crypto-aio 0.0.2 → 0.1.0

package/dist/adapters/evm/proofs.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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* Proofs and block scanning. Every proof read is a quorum read under `PROOF`, comparing\n * only consensus facts (`rpc.ts`). No proof lets one endpoint choose the final height: a\n * proof attests the fact it needs at that fact's own\n * height, so honest endpoints disagree only while it is final on one and not yet on another,\n * which decides nothing. The block source serves dense heights with native transfers and\n * ERC-20 `Transfer` logs, as the chain reports them. Every error thrown here is a\n * `PROVIDER_*` code, retryable by the code table: look again later.\n */\nimport { keccak_256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha3';\nimport { hexToBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils';\nimport type { BlockSource, ProofSource } from '../../core/driver/types';\nimport { ProviderError, isCryptoAioError } from '../../core/errors/error';\nimport type { OrderingData } from '../../core/model/ordering';\nimport { quantity } from './client';\nimport { decodeTransaction, tokenTransferLanded } from './decode';\nimport {\n  MONITOR,\n  PROOF,\n  finalBlockAt,\n  provenFinal,\n  toDriverBlock,\n  type EvmContext,\n} from './reader';\nimport { blockTransactionsKey } from './rpc';\nimport type { EvmClient, EvmFullBlock, EvmLog, EvmReceipt, EvmTx } from './types';\n\n/**\n * A quorum key under which every endpoint whose nonce is past `nonce` agrees. A\n * malformed answer throws, which the transport counts as a disagreement.\n */\nconst nonceAbove =\n  (nonce: bigint) =>\n  (result: unknown): boolean =>\n    quantity(result, 'nonce') > nonce;\n\n/**\n * Node texts for state it does not hold: pruned, beyond its recent-state window, or\n * not served at a tag (geth, op-geth, Nitro, BSC, Erigon, Reth, Besu wordings).\n */\nconst STATE_UNAVAILABLE =\n  /missing trie node|historical state .* not available|header not found|state (is )?not available|pruned/i;\n\n/**\n * The boundary of every proof. Only a definitive negative answer may\n * say \"no\", and a JSON-RPC error answer is none: state the node does not hold, an index it\n * is still building (geth's \"transaction indexing is in progress\"), or any other error,\n * ambiguous or not. Every `RPC_ERROR` becomes a retryable `PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE` (look again\n * later, or elsewhere) that carries it as its cause, so no caller takes it for an answer and\n * the monitor keeps watching. Every other error passes unchanged: `PROVIDER_MISCONFIGURED`\n * stays final, and aborts and foreign errors stay what they are.\n */\nasync function undecided<T>(proof: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n  try {\n    return await proof();\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (!isCryptoAioError(error, 'RPC_ERROR')) throw error;\n    const message = String(error.details?.rpcMessage ?? error.message);\n    throw new ProviderError(\n      'PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n      STATE_UNAVAILABLE.test(message)\n        ? 'finalized state not available'\n        : 'the endpoints gave no answer',\n      { cause: error },\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/** A retryable \"decide nothing\": look again later, or elsewhere. */\nconst undecidable = (reason: string) => new ProviderError('PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE', reason);\n\n/**\n * At most this many nonce reads look for the height that consumed a nonce. The gallop\n * and the bisection take about two reads per doubling of the distance back: at worst 60\n * reads below a final height of 2^30, and 64 below 2^32, so this reaches every consumption\n * on any chain served today.\n */\nconst MAX_SEARCH_READS = 64;\n\n/**\n * The lowest height at or below `final` where `consumed` holds, given that it holds at\n * `final`. A gallop back (`final` less 1, 2, 4, …) finds a height where it does not, then a\n * bisection the first where it does. `consumed` never turns false again as the height\n * grows, since an account's nonce never falls. Beyond `MAX_SEARCH_READS` reads, it decides\n * nothing.\n */\nexport async function consumptionHeight(\n  consumed: (height: bigint) => Promise<boolean>,\n  final: bigint,\n): Promise<bigint> {\n  let reads = 0;\n  const read = (height: bigint): Promise<boolean> => {\n    if (reads === MAX_SEARCH_READS) {\n      throw undecidable('the nonce was consumed too far back to look up');\n    }\n    reads += 1;\n    return consumed(height);\n  };\n  // Consumed at `high`; not at `low` (below genesis, until a read says otherwise).\n  let high = final;\n  let low = -1n;\n  for (let step = 1n; high > 0n && low < 0n; step *= 2n) {\n    const height = final > step ? final - step : 0n;\n    if (await read(height)) high = height;\n    else low = height;\n  }\n  while (high - low > 1n) {\n    const middle = (low + high) / 2n;\n    if (await read(middle)) high = middle;\n    else low = middle;\n  }\n  return high;\n}\n\ntype Inclusion = Awaited<ReturnType<ProofSource['includedFinal']>>;\n\n/**\n * Whether `txHash` is final, when no endpoint serves its\n * receipt. `null` is no proof of absence: a node answers it for every transaction outside its\n * index (geth indexes the last 2,350,000 blocks by default, and pruning nodes of other\n * clients drop theirs), so \"not included\" would prove a final, executed transfer `replaced`.\n * The nonce's consumer decides instead. The quorum attests the nonce consumed at a final\n * height, a search finds the block that consumed it, and the sender's transaction at that\n * nonce there answers: another one proves ours is not included; ours is included, with the\n * verdict its receipt in that block gives. Anything else decides nothing, and so does\n * an endpoint without the historical state the search reads.\n *\n * Known gap: nothing caches the consumer per sender and nonce, so an undecided Attempt\n * repeats the search on every monitor pass. A nonce that an EIP-7702 authorization\n * consumed (no transaction from the sender) is never decided, the safe direction.\n */\nasync function nonceConsumer(\n  ctx: EvmContext,\n  txHash: string,\n  ordering: OrderingData,\n  from: string,\n): Promise<Inclusion> {\n  if (ordering.kind !== 'nonce')\n    throw undecidable('no nonce to look the transaction up by');\n  const { client } = ctx;\n  const { nonce } = ordering;\n  const tags = { ...PROOF, quorumKey: nonceAbove(nonce) };\n  const consumed = async (height: bigint) =>\n    (await client.getTransactionCount(from, height, tags)) > nonce;\n  const { height: final } = await provenFinal(ctx, PROOF);\n  if (!(await consumed(final)))\n    throw undecidable('the nonce is not consumed at finality');\n  const height = await consumptionHeight(consumed, final);\n  const block = await client.getBlockWithTransactions(height, {\n    ...PROOF,\n    quorumKey: blockTransactionsKey,\n  });\n  if (block?.number !== height) throw undecidable('the endpoints serve no final block');\n  const sender = from.toLowerCase();\n  const consumer = block.transactions.find(\n    (tx) => tx.from.toLowerCase() === sender && tx.nonce === nonce,\n  );\n  // No transaction from the sender used the nonce: an EIP-7702 authorization can.\n  if (!consumer) throw undecidable('no transaction in its block used the nonce');\n  // Another transaction is final at our nonce: ours can never be included.\n  if (consumer.hash !== txHash.toLowerCase()) return { included: false };\n  const receipts = await client.getBlockReceipts(block.hash, PROOF);\n  const receipt = receipts?.find((r) => r.transactionHash === consumer.hash);\n  if (receipt?.blockHash !== block.hash) {\n    throw undecidable('the final block has no receipts on the endpoints');\n  }\n  return {\n    included: true,\n    success: receipt.status === 1 && tokenTransferLanded(client.abi, consumer, receipt),\n    blockHeight: height,\n    blockHash: block.hash,\n    txHash: consumer.hash,\n  };\n}\n\nexport function createEvmProofs(ctx: EvmContext): ProofSource {\n  const { client } = ctx;\n  return {\n    finalizedHead: () =>\n      undecided(async () => {\n        const { height, block } = await provenFinal(ctx, PROOF);\n        const final = block ?? 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The\n        // transaction may be final elsewhere, so this decides nothing.\n        if (final.hash !== receipt.blockHash) {\n          throw new ProviderError(\n            'PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT',\n            'the receipt is not in the final block at its height',\n          );\n        }\n        let success = receipt.status === 1;\n        if (success) {\n          // A token transfer that logged no transfer to its recipient paid it nothing\n          // (read from the ref alone, the call's arguments from its keyed calldata). The\n          // core proves only its own Attempts, so this is always a verdict.\n          const tx = await client.getTransaction(ref.id, PROOF);\n          if (!tx) {\n            throw new ProviderError(\n              'PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT',\n              'a receipt without its transaction',\n            );\n          }\n          success = tokenTransferLanded(client.abi, tx, receipt);\n        }\n        return {\n          included: true,\n          success,\n          blockHeight: receipt.blockNumber,\n          blockHash: receipt.blockHash,\n          txHash: receipt.transactionHash,\n        };\n      }),\n\n    slotConsumed: (ordering, from, level) =>\n      undecided(async () => {\n        if (ordering.kind !== 'nonce') return false;\n        if (level === 'latest') {\n          return (\n            (await client.getTransactionCount(from, 'latest', MONITOR)) > ordering.nonce\n          );\n        }\n        // The nonce at a height the quorum attests final (one endpoint's view proposes\n        // it, trailed by PEER_SKEW), on tag and confirmation networks alike. State at a final\n        // height never changes, so honest endpoints agree however their heads move, and one\n        // that over-reports its finalized block cannot advance the height. A number,\n        // not the `finalized` tag: some nodes (BSC's) serve no state at the tag.\n        const { height } = await provenFinal(ctx, PROOF);\n        const count = await client.getTransactionCount(from, height, {\n          ...PROOF,\n          quorumKey: nonceAbove(ordering.nonce),\n        });\n        return count > ordering.nonce;\n      }),\n\n    // Nonce ordering: an EVM transaction never expires.\n    expired: async () => false,\n\n    blockHash: (height, level) =>\n      undecided(async () => {\n        if (level === 'finalized') {\n          return (await finalBlockAt(ctx, height, PROOF))?.hash ?? null;\n        }\n        return (await client.getBlock(height, PROOF))?.hash ?? null;\n      }),\n  };\n}\n\nconst changed = (height: bigint) =>\n  new ProviderError('PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT', `block ${height} changed while scanning`);\n\n/**\n * Whether a block's `logsBloom` may hold `value` (a log's address or topic), by the\n * yellow paper's M3:2048: three bits, each the low 11 bits of a byte pair of the value's\n * keccak-256. `false` is definitive; `true` may be a false positive. No bloom may hold\n * anything.\n */\nexport function mayHold(bloom: string | undefined, value: string): boolean {\n  if (bloom === undefined) return true;\n  const hash = keccak_256(hexToBytes(value.slice(2)));\n  for (let i = 0; i < 6; i += 2) {\n    const bit = (((hash[i] as number) << 8) | (hash[i + 1] as number)) & 2047;\n    // Bit 0 is the last byte's lowest bit.\n    const byte = 255 - (bit >> 3);\n    const bits = Number.parseInt(bloom.slice(2 + 2 * byte, 4 + 2 * byte), 16);\n    if ((bits & (1 << (bit & 7))) === 0) return false;\n  }\n  return true;\n}\n\n/** Provider texts for a method they do not serve, whatever their error code. */\nconst METHOD_MISSING =\n  /method .*(not found|not supported|does not exist|is not available)/i;\n\n/**\n * A definitive answer that the node does not serve `eth_getBlockReceipts`: JSON-RPC's\n * \"method not found\" (-32601), EIP-1474's \"method not supported\" (-32004), or a provider's\n * own code with a text that says so.\n */\nfunction methodMissing(error: unknown): boolean {\n  if (!isCryptoAioError(error, 'RPC_ERROR') || error.ambiguous) return false;\n  const { rpcCode, rpcMessage } = error.details ?? {};\n  return (\n    rpcCode === -32601 ||\n    rpcCode === -32004 ||\n    METHOD_MISSING.test(String(rpcMessage ?? ''))\n  );\n}\n\ntype Receipts = ReadonlyMap<string, EvmReceipt>;\n\n/**\n * Every receipt of `block` in one call, by transaction hash. The node reads them by\n * block, never through a log or transaction index that may lag. `undefined` when the node\n * does not serve `eth_getBlockReceipts`.\n */\nasync function blockReceipts(\n  client: EvmClient,\n  block: EvmFullBlock,\n): Promise<Receipts | undefined> {\n  let receipts: readonly EvmReceipt[] | null;\n  try {\n    receipts = await client.getBlockReceipts(block.hash, MONITOR);\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (methodMissing(error)) return undefined;\n    throw error;\n  }\n  if (receipts === null) throw changed(block.number);\n  return new Map(receipts.map((receipt) => [receipt.transactionHash, receipt]));\n}\n\n/** The fallback: one `eth_getTransactionReceipt` per transaction. */\nasync function receiptsOf(client: EvmClient, txs: readonly EvmTx[]): Promise<Receipts> {\n  const receipts = await Promise.all(\n    txs.map((tx) => client.getReceipt(tx.hash, MONITOR)),\n  );\n  return new Map(\n    receipts.flatMap((receipt, i) =>\n      receipt ? [[txs[i]?.hash as string, receipt]] : [],\n    ),\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * The logs of every transaction of `block`. A receipt missing, or from another block, could\n * hide a deposit, so it fails the scan retryably instead.\n */\nfunction blockLogs(block: EvmFullBlock, receipts: Receipts): readonly EvmLog[] {\n  return block.transactions.flatMap((tx) => {\n    const receipt = receipts.get(tx.hash);\n    if (receipt?.blockHash !== block.hash) throw changed(block.number);\n    return receipt.logs;\n  });\n}\n\nexport function createEvmBlocks(ctx: EvmContext): BlockSource {\n  const { client, config } = ctx;\n  /**\n   * The block's `Transfer` logs without block receipts: `eth_getLogs`, which a lagging\n   * log index answers empty without an error. So when it answers nothing while the header's\n   * bloom may hold the topic, every transaction's receipt is read before the empty answer\n   * is trusted: any call may have logged one.\n   */\n  const transferLogs = async (\n    block: EvmFullBlock,\n  ): Promise<{ readonly logs: readonly EvmLog[]; readonly receipts?: Receipts }> => {\n    const topic = client.abi.transferTopic;\n    const logs = await client.getLogs(\n      { blockHash: block.hash, topics: [topic] },\n      MONITOR,\n    );\n    if (logs.length > 0 || !mayHold(block.logsBloom, topic)) return { logs };\n    const receipts = await receiptsOf(client, block.transactions);\n    return { logs: blockLogs(block, receipts), receipts };\n  };\n\n  return {\n    async header(height) {\n      const block = await client.getBlock(height, MONITOR);\n      return block ? toDriverBlock(block) : null;\n    },\n\n    async transactions(block, filter) {\n      const full = await client.getBlockWithTransactions(block.height, MONITOR);\n      if (!full || full.hash !== block.hash) throw changed(block.height);\n      // One call for every receipt of the block, filtered scans included.\n      let receipts = await blockReceipts(client, full);\n      let selected: readonly EvmTx[] = full.transactions;\n      if (filter?.addresses?.length) {\n        const wanted = new Set(filter.addresses.map((a) => a.toLowerCase()));\n        const watched = (address: string | null) =>\n          address !== null && wanted.has(address.toLowerCase());\n        let logs: readonly EvmLog[];\n        if (receipts) logs = blockLogs(full, receipts);\n        else ({ logs, receipts } = await transferLogs(full));\n        const tokenTxs = new Set(\n          logs\n            .filter((log) => {\n              const transfer = client.abi.decodeTransfer(log);\n              return (\n                transfer !== null && (watched(transfer.from) || watched(transfer.to))\n              );\n            })\n            .map((log) => log.transactionHash),\n        );\n        // A contract creation's recipient is only in its receipt, so every creation stays.\n        selected = full.transactions.filter(\n          (tx) =>\n            tx.to === null || watched(tx.from) || watched(tx.to) || tokenTxs.has(tx.hash),\n        );\n      }\n      receipts ??= await receiptsOf(client, selected);\n      return selected.map((tx) => {\n        const receipt = receipts.get(tx.hash);\n        if (!receipt || receipt.blockHash !== block.hash) throw changed(block.height);\n        // The chain's view, with the network's config so bor's system logs do not make a\n        // plain Polygon transfer `partial`.\n        return decodeTransaction(client.abi, tx, receipt, full.timestamp, config);\n      });\n    },\n  };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/adapters/evm/rawtx.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/** The fields a rejection check reads, of one signed legacy, EIP-2930 or EIP-1559 tx. */
+export interface EvmSentTx {
+    readonly type: 0 | 1 | 2;
+    /** Absent for a legacy transaction signed without EIP-155 (v of 27 or 28). */
+    readonly chainId?: bigint;
+    readonly maxFeePerGas?: bigint;
+    readonly maxPriorityFeePerGas?: bigint;
+    /** The recovery id: `yParity`, or the legacy `v` reduced to 0 or 1; -1 when neither. */
+    readonly recovery: number;
+    readonly r: bigint;
+    readonly s: bigint;
+}
+/**
+ * Twice geth's 128 KiB pool limit, checked before any decoding: a bare broadcast may
+ * carry any bytes, and untrusted input is capped before it is decoded.
+ */
+export declare const MAX_SENT_BYTES: number;
+/**
+ * The sent bytes as the checks read them: the fields, `'malformed'` when geth could not
+ * decode them either, or `undefined` when they are unreadable here but may be valid (an
+ * EIP-4844 or EIP-7702 transaction, or more than `MAX_SENT_BYTES`): no claim holds for those.
+ */
+export declare function readSentTx(hex: string): EvmSentTx | 'malformed' | undefined;
+/** geth's `ValidateSignatureValues` with Homestead's low-s rule, over the recovery id. */
+export declare function signatureValuesValid(tx: EvmSentTx): boolean;

package/dist/adapters/evm/rawtx.js

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.MAX_SENT_BYTES = void 0;
+exports.readSentTx = readSentTx;
+exports.signatureValuesValid = signatureValuesValid;
+/**
+ * What a node's rejection claims is checked against the bytes we sent,
+ * read here SDK-free. The reader is never stricter than geth: it calls bytes `malformed`
+ * only for what geth's RLP decoder also refuses (a broken or non-canonical encoding, an
+ * integer with a leading zero or over 256 bits, the wrong number of fields, a `to` that is
+ * not 20 bytes), and it reads no access list, so a claim it cannot confirm stays a refusal.
+ */
+const bytes_1 = require("../../core/util/bytes");
+/**
+ * Twice geth's 128 KiB pool limit, checked before any decoding: a bare broadcast may
+ * carry any bytes, and untrusted input is capped before it is decoded.
+ */
+exports.MAX_SENT_BYTES = 2 * 128 * 1024;
+class Malformed extends Error {
+}
+/** One canonical RLP item at `at`, and the offset after it; throws `Malformed`. */
+function item(bytes, at) {
+    const lead = bytes[at];
+    if (lead === undefined)
+        throw new Malformed();
+    const span = (offset, length) => {
+        const end = offset + length;
+        if (end > bytes.length)
+            throw new Malformed();
+        return [offset, end];
+    };
+    const longLength = (width) => {
+        const [start, end] = span(at + 1, width);
+        if (bytes[start] === 0)
+            throw new Malformed();
+        let length = 0;
+        for (let i = start; i < end; i++)
+            length = length * 256 + bytes[i];
+        if (length < 56)
+            throw new Malformed();
+        return length;
+    };
+    if (lead < 0x80)
+        return [bytes.subarray(at, at + 1), at + 1];
+    if (lead <= 0xbf) {
+        const long = lead > 0xb7;
+        const width = long ? lead - 0xb7 : 0;
+        const length = long ? longLength(width) : lead - 0x80;
+        const [start, end] = span(at + 1 + width, length);
+        if (!long && length === 1 && bytes[start] < 0x80)
+            throw new Malformed();
+        return [bytes.subarray(start, end), end];
+    }
+    const long = lead > 0xf7;
+    const width = long ? lead - 0xf7 : 0;
+    const length = long ? longLength(width) : lead - 0xc0;
+    const [start, end] = span(at + 1 + width, length);
+    const items = [];
+    for (let offset = start; offset < end;) {
+        const [next, after] = item(bytes, offset);
+        if (after > end)
+            throw new Malformed();
+        items.push(next);
+        offset = after;
+    }
+    return [items, end];
+}
+/** A whole buffer as one list of exactly `fields` items. */
+function list(bytes, fields) {
+    const [value, end] = item(bytes, 0);
+    if (end !== bytes.length || !Array.isArray(value) || value.length !== fields)
+        throw new Malformed();
+    return value;
+}
+/** A canonical unsigned integer of at most `bits` bits. */
+function uint(value, bits) {
+    if (!(value instanceof Uint8Array) || value.length * 8 > bits || value[0] === 0)
+        throw new Malformed();
+    let out = 0n;
+    for (const byte of value)
+        out = (out << 8n) | BigInt(byte);
+    return out;
+}
+function address(value) {
+    if (!(value instanceof Uint8Array) || (value.length !== 0 && value.length !== 20))
+        throw new Malformed();
+}
+/**
+ * The sent bytes as the checks read them: the fields, `'malformed'` when geth could not
+ * decode them either, or `undefined` when they are unreadable here but may be valid (an
+ * EIP-4844 or EIP-7702 transaction, or more than `MAX_SENT_BYTES`): no claim holds for those.
+ */
+function readSentTx(hex) {
+    if (typeof hex !== 'string' || hex.length > 2 + 2 * exports.MAX_SENT_BYTES)
+        return undefined;
+    let bytes;
+    try {
+        bytes = (0, bytes_1.fromHex)(hex);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return 'malformed';
+    }
+    const type = bytes[0];
+    if (type === undefined)
+        return 'malformed';
+    try {
+        if (type >= 0xc0) {
+            const [nonce, gasPrice, gas, to, value, , v, r, s] = list(bytes, 9);
+            uint(nonce, 64);
+            uint(gasPrice, 256);
+            uint(gas, 64);
+            address(to);
+            uint(value, 256);
+            const vv = uint(v, 256);
+            const eip155 = vv >= 35n;
+            return {
+                type: 0,
+                ...(eip155 ? { chainId: (vv - 35n) / 2n } : {}),
+                recovery: eip155
+                    ? Number((vv - 35n) % 2n)
+                    : vv === 27n || vv === 28n
+                        ? Number(vv - 27n)
+                        : -1,
+                r: uint(r, 256),
+                s: uint(s, 256),
+            };
+        }
+        if (type === 1 || type === 2) {
+            const fields = list(bytes.subarray(1), type === 1 ? 11 : 12);
+            const chainId = uint(fields[0], 256);
+            uint(fields[1], 64);
+            const prices = type === 2 ? [uint(fields[2], 256), uint(fields[3], 256)] : [];
+            if (type === 1)
+                uint(fields[2], 256);
+            const rest = type === 1 ? 3 : 4;
+            uint(fields[rest], 64);
+            address(fields[rest + 1]);
+            uint(fields[rest + 2], 256);
+            const [yParity, r, s] = fields.slice(-3);
+            const parity = uint(yParity, 256);
+            return {
+                type,
+                chainId,
+                ...(type === 2
+                    ? {
+                        maxPriorityFeePerGas: prices[0],
+                        maxFeePerGas: prices[1],
+                    }
+                    : {}),
+                recovery: parity <= 1n ? Number(parity) : -1,
+                r: uint(r, 256),
+                s: uint(s, 256),
+            };
+        }
+        // geth reads any other first byte above 0x7f as a legacy list, and fails.
+        if (type >= 0x80)
+            return 'malformed';
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (error instanceof Malformed)
+            return 'malformed';
+        throw error;
+    }
+}
+/** secp256k1's group order. */
+const N = 0xfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364141n;
+/** geth's `ValidateSignatureValues` with Homestead's low-s rule, over the recovery id. */
+function signatureValuesValid(tx) {
+    return ((tx.recovery === 0 || tx.recovery === 1) &&
+        tx.r >= 1n &&
+        tx.r < N &&
+        tx.s >= 1n &&
+        tx.s <= N / 2n);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=rawtx.js.map

package/dist/adapters/evm/rawtx.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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* What a node's rejection claims is checked against the bytes we sent,\n * read here SDK-free. The reader is never stricter than geth: it calls bytes `malformed`\n * only for what geth's RLP decoder also refuses (a broken or non-canonical encoding, an\n * integer with a leading zero or over 256 bits, the wrong number of fields, a `to` that is\n * not 20 bytes), and it reads no access list, so a claim it cannot confirm stays a refusal.\n */\nimport { fromHex } from '../../core/util/bytes';\n\n/** The fields a rejection check reads, of one signed legacy, EIP-2930 or EIP-1559 tx. */\nexport interface EvmSentTx {\n  readonly type: 0 | 1 | 2;\n  /** Absent for a legacy transaction signed without EIP-155 (v of 27 or 28). */\n  readonly chainId?: bigint;\n  readonly maxFeePerGas?: bigint;\n  readonly maxPriorityFeePerGas?: bigint;\n  /** The recovery id: `yParity`, or the legacy `v` reduced to 0 or 1; -1 when neither. */\n  readonly recovery: number;\n  readonly r: bigint;\n  readonly s: bigint;\n}\n\n/**\n * Twice geth's 128 KiB pool limit, checked before any decoding: a bare broadcast may\n * carry any bytes, and untrusted input is capped before it is decoded.\n */\nexport const MAX_SENT_BYTES = 2 * 128 * 1024;\n\nclass Malformed extends Error {}\ntype Item = Uint8Array | readonly Item[];\n\n/** One canonical RLP item at `at`, and the offset after it; throws `Malformed`. */\nfunction item(bytes: Uint8Array, at: number): [Item, number] {\n  const lead = bytes[at];\n  if (lead === undefined) throw new Malformed();\n  const span = (offset: number, length: number): [number, number] => {\n    const end = offset + length;\n    if (end > bytes.length) throw new Malformed();\n    return [offset, end];\n  };\n  const longLength = (width: number): number => {\n    const [start, end] = span(at + 1, width);\n    if (bytes[start] === 0) throw new Malformed();\n    let length = 0;\n    for (let i = start; i < end; i++) length = length * 256 + (bytes[i] as number);\n    if (length < 56) throw new Malformed();\n    return length;\n  };\n  if (lead < 0x80) return [bytes.subarray(at, at + 1), at + 1];\n  if (lead <= 0xbf) {\n    const long = lead > 0xb7;\n    const width = long ? lead - 0xb7 : 0;\n    const length = long ? longLength(width) : lead - 0x80;\n    const [start, end] = span(at + 1 + width, length);\n    if (!long && length === 1 && (bytes[start] as number) < 0x80) throw new Malformed();\n    return [bytes.subarray(start, end), end];\n  }\n  const long = lead > 0xf7;\n  const width = long ? lead - 0xf7 : 0;\n  const length = long ? longLength(width) : lead - 0xc0;\n  const [start, end] = span(at + 1 + width, length);\n  const items: Item[] = [];\n  for (let offset = start; offset < end;) {\n    const [next, after] = item(bytes, offset);\n    if (after > end) throw new Malformed();\n    items.push(next);\n    offset = after;\n  }\n  return [items, end];\n}\n\n/** A whole buffer as one list of exactly `fields` items. */\nfunction list(bytes: Uint8Array, fields: number): readonly Item[] {\n  const [value, end] = item(bytes, 0);\n  if (end !== bytes.length || !Array.isArray(value) || value.length !== fields)\n    throw new Malformed();\n  return value as readonly Item[];\n}\n\n/** A canonical unsigned integer of at most `bits` bits. */\nfunction uint(value: Item | undefined, bits: number): bigint {\n  if (!(value instanceof Uint8Array) || value.length * 8 > bits || value[0] === 0)\n    throw new Malformed();\n  let out = 0n;\n  for (const byte of value) out = (out << 8n) | BigInt(byte);\n  return out;\n}\n\nfunction address(value: Item | undefined): void {\n  if (!(value instanceof Uint8Array) || (value.length !== 0 && value.length !== 20))\n    throw new Malformed();\n}\n\n/**\n * The sent bytes as the checks read them: the fields, `'malformed'` when geth could not\n * decode them either, or `undefined` when they are unreadable here but may be valid (an\n * EIP-4844 or EIP-7702 transaction, or more than `MAX_SENT_BYTES`): no claim holds for those.\n */\nexport function readSentTx(hex: string): EvmSentTx | 'malformed' | undefined {\n  if (typeof hex !== 'string' || hex.length > 2 + 2 * MAX_SENT_BYTES) return undefined;\n  let bytes: Uint8Array;\n  try {\n    bytes = fromHex(hex);\n  } catch {\n    return 'malformed';\n  }\n  const type = bytes[0];\n  if (type === undefined) return 'malformed';\n  try {\n    if (type >= 0xc0) {\n      const [nonce, gasPrice, gas, to, value, , v, r, s] = list(bytes, 9);\n      uint(nonce, 64);\n      uint(gasPrice, 256);\n      uint(gas, 64);\n      address(to);\n      uint(value, 256);\n      const vv = uint(v, 256);\n      const eip155 = vv >= 35n;\n      return {\n        type: 0,\n        ...(eip155 ? { chainId: (vv - 35n) / 2n } : {}),\n        recovery: eip155\n          ? Number((vv - 35n) % 2n)\n          : vv === 27n || vv === 28n\n            ? Number(vv - 27n)\n            : -1,\n        r: uint(r, 256),\n        s: uint(s, 256),\n      };\n    }\n    if (type === 1 || type === 2) {\n      const fields = list(bytes.subarray(1), type === 1 ? 11 : 12);\n      const chainId = uint(fields[0], 256);\n      uint(fields[1], 64);\n      const prices = type === 2 ? [uint(fields[2], 256), uint(fields[3], 256)] : [];\n      if (type === 1) uint(fields[2], 256);\n      const rest = type === 1 ? 3 : 4;\n      uint(fields[rest], 64);\n      address(fields[rest + 1]);\n      uint(fields[rest + 2], 256);\n      const [yParity, r, s] = fields.slice(-3);\n      const parity = uint(yParity, 256);\n      return {\n        type,\n        chainId,\n        ...(type === 2\n          ? {\n              maxPriorityFeePerGas: prices[0] as bigint,\n              maxFeePerGas: prices[1] as bigint,\n            }\n          : {}),\n        recovery: parity <= 1n ? Number(parity) : -1,\n        r: uint(r, 256),\n        s: uint(s, 256),\n      };\n    }\n    // geth reads any other first byte above 0x7f as a legacy list, and fails.\n    if (type >= 0x80) return 'malformed';\n    return undefined;\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (error instanceof Malformed) return 'malformed';\n    throw error;\n  }\n}\n\n/** secp256k1's group order. */\nconst N = 0xfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364141n;\n\n/** geth's `ValidateSignatureValues` with Homestead's low-s rule, over the recovery id. */\nexport function signatureValuesValid(tx: EvmSentTx): boolean {\n  return (\n    (tx.recovery === 0 || tx.recovery === 1) &&\n    tx.r >= 1n &&\n    tx.r < N &&\n    tx.s >= 1n &&\n    tx.s <= N / 2n\n  );\n}\n"]}

package/dist/adapters/evm/reader.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/**
+ * EVM addresses, reads, nonces, finality and the `ext.evm` API. Every call carries the tags
+ * of the `ChainDriver` contract table (`src/core/driver/types.ts`): `read` for point
+ * queries, `monitor` for heights, observations and nonces, and `proof` for the finality
+ * that proofs attest.
+ */
+import type { AddressCodec, ChainReader, DriverBlock, SequenceSource } from '../../core/driver/types';
+import type { Logger } from '../../core/events/logger';
+import type { ChainInfo, NetworkInfo } from '../../core/model/chain';
+import type { EvmNetworkConfig } from './network';
+import type { EvmBlock, EvmCallTags, EvmClient, EvmExt } from './types';
+/** What every EVM port is built from. */
+export interface EvmContext {
+    readonly client: EvmClient;
+    readonly chain: ChainInfo;
+    readonly network: NetworkInfo;
+    readonly config: EvmNetworkConfig;
+    readonly log: Logger;
+}
+export declare const READ: EvmCallTags;
+export declare const MONITOR: EvmCallTags;
+export declare const PROOF: EvmCallTags;
+export declare const withSignal: (tags: EvmCallTags, signal?: AbortSignal) => EvmCallTags;
+export declare function toDriverBlock(block: EvmBlock): DriverBlock;
+/** Whether a definitive (non-ambiguous) JSON-RPC error says the call reverted. */
+export declare function isRevert(error: unknown): boolean;
+/**
+ * How many blocks a proof's final height trails the one endpoint that proposed it, so
+ * a quorum peer up to this far behind that endpoint still attests it.
+ */
+export declare const PEER_SKEW = 2n;
+/**
+ * The highest final block as one endpoint sees it (a `monitor` view): the `finalized` tag,
+ * or the head minus the confirmations; the head read carries the signal of `tags`. Proofs
+ * never use it as a final height: `provenFinal` attests one.
+ */
+export declare function finalizedHeight(ctx: EvmContext, tags: EvmCallTags): Promise<bigint>;
+/**
+ * A height that is final on every endpoint of the proof quorum (`tags`), and the quorum's
+ * block at it when the proof read that block anyway. One endpoint's view (a `monitor` read)
+ * only proposes: the height trails it by `PEER_SKEW` blocks, and the quorum attests it. On
+ * tag networks every quorum endpoint's `finalized` block must be at or past it; on
+ * confirmation networks every one must hold the block that confirms it. So an
+ * endpoint that over-reports cannot advance finality, and a peer that trails the proposer
+ * by up to `PEER_SKEW` blocks still agrees.
+ */
+export declare function provenFinal(ctx: EvmContext, tags: EvmCallTags): Promise<{
+    readonly height: bigint;
+    readonly block?: EvmBlock;
+}>;
+/**
+ * The quorum's block at `height` when `height` is final on every endpoint of the proof
+ * quorum (`tags`), else `null`. Anchored at `height` itself, not at any endpoint's view:
+ * honest endpoints disagree only while `height` is final on one and not yet on another, and
+ * that decides nothing (a retryable `PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT`).
+ */
+export declare function finalBlockAt(ctx: EvmContext, height: bigint, tags: EvmCallTags): Promise<EvmBlock | null>;
+export declare function createEvmAddressCodec(client: EvmClient): AddressCodec;
+/** Whether a definitive (non-ambiguous) JSON-RPC error says the EVM stopped the code. */
+export declare function isExecutionFailure(error: unknown): boolean;
+/** An ERC-20 `balanceOf` at `latest`; `ASSET_RESOLUTION` when the contract gives none. */
+export declare function erc20Balance(client: EvmClient, token: string, owner: string, tags: EvmCallTags): Promise<bigint>;
+export declare function createEvmReader(ctx: EvmContext): ChainReader;
+export declare function createEvmSequence(client: EvmClient): SequenceSource;
+export declare function createEvmExt(client: EvmClient): EvmExt;

package/dist/adapters/evm/reader.js

@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.PEER_SKEW = exports.withSignal = exports.PROOF = exports.MONITOR = exports.READ = void 0;
+exports.toDriverBlock = toDriverBlock;
+exports.isRevert = isRevert;
+exports.finalizedHeight = finalizedHeight;
+exports.provenFinal = provenFinal;
+exports.finalBlockAt = finalBlockAt;
+exports.createEvmAddressCodec = createEvmAddressCodec;
+exports.isExecutionFailure = isExecutionFailure;
+exports.erc20Balance = erc20Balance;
+exports.createEvmReader = createEvmReader;
+exports.createEvmSequence = createEvmSequence;
+exports.createEvmExt = createEvmExt;
+const error_1 = require("../../core/errors/error");
+const client_1 = require("./client");
+const decode_1 = require("./decode");
+exports.READ = { purpose: 'read', retry: 'safe' };
+exports.MONITOR = { purpose: 'monitor', retry: 'safe' };
+exports.PROOF = { purpose: 'proof', retry: 'safe', quorum: 'proof' };
+const withSignal = (tags, signal) => signal ? { ...tags, signal } : tags;
+exports.withSignal = withSignal;
+function toDriverBlock(block) {
+    return {
+        height: block.number,
+        hash: block.hash,
+        parentHash: block.parentHash,
+        timestamp: block.timestamp,
+        transactionIds: block.transactions,
+    };
+}
+/** Whether a definitive (non-ambiguous) JSON-RPC error says the call reverted. */
+function isRevert(error) {
+    if (!(0, error_1.isCryptoAioError)(error, 'RPC_ERROR') || error.ambiguous)
+        return false;
+    const { rpcCode, rpcMessage } = error.details ?? {};
+    return rpcCode === 3 || /revert/i.test(String(rpcMessage ?? error.message));
+}
+/**
+ * How many blocks a proof's final height trails the one endpoint that proposed it, so
+ * a quorum peer up to this far behind that endpoint still attests it.
+ */
+exports.PEER_SKEW = 2n;
+/** `height - depth`, or genesis. */
+const below = (height, depth) => height > depth ? height - depth : 0n;
+/**
+ * A quorum key under which every endpoint whose block is at or past `height` agrees,
+ * so honest endpoints at different heights agree, and one that is not there disagrees.
+ * A malformed answer throws, which the transport counts as a disagreement.
+ */
+const atOrPast = (height) => (result) => result !== null &&
+    (0, client_1.quantity)(result.number, 'block number') >= height;
+/** Whether every quorum endpoint's `finalized` block is at or past `height`. */
+async function finalizedAtOrPast(ctx, height, tags) {
+    const block = await ctx.client.getBlock('finalized', {
+        ...tags,
+        quorumKey: atOrPast(height),
+    });
+    // The endpoints agreed on the predicate, so the first one's block states it for all.
+    return block !== null && block.number >= height;
+}
+/**
+ * The highest final block as one endpoint sees it (a `monitor` view): the `finalized` tag,
+ * or the head minus the confirmations; the head read carries the signal of `tags`. Proofs
+ * never use it as a final height: `provenFinal` attests one.
+ */
+async function finalizedHeight(ctx, tags) {
+    const { finality } = ctx.config;
+    if (finality.kind === 'confirmations') {
+        const head = await ctx.client.blockNumber((0, exports.withSignal)(exports.MONITOR, tags.signal));
+        return below(head, BigInt(finality.confirmations - 1));
+    }
+    const block = await ctx.client.getBlock('finalized', tags);
+    if (!block) {
+        throw new error_1.ProviderError('PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE', 'the endpoint reports no finalized block');
+    }
+    return block.number;
+}
+/**
+ * A height that is final on every endpoint of the proof quorum (`tags`), and the quorum's
+ * block at it when the proof read that block anyway. One endpoint's view (a `monitor` read)
+ * only proposes: the height trails it by `PEER_SKEW` blocks, and the quorum attests it. On
+ * tag networks every quorum endpoint's `finalized` block must be at or past it; on
+ * confirmation networks every one must hold the block that confirms it. So an
+ * endpoint that over-reports cannot advance finality, and a peer that trails the proposer
+ * by up to `PEER_SKEW` blocks still agrees.
+ */
+async function provenFinal(ctx, tags) {
+    const { finality } = ctx.config;
+    const view = (0, exports.withSignal)(exports.MONITOR, tags.signal);
+    if (finality.kind === 'confirmations') {
+        const confirming = below(await ctx.client.blockNumber(view), exports.PEER_SKEW);
+        const block = await ctx.client.getBlock(confirming, tags);
+        if (block?.number !== confirming) {
+            throw new error_1.ProviderError('PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT', 'the endpoints do not hold the confirming block');
+        }
+        const height = below(confirming, BigInt(finality.confirmations - 1));
+        return height === confirming ? { height, block } : { height };
+    }
+    const height = below(await finalizedHeight(ctx, view), exports.PEER_SKEW);
+    if (!(await finalizedAtOrPast(ctx, height, tags))) {
+        throw new error_1.ProviderError('PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT', 'the endpoints do not attest the proposed finalized block');
+    }
+    return { height };
+}
+/**
+ * The quorum's block at `height` when `height` is final on every endpoint of the proof
+ * quorum (`tags`), else `null`. Anchored at `height` itself, not at any endpoint's view:
+ * honest endpoints disagree only while `height` is final on one and not yet on another, and
+ * that decides nothing (a retryable `PROVIDER_INCONSISTENT`).
+ */
+async function finalBlockAt(ctx, height, tags) {
+    const { client } = ctx;
+    const { finality } = ctx.config;
+    if (finality.kind === 'tag') {
+        if (!(await finalizedAtOrPast(ctx, height, tags)))
+            return null;
+        return client.getBlock(height, tags);
+    }
+    // The block that gives `height` its confirmations; with one, it is `height`'s own.
+    const depth = BigInt(finality.confirmations - 1);
+    const confirming = await client.getBlock(height + depth, tags);
+    if (confirming === null)
+        return null;
+    return depth === 0n ? confirming : client.getBlock(height, tags);
+}
+function createEvmAddressCodec(client) {
+    return {
+        validate: (value) => client.isAddress(value),
+        normalize: (value) => {
+            if (!client.isAddress(value)) {
+                throw new error_1.ValidationError('INVALID_ADDRESS', 'not an EVM address');
+            }
+            const canonical = client.checksum(value);
+            return { canonical, display: canonical };
+        },
+        fromPublicKey: (publicKey) => {
+            // The client's strict decode already throws a specific `INVALID_ADDRESS`.
+            const canonical = client.addressFromPublicKey(publicKey);
+            return { canonical, display: canonical };
+        },
+    };
+}
+const assetError = (reason) => new error_1.ValidationError('ASSET_RESOLUTION', reason);
+/** geth's texts for an EVM that stopped the called code itself (`core/vm/errors.go`). */
+const VM_FAILURE = /^(out of gas|invalid opcode|invalid jump destination|stack (underflow|limit reached)|write protection|return data out of bounds)/i;
+/** Whether a definitive (non-ambiguous) JSON-RPC error says the EVM stopped the code. */
+function isExecutionFailure(error) {
+    if (!(0, error_1.isCryptoAioError)(error, 'RPC_ERROR') || error.ambiguous)
+        return false;
+    const { rpcMessage } = error.details ?? {};
+    return typeof rpcMessage === 'string' && VM_FAILURE.test(rpcMessage);
+}
+/** An ERC-20 `balanceOf` at `latest`; `ASSET_RESOLUTION` when the contract gives none. */
+async function erc20Balance(client, token, owner, tags) {
+    const data = await client.call({ to: token, data: client.abi.encodeBalanceOf(owner) }, 'latest', tags);
+    try {
+        return client.abi.decodeUint256(data);
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw assetError('the token contract returned no balance');
+    }
+}
+function tokenOf(asset) {
+    if (asset === 'native' || asset.standard !== 'erc20') {
+        throw assetError(`EVM tokens use the 'erc20' standard`);
+    }
+    return asset.contract;
+}
+/** The text of an ABI `string`, or of a `bytes32` (older tokens such as MKR return one). */
+function symbolText(client, data) {
+    try {
+        return client.abi.decodeString(data);
+    }
+    catch {
+        if (!/^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(data))
+            throw assetError('the token symbol is unreadable');
+        return Buffer.from(data.slice(2), 'hex').toString('utf8').replace(/\0+$/, '');
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Token metadata is read under the proof quorum, stricter than the contract table's
+ * minimum. The core caches it for the container's life, and one endpoint's wrong `decimals`
+ * (a lagging, misrouted or buggy backend) would mis-scale every amount by orders of
+ * magnitude until restart. `decimals` never changes, so honest endpoints always agree.
+ */
+const METADATA = { ...exports.READ, quorum: 'proof' };
+function createEvmReader(ctx) {
+    const { client } = ctx;
+    /**
+     * A revert or a VM execution failure is the token's own permanent problem
+     * (`ASSET_RESOLUTION`, which the core caches until restart, even if the call would
+     * later run). Any other JSON-RPC error is the node's, so it is rethrown retryable: a
+     * provider fault never pins a token. Everything else propagates unchanged: a
+     * misconfigured endpoint stays final, and a retryable failure is already retryable.
+     */
+    const tokenCall = async (contract, data) => {
+        try {
+            return await client.call({ to: contract, data }, 'latest', METADATA);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            if (isRevert(error))
+                throw assetError('the token contract reverted');
+            if (isExecutionFailure(error))
+                throw assetError('the token contract failed to run');
+            if ((0, error_1.isCryptoAioError)(error, 'RPC_ERROR')) {
+                throw (0, error_1.withContext)(error, {}, { retryable: true });
+            }
+            throw error;
+        }
+    };
+    return {
+        getBalance: async (address, asset) => {
+            if (asset === 'native')
+                return client.getBalance(address, 'latest', exports.READ);
+            return erc20Balance(client, tokenOf(asset), address, exports.READ);
+        },
+        getBlockHeight: () => client.blockNumber(exports.MONITOR),
+        getFinalizedHeight: () => finalizedHeight(ctx, exports.MONITOR),
+        getBlock: async (ref) => {
+            const block = await client.getBlock(ref, exports.READ);
+            return block ? toDriverBlock(block) : null;
+        },
+        getTransaction: async (id) => {
+            const tx = await client.getTransaction(id, exports.READ);
+            if (!tx)
+                return null;
+            const receipt = tx.blockHash !== null ? await client.getReceipt(id, exports.READ) : null;
+            return (0, decode_1.decodeTransaction)(client.abi, tx, receipt, undefined, ctx.config);
+        },
+        /**
+         * With an ordering, the token verdict on one of our own Attempts. Without one (a
+         * status lookup by id, for a transaction the library does not manage) the chain's
+         * view, so a third party's call that shares the `transfer` selector is not reported
+         * failed.
+         */
+        observe: async (ref, ordering) => {
+            const tx = await client.getTransaction(ref.id, exports.MONITOR);
+            if (!tx)
+                return { seen: 'none' };
+            const receipt = tx.blockHash === null ? null : await client.getReceipt(ref.id, exports.MONITOR);
+            return ordering === undefined
+                ? (0, decode_1.chainObservation)(tx, receipt)
+                : (0, decode_1.evmObservation)(client.abi, tx, receipt);
+        },
+        getTokenMetadata: async (ref) => {
+            const contract = tokenOf(ref);
+            const decimalsData = await tokenCall(contract, client.abi.encodeDecimals());
+            if (decimalsData === '0x')
+                throw assetError('no token contract at this address');
+            let decimals;
+            try {
+                decimals = client.abi.decodeUint256(decimalsData);
+            }
+            catch {
+                throw assetError('the token decimals are unreadable');
+            }
+            if (decimals > 255n)
+                throw assetError('the token decimals are out of range');
+            const symbol = symbolText(client, await tokenCall(contract, client.abi.encodeSymbol()));
+            if (!symbol)
+                throw assetError('the token has no symbol');
+            return { symbol, decimals: Number(decimals) };
+        },
+        normalizeTokenRef: (ref) => {
+            const contract = tokenOf(ref);
+            if (!client.isAddress(contract))
+                throw assetError('not an EVM contract address');
+            return { standard: 'erc20', contract: client.checksum(contract) };
+        },
+    };
+}
+function createEvmSequence(client) {
+    return {
+        pending: (address) => client.getTransactionCount(address, 'pending', exports.MONITOR),
+        latest: (address) => client.getTransactionCount(address, 'latest', exports.MONITOR),
+    };
+}
+function createEvmExt(client) {
+    return {
+        evm: {
+            getNonce: async (address, block = 'latest') => {
+                if (block !== 'latest' && block !== 'pending') {
+                    throw new error_1.ValidationError('INVALID_INTENT', `block must be 'latest' or 'pending'`);
+                }
+                const codec = createEvmAddressCodec(client);
+                return client.getTransactionCount(codec.normalize(address).canonical, block, exports.READ);
+            },
+        },
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=reader.js.map