dexbot 1.7.2 → 1.7.3
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +24 -0
- package/claw/package.json +1 -1
- package/claw/runtimes/openclaw-plugin/openclaw.plugin.json +1 -1
- package/claw/runtimes/openclaw-plugin/package.json +1 -1
- package/dist/analysis/grid_correction_check.d.ts +60 -1
- package/dist/analysis/grid_correction_check.js +268 -18
- package/dist/analysis/pivot_timeline.d.ts +78 -0
- package/dist/analysis/pivot_timeline.js +360 -0
- package/dist/market_adapter/utils/file_lock.js +16 -4
- package/dist/modules/account_bots.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/modules/bot_defaults.js +6 -1
- package/dist/modules/constants.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/modules/constants.js +66 -0
- package/dist/modules/dexbot_class.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/modules/dexbot_class.js +56 -1
- package/dist/modules/dexbot_cow_runtime.js +231 -19
- package/dist/modules/dexbot_maintenance_runtime.d.ts +31 -1
- package/dist/modules/dexbot_maintenance_runtime.js +164 -11
- package/dist/modules/dexbot_state_recovery.js +15 -1
- package/dist/modules/launcher/instance_lock.d.ts +27 -0
- package/dist/modules/launcher/instance_lock.js +131 -0
- package/dist/modules/order/grid.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/modules/order/grid.js +40 -14
- package/dist/modules/order/index.d.ts +15 -1
- package/dist/modules/order/manager.d.ts +21 -0
- package/dist/modules/order/manager.js +119 -12
- package/dist/modules/order/placement_lock.d.ts +30 -0
- package/dist/modules/order/placement_lock.js +48 -0
- package/dist/modules/order/utils/order.d.ts +39 -1
- package/dist/modules/order/utils/order.js +73 -2
- package/dist/modules/order/utils/system.d.ts +112 -3
- package/dist/modules/order/utils/system.js +368 -6
- package/dist/modules/paths.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/modules/paths.js +1 -0
- package/dist/modules/timing_policy.js +2 -0
- package/dist/modules/types.d.ts +27 -0
- package/dist/pm2.js +126 -0
- package/dist/unlock.js +26 -1
- package/docs/DEXBOT_COMPARISON.md +5 -5
- package/docs/EVOLUTION.md +10 -9
- package/docs/FUND_MOVEMENT_AND_ACCOUNTING.md +1 -1
- package/docs/ORDER_ENGINE_POST_1.0_RETROSPECTIVE.md +155 -2
- package/docs/README.md +1 -1
- package/modules/README.md +1 -0
- package/package.json +2 -1
package/dist/modules/types.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -239,6 +239,15 @@ export interface BotLike {
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* persistence clock — it must hold for SPREAD_STALE_IN_TOLERANCE_RESET_MS.
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*/
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_outOfSpreadToleranceSince: number;
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+
/**
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* One-shot level-triggered spread recheck while the grid is out of
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* tolerance (the base maintenance cadence can be hours; every watchdog
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* clock assumes the check is evaluated).
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+
*/
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+
_spreadRecheckTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null;
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+
_spreadRecheckInFlight: boolean;
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/** A placement that did not reduce the violation was already reported. */
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_outOfSpreadNoProgressWarned: boolean;
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_strandedHoldSince: Map<string, number>;
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_recoverySyncInFlight: number;
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_batchInFlight: number;
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@@ -536,6 +545,16 @@ export interface BotMetrics extends UnknownRecord {
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spreadCorrectionRefusalCauses: Record<string, number>;
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/** Bounded re-plan retries attempted after a transient spread-correction refusal. */
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spreadCorrectionRetryCount: number;
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/** Stale plans dropped because there was no fill context to re-plan from (batch not broadcast). */
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stalePlanDroppedCount: number;
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/** Stale fill batches that proceeded anyway at the re-plan limit (bounded policy). */
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stalePlanProceedCount: number;
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/** Size updates skipped because a PARTIAL slot's booked remaining already matched (post-fill growth refused). */
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clampedNoopUpdateCount: number;
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/** Planned operations thrown away when a definitive chunk failure aborted the remaining chunks. */
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chunkAbortedOpCount: number;
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/** Rails re-placed by the post-recovery rebalance (snapshot reload / repair contexts). */
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reloadReplacedRailCount: number;
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}
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/** An unmatched chain order surfaced by a sync pass. */
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export interface UnmatchedChainOrder extends UnknownRecord {
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@@ -1187,6 +1206,14 @@ export interface OrderManagerLike {
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_lastMarketFillPrice?: number | null;
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_lastMarketFillType?: string | null;
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_lastMarketFillAt?: number | null;
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/**
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* Refused (off-market) fill level: a fill the pivot-arming policy refused
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* (§9.12/P1) still marks its own level as a same-level re-fill block for a
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* short TTL (§9.12/P2 amended). In-memory only — never persisted.
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*/
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_lastRefusedFillPrice?: number | null;
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_lastRefusedFillType?: string | null;
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_lastRefusedFillAt?: number | null;
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_liveMarketPrice?: number | null;
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_liveMarketPriceAt?: number | null;
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_liveMarketPriceAttemptedAt?: number | null;
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package/dist/pm2.js
CHANGED
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@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { parseJsonWithComments } from './modules/order/utils/system.js';
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import { readBotsFileWithLock } from './modules/bots_file_lock.js';
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import { loadSettingsFile, selectActiveBotEntries } from './modules/bot_settings.js';
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+
import { getProcessDiscovery } from './modules/process_discovery.js';
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import * as chainKeys from './modules/chain_keys.js';
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import * as credentialPolicy from './modules/credential_policy.js';
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import { readHeadlessPassword } from './modules/launcher/headless_password.js';
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@@ -436,6 +437,20 @@ async function main({ botNameFilter = null, clawOnly = false, headless = false,
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// prefixed lines process-wide to keep the launcher banner and the
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// connection confirmation as the only startup output.
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muteChainLogs();
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// DOUBLE-CONTROLLER GUARD: a monolithic instance started via
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// `dexbot start` is a live controller for the same accounts this PM2
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// fleet is about to own. Two controllers on one account corrupt each
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// other's grids and fills (observed live 2026-11-14), so refuse here
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// instead of letting the per-bot instance lock kill each PM2 app 3
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// seconds later.
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const monoPid = readLiveMonolithicPidLite();
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if (monoPid > 0) {
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console.error(pm2Error(`DEXBot2 is already running outside PM2 (monolithic PID ${monoPid}).\n` +
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`Starting the PM2 fleet now would put two controllers on the same accounts.\n` +
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`Stop it first with 'dexbot stop', then rerun this command.`));
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await flushVersionStatusOrHeader(versionStatus);
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process.exit(1);
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}
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await waitForConnected(TIMING.CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_MS);
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console.log(pm2Success('Connected to BitShares'));
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}
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@@ -471,6 +486,7 @@ async function main({ botNameFilter = null, clawOnly = false, headless = false,
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console.log();
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// Step 4: Start PM2
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console.log(clawOnly ? 'Starting PM2 with credential daemon only...' : 'Starting PM2 with all services...');
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+
await warnStaleDexbotApps(apps);
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await startManagedAppsPM2(apps);
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console.log();
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console.log('='.repeat(50));
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@@ -522,6 +538,116 @@ function startManagedAppsPM2(apps) {
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}
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return startPM2Process(['start', ECOSYSTEM_FILE]);
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}
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/**
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* Lightweight "a `dexbot start` monolithic instance is live" probe.
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*
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* Reads the monolithic pid file, so it must confirm the pid still belongs to
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* an unlock process (a recycled pid must not block PM2 forever). Kept local
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* instead of importing launcher/monolithic_runtime: pm2.ts is loaded by the
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* ESM-mocked launcher tests, and that module drags in the whole launcher graph
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* (bot settings, supervisor, credential runtime) for one check. The
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* authoritative backstop remains the per-bot instance lock.
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*
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* @returns {number} Live monolithic pid, or 0 when absent/dead/unrelated
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+
*/
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+
function readLiveMonolithicPidLite() {
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try {
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const pid = Number(storage.readFile(PATHS.PROFILES.MONOLITHIC_PID).trim());
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if (!Number.isInteger(pid) || pid <= 0)
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return 0;
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const discovery = getProcessDiscovery();
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if (!discovery.isAlive(pid))
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return 0;
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const cmdline = discovery.readCmdline(pid);
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if (!/(^|[\\/])unlock\.(?:js|ts)(?:\0|$| )/.test(cmdline))
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return 0;
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return pid;
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}
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+
catch (_) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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+
/**
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* Names of PM2 apps that are RUNNING dexbot bot/runtime scripts from this
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* project root. Returns [] when pm2 is unavailable or the query fails — the
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+
* caller treats that as "cannot know", never as "none running".
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+
*/
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+
async function listRunningDexbotAppNames() {
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try {
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const list = await runPm2Raw(['jlist'], { timeoutMs: 15000 });
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if (list.code !== 0)
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return [];
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+
const parsed = JSON.parse(list.stdout || '[]');
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+
if (!Array.isArray(parsed))
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return [];
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const names = [];
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for (const app of parsed) {
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+
const env = app?.pm2_env;
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if (!env)
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+
continue;
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+
if (String(env.pm_cwd || '') !== PATHS.PROJECT_ROOT)
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+
continue;
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+
if (!/(^|[\\/])(bot|dexbot|market_adapter|credential-daemon)\.(?:js|ts)$/.test(String(env.pm_exec_path || '')))
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+
continue;
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+
const status = String(env.status || '');
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+
if (status && status !== 'online' && status !== 'launching')
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+
continue;
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+
if (typeof app.name === 'string' && app.name)
|
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+
names.push(app.name);
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+
}
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598
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+
return names;
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599
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+
}
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+
catch (_) {
|
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601
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+
return [];
|
|
602
|
+
}
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+
}
|
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604
|
+
/**
|
|
605
|
+
* Warn about RUNNING dexbot apps from this project root whose names are not in
|
|
606
|
+
* the current bots.json set (renamed bots, leftovers from an older ecosystem
|
|
607
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+
* generation, a hung interactive-unlock attempt). Such an app comes back on
|
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608
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+
* every `pm2 resurrect`/reboot and can double-run an account against the
|
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609
|
+
* freshly generated fleet — the exact double-controller incident of
|
|
610
|
+
* 2026-11-14. Warn only (never auto-delete): the single-controller instance
|
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611
|
+
* lock refuses them at runtime, and deleting operator processes silently
|
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612
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+
* would hide the misconfiguration instead of surfacing it.
|
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613
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+
*
|
|
614
|
+
* Compared against the FULL configured bot set (not the possibly bot-filtered
|
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615
|
+
* `apps` subset) so `dexbot pm2 <bot>` does not flag the operator's other,
|
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616
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+
* legitimately configured bots.
|
|
617
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+
*/
|
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618
|
+
async function warnStaleDexbotApps(apps) {
|
|
619
|
+
try {
|
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620
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+
const running = await listRunningDexbotAppNames();
|
|
621
|
+
if (running.length === 0)
|
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622
|
+
return;
|
|
623
|
+
const current = new Set((apps || []).map((a) => a.name));
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|
624
|
+
// Full configured set from bots.json (not the possibly bot-filtered
|
|
625
|
+
// `apps` subset). Best-effort: a settings read failure just narrows
|
|
626
|
+
// the comparison to `apps` instead of blocking startup.
|
|
627
|
+
const configured = new Set();
|
|
628
|
+
try {
|
|
629
|
+
if (storage.exists(BOTS_JSON)) {
|
|
630
|
+
const { config } = loadSettingsFile(BOTS_JSON);
|
|
631
|
+
for (const b of selectActiveBotEntries(config)) {
|
|
632
|
+
if (b && b.active !== false && b.name)
|
|
633
|
+
configured.add(String(b.name));
|
|
634
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+
}
|
|
635
|
+
}
|
|
636
|
+
}
|
|
637
|
+
catch (_) { /* best-effort */ }
|
|
638
|
+
const serviceNames = new Set(['dexbot-adapter', 'dexbot-update', 'dexbot-cred']);
|
|
639
|
+
for (const name of running) {
|
|
640
|
+
if (current.has(name) || configured.has(name) || serviceNames.has(name))
|
|
641
|
+
continue;
|
|
642
|
+
if ([...current].some((n) => isSameBotName(n, name)) || [...configured].some((n) => isSameBotName(n, name)))
|
|
643
|
+
continue;
|
|
644
|
+
console.warn(`[PM2] Stale dexbot app '${name}' is RUNNING but not in the current bots.json set ` +
|
|
645
|
+
`(renamed bot or leftover from an older config). It will keep running across reboots and ` +
|
|
646
|
+
`can double-run an account. Remove it with: pm2 delete ${name} && pm2 save`);
|
|
647
|
+
}
|
|
648
|
+
}
|
|
649
|
+
catch (_) { /* diagnostics only — must never block startup */ }
|
|
650
|
+
}
|
|
525
651
|
function startCredentialDaemonPM2({ credentialEnv = {} } = {}) {
|
|
526
652
|
const app = buildCredentialDaemonApp({ credentialEnv });
|
|
527
653
|
const args = [
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package/dist/unlock.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ const { ensureDir } = storage;
|
|
|
75
75
|
const { createBotSupervisor, SOCKET_PATH, forwardSignal, isPidAlive, waitForPidExit, readMarketAdapterLockPid, stopMarketAdapterFromLock, usesAmaGridPrice, waitForChildSpawn, pidMatchesScriptCandidates, candidateRuntimeScriptPaths, } = require('./modules/launcher/bot_supervisor');
|
|
76
76
|
const { statusTitle, statusLabel, statusBool, statusActiveBotName, statusSuccess, statusError, colorStatus, STATUS_COLORS, readProcStat, readProcMemMB, readProcCpuTime, readProcCpuPercent, readProcUptime, formatMemoryWithUptime, printControlStatus, } = require('./modules/launcher/status_reporting');
|
|
77
77
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const { MONOLITHIC_PID_FILE, MONOLITHIC_BOT_PID_FILE, MONOLITHIC_BOT_INFO_FILE, MONOLITHIC_CRED_PID_FILE, MONOLITHIC_OUT_LOG, MONOLITHIC_ERROR_LOG, CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_FILE, cleanupStateFiles, readLiveMonolithicPid, readMonolithicBotInfo, isLikelyCredentialDaemonProcess, isExpectedMonolithicBotPid, isProcessInDstate, stopCredentialDaemonPid, stopCredentialDaemon, ensureNoForeignCredentialDaemon, findCredentialSocketOwnerPid, cleanupCredentialRuntimeFiles, readCredentialDaemonStatus, ensureLogDir: ensureMonolithicLogDir, buildDexbotStartArgs, createUpdateScheduler, listConfiguredBots, getControlBotNames, getControlActionLabel, getControlServiceNames, resolveControlRouting, botNotFoundMessage, printControlActionSummary, formatBotCount, } = require('./modules/launcher/monolithic_runtime');
|
|
78
|
-
const { isConfiguredBotName } = require('./modules/launcher/runtime_mode');
|
|
78
|
+
const { isConfiguredBotName, listDexbotPm2Processes } = require('./modules/launcher/runtime_mode');
|
|
79
79
|
const CODE_ROOT = __dirname;
|
|
80
80
|
const BOTS_FILE = PATHS.PROFILES.BOTS_JSON;
|
|
81
81
|
const LOGS_DIR = PATHS.LOGS_DIR;
|
|
@@ -519,6 +519,31 @@ async function main({ argv = process.argv, startupGraceMs = DEFAULT_STARTUP_GRAC
|
|
|
519
519
|
return;
|
|
520
520
|
}
|
|
521
521
|
}
|
|
522
|
+
// DOUBLE-CONTROLLER GUARD: refuse to start bots that a PM2 fleet is
|
|
523
|
+
// already running (same names). Two controllers on one account corrupt
|
|
524
|
+
// each other's grids and fills (observed live 2026-11-14); fail here with
|
|
525
|
+
// the offending app names instead of letting the per-bot instance lock
|
|
526
|
+
// kill the freshly unlocked bots one by one. Internal children skip the
|
|
527
|
+
// check — their parent launcher already ran it.
|
|
528
|
+
if (!clawOnly && !dryrun && !isInternalChild && launchedBotNames.length > 0) {
|
|
529
|
+
// listDexbotPm2Processes() already gates on the pm2 daemon pid file
|
|
530
|
+
// (no subprocess when PM2 was never run) and keeps only DEXBot2's own
|
|
531
|
+
// processes, so this stays a cheap, offline-safe probe.
|
|
532
|
+
const runningApps = listDexbotPm2Processes()
|
|
533
|
+
.map((p) => String(p?.name || ''))
|
|
534
|
+
.filter(Boolean);
|
|
535
|
+
const overlap = runningApps.filter((appName) => launchedBotNames.some((b) => isSameBotName(b, appName)));
|
|
536
|
+
if (overlap.length > 0) {
|
|
537
|
+
printLauncherHeader({ botName: effectiveBotName || botName, clawOnly, creditOnly, isolated, dryrun, headless });
|
|
538
|
+
console.error(`The following bot(s) are already running under PM2: ${overlap.join(', ')}.\n` +
|
|
539
|
+
`Starting them here too would put two controllers on the same accounts.\n` +
|
|
540
|
+
`Stop the PM2 fleet first: dexbot pm2 stop ${overlap.join(' ')}\n` +
|
|
541
|
+
` (or run the bots under PM2 instead: dexbot pm2)`);
|
|
542
|
+
await flushVersionStatusOrHeader(versionStatus);
|
|
543
|
+
process.exitCode = 1;
|
|
544
|
+
return;
|
|
545
|
+
}
|
|
546
|
+
}
|
|
522
547
|
try {
|
|
523
548
|
if (!isDetachedSupervisorChild) {
|
|
524
549
|
printLauncherHeader({ botName: effectiveBotName || botName, clawOnly, creditOnly, isolated, dryrun, headless });
|
|
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
# DEXBot vs DEXBot2 — Detailed Comparison Report
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
3
|
> **Date:** 2026-09-02 *(metrics refreshed against local source trees)*
|
|
4
|
-
> **Scope:** Full architectural, functional, and operational comparison between the original [DEXBot](https://github.com/Codaone/DEXBot) (Python, v1.0.0) and DEXBot2 (TypeScript, v1.7.
|
|
4
|
+
> **Scope:** Full architectural, functional, and operational comparison between the original [DEXBot](https://github.com/Codaone/DEXBot) (Python, v1.0.0) and DEXBot2 (TypeScript, v1.7.3).
|
|
5
5
|
> **Audience:** Developers, contributors, and operators evaluating or migrating between the two projects.
|
|
6
6
|
|
|
7
7
|
---
|
|
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
|
|
|
36
36
|
|
|
37
37
|
| Attribute | DEXBot (original) | DEXBot2 |
|
|
38
38
|
|---|---|---|
|
|
39
|
-
| **Release Track** | 1.0.0 | v1.7.
|
|
39
|
+
| **Release Track** | 1.0.0 | v1.7.3 |
|
|
40
40
|
| **Language** | Python 3.6+ | TypeScript 5.x |
|
|
41
41
|
| **Status** | Released 1.0.0, unmaintained | Active development |
|
|
42
42
|
| **Last Repo Activity** | May 23, 2020 | 2026-09-02 |
|
|
@@ -776,10 +776,10 @@ Where:
|
|
|
776
776
|
|
|
777
777
|
| Metric | DEXBot | DEXBot2 |
|
|
778
778
|
|---|---|---|
|
|
779
|
-
| **Release Track** | 1.0.0 | v1.7.
|
|
779
|
+
| **Release Track** | 1.0.0 | v1.7.3 |
|
|
780
780
|
| **Active Since** | ~2018 | December 2025 |
|
|
781
|
-
| **Last Commit** | May 23, 2020 | 2026-11-
|
|
782
|
-
| **Total Commits** | 2281 | 2,
|
|
781
|
+
| **Last Commit** | May 23, 2020 | 2026-11-17 |
|
|
782
|
+
| **Total Commits** | 2281 | 2,517 (current HEAD, v1.7.3 line) |
|
|
783
783
|
| **Lines of Code** | ~10,846 Python LOC in `dexbot/` | Large TypeScript runtime + adapter + Claw + analysis + tests |
|
|
784
784
|
| **Source Files** | 72 Python files in `dexbot/` | ~656 TS files across the repo |
|
|
785
785
|
| **Test Files** | 16 Python test files | 367 `test_*.ts` files (350 `tests/` + 17 `claw/tests/`, auto-discovered via `globSync`) |
|
package/docs/EVOLUTION.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
|
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
3
|
## Executive Summary
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
|
-
DEXBot2 is a sophisticated decentralized exchange trading bot for the BitShares blockchain. This report documents the complete evolution of the project from its inception in December 2025 through the current 1.7.
|
|
5
|
+
DEXBot2 is a sophisticated decentralized exchange trading bot for the BitShares blockchain. This report documents the complete evolution of the project from its inception in December 2025 through the current 1.7.3 stable release.
|
|
6
6
|
|
|
7
7
|
### Key Milestones
|
|
8
8
|
- **Project Inception**: December 2, 2025
|
|
9
|
-
- **Growth Phase**: 2,
|
|
9
|
+
- **Growth Phase**: 2,517 commits over ~11 active months
|
|
10
10
|
- **Code Maturity**: Evolution from basic utilities to a ~100,000+ LoC intelligent TypeScript system
|
|
11
|
-
- **Stability**: Progression from manual testing to a suite of
|
|
12
|
-
- **Releases**:
|
|
11
|
+
- **Stability**: Progression from manual testing to a suite of 366 automated test files (live tests included in `test:live`)
|
|
12
|
+
- **Releases**: 154 changelog entries (v0.1.0 to v1.7.3)
|
|
13
13
|
|
|
14
14
|
> **Post-1.0.0 "why":** the thematic story behind the hardening releases — root cause, recurring
|
|
15
15
|
> bug families, and lessons — lives in
|
|
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ Evolved from a basic README to a comprehensive framework (50+ docs entries, 80%+
|
|
|
149
149
|
|
|
150
150
|
## Version History
|
|
151
151
|
|
|
152
|
-
Compact, era-level view; commit counts are `git rev-list --count <tag>..<tag>` over the current history (2026-11-
|
|
152
|
+
Compact, era-level view; commit counts are `git rev-list --count <tag>..<tag>` over the current history (2026-11-17). The 107 commits up to and including the `v0.1.0` tag are not attributed to an era, so the current totals are 2,410 (`v0.1.0..HEAD`) and 2,517 (`HEAD`); the `v1.4.x` era rows overlap slightly because `v1.4.13` is not an ancestor of `v1.4.25` in the current history. Per-release detail lives in [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md); the thematic post-1.0.0 story in [ORDER_ENGINE_POST_1.0_RETROSPECTIVE.md](ORDER_ENGINE_POST_1.0_RETROSPECTIVE.md).
|
|
153
153
|
|
|
154
154
|
| Era | Commits | Theme |
|
|
155
155
|
|-----|--------:|-------|
|
|
@@ -177,13 +177,14 @@ Compact, era-level view; commit counts are `git rev-list --count <tag>..<tag>` o
|
|
|
177
177
|
| v1.6.16 → v1.6.17 | 11 | Last-fill direction guard, placeable-slot spread planning with named stalls, chain-truth funding + fill-anchored boundary re-anchor, owed-crawl consumption, restart auth-before-stop with cleared vault secret, pool-priced LP-share collateral, AMA slowPeriod/slope retune, BTS & per-token supply distribution analyzers |
|
|
178
178
|
| v1.6.17 → v1.6.18 | 19 | Partial-fill re-anchor recovery (stale-evac skip, residual allow-list, crawl subsumption, rotation-only repair), rail-derived boundary + live fill/chain prices, edge-fill pivot exclusion, guard arity pinning with explicit re-arm, per-slot last-fill exclusion count, CLI `--flag=value` walker, `__test` seam guard, export-surface cleanup |
|
|
179
179
|
| v1.6.18 → v1.7.0 | 11 | Liquidity depth chart + `dexbot liquid`/`liq`/`liqu`, `dexbot asset` supply distribution shortcut, pool id/pool-token chart targets + shared spawn runner, case-insensitive asset lookup, asset-report chain-request cuts, shared CLI terminal output, orphan-fill attribution + dark-level revive, stale-grid re-buy discipline, pivot clock provenance & read-time TTL |
|
|
180
|
-
| v1.7.1 → v1.7.2 | 13 | One fill contract + fill-pipeline ratchet, fail-closed grid-update blockers with bounded escalation, single fill identity (`fill_ledger`), credit-time fill-key claim with all-or-nothing balance credits, single-winner concurrent claim, removal of the duplicate applied-amount channel and the second grace-stamp writer, COW broadcast-region leak repair, chain-observed wrong-side cancel exemptions, fill side derived from the paid asset + rail-geometry repair check, fill-anchored rebuild/load boundary, spread rotation into orphaned rail slots, consecutive grid-blocked escalation counter, live-suite env fix |
|
|
181
180
|
| v1.7.0 → v1.7.1 | 22 | One existence record per slot (life-cycle registry, unknown-is-never-gone), typed three-valued broadcast outcome, timing-window policy inventory, reconciliation interleaving fuzzer, one writer per life-cycle clock, serialized placement region with lease re-verification, fill-marker idempotency, forced-retreat gap evacuation + committed-geometry sweep, unknown-gap-geometry fix, replay-safe stranded-boundary repair, stability-ranked node selection + flap scoring, chain-account `<bot>` targets for `credit`/`order`, fee-adjusted pool depth chart with both spreads, atomic branch promotion preflight |
|
|
181
|
+
| v1.7.1 → v1.7.2 | 14 | One fill contract + fill-pipeline ratchet, fail-closed grid-update blockers with bounded escalation, single fill identity (`fill_ledger`), credit-time fill-key claim with all-or-nothing balance credits, single-winner concurrent claim, removal of the duplicate applied-amount channel and the second grace-stamp writer, COW broadcast-region leak repair, chain-observed wrong-side cancel exemptions, fill side derived from the paid asset + rail-geometry repair check, fill-anchored rebuild/load boundary, spread rotation into orphaned rail slots, consecutive grid-blocked escalation counter, live-suite env fix |
|
|
182
|
+
| v1.7.2 → v1.7.3 | 10 | Plan-region serialization (`plan → broadcast → commit`), per-account single-controller lock & cross-runtime start guards, market-bounded last-fill pivot + stale pivot expiry, refused-fill same-level refill guard & policy-aware audit mirror, in-place missing UPDATE target repair, settled-pipeline structural resync gate, snapshot reload absence-grace preservation, clamped PARTIAL-growth update skip |
|
|
182
183
|
|
|
183
184
|
---
|
|
184
185
|
|
|
185
186
|
**Report Originally Generated**: February 19, 2026
|
|
186
|
-
**Last Updated**: November
|
|
187
|
-
**Total Commits**: 2,
|
|
188
|
-
**Date Range**: December 2, 2025 – November
|
|
187
|
+
**Last Updated**: November 17, 2026
|
|
188
|
+
**Total Commits**: 2,517
|
|
189
|
+
**Date Range**: December 2, 2025 – November 17, 2026
|
|
189
190
|
**Repository**: DEXBot2 (BitShares DEX Trading Bot)
|
|
@@ -805,4 +805,4 @@ To prevent "Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use" errors:
|
|
|
805
805
|
**TOCTOU protection in `processFillAccounting`.** `_buildBtsDeferredRefundAdjustment` reads `btsFeeState` from `mgr.orders` while the order lock is held — the lock is acquired before accounting runs, and the POST-RESET and BOOTSTRAP tracked-fill accounting paths follow the same locking pattern.
|
|
806
806
|
|
|
807
807
|
---
|
|
808
|
-
*Technical Reference for DEXBot2 v1.7.
|
|
808
|
+
*Technical Reference for DEXBot2 v1.7.3 release*
|
|
@@ -10,11 +10,12 @@
|
|
|
10
10
|
>
|
|
11
11
|
> **Scope / snapshot:** v1.0.0 → v1.7.1 (`2a85a501`, 2026-11-04), extended through the
|
|
12
12
|
> post-1.7.1 work at `bc20d574` (2026-11-04). §9 is the v1.6.4 → v1.6.17
|
|
13
|
-
> addendum; §9.10 closes the v1.6.18 review pass
|
|
13
|
+
> addendum; §9.10 closes the v1.6.18 review pass, §9.11 carries v1.6.18 → v1.7.1,
|
|
14
|
+
> and §9.12 records the subsequent revised-priority review.
|
|
14
15
|
>
|
|
15
16
|
> **Section numbering:** Part II deliberately keeps its original `§0`–`§8` numbers because
|
|
16
17
|
> source-code comments and tests cite them (e.g. `… §2 fix #1`, `… §3 lineage`); §9 is a
|
|
17
|
-
> later addendum (v1.6.4 → v1.6.17, with §9.10
|
|
18
|
+
> later addendum (v1.6.4 → v1.6.17, with §9.10–§9.12 extending it) that adds to, and does not
|
|
18
19
|
> renumber, that range. Part I uses `R1`–`R5` so the two never collide. The closing appendix
|
|
19
20
|
> is unnumbered (`A`).
|
|
20
21
|
>
|
|
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@
|
|
|
50
51
|
- 9. COW Broadcast, Resync & Geometry Safety (v1.6.4 → v1.6.17) — addendum
|
|
51
52
|
- 9.10 Review pass over v1.6.12 → v1.6.17 (findings P1–P5), released in v1.6.18
|
|
52
53
|
- 9.11 v1.6.18 → v1.7.1: fill identity, absence and the geometry budget
|
|
54
|
+
- 9.12 Revised priority list: counter-orders, pivot evidence and level-triggered repair
|
|
53
55
|
- A. Grid-Price Invariant — former failure trace (appendix)
|
|
54
56
|
|
|
55
57
|
---
|
|
@@ -1004,6 +1006,157 @@ re-planning instead of letting its cancel teeth destroy the rotation (`7618f299`
|
|
|
1004
1006
|
is not a style complaint. Every family above is that pattern applied to a
|
|
1005
1007
|
different noun — price, fill, existence.
|
|
1006
1008
|
|
|
1009
|
+
##### 9.12 Revised priority list: counter-orders, pivot evidence and level-triggered repair
|
|
1010
|
+
|
|
1011
|
+
This review followed the live out-of-spread incident in priority order. The ordering
|
|
1012
|
+
matters: a later watchdog cannot repair a counter-order that an earlier hard veto
|
|
1013
|
+
removed, and a pivot policy cannot be trusted if rotation has already corrupted the
|
|
1014
|
+
ladder it anchors.
|
|
1015
|
+
|
|
1016
|
+
**P0 — keep the counter-order executable.** `describeMarketCrossingActions` uses the
|
|
1017
|
+
single recency-aware `resolveSpreadCrossingFloor` only for an observation. It reports
|
|
1018
|
+
CREATE/UPDATE actions across the floor but never removes them. The internal crossed-book
|
|
1019
|
+
assertion remains blocking: BUY-versus-SELL collisions inside the bot's own simulated
|
|
1020
|
+
book are a different invariant. A stale bot-mid must not provide a second floor or veto
|
|
1021
|
+
the only action that can narrow a gap.
|
|
1022
|
+
|
|
1023
|
+
**P1 — only current-window evidence may arm the pivot.** Fill provenance now has two
|
|
1024
|
+
market-bound checks while the cached market read is fresh: wrong-side fills are refused,
|
|
1025
|
+
and fills more than `GRID_LIMITS.LAST_FILL_PIVOT_MAX_MID_DISTANCE_STEPS` ladder steps
|
|
1026
|
+
from the market are refused symmetrically. The check fails open when the read is absent
|
|
1027
|
+
or stale. Separately, `OrderManager.recordLastFilledPrices` skips fills whose current
|
|
1028
|
+
slot is in the gap band: those are stranded residuals, not window trades. Edge-pinned
|
|
1029
|
+
fills remain excluded by the existing shared classifier. A rail/window fill is still
|
|
1030
|
+
recorded once, by the existing pivot writer.
|
|
1031
|
+
|
|
1032
|
+
**P2 — the pivot may not veto its own counter-order territory.** The shared
|
|
1033
|
+
`evaluateLastFillGuard` verdict is used by both COW placement checks and the final
|
|
1034
|
+
pre-broadcast gate. A SELL strictly below a SELL pivot, inside the band that the fill
|
|
1035
|
+
anchor itself derives, is allowed only when `boundary >= pivotIdx - gapSlots`; this is
|
|
1036
|
+
geometry evidence that the crawl is not behind the fill. The exact pivot level remains
|
|
1037
|
+
blocked as a same-level re-fill, and the BUY mirror remains blocked. Unknown geometry,
|
|
1038
|
+
off-ladder prices and book-seeded pivots fail closed for the exemption.
|
|
1039
|
+
|
|
1040
|
+
**P3 — a rotation moves ownership, not ladder identity.** In
|
|
1041
|
+
`buildCowResultFromPlan`, a rotation UPDATE has two effects: the source becomes a hole
|
|
1042
|
+
at its own genesis price, while the destination receives the planned price/size. The
|
|
1043
|
+
source is never re-priced to the destination. The invariant is checked before apply and
|
|
1044
|
+
again by the post-commit transition; non-rotation partial UPDATEs remain in-place size
|
|
1045
|
+
updates.
|
|
1046
|
+
|
|
1047
|
+
**P4 — a repair must reduce the measured violation.** The entry and post-placement
|
|
1048
|
+
readings share `measureSpreadExcess`, including the same slot-N live-window filter and
|
|
1049
|
+
one-sided handling. `trackOutOfSpreadStaleness` clears its clock after a placement only
|
|
1050
|
+
when `excessAfter < excessBefore`; an unchanged placement is logged and remains stale.
|
|
1051
|
+
If a caller cannot measure the post-placement value, the compatibility fail-open path
|
|
1052
|
+
preserves the established behavior rather than inventing a negative result.
|
|
1053
|
+
|
|
1054
|
+
**P5 — every stale level owns its retry.** While out of tolerance, the watchdog arms one
|
|
1055
|
+
shutdown-safe, deduplicated `SPREAD_STALE_RECHECK_MS` timer. It is not dependent on a
|
|
1056
|
+
future fill or the four-hour blockchain-fetch cadence, so the 5/10/20/30-minute stale
|
|
1057
|
+
windows can actually run. The timer re-enters the normal maintenance pipeline and is
|
|
1058
|
+
cancelled with the bot. A healthy reading must hold for the configured in-tolerance
|
|
1059
|
+
reset window before clearing stale geometry memory.
|
|
1060
|
+
|
|
1061
|
+
**P6 — fill ownership was audited, not duplicated.** The fill history path and orphan
|
|
1062
|
+
fill path both book accounting first and delegate unmatched attribution to the shared
|
|
1063
|
+
`attributeUnmatchedFillToGrid` owner. Replay keys make the pivot/crawl mutation once per
|
|
1064
|
+
fill. No second fill writer was introduced; the regression coverage documents this
|
|
1065
|
+
contract instead of changing working attribution code.
|
|
1066
|
+
|
|
1067
|
+
**Regression gates added/updated:** `test_last_fill_pivot_market_bound` (distance leg
|
|
1068
|
+
and observation/floor recency), `test_pivot_geometry_eligibility` (in-band pivot
|
|
1069
|
+
eligibility and veto territory), `test_rotation_source_level` (source/destination
|
|
1070
|
+
ladder identity), `test_incident_replay` (end-to-end band evacuation), and
|
|
1071
|
+
`test_stale_grid_hardening` (no-progress watchdog and level-triggered recheck). The
|
|
1072
|
+
production build, test build and these incident suites must all pass before promotion.
|
|
1073
|
+
|
|
1074
|
+
**Addendum (2026-11-16, offline audit reconciliation): the checker must audit the gate
|
|
1075
|
+
the runtime actually ran.** During a fast sweep of the bot's own premium rail on a live
|
|
1076
|
+
market-pair bot, the offline direction checker (`analysis/grid_correction_check.ts`)
|
|
1077
|
+
flagged six SELL re-quotes as discipline breaches while the runtime had passed every one
|
|
1078
|
+
of them through its own final gate. The two sides disagreed because they used different
|
|
1079
|
+
pivots:
|
|
1080
|
+
|
|
1081
|
+
- The runtime pivots on `_lastFilledPrice` at decision time, and since P1 above a fill
|
|
1082
|
+
refused from arming (wrong-side, too-far premium sweep, gap-band stranded residual)
|
|
1083
|
+
leaves the pivot behind the true last fill — by up to ~15 grid steps during the sweep.
|
|
1084
|
+
- The strict checker fed true consecutive fills into the same predicate
|
|
1085
|
+
(`isLastFillGuardBlocked`), so it judged each re-quote against a pivot the runtime
|
|
1086
|
+
never held at that gate.
|
|
1087
|
+
|
|
1088
|
+
The runtime did not breach its own rule: its `mode=`/Final-gate lines show
|
|
1089
|
+
`checked/passed` counts consistent with the pivots it held, and every flagged re-quote
|
|
1090
|
+
priced above the runtime's (older, lower) pivot, so no sell landed below realized cost.
|
|
1091
|
+
The refusal policy is deliberate — reverting it would re-introduce the unquoted-side
|
|
1092
|
+
deadlock P1 was written against — so the fix is on the audit side:
|
|
1093
|
+
|
|
1094
|
+
- `analysis/pivot_timeline.ts` reconstructs the runtime's pivot timeline from the bot
|
|
1095
|
+
log's own bookkeeping (`[FILL-PIVOT]`, `mode=`, Final-gate, refusal and allowance
|
|
1096
|
+
lines). "Pivot refreshed from N pending queued fill(s)" is deliberately not an
|
|
1097
|
+
observation: it logs queue content that may be exactly the fill the arming policy just
|
|
1098
|
+
refused.
|
|
1099
|
+
- The checker's default mode is now policy-aware: each strict candidate is re-judged
|
|
1100
|
+
against the pivot the runtime held when the filled order was last priced. Verdicts:
|
|
1101
|
+
`violation` (the runtime's own pivot would have blocked it — a real gate failure),
|
|
1102
|
+
`policy-divergence` (expected under the P1 arming policy; reported in its own section,
|
|
1103
|
+
not counted as FAIL), `unverifiable` (no placement event / pivot observation near the
|
|
1104
|
+
gate — kept as a violation, failing toward reporting). `--strict` preserves the legacy
|
|
1105
|
+
all-fills behaviour; a missing log falls back to strict with a notice.
|
|
1106
|
+
- Order-id joins normalize the Kibana operation suffix (`1.7.x:…` vs the log's plain
|
|
1107
|
+
`1.7.x`), naive Kibana timestamps are read as UTC, and the placement anchor is the
|
|
1108
|
+
order event whose price matches the fill (a post-fill rotation to another level must
|
|
1109
|
+
not become the anchor, or the fill is judged against the pivot it armed itself).
|
|
1110
|
+
|
|
1111
|
+
Lesson: an offline checker that re-implements gate inputs drifts from the gate it
|
|
1112
|
+
audits; it must reconstruct the gate's actual state, and every reconciliation shortcut
|
|
1113
|
+
(timestamps, ids, anchors) is a potential false verdict in either direction.
|
|
1114
|
+
|
|
1115
|
+
**Addendum 2 (2026-11-16, same-level re-fill loop): the P1 refusal silently suspended
|
|
1116
|
+
the P2 same-level block.** The sweep window that produced the six policy divergences
|
|
1117
|
+
above also produced a second, previously invisible pattern: one premium
|
|
1118
|
+
spread-correction slot was re-armed by the correction loop at the identical level and
|
|
1119
|
+
refilled five times in ~2.5 minutes (each cycle: full fill → slot orphaned → next
|
|
1120
|
+
correction cycle re-activates the same slot at the same grid price → immediate fill).
|
|
1121
|
+
Economically benign — every fill priced well above the day's cost basis and the taker
|
|
1122
|
+
kept paying a ~2.9% premium — but a real rule gap:
|
|
1123
|
+
|
|
1124
|
+
- §9.12/P2 blocks the exact pivot level as a same-level re-fill; that block keys off
|
|
1125
|
+
the ARMED pivot. §9.12/P1 refuses off-market (premium-sweep) fills from arming.
|
|
1126
|
+
Together: exactly while a sweep runs, the same-level re-fill protection is
|
|
1127
|
+
suspended — the one window it is needed most.
|
|
1128
|
+
- The offline checker passed the loop: realized fill prices of the re-placed level
|
|
1129
|
+
differ by sub-sat rounding dust, so the strict "sell→sell must rise" float compare
|
|
1130
|
+
saw a rise at every cycle. §0's ground truth ("equal is a violation") is about the
|
|
1131
|
+
LEVEL, not the float.
|
|
1132
|
+
|
|
1133
|
+
Amended policy (both sides of the audit line):
|
|
1134
|
+
|
|
1135
|
+
1. Runtime (`modules/order/utils/system.ts`): a refused fill writes an in-memory,
|
|
1136
|
+
TTL-bounded (`GRID_LIMITS.LAST_FILL_REFUSED_LEVEL_TTL_MS`, 30 min) refused-level
|
|
1137
|
+
marker; `evaluateLastFillGuard` (the shared verdict) and
|
|
1138
|
+
`isLastFillPlacementBlocked` refuse a same-side placement within half a grid step
|
|
1139
|
+
(`pricesWithinHalfStep`) of the marked level, surfaced as `refusedLevel` /
|
|
1140
|
+
reason `refused-level` at every skip site. It vetoes exactly one level and nothing
|
|
1141
|
+
else — the counter-side stays governed by the older direction pivot and spread
|
|
1142
|
+
correction keeps trading around the live market, so the unquoted-side deadlock P1
|
|
1143
|
+
was written against cannot re-open through it. Deliberately NOT a cooldown or
|
|
1144
|
+
backoff on the correction loop (R4/§9.10/P4 "observability instead of a veto";
|
|
1145
|
+
§9.12/P5 owns stale-level retries; a hard pause would have left the sell side
|
|
1146
|
+
unquoted mid-sweep — the marked slot was the only placeable one at the time).
|
|
1147
|
+
2. Checker (`analysis/grid_correction_check.ts`): same-level transitions (same
|
|
1148
|
+
direction, different orders) are detected with the runtime's OWN
|
|
1149
|
+
`pricesWithinHalfStep` and become strict candidates. In policy-aware mode a
|
|
1150
|
+
same-level candidate whose just-filled level carries a fresh refusal marker in the
|
|
1151
|
+
runtime log is a VIOLATION (the amended gate would have blocked the re-placement;
|
|
1152
|
+
it filled anyway); without marker evidence it is a policy divergence tagged
|
|
1153
|
+
`sameLevel`. `--strict` counts every same-level candidate as a violation.
|
|
1154
|
+
|
|
1155
|
+
Pinned by `tests/test_refused_level_refill_block.ts` (REFUSED-1..9) and
|
|
1156
|
+
`tests/test_same_level_refill_check.ts` (SL-1..10). With the amendment applied, the
|
|
1157
|
+
2026-11-16 audit baseline reads: 10 strict candidates = 4 same-level violations (the
|
|
1158
|
+
loop) + 6 policy divergences (the sweep re-quotes, unchanged).
|
|
1159
|
+
|
|
1007
1160
|
---
|
|
1008
1161
|
|
|
1009
1162
|
### A. Grid-Price Invariant — former failure trace
|
package/docs/README.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
3
|
This directory contains the comprehensive technical documentation for the DEXBot2 trading bot. It is designed to guide developers from high-level architecture down to the nuances of fund accounting and state management.
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
|
-
**Version context:** v1.7.
|
|
5
|
+
**Version context:** v1.7.3 (released).
|
|
6
6
|
|
|
7
7
|
---
|
|
8
8
|
|
package/modules/README.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ modules/
|
|
|
132
132
|
│ ├── credential_secret.ts secret management
|
|
133
133
|
│ ├── foreign_cred_daemon.ts external daemon client
|
|
134
134
|
│ ├── headless_password.ts headless password storage
|
|
135
|
+
│ ├── instance_lock.ts per-account single-controller lock
|
|
135
136
|
│ ├── launch_modes.ts monolithic vs isolated routing
|
|
136
137
|
│ ├── market_adapter_runtime.ts adapter process lifecycle
|
|
137
138
|
│ ├── market_adapter_watchdog.ts adapter process watchdog
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "dexbot",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "1.7.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "1.7.3",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "The first open source trading bot with zero runtime dependencies and a fully adaptive market making strategy.",
|
|
5
5
|
"main": "dist/modules/dexbot_class.js",
|
|
6
6
|
"exports": {
|
|
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@
|
|
|
163
163
|
"./dist/modules/launcher/status_reporting.js": false,
|
|
164
164
|
"./dist/modules/launcher/supervisor_control.js": false,
|
|
165
165
|
"./dist/modules/launcher/monolithic_runtime.js": false,
|
|
166
|
+
"./dist/modules/launcher/instance_lock.js": false,
|
|
166
167
|
"./dist/modules/launcher/runtime_mode.js": false,
|
|
167
168
|
"./dist/modules/launcher/market_adapter_runtime.js": false,
|
|
168
169
|
"./dist/modules/launcher/market_adapter_watchdog.js": false,
|