create-mercato-app 0.6.5-develop.5337.1.534b781eac → 0.6.5-develop.5382.1.f542de69af
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/template/.env.example +5 -1
- package/template/AGENTS.md +1 -1
- package/template/docker-compose.fullapp.dev.yml +2 -0
- package/template/docker-compose.fullapp.yml +2 -0
- package/template/src/app/api/[...slug]/route.ts +57 -26
- package/template/src/modules/example/api/todos/route.ts +2 -1
- package/template/src/modules.ts +1 -1
package/package.json
CHANGED
package/template/.env.example
CHANGED
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@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ NEXTAUTH_SECRET=
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APP_URL=http://localhost:3000
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# Additional trusted origins for app requests that must pass host validation.
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# APP_URL is required in production for security-sensitive email links.
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# In dev mode these values also govern the HMR WebSocket (/_next/webpack-hmr):
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# add your public/reverse-proxy/Tailscale host here so remote dev access works,
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# then restart the dev server. Non-allowlisted origins are still rejected.
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# In Docker dev, the value must also be forwarded into the app container.
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# Example: APP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://admin.example.com,https://ops.example.com
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# APP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=
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@@ -549,7 +553,7 @@ OCR_MODEL=gpt-4o
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# ============================================================================
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# Customer Portal Custom Domain (Phase 1–3)
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# ============================================================================
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# See .ai/specs/2026-04-08-portal-custom-domain-routing.md and
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# See .ai/specs/implemented/2026-04-08-portal-custom-domain-routing.md and
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# docker/traefik/README.md. Required when custom-domain mappings are in use.
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# Primary platform host — excluded from the Traefik domain-check middleware
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package/template/AGENTS.md
CHANGED
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@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ export const aiAgentOverrides: AiAgentOverridesMap = {
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}
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```
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Example `modules.ts` inline override (preferred for app-level decisions that do not deserve a fake module). All module contract domains live under the same `entry.overrides` umbrella per the [unified spec](https://github.com/open-mercato/open-mercato/blob/main/.ai/specs/2026-05-04-modules-ts-unified-overrides.md):
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Example `modules.ts` inline override (preferred for app-level decisions that do not deserve a fake module). All module contract domains live under the same `entry.overrides` umbrella per the [unified spec](https://github.com/open-mercato/open-mercato/blob/main/.ai/specs/implemented/2026-05-04-modules-ts-unified-overrides.md):
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```ts
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// src/modules.ts
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@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ services:
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DATABASE_URL: postgres://${POSTGRES_USER:-postgres}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-postgres}@postgres:5432/${POSTGRES_DB:-open-mercato}
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JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:-JWT}
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APP_URL: ${APP_URL:-http://localhost:3000}
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# Additional trusted app/dev origins for the Open Mercato origin allowlist (resolveAllowedDevOrigins)
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APP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS: ${APP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-}
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CACHE_REDIS_URL: redis://redis:6379
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CACHE_STRATEGY: ${CACHE_STRATEGY:-redis}
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ENABLE_CRUD_API_CACHE: ${ENABLE_CRUD_API_CACHE:-true}
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DATABASE_URL: postgres://${POSTGRES_USER:-postgres}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-postgres}@postgres:5432/${POSTGRES_DB:-open-mercato}
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JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:-JWT}
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APP_URL: ${APP_URL:-http://localhost:3000}
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# Additional trusted app/dev origins for the Open Mercato origin allowlist (resolveAllowedDevOrigins)
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APP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS: ${APP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-}
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CACHE_REDIS_URL: redis://redis:6379
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CACHE_STRATEGY: ${CACHE_STRATEGY:-redis}
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ENABLE_CRUD_API_CACHE: ${ENABLE_CRUD_API_CACHE:-true}
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@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ function normalizeLoadedMetadata(
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return { [method]: metadata }
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}
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async function checkAuthorization(
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export async function checkAuthorization(
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methodMetadata: MethodMetadata | null,
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auth: AuthContext,
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req: NextRequest
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}
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if (auth && requiresAuthentication) {
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-
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// HTTP parameter pollution hardening (issue #2665): a request can carry `tenantId`
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// more than once — repeated `?tenantId=` query params, or in both the query string
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// and the body. The dispatcher and downstream handlers may disagree on which
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// occurrence wins (here historically `getAll().last`, handlers use `get()` first),
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// so the authorization gate must validate EVERY distinct candidate. If any one
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// targets a tenant the actor may not select, the request is rejected — making this
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// decision binding regardless of how a handler later parses the same request.
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const rawTenantCandidates = await extractTenantCandidates(req)
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const actorTenant = normalizeTenantId(auth.tenantId ?? null) ?? null
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const enforcedCandidates = new Set<string | null>()
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for (const rawTenantCandidate of rawTenantCandidates) {
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const tenantCandidate = sanitizeTenantCandidate(rawTenantCandidate)
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if (tenantCandidate
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}
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throw error
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}
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if (tenantCandidate === undefined) continue
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const normalizedCandidate = normalizeTenantId(tenantCandidate) ?? null
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if (normalizedCandidate === actorTenant) continue
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if (enforcedCandidates.has(normalizedCandidate)) continue
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enforcedCandidates.add(normalizedCandidate)
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try {
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const guardContainer = await ensureContainer()
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await enforceTenantSelection({ auth, container: guardContainer }, tenantCandidate)
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} catch (error) {
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if (isCrudHttpError(error)) {
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return NextResponse.json(error.body ?? { error: t('api.errors.forbidden', 'Forbidden') }, { status: error.status })
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}
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throw error
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}
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}
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}
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return candidate
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}
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const tenantParams = req.nextUrl?.searchParams?.getAll?.('tenantId') ?? []
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if (tenantParams.length > 0) {
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return tenantParams[tenantParams.length - 1]
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}
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function bodyCarriesTenantId(req: NextRequest): boolean {
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const method = (req.method || 'GET').toUpperCase()
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}
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return method !== 'GET' && method !== 'HEAD' && method !== 'OPTIONS'
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}
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async function extractBodyTenantCandidate(req: NextRequest): Promise<unknown> {
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const rawContentType = req.headers.get('content-type')
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if (!rawContentType) return undefined
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const contentType = rawContentType.split(';')[0].trim().toLowerCase()
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return undefined
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}
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export async function extractTenantCandidate(req: NextRequest): Promise<unknown> {
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const tenantParams = req.nextUrl?.searchParams?.getAll?.('tenantId') ?? []
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if (tenantParams.length > 0) {
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return tenantParams[tenantParams.length - 1]
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}
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if (!bodyCarriesTenantId(req)) {
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return undefined
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}
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return extractBodyTenantCandidate(req)
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}
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// Returns every `tenantId` candidate the request carries — each repeated `?tenantId=`
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// query param plus any body-level value. The dispatcher enforces tenant selection
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// against all of them so a downstream handler that reads a different occurrence
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// (e.g. `searchParams.get()` first vs. `getAll()` last) cannot be tricked into using a
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// candidate that was never authorized (issue #2665).
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export async function extractTenantCandidates(req: NextRequest): Promise<unknown[]> {
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const candidates: unknown[] = [...(req.nextUrl?.searchParams?.getAll?.('tenantId') ?? [])]
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if (bodyCarriesTenantId(req)) {
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const bodyCandidate = await extractBodyTenantCandidate(req)
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if (bodyCandidate !== undefined) candidates.push(bodyCandidate)
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}
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return candidates
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}
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async function handleRequest(
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method: HttpMethod,
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req: NextRequest,
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/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any */
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import { z } from 'zod'
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import { makeCrudRoute } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/crud/factory'
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import { escapeLikePattern } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/db/escapeLikePattern'
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import { Todo } from '../../data/entities'
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const ENTITY_ID = 'example:todo' as const
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if (ids.length > 0) F.id = { $in: ids }
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}
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if (q.id) F.id = q.id
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if (q.title) F.title = { $ilike: `%${q.title}%` }
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if (q.title) F.title = { $ilike: `%${escapeLikePattern(q.title)}%` }
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if (q.isDone !== undefined) F.is_done = q.isDone as any
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if (q.organizationId) F.organization_id = q.organizationId
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if (q.createdFrom || q.createdTo) {
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package/template/src/modules.ts
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// - overrides: optional unified per-app override surface — replace or
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// disable any contract a module presents: AI, routes, events, workers,
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// widgets, notifications, interceptors, setup, ACL, DI, encryption, etc.
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// See `.ai/specs/2026-05-04-modules-ts-unified-overrides.md` and
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// See `.ai/specs/implemented/2026-05-04-modules-ts-unified-overrides.md` and
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// `apps/docs/docs/framework/modules/overrides.mdx`.
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import { parseBooleanWithDefault } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/boolean'
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import type { ModuleOverrides } from '@open-mercato/shared/modules/overrides'
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