create-metamynd-agent 0.2.0 → 0.3.0

package/index.mjs

@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ function exampleIndex(scope, perTxnMax) {
 // Every governed tool call is checked (allow / block / escalate) before it runs.
 import { createGuardFromConfig } from '${GUARD_PKG}';
 
+// Loads agent.metamynd.json: the agent's DID, its signing key, and the gate to call.
 const guard = await createGuardFromConfig('./agent.metamynd.json'); // no env vars
 
 // --- Your real tool. Replace the body with your actual implementation. ---
@@ -208,22 +209,85 @@ const gatedBookFlight = guard.guardTool(
   }),
 );
 
-async function ask(label, args) {
+const dim = (t) => '\\x1b[2m' + t + '\\x1b[0m';
+const bold = (t) => '\\x1b[1m' + t + '\\x1b[0m';
+const rule = (n) => '  ' + '-'.repeat(n);
+
+// Plain-English meaning for the reason codes this demo can produce.
+const WHY = {
+  AUTHORIZED: 'inside the mandate and under the SOP spend cap',
+  SOP_SPEND_CAP: 'your SOP caps a single transaction at $${perTxnMax}',
+  RISK_REVIEW: 'your SOP sends high-risk actions to a human first',
+  MERCHANT_NOT_ALLOWED: 'the mandate lists which merchants this agent may pay',
+};
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1. CONTEXT
+console.log('');
+console.log(bold('  What this simulation shows'));
+console.log('');
+console.log('  An agent should not be the thing that decides what it is allowed to do.');
+console.log('  This run makes that concrete: the SAME code path is attempted three times');
+console.log('  and produces three different outcomes, because the decision is made');
+console.log('  outside your program - and cannot be argued with from inside it.');
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------- 2. MECHANISM
+console.log('');
+console.log(bold('  How it does that'));
+console.log('');
+console.log(dim('   1. this project holds an agent identity (a DID) and its signing key'));
+console.log(dim('   2. that agent has a mandate - a scope it may act in, and a spend cap'));
+console.log(dim('   3. guardTool() wraps your tool, so nothing calls the raw handler'));
+console.log(dim('   4. each attempt is signed here, then decided by MetaMynd remotely'));
+console.log(dim('   5. your tool runs ONLY if that decision is ALLOW'));
+console.log('');
+console.log(dim('  scope  ${scope}'));
+console.log(dim('  cap    $${perTxnMax} per transaction, set by your SOP'));
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------- 3. THE STEPS
+async function attempt(n, intent, args) {
+  console.log('');
+  console.log(bold('  Step ' + n + ' of 3') + ' - ' + intent);
+  console.log(dim('     signing the request locally, then asking the gate to decide...'));
   try {
     const r = await gatedBookFlight(args);
-    console.log('  \\x1b[32m✅ ALLOW\\x1b[0m    ' + label.padEnd(26) + ' → booked ' + r.pnr);
+    console.log('\\x1b[32m     ALLOWED\\x1b[0m  your tool ran and returned ' + r.pnr);
+    console.log(dim('     ' + WHY.AUTHORIZED));
   } catch (e) {
     const g = e.governance ?? {};
-    const tag = g.decision === 'escalate' ? '\\x1b[33m⚠ ESCALATE\\x1b[0m' : '\\x1b[31m⛔ BLOCK\\x1b[0m';
-    console.log('  ' + tag + ' ' + label.padEnd(26) + ' → ' + (g.reasonCode ?? e.message));
+    const why = WHY[g.reasonCode] ?? e.message;
+    if (g.decision === 'escalate') {
+      console.log('\\x1b[33m     ESCALATED\\x1b[0m  held for a human - ' + g.reasonCode);
+      console.log(dim('     ' + why));
+      console.log(dim('     not a failure: approve it in the dashboard and the action resumes.'));
+    } else {
+      console.log('\\x1b[31m     BLOCKED\\x1b[0m  ' + (g.reasonCode ?? 'refused'));
+      console.log(dim('     ' + why));
+      console.log(dim('     your tool never ran - the gate refused before execution.'));
+    }
   }
 }
 
-console.log('\\n  ${scope} — every action passes through the MetaMynd gate\\n  ' + '─'.repeat(58));
-await ask('$${under} low risk',  { amount: ${under}, merchant: 'skyward-air', riskLevel: 'low' });
-await ask('$${over} over cap',  { amount: ${over}, merchant: 'skyward-air', riskLevel: 'low' });
-await ask('$${under} high risk', { amount: ${under}, merchant: 'skyward-air', riskLevel: 'high' });
-console.log('\\n  Change the rules any time in the dashboard (Legal Entity → SOPs) — no redeploy.\\n');
+console.log('');
+console.log(rule(66));
+await attempt(1, 'a $${under} booking, low risk. Expected to pass.', { amount: ${under}, merchant: 'skyward-air', riskLevel: 'low' });
+await attempt(2, 'a $${over} booking, deliberately over the cap.', { amount: ${over}, merchant: 'skyward-air', riskLevel: 'low' });
+await attempt(3, 'a $${under} booking, but flagged high risk.', { amount: ${under}, merchant: 'skyward-air', riskLevel: 'high' });
+console.log('');
+console.log(rule(66));
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------- 4. RESULT
+console.log('');
+console.log(bold('  What this proved'));
+console.log('');
+console.log(dim('   - one code path, three outcomes. The rules decided, not this file'));
+console.log(dim('     and not the model driving it.'));
+console.log(dim('   - the blocked call never reached your tool at all.'));
+console.log(dim('   - every decision was recorded as tamper-evident evidence.'));
+console.log(dim('   - if the gate were unreachable the guard fails CLOSED: it blocks.'));
+console.log('');
+console.log('  Change the cap in the dashboard (Legal Entity -> SOPs) and run again.');
+console.log(dim('  The outcome changes. This file does not. That is the point.'));
+console.log('');
 `;
 }
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "create-metamynd-agent",
-  "version": "0.2.0",
+  "version": "0.3.0",
   "description": "Scaffold a MetaMynd/AgentSafe-governed AI agent in one command — logs in, provisions the agent (identity + mandate + SOP + Standards) in a single call, writes agent.metamynd.json, and drops a runnable example.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {