create-nextblock 0.15.10 → 0.16.2

package/templates/nextblock-template/app/api/mcp/route.ts

@@ -1,415 +1,415 @@
-import { revalidatePath } from 'next/cache';
-
-import {
-  createClient,
-  getServiceRoleSupabaseClient,
-  verifyPackageOnline,
-} from '@nextblock-cms/db/server';
-import {
-  CORTEX_AI_PACKAGE_ID,
-  handleCortexMcpMessage,
-  isLocalhostHost,
-  parseBearerToken,
-  resolveCortexAiMcpSettings,
-  shouldTrustLocalMcpRequest,
-  touchCortexAiMcpToken,
-  verifyCortexAiMcpToken,
-  type CortexAiMcpScope,
-  type CortexMcpToolContext,
-  type JsonRpcMessage,
-} from '@nextblock-cms/cortex';
-
-import { validateBlockContent } from '../../../lib/blocks/blockRegistry';
-import { importExternalImageToMedia } from '../../cms/media/import-external-image';
-import { captureRevisionBaseline, commitRevisionFromBaseline } from '../../cms/revisions/service';
-import type { AnyFullContent } from '../../cms/revisions/utils';
-
-/**
- * Model Context Protocol server endpoint.
- *
- * Exposes the Cortex AI tool registry over MCP Streamable HTTP so external clients
- * (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code) can operate this CMS with the same
- * typed, validated tools the in-app dashboard agent uses. The protocol itself lives
- * in `@nextblock-cms/cortex` (`mcp-server.ts`); this file is the HTTP shim plus auth.
- *
- * Node runtime, not Edge: the tool executors reach `node:crypto`, `sharp` (via the
- * media importer) and the service-role Supabase client.
- */
-export const runtime = 'nodejs';
-export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic';
-
-const SERVER_VERSION = '1.0.0';
-
-/**
- * Confirmation is skipped for MCP callers, deliberately.
- *
- * The in-app agent's two-phase confirm works by matching a phrase in the user's *next
- * chat message*, which has no analogue in MCP — the model calls a tool and gets a
- * result, with no channel to carry a human phrase back. Every MCP host already gates
- * tool calls behind its own approval UI, so the confirmation would be a second prompt
- * the protocol cannot satisfy, and leaving it on would simply make every mutating
- * tool return a preview forever. The real control for MCP is the token scope: a
- * read-only token never sees a mutating tool at all.
- */
-const MCP_SKIP_CONFIRMATION = true;
-
-type McpAuth = {
-  actorUserId: string | null;
-  /**
-   * True when this token outlived the account that minted it (`created_by` is
-   * `ON DELETE SET NULL`), so `actorUserId` below is a stand-in rather than the
-   * principal that actually holds the credential.
-   *
-   * A stand-in is fine for *attribution* — a revision needs some author — but it
-   * must never be the basis for *authorization*, or deleting an administrator would
-   * silently promote their leftover token to whichever admin happens to sort first.
-   * Offboarding someone is exactly when their credentials should lose power, not
-   * inherit someone else's.
-   */
-  actorFromOrphanedToken: boolean;
-  scopes: CortexAiMcpScope[];
-  source: 'admin-session' | 'localhost' | 'token';
-};
-
-/**
- * MCP has no cookie session, so the importer is handed the actor this request already
- * authenticated. Without it every image import fails with "You must be signed in to
- * import an image" — which silently strips the imagery out of any page or product
- * built over MCP, since executors treat an import failure as non-fatal.
- */
-function createMcpImageImporter(actorUserId: string | null) {
-  return async function importExternalImageForMcp(input: {
-    url: string;
-    altText?: string;
-  }): Promise<{ id: string } | { error: string }> {
-    const result = await importExternalImageToMedia({
-      ...(actorUserId ? { actorUserId } : {}),
-      altText: input.altText,
-      url: input.url,
-    });
-
-    if ('error' in result) {
-      return { error: result.error };
-    }
-
-    return { id: result.media.id };
-  };
-}
-
-/** Mirrors the global-agent route so MCP writes land in Revision History like any other edit. */
-function createMcpRevisionRecorder(authorId: string | null) {
-  return async function recordRevision(input: {
-    baseline?: unknown;
-    contentType: 'page' | 'post' | 'product';
-    entityId: number | string;
-    phase: 'capture' | 'commit';
-  }): Promise<unknown> {
-    if (input.phase === 'capture') {
-      return captureRevisionBaseline(input.contentType, input.entityId);
-    }
-
-    const result = await commitRevisionFromBaseline(
-      input.contentType,
-      input.entityId,
-      authorId,
-      (input.baseline ?? null) as AnyFullContent | null
-    );
-
-    if ('error' in result) {
-      console.error('Cortex AI MCP: revision not recorded —', result.error);
-    }
-
-    return undefined;
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Reject cross-origin browser calls (DNS-rebinding defence, required by the spec).
- *
- * Only enforced when an `Origin` header is present: native MCP clients are not
- * browsers and send none, so requiring one would lock out every real caller.
- */
-function isOriginAllowed(request: Request): boolean {
-  const origin = request.headers.get('origin');
-
-  if (!origin) {
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  let originHost: string;
-
-  try {
-    originHost = new URL(origin).host;
-  } catch {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  if (isLocalhostHost(originHost)) {
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  const host = request.headers.get('host');
-
-  if (host && originHost.toLowerCase() === host.toLowerCase()) {
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  const configuredUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_URL;
-
-  if (configuredUrl) {
-    try {
-      return new URL(configuredUrl).host.toLowerCase() === originHost.toLowerCase();
-    } catch {
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return false;
-}
-
-/**
- * Establish who is calling.
- *
- * Three accepted paths, in priority order:
- *  1. A bearer token from `mcp_access_tokens` — the path every external client uses.
- *  2. An authenticated ADMIN cookie session — lets the dashboard's own "Test
- *     connection" button reach the endpoint without minting a token first.
- *  3. Loopback in development, when the operator has left that setting on.
- */
-async function authenticateMcpRequest(request: Request): Promise<McpAuth | null> {
-  const serviceClient = getServiceRoleSupabaseClient();
-  const settings = await resolveCortexAiMcpSettings(serviceClient);
-
-  if (!settings.enabled) {
-    return null;
-  }
-
-  const bearer = parseBearerToken(request.headers.get('authorization'));
-
-  if (bearer) {
-    const verification = await verifyCortexAiMcpToken(serviceClient, bearer);
-
-    if (!verification.valid) {
-      return null;
-    }
-
-    // Bookkeeping only — never block the call on it.
-    void touchCortexAiMcpToken(serviceClient, verification.token.id);
-
-    return {
-      actorFromOrphanedToken: !verification.token.created_by,
-      actorUserId: verification.token.created_by ?? (await resolveFallbackAdminUserId()),
-      scopes: verification.scopes,
-      source: 'token',
-    };
-  }
-
-  const adminUserId = await resolveAdminSessionUserId();
-
-  if (adminUserId) {
-    return {
-      actorFromOrphanedToken: false,
-      actorUserId: adminUserId,
-      scopes: ['read', 'write'],
-      source: 'admin-session',
-    };
-  }
-
-  if (shouldTrustLocalMcpRequest({ hostHeader: request.headers.get('host'), settings })) {
-    // Loopback trust is an explicit opt-in on a development machine, where anyone
-    // who can reach this endpoint can already read the service-role key out of
-    // .env.local. Not treated as orphaned: it grants nothing new.
-    return {
-      actorFromOrphanedToken: false,
-      actorUserId: await resolveFallbackAdminUserId(),
-      scopes: ['read', 'write'],
-      source: 'localhost',
-    };
-  }
-
-  return null;
-}
-
-/**
- * Every mutating Cortex executor calls `getActorUserId()` and throws without one, so a
- * connection with no identity behind it can read but never write. Two connections have
- * that problem: localhost trust (nobody signed in) and a token whose creator was since
- * deleted (`created_by` is `ON DELETE SET NULL`).
- *
- * Rather than advertise a `write` scope those connections cannot actually use, fall back
- * to an ADMIN profile so the write is attributed to a real person in Revision History.
- * This grants no new authority — reaching here already required either loopback in
- * development or a valid admin-minted token — it only supplies the author field.
- *
- * `id` ordering is arbitrary but stable, which is what matters: the same fallback admin
- * every time, so revision authorship does not jump between people run to run.
- */
-async function resolveFallbackAdminUserId(): Promise<string | null> {
-  try {
-    const { data } = await getServiceRoleSupabaseClient()
-      .from('profiles')
-      .select('id')
-      .eq('role', 'ADMIN')
-      .order('id', { ascending: true })
-      .limit(1)
-      .maybeSingle();
-
-    return data?.id ?? null;
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-async function resolveAdminSessionUserId(): Promise<string | null> {
-  try {
-    const supabase = createClient();
-    const {
-      data: { user },
-    } = await supabase.auth.getUser();
-
-    if (!user) {
-      return null;
-    }
-
-    const { data: profile } = await supabase
-      .from('profiles')
-      .select('role')
-      .eq('id', user.id)
-      .single();
-
-    return profile?.role === 'ADMIN' ? user.id : null;
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-function buildToolContext(auth: McpAuth): CortexMcpToolContext {
-  return {
-    actorFromOrphanedToken: auth.actorFromOrphanedToken,
-    actorUserId: auth.actorUserId,
-    importExternalImage: createMcpImageImporter(auth.actorUserId),
-    // No open editor over MCP: tools that need a target take it in their arguments
-    // (`cmsTarget`, `slug`, `entityId`) rather than inheriting one from a UI.
-    pageContext: null,
-    recordRevision: createMcpRevisionRecorder(auth.actorUserId),
-    revalidatePath,
-    skipConfirmation: MCP_SKIP_CONFIRMATION,
-    supabase: getServiceRoleSupabaseClient(),
-    validateBlockContent,
-  };
-}
-
-const JSON_HEADERS = {
-  'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
-  'Content-Type': 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
-} as const;
-
-/**
- * 401 for an unauthenticated caller.
- *
- * The `WWW-Authenticate` value is intentionally bare. Adding a `resource_metadata`
- * parameter would advertise RFC 9728 OAuth discovery, and Claude Code responds to
- * that by starting an OAuth flow — which dead-ends against a static-token server.
- * A plain challenge tells the client "send a bearer token" and nothing more.
- */
-function unauthorized(message: string): Response {
-  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: message }), {
-    headers: {
-      ...JSON_HEADERS,
-      'WWW-Authenticate': 'Bearer realm="NextBlock Cortex AI MCP"',
-    },
-    status: 401,
-  });
-}
-
-export async function POST(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
-  if (!isOriginAllowed(request)) {
-    return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Origin not allowed.' }), {
-      headers: JSON_HEADERS,
-      status: 403,
-    });
-  }
-
-  const isCortexAiActive = await verifyPackageOnline(CORTEX_AI_PACKAGE_ID);
-
-  if (!isCortexAiActive) {
-    return new Response(
-      JSON.stringify({ error: 'NextBlock Cortex AI is not active for this workspace.' }),
-      { headers: JSON_HEADERS, status: 403 }
-    );
-  }
-
-  const auth = await authenticateMcpRequest(request);
-
-  if (!auth) {
-    return unauthorized(
-      'A valid NextBlock MCP access token is required. Generate one in CMS Settings → Cortex AI, and confirm the MCP server is enabled there.'
-    );
-  }
-
-  let message: JsonRpcMessage;
-
-  try {
-    message = (await request.json()) as JsonRpcMessage;
-  } catch {
-    return new Response(
-      JSON.stringify({
-        error: { code: -32700, message: 'Parse error: request body is not valid JSON.' },
-        id: null,
-        jsonrpc: '2.0',
-      }),
-      { headers: JSON_HEADERS, status: 400 }
-    );
-  }
-
-  const response = await handleCortexMcpMessage(message, {
-    context: buildToolContext(auth),
-    scopes: auth.scopes,
-    serverVersion: SERVER_VERSION,
-  });
-
-  // Notifications and responses: 202 Accepted with no body. Returning a JSON-RPC
-  // envelope for a message that carried no `id` desyncs strict clients.
-  if (response.body === null) {
-    return new Response(null, { status: response.status });
-  }
-
-  return new Response(JSON.stringify(response.body), {
-    headers: JSON_HEADERS,
-    status: response.status,
-  });
-}
-
-/**
- * The optional server→client SSE stream.
- *
- * This server never initiates requests or pushes unsolicited notifications — every
- * response is returned inline on the POST — so there is nothing to stream. The spec
- * explicitly permits answering the GET with 405 in that case.
- */
-export function GET(): Response {
-  return new Response(
-    JSON.stringify({
-      error:
-        'This MCP endpoint does not offer a server-initiated SSE stream. Send JSON-RPC messages via POST.',
-    }),
-    { headers: { ...JSON_HEADERS, Allow: 'POST, DELETE, OPTIONS' }, status: 405 }
-  );
-}
-
-/** Session termination. The server is stateless, so there is no session to tear down. */
-export function DELETE(): Response {
-  return new Response(null, { status: 204 });
-}
-
-export function OPTIONS(): Response {
-  return new Response(null, {
-    headers: {
-      'Access-Control-Allow-Headers':
-        'Authorization, Content-Type, MCP-Protocol-Version, Mcp-Session-Id, Mcp-Method, Mcp-Name',
-      'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'POST, DELETE, OPTIONS',
-      Allow: 'POST, DELETE, OPTIONS',
-    },
-    status: 204,
-  });
-}
+import { revalidatePath } from 'next/cache';
+
+import {
+  createClient,
+  getServiceRoleSupabaseClient,
+  verifyPackageOnline,
+} from '@nextblock-cms/db/server';
+import {
+  CORTEX_AI_PACKAGE_ID,
+  handleCortexMcpMessage,
+  isLocalhostHost,
+  parseBearerToken,
+  resolveCortexAiMcpSettings,
+  shouldTrustLocalMcpRequest,
+  touchCortexAiMcpToken,
+  verifyCortexAiMcpToken,
+  type CortexAiMcpScope,
+  type CortexMcpToolContext,
+  type JsonRpcMessage,
+} from '@nextblock-cms/cortex';
+
+import { validateBlockContent } from '../../../lib/blocks/blockRegistry';
+import { importExternalImageToMedia } from '../../cms/media/import-external-image';
+import { captureRevisionBaseline, commitRevisionFromBaseline } from '../../cms/revisions/service';
+import type { AnyFullContent } from '../../cms/revisions/utils';
+
+/**
+ * Model Context Protocol server endpoint.
+ *
+ * Exposes the Cortex AI tool registry over MCP Streamable HTTP so external clients
+ * (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code) can operate this CMS with the same
+ * typed, validated tools the in-app dashboard agent uses. The protocol itself lives
+ * in `@nextblock-cms/cortex` (`mcp-server.ts`); this file is the HTTP shim plus auth.
+ *
+ * Node runtime, not Edge: the tool executors reach `node:crypto`, `sharp` (via the
+ * media importer) and the service-role Supabase client.
+ */
+export const runtime = 'nodejs';
+export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic';
+
+const SERVER_VERSION = '1.0.0';
+
+/**
+ * Confirmation is skipped for MCP callers, deliberately.
+ *
+ * The in-app agent's two-phase confirm works by matching a phrase in the user's *next
+ * chat message*, which has no analogue in MCP — the model calls a tool and gets a
+ * result, with no channel to carry a human phrase back. Every MCP host already gates
+ * tool calls behind its own approval UI, so the confirmation would be a second prompt
+ * the protocol cannot satisfy, and leaving it on would simply make every mutating
+ * tool return a preview forever. The real control for MCP is the token scope: a
+ * read-only token never sees a mutating tool at all.
+ */
+const MCP_SKIP_CONFIRMATION = true;
+
+type McpAuth = {
+  actorUserId: string | null;
+  /**
+   * True when this token outlived the account that minted it (`created_by` is
+   * `ON DELETE SET NULL`), so `actorUserId` below is a stand-in rather than the
+   * principal that actually holds the credential.
+   *
+   * A stand-in is fine for *attribution* — a revision needs some author — but it
+   * must never be the basis for *authorization*, or deleting an administrator would
+   * silently promote their leftover token to whichever admin happens to sort first.
+   * Offboarding someone is exactly when their credentials should lose power, not
+   * inherit someone else's.
+   */
+  actorFromOrphanedToken: boolean;
+  scopes: CortexAiMcpScope[];
+  source: 'admin-session' | 'localhost' | 'token';
+};
+
+/**
+ * MCP has no cookie session, so the importer is handed the actor this request already
+ * authenticated. Without it every image import fails with "You must be signed in to
+ * import an image" — which silently strips the imagery out of any page or product
+ * built over MCP, since executors treat an import failure as non-fatal.
+ */
+function createMcpImageImporter(actorUserId: string | null) {
+  return async function importExternalImageForMcp(input: {
+    url: string;
+    altText?: string;
+  }): Promise<{ id: string } | { error: string }> {
+    const result = await importExternalImageToMedia({
+      ...(actorUserId ? { actorUserId } : {}),
+      altText: input.altText,
+      url: input.url,
+    });
+
+    if ('error' in result) {
+      return { error: result.error };
+    }
+
+    return { id: result.media.id };
+  };
+}
+
+/** Mirrors the global-agent route so MCP writes land in Revision History like any other edit. */
+function createMcpRevisionRecorder(authorId: string | null) {
+  return async function recordRevision(input: {
+    baseline?: unknown;
+    contentType: 'page' | 'post' | 'product';
+    entityId: number | string;
+    phase: 'capture' | 'commit';
+  }): Promise<unknown> {
+    if (input.phase === 'capture') {
+      return captureRevisionBaseline(input.contentType, input.entityId);
+    }
+
+    const result = await commitRevisionFromBaseline(
+      input.contentType,
+      input.entityId,
+      authorId,
+      (input.baseline ?? null) as AnyFullContent | null
+    );
+
+    if ('error' in result) {
+      console.error('Cortex AI MCP: revision not recorded —', result.error);
+    }
+
+    return undefined;
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reject cross-origin browser calls (DNS-rebinding defence, required by the spec).
+ *
+ * Only enforced when an `Origin` header is present: native MCP clients are not
+ * browsers and send none, so requiring one would lock out every real caller.
+ */
+function isOriginAllowed(request: Request): boolean {
+  const origin = request.headers.get('origin');
+
+  if (!origin) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  let originHost: string;
+
+  try {
+    originHost = new URL(origin).host;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (isLocalhostHost(originHost)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  const host = request.headers.get('host');
+
+  if (host && originHost.toLowerCase() === host.toLowerCase()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  const configuredUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_URL;
+
+  if (configuredUrl) {
+    try {
+      return new URL(configuredUrl).host.toLowerCase() === originHost.toLowerCase();
+    } catch {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Establish who is calling.
+ *
+ * Three accepted paths, in priority order:
+ *  1. A bearer token from `mcp_access_tokens` — the path every external client uses.
+ *  2. An authenticated ADMIN cookie session — lets the dashboard's own "Test
+ *     connection" button reach the endpoint without minting a token first.
+ *  3. Loopback in development, when the operator has left that setting on.
+ */
+async function authenticateMcpRequest(request: Request): Promise<McpAuth | null> {
+  const serviceClient = getServiceRoleSupabaseClient();
+  const settings = await resolveCortexAiMcpSettings(serviceClient);
+
+  if (!settings.enabled) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const bearer = parseBearerToken(request.headers.get('authorization'));
+
+  if (bearer) {
+    const verification = await verifyCortexAiMcpToken(serviceClient, bearer);
+
+    if (!verification.valid) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    // Bookkeeping only — never block the call on it.
+    void touchCortexAiMcpToken(serviceClient, verification.token.id);
+
+    return {
+      actorFromOrphanedToken: !verification.token.created_by,
+      actorUserId: verification.token.created_by ?? (await resolveFallbackAdminUserId()),
+      scopes: verification.scopes,
+      source: 'token',
+    };
+  }
+
+  const adminUserId = await resolveAdminSessionUserId();
+
+  if (adminUserId) {
+    return {
+      actorFromOrphanedToken: false,
+      actorUserId: adminUserId,
+      scopes: ['read', 'write'],
+      source: 'admin-session',
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (shouldTrustLocalMcpRequest({ hostHeader: request.headers.get('host'), settings })) {
+    // Loopback trust is an explicit opt-in on a development machine, where anyone
+    // who can reach this endpoint can already read the service-role key out of
+    // .env.local. Not treated as orphaned: it grants nothing new.
+    return {
+      actorFromOrphanedToken: false,
+      actorUserId: await resolveFallbackAdminUserId(),
+      scopes: ['read', 'write'],
+      source: 'localhost',
+    };
+  }
+
+  return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Every mutating Cortex executor calls `getActorUserId()` and throws without one, so a
+ * connection with no identity behind it can read but never write. Two connections have
+ * that problem: localhost trust (nobody signed in) and a token whose creator was since
+ * deleted (`created_by` is `ON DELETE SET NULL`).
+ *
+ * Rather than advertise a `write` scope those connections cannot actually use, fall back
+ * to an ADMIN profile so the write is attributed to a real person in Revision History.
+ * This grants no new authority — reaching here already required either loopback in
+ * development or a valid admin-minted token — it only supplies the author field.
+ *
+ * `id` ordering is arbitrary but stable, which is what matters: the same fallback admin
+ * every time, so revision authorship does not jump between people run to run.
+ */
+async function resolveFallbackAdminUserId(): Promise<string | null> {
+  try {
+    const { data } = await getServiceRoleSupabaseClient()
+      .from('profiles')
+      .select('id')
+      .eq('role', 'ADMIN')
+      .order('id', { ascending: true })
+      .limit(1)
+      .maybeSingle();
+
+    return data?.id ?? null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+async function resolveAdminSessionUserId(): Promise<string | null> {
+  try {
+    const supabase = createClient();
+    const {
+      data: { user },
+    } = await supabase.auth.getUser();
+
+    if (!user) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    const { data: profile } = await supabase
+      .from('profiles')
+      .select('role')
+      .eq('id', user.id)
+      .single();
+
+    return profile?.role === 'ADMIN' ? user.id : null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+function buildToolContext(auth: McpAuth): CortexMcpToolContext {
+  return {
+    actorFromOrphanedToken: auth.actorFromOrphanedToken,
+    actorUserId: auth.actorUserId,
+    importExternalImage: createMcpImageImporter(auth.actorUserId),
+    // No open editor over MCP: tools that need a target take it in their arguments
+    // (`cmsTarget`, `slug`, `entityId`) rather than inheriting one from a UI.
+    pageContext: null,
+    recordRevision: createMcpRevisionRecorder(auth.actorUserId),
+    revalidatePath,
+    skipConfirmation: MCP_SKIP_CONFIRMATION,
+    supabase: getServiceRoleSupabaseClient(),
+    validateBlockContent,
+  };
+}
+
+const JSON_HEADERS = {
+  'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
+  'Content-Type': 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
+} as const;
+
+/**
+ * 401 for an unauthenticated caller.
+ *
+ * The `WWW-Authenticate` value is intentionally bare. Adding a `resource_metadata`
+ * parameter would advertise RFC 9728 OAuth discovery, and Claude Code responds to
+ * that by starting an OAuth flow — which dead-ends against a static-token server.
+ * A plain challenge tells the client "send a bearer token" and nothing more.
+ */
+function unauthorized(message: string): Response {
+  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: message }), {
+    headers: {
+      ...JSON_HEADERS,
+      'WWW-Authenticate': 'Bearer realm="NextBlock Cortex AI MCP"',
+    },
+    status: 401,
+  });
+}
+
+export async function POST(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
+  if (!isOriginAllowed(request)) {
+    return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Origin not allowed.' }), {
+      headers: JSON_HEADERS,
+      status: 403,
+    });
+  }
+
+  const isCortexAiActive = await verifyPackageOnline(CORTEX_AI_PACKAGE_ID);
+
+  if (!isCortexAiActive) {
+    return new Response(
+      JSON.stringify({ error: 'NextBlock Cortex AI is not active for this workspace.' }),
+      { headers: JSON_HEADERS, status: 403 }
+    );
+  }
+
+  const auth = await authenticateMcpRequest(request);
+
+  if (!auth) {
+    return unauthorized(
+      'A valid NextBlock MCP access token is required. Generate one in CMS Settings → Cortex AI, and confirm the MCP server is enabled there.'
+    );
+  }
+
+  let message: JsonRpcMessage;
+
+  try {
+    message = (await request.json()) as JsonRpcMessage;
+  } catch {
+    return new Response(
+      JSON.stringify({
+        error: { code: -32700, message: 'Parse error: request body is not valid JSON.' },
+        id: null,
+        jsonrpc: '2.0',
+      }),
+      { headers: JSON_HEADERS, status: 400 }
+    );
+  }
+
+  const response = await handleCortexMcpMessage(message, {
+    context: buildToolContext(auth),
+    scopes: auth.scopes,
+    serverVersion: SERVER_VERSION,
+  });
+
+  // Notifications and responses: 202 Accepted with no body. Returning a JSON-RPC
+  // envelope for a message that carried no `id` desyncs strict clients.
+  if (response.body === null) {
+    return new Response(null, { status: response.status });
+  }
+
+  return new Response(JSON.stringify(response.body), {
+    headers: JSON_HEADERS,
+    status: response.status,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * The optional server→client SSE stream.
+ *
+ * This server never initiates requests or pushes unsolicited notifications — every
+ * response is returned inline on the POST — so there is nothing to stream. The spec
+ * explicitly permits answering the GET with 405 in that case.
+ */
+export function GET(): Response {
+  return new Response(
+    JSON.stringify({
+      error:
+        'This MCP endpoint does not offer a server-initiated SSE stream. Send JSON-RPC messages via POST.',
+    }),
+    { headers: { ...JSON_HEADERS, Allow: 'POST, DELETE, OPTIONS' }, status: 405 }
+  );
+}
+
+/** Session termination. The server is stateless, so there is no session to tear down. */
+export function DELETE(): Response {
+  return new Response(null, { status: 204 });
+}
+
+export function OPTIONS(): Response {
+  return new Response(null, {
+    headers: {
+      'Access-Control-Allow-Headers':
+        'Authorization, Content-Type, MCP-Protocol-Version, Mcp-Session-Id, Mcp-Method, Mcp-Name',
+      'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'POST, DELETE, OPTIONS',
+      Allow: 'POST, DELETE, OPTIONS',
+    },
+    status: 204,
+  });
+}