create-substrat 0.7.3 → 0.8.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/index.js +5 -5
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/template/.substrat/playbook.md +26 -2
- package/template/AGENTS.md +22 -0
- package/template/src/routes.ts +15 -12
package/index.js
CHANGED
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@@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ const TEMPLATE = join(HERE, 'template');
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// The runtime packages release together off one version line (the changesets `fixed`
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// group), so one constant is right for all of them. Engines do NOT share a line —
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// each versions on its own, so one pin per engine, deliberately.
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const SUBSTRAT = '^0.
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const ENGINE_WORKORDER = '^0.
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const ENGINE_INVOICING = '^0.9.
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const BOUNDARY_LINT = '^0.
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const DEV_ISSUER = '^0.1.
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const SUBSTRAT = '^0.91.1';
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const ENGINE_WORKORDER = '^0.9.2';
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const ENGINE_INVOICING = '^0.9.7';
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const BOUNDARY_LINT = '^0.2.0';
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const DEV_ISSUER = '^0.1.5';
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const DOCS = 'https://substrat.net';
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package/package.json
CHANGED
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@@ -71,7 +71,13 @@ Every vertical gets this whether or not it uses a single engine:
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- **Tenancy** — tenants and scopes, isolated at the database level. A scope is one
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SQLite/DO database. Cross-tenant access is not a bug you avoid; there is no API for it.
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- **Permissions** — roles, grants, entity-narrowed grants, and every decision carries a
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proof path (why it was allowed).
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proof path (why it was allowed). **Sharing is a kernel verb, not a table you design**:
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an operation narrows a permission it already holds onto one entity, and withdraws it,
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with `ctx.grant(principal, perm, entityRef)` / `ctx.revoke(principal, perm, entityRef)`
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— entity-required, delegating (re-checks the caller's own decision), transactional with
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the operation. Neither alternative is this: a `ctx.link` edge is permanent (not
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revocable at all), and org membership is revocable but coarse-grained. Never mint an
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org per domain row to get a revoke.
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- **Events + audit** — every mutation emits a kernel-stamped event. Origin fields (tenant,
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scope, actor, time) are stamped by the kernel; your code cannot mislabel one.
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- **Migrations** — journaled per module, applied lazily per scope.
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@@ -363,6 +369,21 @@ operations + the `ModuleRegistration`. Keep the split — the linter and tests e
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`completeWorkOrder`. One transaction, invariants intact.
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- Portal listing: iterate and `ctx.check(perm, entityRef)` **per entity** — a proof walk,
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not UI filtering.
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- **An entity's history is `readTimeline(ctx, entity, input)` from `@substrat-run/kernel`** —
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not a `SELECT` against `_substrat_outbox`. Reading the spine is allowed (writes to
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`_substrat_*` are not); hand-writing the query is what goes wrong. It returns
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`{ entries, nextCursor }` with `{ id, type, occurredAt, actor }` per entry, and it exists
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to close two traps: `actor` is stored as JSON over a union — a principal is `"01J…"`
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*with quotes*, so a raw `SELECT actor` is a string that resolves against no one — and
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the cursor must be the event `id`, never `occurred_at`, which is identical across every
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event a single operation emits. Your permission check stays your line, above the call.
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`readHistory` is the same walk plus the payload, the permissions that authorized the
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write — each with the grant it resolved through, `null` for a row written before that
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was recorded, which is not the same fact as `[]` — and the PII classification,
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`piiClass` with the `subjectId` it is keyed by, so a renderer can decide whether an
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entry is safe to show before it shows it. `subjectId` is null when `piiClass` is
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`none`, and the payload is `null` after that subject's erasure, which is a supported
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answer to render rather than an error.
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### `src/seed.ts`
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@@ -377,7 +398,10 @@ await host.provisionScope(actor, { tenantId: tenant, scopeId: scope, jurisdictio
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Define roles **per tenant** from the engines' `PERM` + your keys, assign them, create seed
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entities via `stub.invoke` (**never raw SQL**), give portal principals entity-narrowed
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grants. Make it idempotent.
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grants. Make it idempotent. Seed-time grants are the platform actor's verb; sharing a
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**user** initiates at runtime is `ctx.grant` / `ctx.revoke` inside an operation (see the
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`AGENTS.md` section on sharing, and the [todo demo](https://github.com/substrat-run/substrat/tree/main/demos/todo)'s
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`src/module.ts` for the two calls in place).
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### `test/scenario.test.ts`
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package/template/AGENTS.md
CHANGED
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@@ -142,6 +142,28 @@ consumers). Rules 1–5 are enforced mechanically by `boundary-lint`.
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adapter **rejects** a `ctx.link` for an undeclared edge, so a missing one fails loudly.
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This is also what lets a portal permission-walk reach the owner.
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## Sharing is `ctx.grant` / `ctx.revoke`, not a table
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When a person shares their own record with another person — and takes them off it again —
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the operation narrows a permission it already holds onto that one entity:
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```ts
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await ctx.grant(principal, PERM.listContribute, listRef(listId)); // share
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await ctx.revoke(principal, PERM.listContribute, listRef(listId)); // un-share
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```
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Entity-required (module code can never write a scope- or tenant-wide grant), delegating
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(the caller's own decision on that entity is re-checked, so an operation can never hand out
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more than it holds), and transactional with the operation. Every later `ctx.check` reads
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the grant, so nothing else has to remember who may touch what.
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Neither alternative is this, so you can tell a real absence from this one: a `ctx.link`
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edge is **not revocable at all** — it is permanent — and org membership is revocable but
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coarse-grained — a whole org, not one record. Never mint an org per domain row, or a
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membership table consulted by hand in every handler, to get a revoke. The two-line
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reference is the [todo demo](https://github.com/substrat-run/substrat/tree/main/demos/todo)
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(`src/module.ts`, `todo/share-list` and `todo/revoke-share`).
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## The gates — run them, believe them
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```sh
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package/template/src/routes.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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import type { Context, Hono } from 'hono';
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import {
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import { problemResponse } from '@substrat-run/vertical-host';
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import type { ScopeStub } from '@substrat-run/kernel';
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/**
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@@ -28,21 +28,24 @@ export function mountApi(app: Hono<any, any, any>, resolveStub: ResolveStub): vo
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const body = (c: Context) => c.req.json<Record<string, unknown>>();
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/**
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* One error vocabulary, shared with the platform surface: `
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* (@substrat-run/vertical-host) is the same
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* permission denial is 403, a missing thing 404, a
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* fault 502 — identically on both hosts. "No opinion"
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* One error vocabulary, shared with the platform surface: `problemResponse`
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* (@substrat-run/vertical-host) is built on the same `classifyError` that
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* `mountPlatformSurface` uses, so a permission denial is 403, a missing thing 404, a
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* broken invariant 409, a runtime fault 502 — identically on both hosts. "No opinion"
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* becomes the caller's 400.
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*
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* The body is RFC 9457 `application/problem+json`: a `code` from the closed taxonomy
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* when your throw declared one (`substratError('conflict', …)`), `about:blank` when it
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* did not. `{ error }` rides along for one deprecation window, so a client reading it
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* keeps working while you move to `code`.
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*
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* In `worker.ts` this handler is REPLACED: Hono keeps only the last-registered
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* `onError`, and `mountPlatformSurface` installs its own. That is harmless precisely
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* because both are built on
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* here is what gives `server.ts`, which mounts no platform surface, the same
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* because both are built on the same vocabulary — same input, same answer. Registering
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* it here is what gives `server.ts`, which mounts no platform surface, the same
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* behaviour.
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*/
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app.onError((err, c) =>
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const seen = classifyError(err);
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if (seen) return c.json({ error: seen.message }, seen.status);
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return c.json({ error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) }, 400);
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});
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app.onError((err, c) => problemResponse(c, err));
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// -- generic invoke ---------------------------------------------------------
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// The kernel checks a permission inside EVERY operation, so a generic route is
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