daycare-cli 0.0.0-canary.00a24ac

package/dist/sandbox/docker/dockerRunInSandbox.spec.js

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+import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";
+import os from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { pathMountMapMappedToHost } from "../../utils/pathMountMapMappedToHost.js";
+import { dockerContainersShared } from "./dockerContainersShared.js";
+import { dockerRunInSandbox } from "./dockerRunInSandbox.js";
+describe("dockerRunInSandbox", () => {
+    it("rewrites sandbox config paths and runs srt in container", async () => {
+        const workspace = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "daycare-docker-run-"));
+        const homeDir = path.join(workspace, "home");
+        const skillsActiveDir = path.join(workspace, "skills", "active");
+        await fs.mkdir(path.join(homeDir, "desktop", "project"), { recursive: true });
+        await fs.mkdir(skillsActiveDir, { recursive: true });
+        const userId = "u123";
+        const dockerExecSpy = vi.spyOn(dockerContainersShared, "exec");
+        let capturedRuntimeConfig = null;
+        let capturedSettingsHostPath = null;
+        let capturedEnv;
+        let capturedCwd;
+        let capturedCommand;
+        let capturedReadOnly;
+        let capturedUnconfinedSecurity;
+        let capturedCapAdd;
+        let capturedCapDrop;
+        let capturedLocalNetworkAllowlist;
+        let capturedIsolatedDnsServers;
+        let capturedLocalDnsServers;
+        dockerExecSpy.mockImplementationOnce(async (dockerConfig, args) => {
+            // Command is wrapped as: ["bash", "-lc", "/usr/local/bin/sandbox --settings <path> -- <cmd>"]
+            const bashCmd = args.command[2] ?? "";
+            const settingsMatch = bashCmd.match(/--settings\s+(\S+)/);
+            const settingsContainerPath = settingsMatch?.[1];
+            if (!settingsContainerPath) {
+                throw new Error("Expected --settings path in bash command string.");
+            }
+            capturedReadOnly = dockerConfig.readOnly;
+            capturedUnconfinedSecurity = dockerConfig.unconfinedSecurity;
+            capturedCapAdd = dockerConfig.capAdd;
+            capturedCapDrop = dockerConfig.capDrop;
+            capturedLocalNetworkAllowlist = dockerConfig.allowLocalNetworkingForUsers;
+            capturedIsolatedDnsServers = dockerConfig.isolatedDnsServers;
+            capturedLocalDnsServers = dockerConfig.localDnsServers;
+            capturedCommand = bashCmd;
+            capturedSettingsHostPath = pathMountMapMappedToHost({
+                mountPoints: [
+                    { hostPath: homeDir, mappedPath: "/home" },
+                    { hostPath: skillsActiveDir, mappedPath: "/shared/skills" },
+                    { hostPath: skillsActiveDir, mappedPath: "/shared/examples" }
+                ],
+                mappedPath: settingsContainerPath
+            });
+            if (!capturedSettingsHostPath) {
+                throw new Error(`Expected settings path to map to host: ${settingsContainerPath}`);
+            }
+            const rawConfig = await fs.readFile(capturedSettingsHostPath, "utf8");
+            capturedRuntimeConfig = JSON.parse(rawConfig);
+            capturedEnv = args.env;
+            capturedCwd = args.cwd;
+            return {
+                stdout: "done",
+                stderr: "",
+                exitCode: 0
+            };
+        });
+        const result = await dockerRunInSandbox("echo ok", {
+            filesystem: {
+                allowWrite: [homeDir, path.join(homeDir, "desktop")],
+                denyRead: [path.join(homeDir, ".ssh")],
+                denyWrite: [path.join(homeDir, ".aws")]
+            },
+            network: {
+                allowedDomains: ["example.com"],
+                deniedDomains: []
+            }
+        }, {
+            cwd: path.join(homeDir, "desktop", "project"),
+            home: homeDir,
+            docker: {
+                image: "daycare-sandbox",
+                tag: "latest",
+                readOnly: false,
+                unconfinedSecurity: false,
+                capAdd: [],
+                capDrop: [],
+                allowLocalNetworkingForUsers: ["u123"],
+                isolatedDnsServers: ["9.9.9.9"],
+                localDnsServers: ["192.168.1.1"],
+                userId,
+                mounts: [
+                    { hostPath: homeDir, mappedPath: "/home" },
+                    { hostPath: skillsActiveDir, mappedPath: "/shared/skills" },
+                    { hostPath: skillsActiveDir, mappedPath: "/shared/examples" }
+                ]
+            }
+        });
+        expect(result).toEqual({
+            stdout: "done",
+            stderr: ""
+        });
+        expect(capturedRuntimeConfig).toEqual({
+            filesystem: {
+                allowWrite: ["/home", "/home/desktop", "/tmp", "/run", "/var/tmp", "/dev/shm"],
+                denyRead: ["/home/.ssh"],
+                denyWrite: ["/home/.aws"]
+            },
+            network: {
+                allowedDomains: ["example.com"],
+                deniedDomains: []
+            }
+        });
+        expect(capturedEnv?.HOME).toBe("/home");
+        expect(capturedEnv?.TMPDIR).toBe("/tmp");
+        expect(capturedEnv?.TMP).toBe("/tmp");
+        expect(capturedEnv?.TEMP).toBe("/tmp");
+        expect(capturedCwd).toBe("/home/desktop/project");
+        expect(capturedReadOnly).toBe(false);
+        expect(capturedUnconfinedSecurity).toBe(false);
+        expect(capturedCapAdd).toEqual([]);
+        expect(capturedCapDrop).toEqual([]);
+        expect(capturedLocalNetworkAllowlist).toEqual(["u123"]);
+        expect(capturedIsolatedDnsServers).toEqual(["9.9.9.9"]);
+        expect(capturedLocalDnsServers).toEqual(["192.168.1.1"]);
+        expect(capturedCommand).toContain("/usr/local/bin/sandbox --settings ");
+        expect(capturedCommand).toContain(" -- ");
+        expect(capturedCommand).not.toContain(" -c ");
+        await expect(fs.access(capturedSettingsHostPath ?? "")).rejects.toThrow();
+        dockerExecSpy.mockRestore();
+        await fs.rm(workspace, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    });
+    it("throws exec-like error when container command fails", async () => {
+        const workspace = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "daycare-docker-run-fail-"));
+        const homeDir = path.join(workspace, "home");
+        const skillsActiveDir = path.join(workspace, "skills", "active");
+        await fs.mkdir(homeDir, { recursive: true });
+        await fs.mkdir(skillsActiveDir, { recursive: true });
+        const dockerExecSpy = vi.spyOn(dockerContainersShared, "exec");
+        dockerExecSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+            stdout: "partial",
+            stderr: "failed",
+            exitCode: 17
+        });
+        await expect(dockerRunInSandbox("bad", {
+            filesystem: {
+                allowWrite: [homeDir],
+                denyRead: [],
+                denyWrite: []
+            },
+            network: {
+                allowedDomains: ["example.com"],
+                deniedDomains: []
+            }
+        }, {
+            home: homeDir,
+            docker: {
+                image: "daycare-sandbox",
+                tag: "latest",
+                readOnly: false,
+                unconfinedSecurity: false,
+                capAdd: [],
+                capDrop: [],
+                userId: "u123",
+                mounts: [
+                    { hostPath: homeDir, mappedPath: "/home" },
+                    { hostPath: skillsActiveDir, mappedPath: "/shared/skills" },
+                    { hostPath: skillsActiveDir, mappedPath: "/shared/examples" }
+                ]
+            }
+        })).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            code: 17,
+            stdout: "partial",
+            stderr: "failed"
+        });
+        dockerExecSpy.mockRestore();
+        await fs.rm(workspace, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    });
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=dockerRunInSandbox.spec.js.map

package/dist/sandbox/docker/dockerRunInSandbox.spec.js.map

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package/dist/sandbox/docker/dockerTypes.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+import type Docker from "dockerode";
+import type { PathMountPoint } from "../../utils/pathMountTypes.js";
+export type DockerContainerConfig = {
+    image: string;
+    tag: string;
+    socketPath?: string;
+    runtime?: string;
+    readOnly: boolean;
+    unconfinedSecurity: boolean;
+    capAdd: string[];
+    capDrop: string[];
+    allowLocalNetworkingForUsers?: string[];
+    isolatedDnsServers?: string[];
+    localDnsServers?: string[];
+    userId: string;
+    hostHomeDir: string;
+    /** All mount points including home. Extra mounts are read-only. */
+    mounts: PathMountPoint[];
+};
+export type DockerContainerResolvedConfig = DockerContainerConfig & {
+    networkName: string;
+};
+export type DockerContainerExecArgs = {
+    command: string[];
+    cwd?: string;
+    env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+    timeoutMs?: number;
+    maxBufferBytes?: number;
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
+};
+export type DockerContainerExecResult = {
+    stdout: string;
+    stderr: string;
+    exitCode: number | null;
+};
+export type DockerContainer = Docker.Container;
+//# sourceMappingURL=dockerTypes.d.ts.map

package/dist/sandbox/docker/dockerTypes.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/sandbox/docker/dockerTypes.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=dockerTypes.js.map

package/dist/sandbox/docker/dockerTypes.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"dockerTypes.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../sources/sandbox/docker/dockerTypes.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/sandbox/pathResolveSecure.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";
+/**
+ * Result of secure path resolution.
+ */
+export type SecurePathResult = {
+    /** Resolved real path (symlinks followed) */
+    realPath: string;
+    /** The allowed base directory that contains this path */
+    allowedBase: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Securely resolves a path, following symlinks and verifying containment.
+ *
+ * Addresses symlink following attacks by:
+ * 1. Resolving all symlinks using fs.realpath()
+ * 2. Checking containment against the real paths
+ *
+ * @param allowedDirs - Directories the path is allowed to be within
+ * @param target - The target path to resolve
+ * @returns The resolved real path and the base directory it's within
+ * @throws Error if path is outside allowed directories or doesn't exist
+ */
+export declare function pathResolveSecure(allowedDirs: string[], target: string): Promise<SecurePathResult>;
+/**
+ * Synchronous version that checks if a path would be within allowed dirs.
+ * Does NOT resolve symlinks - use only when you've already resolved.
+ */
+export declare function isWithinSecure(base: string, target: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Opens a file handle securely with O_NOFOLLOW semantics.
+ * This prevents TOCTOU attacks by atomically opening without following symlinks.
+ *
+ * @param filePath - Path to open
+ * @param flags - File system flags (e.g., "r", "w", "a")
+ * @returns File handle
+ */
+export declare function openSecure(filePath: string, flags: string): Promise<fs.FileHandle>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=pathResolveSecure.d.ts.map

package/dist/sandbox/pathResolveSecure.d.ts.map

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package/dist/sandbox/pathResolveSecure.js

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { pathSanitize } from "./pathSanitize.js";
+/**
+ * Securely resolves a path, following symlinks and verifying containment.
+ *
+ * Addresses symlink following attacks by:
+ * 1. Resolving all symlinks using fs.realpath()
+ * 2. Checking containment against the real paths
+ *
+ * @param allowedDirs - Directories the path is allowed to be within
+ * @param target - The target path to resolve
+ * @returns The resolved real path and the base directory it's within
+ * @throws Error if path is outside allowed directories or doesn't exist
+ */
+export async function pathResolveSecure(allowedDirs, target) {
+    pathSanitize(target);
+    if (!path.isAbsolute(target)) {
+        throw new Error("Path must be absolute.");
+    }
+    // Resolve the target path following all symlinks
+    let realPath;
+    try {
+        realPath = await fs.realpath(target);
+    }
+    catch {
+        realPath = await resolveMissingPath(target);
+    }
+    // Check containment against each allowed directory (also resolve their real paths)
+    for (const dir of allowedDirs) {
+        let realDir;
+        try {
+            realDir = await fs.realpath(dir);
+        }
+        catch {
+            // If the allowed dir doesn't exist, use logical resolution
+            realDir = path.resolve(dir);
+        }
+        if (isWithinSecure(realDir, realPath)) {
+            return { realPath, allowedBase: realDir };
+        }
+    }
+    throw new Error("Path is outside the allowed directories.");
+}
+async function resolveMissingPath(target) {
+    const missing = [path.basename(target)];
+    let parent = path.dirname(target);
+    while (true) {
+        try {
+            const realParent = await fs.realpath(parent);
+            return path.join(realParent, ...missing);
+        }
+        catch {
+            const next = path.dirname(parent);
+            if (next === parent) {
+                return path.resolve(target);
+            }
+            missing.unshift(path.basename(parent));
+            parent = next;
+        }
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Synchronous version that checks if a path would be within allowed dirs.
+ * Does NOT resolve symlinks - use only when you've already resolved.
+ */
+export function isWithinSecure(base, target) {
+    const relative = path.relative(base, target);
+    return relative === "" || (!relative.startsWith("..") && !path.isAbsolute(relative));
+}
+/**
+ * Opens a file handle securely with O_NOFOLLOW semantics.
+ * This prevents TOCTOU attacks by atomically opening without following symlinks.
+ *
+ * @param filePath - Path to open
+ * @param flags - File system flags (e.g., "r", "w", "a")
+ * @returns File handle
+ */
+export async function openSecure(filePath, flags) {
+    pathSanitize(filePath);
+    // Check if target is a symlink before opening
+    try {
+        const stats = await fs.lstat(filePath);
+        if (stats.isSymbolicLink()) {
+            throw new Error("Cannot open symbolic link directly.");
+        }
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        // File doesn't exist - OK for write/create operations
+        if (error.code !== "ENOENT") {
+            throw error;
+        }
+    }
+    return fs.open(filePath, flags);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=pathResolveSecure.js.map

package/dist/sandbox/pathResolveSecure.js.map

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package/dist/sandbox/pathResolveSecure.spec.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=pathResolveSecure.spec.d.ts.map

package/dist/sandbox/pathResolveSecure.spec.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"pathResolveSecure.spec.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../sources/sandbox/pathResolveSecure.spec.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/sandbox/pathResolveSecure.spec.js

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";
+import os from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { isWithinSecure, openSecure, pathResolveSecure } from "./pathResolveSecure.js";
+describe("pathResolveSecure", () => {
+    let tempDir;
+    let realTempDir;
+    beforeEach(async () => {
+        tempDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "path-resolve-test-"));
+        // On macOS, /var is a symlink to /private/var, so we need the real path
+        realTempDir = await fs.realpath(tempDir);
+        await fs.mkdir(path.join(tempDir, "allowed"));
+        await fs.mkdir(path.join(tempDir, "forbidden"));
+        await fs.writeFile(path.join(tempDir, "allowed", "file.txt"), "content");
+        await fs.writeFile(path.join(tempDir, "forbidden", "secret.txt"), "secret");
+    });
+    afterEach(async () => {
+        await fs.rm(tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    });
+    it("resolves paths within allowed directories", async () => {
+        const allowedDirs = [path.join(tempDir, "allowed")];
+        const result = await pathResolveSecure(allowedDirs, path.join(tempDir, "allowed", "file.txt"));
+        // fs.realpath resolves symlinks, so we compare against realTempDir
+        expect(result.realPath).toBe(path.join(realTempDir, "allowed", "file.txt"));
+        expect(result.allowedBase).toBe(path.join(realTempDir, "allowed"));
+    });
+    it("rejects paths outside allowed directories", async () => {
+        const allowedDirs = [path.join(tempDir, "allowed")];
+        await expect(pathResolveSecure(allowedDirs, path.join(tempDir, "forbidden", "secret.txt"))).rejects.toThrow("Path is outside the allowed directories.");
+    });
+    it("prevents symlink escape attack", async () => {
+        // Create symlink inside allowed dir pointing outside
+        const symlinkPath = path.join(tempDir, "allowed", "escape");
+        await fs.symlink(path.join(tempDir, "forbidden"), symlinkPath);
+        const allowedDirs = [path.join(tempDir, "allowed")];
+        // Attempting to access forbidden/secret.txt via symlink should fail
+        await expect(pathResolveSecure(allowedDirs, path.join(symlinkPath, "secret.txt"))).rejects.toThrow("Path is outside the allowed directories.");
+    });
+    it("allows symlinks that resolve within allowed dirs", async () => {
+        // Create symlink within allowed dir pointing to another file in allowed
+        await fs.mkdir(path.join(tempDir, "allowed", "subdir"));
+        await fs.writeFile(path.join(tempDir, "allowed", "subdir", "data.txt"), "data");
+        const symlinkPath = path.join(tempDir, "allowed", "link");
+        await fs.symlink(path.join(tempDir, "allowed", "subdir"), symlinkPath);
+        const allowedDirs = [path.join(tempDir, "allowed")];
+        const result = await pathResolveSecure(allowedDirs, path.join(symlinkPath, "data.txt"));
+        expect(result.realPath).toBe(path.join(realTempDir, "allowed", "subdir", "data.txt"));
+    });
+    it("handles non-existent files for write operations", async () => {
+        const allowedDirs = [path.join(tempDir, "allowed")];
+        const result = await pathResolveSecure(allowedDirs, path.join(tempDir, "allowed", "newfile.txt"));
+        expect(result.realPath).toBe(path.join(realTempDir, "allowed", "newfile.txt"));
+    });
+    it("handles nested non-existent files for write operations", async () => {
+        const allowedDirs = [path.join(tempDir, "allowed")];
+        const result = await pathResolveSecure(allowedDirs, path.join(tempDir, "allowed", "nested", "deep", "newfile.txt"));
+        expect(result.realPath).toBe(path.join(realTempDir, "allowed", "nested", "deep", "newfile.txt"));
+    });
+    it("rejects paths with null bytes", async () => {
+        const allowedDirs = [path.join(tempDir, "allowed")];
+        await expect(pathResolveSecure(allowedDirs, path.join(tempDir, "allowed\x00forbidden"))).rejects.toThrow("Path contains null byte.");
+    });
+    it("rejects relative paths", async () => {
+        const allowedDirs = [path.join(tempDir, "allowed")];
+        await expect(pathResolveSecure(allowedDirs, "relative/path")).rejects.toThrow("Path must be absolute.");
+    });
+});
+describe("isWithinSecure", () => {
+    it("returns true for paths within base", () => {
+        expect(isWithinSecure("/home/user", "/home/user/file.txt")).toBe(true);
+        expect(isWithinSecure("/home/user", "/home/user/sub/file.txt")).toBe(true);
+        expect(isWithinSecure("/home/user", "/home/user")).toBe(true);
+    });
+    it("returns false for paths outside base", () => {
+        expect(isWithinSecure("/home/user", "/home/other/file.txt")).toBe(false);
+        expect(isWithinSecure("/home/user", "/etc/passwd")).toBe(false);
+        expect(isWithinSecure("/home/user", "/home/user/../other")).toBe(false);
+    });
+});
+describe("openSecure", () => {
+    let tempDir;
+    beforeEach(async () => {
+        tempDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "open-secure-test-"));
+        await fs.writeFile(path.join(tempDir, "regular.txt"), "content");
+        await fs.mkdir(path.join(tempDir, "target"));
+        await fs.writeFile(path.join(tempDir, "target", "secret.txt"), "secret");
+    });
+    afterEach(async () => {
+        await fs.rm(tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    });
+    it("opens regular files", async () => {
+        const handle = await openSecure(path.join(tempDir, "regular.txt"), "r");
+        const content = await handle.readFile("utf8");
+        await handle.close();
+        expect(content).toBe("content");
+    });
+    it("rejects symlinks", async () => {
+        const symlinkPath = path.join(tempDir, "link.txt");
+        await fs.symlink(path.join(tempDir, "regular.txt"), symlinkPath);
+        await expect(openSecure(symlinkPath, "r")).rejects.toThrow("Cannot open symbolic link directly.");
+    });
+    it("allows creating new files", async () => {
+        const newPath = path.join(tempDir, "new.txt");
+        const handle = await openSecure(newPath, "w");
+        await handle.writeFile("new content");
+        await handle.close();
+        const content = await fs.readFile(newPath, "utf8");
+        expect(content).toBe("new content");
+    });
+    it("rejects paths with null bytes", async () => {
+        await expect(openSecure(path.join(tempDir, "file\x00.txt"), "r")).rejects.toThrow("Path contains null byte.");
+    });
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=pathResolveSecure.spec.js.map

package/dist/sandbox/pathResolveSecure.spec.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/sandbox/pathSanitize.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/**
+ * Validates a path for dangerous characters and patterns.
+ * Throws an error if the path is invalid.
+ *
+ * Checks for:
+ * - Null bytes (can truncate strings in C libraries)
+ * - Control characters (ASCII 0-31 except tab/newline)
+ * - Excessively long paths (DoS potential)
+ */
+export declare function pathSanitize(target: string): void;
+/**
+ * Sanitizes and resolves a path, ensuring it's absolute.
+ * Returns the resolved absolute path.
+ */
+export declare function pathSanitizeAndResolve(target: string): string;
+//# sourceMappingURL=pathSanitize.d.ts.map

package/dist/sandbox/pathSanitize.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"pathSanitize.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../sources/sandbox/pathSanitize.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAIA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,YAAY,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAiBjD;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAM7D"}

package/dist/sandbox/pathSanitize.js

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+import path from "node:path";
+const MAX_PATH_LENGTH = 4096;
+/**
+ * Validates a path for dangerous characters and patterns.
+ * Throws an error if the path is invalid.
+ *
+ * Checks for:
+ * - Null bytes (can truncate strings in C libraries)
+ * - Control characters (ASCII 0-31 except tab/newline)
+ * - Excessively long paths (DoS potential)
+ */
+export function pathSanitize(target) {
+    if (target.length > MAX_PATH_LENGTH) {
+        throw new Error(`Path exceeds maximum length of ${MAX_PATH_LENGTH} characters.`);
+    }
+    // Check for null bytes
+    if (target.includes("\x00")) {
+        throw new Error("Path contains null byte.");
+    }
+    // Check for control characters (ASCII 0-31, except 9=tab and 10=newline)
+    for (let i = 0; i < target.length; i++) {
+        const code = target.charCodeAt(i);
+        if (code < 32 && code !== 9 && code !== 10) {
+            throw new Error("Path contains invalid control character.");
+        }
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Sanitizes and resolves a path, ensuring it's absolute.
+ * Returns the resolved absolute path.
+ */
+export function pathSanitizeAndResolve(target) {
+    pathSanitize(target);
+    if (!path.isAbsolute(target)) {
+        throw new Error("Path must be absolute.");
+    }
+    return path.resolve(target);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=pathSanitize.js.map

package/dist/sandbox/pathSanitize.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"pathSanitize.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../sources/sandbox/pathSanitize.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAE7B,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;AAE7B;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,CAAC,MAAc;IACvC,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;QAClC,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,kCAAkC,eAAe,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;IACrF,CAAC;IAED,uBAAuB;IACvB,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1B,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;IAChD,CAAC;IAED,yEAAyE;IACzE,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QACrC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAClC,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;YACzC,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,0CAA0C,CAAC,CAAC;QAChE,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;AACL,CAAC;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,CAAC,MAAc;IACjD,YAAY,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IACrB,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC3B,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9C,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAChC,CAAC"}

package/dist/sandbox/pathSanitize.spec.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=pathSanitize.spec.d.ts.map

package/dist/sandbox/pathSanitize.spec.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"pathSanitize.spec.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../sources/sandbox/pathSanitize.spec.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/sandbox/pathSanitize.spec.js

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { pathSanitize, pathSanitizeAndResolve } from "./pathSanitize.js";
+describe("pathSanitize", () => {
+    it("accepts valid paths", () => {
+        expect(() => pathSanitize("/home/user/file.txt")).not.toThrow();
+        expect(() => pathSanitize("/path/with spaces/file.txt")).not.toThrow();
+        expect(() => pathSanitize("/unicode/日本語/文件.txt")).not.toThrow();
+    });
+    it("rejects paths with null bytes", () => {
+        expect(() => pathSanitize("/home/user\x00/malicious")).toThrow("Path contains null byte.");
+        expect(() => pathSanitize("/etc/passwd\x00.txt")).toThrow("Path contains null byte.");
+    });
+    it("rejects paths with control characters", () => {
+        expect(() => pathSanitize("/home/user\x01file")).toThrow("Path contains invalid control character.");
+        expect(() => pathSanitize("/home/user\x1Ffile")).toThrow("Path contains invalid control character.");
+    });
+    it("allows tabs and newlines", () => {
+        // Tabs and newlines are uncommon but not dangerous in the same way
+        expect(() => pathSanitize("/home/user\tfile")).not.toThrow();
+        expect(() => pathSanitize("/home/user\nfile")).not.toThrow();
+    });
+    it("rejects excessively long paths", () => {
+        const longPath = `/${"a".repeat(5000)}`;
+        expect(() => pathSanitize(longPath)).toThrow("Path exceeds maximum length of 4096 characters.");
+    });
+    it("accepts paths at the limit", () => {
+        const maxPath = `/${"a".repeat(4095)}`;
+        expect(() => pathSanitize(maxPath)).not.toThrow();
+    });
+});
+describe("pathSanitizeAndResolve", () => {
+    it("sanitizes and resolves valid absolute paths", () => {
+        const result = pathSanitizeAndResolve("/home/user/../user/file.txt");
+        expect(result).toBe("/home/user/file.txt");
+    });
+    it("rejects relative paths", () => {
+        expect(() => pathSanitizeAndResolve("relative/path")).toThrow("Path must be absolute.");
+    });
+    it("rejects paths with null bytes before checking absolute", () => {
+        expect(() => pathSanitizeAndResolve("/etc/passwd\x00")).toThrow("Path contains null byte.");
+    });
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=pathSanitize.spec.js.map