crewbus 10.0.11 → 11.3.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (53) hide show
  1. package/AGENTS.template.md +4 -4
  2. package/CHANGELOG.md +151 -0
  3. package/README.md +713 -706
  4. package/TEAM.template.md +1 -1
  5. package/bin/crewbus-hook.js +22 -5
  6. package/bin/crewbus-mcp.js +56 -48
  7. package/bin/crewbus.js +486 -355
  8. package/bin/lib/channels.js +1 -1
  9. package/bin/lib/export.js +1 -1
  10. package/bin/lib/groups.js +1 -5
  11. package/bin/lib/identity.js +92 -152
  12. package/bin/lib/launch.js +128 -30
  13. package/bin/lib/qrcode.js +2971 -0
  14. package/bin/lib/relay.js +26 -54
  15. package/bin/lib/spawn.js +241 -194
  16. package/bin/lib/store.js +2 -2
  17. package/bin/lib/web.js +277 -59
  18. package/claude-plugin/skills/crewbus/SKILL.md +1 -1
  19. package/docs/APPROVALS.md +8 -8
  20. package/docs/AUDIT_EXPORT.md +7 -7
  21. package/docs/CERT_READINESS.md +120 -120
  22. package/docs/COMPATIBILITY.md +196 -194
  23. package/docs/CONSOLIDATOR.md +6 -6
  24. package/docs/CONTROL_PLANE_SPEC.md +12 -14
  25. package/docs/CREWS.md +16 -13
  26. package/docs/DELIVERY.md +213 -210
  27. package/docs/GROUPS.md +8 -8
  28. package/docs/HA.md +151 -151
  29. package/docs/IDENTITY.md +6 -6
  30. package/docs/LEAD_ASSIGN.md +3 -85
  31. package/docs/LONG_RUNS.md +3 -3
  32. package/docs/M1_CLI_DRAFT.md +9 -9
  33. package/docs/ORCHESTRATOR.md +87 -0
  34. package/docs/PAIRING.md +7 -7
  35. package/docs/QUICKSTART.md +24 -13
  36. package/docs/RBAC.md +84 -73
  37. package/docs/SPLIT.md +82 -82
  38. package/docs/TENANCY.md +10 -10
  39. package/docs/THREAT_MODEL.md +68 -69
  40. package/docs/VERIFIER.md +10 -10
  41. package/docs/VERSION_SKEW.md +57 -57
  42. package/documentation.html +37 -29
  43. package/examples/hermes-pairing.md +3 -3
  44. package/examples/t3-pairing.md +1 -1
  45. package/index.html +13 -14
  46. package/opencode/plugins/dm-watch.js +1 -1
  47. package/opencode/tools/dm-send.js +4 -13
  48. package/package.json +75 -50
  49. package/packages/client-runtime/README.md +40 -40
  50. package/packages/contracts/harness.json +108 -111
  51. package/packages/contracts/launch.json +2 -3
  52. package/packages/contracts/pairing.json +3 -3
  53. package/docs/DESKTOP_SPIKE.md +0 -223
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ HMAC-signed for independent off-box verification.
12
12
  "v": 1,
13
13
  "seq": 4,
14
14
  "at": "2026-10-02T23:04:27.106Z",
15
- "actor": "boss",
16
- "role": "admin",
15
+ "actor": "orchestrator",
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+ "role": "orchestrator",
17
17
  "action": "send",
18
18
  "target": "aud1",
19
19
  "board": "C:/data/.crewbus",
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ HMAC-signed for independent off-box verification.
31
31
  | `seq` | 1-based per-stream sequence (`chain` and `audit` number independently) |
32
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  | `at` | ISO-8601 UTC timestamp |
33
33
  | `actor` | agent (or `system`/`unknown`) that caused the event |
34
- | `role` | actor role at write time (`admin`/`lead`/`worker`/`auditor`/`unknown`) |
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+ | `role` | actor role at write time (`orchestrator`/`worker`/`unknown`) |
35
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  | `action` | stable verb — the existing audit action names (`register`, `role-grant`, `offboard`, `acl-set`, `login`, `token-revoke`, `token-rotate`, `send`, `spawn`, `spawn-kill`, `remote-spawn`, `api-spawn`, `api-kill`, `hold-place`, `hold-lift`, …) |
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  | `target` | primary target (`to`/`target`/`agent`, comma-joined, max 200 chars; `""` when none) |
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  | `board` | board root path the event was written on |
@@ -90,13 +90,13 @@ Env equivalents: `CREWBUS_AUDIT_FORWARD`,
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  ## Legal hold
91
91
 
92
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  ```sh
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- crewbus hold place --from <admin> [--reason "..."]
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- crewbus hold lift --from <admin>
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+ crewbus hold place --from orchestrator [--reason "..."]
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+ crewbus hold lift --from orchestrator
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  crewbus hold status [--from <you>] [--json]
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  ```
97
97
 
98
- - `place`/`lift` are admin-only (token-checked + authorized).
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- - `status` is a read — any role, including `auditor`, may call it
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+ - `place`/`lift` are orchestrator-only (token-checked + authorized).
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+ - `status` is a read — any role, including workers, may call it
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  (with `--from` it is token-checked; without, it is an operator read).
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  - While a hold is active, `prune` (dm/broadcast + logs) is **refused**
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  loudly and names the hold:
@@ -1,120 +1,120 @@
1
- # Cert-readiness checklist
2
-
3
- Control-by-control mapping of common audit expectations to what the product
4
- implements (with exact commands/flags) and what remains a customer runbook
5
- item. Statuses: **done** (in the tree, covered by `npm test`), **manual**
6
- (stub runbook below — your cadence, your evidence).
7
-
8
- ## 1. Access control (RBAC)
9
-
10
- - [done] Roles + authorization gates: `agents`, `role-grant`, privileged
11
- ops gated by `authorize()` (`prune`, `acl-set`, `role-grant`, `offboard`,
12
- `group-restrict`, `serve-remote`, `import`, `snapshot-schedule`,
13
- `quota-set`, `hold-place`, `hold-lift`). See `docs/RBAC.md`.
14
- - [done] Default-deny remote spawn/kill: `serve` without
15
- `--allow-remote-spawn` answers 403; `--allow-cmd` regex constrains remote
16
- `--cmd`; `--workdir-root` constrains remote cwd.
17
- - [done] Standby replicas refuse writes: `serve --standby` answers 503 +
18
- `X-Relay-Role: standby` on `POST /sync/put`, `/api/spawn`, `/api/kill`.
19
- See `docs/HA.md`.
20
- - [manual] **Access-review cadence (quarterly stub):** run `agents --json`,
21
- confirm each identity still needs its role, `offboard` leavers
22
- (`register --offboard <name> --from <admin>` preserves inbox for audit),
23
- record the review date + reviewer. Evidence: the signed `role-grant` /
24
- `offboard` events in the log.
25
-
26
- ## 2. Authentication
27
-
28
- - [done] Per-identity tokens: first claim mints (`register --from <you>`
29
- prints `abt-…` once), afterwards `--token` / `CREWBUS_TOKEN` required;
30
- only salted hashes stored; `token rotate`, `token status`, `token revoke`
31
- (revocations sync, never resurrected). Service accounts:
32
- `register --service <name>`; expiry: `register --expires-in 30/90s/15m/
33
- 24h/7d`.
34
- - [done] OIDC: `login --issuer <url> --client-id <id> --token <jwt>` binds
35
- `oidc-<sub>`; relays accept Bearer with
36
- `serve --oidc-issuer <url> [--oidc-audience <id>]`; `sync`/`listen` send
37
- it via `--bearer` / `--oidc-token`. See `docs/OIDC_TLS.md`.
38
- - [done] Relay secret: `--secret` / `CREWBUS_SECRET` via
39
- `x-crewbus-secret` / `?secret=` (constant-time compare); remote serve
40
- without one refuses + warns.
41
- - [manual] **Credential-lifecycle schedule (stub):** rotate service-account
42
- tokens every N days (`token rotate --from <svc>`), rotate the relay
43
- secret on staff changes (restart relays), expire IdP clients for leavers.
44
- Evidence: `token status` output + signed rotation events.
45
-
46
- ## 3. Encryption
47
-
48
- - [done] In transit: in-box TLS `serve --tls-cert <pem> --tls-key <pem>`;
49
- mTLS on `/sync/*` with `--tls-ca` / `--mtls-ca`; outbound
50
- `--mtls-cert`/`--mtls-key`; plain-HTTP-behind-terminator stays supported.
51
- See `docs/OIDC_TLS.md`.
52
- - [done] At rest (backups): `board export` encrypts AES-256-GCM
53
- (32-byte hex/base64 used raw, else scrypt + random salt in the header);
54
- GCM tag verified *before* any byte is written on `import`; secrets
55
- stripped unless `--include-secrets` (loud warning).
56
- - [manual] **Key-rotation schedule (stub):** rotate backup keys yearly (or
57
- on incident): set the new `CREWBUS_BACKUP_KEY`, take a fresh export,
58
- verify `board import --into <fresh-dir>` decrypts, retire the old key in
59
- the vault. Evidence: dated exports + restore-drill log (below).
60
-
61
- ## 4. Audit logging
62
-
63
- - [done] Hash-chained tamper-evident log (`logs/chain.jsonl` for CLI ops,
64
- `logs/audit.jsonl` for relay ops); per-event HMAC signatures;
65
- `log [--audit] [--verify] [--limit 50]` verifies chain + sigs.
66
- - [done] SIEM export: versioned `v:1` envelope
67
- (`seq/at/actor/role/action/target/board/result/prevHash/sig`, `sig` =
68
- 64-hex HMAC); `serve --audit-forward <https-url>
69
- [--audit-forward-key <bearer>]` POSTs off-box with an `audit-spool/`
70
- at-least-once retry queue that drains (never blocks the relay path).
71
- See `docs/AUDIT_EXPORT.md`.
72
- - [done] Legal holds: `hold place --from <admin> [--reason]` /
73
- `hold lift` / `hold status`; `prune` (and `import` over a held board)
74
- refuse while held; hold record syncs to peers.
75
- - [manual] **Log-review + retention (stub):** forward to your SIEM, alert
76
- on `audit-spool/` growth (forwarder down), review privileged actions
77
- (`role-grant`, `offboard`, `hold-*`, `import`, `quota-set`) weekly,
78
- retain per your policy (`prune --older-than` only when no hold).
79
- Evidence: SIEM queries + `log --verify` output.
80
-
81
- ## 5. Backup
82
-
83
- - [done] Portable encrypted backups (`board export --from <admin|auditor>
84
- --out <file>`), safe restore (`board import --force` semantics + hold
85
- interaction), declarative schedules (`snapshot schedule --from <admin>
86
- --every 24h --keep 7 --out-dir <dir>`), `snapshot run` for cron/systemd/
87
- Task Scheduler, quotas/tenancy (`quota set/show`, `storage`, separate
88
- boards per tenant). See `docs/TENANCY.md`.
89
- - [manual] **Restore-drill runbook (quarterly stub):**
90
- 1. `board export --from <admin> --out /offsite/drill-<date>.abbackup.json`
91
- 2. `board import --in /offsite/drill-<date>.abbackup.json --into <fresh-dir> --force`
92
- 3. `gather`/inbox spot-checks + `log --verify` on the restored board
93
- 4. Record date, operator, result. Evidence: the drill log + restored-board
94
- `log --verify` output.
95
-
96
- ## 6. Incident response hooks
97
-
98
- - [done] Kill switches: `spawn-kill --to <w,…> | --all`, `stop --all
99
- --from <you>`, remote `/api/kill` (token-checked, RBAC matrix = CLI).
100
- - [done] Containment: `offboard` (tokens die now, inbox preserved),
101
- `token revoke`, `hold place` (freeze destructive retention), standby
102
- promotion path (`relay promote`, `/healthz`; see `docs/HA.md`).
103
- - [done] Evidence capture: `board export` (encrypted), `log --verify`,
104
- SIEM stream, `relay status --json` + `/healthz` snapshots.
105
- - [manual] **IR runbook stub:** detect (SIEM alert / spool growth / anomalous
106
- `agents --active`), contain (offboard + revoke + hold), preserve
107
- (export before prune), recover (promote standby / restore import),
108
- review (access review + key rotation out of cycle). Assign owners and a
109
- severity scale; rehearse with the restore drill above.
110
-
111
- ## Auditor evidence index (where to look)
112
-
113
- | Artifact | Produces |
114
- |---|---|
115
- | `log --verify` | chain + signature validity (first-broken-seq on tamper) |
116
- | SIEM receiver | `v:1` envelopes (`role`, `authMethod`, `board`, `sig`) |
117
- | `holds/legal.json` + `hold status` | hold provenance (placer, reason, time) |
118
- | `quota show` / `storage --json` | tenant label + limit-vs-actual |
119
- | `relay status --json` / `/healthz` | HA role, lag, promotion history |
120
- | `board export` envelope | `{manifest, files[]}` + algo/kdf header |
1
+ # Cert-readiness checklist
2
+
3
+ Control-by-control mapping of common audit expectations to what the product
4
+ implements (with exact commands/flags) and what remains a customer runbook
5
+ item. Statuses: **done** (in the tree, covered by `npm test`), **manual**
6
+ (stub runbook below — your cadence, your evidence).
7
+
8
+ ## 1. Access control (RBAC)
9
+
10
+ - [done] Roles + authorization gates: `agents`, `role-grant`, privileged
11
+ ops gated by `authorize()` (`prune`, `acl-set`, `role-grant`, `offboard`,
12
+ `group-restrict`, `serve-remote`, `import`, `snapshot-schedule`,
13
+ `quota-set`, `hold-place`, `hold-lift`). See `docs/RBAC.md`.
14
+ - [done] Default-deny remote spawn/kill: `serve` without
15
+ `--allow-remote-spawn` answers 403; `--allow-cmd` regex constrains remote
16
+ `--cmd`; `--workdir-root` constrains remote cwd.
17
+ - [done] Standby replicas refuse writes: `serve --standby` answers 503 +
18
+ `X-Relay-Role: standby` on `POST /sync/put`, `/api/spawn`, `/api/kill`.
19
+ See `docs/HA.md`.
20
+ - [manual] **Access-review cadence (quarterly stub):** run `agents --json`,
21
+ confirm each identity still needs its role, `offboard` leavers
22
+ (`register --offboard <name> --from orchestrator` preserves inbox for audit),
23
+ record the review date + reviewer. Evidence: the signed `role-grant` /
24
+ `offboard` events in the log.
25
+
26
+ ## 2. Authentication
27
+
28
+ - [done] Per-identity tokens: first claim mints (`register --from <you>`
29
+ prints `abt-…` once), afterwards `--token` / `CREWBUS_TOKEN` required;
30
+ only salted hashes stored; `token rotate`, `token status`, `token revoke`
31
+ (revocations sync, never resurrected). Service accounts:
32
+ `register --service <name>`; expiry: `register --expires-in 30/90s/15m/
33
+ 24h/7d`.
34
+ - [done] OIDC: `login --issuer <url> --client-id <id> --token <jwt>` binds
35
+ `oidc-<sub>`; relays accept Bearer with
36
+ `serve --oidc-issuer <url> [--oidc-audience <id>]`; `sync`/`listen` send
37
+ it via `--bearer` / `--oidc-token`. See `docs/OIDC_TLS.md`.
38
+ - [done] Relay secret: `--secret` / `CREWBUS_SECRET` via
39
+ `x-crewbus-secret` / `?secret=` (constant-time compare); remote serve
40
+ without one refuses + warns.
41
+ - [manual] **Credential-lifecycle schedule (stub):** rotate service-account
42
+ tokens every N days (`token rotate --from <svc>`), rotate the relay
43
+ secret on staff changes (restart relays), expire IdP clients for leavers.
44
+ Evidence: `token status` output + signed rotation events.
45
+
46
+ ## 3. Encryption
47
+
48
+ - [done] In transit: in-box TLS `serve --tls-cert <pem> --tls-key <pem>`;
49
+ mTLS on `/sync/*` with `--tls-ca` / `--mtls-ca`; outbound
50
+ `--mtls-cert`/`--mtls-key`; plain-HTTP-behind-terminator stays supported.
51
+ See `docs/OIDC_TLS.md`.
52
+ - [done] At rest (backups): `board export` encrypts AES-256-GCM
53
+ (32-byte hex/base64 used raw, else scrypt + random salt in the header);
54
+ GCM tag verified *before* any byte is written on `import`; secrets
55
+ stripped unless `--include-secrets` (loud warning).
56
+ - [manual] **Key-rotation schedule (stub):** rotate backup keys yearly (or
57
+ on incident): set the new `CREWBUS_BACKUP_KEY`, take a fresh export,
58
+ verify `board import --into <fresh-dir>` decrypts, retire the old key in
59
+ the vault. Evidence: dated exports + restore-drill log (below).
60
+
61
+ ## 4. Audit logging
62
+
63
+ - [done] Hash-chained tamper-evident log (`logs/chain.jsonl` for CLI ops,
64
+ `logs/audit.jsonl` for relay ops); per-event HMAC signatures;
65
+ `log [--audit] [--verify] [--limit 50]` verifies chain + sigs.
66
+ - [done] SIEM export: versioned `v:1` envelope
67
+ (`seq/at/actor/role/action/target/board/result/prevHash/sig`, `sig` =
68
+ 64-hex HMAC); `serve --audit-forward <https-url>
69
+ [--audit-forward-key <bearer>]` POSTs off-box with an `audit-spool/`
70
+ at-least-once retry queue that drains (never blocks the relay path).
71
+ See `docs/AUDIT_EXPORT.md`.
72
+ - [done] Legal holds: `hold place --from orchestrator [--reason]` /
73
+ `hold lift` / `hold status`; `prune` (and `import` over a held board)
74
+ refuse while held; hold record syncs to peers.
75
+ - [manual] **Log-review + retention (stub):** forward to your SIEM, alert
76
+ on `audit-spool/` growth (forwarder down), review privileged actions
77
+ (`role-grant`, `offboard`, `hold-*`, `import`, `quota-set`) weekly,
78
+ retain per your policy (`prune --older-than` only when no hold).
79
+ Evidence: SIEM queries + `log --verify` output.
80
+
81
+ ## 5. Backup
82
+
83
+ - [done] Portable encrypted backups (`board export --from orchestrator
84
+ --out <file>`), safe restore (`board import --force` semantics + hold
85
+ interaction), declarative schedules (`snapshot schedule --from orchestrator
86
+ --every 24h --keep 7 --out-dir <dir>`), `snapshot run` for cron/systemd/
87
+ Task Scheduler, quotas/tenancy (`quota set/show`, `storage`, separate
88
+ boards per tenant). See `docs/TENANCY.md`.
89
+ - [manual] **Restore-drill runbook (quarterly stub):**
90
+ 1. `board export --from orchestrator --out /offsite/drill-<date>.abbackup.json`
91
+ 2. `board import --in /offsite/drill-<date>.abbackup.json --into <fresh-dir> --force`
92
+ 3. `gather`/inbox spot-checks + `log --verify` on the restored board
93
+ 4. Record date, operator, result. Evidence: the drill log + restored-board
94
+ `log --verify` output.
95
+
96
+ ## 6. Incident response hooks
97
+
98
+ - [done] Kill switches: `spawn-kill --to <w,…> | --all`, `stop --all
99
+ --from <you>`, remote `/api/kill` (token-checked, RBAC matrix = CLI).
100
+ - [done] Containment: `offboard` (tokens die now, inbox preserved),
101
+ `token revoke`, `hold place` (freeze destructive retention), standby
102
+ promotion path (`relay promote`, `/healthz`; see `docs/HA.md`).
103
+ - [done] Evidence capture: `board export` (encrypted), `log --verify`,
104
+ SIEM stream, `relay status --json` + `/healthz` snapshots.
105
+ - [manual] **IR runbook stub:** detect (SIEM alert / spool growth / anomalous
106
+ `agents --active`), contain (offboard + revoke + hold), preserve
107
+ (export before prune), recover (promote standby / restore import),
108
+ review (access review + key rotation out of cycle). Assign owners and a
109
+ severity scale; rehearse with the restore drill above.
110
+
111
+ ## Auditor evidence index (where to look)
112
+
113
+ | Artifact | Produces |
114
+ |---|---|
115
+ | `log --verify` | chain + signature validity (first-broken-seq on tamper) |
116
+ | SIEM receiver | `v:1` envelopes (`role`, `authMethod`, `board`, `sig`) |
117
+ | `holds/legal.json` + `hold status` | hold provenance (placer, reason, time) |
118
+ | `quota show` / `storage --json` | tenant label + limit-vs-actual |
119
+ | `relay status --json` / `/healthz` | HA role, lag, promotion history |
120
+ | `board export` envelope | `{manifest, files[]}` + algo/kdf header |