        time, e.g. fb:, spotify: */
+    if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    /* Only an empty (binary) value remains safe at this point;
+       anything else is presumed unsafe, do not add it back */
+    return !value;
   };
   /* Names the HTML spec reserves from valid-custom-element-name; these must
    * never be treated as basic custom elements even when a permissive
@@ -1893,6 +2126,9 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
     if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
       return;
     }
+    /* Same lazy-install guard as uponSanitizeElement (see there): fork the
+       attribute allowlist off its shared binding before a hook can see it. */
+    ALLOWED_ATTR = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, ALLOWED_ATTR, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR);
     const hookEvent = {
       attrName: '',
       attrValue: '',
@@ -1923,7 +2159,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
        */
       if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && stringIndexOf(value, SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX) !== 0) {
         // Remove the attribute with this value
-        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
+        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
         // Prefix the value and later re-create the attribute with the sanitized value
         value = SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX + value;
       }
@@ -1931,12 +2167,12 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
       // itself the clobbering protection, and re-applying it is incorrect.
       /* Work around a security issue with comments inside attributes */
       if (SAFE_FOR_XML && regExpTest(/((--!?|])>)|<\/(style|script|title|xmp|textarea|noscript|iframe|noembed|noframes)/i, value)) {
-        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
+        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
         continue;
       }
       /* Make sure we cannot easily use animated hrefs, even if animations are allowed */
       if (lcName === 'attributename' && stringMatch(value, 'href')) {
-        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
+        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
         continue;
       }
       /* Did the hooks force-keep the attribute? */
@@ -1945,12 +2181,12 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
       }
       /* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
       if (!hookEvent.keepAttr) {
-        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
+        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
         continue;
       }
       /* Work around a security issue in jQuery 3.0 */
       if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(SELF_CLOSING_TAG, value)) {
-        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
+        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
         continue;
       }
       /* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
@@ -1959,7 +2195,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
       }
       /* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */
       if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {
-        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
+        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode, attr);
         continue;
       }
       /* Handle attributes that require Trusted Types */
@@ -2006,8 +2242,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
          Walk it explicitly. The nodeType guard avoids reading
          shadowRoot off text / comment / CDATA / PI nodes that the
          iterator also surfaces. */
-      const shadowNodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(shadowNode) : shadowNode.nodeType;
-      if (shadowNodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+      if (_readNodeType(shadowNode) === NODE_TYPE.element) {
         const innerSr = getShadowRoot(shadowNode);
         if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
           _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(innerSr);
@@ -2065,7 +2300,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
         continue;
       }
       const node = item.node;
-      const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
+      const nodeType = _readNodeType(node);
       const isElement = nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element;
       /* (pushed last → processed first) Children, snapshotted in reverse so
          the first child is processed first. Snapshotting matters because a
@@ -2187,7 +2422,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
          child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
          the property and let this check skip the root-allowlist
          validation entirely. */
-      const nn = getNodeName ? getNodeName(dirty) : dirty.nodeName;
+      const nn = _readNodeName(dirty);
       if (typeof nn === 'string') {
         const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
         if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
@@ -2265,17 +2500,20 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
     }
     /* Get node iterator */
     const walkRoot = inPlace ? dirty : body;
-    const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(walkRoot);
     /* Now start iterating over the created document.
        The walk runs inside an exception barrier (campaign-3 F2): a re-entrant
        engine/custom-element mutation can detach a node mid-walk so
        `_forceRemove`'s parentless guard throws, aborting the loop. Without the
        barrier the caller's in-place tree would be left half-sanitized with the
-       unvisited tail still armed. On any throw we fail closed — strip the
-       in-place root bare — then rethrow so the existing throw contract is
-       preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial body, so the
-       propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
+       unvisited tail still armed. _createNodeIterator itself is inside the
+       barrier too: constructing the iterator dereferences the root's document,
+       and any failure there (e.g. an exotic/clobbered root) must still fail
+       closed rather than skip the neutralize. On any throw we fail closed -
+       strip the in-place root bare - then rethrow so the existing throw
+       contract is preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial
+       body, so the propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
     try {
+      const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(walkRoot);
       while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
         /* Sanitize tags and elements */
         _sanitizeElements(currentNode, walkRoot);