crypto-aio 0.0.3 → 0.2.0

package/dist/adapters/evm/proofs.js

@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.consumptionHeight = consumptionHeight;
+exports.createEvmProofs = createEvmProofs;
+exports.mayHold = mayHold;
+exports.createEvmBlocks = createEvmBlocks;
+/**
+ * Proofs and block scanning. Every proof read is a quorum read under `PROOF`, comparing
+ * only consensus facts (`rpc.ts`). No proof lets one endpoint choose the final height: a
+ * proof attests the fact it needs at that fact's own
+ * height, so honest endpoints disagree only while it is final on one and not yet on another,
+ * which decides nothing. The block source serves dense heights with native transfers and
+ * ERC-20 `Transfer` logs, as the chain reports them. Every error thrown here is a
+ * `PROVIDER_*` code, retryable by the code table: look again later.
+ */
+const sha3_1 = require("@noble/hashes/sha3");
+const utils_1 = require("@noble/hashes/utils");
+const error_1 = require("../../core/errors/error");
+const client_1 = require("./client");
+const decode_1 = require("./decode");
+const reader_1 = require("./reader");
+const rpc_1 = require("./rpc");
+/**
+ * A quorum key under which every endpoint whose nonce is past `nonce` agrees. A
+ * malformed answer throws, which the transport counts as a disagreement.
+ */
+const nonceAbove = (nonce) => (result) => (0, client_1.quantity)(result, 'nonce') > nonce;
+/**
+ * Node texts for state it does not hold: pruned, beyond its recent-state window, or
+ * not served at a tag (geth, op-geth, Nitro, BSC, Erigon, Reth, Besu wordings).
+ */
+const STATE_UNAVAILABLE = /missing trie node|historical state .* not available|header not found|state (is )?not available|pruned/i;
+/**
+ * The boundary of every proof. Only a definitive negative answer may
+ * say "no", and a JSON-RPC error answer is none: state the node does not hold, an index it
+ * is still building (geth's "transaction indexing is in progress"), or any other error,
+ * ambiguous or not. Every `RPC_ERROR` becomes a retryable `PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE` (look again
+ * later, or elsewhere) that carries it as its cause, so no caller takes it for an answer and
+ * the monitor keeps watching. Every other error passes unchanged: `PROVIDER_MISCONFIGURED`
+ * stays final, and aborts and foreign errors stay what they are.
+ */
+async function undecided(proof) {
+    try {
+        return await proof();
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (!(0, error_1.isCryptoAioError)(error, 'RPC_ERROR'))
+            throw error;
+        const message = String(error.details?.rpcMessage ?? error.message);
+        throw new error_1.ProviderError('PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE', STATE_UNAVAILABLE.test(message)
+            ? 'finalized state not available'
+            : 'the endpoints gave no answer', { cause: error });
+    }
+}
+/** A retryable "decide nothing": look again later, or elsewhere. */
+const undecidable = (reason) => new error_1.ProviderError('PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE', reason);
+/**
+ * At most this many nonce reads look for the height that consumed a nonce. The gallop
+ * and the bisection take about two reads per doubling of the distance back: at worst 60
+ * reads below a final height of 2^30, and 64 below 2^32, so this reaches every consumption
+ * on any chain served today.
+ */
+const MAX_SEARCH_READS = 64;
+/**
+ * The lowest height at or below `final` where `consumed` holds, given that it holds at
+ * `final`. A gallop back (`final` less 1, 2, 4, …) finds a height where it does not, then a
+ * bisection the first where it does. `consumed` never turns false again as the height
+ * grows, since an account's nonce never falls. Beyond `MAX_SEARCH_READS` reads, it decides
+ * nothing.
+ */
+async function consumptionHeight(consumed, final) {
+    let reads = 0;
+    const read = (height) => {
+        if (reads === MAX_SEARCH_READS) {
+            throw undecidable('the nonce was consumed too far back to look up');
+        }
+        reads += 1;
+        return consumed(height);
+    };
+    // Consumed at `high`; not at `low` (below genesis, until a read says otherwise).
+    let high = final;
+    let low = -1n;
+    for (let step = 1n; high > 0n && low < 0n; step *= 2n) {
+        const height = final > step ? final - step : 0n;
+        if (await read(height))
+            high = height;
+        else
+            low = height;
+    }
+    while (high - low > 1n) {
+        const middle = (low + high) / 2n;
+        if (await read(middle))
+            high = middle;
+        else
+            low = middle;
+    }
+    return high;
+}
+/**
+ * Whether `txHash` is final, when no endpoint serves its
+ * receipt. `null` is no proof of absence: a node answers it for every transaction outside its
+ * index (geth indexes the last 2,350,000 blocks by default, and pruning nodes of other
+ * clients drop theirs), so "not included" would prove a final, executed transfer `replaced`.
+ * The nonce's consumer decides instead. The quorum attests the nonce consumed at a final
+ * height, a search finds the block that consumed it, and the sender's transaction at that
+ * nonce there answers: another one proves ours is not included; ours is included, with the
+ * verdict its receipt in that block gives. Anything else decides nothing, and so does
+ * an endpoint without the historical state the search reads.
+ *
+ * Known gap: nothing caches the consumer per sender and nonce, so an undecided Attempt
+ * repeats the search on every monitor pass. A nonce that an EIP-7702 authorization
+ * consumed (no transaction from the sender) is never decided, the safe direction.
+ */
+async function nonceConsumer(ctx, txHash, ordering, from) {
+    if (ordering.kind !== 'nonce')
+        throw undecidable('no nonce to look the transaction up by');
+    const { client } = ctx;
+    const { nonce } = ordering;
+    const tags = { ...reader_1.PROOF, quorumKey: nonceAbove(nonce) };
+    const consumed = async (height) => (await client.getTransactionCount(from, height, tags)) > nonce;
+    const { height: final } = await (0, reader_1.provenFinal)(ctx, reader_1.PROOF);
+    if (!(await consumed(final)))
+        throw undecidable('the nonce is not consumed at finality');
+    const height = await consumptionHeight(consumed, final);
+    const block = await client.getBlockWithTransactions(height, {
+        ...reader_1.PROOF,
+        quorumKey: rpc_1.blockTransactionsKey,
+    });
+    if (block?.number !== height)
+        throw undecidable('the endpoints serve no final block');
+    const sender = from.toLowerCase();
+    const consumer = block.transactions.find((tx) => tx.from.toLowerCase() === sender && tx.nonce === nonce);
+    // No transaction from the sender used the nonce: an EIP-7702 authorization can.
+    if (!consumer)
+        throw undecidable('no transaction in its block used the nonce');
+    // Another transaction is final at our nonce: ours can never be included.
+    if (consumer.hash !== txHash.toLowerCase())
+        return { included: false };
+    const receipts = await client.getBlockReceipts(block.hash, reader_1.PROOF);
+    const receipt = receipts?.find((r) => r.transactionHash === consumer.hash);
+    if (receipt?.blockHash !== block.hash) {
+        throw undecidable('the final block has no receipts on the endpoints');
+    }
+    return {
+        included: true,
+        ...verdict(receipt.status === 1, (0, decode_1.tokenTransferLanded)(client.abi, consumer, receipt)),
+        blockHeight: height,
+        blockHash: block.hash,
+        txHash: consumer.hash,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * The verdict of an included transaction of ours: a reverted one, or one that executed but
+ * logged no token transfer to its recipient (`unevidenced`: value may have moved).
+ */
+function verdict(executed, landed) {
+    if (!executed)
+        return { success: false };
+    return landed
+        ? { success: true }
+        : { success: false, reason: 'token transfer failed', failure: 'unevidenced' };
+}
+function createEvmProofs(ctx) {
+    const { client } = ctx;
+    return {
+        finalizedHead: () => undecided(async () => {
+            const { height, block } = await (0, reader_1.provenFinal)(ctx, reader_1.PROOF);
+            const final = block ?? (await client.getBlock(height, reader_1.PROOF));
+            if (!final) {
+                throw new error_1.ProviderError('PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE', 'the endpoints serve no finalized block');
+            }
+            return { height: final.number, hash: final.hash, timestamp: final.timestamp };
+        }),
+        includedFinal: (ref, ordering, from) => undecided(async () => {
+            const receipt = await client.getReceipt(ref.id, reader_1.PROOF);
+            // No receipt is no proof of absence; the transaction at our nonce decides.
+            if (!receipt)
+                return nonceConsumer(ctx, ref.id, ordering, from);
+            const final = await (0, reader_1.finalBlockAt)(ctx, receipt.blockNumber, reader_1.PROOF);
+            // The transaction is in a block, just not a final one on these endpoints yet.
+            // "Not included" would let the core prove a final transfer `replaced` (whenAbsent,
+            // after the slot was proven consumed on endpoints whose finality is further along),
+            // so this decides nothing.
+            if (!final) {
+                throw new error_1.ProviderError('PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE', 'receipt not yet final');
+            }
+            // The endpoints agree on a receipt from a block that is not the final one at its
+            // height: the chain reorganized between the reads, or their receipt index lags. The
+            // transaction may be final elsewhere, so this decides nothing.
+            if (final.hash !== receipt.blockHash) {
+                throw new error_1.ProviderError('PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT', 'the receipt is not in the final block at its height');
+            }
+            const executed = receipt.status === 1;
+            let landed = true;
+            if (executed) {
+                // A token transfer that logged no transfer to its recipient paid it nothing
+                // (read from the ref alone, the call's arguments from its keyed calldata). The
+                // core proves only its own Attempts, so this is always a verdict.
+                const tx = await client.getTransaction(ref.id, reader_1.PROOF);
+                if (!tx) {
+                    throw new error_1.ProviderError('PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT', 'a receipt without its transaction');
+                }
+                landed = (0, decode_1.tokenTransferLanded)(client.abi, tx, receipt);
+            }
+            return {
+                included: true,
+                ...verdict(executed, landed),
+                blockHeight: receipt.blockNumber,
+                blockHash: receipt.blockHash,
+                txHash: receipt.transactionHash,
+            };
+        }),
+        slotConsumed: (ordering, from, level) => undecided(async () => {
+            if (ordering.kind !== 'nonce')
+                return false;
+            if (level === 'latest') {
+                return ((await client.getTransactionCount(from, 'latest', reader_1.MONITOR)) > ordering.nonce);
+            }
+            // The nonce at a height the quorum attests final (one endpoint's view proposes
+            // it, trailed by PEER_SKEW), on tag and confirmation networks alike. State at a final
+            // height never changes, so honest endpoints agree however their heads move, and one
+            // that over-reports its finalized block cannot advance the height. A number,
+            // not the `finalized` tag: some nodes (BSC's) serve no state at the tag.
+            const { height } = await (0, reader_1.provenFinal)(ctx, reader_1.PROOF);
+            const count = await client.getTransactionCount(from, height, {
+                ...reader_1.PROOF,
+                quorumKey: nonceAbove(ordering.nonce),
+            });
+            return count > ordering.nonce;
+        }),
+        // Nonce ordering: an EVM transaction never expires.
+        expired: async () => false,
+        blockHash: (height, level) => undecided(async () => {
+            if (level === 'finalized') {
+                return (await (0, reader_1.finalBlockAt)(ctx, height, reader_1.PROOF))?.hash ?? null;
+            }
+            return (await client.getBlock(height, reader_1.PROOF))?.hash ?? null;
+        }),
+    };
+}
+const changed = (height) => new error_1.ProviderError('PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT', `block ${height} changed while scanning`);
+/**
+ * Whether a block's `logsBloom` may hold `value` (a log's address or topic), by the
+ * yellow paper's M3:2048: three bits, each the low 11 bits of a byte pair of the value's
+ * keccak-256. `false` is definitive; `true` may be a false positive. No bloom may hold
+ * anything.
+ */
+function mayHold(bloom, value) {
+    if (bloom === undefined)
+        return true;
+    const hash = (0, sha3_1.keccak_256)((0, utils_1.hexToBytes)(value.slice(2)));
+    for (let i = 0; i < 6; i += 2) {
+        const bit = ((hash[i] << 8) | hash[i + 1]) & 2047;
+        // Bit 0 is the last byte's lowest bit.
+        const byte = 255 - (bit >> 3);
+        const bits = Number.parseInt(bloom.slice(2 + 2 * byte, 4 + 2 * byte), 16);
+        if ((bits & (1 << (bit & 7))) === 0)
+            return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+/** Provider texts for a method they do not serve, whatever their error code. */
+const METHOD_MISSING = /method .*(not found|not supported|does not exist|is not available)/i;
+/**
+ * A definitive answer that the node does not serve `eth_getBlockReceipts`: JSON-RPC's
+ * "method not found" (-32601), EIP-1474's "method not supported" (-32004), or a provider's
+ * own code with a text that says so.
+ */
+function methodMissing(error) {
+    if (!(0, error_1.isCryptoAioError)(error, 'RPC_ERROR') || error.ambiguous)
+        return false;
+    const { rpcCode, rpcMessage } = error.details ?? {};
+    return (rpcCode === -32601 ||
+        rpcCode === -32004 ||
+        METHOD_MISSING.test(String(rpcMessage ?? '')));
+}
+/**
+ * Every receipt of `block` in one call, by transaction hash. The node reads them by
+ * block, never through a log or transaction index that may lag. `undefined` when the node
+ * does not serve `eth_getBlockReceipts`.
+ */
+async function blockReceipts(client, block) {
+    let receipts;
+    try {
+        receipts = await client.getBlockReceipts(block.hash, reader_1.MONITOR);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (methodMissing(error))
+            return undefined;
+        throw error;
+    }
+    if (receipts === null)
+        throw changed(block.number);
+    return new Map(receipts.map((receipt) => [receipt.transactionHash, receipt]));
+}
+/** The fallback: one `eth_getTransactionReceipt` per transaction. */
+async function receiptsOf(client, txs) {
+    const receipts = await Promise.all(txs.map((tx) => client.getReceipt(tx.hash, reader_1.MONITOR)));
+    return new Map(receipts.flatMap((receipt, i) => receipt ? [[txs[i]?.hash, receipt]] : []));
+}
+/**
+ * The logs of every transaction of `block`. A receipt missing, or from another block, could
+ * hide a deposit, so it fails the scan retryably instead.
+ */
+function blockLogs(block, receipts) {
+    return block.transactions.flatMap((tx) => {
+        const receipt = receipts.get(tx.hash);
+        if (receipt?.blockHash !== block.hash)
+            throw changed(block.number);
+        return receipt.logs;
+    });
+}
+function createEvmBlocks(ctx) {
+    const { client, config } = ctx;
+    /**
+     * The block's `Transfer` logs without block receipts: `eth_getLogs`, which a lagging
+     * log index answers empty without an error. So when it answers nothing while the header's
+     * bloom may hold the topic, every transaction's receipt is read before the empty answer
+     * is trusted: any call may have logged one.
+     */
+    const transferLogs = async (block) => {
+        const topic = client.abi.transferTopic;
+        const logs = await client.getLogs({ blockHash: block.hash, topics: [topic] }, reader_1.MONITOR);
+        if (logs.length > 0 || !mayHold(block.logsBloom, topic))
+            return { logs };
+        const receipts = await receiptsOf(client, block.transactions);
+        return { logs: blockLogs(block, receipts), receipts };
+    };
+    return {
+        async header(height) {
+            const block = await client.getBlock(height, reader_1.MONITOR);
+            return block ? (0, reader_1.toDriverBlock)(block) : null;
+        },
+        async transactions(block, filter) {
+            const full = await client.getBlockWithTransactions(block.height, reader_1.MONITOR);
+            if (!full || full.hash !== block.hash)
+                throw changed(block.height);
+            // One call for every receipt of the block, filtered scans included.
+            let receipts = await blockReceipts(client, full);
+            let selected = full.transactions;
+            if (filter?.addresses?.length) {
+                const wanted = new Set(filter.addresses.map((a) => a.toLowerCase()));
+                const watched = (address) => address !== null && wanted.has(address.toLowerCase());
+                let logs;
+                if (receipts)
+                    logs = blockLogs(full, receipts);
+                else
+                    ({ logs, receipts } = await transferLogs(full));
+                const tokenTxs = new Set(logs
+                    .filter((log) => {
+                    const transfer = client.abi.decodeTransfer(log);
+                    return (transfer !== null && (watched(transfer.from) || watched(transfer.to)));
+                })
+                    .map((log) => log.transactionHash));
+                // A contract creation's recipient is only in its receipt, so every creation stays.
+                selected = full.transactions.filter((tx) => tx.to === null || watched(tx.from) || watched(tx.to) || tokenTxs.has(tx.hash));
+            }
+            receipts ??= await receiptsOf(client, selected);
+            return selected.map((tx) => {
+                const receipt = receipts.get(tx.hash);
+                if (!receipt || receipt.blockHash !== block.hash)
+                    throw changed(block.height);
+                // The chain's view, with the network's config so bor's system logs do not make a
+                // plain Polygon transfer `partial`.
+                return (0, decode_1.decodeTransaction)(client.abi, tx, receipt, full.timestamp, config);
+            });
+        },
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=proofs.js.map

package/dist/adapters/evm/proofs.js.map

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* Proofs and block scanning. Every proof read is a quorum read under `PROOF`, comparing\n * only consensus facts (`rpc.ts`). No proof lets one endpoint choose the final height: a\n * proof attests the fact it needs at that fact's own\n * height, so honest endpoints disagree only while it is final on one and not yet on another,\n * which decides nothing. The block source serves dense heights with native transfers and\n * ERC-20 `Transfer` logs, as the chain reports them. Every error thrown here is a\n * `PROVIDER_*` code, retryable by the code table: look again later.\n */\nimport { keccak_256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha3';\nimport { hexToBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils';\nimport type { BlockSource, ProofSource } from '../../core/driver/types';\nimport { ProviderError, isCryptoAioError } from '../../core/errors/error';\nimport type { OrderingData } from '../../core/model/ordering';\nimport type { TxFailure } from '../../core/model/transaction';\nimport { quantity } from './client';\nimport { decodeTransaction, tokenTransferLanded } from './decode';\nimport {\n  MONITOR,\n  PROOF,\n  finalBlockAt,\n  provenFinal,\n  toDriverBlock,\n  type EvmContext,\n} from './reader';\nimport { blockTransactionsKey } from './rpc';\nimport type { EvmClient, EvmFullBlock, EvmLog, EvmReceipt, EvmTx } from './types';\n\n/**\n * A quorum key under which every endpoint whose nonce is past `nonce` agrees. A\n * malformed answer throws, which the transport counts as a disagreement.\n */\nconst nonceAbove =\n  (nonce: bigint) =>\n  (result: unknown): boolean =>\n    quantity(result, 'nonce') > nonce;\n\n/**\n * Node texts for state it does not hold: pruned, beyond its recent-state window, or\n * not served at a tag (geth, op-geth, Nitro, BSC, Erigon, Reth, Besu wordings).\n */\nconst STATE_UNAVAILABLE =\n  /missing trie node|historical state .* not available|header not found|state (is )?not available|pruned/i;\n\n/**\n * The boundary of every proof. Only a definitive negative answer may\n * say \"no\", and a JSON-RPC error answer is none: state the node does not hold, an index it\n * is still building (geth's \"transaction indexing is in progress\"), or any other error,\n * ambiguous or not. Every `RPC_ERROR` becomes a retryable `PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE` (look again\n * later, or elsewhere) that carries it as its cause, so no caller takes it for an answer and\n * the monitor keeps watching. Every other error passes unchanged: `PROVIDER_MISCONFIGURED`\n * stays final, and aborts and foreign errors stay what they are.\n */\nasync function undecided<T>(proof: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n  try {\n    return await proof();\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (!isCryptoAioError(error, 'RPC_ERROR')) throw error;\n    const message = String(error.details?.rpcMessage ?? error.message);\n    throw new ProviderError(\n      'PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n      STATE_UNAVAILABLE.test(message)\n        ? 'finalized state not available'\n        : 'the endpoints gave no answer',\n      { cause: error },\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/** A retryable \"decide nothing\": look again later, or elsewhere. */\nconst undecidable = (reason: string) => new ProviderError('PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE', reason);\n\n/**\n * At most this many nonce reads look for the height that consumed a nonce. The gallop\n * and the bisection take about two reads per doubling of the distance back: at worst 60\n * reads below a final height of 2^30, and 64 below 2^32, so this reaches every consumption\n * on any chain served today.\n */\nconst MAX_SEARCH_READS = 64;\n\n/**\n * The lowest height at or below `final` where `consumed` holds, given that it holds at\n * `final`. A gallop back (`final` less 1, 2, 4, …) finds a height where it does not, then a\n * bisection the first where it does. `consumed` never turns false again as the height\n * grows, since an account's nonce never falls. Beyond `MAX_SEARCH_READS` reads, it decides\n * nothing.\n */\nexport async function consumptionHeight(\n  consumed: (height: bigint) => Promise<boolean>,\n  final: bigint,\n): Promise<bigint> {\n  let reads = 0;\n  const read = (height: bigint): Promise<boolean> => {\n    if (reads === MAX_SEARCH_READS) {\n      throw undecidable('the nonce was consumed too far back to look up');\n    }\n    reads += 1;\n    return consumed(height);\n  };\n  // Consumed at `high`; not at `low` (below genesis, until a read says otherwise).\n  let high = final;\n  let low = -1n;\n  for (let step = 1n; high > 0n && low < 0n; step *= 2n) {\n    const height = final > step ? final - step : 0n;\n    if (await read(height)) high = height;\n    else low = height;\n  }\n  while (high - low > 1n) {\n    const middle = (low + high) / 2n;\n    if (await read(middle)) high = middle;\n    else low = middle;\n  }\n  return high;\n}\n\ntype Inclusion = Awaited<ReturnType<ProofSource['includedFinal']>>;\n\n/**\n * Whether `txHash` is final, when no endpoint serves its\n * receipt. `null` is no proof of absence: a node answers it for every transaction outside its\n * index (geth indexes the last 2,350,000 blocks by default, and pruning nodes of other\n * clients drop theirs), so \"not included\" would prove a final, executed transfer `replaced`.\n * The nonce's consumer decides instead. The quorum attests the nonce consumed at a final\n * height, a search finds the block that consumed it, and the sender's transaction at that\n * nonce there answers: another one proves ours is not included; ours is included, with the\n * verdict its receipt in that block gives. Anything else decides nothing, and so does\n * an endpoint without the historical state the search reads.\n *\n * Known gap: nothing caches the consumer per sender and nonce, so an undecided Attempt\n * repeats the search on every monitor pass. A nonce that an EIP-7702 authorization\n * consumed (no transaction from the sender) is never decided, the safe direction.\n */\nasync function nonceConsumer(\n  ctx: EvmContext,\n  txHash: string,\n  ordering: OrderingData,\n  from: string,\n): Promise<Inclusion> {\n  if (ordering.kind !== 'nonce')\n    throw undecidable('no nonce to look the transaction up by');\n  const { client } = ctx;\n  const { nonce } = ordering;\n  const tags = { ...PROOF, quorumKey: nonceAbove(nonce) };\n  const consumed = async (height: bigint) =>\n    (await client.getTransactionCount(from, height, tags)) > nonce;\n  const { height: final } = await provenFinal(ctx, PROOF);\n  if (!(await consumed(final)))\n    throw undecidable('the nonce is not consumed at finality');\n  const height = await consumptionHeight(consumed, final);\n  const block = await client.getBlockWithTransactions(height, {\n    ...PROOF,\n    quorumKey: blockTransactionsKey,\n  });\n  if (block?.number !== height) throw undecidable('the endpoints serve no final block');\n  const sender = from.toLowerCase();\n  const consumer = block.transactions.find(\n    (tx) => tx.from.toLowerCase() === sender && tx.nonce === nonce,\n  );\n  // No transaction from the sender used the nonce: an EIP-7702 authorization can.\n  if (!consumer) throw undecidable('no transaction in its block used the nonce');\n  // Another transaction is final at our nonce: ours can never be included.\n  if (consumer.hash !== txHash.toLowerCase()) return { included: false };\n  const receipts = await client.getBlockReceipts(block.hash, PROOF);\n  const receipt = receipts?.find((r) => r.transactionHash === consumer.hash);\n  if (receipt?.blockHash !== block.hash) {\n    throw undecidable('the final block has no receipts on the endpoints');\n  }\n  return {\n    included: true,\n    ...verdict(receipt.status === 1, tokenTransferLanded(client.abi, consumer, receipt)),\n    blockHeight: height,\n    blockHash: block.hash,\n    txHash: consumer.hash,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * The verdict of an included transaction of ours: a reverted one, or one that executed but\n * logged no token transfer to its recipient (`unevidenced`: value may have moved).\n */\nfunction verdict(\n  executed: boolean,\n  landed: boolean,\n): { readonly success: boolean; readonly reason?: string; readonly failure?: TxFailure } {\n  if (!executed) return { success: false };\n  return landed\n    ? { success: true }\n    : { success: false, reason: 'token transfer failed', failure: 'unevidenced' };\n}\n\nexport function createEvmProofs(ctx: EvmContext): ProofSource {\n  const { client } = ctx;\n  return {\n    finalizedHead: () =>\n      undecided(async () => {\n        const { height, block } = await provenFinal(ctx, PROOF);\n        const final = block ?? (await client.getBlock(height, PROOF));\n        if (!final) {\n          throw new ProviderError(\n            'PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n            'the endpoints serve no finalized block',\n          );\n        }\n        return { height: final.number, hash: final.hash, timestamp: final.timestamp };\n      }),\n\n    includedFinal: (ref, ordering, from) =>\n      undecided(async () => {\n        const receipt = await client.getReceipt(ref.id, PROOF);\n        // No receipt is no proof of absence; the transaction at our nonce decides.\n        if (!receipt) return nonceConsumer(ctx, ref.id, ordering, from);\n        const final = await finalBlockAt(ctx, receipt.blockNumber, PROOF);\n        // The transaction is in a block, just not a final one on these endpoints yet.\n        // \"Not included\" would let the core prove a final transfer `replaced` (whenAbsent,\n        // after the slot was proven consumed on endpoints whose finality is further along),\n        // so this decides nothing.\n        if (!final) {\n          throw new ProviderError('PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE', 'receipt not yet final');\n        }\n        // The endpoints agree on a receipt from a block that is not the final one at its\n        // height: the chain reorganized between the reads, or their receipt index lags. The\n        // transaction may be final elsewhere, so this decides nothing.\n        if (final.hash !== receipt.blockHash) {\n          throw new ProviderError(\n            'PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT',\n            'the receipt is not in the final block at its height',\n          );\n        }\n        const executed = receipt.status === 1;\n        let landed = true;\n        if (executed) {\n          // A token transfer that logged no transfer to its recipient paid it nothing\n          // (read from the ref alone, the call's arguments from its keyed calldata). The\n          // core proves only its own Attempts, so this is always a verdict.\n          const tx = await client.getTransaction(ref.id, PROOF);\n          if (!tx) {\n            throw new ProviderError(\n              'PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT',\n              'a receipt without its transaction',\n            );\n          }\n          landed = tokenTransferLanded(client.abi, tx, receipt);\n        }\n        return {\n          included: true,\n          ...verdict(executed, landed),\n          blockHeight: receipt.blockNumber,\n          blockHash: receipt.blockHash,\n          txHash: receipt.transactionHash,\n        };\n      }),\n\n    slotConsumed: (ordering, from, level) =>\n      undecided(async () => {\n        if (ordering.kind !== 'nonce') return false;\n        if (level === 'latest') {\n          return (\n            (await client.getTransactionCount(from, 'latest', MONITOR)) > ordering.nonce\n          );\n        }\n        // The nonce at a height the quorum attests final (one endpoint's view proposes\n        // it, trailed by PEER_SKEW), on tag and confirmation networks alike. State at a final\n        // height never changes, so honest endpoints agree however their heads move, and one\n        // that over-reports its finalized block cannot advance the height. A number,\n        // not the `finalized` tag: some nodes (BSC's) serve no state at the tag.\n        const { height } = await provenFinal(ctx, PROOF);\n        const count = await client.getTransactionCount(from, height, {\n          ...PROOF,\n          quorumKey: nonceAbove(ordering.nonce),\n        });\n        return count > ordering.nonce;\n      }),\n\n    // Nonce ordering: an EVM transaction never expires.\n    expired: async () => false,\n\n    blockHash: (height, level) =>\n      undecided(async () => {\n        if (level === 'finalized') {\n          return (await finalBlockAt(ctx, height, PROOF))?.hash ?? null;\n        }\n        return (await client.getBlock(height, PROOF))?.hash ?? null;\n      }),\n  };\n}\n\nconst changed = (height: bigint) =>\n  new ProviderError('PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT', `block ${height} changed while scanning`);\n\n/**\n * Whether a block's `logsBloom` may hold `value` (a log's address or topic), by the\n * yellow paper's M3:2048: three bits, each the low 11 bits of a byte pair of the value's\n * keccak-256. `false` is definitive; `true` may be a false positive. No bloom may hold\n * anything.\n */\nexport function mayHold(bloom: string | undefined, value: string): boolean {\n  if (bloom === undefined) return true;\n  const hash = keccak_256(hexToBytes(value.slice(2)));\n  for (let i = 0; i < 6; i += 2) {\n    const bit = (((hash[i] as number) << 8) | (hash[i + 1] as number)) & 2047;\n    // Bit 0 is the last byte's lowest bit.\n    const byte = 255 - (bit >> 3);\n    const bits = Number.parseInt(bloom.slice(2 + 2 * byte, 4 + 2 * byte), 16);\n    if ((bits & (1 << (bit & 7))) === 0) return false;\n  }\n  return true;\n}\n\n/** Provider texts for a method they do not serve, whatever their error code. */\nconst METHOD_MISSING =\n  /method .*(not found|not supported|does not exist|is not available)/i;\n\n/**\n * A definitive answer that the node does not serve `eth_getBlockReceipts`: JSON-RPC's\n * \"method not found\" (-32601), EIP-1474's \"method not supported\" (-32004), or a provider's\n * own code with a text that says so.\n */\nfunction methodMissing(error: unknown): boolean {\n  if (!isCryptoAioError(error, 'RPC_ERROR') || error.ambiguous) return false;\n  const { rpcCode, rpcMessage } = error.details ?? {};\n  return (\n    rpcCode === -32601 ||\n    rpcCode === -32004 ||\n    METHOD_MISSING.test(String(rpcMessage ?? ''))\n  );\n}\n\ntype Receipts = ReadonlyMap<string, EvmReceipt>;\n\n/**\n * Every receipt of `block` in one call, by transaction hash. The node reads them by\n * block, never through a log or transaction index that may lag. `undefined` when the node\n * does not serve `eth_getBlockReceipts`.\n */\nasync function blockReceipts(\n  client: EvmClient,\n  block: EvmFullBlock,\n): Promise<Receipts | undefined> {\n  let receipts: readonly EvmReceipt[] | null;\n  try {\n    receipts = await client.getBlockReceipts(block.hash, MONITOR);\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (methodMissing(error)) return undefined;\n    throw error;\n  }\n  if (receipts === null) throw changed(block.number);\n  return new Map(receipts.map((receipt) => [receipt.transactionHash, receipt]));\n}\n\n/** The fallback: one `eth_getTransactionReceipt` per transaction. */\nasync function receiptsOf(client: EvmClient, txs: readonly EvmTx[]): Promise<Receipts> {\n  const receipts = await Promise.all(\n    txs.map((tx) => client.getReceipt(tx.hash, MONITOR)),\n  );\n  return new Map(\n    receipts.flatMap((receipt, i) =>\n      receipt ? [[txs[i]?.hash as string, receipt]] : [],\n    ),\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * The logs of every transaction of `block`. A receipt missing, or from another block, could\n * hide a deposit, so it fails the scan retryably instead.\n */\nfunction blockLogs(block: EvmFullBlock, receipts: Receipts): readonly EvmLog[] {\n  return block.transactions.flatMap((tx) => {\n    const receipt = receipts.get(tx.hash);\n    if (receipt?.blockHash !== block.hash) throw changed(block.number);\n    return receipt.logs;\n  });\n}\n\nexport function createEvmBlocks(ctx: EvmContext): BlockSource {\n  const { client, config } = ctx;\n  /**\n   * The block's `Transfer` logs without block receipts: `eth_getLogs`, which a lagging\n   * log index answers empty without an error. So when it answers nothing while the header's\n   * bloom may hold the topic, every transaction's receipt is read before the empty answer\n   * is trusted: any call may have logged one.\n   */\n  const transferLogs = async (\n    block: EvmFullBlock,\n  ): Promise<{ readonly logs: readonly EvmLog[]; readonly receipts?: Receipts }> => {\n    const topic = client.abi.transferTopic;\n    const logs = await client.getLogs(\n      { blockHash: block.hash, topics: [topic] },\n      MONITOR,\n    );\n    if (logs.length > 0 || !mayHold(block.logsBloom, topic)) return { logs };\n    const receipts = await receiptsOf(client, block.transactions);\n    return { logs: blockLogs(block, receipts), receipts };\n  };\n\n  return {\n    async header(height) {\n      const block = await client.getBlock(height, MONITOR);\n      return block ? toDriverBlock(block) : null;\n    },\n\n    async transactions(block, filter) {\n      const full = await client.getBlockWithTransactions(block.height, MONITOR);\n      if (!full || full.hash !== block.hash) throw changed(block.height);\n      // One call for every receipt of the block, filtered scans included.\n      let receipts = await blockReceipts(client, full);\n      let selected: readonly EvmTx[] = full.transactions;\n      if (filter?.addresses?.length) {\n        const wanted = new Set(filter.addresses.map((a) => a.toLowerCase()));\n        const watched = (address: string | null) =>\n          address !== null && wanted.has(address.toLowerCase());\n        let logs: readonly EvmLog[];\n        if (receipts) logs = blockLogs(full, receipts);\n        else ({ logs, receipts } = await transferLogs(full));\n        const tokenTxs = new Set(\n          logs\n            .filter((log) => {\n              const transfer = client.abi.decodeTransfer(log);\n              return (\n                transfer !== null && (watched(transfer.from) || watched(transfer.to))\n              );\n            })\n            .map((log) => log.transactionHash),\n        );\n        // A contract creation's recipient is only in its receipt, so every creation stays.\n        selected = full.transactions.filter(\n          (tx) =>\n            tx.to === null || watched(tx.from) || watched(tx.to) || tokenTxs.has(tx.hash),\n        );\n      }\n      receipts ??= await receiptsOf(client, selected);\n      return selected.map((tx) => {\n        const receipt = receipts.get(tx.hash);\n        if (!receipt || receipt.blockHash !== block.hash) throw changed(block.height);\n        // The chain's view, with the network's config so bor's system logs do not make a\n        // plain Polygon transfer `partial`.\n        return decodeTransaction(client.abi, tx, receipt, full.timestamp, config);\n      });\n    },\n  };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/adapters/evm/rawtx.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/** The fields a rejection check reads, of one signed legacy, EIP-2930 or EIP-1559 tx. */
+export interface EvmSentTx {
+    readonly type: 0 | 1 | 2;
+    /** Absent for a legacy transaction signed without EIP-155 (v of 27 or 28). */
+    readonly chainId?: bigint;
+    readonly maxFeePerGas?: bigint;
+    readonly maxPriorityFeePerGas?: bigint;
+    /** The recovery id: `yParity`, or the legacy `v` reduced to 0 or 1; -1 when neither. */
+    readonly recovery: number;
+    readonly r: bigint;
+    readonly s: bigint;
+}
+/**
+ * Twice geth's 128 KiB pool limit, checked before any decoding: a bare broadcast may
+ * carry any bytes, and untrusted input is capped before it is decoded.
+ */
+export declare const MAX_SENT_BYTES: number;
+/**
+ * The sent bytes as the checks read them: the fields, `'malformed'` when geth could not
+ * decode them either, or `undefined` when they are unreadable here but may be valid (an
+ * EIP-4844 or EIP-7702 transaction, or more than `MAX_SENT_BYTES`): no claim holds for those.
+ */
+export declare function readSentTx(hex: string): EvmSentTx | 'malformed' | undefined;
+/** geth's `ValidateSignatureValues` with Homestead's low-s rule, over the recovery id. */
+export declare function signatureValuesValid(tx: EvmSentTx): boolean;

package/dist/adapters/evm/rawtx.js

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.MAX_SENT_BYTES = void 0;
+exports.readSentTx = readSentTx;
+exports.signatureValuesValid = signatureValuesValid;
+/**
+ * What a node's rejection claims is checked against the bytes we sent,
+ * read here SDK-free. The reader is never stricter than geth: it calls bytes `malformed`
+ * only for what geth's RLP decoder also refuses (a broken or non-canonical encoding, an
+ * integer with a leading zero or over 256 bits, the wrong number of fields, a `to` that is
+ * not 20 bytes), and it reads no access list, so a claim it cannot confirm stays a refusal.
+ */
+const bytes_1 = require("../../core/util/bytes");
+/**
+ * Twice geth's 128 KiB pool limit, checked before any decoding: a bare broadcast may
+ * carry any bytes, and untrusted input is capped before it is decoded.
+ */
+exports.MAX_SENT_BYTES = 2 * 128 * 1024;
+class Malformed extends Error {
+}
+/** One canonical RLP item at `at`, and the offset after it; throws `Malformed`. */
+function item(bytes, at) {
+    const lead = bytes[at];
+    if (lead === undefined)
+        throw new Malformed();
+    const span = (offset, length) => {
+        const end = offset + length;
+        if (end > bytes.length)
+            throw new Malformed();
+        return [offset, end];
+    };
+    const longLength = (width) => {
+        const [start, end] = span(at + 1, width);
+        if (bytes[start] === 0)
+            throw new Malformed();
+        let length = 0;
+        for (let i = start; i < end; i++)
+            length = length * 256 + bytes[i];
+        if (length < 56)
+            throw new Malformed();
+        return length;
+    };
+    if (lead < 0x80)
+        return [bytes.subarray(at, at + 1), at + 1];
+    if (lead <= 0xbf) {
+        const long = lead > 0xb7;
+        const width = long ? lead - 0xb7 : 0;
+        const length = long ? longLength(width) : lead - 0x80;
+        const [start, end] = span(at + 1 + width, length);
+        if (!long && length === 1 && bytes[start] < 0x80)
+            throw new Malformed();
+        return [bytes.subarray(start, end), end];
+    }
+    const long = lead > 0xf7;
+    const width = long ? lead - 0xf7 : 0;
+    const length = long ? longLength(width) : lead - 0xc0;
+    const [start, end] = span(at + 1 + width, length);
+    const items = [];
+    for (let offset = start; offset < end;) {
+        const [next, after] = item(bytes, offset);
+        if (after > end)
+            throw new Malformed();
+        items.push(next);
+        offset = after;
+    }
+    return [items, end];
+}
+/** A whole buffer as one list of exactly `fields` items. */
+function list(bytes, fields) {
+    const [value, end] = item(bytes, 0);
+    if (end !== bytes.length || !Array.isArray(value) || value.length !== fields)
+        throw new Malformed();
+    return value;
+}
+/** A canonical unsigned integer of at most `bits` bits. */
+function uint(value, bits) {
+    if (!(value instanceof Uint8Array) || value.length * 8 > bits || value[0] === 0)
+        throw new Malformed();
+    let out = 0n;
+    for (const byte of value)
+        out = (out << 8n) | BigInt(byte);
+    return out;
+}
+function address(value) {
+    if (!(value instanceof Uint8Array) || (value.length !== 0 && value.length !== 20))
+        throw new Malformed();
+}
+/**
+ * The sent bytes as the checks read them: the fields, `'malformed'` when geth could not
+ * decode them either, or `undefined` when they are unreadable here but may be valid (an
+ * EIP-4844 or EIP-7702 transaction, or more than `MAX_SENT_BYTES`): no claim holds for those.
+ */
+function readSentTx(hex) {
+    if (typeof hex !== 'string' || hex.length > 2 + 2 * exports.MAX_SENT_BYTES)
+        return undefined;
+    let bytes;
+    try {
+        bytes = (0, bytes_1.fromHex)(hex);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return 'malformed';
+    }
+    const type = bytes[0];
+    if (type === undefined)
+        return 'malformed';
+    try {
+        if (type >= 0xc0) {
+            const [nonce, gasPrice, gas, to, value, , v, r, s] = list(bytes, 9);
+            uint(nonce, 64);
+            uint(gasPrice, 256);
+            uint(gas, 64);
+            address(to);
+            uint(value, 256);
+            const vv = uint(v, 256);
+            const eip155 = vv >= 35n;
+            return {
+                type: 0,
+                ...(eip155 ? { chainId: (vv - 35n) / 2n } : {}),
+                recovery: eip155
+                    ? Number((vv - 35n) % 2n)
+                    : vv === 27n || vv === 28n
+                        ? Number(vv - 27n)
+                        : -1,
+                r: uint(r, 256),
+                s: uint(s, 256),
+            };
+        }
+        if (type === 1 || type === 2) {
+            const fields = list(bytes.subarray(1), type === 1 ? 11 : 12);
+            const chainId = uint(fields[0], 256);
+            uint(fields[1], 64);
+            const prices = type === 2 ? [uint(fields[2], 256), uint(fields[3], 256)] : [];
+            if (type === 1)
+                uint(fields[2], 256);
+            const rest = type === 1 ? 3 : 4;
+            uint(fields[rest], 64);
+            address(fields[rest + 1]);
+            uint(fields[rest + 2], 256);
+            const [yParity, r, s] = fields.slice(-3);
+            const parity = uint(yParity, 256);
+            return {
+                type,
+                chainId,
+                ...(type === 2
+                    ? {
+                        maxPriorityFeePerGas: prices[0],
+                        maxFeePerGas: prices[1],
+                    }
+                    : {}),
+                recovery: parity <= 1n ? Number(parity) : -1,
+                r: uint(r, 256),
+                s: uint(s, 256),
+            };
+        }
+        // geth reads any other first byte above 0x7f as a legacy list, and fails.
+        if (type >= 0x80)
+            return 'malformed';
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (error instanceof Malformed)
+            return 'malformed';
+        throw error;
+    }
+}
+/** secp256k1's group order. */
+const N = 0xfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364141n;
+/** geth's `ValidateSignatureValues` with Homestead's low-s rule, over the recovery id. */
+function signatureValuesValid(tx) {
+    return ((tx.recovery === 0 || tx.recovery === 1) &&
+        tx.r >= 1n &&
+        tx.r < N &&
+        tx.s >= 1n &&
+        tx.s <= N / 2n);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=rawtx.js.map