dexe-mcp 0.9.0 → 0.11.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +109 -20
- package/README.md +6 -6
- package/dist/config.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/config.js +30 -0
- package/dist/config.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/env/schema.d.ts +21 -0
- package/dist/env/schema.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/env/schema.js +21 -0
- package/dist/env/schema.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/controllingVoters.d.ts +44 -0
- package/dist/lib/controllingVoters.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/controllingVoters.js +152 -0
- package/dist/lib/controllingVoters.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/dangerousSelectors.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/dangerousSelectors.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/dangerousSelectors.js +12 -22
- package/dist/lib/dangerousSelectors.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/decoders.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/lib/decoders.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/decoders.js +2 -2
- package/dist/lib/govProposalView.d.ts +37 -0
- package/dist/lib/govProposalView.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/govProposalView.js +42 -0
- package/dist/lib/govProposalView.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/protocolAdvisories.d.ts +12 -13
- package/dist/lib/protocolAdvisories.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/protocolAdvisories.js +23 -16
- package/dist/lib/protocolAdvisories.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/quorumRisk.d.ts +92 -0
- package/dist/lib/quorumRisk.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/quorumRisk.js +159 -0
- package/dist/lib/quorumRisk.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/time.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/lib/time.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/time.js +24 -0
- package/dist/lib/time.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tools/daoDeploy.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/daoDeploy.js +32 -0
- package/dist/tools/daoDeploy.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/flow.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/flow.js +90 -1
- package/dist/tools/flow.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/gov.js +2 -2
- package/dist/tools/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/index.js +2 -0
- package/dist/tools/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/otc.d.ts +20 -0
- package/dist/tools/otc.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/otc.js +191 -58
- package/dist/tools/otc.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/proposalBuild.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/proposalBuild.js +19 -5
- package/dist/tools/proposalBuild.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/proposalBuildComplex.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/proposalBuildComplex.js +12 -1
- package/dist/tools/proposalBuildComplex.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/proposalBuildMore.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/proposalBuildMore.js +8 -5
- package/dist/tools/proposalBuildMore.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/risk.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/tools/risk.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tools/risk.js +255 -0
- package/dist/tools/risk.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tools/subgraph.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/subgraph.js +22 -15
- package/dist/tools/subgraph.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/voteBuild.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/voteBuild.js +16 -4
- package/dist/tools/voteBuild.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +2 -2
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/**
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* Controlling-holder participation signal for the treasury-safety advisory.
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*
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* Resolves whether at least one member of a DAO's "controlling set" voted For a
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* given proposal. The controlling set (a product decision) is:
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* validators ∪ top-N token holders by voting weight.
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* "Voted For" is lenient: ≥1 member among the For-voters ⇒ `true`.
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*
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* Posture: **fail-soft, never throws.** Any missing subgraph, non-mainnet chain,
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* empty set, or subgraph/RPC error ⇒ `null` (unknown). Informational only — a
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* `false` (set non-empty, nobody voted For) adds an advisory note; it never
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* blocks. We only return `false` when we positively enumerated the set AND
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* confirmed no member voted For on-chain.
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*
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* The set is enumerated via subgraph (cheap, but untrusted for vote direction);
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* each member's vote direction is then confirmed ON-CHAIN via
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* `GovPool.getTotalVotes` (authoritative). We OR across PersonalVote /
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* MicropoolVote / DelegatedVote so a member who voted via delegation or a
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* micropool is not mistaken for a non-voter.
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*/
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import { Interface } from "ethers";
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import { multicall } from "./multicall.js";
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import { gqlRequest } from "./subgraph.js";
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/**
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* Identical to the fragment in src/tools/vote.ts / src/tools/inbox.ts. Kept
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* local + exported so the unit test can assert ethers parses it (ethers
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* silently drops malformed fragments — see govProposalView Phase-A gotcha).
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*/
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export const GET_TOTAL_VOTES_FRAGMENT = "function getTotalVotes(uint256 proposalId, address voter, uint8 voteType) view returns (uint256 totalVoted, uint256 totalRawVoted, uint256 votesForNow, bool isVoteFor)";
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/** PersonalVote=0, MicropoolVote=1, DelegatedVote=2 (TreasuryVote=3 omitted). */
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const VOTE_TYPES = [0, 1, 2];
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/** Default top-N token holders when neither arg nor config overrides it. */
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const DEFAULT_TOP_N = 5;
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/** Trimmed from src/tools/subgraph.ts VALIDATORS_QUERY (fields we need only). */
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const VALIDATORS_QUERY = /* GraphQL */ `
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query getDaoPoolValidators($offset: Int!, $limit: Int!, $address: String!) {
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validatorInPools(
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skip: $offset
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first: $limit
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orderBy: balance
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orderDirection: desc
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where: { pool: $address }
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) {
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validatorAddress
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}
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}
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`;
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/** Trimmed from src/tools/subgraph.ts DAO_MEMBERS_QUERY (fields we need only). */
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const DAO_MEMBERS_QUERY = /* GraphQL */ `
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query getVotersInPool($poolId: String!, $offset: Int!, $limit: Int!) {
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voterInPools(skip: $offset, first: $limit, where: { pool: $poolId }) {
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receivedDelegation
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voter {
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id
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totalVotes
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}
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}
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}
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`;
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function toBig(s) {
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try {
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return s ? BigInt(s) : 0n;
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}
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catch {
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return 0n;
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}
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}
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/** Validator addresses for `pool` (lowercased). Fail-soft → []. */
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async function fetchValidators(cfg, pool) {
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try {
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const data = await gqlRequest(cfg.subgraphValidatorsUrl, VALIDATORS_QUERY, { offset: 0, limit: 100, address: pool });
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return (data.validatorInPools ?? [])
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.map((v) => v.validatorAddress?.toLowerCase())
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.filter((a) => !!a);
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}
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catch {
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return [];
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}
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}
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/** Top-N holders by (totalVotes + receivedDelegation), lowercased. Fail-soft → []. */
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async function fetchTopHolders(cfg, pool, topN) {
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try {
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const data = await gqlRequest(cfg.subgraphPoolsUrl, DAO_MEMBERS_QUERY, { poolId: pool, offset: 0, limit: 50 });
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const weighted = (data.voterInPools ?? [])
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.map((r) => ({
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addr: r.voter?.id?.toLowerCase(),
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weight: toBig(r.voter?.totalVotes) + toBig(r.receivedDelegation),
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}))
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.filter((x) => !!x.addr);
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weighted.sort((a, b) => (a.weight < b.weight ? 1 : a.weight > b.weight ? -1 : 0));
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return weighted.slice(0, Math.max(0, topN)).map((x) => x.addr);
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}
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catch {
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return [];
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}
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}
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/**
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* Did ≥1 controlling-set member vote For proposal `proposalId`?
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* - `true` — at least one member voted For (any vote type).
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* - `false` — set was enumerated, non-empty, and NONE voted For.
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* - `null` — cannot determine (no subgraph / non-mainnet / empty set / error).
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* Never throws.
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*/
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export async function resolveControllingHoldersVotedFor(args) {
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const { provider, govPool, proposalId, cfg, chainId } = args;
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const topN = args.topN ?? cfg.controllingTopN ?? DEFAULT_TOP_N;
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// Gate: subgraph exists only on mainnet (56). Testnet (97) ⇒ unknown.
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if (chainId !== 56)
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return null;
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if (!cfg.subgraphValidatorsUrl || !cfg.subgraphPoolsUrl)
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return null;
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const pool = govPool.toLowerCase();
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// Enumerate each source independently — a transient failure of one source
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// only shrinks the set, which can only make `false` LESS likely (the safe
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// direction: fewer wrongful refuses).
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const [validators, holders] = await Promise.all([
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fetchValidators(cfg, pool),
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fetchTopHolders(cfg, pool, topN),
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]);
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const members = [...new Set([...validators, ...holders])];
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if (members.length === 0)
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return null;
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try {
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const iface = new Interface([GET_TOTAL_VOTES_FRAGMENT]);
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const calls = [];
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for (const member of members) {
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for (const vt of VOTE_TYPES) {
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calls.push({
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target: govPool,
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iface,
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method: "getTotalVotes",
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args: [proposalId, member, vt],
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allowFailure: true,
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});
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}
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}
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const results = await multicall(provider, calls);
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for (const r of results) {
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if (!r.success || r.value == null)
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continue;
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// getTotalVotes returns a 4-tuple: [totalVoted, totalRawVoted, votesForNow, isVoteFor]
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const v = r.value;
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if (v[2] > 0n && v[3] === true)
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return true;
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}
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return false; // set non-empty, confirmed nobody voted For
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}
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catch {
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return null; // RPC/decoding failure ⇒ unknown, never a refuse
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}
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}
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//# sourceMappingURL=controllingVoters.js.map
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{"version":3,"file":"controllingVoters.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/controllingVoters.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmBG;AACH,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAwB,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AACzD,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAa,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AACtD,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAG3C;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wBAAwB,GACnC,yKAAyK,CAAC;AAE5K,iFAAiF;AACjF,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAU,CAAC;AAEtC,4EAA4E;AAC5E,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AAExB,iFAAiF;AACjF,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC;;;;;;;;;;;;CAYtC,CAAC;AAEF,kFAAkF;AAClF,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC;;;;;;;;;;CAUvC,CAAC;AAEF,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,CAA4B;IACzC,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;IAC5B,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACP,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACZ,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED,mEAAmE;AACnE,KAAK,UAAU,eAAe,CAAC,GAAe,EAAE,IAAY;IAC1D,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,UAAU,CAC3B,GAAG,CAAC,qBAAsB,EAC1B,gBAAgB,EAChB,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CACzC,CAAC;QACF,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;aACjC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;aAC7C,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACrC,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACP,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACZ,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED,sFAAsF;AACtF,KAAK,UAAU,eAAe,CAAC,GAAe,EAAE,IAAY,EAAE,IAAY;IACxE,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,UAAU,CAE1B,GAAG,CAAC,gBAAiB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QACrF,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;aACvC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YACX,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC;SACjE,CAAC,CAAC;aACF,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAyC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAClE,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAClF,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACjE,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACP,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACZ,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,iCAAiC,CAAC,IAOvD;IACC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC7D,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,eAAe,IAAI,aAAa,CAAC;IAE/D,sEAAsE;IACtE,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IAChC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,qBAAqB,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,gBAAgB;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IAErE,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;IAEnC,0EAA0E;IAC1E,0EAA0E;IAC1E,sCAAsC;IACtC,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;QAC9C,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;QAC1B,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;KACjC,CAAC,CAAC;IACH,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1D,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IAEtC,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACxD,MAAM,KAAK,GAAW,EAAE,CAAC;QACzB,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7B,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC5B,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;oBACT,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,KAAK;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe;oBACvB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;oBAC9B,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI;iBACnB,CAAC,CAAC;YACL,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QACjD,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YACxB,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI;gBAAE,SAAS;YAC5C,uFAAuF;YACvF,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAqD,CAAC;YAClE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI;gBAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;QAC9C,CAAC;QACD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,4CAA4C;IAC5D,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACP,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,iDAAiD;IAChE,CAAC;AACH,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ export declare function selectorOf(data: string): string | null;
|
|
|
11
11
|
* denylisted, else null. `data` is raw calldata (0x-hex).
|
|
12
12
|
*/
|
|
13
13
|
export declare function findForbiddenSelector(data: string): ForbiddenSelector | null;
|
|
14
|
-
/** Human-readable hard-refusal explaining why the selector is blocked
|
|
14
|
+
/** Human-readable hard-refusal explaining why the selector is blocked. */
|
|
15
15
|
export declare function dangerousSelectorError(match: ForbiddenSelector, target?: string): string;
|
|
16
16
|
/** The full denylist — for docs, tests, and introspection. */
|
|
17
17
|
export declare function forbiddenSelectors(): ForbiddenSelector[];
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"dangerousSelectors.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/dangerousSelectors.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"dangerousSelectors.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/dangerousSelectors.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAiCA,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAiB;IAChC,8CAA8C;IAC9C,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,oFAAoF;IACpF,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACnB;AAaD,mFAAmF;AACnF,wBAAgB,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAGtD;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAgB,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,iBAAiB,GAAG,IAAI,CAI5E;AAED,0EAA0E;AAC1E,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAUxF;AAED,8DAA8D;AAC9D,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,IAAI,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAExD"}
|
|
@@ -1,27 +1,19 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { id } from "ethers";
|
|
2
2
|
/**
|
|
3
|
-
*
|
|
3
|
+
* Forbidden proposal-action selectors — hard guard.
|
|
4
4
|
*
|
|
5
5
|
* Every function below lives on `GovUserKeeper` and is `onlyOwner` (the owner is
|
|
6
6
|
* the GovPool). GovPool invokes them internally on behalf of users through its
|
|
7
7
|
* own deposit/withdraw/delegate entrypoints — they are NOT meant to be the
|
|
8
8
|
* `executor` + `data` of a raw governance proposal action.
|
|
9
9
|
*
|
|
10
|
-
* They are
|
|
11
|
-
* argument is decoupled from the funds' owner
|
|
12
|
-
*
|
|
13
|
-
*
|
|
14
|
-
*
|
|
15
|
-
*
|
|
16
|
-
*
|
|
17
|
-
* (`GovPoolCreate._handleDataForInternalProposal`) is supposed to make these
|
|
18
|
-
* unreachable-by-proposal, but it only runs when the *last* action's executor is
|
|
19
|
-
* a registered INTERNAL executor. A proposal whose trailing action routes to
|
|
20
|
-
* DEFAULT skips the allowlist entirely, so these selectors slip through —
|
|
21
|
-
* finding C-2. This guard refuses to build any proposal action carrying one of
|
|
22
|
-
* them, regardless of routing. It is harm-reduction at the MCP layer ONLY: the
|
|
23
|
-
* root cause is in the protocol contracts, and an attacker can still hand-craft
|
|
24
|
-
* the calldata. See docs/security/C2-default-routing-bypass.md.
|
|
10
|
+
* They are unsafe as proposal targets because the `payer` / `delegator`
|
|
11
|
+
* argument is decoupled from the funds' owner (e.g. `withdrawTokens(payer,
|
|
12
|
+
* receiver, amount)` debits `payer` and pays `receiver`), so a proposal could
|
|
13
|
+
* name an account other than the proposer. This guard refuses to build any
|
|
14
|
+
* proposal action carrying one of these selectors. Defense-in-depth at the MCP
|
|
15
|
+
* layer; users deposit/withdraw/delegate their OWN funds through the GovPool
|
|
16
|
+
* entrypoints, never via a proposal.
|
|
25
17
|
*/
|
|
26
18
|
const FORBIDDEN_SIGNATURES = [
|
|
27
19
|
"withdrawTokens(address,address,uint256)",
|
|
@@ -61,17 +53,15 @@ export function findForbiddenSelector(data) {
|
|
|
61
53
|
return null;
|
|
62
54
|
return FORBIDDEN_BY_SELECTOR.get(sel) ?? null;
|
|
63
55
|
}
|
|
64
|
-
/** Human-readable hard-refusal explaining why the selector is blocked
|
|
56
|
+
/** Human-readable hard-refusal explaining why the selector is blocked. */
|
|
65
57
|
export function dangerousSelectorError(match, target) {
|
|
66
58
|
return (`Refusing to build: calldata selector ${match.selector} is ` +
|
|
67
59
|
`GovUserKeeper.${match.signature}, a privileged onlyOwner accounting function ` +
|
|
68
60
|
`that must never be a governance proposal action` +
|
|
69
61
|
(target ? ` (target ${target})` : "") +
|
|
70
|
-
`.
|
|
71
|
-
`
|
|
72
|
-
`
|
|
73
|
-
`from the caller. Users deposit/withdraw/delegate their OWN funds through the ` +
|
|
74
|
-
`GovPool entrypoints, never via a proposal. Hard block, no override.`);
|
|
62
|
+
`. These functions take a 'payer'/'delegator' argument decoupled from the ` +
|
|
63
|
+
`caller; users deposit/withdraw/delegate their OWN funds through the GovPool ` +
|
|
64
|
+
`entrypoints, never via a proposal. Hard block, no override.`);
|
|
75
65
|
}
|
|
76
66
|
/** The full denylist — for docs, tests, and introspection. */
|
|
77
67
|
export function forbiddenSelectors() {
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"dangerousSelectors.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/dangerousSelectors.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAE5B
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"dangerousSelectors.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/dangerousSelectors.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAE5B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,MAAM,oBAAoB,GAAG;IAC3B,yCAAyC;IACzC,wCAAwC;IACxC,yCAAyC;IACzC,2CAA2C;IAC3C,yCAAyC;IACzC,2CAA2C;IAC3C,yCAAyC;IACzC,wCAAwC;IACxC,yCAAyC;IACzC,2CAA2C;IAC3C,yCAAyC;IACzC,2CAA2C;CACnC,CAAC;AASX;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAA2C,IAAI,GAAG,CAC3E,oBAAoB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE;IACrC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1D,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAU,CAAC;AACtD,CAAC,CAAC,CACH,CAAC;AAEF,mFAAmF;AACnF,MAAM,UAAU,UAAU,CAAC,IAAY;IACrC,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IACxF,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AACzC,CAAC;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAY;IAChD,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7B,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IAC9B,OAAO,qBAAqB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;AAChD,CAAC;AAED,0EAA0E;AAC1E,MAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,CAAC,KAAwB,EAAE,MAAe;IAC9E,OAAO,CACL,wCAAwC,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,MAAM;QAC5D,iBAAiB,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS,+CAA+C;QAC/E,iDAAiD;QACjD,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACrC,2EAA2E;QAC3E,8EAA8E;QAC9E,6DAA6D,CAC9D,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED,8DAA8D;AAC9D,MAAM,UAAU,kBAAkB;IAChC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAC7C,CAAC"}
|
package/dist/lib/decoders.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -10,12 +10,12 @@ export interface DecodedCall {
|
|
|
10
10
|
args: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
11
11
|
/** Raw positional args — useful for agents that want the tuple directly. */
|
|
12
12
|
argsArray: unknown[];
|
|
13
|
-
/** True if this selector is a
|
|
13
|
+
/** True if this selector is a privileged accounting function (unsafe as a proposal action). */
|
|
14
14
|
privileged?: boolean;
|
|
15
15
|
/**
|
|
16
16
|
* Calls discovered inside this call's calldata args — e.g. the inner calls of
|
|
17
17
|
* a `multicall(bytes[])`, or the actions of a nested `createProposal`. Lets a
|
|
18
|
-
* reviewer see hidden privileged calls instead of just the wrapper
|
|
18
|
+
* reviewer see hidden privileged calls instead of just the wrapper.
|
|
19
19
|
*/
|
|
20
20
|
nested?: DecodedCall[];
|
|
21
21
|
}
|
|
@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ export declare class CalldataDecoder {
|
|
|
41
41
|
* Decode calldata and recursively unwrap any well-formed nested calldata
|
|
42
42
|
* found in its arguments — `multicall(bytes[])`, a nested `createProposal`'s
|
|
43
43
|
* `ProposalAction[]`, `tryExecute`, etc. The decoded `primary` carries a
|
|
44
|
-
* `privileged` flag for
|
|
45
|
-
* reading the text sees hidden inner calls, not just the wrapper
|
|
44
|
+
* `privileged` flag for privileged-class selectors and a `nested` tree so a
|
|
45
|
+
* reviewer reading the text sees hidden inner calls, not just the wrapper.
|
|
46
46
|
*/
|
|
47
47
|
decodeCalldata(data: string, contractName?: string): {
|
|
48
48
|
primary: DecodedCall | null;
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"decoders.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/decoders.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AACA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AACjD,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAGpD,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW;IAC1B,iGAAiG;IACjG,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IACxB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC1B,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,mGAAmG;IACnG,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9B,4EAA4E;IAC5E,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACrB
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"decoders.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/decoders.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AACA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AACjD,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAGpD,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW;IAC1B,iGAAiG;IACjG,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IACxB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC1B,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,mGAAmG;IACnG,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9B,4EAA4E;IAC5E,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACrB,+FAA+F;IAC/F,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACrB;;;;OAIG;IACH,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;CACxB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,qBAAqB;IACpC,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;IACxB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb,4EAA4E;IAC5E,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CAC7B;AAED,qBAAa,eAAe;IAExB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS;IAC1B,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS;gBADT,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,EACpB,SAAS,EAAE,aAAa;IAG3C;;;;OAIG;IACH,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK;IAEnC;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,cAAc,CACZ,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EACZ,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GACpB;QAAE,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;QAAC,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,CAAA;KAAE;IAI/D,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc;IAiBtB,qFAAqF;IACrF,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa;IAarB,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU;IA+ClB;;;;;;;;OAQG;IACH,oBAAoB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;QAC3B,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QACjB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QACd,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QACb,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;KACzB,GAAG,qBAAqB;CAU1B"}
|
package/dist/lib/decoders.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ export class CalldataDecoder {
|
|
|
17
17
|
* Decode calldata and recursively unwrap any well-formed nested calldata
|
|
18
18
|
* found in its arguments — `multicall(bytes[])`, a nested `createProposal`'s
|
|
19
19
|
* `ProposalAction[]`, `tryExecute`, etc. The decoded `primary` carries a
|
|
20
|
-
* `privileged` flag for
|
|
21
|
-
* reading the text sees hidden inner calls, not just the wrapper
|
|
20
|
+
* `privileged` flag for privileged-class selectors and a `nested` tree so a
|
|
21
|
+
* reviewer reading the text sees hidden inner calls, not just the wrapper.
|
|
22
22
|
*/
|
|
23
23
|
decodeCalldata(data, contractName) {
|
|
24
24
|
return this.decodeEnriched(data, contractName, 0);
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Canonical IGovPool.getProposals fragment + a fail-soft ProposalView decoder.
|
|
3
|
+
*
|
|
4
|
+
* Shared by the flow execute-gate (src/tools/flow.ts) and the risk-assess tool
|
|
5
|
+
* (src/tools/risk.ts) so the deeply-nested struct is declared and decoded in
|
|
6
|
+
* exactly one place. The nested `validatorProposal`
|
|
7
|
+
* (IGovValidators.ExternalProposal) MUST stay byte-exact with the deployed
|
|
8
|
+
* contract or ethers decoding throws — verified against DeXe-Protocol
|
|
9
|
+
* interfaces/gov/IGovPool.sol + interfaces/gov/validators/IGovValidators.sol.
|
|
10
|
+
*/
|
|
11
|
+
export declare const GET_PROPOSALS_FRAGMENT = "function getProposals(uint256 offset, uint256 limit) view returns (tuple(tuple(tuple(tuple(bool earlyCompletion, bool delegatedVotingAllowed, bool validatorsVote, uint64 duration, uint64 durationValidators, uint64 executionDelay, uint128 quorum, uint128 quorumValidators, uint256 minVotesForVoting, uint256 minVotesForCreating, tuple(address rewardToken, uint256 creationReward, uint256 executionReward, uint256 voteRewardsCoefficient) rewardsInfo, string executorDescription) settings, uint64 voteEnd, uint64 executeAfter, bool executed, uint256 votesFor, uint256 votesAgainst, uint256 rawVotesFor, uint256 rawVotesAgainst, uint256 givenRewards) core, string descriptionURL, tuple(address executor, uint256 value, bytes data)[] actionsOnFor, tuple(address executor, uint256 value, bytes data)[] actionsOnAgainst) proposal, tuple(tuple(bool executed, uint56 snapshotId, uint64 voteEnd, uint64 executeAfter, uint128 quorum, uint256 votesFor, uint256 votesAgainst) core) validatorProposal, uint8 proposalState, uint256 requiredQuorum, uint256 requiredValidatorsQuorum)[])";
|
|
12
|
+
export interface DecodedProposalView {
|
|
13
|
+
actionsOnFor: {
|
|
14
|
+
executor: string;
|
|
15
|
+
value: string;
|
|
16
|
+
data: string;
|
|
17
|
+
}[];
|
|
18
|
+
actionsOnAgainst: {
|
|
19
|
+
executor: string;
|
|
20
|
+
value: string;
|
|
21
|
+
data: string;
|
|
22
|
+
}[];
|
|
23
|
+
/** settings.quorum — a fraction of 1e27 (pct × 1e25). */
|
|
24
|
+
quorumRaw: bigint;
|
|
25
|
+
votesFor: bigint;
|
|
26
|
+
votesAgainst: bigint;
|
|
27
|
+
/** getProposals' requiredQuorum view field — absolute token-weight. */
|
|
28
|
+
requiredQuorum: bigint;
|
|
29
|
+
proposalState: number;
|
|
30
|
+
descriptionURL: string;
|
|
31
|
+
}
|
|
32
|
+
/**
|
|
33
|
+
* Decode one element of the getProposals return (a ProposalView tuple). Returns
|
|
34
|
+
* null on any structural surprise — callers fail soft rather than throw.
|
|
35
|
+
*/
|
|
36
|
+
export declare function decodeProposalView(view: unknown): DecodedProposalView | null;
|
|
37
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=govProposalView.d.ts.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"govProposalView.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/govProposalView.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB,kjCAC8gC,CAAC;AAEljC,MAAM,WAAW,mBAAmB;IAClC,YAAY,EAAE;QAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;KAAE,EAAE,CAAC;IAClE,gBAAgB,EAAE;QAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;KAAE,EAAE,CAAC;IACtE,yDAAyD;IACzD,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB,uEAAuE;IACvE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACxB;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,mBAAmB,GAAG,IAAI,CAyB5E"}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Canonical IGovPool.getProposals fragment + a fail-soft ProposalView decoder.
|
|
3
|
+
*
|
|
4
|
+
* Shared by the flow execute-gate (src/tools/flow.ts) and the risk-assess tool
|
|
5
|
+
* (src/tools/risk.ts) so the deeply-nested struct is declared and decoded in
|
|
6
|
+
* exactly one place. The nested `validatorProposal`
|
|
7
|
+
* (IGovValidators.ExternalProposal) MUST stay byte-exact with the deployed
|
|
8
|
+
* contract or ethers decoding throws — verified against DeXe-Protocol
|
|
9
|
+
* interfaces/gov/IGovPool.sol + interfaces/gov/validators/IGovValidators.sol.
|
|
10
|
+
*/
|
|
11
|
+
export const GET_PROPOSALS_FRAGMENT = "function getProposals(uint256 offset, uint256 limit) view returns (tuple(tuple(tuple(tuple(bool earlyCompletion, bool delegatedVotingAllowed, bool validatorsVote, uint64 duration, uint64 durationValidators, uint64 executionDelay, uint128 quorum, uint128 quorumValidators, uint256 minVotesForVoting, uint256 minVotesForCreating, tuple(address rewardToken, uint256 creationReward, uint256 executionReward, uint256 voteRewardsCoefficient) rewardsInfo, string executorDescription) settings, uint64 voteEnd, uint64 executeAfter, bool executed, uint256 votesFor, uint256 votesAgainst, uint256 rawVotesFor, uint256 rawVotesAgainst, uint256 givenRewards) core, string descriptionURL, tuple(address executor, uint256 value, bytes data)[] actionsOnFor, tuple(address executor, uint256 value, bytes data)[] actionsOnAgainst) proposal, tuple(tuple(bool executed, uint56 snapshotId, uint64 voteEnd, uint64 executeAfter, uint128 quorum, uint256 votesFor, uint256 votesAgainst) core) validatorProposal, uint8 proposalState, uint256 requiredQuorum, uint256 requiredValidatorsQuorum)[])";
|
|
12
|
+
/**
|
|
13
|
+
* Decode one element of the getProposals return (a ProposalView tuple). Returns
|
|
14
|
+
* null on any structural surprise — callers fail soft rather than throw.
|
|
15
|
+
*/
|
|
16
|
+
export function decodeProposalView(view) {
|
|
17
|
+
try {
|
|
18
|
+
const v = view;
|
|
19
|
+
const proposal = v[0];
|
|
20
|
+
const core = proposal[0];
|
|
21
|
+
const settings = core[0];
|
|
22
|
+
const mapActions = (raw) => raw.map((a) => ({
|
|
23
|
+
executor: a[0],
|
|
24
|
+
value: a[1].toString(),
|
|
25
|
+
data: a[2],
|
|
26
|
+
}));
|
|
27
|
+
return {
|
|
28
|
+
actionsOnFor: mapActions(proposal[2]),
|
|
29
|
+
actionsOnAgainst: mapActions(proposal[3]),
|
|
30
|
+
quorumRaw: settings[6],
|
|
31
|
+
votesFor: core[4],
|
|
32
|
+
votesAgainst: core[5],
|
|
33
|
+
requiredQuorum: v[3],
|
|
34
|
+
proposalState: Number(v[2]),
|
|
35
|
+
descriptionURL: proposal[1],
|
|
36
|
+
};
|
|
37
|
+
}
|
|
38
|
+
catch {
|
|
39
|
+
return null;
|
|
40
|
+
}
|
|
41
|
+
}
|
|
42
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=govProposalView.js.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"govProposalView.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/govProposalView.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AAEH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sBAAsB,GACjC,+iCAA+iC,CAAC;AAeljC;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,kBAAkB,CAAC,IAAa;IAC9C,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,IAAiB,CAAC;QAC5B,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAc,CAAC;QACnC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAc,CAAC;QACtC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAc,CAAC;QACtC,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,CAAC,GAAY,EAAE,EAAE,CACjC,GAAuC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YACnD,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YACd,KAAK,EAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAY,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE;YAClC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;SACX,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACN,OAAO;YACL,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YACrC,gBAAgB,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YACzC,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAW;YAChC,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAW;YAC3B,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAW;YAC/B,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAW;YAC9B,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YAC3B,cAAc,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAW;SACtC,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACP,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IACd,CAAC;AACH,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -1,26 +1,25 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
/**
|
|
2
|
-
* Advisory warnings for proposal configurations
|
|
3
|
-
*
|
|
4
|
-
*
|
|
5
|
-
*
|
|
6
|
-
* unknowingly ship a degraded-governance configuration.
|
|
2
|
+
* Advisory warnings for proposal/DAO configurations that are governance-safety
|
|
3
|
+
* risks. These surface in the relevant builder's human-readable output so a
|
|
4
|
+
* reviewer/agent doesn't unknowingly ship a degraded-governance configuration.
|
|
5
|
+
* Advisory only — verify settings against your DAO's policy.
|
|
7
6
|
*/
|
|
8
|
-
/** Seconds. A validator phase beyond this is almost certainly a mistake — and
|
|
7
|
+
/** Seconds. A validator phase beyond this is almost certainly a mistake — and keeps deposits locked. */
|
|
9
8
|
export declare const DURATION_VALIDATORS_SANITY_CAP = 2592000n;
|
|
10
9
|
/**
|
|
11
10
|
* Flag degraded-governance GovSettings: zero-delay execution (no timelock),
|
|
12
|
-
* auto-defeating validator quorum, and an unbounded validator phase that
|
|
13
|
-
*
|
|
14
|
-
* deployed contracts enforce no such bounds (H-11, executionDelay=0).
|
|
11
|
+
* auto-defeating validator quorum, and an unbounded validator phase that can
|
|
12
|
+
* keep deposits locked for its duration. Configure these against your DAO's policy.
|
|
15
13
|
*/
|
|
16
14
|
export declare function settingsAdvisories(s: {
|
|
17
15
|
validatorsVote: boolean;
|
|
18
16
|
durationValidators: string;
|
|
19
17
|
executionDelay: string;
|
|
20
18
|
quorumValidators: string;
|
|
21
|
-
|
|
19
|
+
quorum?: string;
|
|
20
|
+
}, floorPct?: number): string[];
|
|
22
21
|
/** changeVotePower swaps the DAO's vote-power math contract — a privileged, governance-wide change. */
|
|
23
|
-
export declare const CHANGE_VOTE_POWER_ADVISORY = "\u26A0 changeVotePower swaps the DAO's entire vote-power math contract \u2014 a privileged, governance-wide change (reversible only by another passed proposal). Verify the new VotePower address before proposing. [
|
|
24
|
-
/** custom_abi can encode ANY call;
|
|
25
|
-
export declare const CUSTOM_ABI_DEFAULT_ROUTING_ADVISORY = "\u26A0 custom_abi encodes an arbitrary call with no semantic validation.
|
|
22
|
+
export declare const CHANGE_VOTE_POWER_ADVISORY = "\u26A0 changeVotePower swaps the DAO's entire vote-power math contract \u2014 a privileged, governance-wide change (reversible only by another passed proposal). Verify the new VotePower address before proposing. [governance-safety advisory]";
|
|
23
|
+
/** custom_abi can encode ANY call; ensure actions route to registered executors. */
|
|
24
|
+
export declare const CUSTOM_ABI_DEFAULT_ROUTING_ADVISORY = "\u26A0 custom_abi encodes an arbitrary call with no semantic validation. Ensure every proposal action routes to a properly registered executor so the DAO's internal access controls apply, and keep the final action's executor a registered one. Privileged accounting selectors are refused by the MCP's selector guard. [governance-safety advisory]";
|
|
26
25
|
//# sourceMappingURL=protocolAdvisories.d.ts.map
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"protocolAdvisories.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/protocolAdvisories.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"protocolAdvisories.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/protocolAdvisories.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;GAKG;AAQH,wGAAwG;AACxG,eAAO,MAAM,8BAA8B,WAAa,CAAC;AAEzD;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAChC,CAAC,EAAE;IACD,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACxB,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC3B,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACjB,EACD,QAAQ,SAAK,GACZ,MAAM,EAAE,CA6BV;AAED,uGAAuG;AACvG,eAAO,MAAM,0BAA0B,qPACmM,CAAC;AAE3O,oFAAoF;AACpF,eAAO,MAAM,mCAAmC,6VACuS,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -1,39 +1,46 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
/**
|
|
2
|
-
* Advisory warnings for proposal configurations
|
|
3
|
-
*
|
|
4
|
-
*
|
|
5
|
-
*
|
|
6
|
-
* unknowingly ship a degraded-governance configuration.
|
|
2
|
+
* Advisory warnings for proposal/DAO configurations that are governance-safety
|
|
3
|
+
* risks. These surface in the relevant builder's human-readable output so a
|
|
4
|
+
* reviewer/agent doesn't unknowingly ship a degraded-governance configuration.
|
|
5
|
+
* Advisory only — verify settings against your DAO's policy.
|
|
7
6
|
*/
|
|
7
|
+
import { quorumPctFromRaw, judgeQuorum, lowQuorumAdvisory } from "./quorumRisk.js";
|
|
8
8
|
function toBig(s) {
|
|
9
9
|
return /^[0-9]+$/.test(s) ? BigInt(s) : null;
|
|
10
10
|
}
|
|
11
|
-
/** Seconds. A validator phase beyond this is almost certainly a mistake — and
|
|
11
|
+
/** Seconds. A validator phase beyond this is almost certainly a mistake — and keeps deposits locked. */
|
|
12
12
|
export const DURATION_VALIDATORS_SANITY_CAP = 2592000n; // 30 days
|
|
13
13
|
/**
|
|
14
14
|
* Flag degraded-governance GovSettings: zero-delay execution (no timelock),
|
|
15
|
-
* auto-defeating validator quorum, and an unbounded validator phase that
|
|
16
|
-
*
|
|
17
|
-
* deployed contracts enforce no such bounds (H-11, executionDelay=0).
|
|
15
|
+
* auto-defeating validator quorum, and an unbounded validator phase that can
|
|
16
|
+
* keep deposits locked for its duration. Configure these against your DAO's policy.
|
|
18
17
|
*/
|
|
19
|
-
export function settingsAdvisories(s) {
|
|
18
|
+
export function settingsAdvisories(s, floorPct = 50) {
|
|
20
19
|
const out = [];
|
|
20
|
+
// Low quorum reduces the participation required to pass a proposal — a
|
|
21
|
+
// governance-safety risk for treasury-moving proposals.
|
|
22
|
+
if (s.quorum !== undefined) {
|
|
23
|
+
const pct = quorumPctFromRaw(s.quorum);
|
|
24
|
+
if (judgeQuorum(pct, floorPct) !== "SAFE") {
|
|
25
|
+
out.push(lowQuorumAdvisory(pct, floorPct));
|
|
26
|
+
}
|
|
27
|
+
}
|
|
21
28
|
if (toBig(s.executionDelay) === 0n) {
|
|
22
|
-
out.push("executionDelay=0 → no timelock: a passed proposal executes immediately, leaving no window to
|
|
29
|
+
out.push("executionDelay=0 → no timelock: a passed proposal executes immediately, leaving no window to review it before it takes effect. Set a non-zero execution delay (a 1-day minimum is recommended for standard governance).");
|
|
23
30
|
}
|
|
24
31
|
if (s.validatorsVote) {
|
|
25
32
|
if (toBig(s.quorumValidators) === 0n) {
|
|
26
|
-
out.push("quorumValidators=0 with validatorsVote=true → every validator proposal auto-defeats (governance
|
|
33
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+
out.push("quorumValidators=0 with validatorsVote=true → every validator proposal auto-defeats (governance stalls). Set a non-zero validator quorum.");
|
|
27
34
|
}
|
|
28
35
|
const dv = toBig(s.durationValidators);
|
|
29
36
|
if (dv !== null && dv > DURATION_VALIDATORS_SANITY_CAP) {
|
|
30
|
-
out.push(`durationValidators=${s.durationValidators}s (> 30 days) →
|
|
37
|
+
out.push(`durationValidators=${s.durationValidators}s (> 30 days) → deposits stay locked for the whole validator phase, so a very large value can lock voters' funds for an extended period. Use a sane validator duration.`);
|
|
31
38
|
}
|
|
32
39
|
}
|
|
33
40
|
return out;
|
|
34
41
|
}
|
|
35
42
|
/** changeVotePower swaps the DAO's vote-power math contract — a privileged, governance-wide change. */
|
|
36
|
-
export const CHANGE_VOTE_POWER_ADVISORY = "⚠ changeVotePower swaps the DAO's entire vote-power math contract — a privileged, governance-wide change (reversible only by another passed proposal). Verify the new VotePower address before proposing. [
|
|
37
|
-
/** custom_abi can encode ANY call;
|
|
38
|
-
export const CUSTOM_ABI_DEFAULT_ROUTING_ADVISORY = "⚠ custom_abi encodes an arbitrary call with no semantic validation.
|
|
43
|
+
export const CHANGE_VOTE_POWER_ADVISORY = "⚠ changeVotePower swaps the DAO's entire vote-power math contract — a privileged, governance-wide change (reversible only by another passed proposal). Verify the new VotePower address before proposing. [governance-safety advisory]";
|
|
44
|
+
/** custom_abi can encode ANY call; ensure actions route to registered executors. */
|
|
45
|
+
export const CUSTOM_ABI_DEFAULT_ROUTING_ADVISORY = "⚠ custom_abi encodes an arbitrary call with no semantic validation. Ensure every proposal action routes to a properly registered executor so the DAO's internal access controls apply, and keep the final action's executor a registered one. Privileged accounting selectors are refused by the MCP's selector guard. [governance-safety advisory]";
|
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39
46
|
//# sourceMappingURL=protocolAdvisories.js.map
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"protocolAdvisories.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/protocolAdvisories.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"protocolAdvisories.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/protocolAdvisories.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;GAKG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAEnF,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,CAAS;IACtB,OAAO,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;AAC/C,CAAC;AAED,wGAAwG;AACxG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,8BAA8B,GAAG,QAAU,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU;AAEpE;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,kBAAkB,CAChC,CAMC,EACD,QAAQ,GAAG,EAAE;IAEb,MAAM,GAAG,GAAa,EAAE,CAAC;IACzB,uEAAuE;IACvE,wDAAwD;IACxD,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QAC3B,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;QACvC,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1C,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7C,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QACnC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CACN,yNAAyN,CAC1N,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;QACrB,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;YACrC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CACN,2IAA2I,CAC5I,CAAC;QACJ,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC;QACvC,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,8BAA8B,EAAE,CAAC;YACvD,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CACN,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,kBAAkB,yKAAyK,CACpN,CAAC;QACJ,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC;AACb,CAAC;AAED,uGAAuG;AACvG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,0BAA0B,GACrC,wOAAwO,CAAC;AAE3O,oFAAoF;AACpF,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,mCAAmC,GAC9C,qVAAqV,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Low-quorum governance-safety advisories — pure logic, no RPC.
|
|
3
|
+
*
|
|
4
|
+
* Treasury-moving proposals (ERC20 approve/transfer or native value) should pass
|
|
5
|
+
* under an adequate quorum so a true majority is required. This module flags when
|
|
6
|
+
* a DAO's quorum setting is low for such proposals, so an operator/agent verifies
|
|
7
|
+
* the quorum and stakeholder participation before executing. Advisory only — the
|
|
8
|
+
* durable control is an adequate on-chain quorum threshold configured per DAO.
|
|
9
|
+
*/
|
|
10
|
+
export type RiskLevel = "SAFE" | "CAUTION" | "DANGER";
|
|
11
|
+
/** Worst (most dangerous) of a set of risk levels. Empty → SAFE. */
|
|
12
|
+
export declare function worstRisk(...levels: RiskLevel[]): RiskLevel;
|
|
13
|
+
/** Convert a raw quorum setting (pct × 1e25) to a human percentage. 5e26 → 50. */
|
|
14
|
+
export declare function quorumPctFromRaw(raw: bigint | string): number;
|
|
15
|
+
/** SAFE ≥ floor; CAUTION ≥ 0.8×floor; DANGER below. NaN → DANGER (unparseable). */
|
|
16
|
+
export declare function judgeQuorum(pct: number, floorPct: number): RiskLevel;
|
|
17
|
+
export type TreasuryHitKind = "approve" | "transfer" | "transferFrom" | "increaseAllowance" | "nftTransfer" | "nativeValue";
|
|
18
|
+
export interface TreasuryHit {
|
|
19
|
+
/** Index of the action in the proposal's action array. */
|
|
20
|
+
index: number;
|
|
21
|
+
/** Target contract of the action. */
|
|
22
|
+
executor: string;
|
|
23
|
+
/** 0x 4-byte selector, or null for a pure native-value transfer. */
|
|
24
|
+
selector: string | null;
|
|
25
|
+
kind: TreasuryHitKind;
|
|
26
|
+
/** Best-effort decoded recipient (spender / `to`), or null when undecodable. */
|
|
27
|
+
recipient: string | null;
|
|
28
|
+
/** Best-effort decoded amount / tokenId as a decimal string, or null. */
|
|
29
|
+
amount: string | null;
|
|
30
|
+
}
|
|
31
|
+
/** Decimal selectors of every treasury-touching function (for docs/tests). */
|
|
32
|
+
export declare function treasurySelectors(): string[];
|
|
33
|
+
/**
|
|
34
|
+
* Scan a proposal's actions and report every one that moves treasury value or
|
|
35
|
+
* grants an allowance. Best-effort recipient/amount decode — NEVER throws.
|
|
36
|
+
* A single action can yield two hits (native value + an ERC20 call).
|
|
37
|
+
*/
|
|
38
|
+
export declare function classifyTreasuryActions(actions: {
|
|
39
|
+
executor: string;
|
|
40
|
+
value: string;
|
|
41
|
+
data: string;
|
|
42
|
+
}[]): TreasuryHit[];
|
|
43
|
+
export interface QuorumConcentration {
|
|
44
|
+
/** Absolute voting weight needed to clear quorum, or null when unknown. */
|
|
45
|
+
requiredWeight: bigint | null;
|
|
46
|
+
/** Token total supply used as the denominator, or null when unknown. */
|
|
47
|
+
totalSupply: bigint | null;
|
|
48
|
+
/**
|
|
49
|
+
* Share of total supply required to meet quorum. INDICATIVE: ignores VotePower
|
|
50
|
+
* math, NFT multipliers, and delegation, and uses minted supply as the
|
|
51
|
+
* denominator. Null when supply/weight unknown. A low value indicates a DAO
|
|
52
|
+
* whose decisions need only a small share of supply — a governance-safety flag.
|
|
53
|
+
*/
|
|
54
|
+
pctOfSupplyForQuorum: number | null;
|
|
55
|
+
verdict: RiskLevel;
|
|
56
|
+
}
|
|
57
|
+
/**
|
|
58
|
+
* Estimate the share of token supply required to meet a proposal's quorum.
|
|
59
|
+
* Prefers the on-chain `requiredWeight` (getProposalRequiredQuorum); otherwise
|
|
60
|
+
* derives it from `quorumPct × totalVoteWeight`. When the percentage cannot be
|
|
61
|
+
* computed the verdict is CAUTION (unknown is never SAFE).
|
|
62
|
+
*/
|
|
63
|
+
export declare function quorumConcentration(args: {
|
|
64
|
+
quorumPct: number;
|
|
65
|
+
floorPct?: number;
|
|
66
|
+
totalSupply?: bigint;
|
|
67
|
+
requiredWeight?: bigint;
|
|
68
|
+
totalVoteWeight?: bigint;
|
|
69
|
+
}): QuorumConcentration;
|
|
70
|
+
/** Flag a below-floor quorum SETTING (deploy / change-voting-settings). */
|
|
71
|
+
export declare function lowQuorumAdvisory(pct: number, floorPct: number): string;
|
|
72
|
+
/** Flag a treasury-touching proposal at build time (static, no RPC needed). */
|
|
73
|
+
export declare const TREASURY_RISK_ADVISORY: string;
|
|
74
|
+
/**
|
|
75
|
+
* Build-time advisory for any builder whose actions move treasury value.
|
|
76
|
+
* Returns the static advisory string when there is at least one treasury hit
|
|
77
|
+
* and the guard is enabled, else null. Build-time is WARN-only — it never
|
|
78
|
+
* blocks (refusing would just route users to hand-crafted custom_abi).
|
|
79
|
+
*/
|
|
80
|
+
export declare function buildTimeTreasuryAdvisory(actions: {
|
|
81
|
+
executor: string;
|
|
82
|
+
value: string;
|
|
83
|
+
data: string;
|
|
84
|
+
}[], guard: "off" | "warn"): string | null;
|
|
85
|
+
/**
|
|
86
|
+
* Advisory message for the vote_and_execute treasury alert. `reasons` are the
|
|
87
|
+
* failing checks (below-floor quorum, no controlling-member participation).
|
|
88
|
+
* Advisory ONLY — the guard never blocks; it surfaces this and proceeds. The
|
|
89
|
+
* durable control is an adequate on-chain quorum threshold configured per DAO.
|
|
90
|
+
*/
|
|
91
|
+
export declare function treasuryExecuteAdvisory(reasons: string[]): string;
|
|
92
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=quorumRisk.d.ts.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
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|