dd-trace 6.4.0 → 6.5.0

package/ci/test-optimization-validation/preflight-runner.js

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+'use strict'
+
+const { getCommandBlocker } = require('./command-blocker')
+const { runCommand, serializeDisplayCommand } = require('./command-runner')
+const { getDatadogCleanCommand } = require('./local-command')
+const { getBasicReportingCommand, summarizeTestOutput } = require('./scenarios/basic-reporting')
+const { frameworkOutDir } = require('./scenarios/helpers')
+const { getObservedTestCount } = require('./test-output')
+
+/**
+ * Runs the selected Basic Reporting command without inherited Datadog initialization.
+ *
+ * @param {object} input preflight inputs
+ * @param {object} input.framework manifest framework entry
+ * @param {string} input.out validation output directory
+ * @param {object} input.options validator options
+ * @returns {Promise<{ok: boolean, failure?: object, preflight: object}>} preflight outcome
+ */
+async function runFrameworkPreflight ({ framework, out, options }) {
+  const maxTestCount = framework.preflight.maxTestCount
+  const command = getDatadogCleanCommand(getBasicReportingCommand(framework))
+  const outDir = frameworkOutDir(out, framework, 'preflight')
+  const result = await runCommand(command, {
+    artifactRoot: out,
+    envMode: 'clean',
+    label: `${framework.id}:preflight`,
+    outDir,
+    repositoryRoot: options.repositoryRoot,
+    requireExecutableApproval: options.requireExecutableApproval,
+    verbose: options.verbose,
+  })
+  const observedTestCount = getObservedTestCount(framework.framework, result.stdout, result.stderr)
+  const preflight = {
+    ran: true,
+    source: 'validator',
+    maxTestCount,
+    command: serializeDisplayCommand(command),
+    exitCode: result.exitCode,
+    durationMs: result.durationMs,
+    observedTestCount,
+    stdoutSummary: summarizeTestOutput(result.stdout).join('\n'),
+    stderrSummary: summarizeTestOutput('', result.stderr).join('\n'),
+  }
+  framework.preflight = preflight
+
+  const testCountKnown = Number.isInteger(observedTestCount)
+  const scopeMatched = testCountKnown && observedTestCount >= 1 && observedTestCount <= maxTestCount
+  preflight.scopeMatched = scopeMatched
+
+  if (!result.timedOut && scopeMatched && (result.exitCode === 0 || observedTestCount > 0)) {
+    return { ok: true, preflight }
+  }
+
+  const commandFailure = getCommandBlocker(result)
+  const diagnosis = commandFailure?.summary || getPreflightFailureDiagnosis({
+    maxTestCount,
+    observedTestCount,
+    result,
+    testCountKnown,
+  })
+
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    preflight,
+    failure: {
+      frameworkId: framework.id,
+      scenario: 'basic-reporting',
+      status: commandFailure ? 'blocked' : 'error',
+      diagnosis,
+      evidence: {
+        commandExitCode: result.exitCode,
+        commandTimedOut: result.timedOut,
+        representativeScopeMismatch: !commandFailure && !scopeMatched,
+        ...(commandFailure ? { commandFailure } : {}),
+        preflight,
+      },
+      artifacts: Object.values(result.artifacts),
+    },
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Produces the narrowest diagnosis supported by a failed clean preflight.
+ *
+ * @param {object} input diagnosis inputs
+ * @param {number} input.maxTestCount approved representative test limit
+ * @param {number|undefined} input.observedTestCount parsed test count
+ * @param {object} input.result command result
+ * @param {boolean} input.testCountKnown whether the test count was parsed
+ * @returns {string} customer-facing diagnosis
+ */
+function getPreflightFailureDiagnosis ({ maxTestCount, observedTestCount, result, testCountKnown }) {
+  if (result.timedOut) {
+    return 'The selected test command timed out during the validator-controlled uninstrumented preflight. No Test ' +
+      'Optimization conclusion was reached.'
+  }
+  if (!testCountKnown) {
+    return 'The validator could not determine how many tests the selected command ran, so it could not confirm ' +
+      `the approved representative scope of at most ${maxTestCount} tests. Select a command whose output ` +
+      'reports the test count before validating Test Optimization.'
+  }
+  if (observedTestCount > maxTestCount) {
+    return `The selected command ran ${observedTestCount} tests, exceeding the approved representative scope ` +
+      `of at most ${maxTestCount}. Select a narrower test command before validating Test Optimization.`
+  }
+  if (observedTestCount < 1) {
+    return 'The selected command did not report any tests. Select a runnable representative before validating ' +
+      'Test Optimization.'
+  }
+  return 'The selected test command failed before the validator could confirm that tests ran without Datadog ' +
+    'initialization. Fix the project command or its setup before validating Test Optimization.'
+}
+
+module.exports = { runFrameworkPreflight }

package/ci/test-optimization-validation/redaction.js

@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
+'use strict'
+
+const REDACTED = '<redacted>'
+const MAX_SANITIZE_DEPTH = 128
+const TRUNCATED_NESTING = '[Truncated: nesting exceeds redaction limit]'
+
+const SECRET_NAME_SOURCE = [
+  'API_?KEY',
+  'APP_?KEY',
+  'TOKEN',
+  'SECRET',
+  'PASSWORD',
+  'PASSPHRASE',
+  'CREDENTIAL',
+  'PRIVATE_?KEY',
+  'CLIENT_?SECRET',
+  'ACCESS_?KEY',
+  'COOKIE',
+].join('|')
+const EXACT_SECRET_ASSIGNMENT_NAME_SOURCE = [
+  SECRET_NAME_SOURCE,
+  'AUTH',
+  'AUTHORIZATION',
+  'PASS',
+  'SET-COOKIE',
+  'PAT',
+  'JWT',
+  'WEBHOOK(?:_URL)?',
+].join('|')
+const SECRET_NAME_CHARS = '[A-Za-z0-9_.-]'
+const SECRET_ASSIGNMENT_NAME_SOURCE = [
+  `(?:${EXACT_SECRET_ASSIGNMENT_NAME_SOURCE})`,
+  `[A-Za-z_]${SECRET_NAME_CHARS}*(?:${SECRET_NAME_SOURCE})${SECRET_NAME_CHARS}*`,
+  `[A-Za-z_]${SECRET_NAME_CHARS}*[-_]PASS`,
+  `[A-Za-z_]${SECRET_NAME_CHARS}*[-_]AUTH(?:ORIZATION)?`,
+  `[A-Za-z_]${SECRET_NAME_CHARS}*[-_](?:PAT|JWT|WEBHOOK(?:_URL)?)`,
+  'PASS',
+  'AUTH',
+  'AUTHORIZATION',
+  'COOKIE',
+  'SET-COOKIE',
+].join('|')
+const SECRET_FLAG_SOURCE = [
+  'api-key',
+  'app-key',
+  'token',
+  'secret',
+  'password',
+  'pass',
+  'credential',
+  'private-key',
+  'client-secret',
+  'access-key',
+  'auth',
+].join('|')
+const SECRET_VALUE_SOURCE = String.raw`("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s,;]+)`
+const SENSITIVE_NAME_PATTERN = new RegExp(`(?:${SECRET_NAME_SOURCE})`, 'i')
+const SENSITIVE_AUTH_NAME_PATTERN = /(?:^|_)AUTH(?:ORIZATION)?(?:_|$)/i
+const SENSITIVE_COOKIE_NAME_PATTERN = /(?:^|_)SET_?COOKIE(?:_|$)|(?:^|_)COOKIE(?:_|$)/i
+const SENSITIVE_PASS_NAME_PATTERN = /(?:^|_)PASS(?:_|$)/i
+const SENSITIVE_TOKEN_ALIAS_NAME_PATTERN = /(?:^|_)(?:PAT|JWT|WEBHOOK(?:_URL)?)(?:_|$)/i
+const SECRET_ASSIGNMENT_PATTERN = new RegExp(
+  String.raw`\b(${SECRET_ASSIGNMENT_NAME_SOURCE})\s*=\s*` + SECRET_VALUE_SOURCE,
+  'gi'
+)
+const SECRET_FLAG_PATTERN = new RegExp(
+  String.raw`(--(?:${SECRET_FLAG_SOURCE})(?:-[A-Za-z0-9]+)*)(=|\s+)` + SECRET_VALUE_SOURCE,
+  'gi'
+)
+const SECRET_FLAG_NAME_PATTERN = new RegExp(
+  `^--(?:${SECRET_FLAG_SOURCE})(?:-[A-Za-z0-9]+)*$`,
+  'i'
+)
+const AUTH_HEADER_PATTERN = /\b(Bearer)\s+([^\s'",}\]]+)/gi
+const AUTH_SCHEME_ASSIGNMENT_QUOTED_PATTERN = new RegExp(
+  String.raw`\b(${SECRET_ASSIGNMENT_NAME_SOURCE})\s*=\s*(["'])(?:Bearer|Basic)\s+.*?\2`,
+  'gi'
+)
+const AUTH_SCHEME_ASSIGNMENT_PATTERN = new RegExp(
+  String.raw`\b(${SECRET_ASSIGNMENT_NAME_SOURCE})\s*=\s*(?:Bearer|Basic)\s+[^\s,;]+`,
+  'gi'
+)
+const DEFAULT_IGNORABLE_PATTERN = /\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}/gu
+const DEFAULT_IGNORABLE_TEST_PATTERN = /\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}/u
+const CONTROL_CHARACTER_TEST_PATTERN = /\p{Cc}/u
+const UNSAFE_CONTROL_SOURCE = String.raw`[\u0000-\u0008\u000B\u000C\u000E-\u001F\u007F-\u009F]`
+const UNSAFE_CONTROL_PATTERN = new RegExp(UNSAFE_CONTROL_SOURCE, 'g')
+const UNSAFE_CONTROL_TEST_PATTERN = new RegExp(UNSAFE_CONTROL_SOURCE)
+const PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK_PATTERN =
+  /-----BEGIN (?:[A-Z0-9 ]+ )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END (?:[A-Z0-9 ]+ )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g
+const JWT_VALUE_PATTERN = /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b/g
+const KNOWN_TOKEN_VALUE_PATTERN =
+  /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,})\b/g
+const SECRET_HEADER_ENV_NAME_SOURCE = [
+  `(?:${SECRET_NAME_SOURCE}|PAT|JWT|WEBHOOK(?:_URL)?)`,
+  `[A-Za-z_]${SECRET_NAME_CHARS}*(?:${SECRET_NAME_SOURCE})${SECRET_NAME_CHARS}*`,
+  `[A-Za-z_]${SECRET_NAME_CHARS}*[-_]AUTH(?:ORIZATION)?`,
+  `[A-Za-z_]${SECRET_NAME_CHARS}*[-_](?:PAT|JWT|WEBHOOK(?:_URL)?)`,
+].join('|')
+const SECRET_HEADER_NAME_SOURCE = [
+  'dd-api-key',
+  'x-api-key',
+  'api-key',
+  'authorization',
+  'proxy-authorization',
+  'token',
+  'cookie',
+  'set-cookie',
+  SECRET_HEADER_ENV_NAME_SOURCE,
+].join('|')
+const SECRET_HEADER_PATTERN = new RegExp(
+  String.raw`\b((?:${SECRET_HEADER_NAME_SOURCE}))\s*:\s*("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\r\n,}]+)`,
+  'gi'
+)
+const URL_CREDENTIAL_PATTERN = /([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/)([^@\s/]+)(@)/gi
+const GITHUB_SECRET_REFERENCE_PATTERN =
+  /(?:\b[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*\s*[:=]\s*)?\$\{\{\s*secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*\}\}/g
+const SAFE_REFERENCE_MARKER_PATTERN = /DDCIVARREF([0-9]+)X/g
+
+const ENV_CONTAINER_KEYS = new Set([
+  'safeEnv',
+  'workflowEnv',
+  'jobEnv',
+  'stepEnv',
+  'inheritedEnv',
+])
+
+const SECRET_NAME_ONLY_KEYS = new Set([
+  'requiredEnvVars',
+  'requiredSecretEnvVars',
+  'secretEnvVars',
+  'missingEnvVars',
+  'originalSecretEnvVars',
+])
+
+/**
+ * Redacts secret-like values from arbitrary report data before it is serialized.
+ *
+ * @param {unknown} value data to sanitize
+ * @returns {unknown} sanitized copy
+ */
+function sanitizeForReport (value) {
+  return sanitizeValue(value, new WeakSet(), undefined, 0)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Redacts secret-like values from an environment variable map.
+ *
+ * @param {object|undefined} env environment map
+ * @returns {object|undefined} sanitized environment map
+ */
+function sanitizeEnv (env) {
+  if (!env || typeof env !== 'object' || Array.isArray(env)) return
+
+  const sanitized = {}
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(env)) {
+    sanitized[name] = sanitizeEnvValue(name, value)
+  }
+  if (Object.keys(sanitized).length > 0) return sanitized
+}
+
+/**
+ * Redacts a single environment value when its name is secret-like.
+ *
+ * @param {string} name environment variable name
+ * @param {unknown} value environment variable value
+ * @returns {string|undefined} sanitized environment variable value
+ */
+function sanitizeEnvValue (name, value) {
+  if (isSensitiveName(name)) return REDACTED
+  if (value === undefined) return
+  return sanitizeString(String(value))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Redacts common inline secret forms from strings.
+ *
+ * @param {string} value string to sanitize
+ * @returns {string} sanitized string
+ */
+function sanitizeString (value) {
+  const references = []
+  const protectedValue = value.replaceAll(GITHUB_SECRET_REFERENCE_PATTERN, reference => {
+    return `DDCIVARREF${references.push(reference) - 1}X`
+  })
+  const sanitized = protectedValue
+    .replaceAll(DEFAULT_IGNORABLE_PATTERN, '')
+    .replaceAll(UNSAFE_CONTROL_PATTERN, '')
+    .replaceAll(PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK_PATTERN, '<redacted-private-key>')
+    .replaceAll(JWT_VALUE_PATTERN, REDACTED)
+    .replaceAll(KNOWN_TOKEN_VALUE_PATTERN, REDACTED)
+    .replaceAll(AUTH_SCHEME_ASSIGNMENT_QUOTED_PATTERN, `$1=${REDACTED}`)
+    .replaceAll(AUTH_SCHEME_ASSIGNMENT_PATTERN, `$1=${REDACTED}`)
+    .replaceAll(SECRET_ASSIGNMENT_PATTERN, `$1=${REDACTED}`)
+    .replaceAll(SECRET_FLAG_PATTERN, `$1$2${REDACTED}`)
+    .replaceAll(SECRET_HEADER_PATTERN, `$1: ${REDACTED}`)
+    .replaceAll(AUTH_HEADER_PATTERN, `$1 ${REDACTED}`)
+    .replaceAll(URL_CREDENTIAL_PATTERN, `$1${REDACTED}$3`)
+
+  return sanitized.replaceAll(SAFE_REFERENCE_MARKER_PATTERN, (marker, index) => references[Number(index)] || marker)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Detects default-ignorable Unicode characters that can conceal executable text or secret names.
+ *
+ * @param {unknown} value candidate text
+ * @returns {boolean} true when the text contains a default-ignorable Unicode character
+ */
+function hasUnicodeDefaultIgnorable (value) {
+  return DEFAULT_IGNORABLE_TEST_PATTERN.test(String(value ?? ''))
+}
+
+function hasUnsafeInvisibleCharacter (value) {
+  const text = String(value ?? '')
+  return hasUnicodeDefaultIgnorable(text) || UNSAFE_CONTROL_TEST_PATTERN.test(text)
+}
+
+function hasUnsafeExecutionCharacter (value) {
+  return hasUnicodeDefaultIgnorable(value) || CONTROL_CHARACTER_TEST_PATTERN.test(String(value ?? ''))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Makes untrusted text safe to print to an interactive terminal while preserving line breaks.
+ *
+ * @param {unknown} value console value
+ * @returns {string} inert console text
+ */
+function sanitizeConsoleText (value) {
+  let result = ''
+  for (const character of sanitizeString(String(value ?? ''))) {
+    const code = character.charCodeAt(0)
+    result += character === '\n' || character === '\t' || code > 0x1F && code !== 0x7F
+      ? character
+      : String.raw`\u${code.toString(16).padStart(4, '0')}`
+  }
+  return result
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns whether a key or variable name usually carries secret values.
+ *
+ * @param {string} name key or environment variable name
+ * @returns {boolean} true when values under this name should be redacted
+ */
+function isSensitiveName (name) {
+  const normalized = String(name || '').replaceAll(/[-.]/g, '_')
+  return SENSITIVE_NAME_PATTERN.test(normalized) ||
+    SENSITIVE_AUTH_NAME_PATTERN.test(normalized) ||
+    SENSITIVE_COOKIE_NAME_PATTERN.test(normalized) ||
+    SENSITIVE_PASS_NAME_PATTERN.test(normalized) ||
+    SENSITIVE_TOKEN_ALIAS_NAME_PATTERN.test(normalized)
+}
+
+function sanitizeValue (value, seen, key, depth) {
+  if (typeof value === 'string') {
+    if (key && isSensitiveName(key) && !SECRET_NAME_ONLY_KEYS.has(key)) return REDACTED
+    return sanitizeString(value)
+  }
+
+  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return value
+  if (depth > MAX_SANITIZE_DEPTH) return TRUNCATED_NESTING
+  if (seen.has(value)) return '[Circular]'
+  seen.add(value)
+
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    const sanitized = sanitizeArray(value, seen, key, depth)
+    seen.delete(value)
+    return sanitized
+  }
+
+  if (key && ENV_CONTAINER_KEYS.has(key)) {
+    const env = sanitizeEnv(value)
+    seen.delete(value)
+    return env || {}
+  }
+
+  const sanitized = {}
+  for (const [entryKey, entryValue] of Object.entries(value)) {
+    if (isSensitiveName(entryKey) && !SECRET_NAME_ONLY_KEYS.has(entryKey)) {
+      sanitized[entryKey] = REDACTED
+      continue
+    }
+    sanitized[entryKey] = sanitizeValue(entryValue, seen, entryKey, depth + 1)
+  }
+  seen.delete(value)
+  return sanitized
+}
+
+/**
+ * Redacts secret flag/value pairs in arrays such as argv before sanitizing nested values.
+ *
+ * @param {Array<unknown>} value array to sanitize
+ * @param {WeakSet<object>} seen objects currently being sanitized
+ * @param {string|undefined} key parent key
+ * @param {number} depth current nesting depth
+ * @returns {Array<unknown>} sanitized array
+ */
+function sanitizeArray (value, seen, key, depth) {
+  const sanitized = []
+
+  for (let index = 0; index < value.length; index++) {
+    const item = value[index]
+    if (typeof item === 'string' && SECRET_FLAG_NAME_PATTERN.test(item) && index + 1 < value.length) {
+      sanitized.push(sanitizeString(item))
+      if (!isFlagToken(value[index + 1])) {
+        sanitized.push(REDACTED)
+        index++
+      }
+      continue
+    }
+
+    sanitized.push(sanitizeValue(item, seen, key, depth + 1))
+  }
+
+  return sanitized
+}
+
+function isFlagToken (value) {
+  return typeof value === 'string' && /^-{1,2}\S/.test(value)
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  hasUnsafeExecutionCharacter,
+  hasUnsafeInvisibleCharacter,
+  isSensitiveName,
+  sanitizeConsoleText,
+  sanitizeEnv,
+  sanitizeEnvValue,
+  sanitizeForReport,
+  sanitizeString,
+}