crysk 0.4.0 → 0.5.1

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (98) hide show
  1. package/README.md +26 -17
  2. package/config/models/anthropic.json +1 -1
  3. package/dist/SKILL-k4k0zn1w.md +143 -0
  4. package/dist/SKILL-vhb4c3vv.md +553 -0
  5. package/dist/SKILL-xpf6kmdw.md +74 -0
  6. package/dist/ci-admission-0ken6ehx.md +128 -0
  7. package/dist/cli.js +3056 -1623
  8. package/dist/index.js +1744 -938
  9. package/dist/opencode-ci-ac5zksdn.md +106 -0
  10. package/dist/workflow-4pkyck01.yml +160 -0
  11. package/package.json +1 -1
  12. package/prompts/default/PROVENANCE.md +1 -0
  13. package/skills/crysk/SKILL.md +16 -16
  14. package/skills/crysk-ci-setup/SKILL.md +41 -38
  15. package/skills/crysk-ci-setup/assets/workflow.yml +31 -22
  16. package/skills/crysk-ci-setup/references/ci-admission.md +1 -1
  17. package/skills/crysk-ci-setup/references/opencode-ci.md +53 -88
  18. package/skills/crysk-loop/SKILL.md +1 -1
  19. package/src/asset-manifest.ts +0 -4
  20. package/src/assets.ts +1 -1
  21. package/src/ci/admission-ledger.ts +4 -0
  22. package/src/ci/classify-error.ts +21 -24
  23. package/src/ci/cli-record.ts +53 -1
  24. package/src/ci/crysk-secrets.ts +409 -0
  25. package/src/ci/force-comment.ts +14 -1
  26. package/src/ci/gates.ts +86 -57
  27. package/src/ci/outcome.ts +421 -330
  28. package/src/ci/platform-config.ts +2 -2
  29. package/src/ci/platform-estimate.ts +111 -0
  30. package/src/ci/platform-report.ts +274 -41
  31. package/src/ci/platform-trace.ts +581 -0
  32. package/src/ci/platform.ts +58 -12
  33. package/src/ci/publish.ts +19 -6
  34. package/src/ci/reporter.ts +14 -4
  35. package/src/ci/review-levels.ts +8 -7
  36. package/src/ci/run.ts +88 -0
  37. package/src/ci/setup.ts +485 -118
  38. package/src/ci/trace-bundle.ts +1486 -0
  39. package/src/ci/trace-transcripts.ts +480 -0
  40. package/src/ci/trigger.ts +176 -33
  41. package/src/cli.ts +11 -3
  42. package/src/commands/ci-setup-questions.ts +3 -3
  43. package/src/commands/ci-setup.ts +152 -6
  44. package/src/commands/config.ts +3 -0
  45. package/src/commands/doctor.ts +15 -6
  46. package/src/config/config.ts +16 -3
  47. package/src/diversity/clustering.ts +0 -1
  48. package/src/diversity/identity.ts +4 -5
  49. package/src/diversity/pipeline-integration.ts +1 -9
  50. package/src/doctor.ts +3 -3
  51. package/src/execution/attempt-evidence.ts +10 -5
  52. package/src/execution/claude-session-trace.ts +480 -0
  53. package/src/execution/contracts.ts +21 -4
  54. package/src/execution/harness.ts +105 -8
  55. package/src/execution/model-fallback.ts +239 -0
  56. package/src/execution/usage-normalized.ts +6 -4
  57. package/src/home-preflight.ts +1 -1
  58. package/src/index.ts +1 -1
  59. package/src/model/catalog.ts +13 -37
  60. package/src/model/free-discovery.ts +117 -8
  61. package/src/model/model-name.ts +404 -0
  62. package/src/model/provider-capabilities.ts +22 -7
  63. package/src/model/routing.ts +346 -467
  64. package/src/pr/admission.ts +18 -0
  65. package/src/pr/ci-admission-gate.ts +2 -0
  66. package/src/pr/discovery.ts +18 -0
  67. package/src/pr/plan.ts +55 -5
  68. package/src/pr/preflight.ts +1 -1
  69. package/src/pr/publish-outcome.ts +1 -1
  70. package/src/pr/review-pr.ts +26 -1
  71. package/src/pr/target.ts +63 -11
  72. package/src/production-runtime.ts +760 -331
  73. package/src/review/pipeline.ts +277 -101
  74. package/src/review/preflight.ts +201 -294
  75. package/src/review/report.ts +30 -26
  76. package/src/review/review.ts +20 -3
  77. package/src/review/route-preflight.ts +79 -11
  78. package/src/review/run.ts +44 -6
  79. package/src/review/scout.ts +1 -1
  80. package/src/review/spec.ts +3 -3
  81. package/src/review/step-runner.ts +70 -1
  82. package/src/runner-authority.ts +127 -9
  83. package/src/security/binding-policy.ts +1 -2
  84. package/src/security/claude-credential.ts +355 -0
  85. package/src/security/credential-broker.ts +56 -40
  86. package/src/security/evidence-redaction.ts +179 -4
  87. package/src/security/opencode-secret-manifest.ts +114 -0
  88. package/src/security/redact.ts +45 -0
  89. package/src/system-tools.ts +48 -21
  90. package/src/transport-registry.ts +12 -2
  91. package/src/transports/claude-code-cli.ts +21 -2
  92. package/src/transports/opencode-sdk.ts +11 -9
  93. package/src/transports/opencode-server.ts +7 -10
  94. package/src/ui/config-edit.ts +9 -20
  95. package/src/ui/config.ts +32 -27
  96. package/src/ui/plan.ts +84 -50
  97. package/src/updater.ts +10 -7
  98. package/prompts/default/deep-review-lifecycle.md +0 -362
@@ -386,51 +386,66 @@ export class OpenCodeAuthBroker implements CredentialBroker {
386
386
  );
387
387
  }
388
388
 
389
- let raw: string;
390
- try {
391
- raw = await this.readerFn();
392
- } catch {
393
- throw new CredentialProjectionError("source_read_failed");
394
- }
395
-
396
- let parsed: unknown;
397
- try {
398
- parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
399
- } catch {
400
- throw new CredentialProjectionError("malformed_payload");
401
- }
402
-
403
- if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {
404
- throw new CredentialProjectionError("malformed_payload");
405
- }
406
-
407
- const record = (parsed as Record<string, unknown>).openai;
408
- if (typeof record !== "object" || record === null) {
409
- throw new CredentialProjectionError("missing_subscription_record");
410
- }
411
- // This kind promises ChatGPT OAuth specifically. An `openai` entry holding
412
- // a pay-as-you-go API key is a different credential on different billing,
413
- // and projecting it here would make the capability report's
414
- // `billing.mode: "subscription"` a lie rather than a claim.
415
- //
416
- // #133 note: this lock is also what makes credentialKindForRoute's
417
- // provider-keyed decision safe. That function does NOT read the store, so
418
- // an `openai` entry holding an API key still resolves to this OAuth kind —
419
- // and lands here, refused, rather than being silently routed metered. A
420
- // bounded, stated limit, not a bug: the failure is loud and the fix is to
421
- // name that provider differently in the routing config.
422
- if ((record as Record<string, unknown>).type !== "oauth") {
423
- throw new CredentialProjectionError("missing_subscription_record");
389
+ const lookup = await lookupOpenCodeOAuthRecord(this.readerFn);
390
+ if (!lookup.ok) {
391
+ throw new CredentialProjectionError(lookup.failureClass);
424
392
  }
425
393
 
426
394
  return buildOpenCodeProjection(
427
395
  input.kind,
428
396
  OPENCODE_OAUTH_PROVIDER,
429
- record as OpenCodeProviderRecord,
397
+ lookup.record,
430
398
  );
431
399
  }
432
400
  }
433
401
 
402
+ // The read+parse+validate sequence for the `openai` ChatGPT OAuth record, the
403
+ // OAuth broker's own (above) and admission's credential check
404
+ // (openCodeCredentialRefusal, production-runtime.ts). One copy, so admission
405
+ // asks exactly what the broker will ask when the route runs.
406
+ export async function lookupOpenCodeOAuthRecord(
407
+ readerFn: () => Promise<string>,
408
+ ): Promise<OpenCodeRecordLookup> {
409
+ let raw: string;
410
+ try {
411
+ raw = await readerFn();
412
+ } catch {
413
+ return { ok: false, failureClass: "source_read_failed" };
414
+ }
415
+
416
+ let parsed: unknown;
417
+ try {
418
+ parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
419
+ } catch {
420
+ return { ok: false, failureClass: "malformed_payload" };
421
+ }
422
+
423
+ if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) {
424
+ return { ok: false, failureClass: "malformed_payload" };
425
+ }
426
+
427
+ const record = (parsed as Record<string, unknown>).openai;
428
+ if (typeof record !== "object" || record === null) {
429
+ return { ok: false, failureClass: "missing_subscription_record" };
430
+ }
431
+ // This kind promises ChatGPT OAuth specifically. An `openai` entry holding
432
+ // a pay-as-you-go API key is a different credential on different billing,
433
+ // and projecting it here would make the capability report's
434
+ // `billing.mode: "subscription"` a lie rather than a claim.
435
+ //
436
+ // #133 note: this lock is also what makes credentialKindForRoute's
437
+ // provider-keyed decision safe. That function does NOT read the store, so
438
+ // an `openai` entry holding an API key still resolves to this OAuth kind —
439
+ // and lands here, refused, rather than being silently routed metered. A
440
+ // bounded, stated limit, not a bug: the failure is loud and the fix is to
441
+ // name that provider differently in the model name (`opencode:<provider>/...`).
442
+ if ((record as Record<string, unknown>).type !== "oauth") {
443
+ return { ok: false, failureClass: "missing_subscription_record" };
444
+ }
445
+
446
+ return { ok: true, record: record as OpenCodeProviderRecord };
447
+ }
448
+
434
449
  // ONE builder for both OpenCode brokers. A third copy of the create+lstat+hash
435
450
  // sequence is exactly the drift `openCodeProjectionLayout` already exists to
436
451
  // prevent (pr-hero F001 on PR #80: two hand-maintained path lists, three
@@ -526,7 +541,7 @@ function buildOpenCodeProjection(
526
541
  // traversal, a prototype key, or anything requiring escaping.
527
542
  const OPENCODE_PROVIDER_NAME = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]*$/;
528
543
 
529
- type OpenCodeApiRecordLookup =
544
+ export type OpenCodeRecordLookup =
530
545
  | { readonly ok: true; readonly record: OpenCodeProviderRecord }
531
546
  | {
532
547
  readonly ok: false;
@@ -541,11 +556,12 @@ type OpenCodeApiRecordLookup =
541
556
  // hash sequence: a third hand-maintained copy is exactly the drift that
542
557
  // comment warns about, and here it would additionally let the two callers'
543
558
  // validation silently diverge (e.g. one broker accepting a record shape the
544
- // other refuses).
545
- async function lookupOpenCodeApiRecord(
559
+ // other refuses). Admission's credential check (openCodeCredentialRefusal,
560
+ // production-runtime.ts) is the third caller, for the same reason.
561
+ export async function lookupOpenCodeApiRecord(
546
562
  readerFn: () => Promise<string>,
547
563
  provider: string,
548
- ): Promise<OpenCodeApiRecordLookup> {
564
+ ): Promise<OpenCodeRecordLookup> {
549
565
  let raw: string;
550
566
  try {
551
567
  raw = await readerFn();
@@ -1,8 +1,184 @@
1
1
  const MAX_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
2
+ const REDACTED = "[REDACTED]";
2
3
  const SECRET =
3
4
  /authorization|cookie|password|secret|api.?key|access.?token|refresh.?token|^token$|^key$/i;
4
- export function redactEvidenceText(value: string): string {
5
+
6
+ // The words of an identifier, lower-cased. camelCase, snake_case, kebab-case
7
+ // and dotted names split the same way: `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and
8
+ // `awsSecretAccessKey` both give aws, secret, access, key.
9
+ export function nameParts(name: string): string[] {
10
+ return name
11
+ .replace(/([a-z0-9])([A-Z])/g, "$1 $2")
12
+ .replace(/([A-Z]+)([A-Z][a-z])/g, "$1 $2")
13
+ .toLowerCase()
14
+ .split(/[^a-z0-9]+/)
15
+ .filter((part) => part.length > 0);
16
+ }
17
+
18
+ const SECRET_WORDS = new Set([
19
+ "secret",
20
+ "secrets",
21
+ "password",
22
+ "passwords",
23
+ "passwd",
24
+ "passphrase",
25
+ "apikey",
26
+ "apitoken",
27
+ "accesskey",
28
+ "accesstoken",
29
+ "authtoken",
30
+ "privatekey",
31
+ "secretkey",
32
+ "clientsecret",
33
+ "refreshtoken",
34
+ ]);
35
+ const KEY_QUALIFIERS = new Set([
36
+ "api",
37
+ "access",
38
+ "private",
39
+ "secret",
40
+ "client",
41
+ "signing",
42
+ "encryption",
43
+ "master",
44
+ "session",
45
+ ]);
46
+
47
+ // Whether a name says its value is a credential: it holds a secret or password
48
+ // word anywhere, or it ends in `token` or in a qualified `key` (api, access,
49
+ // private...). Counts and descriptors survive: `max_tokens`, `token_type`,
50
+ // `tokenCount` and `apiKeySource` are not credentials.
51
+ export function isSecretName(name: string): boolean {
52
+ const parts = nameParts(name);
53
+ const last = parts.at(-1);
54
+ if (last === undefined) return false;
55
+ if (parts.some((part) => SECRET_WORDS.has(part))) return true;
56
+ if (last === "token") return true;
57
+ const qualifier = parts.at(-2);
58
+ return (
59
+ last === "key" && qualifier !== undefined && KEY_QUALIFIERS.has(qualifier)
60
+ );
61
+ }
62
+
63
+ // Values that cannot be a credential, whatever name they are assigned to: a
64
+ // GitHub Actions expression, a permission or `secrets:` word, a YAML block
65
+ // scalar indicator, a placeholder, an environment reference, a boolean, or a
66
+ // small number. A workflow file a hunter reads is full of them
67
+ // (`id-token: write`, `API_KEY=${{ secrets.API_KEY }}`). The whole value must
68
+ // match, so `write-abc123` or `xxxabc123` is still a value to hide. A number
69
+ // stays hidden under a password name, and past five digits under any name,
70
+ // since a PIN or a numeric key is a secret.
71
+ const NON_SECRET_VALUES: readonly RegExp[] = [
72
+ /^\$\{\{(?:(?!\}\})[^\r\n])*\}\}$/,
73
+ /^(?:read|write|none|read-all|write-all|inherit)$/,
74
+ /^[|>][+-]?[1-9]?$/,
75
+ /^<[^<>\r\n]*>$/,
76
+ /^(?:x{3,}|X{3,}|\*{3,}|changeme|\[REDACTED\])$/,
77
+ /^\$[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*$/,
78
+ /^\$\{[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*\}$/,
79
+ /^(?:process\.env|Bun\.env|import\.meta\.env)\.[A-Za-z_]\w*$/,
80
+ /^(?:true|false)$/i,
81
+ ];
82
+ const PASSWORD_WORDS = new Set(["password", "passwd", "passphrase", "pin"]);
83
+
84
+ export function isNonSecretValue(value: string, name = ""): boolean {
85
+ const bare = value.replace(/^\\*(["'])(.*)\\*\1$/, "$2");
86
+ if (bare === "" || NON_SECRET_VALUES.some((shape) => shape.test(bare))) {
87
+ return true;
88
+ }
89
+ return (
90
+ /^\d{1,5}$/.test(bare) &&
91
+ !nameParts(name).some((part) => PASSWORD_WORDS.has(part))
92
+ );
93
+ }
94
+
95
+ // A GitHub Actions expression is one value even though it holds spaces, so
96
+ // `token: ${{ github.token }}` is read whole and kept, not cut at `${{`.
97
+ // Its body never holds another `${{` and is at most 512 characters, so a line
98
+ // of unclosed `token=${{ ` is scanned once, not to its end from every start.
99
+ export const EXPRESSION_VALUE = String.raw`\$\{\{(?:[^$}\r\n]|\$(?!\{\{)|\}(?!\})){0,512}\}\}(?=[\s,;&"'\\]|$)`;
100
+ // A YAML `:` value may sit below its key, past up to three blank or comment
101
+ // lines, unless that line is a key of its own: a `secrets:` section's first
102
+ // entry is not its value, and a comment is never one. The key must end its
103
+ // line, so each line is crossed from at most the three keys above it.
104
+ const YAML_VALUE_BELOW = String.raw`:(?:[ \t]*\r?\n(?:[ \t]*(?:#[^\r\n]*)?\r?\n){0,3}(?![ \t]*[\w.-]+[ \t]*:(?:\s|$))[ \t]*(?!#)|[ \t]*)`;
105
+
106
+ // Every pattern below stops at quotes and backslashes, so it can run on JSON
107
+ // text without breaking the parse that follows. Each one starts only where a
108
+ // run begins (lookbehind, not \b), so a long run of word characters is
109
+ // scanned once, not once per character.
110
+ // A block cut before its END line runs to the last base64 character. The run
111
+ // also takes the gutter of a line-numbered Read (` 2→` or ` 2\t`,
112
+ // raw or JSON-escaped): digits and whitespace are already base64 run
113
+ // characters, so only the arrow and the escaped tab are added.
114
+ const PEM_PRIVATE_KEY =
115
+ /-----BEGIN[A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY[A-Z ]*-----(?:[\s\S]*?-----END[A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY[A-Z ]*-----|(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/=\s\u2192]|\\[nrt])*)/g;
116
+ // `scheme://user:password@`, for every scheme: postgres, mysql, mongodb+srv,
117
+ // redis, amqp. The user goes too, since it is often a key id.
118
+ const URL_CREDENTIALS =
119
+ /(?<![a-z0-9+.-])([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/)[^\s/@:'"<>\\]*:[^\s/@'"<>\\]+@/gi;
120
+ const AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID = /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}\b/g;
121
+ const STRIPE_KEY = /\b(?:sk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}/g;
122
+ const JWT =
123
+ /(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{4,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]*/g;
124
+ // `"name": "value"`, `name = 'value'` and `{\"name\":\"value\"}`: the value
125
+ // is quoted, so code such as `token_count = usage.total` keeps reading.
126
+ const QUOTED_ASSIGNMENT =
127
+ /(?<![\w.-])([\w.-]+)(\\*["']?\s*[=:]\s*\\*["'])([^"'\\\r\n]+)/g;
128
+ // `NAME=value` and `name: value` in env, ini and YAML files, for UPPER_SNAKE,
129
+ // snake_case and kebab-case names. camelCase is left to the quoted form unless
130
+ // the caller asks for it, so `privateKey = loadKey()` in a code window reads as
131
+ // before; the session copy asks, since a YAML file spells `privateKey: abc`.
132
+ // An `=` value stays on its line, so an empty `TOKEN=` never takes the next
133
+ // variable. A `:` value may sit below its key (YAML_VALUE_BELOW).
134
+ const UNQUOTED_ASSIGNMENT = new RegExp(
135
+ String.raw`(?<![\w.-])([A-Za-z][\w-]*)([ \t]*(?:=[ \t]*|${YAML_VALUE_BELOW}))(${EXPRESSION_VALUE}|[^\s,;&"'\\]+)`,
136
+ "g",
137
+ );
138
+
139
+ /**
140
+ * The credential shapes that need no surrounding context, plus assignments to
141
+ * a name `isSecret` accepts. Safe on JSON text: it never removes a quote.
142
+ */
143
+ export function redactSecretShapes(
144
+ value: string,
145
+ isSecret: (name: string) => boolean = isSecretName,
146
+ unquotedCamelCase = false,
147
+ ): string {
5
148
  return value
149
+ .replace(PEM_PRIVATE_KEY, REDACTED)
150
+ .replace(URL_CREDENTIALS, `$1${REDACTED}@`)
151
+ .replace(AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, REDACTED)
152
+ .replace(STRIPE_KEY, REDACTED)
153
+ .replace(JWT, REDACTED)
154
+ .replace(
155
+ QUOTED_ASSIGNMENT,
156
+ (match, name: string, separator: string, value: string) =>
157
+ isSecret(name) && !isNonSecretValue(value, name)
158
+ ? `${name}${separator}${REDACTED}`
159
+ : match,
160
+ )
161
+ .replace(
162
+ UNQUOTED_ASSIGNMENT,
163
+ (match, name: string, separator: string, value: string) =>
164
+ (unquotedCamelCase || !/[a-z][A-Z]/.test(name)) &&
165
+ isSecret(name) &&
166
+ !isNonSecretValue(value, name)
167
+ ? `${name}${separator}${REDACTED}`
168
+ : match,
169
+ );
170
+ }
171
+
172
+ // A credential keyword, its separator, and the value: on the same line after
173
+ // `=`, and after `:` also below the key (YAML_VALUE_BELOW), so a camelCase
174
+ // `apiKey:` the unquoted rule leaves alone still loses a value on a later line.
175
+ const LEGACY_KEYWORD_VALUE = new RegExp(
176
+ String.raw`((?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|token|password|secret)[ \t]*(?:=[ \t]*|${YAML_VALUE_BELOW}))(${EXPRESSION_VALUE}|[^\s,;&]+)`,
177
+ "gi",
178
+ );
179
+
180
+ export function redactEvidenceText(value: string): string {
181
+ return redactSecretShapes(value)
6
182
  .replace(
7
183
  /\b(?:authorization|proxy-authorization|cookie|set-cookie)\s*:[^\r\n]*/gi,
8
184
  "[REDACTED HEADER]",
@@ -23,9 +199,8 @@ export function redactEvidenceText(value: string): string {
23
199
  /\b(?:sk-[\w-]+|gh[pousr]_[\w]+|github_pat_[\w]+|Bearer\s+[^\s,;]+)/gi,
24
200
  "[REDACTED]",
25
201
  )
26
- .replace(
27
- /((?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|token|password|secret)\s*[=:]\s*)[^\s,;&]+/gi,
28
- "$1[REDACTED]",
202
+ .replace(LEGACY_KEYWORD_VALUE, (match, keyword: string, value: string) =>
203
+ isNonSecretValue(value, keyword) ? match : `${keyword}[REDACTED]`,
29
204
  );
30
205
  }
31
206
  /** JSON-only bounded traversal: never call getters, custom iterators or toJSON. */
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
1
+ // The manifest the CI setup step leaves beside the OpenCode auth file it builds
2
+ // from CRYSK_OPENCODE_* secrets (odd/tasks/role-model-routing.md S8/S9, L12
3
+ // "Building auth.json", unit U3).
4
+ //
5
+ // WHY a file: the secrets reach the setup step only (L13), and the run step
6
+ // never sees them or the setup step's outputs, yet the run must bind each
7
+ // OpenCode route to the kind of credential the auth file actually holds. An
8
+ // openai record built from `CRYSK_OPENCODE_OPENAI_API_KEY` is a metered API
9
+ // token, not the ChatGPT subscription the provider literal assumes. The setup
10
+ // step writes, next to auth.json, WHICH secret built each provider's record;
11
+ // the run reads the names back and hands them to credentialKindForRoute
12
+ // (runner-authority.ts), which applies the same chooseOpenCodeSecret rule the
13
+ // setup step used. Names and kinds only, never a value.
14
+ //
15
+ // No manifest (the old `opencode-auth` input, a local `opencode auth login`
16
+ // store) means the provider literal decides, exactly as before U3. A manifest
17
+ // that does not parse is treated as absent: the literal then stands and a
18
+ // mismatched record is refused loudly at projection, never billed silently.
19
+
20
+ import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
21
+ import { homedir } from "node:os";
22
+ import path from "node:path";
23
+ import { resolveOpenCodeAuthPath } from "./credential-broker";
24
+
25
+ export const OPENCODE_SECRET_MANIFEST_FILE = "crysk-credentials.json";
26
+
27
+ const SOURCE = "crysk-secrets";
28
+ const SECRET_NAME_RE =
29
+ /^CRYSK_OPENCODE_[A-Z0-9]+(?:_[A-Z0-9]+)*_(?:API_KEY|OAUTH)$/;
30
+
31
+ export interface OpenCodeSecretManifestEntry {
32
+ // The provider id as the model name writes it, which keys auth.json.
33
+ readonly provider: string;
34
+ // The secret whose value built the record.
35
+ readonly secret: string;
36
+ readonly kind: "oauth" | "api_key";
37
+ // The provider's other secret, set but not used (the subscription came first).
38
+ readonly unused?: string;
39
+ }
40
+
41
+ export function openCodeSecretManifestPath(authPath: string): string {
42
+ return path.join(path.dirname(authPath), OPENCODE_SECRET_MANIFEST_FILE);
43
+ }
44
+
45
+ export function serializeOpenCodeSecretManifest(
46
+ entries: readonly OpenCodeSecretManifestEntry[],
47
+ ): string {
48
+ const providers: Record<string, Record<string, string>> = {};
49
+ for (const entry of [...entries].sort((a, b) =>
50
+ a.provider.localeCompare(b.provider),
51
+ )) {
52
+ providers[entry.provider] = {
53
+ secret: entry.secret,
54
+ kind: entry.kind,
55
+ ...(entry.unused === undefined ? {} : { unused: entry.unused }),
56
+ };
57
+ }
58
+ return `${JSON.stringify({ v: 1, source: SOURCE, providers }, null, 2)}\n`;
59
+ }
60
+
61
+ function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
62
+ return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
63
+ }
64
+
65
+ // Every secret name the manifest records, sorted, or undefined when the text is
66
+ // not a manifest this version wrote.
67
+ export function openCodeSecretNamesFromManifest(
68
+ text: string,
69
+ ): readonly string[] | undefined {
70
+ let parsed: unknown;
71
+ try {
72
+ parsed = JSON.parse(text);
73
+ } catch {
74
+ return undefined;
75
+ }
76
+ if (!isRecord(parsed) || parsed.v !== 1 || parsed.source !== SOURCE) {
77
+ return undefined;
78
+ }
79
+ if (!isRecord(parsed.providers)) return undefined;
80
+ const names = new Set<string>();
81
+ for (const entry of Object.values(parsed.providers)) {
82
+ if (!isRecord(entry)) return undefined;
83
+ if (entry.kind !== "oauth" && entry.kind !== "api_key") return undefined;
84
+ const recorded =
85
+ entry.unused === undefined
86
+ ? [entry.secret]
87
+ : [entry.secret, entry.unused];
88
+ for (const name of recorded) {
89
+ if (typeof name !== "string" || !SECRET_NAME_RE.test(name)) {
90
+ return undefined;
91
+ }
92
+ names.add(name);
93
+ }
94
+ }
95
+ return [...names].sort();
96
+ }
97
+
98
+ // The names the manifest beside the auth file this env resolves to records, or
99
+ // undefined when there is none. Read once per run, at admission.
100
+ export function readOpenCodeSecretNames(
101
+ env: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>> = process.env,
102
+ homeDir: string = homedir(),
103
+ ): readonly string[] | undefined {
104
+ let text: string;
105
+ try {
106
+ text = readFileSync(
107
+ openCodeSecretManifestPath(resolveOpenCodeAuthPath(env, homeDir)),
108
+ "utf8",
109
+ );
110
+ } catch {
111
+ return undefined;
112
+ }
113
+ return openCodeSecretNamesFromManifest(text);
114
+ }
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ const REDACTION_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [
8
8
  /sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g,
9
9
  /gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}/g,
10
10
  /Bearer\s+\S+/gi,
11
+ // Google API keys: `AIza` and 35 characters.
12
+ /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}/g,
13
+ // Groq (`gsk_`) and xAI (`xai-`) keys. The minimum length keeps model and
14
+ // provider names that share the prefix (`xai-grok-4`) readable.
15
+ /gsk_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,
16
+ /xai-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,
11
17
  ];
12
18
 
13
19
  // A keyword followed by a value: `token: abc`, `api_key="abc"`, `password hunter2`. When
@@ -69,3 +75,42 @@ export function redactDiagnostic(text: string): string {
69
75
  : REDACTED,
70
76
  );
71
77
  }
78
+
79
+ // Plain hex and base64 are NOT in REDACTION_PATTERNS: error output and logs
80
+ // carry commit SHAs and digests, and redacting them would hide the evidence.
81
+ // They are refused only where a whole config value is validated (a model name,
82
+ // an effort, a config key), which never holds a SHA or a digest.
83
+ //
84
+ // Hex: 32 characters or more, the shortest common key length (MD5-sized).
85
+ const WHOLE_HEX = /^[0-9a-fA-F]{32,}$/;
86
+ // Base64: 40 characters or more of the standard alphabet plus `_`, padding
87
+ // allowed, with upper case, lower case and a digit. `-` and `.` are left out
88
+ // on purpose: model ids are hyphenated or dotted words
89
+ // (`Llama-4-Maverick-17B-128E-Instruct-FP8`), keys are not.
90
+ const WHOLE_BASE64 = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/_]{40,}={0,2}$/;
91
+
92
+ function isLongBase64(value: string): boolean {
93
+ return (
94
+ WHOLE_BASE64.test(value) &&
95
+ /[A-Z]/.test(value) &&
96
+ /[a-z]/.test(value) &&
97
+ /[0-9]/.test(value)
98
+ );
99
+ }
100
+
101
+ // Whether a whole config value looks like a credential: a key shape that
102
+ // redactDiagnostic knows, or a long plain hex or base64 value.
103
+ export function looksLikeCredential(value: string): boolean {
104
+ return (
105
+ redactDiagnostic(value) !== value ||
106
+ WHOLE_HEX.test(value) ||
107
+ isLongBase64(value)
108
+ );
109
+ }
110
+
111
+ // A config value for a message: `[REDACTED]` when the whole value looks like a
112
+ // credential, otherwise redactDiagnostic's output.
113
+ export function redactConfigValue(value: string): string {
114
+ if (WHOLE_HEX.test(value) || isLongBase64(value)) return REDACTED;
115
+ return redactDiagnostic(value);
116
+ }
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ import {
6
6
  LEGACY_WORKFLOW_RELATIVE_PATH,
7
7
  WORKFLOW_RELATIVE_PATH,
8
8
  } from "./brand-paths";
9
+ import {
10
+ claudeCredentialPresence,
11
+ defaultClaudeLoginPresent,
12
+ } from "./security/claude-credential";
9
13
  import { resolveOpenCodeAuthPath } from "./security/credential-broker";
10
14
 
11
15
  export type SystemTool = "git" | "claude" | "gh" | "codegraph";
@@ -28,6 +32,10 @@ export interface CheckSystemToolsOptions {
28
32
  exists?: (path: string) => boolean;
29
33
  env?: Record<string, string | undefined>;
30
34
  home?: string;
35
+ // Injectable so the Keychain half of the Claude login check is testable off macOS.
36
+ platform?: NodeJS.Platform;
37
+ // Whether the Keychain item exists; tests inject it so none asks the real Keychain.
38
+ keychainProbe?: () => boolean;
31
39
  }
32
40
 
33
41
  export interface InstallSystemToolOptions {
@@ -103,6 +111,7 @@ export async function checkSystemTools(
103
111
  const exists = options.exists ?? existsSync;
104
112
  const env = options.env ?? process.env;
105
113
  const home = options.home ?? os.homedir();
114
+ const platform = options.platform ?? process.platform;
106
115
 
107
116
  // 1. git
108
117
  const gitBin = await which("git");
@@ -134,26 +143,33 @@ export async function checkSystemTools(
134
143
  const res = await exec([claudeBin, "--version"]);
135
144
  const version = res.stdout.trim().replace(/^claude-code\//, "");
136
145
 
137
- // Check auth mechanisms
138
- const hasToken =
139
- Boolean(
140
- env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN &&
141
- env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN.trim().length > 0,
142
- ) ||
143
- Boolean(env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY && env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY.trim().length > 0);
144
-
145
- const hasSessionFile =
146
- exists(path.join(home, ".claude.json")) ||
147
- exists(path.join(home, ".claude", "session.json"));
148
-
149
- const authOk = hasToken || hasSessionFile;
146
+ // The rule a run applies (U2, security/claude-credential.ts): a Claude
147
+ // credential variable (CRYSK_CLAUDE_* first, then the CLI's own names), or
148
+ // the machine's own login. `~/.claude.json` and `~/.claude/session.json` do
149
+ // not count: every Claude user has the first, API-key users included. The
150
+ // login half is defaultClaudeLoginPresent itself, over the injected `exists`,
151
+ // `home`, `platform` and `keychainProbe`: the CLI's OAuth store, or on macOS
152
+ // the Keychain item (R001, #494), so the doctor says what the run will choose.
153
+ const loginPresent = defaultClaudeLoginPresent(
154
+ { HOME: home },
155
+ {
156
+ platform,
157
+ existsFn: exists,
158
+ ...(options.keychainProbe === undefined
159
+ ? {}
160
+ : { keychainProbe: options.keychainProbe }),
161
+ },
162
+ );
163
+ const presence = claudeCredentialPresence(env, loginPresent);
164
+ const authOk =
165
+ presence.subscription !== undefined || presence.api_key !== undefined;
150
166
  claudeStatus = {
151
167
  installed: true,
152
168
  version: version.length > 0 ? version : undefined,
153
169
  authOk,
154
170
  hint: authOk
155
171
  ? undefined
156
- : "Run 'claude' in your terminal to complete login or set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
172
+ : "Run 'claude' in your terminal to log in, or set CRYSK_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN (from 'claude setup-token') or CRYSK_CLAUDE_API_KEY",
157
173
  };
158
174
  }
159
175
 
@@ -273,8 +289,9 @@ export async function installSystemTool(
273
289
  // can happen in — see spec.md §4.1's two scenarios:
274
290
  // - Inside GitHub Actions: are the required secrets present? Presence
275
291
  // only, NEVER a value, a prefix, or a length — see CLAUDE.md's "Never
276
- // leak secrets into generated output" rule. Review auth is Anthropic
277
- // env OR the OpenCode auth file at resolveOpenCodeAuthPath().
292
+ // leak secrets into generated output" rule. Review auth is a Claude
293
+ // credential by U2's rule (CRYSK_CLAUDE_* first) OR the OpenCode auth
294
+ // file at resolveOpenCodeAuthPath().
278
295
  // - In a local repo: is a pr-hero workflow configured at all?
279
296
  // Deliberately does NOT verify the workflow file is git-committed (spec's
280
297
  // "present and committed" local scenario) — that needs a git call, and the
@@ -304,27 +321,37 @@ export function checkCiConfiguration(
304
321
  if (options.isCi) {
305
322
  const exists = options.exists ?? existsSync;
306
323
  const hasGithubToken = Boolean(env.GITHUB_TOKEN?.trim());
324
+ // U2's rule, the one a run chooses by: CRYSK_CLAUDE_* first (what the action's
325
+ // crysk-secrets input carries, U5), then the CLI's names; a whitespace-only value
326
+ // is absent and ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN never counts. No login: a hosted runner has none.
327
+ const presence = claudeCredentialPresence(env, false);
307
328
  const hasClaudeAuth =
308
- Boolean(env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY?.trim()) ||
309
- Boolean(env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN?.trim());
329
+ presence.subscription !== undefined || presence.api_key !== undefined;
310
330
  const hasOpenCodeAuth = exists(resolveOpenCodeAuthPath(env));
311
331
  const hasReviewAuth = hasClaudeAuth || hasOpenCodeAuth;
312
332
 
313
333
  const missing: string[] = [];
314
334
  if (!hasGithubToken) missing.push("GITHUB_TOKEN");
315
- if (!hasReviewAuth) missing.push("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY");
335
+ if (!hasReviewAuth) {
336
+ missing.push("CRYSK_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN (or CRYSK_CLAUDE_API_KEY)");
337
+ }
316
338
 
317
339
  if (missing.length === 0) {
318
340
  return {
319
341
  configured: true,
320
342
  message:
321
- "Required CI secrets are present (GITHUB_TOKEN, Anthropic/Claude or OpenCode auth)",
343
+ "Required CI secrets are present (GITHUB_TOKEN, a CRYSK_CLAUDE_* credential or OpenCode auth)",
322
344
  };
323
345
  }
324
346
  return {
325
347
  configured: false,
326
348
  message: `Missing required CI secret(s): ${missing.join(", ")}`,
327
- hint: "Configure the missing secret(s) as repository secrets and pass them in the workflow's `with:` block — never echo their values.",
349
+ hint:
350
+ "Set the missing secret(s) as repository secrets (`claude setup-token`, then " +
351
+ "`gh secret set CRYSK_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN`) and pass each in the Crysk action's " +
352
+ // Spliced so the GitHub expression is not read as a template placeholder.
353
+ "`crysk-secrets` input as a `NAME=$" +
354
+ "{{ secrets.NAME }}` line — never echo their values.",
328
355
  };
329
356
  }
330
357
 
@@ -3,7 +3,11 @@ import os from "node:os";
3
3
  import path from "node:path";
4
4
  import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
5
5
  import { capabilityGateDecision } from "#model/provider-capabilities";
6
- import type { ResolvedRoutePlan, ResolvedStepRoute } from "#model/routing";
6
+ import {
7
+ planRoutes,
8
+ type ResolvedRoutePlan,
9
+ type ResolvedStepRoute,
10
+ } from "#model/routing";
7
11
  import { type AssetMode, detectAssetMode } from "./assets";
8
12
  // Route-keyed transport factory/cache: one ProviderTransport instance per
9
13
  // `${backend}:${routeFingerprint}`. `release()` drops a lease; teardown order
@@ -492,6 +496,10 @@ export interface TransportFactoryOptions {
492
496
  readonly env?: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>;
493
497
  // #149: the credential broker the authority resolved for the opencode
494
498
  // backend. The server runs under its projection for the servers whole life.
499
+ // U4: on the registry it is only the default, set when the plan runs on one
500
+ // OpenCode credential; each binding passes its own on get() (acquire), and
501
+ // `{ ...defaultOptions, ...options }` lets that one win, so a plan on several
502
+ // credentials gives each route's server its own broker.
495
503
  readonly credentialBroker?: CredentialBroker;
496
504
  // #133: the KIND that broker was resolved for. Travels beside it and is
497
505
  // only ever meaningful as a pair — see openCodeLaunchServerFor.
@@ -971,7 +979,9 @@ export async function admitRoutePlan(
971
979
  const reports = new Map<RunnerBackend, ProviderCapabilityReport>();
972
980
  const mode = options.mode ?? "production";
973
981
 
974
- for (const step of plan.steps) {
982
+ // Every route the plan may run, fallbacks included (S4): a fallback on a
983
+ // backend that is not admissible fails here, before anything spends.
984
+ for (const step of planRoutes(plan)) {
975
985
  const backend = step.route.backend;
976
986
 
977
987
  if (!registry.has(backend)) {