daftari 3.14.0 → 3.16.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +21 -0
- package/dist/consolidate/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/consolidate/index.js +3 -12
- package/dist/consolidate/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/curation/leak-ledger.d.ts +30 -0
- package/dist/curation/leak-ledger.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/curation/leak-ledger.js +190 -0
- package/dist/curation/leak-ledger.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/distill/cli.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/distill/cli.js +2 -1
- package/dist/distill/cli.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/distill/cost.d.ts +3 -3
- package/dist/distill/cost.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/distill/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/distill/index.js +3 -15
- package/dist/distill/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/distill/state.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/distill/state.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/distill/state.js +16 -6
- package/dist/distill/state.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/eval/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/eval/index.js +11 -16
- package/dist/eval/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/eval/llm-openrouter.d.ts +4 -1
- package/dist/eval/llm-openrouter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/eval/llm-openrouter.js +21 -5
- package/dist/eval/llm-openrouter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/eval/transport.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/eval/transport.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/eval/transport.js +27 -0
- package/dist/eval/transport.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/sleep/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/sleep/index.js +4 -14
- package/dist/sleep/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/board.test.js +2 -0
- package/dist/tools/board.test.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/read.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/read.js +45 -0
- package/dist/tools/read.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/search.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/search.js +77 -8
- package/dist/tools/search.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/write.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/tools/write.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/write.js +181 -1
- package/dist/tools/write.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/utils/config.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/utils/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/utils/config.js +73 -0
- package/dist/utils/config.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/tools/write.js
CHANGED
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@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import matter from "gray-matter";
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13
13
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import { acquireLock, mintLeaseHolder, openLockDb, releaseLock } from "../access/locks.js";
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14
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import { canPromote, canWrite, isProposeOnly } from "../access/rbac.js";
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import { mintConsumesEdges } from "../curation/consumes.js";
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16
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+
import { leakLedgerPath, privateReadsForRun, privateReadsForRunStrict, } from "../curation/leak-ledger.js";
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import { foreignPositionViolation } from "../curation/positions.js";
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import { frontmatterDiff, recordProvenance } from "../curation/provenance.js";
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import { recordShadowAction } from "../curation/shadow.js";
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@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ import { indexDocument } from "../search/reindex.js";
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import { noteSelfWrite } from "../search/self-write.js";
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import { allDocumentPaths, getDocumentsByPaths } from "../storage/index-db.js";
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import { readFile, resolveVaultPath } from "../storage/local.js";
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-
import { loadConfig } from "../utils/config.js";
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+
import { loadConfig, } from "../utils/config.js";
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import { normalizeIsoDate } from "../utils/dates.js";
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import { commit } from "../utils/git.js";
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import { sha256Hex } from "../utils/hash.js";
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@@ -324,6 +325,29 @@ async function performWrite(params) {
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return err(new Error(`${STALE_WRITE_PREFIX} ${params.relPath} changed since base_version`));
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}
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}
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// Cross-vault leak gate (U3): the write-time refusal. Runs AFTER the
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329
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// stale-write check (a stale write should surface as staleness, not a
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// leak refusal) and BEFORE anything durable — writeFile is the first
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// side effect below, and mintConsumesEdges (the other candidate
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// insertion point) runs post-commit, which is too late for a refusal.
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const gate = await checkLeakGate({
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visibility: params.visibility,
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leakGate: params.leakGate,
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hasAccessContext: params.hasAccessContext,
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runId: params.runId,
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});
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if (gate.outcome === "refuse") {
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await recordProvenance(params.vaultRoot, {
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tool: params.tool,
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file: params.relPath,
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agent: params.agent,
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...(params.principal ? { principal: params.principal } : {}),
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...(params.runId ? { run_id: params.runId } : {}),
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action: "rejected_leak",
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reason: gate.reason,
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});
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return err(new Error(`${LEAK_GATE_PREFIX} ${params.relPath}: ${gate.reason}`));
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}
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await mkdir(dirname(params.absPath), { recursive: true });
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await writeFile(params.absPath, params.fileText, "utf-8");
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const indexed = await indexDocument(params.vaultRoot, params.relPath);
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@@ -384,6 +408,12 @@ async function performWrite(params) {
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updated: params.newFrontmatter.updated,
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validation: params.validation,
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indexUpdated: indexed.ok,
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...(gate.outcome === "warn"
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? {
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leak_warning: `this run read ${gate.count} private source(s) this session before ` +
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`writing into a shared vault (leak_gate.mode: "warn" — the write landed anyway)`,
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}
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: {}),
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});
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}
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finally {
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@@ -452,6 +482,83 @@ export function commitIdentity(agent, principal) {
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return { author: agent, trailer: "" };
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return { author: principal, trailer: `\n\nDaftari-Agent: ${agent}` };
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}
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// The one place the leak-gate rejection message prefix is defined, mirroring
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// STALE_WRITE_PREFIX below. `mode: refuse` is the only mode that ever
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// produces this error — `warn` lands the write with a `leak_warning` instead,
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// `off` never runs the check.
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export const LEAK_GATE_PREFIX = "leak gate:";
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// Cross-vault leak gate (U3): decides whether a write into `visibility`
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// should be refused, landed-with-a-warning, or allowed outright, given the
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// run that produced it. Never returns which private document was read —
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// only a count — so a refusal surfacing in a shared context cannot itself
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// leak the private source's path (spec: refusal names the run_id and count
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// only).
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//
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// Known, accepted structural limitation: this can only see what the CURRENT
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// run_id read. An agent that reads a private source under run R and then
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// writes under a DIFFERENT run_id R2 is not caught — the ledger has nothing
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// under R2 to find. Closing that gap needs a stronger caller-identity signal
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// than the free-text, caller-supplied run_id this gate is built on.
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502
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async function checkLeakGate(params) {
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const mode = params.leakGate.mode;
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if (mode === "off")
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return { outcome: "allow" };
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if (params.visibility !== "shared")
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return { outcome: "allow" };
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508
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// Operator servers (no AccessContext) bypass the gate entirely, matching
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// the existing operator-bypass convention on the foreign-position check
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510
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// above (`if (access && ...)`) — there is no authenticated agent identity
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// to hold accountable for an omitted run_id.
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512
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if (!params.hasAccessContext)
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return { outcome: "allow" };
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514
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if (!params.runId) {
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515
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// An agent caller writing into a shared vault with no run_id at all
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// cannot be checked against the ledger — and omitting run_id is exactly
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517
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// how an agent would dodge this gate if silence were allowed to pass.
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518
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// `refuse` treats "cannot verify" as "deny"; `warn` has nothing to warn
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519
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// about and lets the write through unannotated.
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520
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if (mode === "refuse") {
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return {
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522
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outcome: "refuse",
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reason: "no run_id was supplied for a write into a shared vault — cannot verify " +
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"this run read no private source, so the write is refused",
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};
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}
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527
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return { outcome: "allow" };
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528
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}
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529
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const ledgerPath = leakLedgerPath(params.leakGate.sessionLedgerPath);
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530
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if (mode === "refuse") {
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531
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// Fail-closed: a ledger the gate cannot read is treated as a possible
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532
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// leak, not an absence of one. privateReadsForRun's fail-OPEN posture
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533
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// (used by warn mode and by the read/search instrumentation) is
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534
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// deliberately not used here — see privateReadsForRunStrict's docs.
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535
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const scanned = await privateReadsForRunStrict(ledgerPath, params.runId);
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536
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if (!scanned.ok) {
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537
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return {
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538
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outcome: "refuse",
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539
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reason: `the leak ledger could not be read (${scanned.error.message}) — cannot ` +
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540
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`verify run ${params.runId} read no private source, so the write into ` +
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541
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"this shared vault is refused",
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};
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}
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544
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if (scanned.value.count > 0) {
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return {
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546
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outcome: "refuse",
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547
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reason: `run ${params.runId} read ${scanned.value.count} private-visibility source(s) ` +
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548
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"this session — refusing to write that into a shared vault",
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};
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}
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551
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return { outcome: "allow" };
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552
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}
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553
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// mode === "warn": best-effort, never blocks. A ledger read failure
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554
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// degrades to "nothing seen" (privateReadsForRun's own fail-open
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555
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// contract) — appropriate here because warn mode's whole point is to
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556
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// never refuse a write.
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557
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const scanned = await privateReadsForRun(ledgerPath, params.runId);
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558
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if (scanned.count > 0)
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559
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return { outcome: "warn", count: scanned.count };
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560
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return { outcome: "allow" };
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}
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455
562
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// The one place the stale-rejection message prefix is defined: the producer
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// (performWrite's base_version check) and the classifier below must agree,
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564
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// or retryOnStale silently stops retrying and the lost-update race returns.
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@@ -544,6 +651,9 @@ export function performFrontmatterWrite(opts) {
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544
651
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shadowMode: target.config.shadowMode,
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545
652
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principal: opts.access?.user,
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546
653
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bodyChanged: false,
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654
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visibility: target.config.visibility,
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leakGate: target.config.leakGate,
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hasAccessContext: opts.access !== undefined,
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...(opts.runId !== undefined ? { runId: opts.runId } : {}),
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});
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659
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}
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@@ -1075,6 +1185,9 @@ export async function vaultWrite(vaultRoot, args, access) {
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1075
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principal: access?.user,
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...(runId.value !== undefined ? { runId: runId.value } : {}),
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bodyChanged: !isUpdate || !sameBody(oldContent, body),
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visibility: config.value.visibility,
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1189
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leakGate: config.value.leakGate,
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1190
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hasAccessContext: access !== undefined,
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});
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1079
1192
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// #169: an in-place overwrite destroys the prior version's lineage, and
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1193
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// daftari HAS the preserve-not-overwrite primitive — steer toward it at
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@@ -1188,6 +1301,9 @@ export async function vaultAppend(vaultRoot, args, access) {
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1188
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principal: access?.user,
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...(runId.value !== undefined ? { runId: runId.value } : {}),
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bodyChanged: true,
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visibility: target.value.config.visibility,
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leakGate: target.value.config.leakGate,
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hasAccessContext: access !== undefined,
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});
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1192
1308
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if (!written.ok)
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return written;
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@@ -1234,6 +1350,9 @@ export async function vaultPromote(vaultRoot, args, access) {
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1234
1350
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const agent = requireString(args, "agent", "vault_promote");
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1235
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if (!agent.ok)
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1236
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return agent;
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1353
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const runId = readRunId(args, "vault_promote");
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if (!runId.ok)
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1355
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return runId;
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const baseVersion = readBaseVersion(args, "vault_promote");
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if (!baseVersion.ok)
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return baseVersion;
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@@ -1283,6 +1402,7 @@ export async function vaultPromote(vaultRoot, args, access) {
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1283
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commitMessage: `vault_promote: ${path.value} draft→canonical by ${agent.value}`,
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baseVersion: baseVersion.value ?? target.value.contentHash,
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access,
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...(runId.value !== undefined ? { runId: runId.value } : {}),
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});
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};
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return retryOnStaleIfDefaulted(baseVersion.value, attemptPromote);
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@@ -1355,6 +1475,9 @@ export async function vaultDeprecate(vaultRoot, args, access) {
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1355
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const agent = requireString(args, "agent", "vault_deprecate");
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1356
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if (!agent.ok)
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return agent;
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1478
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const runId = readRunId(args, "vault_deprecate");
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1479
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if (!runId.ok)
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return runId;
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const reason = requireString(args, "reason", "vault_deprecate");
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if (!reason.ok)
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return reason;
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@@ -1412,6 +1535,7 @@ export async function vaultDeprecate(vaultRoot, args, access) {
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1412
1535
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(supersededBy ? ` (superseded by ${supersededBy})` : ""),
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baseVersion: baseVersion.value ?? target.value.contentHash,
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access,
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...(runId.value !== undefined ? { runId: runId.value } : {}),
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});
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};
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const written = await retryOnStaleIfDefaulted(baseVersion.value, attemptDeprecate);
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@@ -1445,6 +1569,9 @@ export async function vaultSetConfidence(vaultRoot, args, access) {
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1445
1569
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const agent = requireString(args, "agent", "vault_set_confidence");
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1446
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if (!agent.ok)
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1447
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return agent;
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const runId = readRunId(args, "vault_set_confidence");
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1573
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if (!runId.ok)
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return runId;
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const reason = requireString(args, "reason", "vault_set_confidence");
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if (!reason.ok)
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return reason;
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@@ -1503,6 +1630,7 @@ export async function vaultSetConfidence(vaultRoot, args, access) {
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1503
1630
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`by ${agent.value} — ${reason.value}`,
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baseVersion: baseVersion.value ?? target.value.contentHash,
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access,
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...(runId.value !== undefined ? { runId: runId.value } : {}),
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});
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};
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return retryOnStaleIfDefaulted(baseVersion.value, attemptSetConfidence);
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@@ -1530,6 +1658,9 @@ export async function vaultSetTier(vaultRoot, args, access) {
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1530
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const agent = requireString(args, "agent", "vault_set_tier");
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if (!agent.ok)
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return agent;
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const runId = readRunId(args, "vault_set_tier");
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if (!runId.ok)
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return runId;
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const reason = requireString(args, "reason", "vault_set_tier");
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if (!reason.ok)
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return reason;
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@@ -1590,6 +1721,7 @@ export async function vaultSetTier(vaultRoot, args, access) {
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`by ${agent.value} — ${reason.value}`,
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baseVersion: baseVersion.value ?? target.value.contentHash,
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access,
|
|
1724
|
+
...(runId.value !== undefined ? { runId: runId.value } : {}),
|
|
1593
1725
|
});
|
|
1594
1726
|
};
|
|
1595
1727
|
return retryOnStaleIfDefaulted(baseVersion.value, attemptSetTier);
|
|
@@ -1617,6 +1749,9 @@ export async function vaultSupersede(vaultRoot, args, access) {
|
|
|
1617
1749
|
const agent = requireString(args, "agent", "vault_supersede");
|
|
1618
1750
|
if (!agent.ok)
|
|
1619
1751
|
return agent;
|
|
1752
|
+
const runId = readRunId(args, "vault_supersede");
|
|
1753
|
+
if (!runId.ok)
|
|
1754
|
+
return runId;
|
|
1620
1755
|
const baseVersion = readBaseVersion(args, "vault_supersede");
|
|
1621
1756
|
if (!baseVersion.ok)
|
|
1622
1757
|
return baseVersion;
|
|
@@ -1693,6 +1828,7 @@ export async function vaultSupersede(vaultRoot, args, access) {
|
|
|
1693
1828
|
`by ${agent.value}${reason ? ` — ${reason}` : ""}`,
|
|
1694
1829
|
baseVersion: baseVersion.value,
|
|
1695
1830
|
access,
|
|
1831
|
+
...(runId.value !== undefined ? { runId: runId.value } : {}),
|
|
1696
1832
|
});
|
|
1697
1833
|
if (!written.ok)
|
|
1698
1834
|
return written;
|
|
@@ -1732,6 +1868,15 @@ export async function vaultMerge(vaultRoot, args, access) {
|
|
|
1732
1868
|
const agent = requireString(args, "agent", "vault_merge");
|
|
1733
1869
|
if (!agent.ok)
|
|
1734
1870
|
return agent;
|
|
1871
|
+
// Cross-vault leak gate (U3, FIX 1): mirrors vault_write's run_id parsing —
|
|
1872
|
+
// vault_merge writes directly (three files, one commit) rather than going
|
|
1873
|
+
// through performWrite, so it must thread run_id and run the same gate
|
|
1874
|
+
// check itself. Without this, vault_merge was an ungated shared-write path:
|
|
1875
|
+
// a caller-supplied body could land verbatim in a shared/refuse vault with
|
|
1876
|
+
// no leak check at all.
|
|
1877
|
+
const runId = readRunId(args, "vault_merge");
|
|
1878
|
+
if (!runId.ok)
|
|
1879
|
+
return runId;
|
|
1735
1880
|
const boundary = readBoundary(args, "vault_merge");
|
|
1736
1881
|
if (!boundary.ok)
|
|
1737
1882
|
return boundary;
|
|
@@ -2080,6 +2225,29 @@ export async function vaultMerge(vaultRoot, args, access) {
|
|
|
2080
2225
|
"retry against the current documents"));
|
|
2081
2226
|
}
|
|
2082
2227
|
}
|
|
2228
|
+
// Cross-vault leak gate (U3, FIX 1): the same write-time refusal
|
|
2229
|
+
// performWrite runs, mirrored here because vault_merge writes directly.
|
|
2230
|
+
// Runs AFTER the stale-merge revalidation and BEFORE any writeFile call
|
|
2231
|
+
// below — the merge target's `body` is entirely caller-supplied, so an
|
|
2232
|
+
// ungated merge is exactly as dangerous as an ungated vault_write.
|
|
2233
|
+
const gate = await checkLeakGate({
|
|
2234
|
+
visibility: config.value.visibility,
|
|
2235
|
+
leakGate: config.value.leakGate,
|
|
2236
|
+
hasAccessContext: access !== undefined,
|
|
2237
|
+
runId: runId.value,
|
|
2238
|
+
});
|
|
2239
|
+
if (gate.outcome === "refuse") {
|
|
2240
|
+
await recordProvenance(vaultRoot, {
|
|
2241
|
+
tool: "vault_merge",
|
|
2242
|
+
file: targetPath.value,
|
|
2243
|
+
agent: agent.value,
|
|
2244
|
+
...(access?.user ? { principal: access.user } : {}),
|
|
2245
|
+
...(runId.value ? { run_id: runId.value } : {}),
|
|
2246
|
+
action: "rejected_leak",
|
|
2247
|
+
reason: gate.reason,
|
|
2248
|
+
});
|
|
2249
|
+
return err(new Error(`${LEAK_GATE_PREFIX} ${targetPath.value}: ${gate.reason}`));
|
|
2250
|
+
}
|
|
2083
2251
|
// Write all files, then a single git commit. This is NOT crash-atomic on
|
|
2084
2252
|
// the disk-write phase: like the single-file write path (performWrite), a
|
|
2085
2253
|
// throw mid-loop — or a commit() failure after the files are on disk —
|
|
@@ -2143,6 +2311,12 @@ export async function vaultMerge(vaultRoot, args, access) {
|
|
|
2143
2311
|
updated: stampedTarget.updated,
|
|
2144
2312
|
validation: targetReport,
|
|
2145
2313
|
indexUpdated: allIndexed,
|
|
2314
|
+
...(gate.outcome === "warn"
|
|
2315
|
+
? {
|
|
2316
|
+
leak_warning: `this run read ${gate.count} private source(s) this session before ` +
|
|
2317
|
+
`merging into a shared vault (leak_gate.mode: "warn" — the write landed anyway)`,
|
|
2318
|
+
}
|
|
2319
|
+
: {}),
|
|
2146
2320
|
});
|
|
2147
2321
|
}
|
|
2148
2322
|
catch (e) {
|
|
@@ -2593,6 +2767,7 @@ export const writeTools = [
|
|
|
2593
2767
|
description: "Vault-relative path of the draft document to promote",
|
|
2594
2768
|
},
|
|
2595
2769
|
agent: agentProperty,
|
|
2770
|
+
run_id: runIdProperty,
|
|
2596
2771
|
base_version: baseVersionProperty,
|
|
2597
2772
|
},
|
|
2598
2773
|
required: ["path", "agent"],
|
|
@@ -2630,6 +2805,7 @@ export const writeTools = [
|
|
|
2630
2805
|
},
|
|
2631
2806
|
predecessor_valid_until: boundaryProperty,
|
|
2632
2807
|
agent: agentProperty,
|
|
2808
|
+
run_id: runIdProperty,
|
|
2633
2809
|
base_version: baseVersionProperty,
|
|
2634
2810
|
},
|
|
2635
2811
|
required: ["path", "reason", "agent"],
|
|
@@ -2668,6 +2844,7 @@ export const writeTools = [
|
|
|
2668
2844
|
description: "Why the confidence is changing (recorded in the commit and provenance)",
|
|
2669
2845
|
},
|
|
2670
2846
|
agent: agentProperty,
|
|
2847
|
+
run_id: runIdProperty,
|
|
2671
2848
|
base_version: baseVersionProperty,
|
|
2672
2849
|
},
|
|
2673
2850
|
required: ["path", "confidence", "reason", "agent"],
|
|
@@ -2711,6 +2888,7 @@ export const writeTools = [
|
|
|
2711
2888
|
description: "Why the tier is changing (recorded in the commit and provenance)",
|
|
2712
2889
|
},
|
|
2713
2890
|
agent: agentProperty,
|
|
2891
|
+
run_id: runIdProperty,
|
|
2714
2892
|
base_version: baseVersionProperty,
|
|
2715
2893
|
},
|
|
2716
2894
|
required: ["path", "tier", "reason", "agent"],
|
|
@@ -2749,6 +2927,7 @@ export const writeTools = [
|
|
|
2749
2927
|
},
|
|
2750
2928
|
predecessor_valid_until: boundaryProperty,
|
|
2751
2929
|
agent: agentProperty,
|
|
2930
|
+
run_id: runIdProperty,
|
|
2752
2931
|
base_version: baseVersionProperty,
|
|
2753
2932
|
},
|
|
2754
2933
|
required: ["old_path", "new_path", "agent"],
|
|
@@ -2799,6 +2978,7 @@ export const writeTools = [
|
|
|
2799
2978
|
},
|
|
2800
2979
|
predecessor_valid_until: boundaryProperty,
|
|
2801
2980
|
agent: agentProperty,
|
|
2981
|
+
run_id: runIdProperty,
|
|
2802
2982
|
},
|
|
2803
2983
|
required: ["path_a", "path_b", "target_path", "body", "agent"],
|
|
2804
2984
|
additionalProperties: false,
|