create-ailk 0.5.0 → 0.6.1

package/templates/apps/api/src/services/__tests__/verified-email.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/**
+ * @file verified-email.test.ts
+ *
+ * The shared verified-email read (#5701 D4) — the one `User {id, email,
+ * emailVerified}` read every email-keyed authorization path goes through.
+ *
+ * What is asserted: the read's exact shape (the `where` and the three
+ * selected fields, which is what makes `tools/lint-email-authz.ts`'s
+ * predicate satisfiable and what the five migrated call sites' own tests
+ * still expect); the two distinct refusals, which the callers map to
+ * different outcomes on the wire; and — the invariant itself — that the
+ * address never leaves this function unless `emailVerified === true`.
+ */
+import { findVerifiedEmail } from "../verified-email";
+
+// eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- jest mock factory must be hoisted
+jest.mock("../../lib/prisma.js", () => ({
+  prisma: { user: { findUnique: jest.fn() } },
+}));
+
+import { prisma } from "../../lib/prisma.js";
+
+const USER_ID = "user_00000000-0000-7000-8000-0000000000a1";
+const EMAIL = "founder@example.com";
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  jest.clearAllMocks();
+});
+
+describe("findVerifiedEmail", () => {
+  it("reads the User by id, selecting exactly id, email and emailVerified", async () => {
+    (prisma.user.findUnique as jest.Mock).mockResolvedValue({
+      id: USER_ID,
+      email: EMAIL,
+      emailVerified: true,
+    });
+
+    await findVerifiedEmail(USER_ID);
+
+    expect(prisma.user.findUnique).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      where: { id: USER_ID },
+      select: { id: true, email: true, emailVerified: true },
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("returns the address when the User exists and the address is verified", async () => {
+    (prisma.user.findUnique as jest.Mock).mockResolvedValue({
+      id: USER_ID,
+      email: EMAIL,
+      emailVerified: true,
+    });
+
+    const result = await findVerifiedEmail(USER_ID);
+
+    expect(result).toEqual({ ok: true, value: { id: USER_ID, email: EMAIL } });
+  });
+
+  it("refuses with user_not_found when there is no User row", async () => {
+    (prisma.user.findUnique as jest.Mock).mockResolvedValue(null);
+
+    const result = await findVerifiedEmail(USER_ID);
+
+    expect(result).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: "user_not_found" });
+  });
+
+  it("refuses with email_unverified — and never yields the address — when the address is unverified", async () => {
+    (prisma.user.findUnique as jest.Mock).mockResolvedValue({
+      id: USER_ID,
+      email: EMAIL,
+      emailVerified: false,
+    });
+
+    const result = await findVerifiedEmail(USER_ID);
+
+    expect(result).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: "email_unverified" });
+    expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain(EMAIL);
+  });
+});

package/templates/apps/api/src/services/abandon-email.ts

@@ -275,9 +275,15 @@ export async function runAbandonEmailSweep(
   if (dbError) return { ok: false, error: dbError };
 
   const now = opts.now ?? new Date();
+  // #4740: `||`, not `??` — an accidentally-set empty-string override
+  // (AILK_ABANDON_EMAIL_FROM="") is an env GAP, not a sender, so it falls
+  // through to the owner-wide default; both empty resolves to `undefined` and
+  // the `!fromAddress` guard leaves the candidate unstamped. The same shape
+  // is applied identically in waitlist-followup.ts's sibling sweep.
   const fromAddress =
-    process.env.AILK_ABANDON_EMAIL_FROM ??
-    process.env.AILK_LEAD_NOTIFICATION_FROM;
+    process.env.AILK_ABANDON_EMAIL_FROM ||
+    process.env.AILK_LEAD_NOTIFICATION_FROM ||
+    undefined;
 
   const summary: AbandonEmailSweepSummary = {
     scanned: 0,

package/templates/apps/api/src/services/aeo-score.ts

@@ -34,6 +34,20 @@ import type {
   AeoScoreResult,
 } from "@working-theory/validation";
 
+/**
+ * The readiness rules (#5949) are deliberately NOT in this set. They grade
+ * frontmatter and site-set facts (`AuditInput.readiness`); `buildAuditPayload`
+ * produces no frontmatter, so on a crawl input all three pass vacuously
+ * (packages/aeo FR5). Adding them would put three always-100 dimensions into a
+ * closed four-member public enum. `/v1/aeo/score` has no MCP twin
+ * (apps/api/CLAUDE.md § API ↔ MCP parity), so this is not a parity divergence.
+ */
+export const AEO_SCORE_EXCLUDED_READINESS_RULES = [
+  "policies-present",
+  "offer-on-priced-page",
+  "tax-code-when-stripe-tax",
+] as const;
+
 /** The service's fixed rule set — the four content rules only (§ 2.1 FR4). */
 export const AEO_SCORE_RULES: Rule[] = [
   schemaCoverage,
@@ -43,7 +57,10 @@ export const AEO_SCORE_RULES: Rule[] = [
 ];
 
 /** Severity table, verbatim from prospect-audit-site's "Compose the score-led sales report". */
-export const AEO_DIMENSION_SEVERITY: Record<AeoDimensionId, "high" | "medium" | "low"> = {
+export const AEO_DIMENSION_SEVERITY: Record<
+  AeoDimensionId,
+  "high" | "medium" | "low"
+> = {
   "schema-coverage": "high",
   "entity-markup": "high",
   "jsonld-validity": "medium",
@@ -77,7 +94,8 @@ export function resolveScoreBudgetMs(
 ): number {
   if (!rawEnv) return AEO_SCORE_DEFAULT_BUDGET_MS;
   const parsed = Number(rawEnv);
-  if (!Number.isFinite(parsed) || parsed <= 0) return AEO_SCORE_DEFAULT_BUDGET_MS;
+  if (!Number.isFinite(parsed) || parsed <= 0)
+    return AEO_SCORE_DEFAULT_BUDGET_MS;
   if (parsed > AEO_SCORE_MAX_BUDGET_MS) {
     log?.warn(
       `AEO_SCORE_BUDGET_MS=${rawEnv} exceeds the ${AEO_SCORE_MAX_BUDGET_MS}ms cap; falling back to the ${AEO_SCORE_DEFAULT_BUDGET_MS}ms default.`,
@@ -108,7 +126,10 @@ function faqHowtoOpportunityFinding(slug: string): string {
   return `${slug}: no FAQPage or HowTo structured data (a visibility opportunity, not a defect)`;
 }
 
-function buildDimension(ruleId: AeoDimensionId, report: AuditReport): AeoDimension {
+function buildDimension(
+  ruleId: AeoDimensionId,
+  report: AuditReport,
+): AeoDimension {
   const perRule = report.perRule.find((r) => r.id === ruleId) as PerRuleResult;
   const perPage = perRule.perPage ?? [];
   const fraction = perRule.score ?? (perRule.pass ? 1 : 0);
@@ -121,11 +142,20 @@ function buildDimension(ruleId: AeoDimensionId, report: AuditReport): AeoDimensi
   if (ruleId === FAQ_HOWTO_INCENTIVE_ID) {
     pagesPassing = perPage.filter((p) => p.bonus === true).length;
     const firstMissing = perPage.find((p) => p.bonus !== true);
-    finding = firstMissing ? faqHowtoOpportunityFinding(firstMissing.slug) : null;
+    finding = firstMissing
+      ? faqHowtoOpportunityFinding(firstMissing.slug)
+      : null;
   } else {
-    pagesPassing = perPage.length > 0 ? perPage.filter((p) => p.pass).length : (perRule.pass ? 1 : 0);
+    pagesPassing =
+      perPage.length > 0
+        ? perPage.filter((p) => p.pass).length
+        : perRule.pass
+          ? 1
+          : 0;
     const firstFailing = perPage.find((p) => !p.pass);
-    finding = firstFailing ? (firstFailing.evidence ?? perRule.evidence ?? null) : null;
+    finding = firstFailing
+      ? (firstFailing.evidence ?? perRule.evidence ?? null)
+      : null;
   }
 
   return {
@@ -168,11 +198,14 @@ const SSRF_GUARD_REASON_PATTERN =
  */
 function toClientSkippedEntry(entry: SkippedEntry): SkippedEntry {
   if (!SSRF_GUARD_REASON_PATTERN.test(entry.reason)) return entry;
-  console.warn("aeo-score: per-path SSRF-guard rejection (redacted on the wire)", {
-    path: entry.path,
-    url: entry.url,
-    reason: entry.reason,
-  });
+  console.warn(
+    "aeo-score: per-path SSRF-guard rejection (redacted on the wire)",
+    {
+      path: entry.path,
+      url: entry.url,
+      reason: entry.reason,
+    },
+  );
   return { ...entry, reason: "ssrf_blocked" };
 }
 
@@ -233,7 +266,11 @@ export async function scoreUrl(
     ...(deps.resolver !== undefined && { resolver: deps.resolver }),
   });
   if (!safe.ok) {
-    return { status: "unavailable", reason: "ssrf_blocked", message: safe.reason };
+    return {
+      status: "unavailable",
+      reason: "ssrf_blocked",
+      message: safe.reason,
+    };
   }
 
   const budgetMs = deps.budgetMs ?? AEO_SCORE_DEFAULT_BUDGET_MS;