create-brainerce-store 1.87.0 → 1.88.0

package/templates/nextjs/base/src/app/api/store/[...path]/route.ts

@@ -1,296 +1,296 @@
-// SECURITY: This BFF proxy intentionally has no application-level rate limiting.
-// Rate limiting is the deployer's responsibility — configure it at the platform
-// edge (Vercel Firewall, Cloudflare, nginx) or add a Redis-backed limiter
-// (e.g. @upstash/ratelimit) here before going to production. Auth endpoints
-// like customers/login and customers/register are the most important to cover.
-import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
-import { cookies } from 'next/headers';
-import { checkCsrf } from '@/core/lib/csrf';
-import { getRequestOrigin } from '@/core/lib/site-url';
-
-const BACKEND_URL = (process.env.BRAINERCE_API_URL || 'https://api.brainerce.com').replace(
-  /\/$/,
-  ''
-);
-
-const TOKEN_COOKIE = 'brainerce_customer_token';
-const LOGGED_IN_COOKIE = 'brainerce_logged_in';
-
-const COOKIE_MAX_AGE = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60; // 7 days
-const BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
-
-/** Auth endpoints whose responses contain tokens to intercept */
-const AUTH_ENDPOINTS = ['customers/login', 'customers/register', 'customers/verify-email'];
-
-function isAuthEndpoint(path: string): boolean {
-  return AUTH_ENDPOINTS.some((ep) => path.endsWith(ep));
-}
-
-function isSafePathSegment(segment: string): boolean {
-  if (!segment) return false;
-  if (segment === '.' || segment === '..') return false;
-  if (segment.includes('/') || segment.includes('\\')) return false;
-  if (segment.includes('\0')) return false;
-  return true;
-}
-
-function isSecure(): boolean {
-  return process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production';
-}
-
-/**
- * Reads a fetch `Response` body as text, self-healing an observed runtime bug:
- * on Next.js 15.5.26, a `fetch()` made from a Route Handler or Server
- * Component can return a Response whose body is still gzip-compressed bytes,
- * even though an identical request (same URL, same headers) made via plain
- * Node `fetch()` outside Next decompresses correctly — confirmed by diffing
- * the raw response bytes both ways. The exact point inside Next's
- * server-side fetch instrumentation that causes this isn't confirmed, only
- * the externally observable symptom is. Calling `.text()` on a Response like
- * that UTF-8-decodes still-gzipped bytes — lossy (replacement characters)
- * and unparseable as JSON.
- *
- * A correctly-behaving fetch (browsers; plain Node; this bug's absence) never
- * hands back bytes that still start with gzip's magic number (`1f 8b`) — real
- * compression has already been undone by the time a body reaches here — so
- * checking for it before ever decoding as text can't misfire into
- * double-decompressing an already-plain body.
- *
- * This only works because the backend request below pins `Accept-Encoding:
- * gzip` instead of the runtime default (which also offers Brotli) — Brotli
- * has no reliable magic-number signature and no Web Streams API decoder, so
- * this self-healing has no fallback for it. That header is
- * correctness-critical here, not a tuning choice: reverting it to the
- * runtime default reintroduces this exact corruption, just for
- * Brotli-compressed responses instead of gzip ones.
- */
-async function readBackendBody(response: Response): Promise<string> {
-  const buffer = new Uint8Array(await response.arrayBuffer());
-  if (buffer.length >= 2 && buffer[0] === 0x1f && buffer[1] === 0x8b) {
-    const decompressed = new Blob([buffer])
-      .stream()
-      .pipeThrough(new DecompressionStream('gzip'));
-    return new TextDecoder('utf-8').decode(await new Response(decompressed).arrayBuffer());
-  }
-  return new TextDecoder('utf-8').decode(buffer);
-}
-
-function setAuthCookies(response: NextResponse, token: string): void {
-  response.cookies.set(TOKEN_COOKIE, token, {
-    httpOnly: true,
-    secure: isSecure(),
-    sameSite: 'lax',
-    path: '/',
-    maxAge: COOKIE_MAX_AGE,
-  });
-  response.cookies.set(LOGGED_IN_COOKIE, '1', {
-    httpOnly: false,
-    secure: isSecure(),
-    sameSite: 'lax',
-    path: '/',
-    maxAge: COOKIE_MAX_AGE,
-  });
-}
-
-function clearAuthCookies(response: NextResponse): void {
-  response.cookies.delete(TOKEN_COOKIE);
-  response.cookies.delete(LOGGED_IN_COOKIE);
-}
-
-async function proxyRequest(
-  request: NextRequest,
-  params: { path: string[] }
-): Promise<NextResponse> {
-  const method = request.method;
-
-  // Reject path-traversal attempts before constructing the backend URL
-  if (!params.path.every(isSafePathSegment)) {
-    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid path' }, { status: 400 });
-  }
-
-  // CSRF protection for mutating requests
-  if (['POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE'].includes(method)) {
-    const csrfError = checkCsrf(request);
-    if (csrfError) return csrfError;
-  }
-
-  // Build backend URL from path segments
-  const pathSegments = params.path.join('/');
-  const backendUrl = new URL(`${BACKEND_URL}/${pathSegments}`);
-
-  // Forward query parameters
-  request.nextUrl.searchParams.forEach((value, key) => {
-    backendUrl.searchParams.set(key, value);
-  });
-
-  // Build headers for backend request. Preserve the incoming Content-Type
-  // (including the multipart boundary for file uploads); default to JSON
-  // when absent. Overriding the Content-Type would strip the boundary and
-  // corrupt multipart uploads on the backend.
-  const incomingContentType = request.headers.get('content-type');
-  const headers: Record<string, string> = {
-    'Content-Type': incomingContentType || 'application/json',
-    // Pinned to gzip (not the runtime default `gzip, deflate, br`) so
-    // readBackendBody()'s self-healing only has to reason about one wire
-    // format — see the comment there.
-    'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip',
-  };
-
-  // Send the proxy's own origin, never the client-supplied Origin header —
-  // forwarding a client-controlled value would just hand a caller the ability
-  // to pick which storefront the backend thinks it is talking to.
-  //
-  // ⛔ The backend READS this value: a LIVE sales channel accepts only the
-  // domain configured on the connection (exact host or a subdomain of it) plus
-  // any additional allowed origins. It is not a presence check. So this header
-  // has to carry the storefront's PUBLIC origin.
-  //
-  // `request.nextUrl.origin` alone is not that origin: behind a reverse proxy
-  // it can be an internal address (`http://localhost:3000`, a container host),
-  // and every storefront call then fails on a Live connection. A TEST
-  // connection with no domain configured accepts anything, which is why this
-  // used to surface only at go-live. `getRequestOrigin` prefers the forwarded
-  // host the browser actually used and falls back to configuration.
-  headers['Origin'] = await getRequestOrigin(request.headers);
-
-  // Forward SDK version header if present
-  const sdkVersion = request.headers.get('x-sdk-version');
-  if (sdkVersion) {
-    headers['X-SDK-Version'] = sdkVersion;
-  }
-
-  // Forward Accept-Language so the backend locale middleware can resolve translations
-  const acceptLanguage = request.headers.get('accept-language');
-  if (acceptLanguage) {
-    headers['Accept-Language'] = acceptLanguage;
-  }
-
-  // Add auth token from httpOnly cookie
-  const cookieStore = await cookies();
-  const tokenCookie = cookieStore.get(TOKEN_COOKIE);
-  if (tokenCookie?.value) {
-    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${tokenCookie.value}`;
-  }
-
-  // Forward request body for non-GET requests. Use ArrayBuffer so multipart
-  // bodies (file uploads) pass through unchanged — `request.text()` works for
-  // JSON but would break binary content.
-  const isMultipart = incomingContentType?.includes('multipart/form-data') ?? false;
-  let body: ArrayBuffer | string | undefined;
-  if (method !== 'GET' && method !== 'HEAD') {
-    try {
-      body = isMultipart ? await request.arrayBuffer() : await request.text();
-    } catch {
-      // No body
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Proxy the request to backend
-  let backendResponse: Response;
-  const abortController = new AbortController();
-  const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => abortController.abort(), BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS);
-  try {
-    backendResponse = await fetch(backendUrl.toString(), {
-      method,
-      headers,
-      body,
-      signal: abortController.signal,
-    });
-  } catch (error) {
-    const isTimeout = (error as Error)?.name === 'AbortError';
-    return NextResponse.json(
-      { error: isTimeout ? 'Backend request timed out' : 'Backend service unavailable' },
-      { status: isTimeout ? 504 : 502 }
-    );
-  } finally {
-    clearTimeout(timeoutId);
-  }
-
-  // Read response body
-  const responseText = await readBackendBody(backendResponse);
-
-  // For auth endpoints: intercept token, set cookie, strip token from response
-  if (backendResponse.ok && method === 'POST' && isAuthEndpoint(pathSegments)) {
-    try {
-      const data = JSON.parse(responseText);
-      if (data.token) {
-        const token = data.token;
-
-        // Strip token from client response
-        const { token: _stripped, ...safeData } = data;
-
-        const response = NextResponse.json(safeData, {
-          status: backendResponse.status,
-        });
-        setAuthCookies(response, token);
-        return response;
-      }
-    } catch {
-      // Not JSON or no token field — pass through
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Handle 401 responses: clear auth cookies
-  if (backendResponse.status === 401 && tokenCookie?.value) {
-    const response = new NextResponse(responseText, {
-      status: backendResponse.status,
-      headers: {
-        'Content-Type': backendResponse.headers.get('Content-Type') || 'application/json',
-      },
-    });
-    clearAuthCookies(response);
-    return response;
-  }
-
-  // Sanitize 5xx responses so backend internals don't leak to the client
-  if (backendResponse.status >= 500) {
-    console.error(`[proxy] backend ${backendResponse.status} on ${pathSegments}:`, responseText);
-    return NextResponse.json(
-      { error: 'Backend service error' },
-      { status: backendResponse.status }
-    );
-  }
-
-  // Pass through response as-is
-  return new NextResponse(responseText, {
-    status: backendResponse.status,
-    headers: {
-      'Content-Type': backendResponse.headers.get('Content-Type') || 'application/json',
-    },
-  });
-}
-
-export async function GET(
-  request: NextRequest,
-  { params }: { params: Promise<{ path: string[] }> }
-) {
-  return proxyRequest(request, await params);
-}
-
-export async function POST(
-  request: NextRequest,
-  { params }: { params: Promise<{ path: string[] }> }
-) {
-  return proxyRequest(request, await params);
-}
-
-export async function PUT(
-  request: NextRequest,
-  { params }: { params: Promise<{ path: string[] }> }
-) {
-  return proxyRequest(request, await params);
-}
-
-export async function PATCH(
-  request: NextRequest,
-  { params }: { params: Promise<{ path: string[] }> }
-) {
-  return proxyRequest(request, await params);
-}
-
-export async function DELETE(
-  request: NextRequest,
-  { params }: { params: Promise<{ path: string[] }> }
-) {
-  return proxyRequest(request, await params);
-}
+// SECURITY: This BFF proxy intentionally has no application-level rate limiting.
+// Rate limiting is the deployer's responsibility — configure it at the platform
+// edge (Vercel Firewall, Cloudflare, nginx) or add a Redis-backed limiter
+// (e.g. @upstash/ratelimit) here before going to production. Auth endpoints
+// like customers/login and customers/register are the most important to cover.
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
+import { cookies } from 'next/headers';
+import { checkCsrf } from '@/core/lib/csrf';
+import { getRequestOrigin } from '@/core/lib/site-url';
+
+const BACKEND_URL = (process.env.BRAINERCE_API_URL || 'https://api.brainerce.com').replace(
+  /\/$/,
+  ''
+);
+
+const TOKEN_COOKIE = 'brainerce_customer_token';
+const LOGGED_IN_COOKIE = 'brainerce_logged_in';
+
+const COOKIE_MAX_AGE = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60; // 7 days
+const BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
+
+/** Auth endpoints whose responses contain tokens to intercept */
+const AUTH_ENDPOINTS = ['customers/login', 'customers/register', 'customers/verify-email'];
+
+function isAuthEndpoint(path: string): boolean {
+  return AUTH_ENDPOINTS.some((ep) => path.endsWith(ep));
+}
+
+function isSafePathSegment(segment: string): boolean {
+  if (!segment) return false;
+  if (segment === '.' || segment === '..') return false;
+  if (segment.includes('/') || segment.includes('\\')) return false;
+  if (segment.includes('\0')) return false;
+  return true;
+}
+
+function isSecure(): boolean {
+  return process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reads a fetch `Response` body as text, self-healing an observed runtime bug:
+ * on Next.js 15.5.26, a `fetch()` made from a Route Handler or Server
+ * Component can return a Response whose body is still gzip-compressed bytes,
+ * even though an identical request (same URL, same headers) made via plain
+ * Node `fetch()` outside Next decompresses correctly — confirmed by diffing
+ * the raw response bytes both ways. The exact point inside Next's
+ * server-side fetch instrumentation that causes this isn't confirmed, only
+ * the externally observable symptom is. Calling `.text()` on a Response like
+ * that UTF-8-decodes still-gzipped bytes — lossy (replacement characters)
+ * and unparseable as JSON.
+ *
+ * A correctly-behaving fetch (browsers; plain Node; this bug's absence) never
+ * hands back bytes that still start with gzip's magic number (`1f 8b`) — real
+ * compression has already been undone by the time a body reaches here — so
+ * checking for it before ever decoding as text can't misfire into
+ * double-decompressing an already-plain body.
+ *
+ * This only works because the backend request below pins `Accept-Encoding:
+ * gzip` instead of the runtime default (which also offers Brotli) — Brotli
+ * has no reliable magic-number signature and no Web Streams API decoder, so
+ * this self-healing has no fallback for it. That header is
+ * correctness-critical here, not a tuning choice: reverting it to the
+ * runtime default reintroduces this exact corruption, just for
+ * Brotli-compressed responses instead of gzip ones.
+ */
+async function readBackendBody(response: Response): Promise<string> {
+  const buffer = new Uint8Array(await response.arrayBuffer());
+  if (buffer.length >= 2 && buffer[0] === 0x1f && buffer[1] === 0x8b) {
+    const decompressed = new Blob([buffer])
+      .stream()
+      .pipeThrough(new DecompressionStream('gzip'));
+    return new TextDecoder('utf-8').decode(await new Response(decompressed).arrayBuffer());
+  }
+  return new TextDecoder('utf-8').decode(buffer);
+}
+
+function setAuthCookies(response: NextResponse, token: string): void {
+  response.cookies.set(TOKEN_COOKIE, token, {
+    httpOnly: true,
+    secure: isSecure(),
+    sameSite: 'lax',
+    path: '/',
+    maxAge: COOKIE_MAX_AGE,
+  });
+  response.cookies.set(LOGGED_IN_COOKIE, '1', {
+    httpOnly: false,
+    secure: isSecure(),
+    sameSite: 'lax',
+    path: '/',
+    maxAge: COOKIE_MAX_AGE,
+  });
+}
+
+function clearAuthCookies(response: NextResponse): void {
+  response.cookies.delete(TOKEN_COOKIE);
+  response.cookies.delete(LOGGED_IN_COOKIE);
+}
+
+async function proxyRequest(
+  request: NextRequest,
+  params: { path: string[] }
+): Promise<NextResponse> {
+  const method = request.method;
+
+  // Reject path-traversal attempts before constructing the backend URL
+  if (!params.path.every(isSafePathSegment)) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid path' }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  // CSRF protection for mutating requests
+  if (['POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE'].includes(method)) {
+    const csrfError = checkCsrf(request);
+    if (csrfError) return csrfError;
+  }
+
+  // Build backend URL from path segments
+  const pathSegments = params.path.join('/');
+  const backendUrl = new URL(`${BACKEND_URL}/${pathSegments}`);
+
+  // Forward query parameters
+  request.nextUrl.searchParams.forEach((value, key) => {
+    backendUrl.searchParams.set(key, value);
+  });
+
+  // Build headers for backend request. Preserve the incoming Content-Type
+  // (including the multipart boundary for file uploads); default to JSON
+  // when absent. Overriding the Content-Type would strip the boundary and
+  // corrupt multipart uploads on the backend.
+  const incomingContentType = request.headers.get('content-type');
+  const headers: Record<string, string> = {
+    'Content-Type': incomingContentType || 'application/json',
+    // Pinned to gzip (not the runtime default `gzip, deflate, br`) so
+    // readBackendBody()'s self-healing only has to reason about one wire
+    // format — see the comment there.
+    'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip',
+  };
+
+  // Send the proxy's own origin, never the client-supplied Origin header —
+  // forwarding a client-controlled value would just hand a caller the ability
+  // to pick which storefront the backend thinks it is talking to.
+  //
+  // ⛔ The backend READS this value: a LIVE sales channel accepts only the
+  // domain configured on the connection (exact host or a subdomain of it) plus
+  // any additional allowed origins. It is not a presence check. So this header
+  // has to carry the storefront's PUBLIC origin.
+  //
+  // `request.nextUrl.origin` alone is not that origin: behind a reverse proxy
+  // it can be an internal address (`http://localhost:3000`, a container host),
+  // and every storefront call then fails on a Live connection. A TEST
+  // connection with no domain configured accepts anything, which is why this
+  // used to surface only at go-live. `getRequestOrigin` prefers the forwarded
+  // host the browser actually used and falls back to configuration.
+  headers['Origin'] = await getRequestOrigin(request.headers);
+
+  // Forward SDK version header if present
+  const sdkVersion = request.headers.get('x-sdk-version');
+  if (sdkVersion) {
+    headers['X-SDK-Version'] = sdkVersion;
+  }
+
+  // Forward Accept-Language so the backend locale middleware can resolve translations
+  const acceptLanguage = request.headers.get('accept-language');
+  if (acceptLanguage) {
+    headers['Accept-Language'] = acceptLanguage;
+  }
+
+  // Add auth token from httpOnly cookie
+  const cookieStore = await cookies();
+  const tokenCookie = cookieStore.get(TOKEN_COOKIE);
+  if (tokenCookie?.value) {
+    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${tokenCookie.value}`;
+  }
+
+  // Forward request body for non-GET requests. Use ArrayBuffer so multipart
+  // bodies (file uploads) pass through unchanged — `request.text()` works for
+  // JSON but would break binary content.
+  const isMultipart = incomingContentType?.includes('multipart/form-data') ?? false;
+  let body: ArrayBuffer | string | undefined;
+  if (method !== 'GET' && method !== 'HEAD') {
+    try {
+      body = isMultipart ? await request.arrayBuffer() : await request.text();
+    } catch {
+      // No body
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Proxy the request to backend
+  let backendResponse: Response;
+  const abortController = new AbortController();
+  const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => abortController.abort(), BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS);
+  try {
+    backendResponse = await fetch(backendUrl.toString(), {
+      method,
+      headers,
+      body,
+      signal: abortController.signal,
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    const isTimeout = (error as Error)?.name === 'AbortError';
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: isTimeout ? 'Backend request timed out' : 'Backend service unavailable' },
+      { status: isTimeout ? 504 : 502 }
+    );
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timeoutId);
+  }
+
+  // Read response body
+  const responseText = await readBackendBody(backendResponse);
+
+  // For auth endpoints: intercept token, set cookie, strip token from response
+  if (backendResponse.ok && method === 'POST' && isAuthEndpoint(pathSegments)) {
+    try {
+      const data = JSON.parse(responseText);
+      if (data.token) {
+        const token = data.token;
+
+        // Strip token from client response
+        const { token: _stripped, ...safeData } = data;
+
+        const response = NextResponse.json(safeData, {
+          status: backendResponse.status,
+        });
+        setAuthCookies(response, token);
+        return response;
+      }
+    } catch {
+      // Not JSON or no token field — pass through
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Handle 401 responses: clear auth cookies
+  if (backendResponse.status === 401 && tokenCookie?.value) {
+    const response = new NextResponse(responseText, {
+      status: backendResponse.status,
+      headers: {
+        'Content-Type': backendResponse.headers.get('Content-Type') || 'application/json',
+      },
+    });
+    clearAuthCookies(response);
+    return response;
+  }
+
+  // Sanitize 5xx responses so backend internals don't leak to the client
+  if (backendResponse.status >= 500) {
+    console.error(`[proxy] backend ${backendResponse.status} on ${pathSegments}:`, responseText);
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'Backend service error' },
+      { status: backendResponse.status }
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Pass through response as-is
+  return new NextResponse(responseText, {
+    status: backendResponse.status,
+    headers: {
+      'Content-Type': backendResponse.headers.get('Content-Type') || 'application/json',
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+export async function GET(
+  request: NextRequest,
+  { params }: { params: Promise<{ path: string[] }> }
+) {
+  return proxyRequest(request, await params);
+}
+
+export async function POST(
+  request: NextRequest,
+  { params }: { params: Promise<{ path: string[] }> }
+) {
+  return proxyRequest(request, await params);
+}
+
+export async function PUT(
+  request: NextRequest,
+  { params }: { params: Promise<{ path: string[] }> }
+) {
+  return proxyRequest(request, await params);
+}
+
+export async function PATCH(
+  request: NextRequest,
+  { params }: { params: Promise<{ path: string[] }> }
+) {
+  return proxyRequest(request, await params);
+}
+
+export async function DELETE(
+  request: NextRequest,
+  { params }: { params: Promise<{ path: string[] }> }
+) {
+  return proxyRequest(request, await params);
+}