deadbyte-mcp 0.15.49 → 0.15.50

package/node_modules/@modelcontextprotocol/client/dist/index.cjs

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 const require_chunk = require('./chunk-Bnu9O96Y.cjs');
-const require_src = require('./src-D0qEN74R.cjs');
+const require_src = require('./src-DpAS0jfg.cjs');
 let _modelcontextprotocol_client__shims = require("@modelcontextprotocol/client/_shims");
 let pkce_challenge = require("pkce-challenge");
 pkce_challenge = require_chunk.__toESM(pkce_challenge);
@@ -115,10 +115,12 @@ var RegistrationRejectedError = class extends OAuthClientFlowError {
 };
 /**
 * Thrown by the token-exchange and refresh paths when the resolved token
-* endpoint is not `https:` and is not a loopback host (SEP-2207). This is a
-* configuration error — re-authorizing cannot fix it — so it intentionally does
-* **not** extend `OAuthError` and `auth()`'s refresh branch rethrows it instead
-* of falling through to a fresh `/authorize` redirect.
+* endpoint is not `https:` and is not a loopback host. The MCP authorization
+* specification requires authorization server endpoints to use HTTPS; loopback
+* hosts are exempt here for local development. This is a configuration error —
+* re-authorizing cannot fix it — so it intentionally does **not** extend
+* `OAuthError` and `auth()`'s refresh branch rethrows it instead of falling
+* through to a fresh `/authorize` redirect.
 */
 var InsecureTokenEndpointError = class extends OAuthClientFlowError {
 	static {
@@ -127,7 +129,7 @@ var InsecureTokenEndpointError = class extends OAuthClientFlowError {
 	/** The token endpoint URL that was rejected. */
 	tokenEndpoint;
 	constructor(tokenEndpoint) {
-		super(`Refusing to send credentials to non-https token endpoint '${tokenEndpoint}'. OAuth token requests MUST use TLS (localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1 are exempt).`);
+		super(`Refusing to send credentials to non-https token endpoint '${tokenEndpoint}'. OAuth token requests MUST use TLS (localhost / *.localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1 are exempt).`);
 		this.tokenEndpoint = tokenEndpoint;
 	}
 };
@@ -152,21 +154,25 @@ var InsecureTokenEndpointError = class extends OAuthClientFlowError {
 * `requiredScope`, which appears in the error message).
 */
 /**
-* Thrown by `auth()` on the authorization-code callback leg when the
-* authorization server resolved by discovery differs from the one recorded in
-* `discoveryState()` at redirect time. The `authorization_code` and PKCE
-* `code_verifier` are bound to the AS that minted the code (RFC 7636); sending
-* them to a different AS's token endpoint is a credential-exfiltration vector.
-*
-* This is the only runtime check left in the SEP-2352 model — stored tokens and
-* client credentials are protected structurally by the `issuer` stamp instead.
+* Thrown by `auth()` and `fetchToken()` when the authorization server in use differs
+* from the one a credential is bound to and the flow cannot simply start over:
+*
+* - on the authorization-code callback leg, when it differs from the one recorded
+*   in `discoveryState()` at redirect time — the `authorization_code` and PKCE
+*   `code_verifier` are bound to the AS that minted the code (RFC 7636);
+* - for client information whose `issuer` stamp names a different authorization
+*   server on a provider that cannot re-register (no `saveClientInformation()`,
+*   e.g. the bundled static-credential providers); `fetchToken()` throws for any provider.
+*
+* Stored tokens and re-registrable client information are protected structurally
+* by the `issuer` stamp instead (they read back as absent).
 */
 var AuthorizationServerMismatchError = class extends OAuthClientFlowError {
 	static {
 		Object.defineProperty(this, "mcpBrand", { value: "mcp.AuthorizationServerMismatchError" });
 	}
 	constructor(recordedIssuer, currentIssuer) {
-		super(`Authorization server changed between redirect and callback (redirected to ${JSON.stringify(recordedIssuer)}, callback resolved ${JSON.stringify(currentIssuer)}); refusing to send authorization_code/code_verifier to a different token endpoint`);
+		super(`Authorization server mismatch: credentials are bound to ${JSON.stringify(recordedIssuer)} but this call resolved ${JSON.stringify(currentIssuer)}; refusing to present them to a different authorization server`);
 		this.recordedIssuer = recordedIssuer;
 		this.currentIssuer = currentIssuer;
 	}
@@ -210,10 +216,13 @@ var InsufficientScopeError = class extends OAuthClientFlowError {
 *   "binding on first use" claim would be false and would fire on every call.
 */
 function discardIfIssuerMismatch(stored, issuer, opts) {
-	if (stored === void 0) return void 0;
-	if (stored.issuer === void 0) {
+	if (!stored) return void 0;
+	if (typeof stored.issuer !== "string") {
 		if (opts?.canPersistStamp !== false) console.warn("[mcp-sdk] SEP-2352: stored OAuth credential has no 'issuer' stamp (pre-upgrade storage or provider not round-tripping the value). SEP-2352 isolation is inactive for this read; ensure your provider round-trips the issuer field.");
-		return stored;
+		return stored.issuer === void 0 ? stored : {
+			...stored,
+			issuer: void 0
+		};
 	}
 	return issuersMatch(stored.issuer, issuer) ? stored : void 0;
 }
@@ -521,13 +530,19 @@ function applyPostAuth(clientId, clientSecret, params) {
 function applyPublicAuth(clientId, params) {
 	params.set("client_id", clientId);
 }
-/** Loopback hosts exempt from the in-transit `https:` requirement (RFC 8252 §7.3). */
+/**
+* Loopback hosts exempt from the in-transit `https:` requirement (RFC 8252 §7.3).
+* Includes bare `localhost` and any name ending in `.localhost` (RFC 6761 §6.3).
+*/
 function isLoopbackHost(hostname) {
-	return hostname === "localhost" || hostname === "127.0.0.1" || hostname === "[::1]" || hostname === "::1";
+	return hostname === "localhost" || hostname.endsWith(".localhost") || hostname === "127.0.0.1" || hostname === "[::1]" || hostname === "::1";
 }
 /**
-* SEP-2207: refuse to send credentials to a non-TLS, non-loopback token endpoint.
-* Throws {@linkcode InsecureTokenEndpointError}. Loopback hosts are exempt.
+* Refuse to send credentials to a non-TLS token endpoint. The MCP authorization
+* specification requires authorization server endpoints to use HTTPS. Loopback
+* hosts are exempt here for local development.
+*
+* @throws {@linkcode InsecureTokenEndpointError} if the endpoint is insecure.
 */
 function assertSecureTokenEndpoint(tokenEndpoint) {
 	const url = new URL(String(tokenEndpoint));
@@ -977,12 +992,13 @@ async function discoverOAuthProtectedResourceMetadata(serverUrl, opts, fetchFn =
 * error object alone, so the swallow-and-fallthrough heuristic is preserved there.
 */
 async function fetchWithCorsRetry(url, headers, fetchFn = fetch) {
+	const withinOrigin = require_src.fetchWithinOrigin(fetchFn);
 	try {
-		return await fetchFn(url, { headers });
+		return await withinOrigin(url, { headers });
 	} catch (error) {
 		if (!(error instanceof TypeError) || !_modelcontextprotocol_client__shims.CORS_IS_POSSIBLE) throw error;
 		if (headers) try {
-			return await fetchFn(url, {});
+			return await withinOrigin(url, {});
 		} catch (retryError) {
 			if (!(retryError instanceof TypeError)) throw retryError;
 			return;
@@ -1009,7 +1025,7 @@ async function tryMetadataDiscovery(url, protocolVersion, fetchFn = fetch) {
 function shouldAttemptFallback(response, pathname) {
 	if (!response) return true;
 	if (pathname === "/") return false;
-	return response.status >= 400 && response.status < 500 || response.status === 502;
+	return !response.ok && response.status < 500 || response.status === 502;
 }
 /**
 * Generic function for discovering OAuth metadata with fallback support
@@ -1132,7 +1148,7 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationServerMetadata(authorizationServerUrl, { fet
 		continue;
 		if (!response.ok) {
 			await response.text?.().catch(() => {});
-			if (response.status >= 400 && response.status < 500 || response.status === 502) continue;
+			if (response.status < 500 || response.status === 502) continue;
 			throw new Error(`HTTP ${response.status} trying to load ${type === "oauth" ? "OAuth" : "OpenID provider"} metadata from ${endpointUrl}`);
 		}
 		const parsed = type === "oauth" ? _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthMetadataSchema.parse(await response.json()) : _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OpenIdProviderDiscoveryMetadataSchema.parse(await response.json());
@@ -1251,7 +1267,7 @@ async function executeTokenRequest(authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, tokenRequ
 			htm: "POST",
 			htu: tokenUrl
 		}));
-		return (fetchFn ?? fetch)(tokenUrl, {
+		return require_src.fetchWithinOrigin(fetchFn ?? fetch)(tokenUrl, {
 			method: "POST",
 			headers: requestHeaders,
 			body: tokenRequestParams
@@ -1268,7 +1284,7 @@ async function executeTokenRequest(authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, tokenRequ
 	if (!response.ok) throw await parseErrorResponse(response);
 	const json = await response.json();
 	try {
-		return _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthTokensSchema.parse(json);
+		return _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthTokensSchema.parse(require_src.withoutIssuer(json));
 	} catch (parseError) {
 		if (typeof json === "object" && json !== null && "error" in json) throw await parseErrorResponse(JSON.stringify(json));
 		throw parseError;
@@ -1364,6 +1380,14 @@ async function fetchToken(provider, authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, resource
 		expectedIssuer: metadata?.issuer,
 		issParameterSupported: isIssParameterSupported(metadata)
 	});
+	const issuer = metadata?.issuer ?? String(authorizationServerUrl);
+	const readClientInformation = async () => {
+		const rawClientInfo = await provider.clientInformation({ issuer });
+		const checked = discardIfIssuerMismatch(rawClientInfo, issuer, { canPersistStamp: false });
+		if (rawClientInfo && checked === void 0) throw new AuthorizationServerMismatchError(String(rawClientInfo.issuer), issuer);
+		return checked;
+	};
+	let clientInformation = await readClientInformation();
 	const effectiveScope = scope ?? provider.clientMetadata.scope;
 	let tokenRequestParams;
 	if (provider.prepareTokenRequest) tokenRequestParams = await provider.prepareTokenRequest(effectiveScope);
@@ -1372,11 +1396,11 @@ async function fetchToken(provider, authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, resource
 		if (!provider.redirectUrl) throw new Error("redirectUrl is required for authorization_code flow");
 		tokenRequestParams = prepareAuthorizationCodeRequest(authorizationCode, await provider.codeVerifier(), provider.redirectUrl);
 	}
-	const clientInformation = await provider.clientInformation({ issuer: metadata?.issuer ?? String(authorizationServerUrl) });
+	clientInformation ??= await readClientInformation();
 	return executeTokenRequest(authorizationServerUrl, {
 		metadata,
 		tokenRequestParams,
-		clientInformation: clientInformation ?? void 0,
+		clientInformation,
 		addClientAuthentication: provider.addClientAuthentication,
 		resource,
 		dpop: await provider.dpop?.(),
@@ -1392,10 +1416,17 @@ async function fetchToken(provider, authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, resource
 * consistently across both DCR and the subsequent authorization request.
 *
 * @deprecated Dynamic Client Registration is deprecated as of protocol version
-* 2026-07-28 (SEP-2577) in favor of Client ID Metadata Documents (SEP-991).
-* Remains functional during the deprecation window (at least twelve months).
-* Prefer a CIMD URL `client_id` when the authorization server advertises
-* `client_id_metadata_document_supported`; the SDK already gates on this for you.
+* 2026-07-28 in favor of Client ID Metadata Documents (SEP-991); the deprecation
+* landed via spec PR
+* {@link https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2858 | modelcontextprotocol#2858}
+* (SEP-2577 is the separate roots/sampling/logging deprecation). Remains
+* functional during the deprecation window — at least twelve months under the
+* feature lifecycle policy (SEP-2596), so 2027-07-28 is the earliest possible
+* removal date. Prefer a CIMD URL `client_id` when the authorization server
+* advertises `client_id_metadata_document_supported`: the built-in `auth()` flow
+* skips registration for you when that capability is advertised AND your
+* provider supplies `clientMetadataUrl`, but `registerClient` itself does not
+* gate — calling it directly always sends the registration request.
 */
 async function registerClient(authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, clientMetadata, scope, fetchFn }) {
 	let registrationUrl;
@@ -1407,7 +1438,7 @@ async function registerClient(authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, clientMetadata
 		...clientMetadata,
 		...scope === void 0 ? {} : { scope }
 	};
-	const response = await (fetchFn ?? fetch)(registrationUrl, {
+	const response = await require_src.fetchWithinOrigin(fetchFn ?? fetch)(registrationUrl, {
 		method: "POST",
 		headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
 		body: JSON.stringify(submittedMetadata)
@@ -1417,7 +1448,7 @@ async function registerClient(authorizationServerUrl, { metadata, clientMetadata
 		body: await response.text(),
 		submittedMetadata
 	});
-	return _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthClientInformationFullSchema.parse(await response.json());
+	return _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthClientInformationFullSchema.parse(require_src.withoutIssuer(await response.json()));
 }
 
 //#endregion
@@ -1472,6 +1503,15 @@ function createPrivateKeyJwtAuth(options) {
 	};
 }
 /**
+* The `issuer` stamp for constructor-supplied client information. Omitting `expectedIssuer` is
+* deprecated: nothing else says which authorization server such credentials belong to.
+*/
+function checkedExpectedIssuer(expectedIssuer) {
+	if (expectedIssuer === void 0) console.warn("[mcp-sdk] Omitting `expectedIssuer` is deprecated. Without it, the MCP server decides which authorization server receives this client's credentials; pass your authorization server's issuer URL as `expectedIssuer` so they are only sent there.");
+	else if (typeof expectedIssuer !== "string" || !expectedIssuer) throw new Error("expectedIssuer must be the authorization server's issuer URL");
+	return expectedIssuer;
+}
+/**
 * OAuth provider for `client_credentials` grant with `client_secret_basic` authentication.
 *
 * This provider is designed for machine-to-machine authentication where
@@ -1481,7 +1521,8 @@ function createPrivateKeyJwtAuth(options) {
 * ```ts source="./authExtensions.examples.ts#ClientCredentialsProvider_basicUsage"
 * const provider = new ClientCredentialsProvider({
 *     clientId: 'my-client',
-*     clientSecret: 'my-secret'
+*     clientSecret: 'my-secret',
+*     expectedIssuer: 'https://auth.example.com'
 * });
 *
 * const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(serverUrl, {
@@ -1497,7 +1538,7 @@ var ClientCredentialsProvider = class {
 		this._clientInfo = {
 			client_id: options.clientId,
 			client_secret: options.clientSecret,
-			issuer: options.expectedIssuer
+			issuer: checkedExpectedIssuer(options.expectedIssuer)
 		};
 		this._clientMetadata = {
 			client_name: options.clientName ?? "client-credentials-client",
@@ -1545,7 +1586,8 @@ var ClientCredentialsProvider = class {
 * const provider = new PrivateKeyJwtProvider({
 *     clientId: 'my-client',
 *     privateKey: pemEncodedPrivateKey,
-*     algorithm: 'RS256'
+*     algorithm: 'RS256',
+*     expectedIssuer: 'https://auth.example.com'
 * });
 *
 * const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(serverUrl, {
@@ -1561,7 +1603,7 @@ var PrivateKeyJwtProvider = class {
 	constructor(options) {
 		this._clientInfo = {
 			client_id: options.clientId,
-			issuer: options.expectedIssuer
+			issuer: checkedExpectedIssuer(options.expectedIssuer)
 		};
 		this._clientMetadata = {
 			client_name: options.clientName ?? "private-key-jwt-client",
@@ -1620,7 +1662,7 @@ var StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider = class {
 	constructor(options) {
 		this._clientInfo = {
 			client_id: options.clientId,
-			issuer: options.expectedIssuer
+			issuer: checkedExpectedIssuer(options.expectedIssuer)
 		};
 		this._clientMetadata = {
 			client_name: options.clientName ?? "static-private-key-jwt-client",
@@ -1692,7 +1734,8 @@ var StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider = class {
 *         return result.jwtAuthGrant;
 *     },
 *     clientId: 'my-mcp-client',
-*     clientSecret: 'my-mcp-secret'
+*     clientSecret: 'my-mcp-secret',
+*     expectedIssuer: 'https://auth.example.com'
 * });
 *
 * const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(serverUrl, {
@@ -1713,7 +1756,7 @@ var CrossAppAccessProvider = class {
 		this._clientInfo = {
 			client_id: options.clientId,
 			client_secret: options.clientSecret,
-			issuer: options.expectedIssuer
+			issuer: checkedExpectedIssuer(options.expectedIssuer)
 		};
 		this._clientMetadata = {
 			client_name: options.clientName ?? "cross-app-access-client",
@@ -2376,6 +2419,10 @@ function classifyProbeOutcome(outcome, context) {
 		case "rpc-error": return classifyRpcError(outcome, context);
 		case "http-error": return classifyHttpError(outcome, context);
 		case "network-error": return classifyNetworkError(outcome.error, context);
+		case "unusable-reply": return {
+			kind: "error",
+			error: new require_src.SdkError(require_src.SdkErrorCode.EraNegotiationFailed, `Version negotiation probe failed: the server answered with an unusable reply (${describeError(outcome.error)})`, { cause: outcome.error }, { cause: outcome.error })
+		};
 		case "auth-required": return {
 			kind: "error",
 			error: outcome.error
@@ -2713,6 +2760,11 @@ function buildProbeRequest(id, protocolVersion, clientInfo, capabilities) {
 		}) }
 	};
 }
+/** True for what the transport throws when the probe was answered 2xx without a usable reply. */
+function isUnusableReplyError(error) {
+	if (error instanceof require_src.SdkError && error.code === require_src.SdkErrorCode.ClientHttpUnexpectedContent) return true;
+	return error instanceof Error && error.name === "SyntaxError";
+}
 function normalizeReply(reply, timeoutMs) {
 	switch (reply.kind) {
 		case "response": return reply.error === void 0 ? {
@@ -2737,6 +2789,10 @@ function normalizeReply(reply, timeoutMs) {
 					statusText: error.data.statusText
 				};
 			}
+			if (isUnusableReplyError(error)) return {
+				kind: "unusable-reply",
+				error
+			};
 			return {
 				kind: "network-error",
 				error
@@ -3635,7 +3691,7 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 		}, options);
 		const hit = await this._serveFromCache("prompts/list", void 0, options);
 		if (hit !== void 0) return hit;
-		return this._listAllPages("prompts/list", params, options, (acc, page) => acc.prompts.push(...page.prompts));
+		return this._listAllPages("prompts/list", params, options, (r) => r.prompts);
 	}
 	/**
 	* Lists available resources.
@@ -3674,7 +3730,7 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 		}, options);
 		const hit = await this._serveFromCache("resources/list", void 0, options);
 		if (hit !== void 0) return hit;
-		return this._listAllPages("resources/list", params, options, (acc, page) => acc.resources.push(...page.resources));
+		return this._listAllPages("resources/list", params, options, (r) => r.resources);
 	}
 	/**
 	* Lists available resource URI templates for dynamic resources.
@@ -3699,7 +3755,7 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 		}, options);
 		const hit = await this._serveFromCache("resources/templates/list", void 0, options);
 		if (hit !== void 0) return hit;
-		return this._listAllPages("resources/templates/list", params, options, (acc, page) => acc.resourceTemplates.push(...page.resourceTemplates));
+		return this._listAllPages("resources/templates/list", params, options, (r) => r.resourceTemplates);
 	}
 	/**
 	* Walk every page of a paginated list verb, aggregate, and write ONE
@@ -3707,8 +3763,7 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 	* methods' no-`cursor` auto-aggregate path. Page 1's result object is
 	* mutated in place (its items array is extended; `nextCursor` is
 	* cleared); page-1 metadata (`ttlMs`, `cacheScope`, `_meta`) is preserved.
-	* A `nextCursor` that repeats stops the walk (defence against a
-	* non-converging server, mcp.d's `drainList` guard);
+	* A page with the same items and `nextCursor` as the previous page ends the walk;
 	* {@linkcode ClientOptions.listMaxPages} is a hard cap — hitting it
 	* throws, so a partial aggregate is never cached. The
 	* captured-generation guard skips the write when a `list_changed` landed
@@ -3723,7 +3778,7 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 	* trace context) supplied to the public `list*()` reaches every wire
 	* request the walk issues.
 	*/
-	async _listAllPages(method, baseParams, options, append, finalize) {
+	async _listAllPages(method, baseParams, options, items, finalize) {
 		const bypass = options?.cacheMode === "bypass";
 		const generation = this._cache.captureGeneration(method);
 		const acc = await this.request({
@@ -3731,14 +3786,13 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 			...baseParams && { params: { ...baseParams } }
 		}, options);
 		let cursor = acc.nextCursor;
-		const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+		let previous = acc;
 		let pages = 1;
-		while (cursor !== void 0 && !seen.has(cursor)) {
+		while (cursor !== void 0) {
 			if (this._listMaxPages !== 0 && pages >= this._listMaxPages) throw new require_src.SdkError(require_src.SdkErrorCode.ListPaginationExceeded, `${method}: exceeded listMaxPages (${this._listMaxPages}); server pagination did not terminate`, {
 				method,
 				listMaxPages: this._listMaxPages
 			});
-			seen.add(cursor);
 			const page = await this.request({
 				method,
 				params: {
@@ -3746,7 +3800,9 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 					cursor
 				}
 			}, options);
-			append(acc, page);
+			if (page.nextCursor === cursor && JSON.stringify(items(page)) === JSON.stringify(items(previous))) break;
+			items(acc).push(...items(page));
+			previous = page;
 			cursor = page.nextCursor;
 			pages++;
 		}
@@ -4007,19 +4063,22 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 				notifications: filter
 			}
 		};
+		const routeSendFailure = (error) => {
+			settle({
+				cause: "remote",
+				error: error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error))
+			});
+		};
 		try {
-			await this.transport.send(jsonrpcRequest, {
+			this.transport.send(jsonrpcRequest, {
 				requestSignal: requestAbort.signal,
 				onRequestStreamEnd: () => settle({
 					cause: "remote",
 					error: /* @__PURE__ */ new Error("subscriptions/listen: stream ended")
 				})
-			});
+			}).catch(routeSendFailure);
 		} catch (error) {
-			settle({
-				cause: "remote",
-				error: error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error))
-			});
+			routeSendFailure(error);
 		}
 		return {
 			honoredFilter: await opening,
@@ -4271,7 +4330,7 @@ var Client = class extends require_src.Protocol {
 		}
 		const hit = await this._serveFromCache("tools/list", void 0, options);
 		if (hit !== void 0) return hit;
-		return this._listAllPages("tools/list", params, options, (acc, page) => acc.tools.push(...page.tools), (acc) => this._excludeInvalidXMcpHeaderTools(acc));
+		return this._listAllPages("tools/list", params, options, (r) => r.tools, (acc) => this._excludeInvalidXMcpHeaderTools(acc));
 	}
 	/**
 	* SEP-2243 (protocol revision 2026-07-28): a Streamable HTTP client MUST
@@ -4384,7 +4443,7 @@ async function requestJwtAuthorizationGrant(options) {
 	});
 	if (clientSecret) params.set("client_secret", clientSecret);
 	if (scope) params.set("scope", scope);
-	const response = await fetchFn(tokenUrl, {
+	const response = await require_src.fetchWithinOrigin(fetchFn)(tokenUrl, {
 		method: "POST",
 		headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
 		body: params.toString()
@@ -4477,7 +4536,7 @@ async function exchangeJwtAuthGrant(options) {
 		client_id: clientId,
 		client_secret: clientSecret
 	}, headers, params);
-	const response = await fetchFn(tokenUrl, {
+	const response = await require_src.fetchWithinOrigin(fetchFn)(tokenUrl, {
 		method: "POST",
 		headers,
 		body: params.toString()
@@ -4492,7 +4551,7 @@ async function exchangeJwtAuthGrant(options) {
 		throw new Error(`JWT grant exchange failed with status ${response.status}: ${JSON.stringify(errorBody)}`);
 	}
 	const responseBody = await response.json();
-	const parseResult = _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthTokensSchema.safeParse(responseBody);
+	const parseResult = _modelcontextprotocol_core_internal.OAuthTokensSchema.safeParse(require_src.withoutIssuer(responseBody));
 	if (!parseResult.success) throw new Error(`Invalid token response: ${parseResult.error.message}`);
 	return parseResult.data;
 }
@@ -4997,6 +5056,7 @@ var SSEClientTransport = class {
 	_skipIssuerMetadataValidation;
 	_fetch;
 	_fetchWithInit;
+	_redirectPolicy;
 	_dpop;
 	_protocolVersion;
 	onclose;
@@ -5018,9 +5078,21 @@ var SSEClientTransport = class {
 				this._fetch = this._dpop(opts.fetch ?? fetch);
 			}
 		} else this._authProvider = opts?.authProvider;
+		this._redirectPolicy = opts?.redirectPolicy;
 		this._fetchWithInit = require_src.createFetchWithInit(opts?.fetch, opts?.requestInit);
+		if (this._redirectPolicy === "follow") this._fetchWithInit = require_src.fetchLeavingRedirects(this._fetchWithInit);
 	}
 	_last401Response;
+	_connectAuthRetried = false;
+	/** `baseFetch` with redirects handled as `redirectPolicy` says. */
+	_redirects(baseFetch) {
+		return this._redirectPolicy === "follow" ? baseFetch : require_src.fetchWithinOrigin(baseFetch);
+	}
+	/** Error text for a redirect `response` that was not followed, or `undefined` for any other response. */
+	_unfollowedRedirect(url, response) {
+		const text = this._redirectPolicy === "follow" ? void 0 : require_src.unfollowedRedirect(url, response);
+		return text && `${text} (redirectPolicy: 'same-origin')`;
+	}
 	async _commonHeaders() {
 		const headers = new Headers(this._requestInit?.headers || void 0);
 		let token;
@@ -5035,7 +5107,8 @@ var SSEClientTransport = class {
 	}
 	_startOrAuth() {
 		const eventSourceFetch = this._eventSourceInit?.fetch;
-		const fetchImpl = eventSourceFetch ? this._dpop?.(eventSourceFetch) ?? eventSourceFetch : this._fetch ?? fetch;
+		const fetchImpl = this._redirects(eventSourceFetch ? this._dpop?.(eventSourceFetch) ?? eventSourceFetch : this._fetch ?? fetch);
+		let redirect;
 		return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
 			this._eventSource = new eventsource.EventSource(this._url.href, {
 				...this._eventSourceInit,
@@ -5046,6 +5119,7 @@ var SSEClientTransport = class {
 						...init,
 						headers
 					});
+					redirect = this._unfollowedRedirect(url, response);
 					if (response.status === 401) {
 						this._last401Response = response;
 						if (response.headers.has("www-authenticate")) {
@@ -5060,31 +5134,42 @@ var SSEClientTransport = class {
 			this._abortController = new AbortController();
 			this._eventSource.onerror = (event) => {
 				if (event.code === 401 && this._authProvider) {
-					if (this._authProvider.onUnauthorized && this._last401Response) {
+					if (this._authProvider.onUnauthorized && this._last401Response && !this._connectAuthRetried) {
 						const response = this._last401Response;
 						this._last401Response = void 0;
+						this._connectAuthRetried = true;
 						this._eventSource?.close();
 						this._authProvider.onUnauthorized({
 							response,
 							serverUrl: this._url,
 							fetchFn: this._fetchWithInit
 						}).then(() => this._startOrAuth().then(resolve, reject), (error$2) => {
+							this._connectAuthRetried = false;
 							markAuthSeamEscape(error$2);
 							this.onerror?.(error$2);
 							reject(error$2);
 						});
 						return;
 					}
-					const error$1 = markAuthSeamEscape(new UnauthorizedError());
+					const retried = this._connectAuthRetried;
+					this._connectAuthRetried = false;
+					const error$1 = markAuthSeamEscape(retried ? new require_src.SdkHttpError(require_src.SdkErrorCode.ClientHttpAuthentication, "Server returned 401 after re-authentication", {
+						status: 401,
+						statusText: this._last401Response?.statusText ?? ""
+					}) : new UnauthorizedError());
+					this._last401Response = void 0;
 					reject(error$1);
 					this.onerror?.(error$1);
 					return;
 				}
-				const error = new SseError(event.code, event.message, event);
+				this._connectAuthRetried = false;
+				const error = new SseError(event.code, redirect ?? event.message, event);
 				reject(error);
 				this.onerror?.(error);
 			};
-			this._eventSource.onopen = () => {};
+			this._eventSource.onopen = () => {
+				this._connectAuthRetried = false;
+			};
 			this._eventSource.addEventListener("endpoint", (event) => {
 				const messageEvent = event;
 				try {
@@ -5151,7 +5236,7 @@ var SSEClientTransport = class {
 				body: JSON.stringify(message),
 				signal: this._abortController?.signal
 			};
-			const response = await (this._fetch ?? fetch)(this._endpoint, init);
+			const response = await this._redirects(this._fetch ?? fetch)(this._endpoint, init);
 			if (!response.ok) {
 				if (response.status === 401 && this._authProvider) {
 					if (response.headers.has("www-authenticate")) {
@@ -5180,7 +5265,7 @@ var SSEClientTransport = class {
 					throw markAuthSeamEscape(new UnauthorizedError());
 				}
 				const text = await response.text?.().catch(() => null);
-				throw new Error(`Error POSTing to endpoint (HTTP ${response.status}): ${text}`);
+				throw new Error(`Error POSTing to endpoint (HTTP ${response.status}): ${this._unfollowedRedirect(this._endpoint, response) ?? text}`);
 			}
 			await response.text?.().catch(() => {});
 		} catch (error) {
@@ -5265,6 +5350,7 @@ var StreamableHTTPClientTransport = class {
 	_skipIssuerMetadataValidation;
 	_fetch;
 	_fetchWithInit;
+	_redirectPolicy;
 	_sessionId;
 	_reconnectionOptions;
 	_protocolVersion;
@@ -5295,7 +5381,9 @@ var StreamableHTTPClientTransport = class {
 			this._authProvider = adaptOAuthProvider(opts.authProvider, { skipIssuerMetadataValidation: opts.skipIssuerMetadataValidation });
 			if (opts.authProvider.dpop) this._fetch = withDpopFromProvider(opts.authProvider)(opts.fetch ?? fetch);
 		} else this._authProvider = opts?.authProvider;
+		this._redirectPolicy = opts?.redirectPolicy;
 		this._fetchWithInit = require_src.createFetchWithInit(opts?.fetch, opts?.requestInit);
+		if (this._redirectPolicy === "follow") this._fetchWithInit = require_src.fetchLeavingRedirects(this._fetchWithInit);
 		this._sessionId = opts?.sessionId;
 		this._protocolVersion = opts?.protocolVersion;
 		this._reconnectionOptions = opts?.reconnectionOptions ?? DEFAULT_STREAMABLE_HTTP_RECONNECTION_OPTIONS;
@@ -5347,6 +5435,15 @@ var StreamableHTTPClientTransport = class {
 			skipIssuerMetadataValidation: this._skipIssuerMetadataValidation
 		});
 	}
+	/** `baseFetch` with redirects handled as `redirectPolicy` says. */
+	_redirects(baseFetch) {
+		return this._redirectPolicy === "follow" ? baseFetch : require_src.fetchWithinOrigin(baseFetch);
+	}
+	/** Error text for a redirect `response` that was not followed, or `undefined` for any other response. */
+	_unfollowedRedirect(url, response) {
+		const text = this._redirectPolicy === "follow" ? void 0 : require_src.unfollowedRedirect(url, response);
+		return text && `${text} (redirectPolicy: 'same-origin')`;
+	}
 	async _commonHeaders() {
 		const headers = new Headers(this._requestInit?.headers || void 0);
 		let token;
@@ -5398,7 +5495,7 @@ var StreamableHTTPClientTransport = class {
 			if (resumptionToken) headers.set("last-event-id", resumptionToken);
 			const transportSignal = this._abortController?.signal;
 			const signal = requestSignal !== void 0 && transportSignal !== void 0 ? anySignal(transportSignal, requestSignal) : requestSignal ?? transportSignal;
-			const response = await (this._fetch ?? fetch)(this._url, {
+			const response = await this._redirects(this._fetch ?? fetch)(this._url, {
 				...this._requestInit,
 				method: "GET",
 				headers,
@@ -5450,7 +5547,8 @@ var StreamableHTTPClientTransport = class {
 					options.onRequestStreamEnd?.();
 					return;
 				}
-				throw new require_src.SdkHttpError(require_src.SdkErrorCode.ClientHttpFailedToOpenStream, `Failed to open SSE stream: ${response.statusText}`, {
+				const reason = this._unfollowedRedirect(this._url, response) ?? response.statusText;
+				throw new require_src.SdkHttpError(require_src.SdkErrorCode.ClientHttpFailedToOpenStream, `Failed to open SSE stream: ${reason}`, {
 					status: response.status,
 					statusText: response.statusText
 				});
@@ -5639,7 +5737,7 @@ var StreamableHTTPClientTransport = class {
 				body: JSON.stringify(message),
 				signal
 			};
-			const response = await (this._fetch ?? fetch)(this._url, init);
+			const response = await this._redirects(this._fetch ?? fetch)(this._url, init);
 			if (isHandshake && response.ok) this._sessionId = response.headers.get("mcp-session-id") || void 0;
 			if (!response.ok) {
 				if (response.status === 401 && this._authProvider) {
@@ -5690,7 +5788,8 @@ var StreamableHTTPClientTransport = class {
 						return;
 					}
 				} catch {}
-				throw new require_src.SdkHttpError(require_src.SdkErrorCode.ClientHttpNotImplemented, `Error POSTing to endpoint: ${text}`, {
+				const reason = this._unfollowedRedirect(this._url, response) ?? text;
+				throw new require_src.SdkHttpError(require_src.SdkErrorCode.ClientHttpNotImplemented, `Error POSTing to endpoint: ${reason}`, {
 					status: response.status,
 					statusText: response.statusText,
 					text
@@ -5747,9 +5846,9 @@ var StreamableHTTPClientTransport = class {
 				headers,
 				signal: this._abortController?.signal
 			};
-			const response = await (this._fetch ?? fetch)(this._url, init);
+			const response = await this._redirects(this._fetch ?? fetch)(this._url, init);
 			await response.text?.().catch(() => {});
-			if (!response.ok && response.status !== 405) throw new require_src.SdkHttpError(require_src.SdkErrorCode.ClientHttpFailedToTerminateSession, `Failed to terminate session: ${response.statusText}`, {
+			if (!response.ok && response.status !== 405) throw new require_src.SdkHttpError(require_src.SdkErrorCode.ClientHttpFailedToTerminateSession, `Failed to terminate session: ${this._unfollowedRedirect(this._url, response) ?? response.statusText}`, {
 				status: response.status,
 				statusText: response.statusText
 			});