create-ailk 0.23.0 → 0.24.0

package/templates/apps/api/CLAUDE.md

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ The root index sits outside `/v1/*`:
 
 Routes are versioned under `/v1/*`:
 
-- `/v1/leads/{submit,subscribe,callback}` — lead capture, newsletter subscription, callback request. **A consent-bearing lead carries terms acceptance (#8730, #9130):** a `submit` whose `source` is a consent source (`isConsentLeadSource` — the contact sources `contact-form`, `conversational-intake`, `flow:contact`, plus the Free apply page's `flow:job-application`) without a top-level `consent: true` is `400 consent_required` before the tenant read; an accepted one gets `payload.consent = { statement, acceptedAt }` written by the route (the platform's `CONTACT_FORM_TERMS_STATEMENT` and the request's receive time), replacing any the client sent, and that server-written key is left out of the `Idempotency-Key` replay comparison (`services/lead-routing.ts`'s `comparablePayload`) so a keyed retry replays. `isContactLeadSource` stays the narrower contact set (what /contact may stamp); the magnet-source stamp is unchanged. Other sources, `subscribe` and `callback` are unchanged. **A magnet's completion (#8757 D6):** after a `flow:<slug>` submit is written to the database, `services/magnet-completion.ts` reads that LIVE magnet's setting. `invite` adds `next: { completion: "invite" }` to the 201 and, on a first write (never a replay), sends the submitter one `sendDeliverableEmail` from the completion emails' sender (`AILK_DELIVERABLE_EMAIL_FROM`, else `AILK_LEAD_NOTIFICATION_FROM`) — the magnet's `completionEmail` copy, else "We received your {title}" — whose link (`cta` "Track this in your account") is `accountOrigin + accountInvitePath(…)`: `FRONTEND_URL`'s origin with `/sign-in` for a keyless caller on a `workspace`/`multi-tenant` build, the enabled spoke sign-in client's callback origin (`https:` unless `NODE_ENV=development`) with `/api/hub-session/sign-in` for a spoke; no origin degrades to `lead`. The completion read waits at most 1.5 s (`MAGNET_COMPLETION_BUDGET_MS`). Capped in the database at one email per recipient per magnet per day and 50 per magnet per hour (a capped send keeps `next`); logged `{ event: "magnet-invite", outcome }`, never the address. `checkout` adds `next: { completion: "checkout", checkoutOffering }` only while the `commerce` claim reads `claimed` and the offering is still listed. A failed read or send never changes the 201. `capture_lead` posts `source: "mcp"`, so its answer and the parity rows are unchanged. Where a lead goes is `src/lib/lead-delivery.ts` (#6730): `DATABASE_URL` set → the database (the inbox); no database but `RESEND_API_KEY` + `AILK_LEAD_NOTIFICATION_TO` + `AILK_LEAD_NOTIFICATION_FROM` → the owner email IS the delivery (`persisted: "email"`, a refused send is `503 delivery_failed`); neither outside production → the local file fallback; neither in production → `503 lead_capture_not_configured` before any write. A newsletter signup needs a database (or the local file). A lead is never reported captured when nothing stored or delivered it.
+- `/v1/leads/{submit,subscribe,callback}` — lead capture, newsletter subscription, callback request. **A consent-bearing lead carries terms acceptance (#8730, #9130):** a `submit` whose `source` is a consent source (`isConsentLeadSource` — the contact sources `contact-form`, `conversational-intake`, `flow:contact`, plus the Free apply page's `flow:job-application`) without a top-level `consent: true` is `400 consent_required` before the tenant read; an accepted one gets `payload.consent = { statement, acceptedAt }` written by the route (the platform's `CONTACT_FORM_TERMS_STATEMENT` and the request's receive time), replacing any the client sent, and that server-written key is left out of the `Idempotency-Key` replay comparison (`services/lead-routing.ts`'s `comparablePayload`) so a keyed retry replays. `isContactLeadSource` stays the narrower contact set (what /contact may stamp); the magnet-source stamp is unchanged. Other sources, `subscribe` and `callback` are unchanged. **A magnet's completion (#8757 D6):** after a `flow:<slug>` submit is written to the database, `services/magnet-completion.ts` reads that LIVE magnet's setting. `invite` adds `next: { completion: "invite" }` to the 201 and, on a first write (never a replay), sends the submitter one `sendDeliverableEmail` from the completion emails' sender (`AILK_DELIVERABLE_EMAIL_FROM`, else `AILK_LEAD_NOTIFICATION_FROM`) — the magnet's `completionEmail` copy, else "We received your {title}" — whose link (`cta` "Track this in your account") is `accountOrigin + accountInvitePath(…)`: `FRONTEND_URL`'s origin with `/sign-in` for a keyless caller on a `workspace`/`multi-tenant` build, the enabled spoke sign-in client's callback origin (`https:` unless `NODE_ENV=development`) with `/api/hub-session/sign-in` for a spoke; no origin degrades to `lead`. The completion read waits at most 1.5 s (`MAGNET_COMPLETION_BUDGET_MS`). Capped in the database at one email per recipient per magnet per day and 50 per magnet per hour (a capped send keeps `next`); logged `{ event: "magnet-invite", outcome }`, never the address. `checkout` adds `next: { completion: "checkout", checkoutOffering }` only while the `commerce` claim reads `claimed` and the offering is still listed. A failed read or send never changes the 201. **The three routes are parity twins (#7171, #7172, #7173):** each is its own registration parsing `request.body` with one `@working-theory/validation` export — `leadSubmitBodySchema` (`source`, `email?`, `consent?`, `payload?`), `leadSubscribeBodySchema` (`email?`, `source`), `leadCallbackBodySchema` (`name`, `phone`, `preferredTime?`, `payload?`); plain objects, never `.strict()`, so every body a site form sends today (`siteId` beside the fields, the StepFlow envelope — to `submit` or `subscribe` — no `payload`) still passes and an unknown key is stripped — a body the export refuses is `400 invalid_input`, before the tenant read, and `routeLead` still reads the RAW body, so what it validates and persists is unchanged (#5732). `capture_lead`, `subscribe_newsletter` and `request_callback` take exactly those exports and return the 201 body unchanged (the tool adopted the API — the operator's decision of 2026-10-19); an agent MAY send a `flow:` source; the same per-recipient and per-magnet caps apply; `next` is then present on the wire and is not declared in the catalog output (the parity fixtures use `source: "mcp"`). Where a lead goes is `src/lib/lead-delivery.ts` (#6730): `DATABASE_URL` set → the database (the inbox); no database but `RESEND_API_KEY` + `AILK_LEAD_NOTIFICATION_TO` + `AILK_LEAD_NOTIFICATION_FROM` → the owner email IS the delivery (`persisted: "email"`, a refused send is `503 delivery_failed`); neither outside production → the local file fallback; neither in production → `503 lead_capture_not_configured` before any write. A newsletter signup needs a database (or the local file). A lead is never reported captured when nothing stored or delivered it.
 - `/v1/leads/capture` (GET) — `{ ok: true, data: { contact, newsletter } }`, two booleans saying whether a submit / a subscribe would be accepted (#6730). The web contact page reads it to show the form or the site's contact email. Never names the delivery mode, an address or an env var. Registered at the top level, outside `leadsScope`'s strict per-IP limit. No MCP twin — a recorded exception on the same footing as the anonymous form-lifecycle routes: an agent needs no preflight, because the three lead-write tools already return the 503 when capture is not accepted.
 - `/v1/leads` (GET, `?cursor=&limit=`) — the leads INBOX read (#5678): the caller's OWN sites' leads, newest first, cursor-paginated (`limit` defaults to 50, max 200; `(createdAt desc, id desc)`; `cursor` is the previous page's last row id, and one that does not resolve within the caller's scope is a 400, never a silent page 1 — the API keeps that contract, and the web inbox deliberately softens it on its own side by re-reading page one when a URL-supplied cursor 400s, which is a rendering choice and not a change to this response). Five fields per row and nothing more — `id`, `name` (lifted from `payload.name` when the site's form captured one), `email`, `source`, `createdAt`; `payload`'s other keys, `siteId`, `promotedUserId` and `promotedAt` are never selected (`src/services/leads-inbox.ts` is the only read path). Registered in `authScope` only (auth, no tenant guard) and — alone in that scope — **unconditionally**, with no `isModuleEnabled()` gate: lead capture is a never-gate surface at every level, so reading a lead back cannot be gated either. Identity is `request.userId`; there is no site, org or workspace parameter, so the scope cannot be widened from the wire. It is resolved from the caller's own memberships by `src/services/owner-workspaces.ts`'s `resolveOwnerWorkspaces` — the ONE site→workspace resolution in this app, shared with `lead-promotion.ts` rather than written a second time — and every read filters `siteId ∈ workspaceIds`. Role floor: the `inbox-read` permission in `@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2) — every role, a member included (the operator's 2026-10-04 decision; contact PII is the inbox's job); the scope is the UNION of every workspace in the caller's organizations whose role holds `inbox-read`, not one active tenant, because this route registers outside the tenant scope. **Two deployment preconditions decide whether it returns anything, and both fail EMPTY rather than wide:** on a build with no `multi-tenant` module `resolveOwnerWorkspaces` resolves none (a deliberate scope limit since #5677), so there the scope is the default workspace, granted only through `services/default-tenant.ts`'s `resolveDefaultTenantForOperator` — `AILK_OPERATOR_EMAIL` set, the caller's verified email equal to it, a one-workspace deployment, a role holding `inbox-read` — and every other caller gets the empty page (#6730); and the `siteId` the leads were WRITTEN under must equal a workspace id. That `siteId` has TWO sources, and `currentSiteId()` is not the one on the primary path: the three POST capture routes read it from the REQUEST BODY (`routes/leads/index.ts`), which the capture sections declare in content and default to `"default"` (`ContactForm`/`Newsletter`/`StepFlow`, `ext.siteId ?? "default"`), while the recommender's capture path (`routes/flows/recommender.ts`) is the one that uses `currentSiteId()` (`lib/site.ts`, `AILK_SITE_ID ?? "default"`). A workspace id is `wksp_<uuidv7>`, so `siteId ∈ workspaceIds` matches only when the content-declared value — and, for recommender leads, `AILK_SITE_ID` — is set to it (the same convention `waitlist-dashboard.ts` already relies on). The rendered `name` is lifted from `payload.name` and truncated at 200 characters: the write side bounds `payload` at 64 keys and no per-value length, and `POST /v1/leads/submit` is anonymous with no ownership check on `siteId`. No MCP twin — identity-bound (#3591 exception, the same shape as `/v1/workspaces/*` and `/v1/billing/*`).
 - `/v1/flows/:slug` (GET), `/v1/flows/:slug/steps` (POST) — serve a flow config + submit a step's answers; server-side per-step partial-state persistence (#3956). The GET serves the stored config **minus `completionEmail`** (#7519 D5, SEC-7519-I1): `serveFlow` projects the owner's completion-email copy out, while completion reads the stored snapshot and sends it (`sendCompletionEmail`, for a flow with no `deliverables`) — capped in the database like the invite email (#8847 security review): at most one per recipient per magnet per day and 50 per magnet per hour, counted from the magnet's stored leads; a capped or uncountable send writes nothing and logs `{ event: "completion-email", outcome }`, never the address, and the completion still succeeds. Module: `signal-collectors` (D-48, #5366) — registers only when the module is enabled; MCP twins `get_flow`/`submit_flow_step` carry the same `module` tag (D7). **The workspace (#7844, #9145):** every `/v1/flows` route resolves it through `services/public-site-resolver.ts`'s `resolveCallerWorkspace` — a registered spoke's key to its own workspace; a keyless call through `resolveDefaultWorkspaceId`, the one-workspace predicate `resolvePublicWorkspace` uses, on any content adapter and never the `AILK_SITE_ID` alias (one workspace that is the seeded default, else unresolved), so a multi-workspace deployment that is not a hub answers `503 tenant_unresolved` here as its content, pricing and schedule reads refuse; a refused key, or a keyless call on a hub, is the same `503`. `resolveSiteWorkspaceId()` keeps only its deployment-scoped callers (the recommender's spoke-checkout own-site check, the deletion request's hub-operator destination, the owner platform, account and sign-up consents, the checkout webhook's signed-in buyer, the listing config's env key, the lead submit's keyless write and the seed bins). **A completion on an `invite` magnet (#8771):** `submitStep` reads that LIVE magnet's setting once, at completion, through `services/magnet-completion.ts` (`magnetCompletionWithinBudget`, `accountTargetFor`) for the `accountCaller` the route hands it (`{ kind: "spoke", spokeId, workspaceId }` for a registered spoke's key, else `{ kind: "anonymous" }`; never taken from the body). On `invite` the response gains `data.next: { completion: "invite" }` (never the email) and `sendInviteConfirmation` is fired, not awaited, in place of the magnet's own `completionEmail` — one email, under #8757's caps; a flow with `deliverables` sends its deliverable's email only. Any other setting, a lead not written to the database, a failed read or a failed send gives no `next` and today's completion email. `submit_flow_step` returns the body as it came, so the twin carries `next` with no tool change. **A `deliverable` block (#8848 D1–D4):** a config may carry one `deliverable` — `kind` `file` (its bytes are the `deliverables` default entry's asset), `video`, `page` or `external`, plus `gated` and its display copy — which makes the flow `special-report`. The GET serves a GATED block without its target (`src`, `poster`, `href`); a completing response for a gated block gains `data.deliverable`: the file's freshly minted grant id (`{ kind: "file", grantId }`, no key when none was minted; the same grant is still emailed), or the stored target. `fulfillDeliverable` resolves a `deliverable` flow's asset against the `Asset` store only, never the legacy `DeliverableAsset` store. A spoke seed carrying `deliverable` is `400 field_not_seedable`. Both MCP twins carry the new keys through the shared schemas, with no tool change.
@@ -48,34 +48,36 @@ Routes are versioned under `/v1/*`:
 - `/v1/flows/:slug/aggregate` (GET) — anonymous, site-scoped per-question response counts across all completed respondents for the results reveal (#4771): respondents are completed `FlowSession` rows (not `Lead` rows — a recommending-mode respondent has no Lead until the email moment), question metadata + the chart flag come from the `WaitlistExperiment` register, and only `resultsReveal`-flagged `single`/`multi` questions are returned (`src/services/flow-aggregate.ts`). No individual answer, email, name, session id, or score in the response; no auth. Module: `signal-collectors`. No MCP twin — recorded exception (an agent walking a flow already gets everything it needs from `submit_flow_step`'s own response; "how everyone else answered" changes none of it).
 - `/v1/deliverables/:grantId` (GET) — the capability-token download route for gated PDFs and reports, including client deliverables (#3961 D5); the token itself is the sole gate, no auth preHandler applies (`src/routes/deliverables/index.ts`). Module: `signal-collectors` (D-48, #5366). No MCP twin — identity-bound capability-link download (#3591 exception, the same shape as `/v1/waitlist-signups/me`). **Three grant classes since #6310**, keyed on `grant.assetId`'s ADR-0031 prefix: `playbook:` (unchanged, the FEAT-074 U4b virtual asset); `asset_` — a workspace `Asset`, resolved through the named boundary `src/lib/deliverable-asset-store.ts`, scoped by `grant.workspaceId` (a serve-time tenancy re-check restored for this class — D15) — served `attachment` with an extension pinned to the stored content type, `nosniff`, a non-raster `Content-Security-Policy` (for EVERY content type, including raster — never `inline`), and `Cache-Control: private, no-store` so a deleted asset stops downloading immediately; `dasset_` — the LEGACY `DeliverableAsset` store (unchanged, tried only when a magnet's `assetKey` does not resolve against `Asset`). A client's file — tagged `private`, attached to a member-area message, or (#8171 D3) named by a delivered piece version — is never minted or served as a deliverable. Every miss on the `asset_` class — a NULL `workspaceId`, no row, a foreign-workspace row — folds into the SAME uniform 404 as every other class; there is deliberately no redirect to the public `GET /v1/assets/:assetId` (that route's year-long `immutable` cache would defeat deletion as a revocation lever, and would collapse every lead's capability onto one workspace-canonical id — spec #6310 §9 SEC-001/SEC-002).
 - `/v1/flows/:slug/save` (POST), `/v1/flows/:slug/checkout` (POST) — the recommender's email moment (#4841): `save` creates the FlowSession + Lead (+ the T+0 DeliverableGrant) for the permalink's answers; `checkout` does the same, records the `FlowCheckout` buyer row at a SERVER-recomputed `price()` (the body carries no amount — `flowCheckoutInputSchema` is strict), and opens a Stripe TEST-mode Checkout Session whose metadata carries the permalink + offer key (`src/routes/flows/recommender.ts`, `src/services/recommender-capture.ts`, `packages/stripe-client`'s `createQuotedCheckoutSession`). Anonymous, rate-limited; a non-`sk_test_` key is refused before any side effect. **An Offerings offer is never quoted here (#9071 D2):** a `checkout` whose register offer carries `lookupKey` is `409 checkout_not_configured` before any write, and one whose flow config offer carries it is the same `409` after the email moment but before any checkout row or Stripe call — logged `{ slug, outcome: "offerings_offer_refused" }`; such an offer is sold on `/pricing` at Stripe's own Price. No MCP twin — recorded exception: an agent walking a flow has no email to give and no card to pay with; the anonymous MCP surface is identity-blind.
-- `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/magnets` (GET, POST), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/magnets/:id` (GET, PATCH), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/magnets/:id/signups` (GET), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/magnets/:id/subscribers` (GET), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/magnets/:id/messages` (GET) — the tenant-scoped magnet Admin authoring surface over the flow engine's `FlowDefinition` rows (#6157 S5c, `src/routes/magnets/index.ts`): list (cursor-paginated, fixed 50-row page), create, get, update, and the three per-magnet captured-lead reads (#6246 S6h). Reads and writes only through `tenantDb(tenant).flows` — never `prisma.flowDefinition`, `currentSiteId()`, or `upsertFlowDefinition` (the PUBLIC/seed path below, which the admin path never calls). No DELETE — the reversible alternative is `status: "draft"` (#6156), which stops a NEW walk from starting while an in-flight walk finishes on its pinned snapshot. `slug` lives only inside `config.slug`. **A PATCH whose `config.slug` differs renames the magnet (#8641 D8):** `tenantDb(tenant).flows.rename` moves the row, this workspace's `Lead.source = 'flow:<slug>'` rows and its `FlowSession.flowSlug` rows to the new slug in one transaction, so its submissions follow it; `FlowCheckout` rows and lead payload copies are never rewritten. Refused before any write: `409 slug_fixed` (the stored slug is `onboarding`, `request-quote`, `contact` (#8661 D5), `job-application` (#8746 D3), `newsletter` (#8847 D4) or `recommender` (#9071 D12), which the server reads by name, or the row belongs to a listing) and `409 slug_reserved` (the new slug is one of those six); inside the transaction, `409 conflict` first (another magnet holds it — #8734 D1; also the loser of two renames racing for one free slug, which fails on the `(site_id, slug)` key because the definition row is the rename's first write, D4), then `409 slug_bound` (a checkout or a waitlist register of this workspace names either slug, or a session of this workspace already sits at the new one). A lead of this workspace at `flow:<new slug>` that no magnet owns does not refuse: the rename re-stamps it `unclaimed:flow:<new slug>` (`unclaimedLeadSource`, `@working-theory/validation`) so the magnet never adopts it (#8734 D3). A rename records a `magnet.rename` audit row whose summary is `{ from, to, leads, sessions, unclaimed }`. The two operator-writable config URLs (`abandonEmail.resumeUrl`, `followUps[].cta.href`) pass an exact-origin gate against `FRONTEND_URL` before any write, the same discipline the recommender's checkout redirect already applies (#4912). Role floors from `@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2) (D5): list and get serve the full row to `magnets-manage` (owner, admin) and, to a caller holding only `magnets-read` (a member), a LIVE-only summary of exactly `{ id, slug, kind, title, landingPage }` — a member's list is read to completion (at most 20 pages of 50, a `warn` at the cap) and answers `nextCursor: null`, a member's `?cursor=` is a 400, and a draft's get is the same 404 as an absent id — because a magnet's `config` carries `scoring` thresholds, `offers`/`rateTable` and `deliverables` asset keys and no draft is a member's; POST and PATCH need `magnets-manage`; the per-magnet captured-people lists need `inbox-read` (every role), and for a caller without `magnets-manage` a magnet that is not live is the same 404. Both writes declare a route-level `bodyLimit` (256 KiB) and each records one `recordAgentAction` audit row. **`customersEnabled` (#8171 D6)** — the member-area customer switch — is served on every full row and written by the PATCH (a PATCH of it alone skips the plan check); the member summary row never carries it. **The completion setting (#8757 D1–D4):** every magnet carries `completion` (`lead` | `invite` | `checkout`, column default `lead`) and `checkoutOffering` (set exactly when `checkout`), two `FlowDefinition` columns closed by three CHECKs and read and written only through `lib/flow-completion-store.ts` (`tenant-db.ts` stays closed under the #8746 contract; `architecture.yaml` lists the store under `paths_scoped`). The migration backfilled `onboarding`, `request-quote` and `job-application` to `invite` by slug (`STANDARD_MAGNET_COMPLETIONS`); a magnet created later is `lead` until #8759. Every full row serves the pair; the member summary never does. The PATCH writes it ALONE — `{ completion, checkoutOffering }` beside any other key is `400 completion_alone`, an offering without a completion or a pair `flowCompletionSettingSchema` refuses `400 validation_failed` — with no plan check, and records `magnet.update` with summary `{ completion }`. `checkout` also needs a person (`403 completion_needs_person` for an agent key), the `commerce` claim (`409 commerce_required`, `503 license-undetermined`) and a key `services/plan-offerings.ts`'s `listPlanOfferings` lists right now (`409 offering_unknown`; a failed read `503 offerings_unavailable`). **The standard onboarding magnet (#8515 D2–D4):** every workspace holds one `diagnostic` magnet at slug `onboarding` (`ONBOARDING_FLOW_SLUG`, `onboardingFlowConfig` in `@working-theory/validation`), `draft` and `customersEnabled: true`, written only by `lib/tenant-db.ts`'s insert-only seed (`createMany` with `skipDuplicates`, so a re-seed creates nothing and never overwrites the owner's edits or an owner's own magnet at that slug): `POST /v1/workspaces` seeds the workspace it just created, after its transaction commits (a failed seed is one `error` line and still a `201`), and the seed-presets CLI (`node dist/bin/seed-presets.js`, run once after deploy) seeds every existing workspace and prints counts only. Its two bare-id exports have one production caller each, pinned by `tests/architecture/onboarding-seed-callers.test.ts`. **The standard Contact form magnet (#8661 D1–D3):** every workspace also holds one `contact` magnet at slug `contact` (`CONTACT_FORM_FLOW_SLUG`, `contactFormFlowConfig`), titled "Contact form", `live`, `customersEnabled: false`, landing page `/contact` — Name, Email, a five-option Subject, Message and a required terms checkbox. It is written by the same insert-only seed, from the same two callers (a failed seed is one `contact-form-seed` `error` line and still a `201`), and by `database/seed.ts` for the default workspace; a re-seed never duplicates it or overwrites an edit. The web /contact page reads it on every request through `GET /v1/flows/contact`, and a submission that used it is stamped `flow:contact`, an Inbox submission under "Contact form". **The standard Job application magnet (#8746 D3, D4):** every workspace also holds one `diagnostic` magnet at slug `job-application` (`JOB_APPLICATION_FLOW_SLUG`, `jobApplicationFlowConfig`), titled "Job application", `live`, `customersEnabled: false`, landing page `/careers` — First name, Last name and Email (required), Phone and LinkedIn URL — with no `completion` field. It is written by the same insert-only seed, from the same two callers (a failed seed is one `job-application-seed` `error` line and still a `201`), and by `database/seed.ts` for the default workspace; `RESERVED_FLOW_SLUGS` carries its slug, so no flow-engine write, spoke seed or new listing takes it. Each web job page `/careers/<slug>` carries an Apply button to `/careers/<slug>/apply` (#8849), whose Free apply page reads it through `GET /v1/flows/job-application` and draws its field step as a one-step form, and a submission is stamped `flow:job-application`, an Inbox submission under "Job application" whose `name` is first + last and whose `job` is the posting's slug. Module: `multi-tenant || signal-collectors`, the same gate the review-surface dashboard (`/v1/waitlist-experiments/*`, `/v1/project-listings/*`) already registers under. No MCP twin on any of the seven — identity-bound tenant routes (#3591 exception, same shape as the sibling `/v1/workspaces/*` routes); the public `/v1/flows/*` routes and their two MCP tools are unchanged, pinned by `src/routes/flows/__tests__/parity.test.ts`. **The three new list routes (#6246 S6h)** join every magnet through `Lead.source = 'flow:' + <the resolved magnet's slug>` — the literal string `flow-engine.ts`'s `completeSubmission` stamps on every flow-engine `Lead` row regardless of kind, including `newsletter`/`waitlist` (`Subscriber` is written only by the separate, pre-flow-engine `subscribe_newsletter` path, unrelated to a magnet) — via ONE new `tenantDb(tenant).leads.listBySource(source, { limit })` accessor, an exact-source-equality sibling of #6204's allowlist-scoped `listUnhandledMessages`, served by a new `(workspaceId, source)` composite index on `Lead`. `/signups` expects `kind: "waitlist"`, `/subscribers` expects `"newsletter"`, `/messages` expects `"contact"`; a magnet id absent from the caller's workspace OR resolved to the WRONG kind for the called route is `404 not_found`, indistinguishably (mirrors the existing GET's absent-or-foreign fold). `/signups` and `/subscribers` serve four keys (`id`, `name`, `email`, `createdAt`); `/messages` serves those four plus `handledAt`. Bounded `?limit=` (default 50, max 200), newest-first — mirrors `workspaces/messages.ts`'s own query schema. Applications (Listicle) is deliberately OUT of this surface — `ProjectListing` carries no reverse link to the listicle-kind `FlowDefinition` that captured it, so "scoped to that magnet" cannot be honored without a schema change (split to #6314).
+- `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/magnets` (GET, POST), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/magnets/:id` (GET, PATCH), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/magnets/:id/signups` (GET), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/magnets/:id/subscribers` (GET), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/magnets/:id/messages` (GET) — the tenant-scoped magnet Admin authoring surface over the flow engine's `FlowDefinition` rows (#6157 S5c, `src/routes/magnets/index.ts`): list (cursor-paginated, fixed 50-row page), create, get, update, and the three per-magnet captured-lead reads (#6246 S6h). Reads and writes only through `tenantDb(tenant).flows` — never `prisma.flowDefinition`, `currentSiteId()`, or `upsertFlowDefinition` (the PUBLIC/seed path below, which the admin path never calls). No DELETE — the reversible alternative is `status: "draft"` (#6156), which stops a NEW walk from starting while an in-flight walk finishes on its pinned snapshot. `slug` lives only inside `config.slug`. **A PATCH whose `config.slug` differs renames the magnet (#8641 D8):** `tenantDb(tenant).flows.rename` moves the row, this workspace's `Lead.source = 'flow:<slug>'` rows and its `FlowSession.flowSlug` rows to the new slug in one transaction, so its submissions follow it; `FlowCheckout` rows and lead payload copies are never rewritten. Refused before any write: `409 slug_fixed` (the stored slug is `onboarding`, `request-quote`, `contact` (#8661 D5), `job-application` (#8746 D3), `newsletter` (#8847 D4), `recommender` (#9071 D12) or `trial` (#9287 D11), which the server reads by name, or the row belongs to a listing) and `409 slug_reserved` (the new slug is one of those seven); inside the transaction, `409 conflict` first (another magnet holds it — #8734 D1; also the loser of two renames racing for one free slug, which fails on the `(site_id, slug)` key because the definition row is the rename's first write, D4), then `409 slug_bound` (a checkout or a waitlist register of this workspace names either slug, or a session of this workspace already sits at the new one). A lead of this workspace at `flow:<new slug>` that no magnet owns does not refuse: the rename re-stamps it `unclaimed:flow:<new slug>` (`unclaimedLeadSource`, `@working-theory/validation`) so the magnet never adopts it (#8734 D3). A rename records a `magnet.rename` audit row whose summary is `{ from, to, leads, sessions, unclaimed }`. The two operator-writable config URLs (`abandonEmail.resumeUrl`, `followUps[].cta.href`) pass an exact-origin gate against `FRONTEND_URL` before any write, the same discipline the recommender's checkout redirect already applies (#4912). Role floors from `@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2) (D5): list and get serve the full row to `magnets-manage` (owner, admin) and, to a caller holding only `magnets-read` (a member), a LIVE-only summary of exactly `{ id, slug, kind, title, landingPage }` — a member's list is read to completion (at most 20 pages of 50, a `warn` at the cap) and answers `nextCursor: null`, a member's `?cursor=` is a 400, and a draft's get is the same 404 as an absent id — because a magnet's `config` carries `scoring` thresholds, `offers`/`rateTable` and `deliverables` asset keys and no draft is a member's; POST and PATCH need `magnets-manage`; the per-magnet captured-people lists need `inbox-read` (every role), and for a caller without `magnets-manage` a magnet that is not live is the same 404. Both writes declare a route-level `bodyLimit` (256 KiB) and each records one `recordAgentAction` audit row. **`customersEnabled` (#8171 D6)** — the member-area customer switch — is served on every full row and written by the PATCH (a PATCH of it alone skips the plan check); the member summary row never carries it. **The completion setting (#8757 D1–D4):** every magnet carries `completion` (`lead` | `invite` | `checkout`, column default `lead`) and `checkoutOffering` (set exactly when `checkout`), two `FlowDefinition` columns closed by three CHECKs and read and written only through `lib/flow-completion-store.ts` (`tenant-db.ts` stays closed under the #8746 contract; `architecture.yaml` lists the store under `paths_scoped`). The migration backfilled `onboarding`, `request-quote` and `job-application` to `invite` by slug (`STANDARD_MAGNET_COMPLETIONS`); a magnet created later is `lead` until #8759. Every full row serves the pair; the member summary never does. The PATCH writes it ALONE — `{ completion, checkoutOffering }` beside any other key is `400 completion_alone`, an offering without a completion or a pair `flowCompletionSettingSchema` refuses `400 validation_failed` — with no plan check, and records `magnet.update` with summary `{ completion }`. `checkout` also needs a person (`403 completion_needs_person` for an agent key), the `commerce` claim (`409 commerce_required`, `503 license-undetermined`) and a key `services/plan-offerings.ts`'s `listPlanOfferings` lists right now (`409 offering_unknown`; a failed read `503 offerings_unavailable`). **The standard onboarding magnet (#8515 D2–D4):** every workspace holds one `diagnostic` magnet at slug `onboarding` (`ONBOARDING_FLOW_SLUG`, `onboardingFlowConfig` in `@working-theory/validation`), `draft` and `customersEnabled: true`, written only by `lib/tenant-db.ts`'s insert-only seed (`createMany` with `skipDuplicates`, so a re-seed creates nothing and never overwrites the owner's edits or an owner's own magnet at that slug): `POST /v1/workspaces` seeds the workspace it just created, after its transaction commits (a failed seed is one `error` line and still a `201`), and the seed-presets CLI (`node dist/bin/seed-presets.js`, run once after deploy) seeds every existing workspace and prints counts only. Its two bare-id exports have one production caller each, pinned by `tests/architecture/onboarding-seed-callers.test.ts`. **The standard Contact form magnet (#8661 D1–D3):** every workspace also holds one `contact` magnet at slug `contact` (`CONTACT_FORM_FLOW_SLUG`, `contactFormFlowConfig`), titled "Contact form", `live`, `customersEnabled: false`, landing page `/contact` — Name, Email, a five-option Subject, Message and a required terms checkbox. It is written by the same insert-only seed, from the same two callers (a failed seed is one `contact-form-seed` `error` line and still a `201`), and by `database/seed.ts` for the default workspace; a re-seed never duplicates it or overwrites an edit. The web /contact page reads it on every request through `GET /v1/flows/contact`, and a submission that used it is stamped `flow:contact`, an Inbox submission under "Contact form". **The standard Job application magnet (#8746 D3, D4):** every workspace also holds one `diagnostic` magnet at slug `job-application` (`JOB_APPLICATION_FLOW_SLUG`, `jobApplicationFlowConfig`), titled "Job application", `live`, `customersEnabled: false`, landing page `/careers` — First name, Last name and Email (required), Phone and LinkedIn URL — with no `completion` field. It is written by the same insert-only seed, from the same two callers (a failed seed is one `job-application-seed` `error` line and still a `201`), and by `database/seed.ts` for the default workspace; `RESERVED_FLOW_SLUGS` carries its slug, so no flow-engine write, spoke seed or new listing takes it. Each web job page `/careers/<slug>` carries an Apply button to `/careers/<slug>/apply` (#8849), whose Free apply page reads it through `GET /v1/flows/job-application` and draws its field step as a one-step form, and a submission is stamped `flow:job-application`, an Inbox submission under "Job application" whose `name` is first + last and whose `job` is the posting's slug. **The standard trial magnet (#9287 D11, #9301):** every workspace also holds one `diagnostic` magnet at slug `trial` (`TRIAL_FLOW_SLUG`, `trialFlowConfig`), titled "Free trial", `live`, `customersEnabled: false`, completion `lead`, landing page `/trial` — First name, Last name, Work email and a required terms box; a site may add a `company`-tagged field, which fills the Person's company. It is written by the same insert-only seed, from the same two callers (a failed seed is one `trial-seed` `error` line and still a `201`), by `database/seed.ts` for the default workspace and by the `20261025120000_trial_magnet` migration for existing workspaces; `RESERVED_FLOW_SLUGS` carries its slug. A completed walk is stamped `flow:trial`, an Inbox submission under "Free trial" whose Person carries the given name, family name and email. Module: `multi-tenant || signal-collectors`, the same gate the review-surface dashboard (`/v1/waitlist-experiments/*`, `/v1/project-listings/*`) already registers under. No MCP twin on any of the seven — identity-bound tenant routes (#3591 exception, same shape as the sibling `/v1/workspaces/*` routes); the public `/v1/flows/*` routes and their two MCP tools are unchanged, pinned by `src/routes/flows/__tests__/parity.test.ts`. **The three new list routes (#6246 S6h)** join every magnet through `Lead.source = 'flow:' + <the resolved magnet's slug>` — the literal string `flow-engine.ts`'s `completeSubmission` stamps on every flow-engine `Lead` row regardless of kind, including `newsletter`/`waitlist` (`Subscriber` is written only by the separate, pre-flow-engine `subscribe_newsletter` path, unrelated to a magnet) — via ONE new `tenantDb(tenant).leads.listBySource(source, { limit })` accessor, an exact-source-equality sibling of #6204's allowlist-scoped `listUnhandledMessages`, served by a new `(workspaceId, source)` composite index on `Lead`. `/signups` expects `kind: "waitlist"`, `/subscribers` expects `"newsletter"`, `/messages` expects `"contact"`; a magnet id absent from the caller's workspace OR resolved to the WRONG kind for the called route is `404 not_found`, indistinguishably (mirrors the existing GET's absent-or-foreign fold). `/signups` and `/subscribers` serve four keys (`id`, `name`, `email`, `createdAt`); `/messages` serves those four plus `handledAt`. Bounded `?limit=` (default 50, max 200), newest-first — mirrors `workspaces/messages.ts`'s own query schema. Applications (Listicle) is deliberately OUT of this surface — `ProjectListing` carries no reverse link to the listicle-kind `FlowDefinition` that captured it, so "scoped to that magnet" cannot be honored without a schema change (split to #6314).
 - `/v1/deliverables/open/:slug` (GET) — an UNGATED file deliverable's bytes, keyed by the flow slug (#8848 D5, `deliverableOpenRoute` in `src/routes/deliverables/index.ts`). Anonymous; the workspace is the caller's (`resolveCallerWorkspace`, keyless through the one-workspace predicate as the flows bullet says; a refused spoke key or an ambiguous deployment `503 tenant_unresolved`), never a request value; no `DATABASE_URL` is `503 deliverables_not_configured`. The flow must be live and carry `deliverable` with `kind: "file"` and `gated: false`; the bytes are its `deliverables` default entry's `Asset`, through `lib/deliverable-asset-store.ts` (a client's file refused), never the legacy store, never a `playbook:` key; served with the grant route's `asset_` headers (`attachment`, pinned extension, `nosniff`, the sandbox CSP, `private, no-store`). Every miss is the file's one uniform 404. Registered in its own encapsulated `deliverableopen` rate-limit scope (60 a minute) with the visitor forward-key digests, and on `FORWARDED_VISITOR_ROUTES`, so a site's proxied reads (`/reports/<slug>/file`) are counted per visitor; the grant route's own budget is unchanged. Module: `signal-collectors`. No MCP twin — a byte download on the grant route's footing, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
-- `/v1/content/{types,search,offerings,pricing,shown-offerings,:type,:type/:slug}` — public content reads. `GET /v1/content/offerings` (`?type=&locale=`) is `get_offerings`' twin (#7177), answering `{ ok: true, data: { offerings } }` through `listOfferings` in `@working-theory/content-adapters`, the seam the tool also calls. `GET /v1/content/pricing` (`?slug=&locale=`) is `get_pricing`'s twin (#7178), answering `{ ok: true, data: { tiers } | null }` through `getPricingTiers`. `GET /v1/content/shown-offerings` is the `/pricing` page's Offerings read (#8924), answering `{ ok: true, data: { status: "shown", shownSet } | { status: "unconnected" } | { status: "empty" } }` behind the `commerce` claim, refreshing the snapshot on the bounded non-forced path, with no MCP twin. On a connected workspace with a current shown set, `GET /v1/content/pricing` (the `pricing` page) and `GET /v1/content/offerings` (unless `type=service`) answer that set through `readShownOfferings` (exported from `shown-offerings.ts`, the one read all three share, registered with one `shownSetRouteOptions` in `server.ts`) and `@working-theory/content-adapters`' shown-set mapping (`pricingTiersFromShownSet`, `listOfferingsWithShownSet`), with major-unit prices, `interval` and the full `lookupKey` (offerings: the Service pages, then the shown Products in place of the Product pages, each with `prices`); every other case — no connection, no claim, an expired or empty set, a failed read or mapping (one `warn { outcome: "shown_set_failed", errName }`) — answers page content as before; their MCP twins read the same answer through `apiClient.offerings.shown` (#8933).
+- `/v1/content/{types,search,offerings,pricing,shown-offerings,:type,:type/:slug}` — public content reads. `GET /v1/content/search`, `GET /v1/content/:type` and `GET /v1/content/:type/:slug` are `search_content`'s, `list_pages`' and `read_content`'s twins (#7167, #7168, #7169): each parses its request with the `@working-theory/validation` exports in `content-reads.ts` (`contentSearchQuerySchema`; `contentListParamsSchema` + `contentListQuerySchema`; `contentPageParamsSchema` + `contentPageQuerySchema`) and answers through the shared builder in `@working-theory/content-adapters` the tool also calls (`searchContentItemList`, `listPagesItemList`, `readContentDocument`), so the pair takes the same arguments and returns the same result — the tool adopted the API; the `/v1` wire shapes are unchanged. `GET /v1/content/offerings` (`?type=&locale=`) is `get_offerings`' twin (#7177), answering `{ ok: true, data: { offerings } }` through `listOfferings` in `@working-theory/content-adapters`, the seam the tool also calls. `GET /v1/content/pricing` (`?slug=&locale=`) is `get_pricing`'s twin (#7178), answering `{ ok: true, data: { tiers } | null }` through `getPricingTiers`. `GET /v1/content/shown-offerings` is the `/pricing` page's Offerings read (#8924), answering `{ ok: true, data: { status: "shown", shownSet } | { status: "unconnected" } | { status: "empty" } }` behind the `commerce` claim, refreshing the snapshot on the bounded non-forced path, with no MCP twin. On a connected workspace with a current shown set, `GET /v1/content/pricing` (the `pricing` page) and `GET /v1/content/offerings` (unless `type=service`) answer that set through `readShownOfferings` (exported from `shown-offerings.ts`, the one read all three share, registered with one `shownSetRouteOptions` in `server.ts`) and `@working-theory/content-adapters`' shown-set mapping (`pricingTiersFromShownSet`, `listOfferingsWithShownSet`), with major-unit prices, `interval` and the full `lookupKey` (offerings: the Service pages, then the shown Products in place of the Product pages, each with `prices`); every other case — no connection, no claim, an expired or empty set, a failed read or mapping (one `warn { outcome: "shown_set_failed", errName }`) — answers page content as before; their MCP twins read the same answer through `apiClient.offerings.shown` (#8933).
 - `/v1/auth/tokens`, `/v1/user/{profile,data/:key}` — local auth + user data
 - `/v1/hub-sign-in/codes` (POST), `/v1/hub-sign-in/token` (POST), `/v1/hub-sign-in/revoke` (POST), `/v1/hub-sign-in/me` (GET) — the hub signs in its spokes (#7894, `src/routes/auth/hub-sign-in.ts` over `src/services/hub-sign-in.ts`; spec `docs/specs/7894-the-hub-signs-in-its-spec.md`): an authorization code with PKCE between a spoke (a confidential client whose `OAuthClient.clientId` IS its `Spoke.id`) and this hub. `codes` is in `authScope` and answers a COOKIE session only (a personal `ApiToken` is 403, an agent key 403 at the preHandler, a hub credential 404): it mints a single-use 60 s code only for an email-verified person and a callback in the client's registered `redirectUris` (exact match), 30 a user per 10 minutes. `token` and `revoke` are in their OWN scope outside `authScope` (per-IP `rateLimitMiddleware`, scope `hubsignin`, 60/min; plus a per-client bucket of 120 exchanges a minute keyed on the VERIFIED client): the caller authenticates with `Authorization: Basic clientId:secret` AND `x-ailk-spoke-key`, which must resolve to the unrevoked spoke whose id is that client — either alone is `401 invalid_client`. `token` consumes the code first and exactly once, then checks the client, the callback and the PKCE verifier (`400 invalid_grant` for any failure, the code gone either way) and issues `ailk_hst_…`, a 24 h credential stored only as a SHA-256 digest in `OAuthAuthorization` (one row per person and spoke, so a new sign-in rotates it); it writes no `Session` row and sets no cookie. `revoke` ends a credential or burns an unexpired code of that client (`{ revoked }`, never an error). `me` answers the credential's person, read live, and is reachable only by that credential. **The credential is admitted by one branch of `middleware/auth.ts`** — only beside the same spoke's key, only while its grant is unrevoked and unexpired, its client enabled and its person's email verified, and only on `HUB_SESSION_ROUTES`, an exact list of 26 method + registered-URL strings, never a prefix (#8220): `GET /v1/hub-sign-in/me`, #7877's three member reads, #8169's eight member reads, #8170's six member writes, #8435's two contact routes, #8438's two consent routes, #8765's account-agreements pair and #8515's onboarding read and write; every other route answers `404` with no handler run (the status the account area's `read()` loads as "nothing for this caller"), and the list is extended only by a reviewed edit. **The per-person budget (#8220 D2, SEC-8169-4):** each person at each spoke gets 60 requests and 10 writes a minute and 30 writes an hour (a fixed hour window from the first admitted write, so up to twice that across a window edge), keyed on the VERIFIED spoke and person and charged only after admission (a refused credential or an off-list route never gets a bucket); over budget is `429 rate_limited` with `Retry-After`. The write limits refuse only writes, and a refused request is not counted. Every line the request logger writes for an admitted request after admission carries `spokeId` (never the key or the credential); a helper logging through the module-level `logger` carries no request binding. The server-wide per-IP limiter still counts all of one spoke's members together — a named residual whose follow-up (the visitor forward key on member calls) must land before Phase 3 (#8163) ships to a live spoke. A bearer write skips the origin check, so the cross-site-request protection for the member writes is the spoke's: its server actions that send a sealed credential carry it (Phase 3, #8163; SEC-8220-11). A completed password reset (`apps/web/auth.ts` `onPasswordReset`) revokes every credential of that person. The operator registers a spoke's client with `spokes sign-in-client --id <spoke_id> --redirect-uri <url>` (`bin/spokes.ts`; `--disable` switches it off) — `lib/hub-sign-in-store.ts` is the only file that names `prisma.oAuthClient` and `prisma.oAuthAuthorization`. No MCP twin for any of the four — a credential exchange between a site and its hub is not an agent-facing call (#3591 exception, the `/v1/auth/tokens` footing). The browser step lives on the hub's web app: `apps/web/app/api/auth/hub/authorize/route.ts`.
-- `/v1/checkout/sessions` — start a Stripe checkout. **Two paths (#8931, `src/routes/checkout/sessions.ts` over `src/services/offerings/checkout-authorization.ts`; spec `docs/specs/8931-offerings-checkout-authorization-server-side-spec.md`; contract A1–A11, A13).** The path comes from `resolvePublicWorkspace()` and the workspace's own Organization alone — no body field names either: a resolved workspace whose Organization has a Stripe connection takes the **Offerings path**; a presented `x-ailk-spoke-key` the resolver refuses is `503 { error: "tenant_unresolved" }` with no Stripe call; a corrupt connection, or a database read that fails while choosing, is `502 checkout-unavailable`; everything else (keyless, `ambiguous`, off the database adapter, no Organization, no connection) takes the **env path**, today's code. **The env path is the hub's own-products path only, never a spoke's (#9142):** a spoke sells only through its `apps/web` Offerings buy route, which calls this route only for a lookup key its connected workspace's shown set holds, so a spoke's buy always takes the Offerings path; the spoke's own env-key buy route and Stripe webhook are retired. The Offerings path charges `chargeWriteBudget` scope `offeringscheckout` before the body is read — 10 a minute per `request.ip` and 60 per workspace (`OFFERINGS_CHECKOUT_PER_WORKSPACE_PER_MINUTE`), charged one at a time with the IP first, so a request its IP bucket refuses never spends the workspace's, whatever the process's mode — answering `429 { error: "rate_limited", retryAfterSeconds }` with `Retry-After`. It parses `productCode` (the full lookup key) by the one grammar first, builds the connection's own client (`stripeClientForOrganization`), reads org-enabled ∩ workspace-shown from the rows (`getSellableProductIds`, never the snapshot), looks the key up live on that client, and sells only when the Price's own Product is in the set — and, for a workspace saved per Price (#9070 D5), the Price itself is one of its stored shown Prices (`getSellableProductIds`' `priceIds`; `null` for a row saved per Product) — and `normalizeCatalog` keeps that Price under that key and period. Every miss — ungrammatical, not enabled, not shown, moved, archived, nonexistent — is the one `404 { error: "unknown-product-code" }`, never echoing the key; Stripe, the rows or the connection failing is `502`, never the snapshot or the env key. The session is anonymous (no `customer`, no signed-in buyer, so no `ailk_user_id`), sells the authorized Price id, allows promotion codes, `customer_creation: "always"` in payment mode, and is stamped by the server `metadata` and `subscription_data.metadata` `{ site: <workspaceId>, ailk_offering: <lookup key> }`; it is recorded through `recordCheckoutSession` before the route answers, and a failed record expires it on the same client and answers `502`. **The env path refuses an Offerings product (A9):** `createCheckoutSession` gets `{ refuseProduct: isOfferingsProduct }`, so a Price whose Product carries `metadata.ailk_group` (or whose Product did not expand) is the same `404`. The request schema and the `201 { sessionId, url }` body are unchanged, so the `start_purchase` parity row is too. **`GET /v1/checkout/sessions/:id` (A13):** when `DATABASE_URL` is set, a session `readCheckoutSessionRecord` holds is read with that record's Organization's own client, only in the record's mode; its line-item names pass the catalog's T1 `normalizeText`; a record that cannot be read, or a connection gone, unusable or in another mode, is `502`, never the env path; no record is today's env read. Logs carry the workspace or Organization, an 8-character session prefix and a fixed reason only.
+- `/v1/checkout/sessions` — start a Stripe checkout. **Two paths (#8931, `src/routes/checkout/sessions.ts` over `src/services/offerings/checkout-authorization.ts`; spec `docs/specs/8931-offerings-checkout-authorization-server-side-spec.md`; contract A1–A11, A13).** The path comes from `resolvePublicWorkspace()` and the workspace's own Organization alone — no body field names either: a resolved workspace whose Organization has a Stripe connection takes the **Offerings path**; a presented `x-ailk-spoke-key` the resolver refuses is `503 { error: "tenant_unresolved" }` with no Stripe call; a corrupt connection, or a database read that fails while choosing, is `502 checkout-unavailable`; everything else (keyless, `ambiguous`, off the database adapter, no Organization, no connection) takes the **env path**, today's code. **The env path is the hub's own-products path only, never a spoke's (#9142):** a spoke sells only through its `apps/web` Offerings buy route, which calls this route only for a lookup key its connected workspace's shown set holds, so a spoke's buy always takes the Offerings path; the spoke's own env-key buy route and Stripe webhook are retired. The Offerings path charges `chargeWriteBudget` scope `offeringscheckout` before the body is read — 10 a minute per `request.ip` and 60 per workspace (`OFFERINGS_CHECKOUT_PER_WORKSPACE_PER_MINUTE`), charged one at a time with the IP first, so a request its IP bucket refuses never spends the workspace's, whatever the process's mode — answering `429 { error: "rate_limited", retryAfterSeconds }` with `Retry-After`. It parses `productCode` (the full lookup key) by the one grammar first, builds the connection's own client (`stripeClientForOrganization`), reads org-enabled ∩ workspace-shown from the rows (`getSellableProductIds`, never the snapshot), looks the key up live on that client, and sells only when the Price's own Product is in the set — and, for a workspace saved per Price (#9070 D5), the Price itself is one of its stored shown Prices (`getSellableProductIds`' `priceIds`; `null` for a row saved per Product) — and `normalizeCatalog` keeps that Price under that key and period. Every miss — ungrammatical, not enabled, not shown, moved, archived, nonexistent — is the one `404 { error: "unknown-product-code" }`, never echoing the key; Stripe, the rows or the connection failing is `502`, never the snapshot or the env key. The session is anonymous (no `customer`, no signed-in buyer, so no `ailk_user_id`), sells the authorized Price id, allows promotion codes, `customer_creation: "always"` in payment mode, and is stamped by the server `metadata` and `subscription_data.metadata` `{ site: <workspaceId>, ailk_offering: <lookup key> }`; it is recorded through `recordCheckoutSession` before the route answers, and a failed record expires it on the same client and answers `502`. **The env path refuses an Offerings product (A9):** `createCheckoutSession` gets `{ refuseProduct: isOfferingsProduct }`, so a Price whose Product carries `metadata.ailk_group` (or whose Product did not expand) is the same `404`. **The Offerings path refuses the hub's own plans (#9338 DD5):** right after the grammar parse, a key whose plan is `ailk-pro` or `ailk-pro-plus` (`isPlanPurchaseKey`, any period) is the same `404`, before any read or Stripe call, for every Organization — such a sale would stamp `ailk_offering`, which no billing path mints a licence for. A hub plan under another slug is not covered (the named residual). The request schema and the `201 { sessionId, url }` body are unchanged, so the `start_purchase` parity row is too. **`GET /v1/checkout/sessions/:id` (A13):** when `DATABASE_URL` is set, a session `readCheckoutSessionRecord` holds is read with that record's Organization's own client, only in the record's mode; its line-item names pass the catalog's T1 `normalizeText`; a record that cannot be read, or a connection gone, unusable or in another mode, is `502`, never the env path; no record is today's env read. Logs carry the workspace or Organization, an 8-character session prefix and a fixed reason only.
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/{theme,identity,seo}` (GET/PUT) — per-workspace site config (multi-tenant module). PUT needs `workspace-settings` (owner, admin — `@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2)), checked before the body parse; GET stays open to every member.
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/meetings` (GET/PUT) — the operator's enabled-slug gate for meeting types (#6183 S9b, `src/routes/workspaces/meetings.ts`). Beside the three siblings above in URL shape and tenant-isolation posture, but registered in its OWN scope, gated on `isModuleEnabled("scheduling")` ALONE — not the `workspace`/`multi-tenant` scope its siblings share, because its GET reaches `services/scheduling/` (see below), which a scaffold without that module does not carry (`tools/lint-slice-registration.ts`, #5701). PUT needs `meeting-types-manage` (owner, admin — `@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2)) because this blob decides which pages the public site serves. GET answers `meeting-types-manage` with the full join and `meeting-types-read` (every role, a member included) with the ENABLED rows only (#7636 D6) — since it does NOT just return the stored blob, it echoes the deployment's whole provider catalog, including the rows the operator chose not to publish (security review, 2026-09-19), which a member never sees. GET is the one segment in this file's family that does NOT just return the stored blob: it ALSO lists the scheduling provider's own bookable event types (`listEventTypes`, #6182), joined with `enabled: boolean`; an unconfigured/unreachable provider answers the same `SchedulingErrorKind` outcome `/v1/schedule/*` uses, distinct from an empty list. **`customerSlugs` (#8171 D5)** — who may book from the member area, independent of `enabledSlugs`: `GET ?include=customers` adds `customer: boolean` per row, and without it the body is unchanged; the PUT carries `customerSlugs`, and a PUT without it keeps the stored list (a read then a write, last-writer-wins), so the public toggle never erases it. `enabledSlugs` keeps its whole-list meaning, so a writer of `customerSlugs` sends the `enabledSlugs` it read. **`include` is a comma list (#9128)** — `?include=customers,private`, in either order, or a repeated `include` key; an unknown value is ignored, so `?include=customers` alone reads as before. **`private` adds `private: boolean` per row** — membership of the stored `privateSlugs` (#8843 D2), the Admin meeting page's Private switch — on the `meeting-types-manage` full join only: a `meeting-types-read` caller never receives it, whatever it asks. The PUT carries `privateSlugs` whole-list and keeps a stored list a body leaves out, as it does `customerSlugs`. An agent's PUT is audited `meetings.set_customers` when it carries `customerSlugs`, else `meetings.set_enabled`. No MCP twin — identity-bound tenant route (#3591 exception).
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/meetings/connection` (GET, PUT, DELETE) — the workspace's own scheduling connection (#7533, `src/routes/workspaces/meetings.ts`; data access and the cipher in `src/services/scheduling/connections.ts`, the only file that touches `prisma.schedulingConnection`). Same registration, scope and tenant guard as the meetings route above. GET, PUT and DELETE all need `scheduling-connection` (owner, admin — `@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2), the operator's 2026-10-04 decision overturning SEC-7533-11's owner-only write). GET answers `null` or a summary — `provider`, `baseUrl`, `webhookPath`, `createdAt`, `updatedAt` — with no credential, secret, ciphertext or hint of one. PUT takes a strict `{ provider, apiKey, baseUrl? }`; create and replace are one operation, and every PUT mints a new webhook token and secret, returning the secret this once (`Cache-Control: no-store`) so the operator can paste it into the provider — a replace cuts off the previous entry point. `baseUrl` must be `https://api.cal.com` or the deployment's own `CAL_API_BASE_URL` origin, with no path, query or userinfo (`400 base_url_not_allowed`); only the bare origin is stored. The credential and the secret are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under `SCHEDULING_CREDENTIAL_KEY`, bound to the workspace and the column; with the key unset, PUT answers `503 credential_key_not_configured` before any write. DELETE is idempotent (`{ revoked }`) and unconfigures the workspace at once. Because a connection replaces the account every provider call uses, every successful PUT, and every DELETE that revoked a row, writes one `recordAgentAction` audit row (`scheduling.connection.{connect,replace,remove}`; a PUT is `replace` whenever the workspace was served by any provider before it — its own row, or the env credential on a one-workspace deployment) and emails every OTHER owner of the organization through `@working-theory/email`'s `sendSchedulingConnectionChangedEmail` (#7636 D7). Neither step can fail the write: a failed audit is logged at `error`, and the notify step runs in its own `try`, so the one-time secret is always returned; with no sender address or no Resend key it is skipped with a `warn`. Logs carry the recipient count, never an address. The meetings GET above, and the three anonymous `/v1/schedule/*` provider routes below, resolve their provider through `src/services/scheduling/resolve.ts`: a workspace's own row always wins; `CAL_API_KEY` serves a workspace only on a one-workspace deployment; otherwise `not_configured`. No MCP twin — identity-bound tenant routes (#3591 exception).
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/general` (GET/PUT) — the workspace's own display name, the Pro `workspace` module's general-settings surface (#5371). Registered under `isModuleEnabled("workspace") || isModuleEnabled("multi-tenant")` alongside the site-config routes above, behind the same tenant guard; the scope is always `request.tenant.workspaceId`, never the path param (the guard 403s a mismatch before any handler runs). PUT takes a strict `{ name }` body (1–200 chars, trimmed) and answers `{ name }`; GET answers `{ name, emailFrom }` (#7519 D6), where `emailFrom` is the deployment's sender (`deliverableSenderAddress()` — `AILK_DELIVERABLE_EMAIL_FROM ?? AILK_LEAD_NOTIFICATION_FROM`, the resolver the fulfillment service sends with) or `null` when neither is set, so the Admin's magnet wizard can show it read-only. Role floor on PUT: `workspace-settings` (owner, admin — `@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2)) — renaming is an org-level settings write; GET stays open to every member. No MCP twin — identity-bound tenant route (#3591 exception, same shape as `/v1/billing/*`).
-- `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/messages` (GET, `?limit=`), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/messages/:leadId` (GET, PATCH) — the Inbox message API (#6216 S7e, `src/routes/workspaces/messages.ts`): the workspace's unhandled messages newest first, the item read (resolves a message handled or not, serving `handledAt`), and the one-way idempotent handled stamp over #6204's `markMessageHandled`. Registered under `isModuleEnabled("workspace") || isModuleEnabled("multi-tenant")`, the same scope as the two routes above. A message is a `Lead` whose `source` is in #6204's closed `MESSAGE_LEAD_SOURCE_LIST` allowlist and that is not an order (#9170, the orders bullet below) — both checked only in `tenantDb(tenant).leads`, never in this file; a non-message lead is a 404 on the item read and the PATCH and absent from the list, the SAME 404 body as an absent id, another workspace's id, or an unbackfilled `workspaceId`. **One served row across all three routes** — `id`, `name`, `email`, `source`, `createdAt`, `handledAt` — and nothing else: no `payload`, no message body (operator ruling, 2026-09-19; `leads-inbox.ts`'s PII boundary is unchanged, not widened). PATCH takes `{ "handled": true }` only, `.strict()`; there is no un-handle path (#6204 D4), so `{ "handled": false }` is a 400. The stamp records the actor via `tenant.userId` in `Lead.handledBy` — written, not served. Role floor: `inbox-read` on the GETs and `inbox-act` on PATCH and accept (`@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2) — every role, a member included), the SAME rows `services/inbox-messages.ts` re-checks, checked before any read or write. The role is not self-servable: since #7523 `multi-tenant`'s null-binding fallback grants the default tenant only to the pinned, verified operator, the same check the base `workspace`-only guard applies (see the `AILK_OPERATOR_EMAIL` paragraph below). No anonymous MCP twin — identity-bound tenant routes, and the anonymous `/mcp` carries no caller identity. Each route's twin is a signed-in tool on `/mcp/workspace` (#3591 D13), which forwards the caller's agent key here: `list_inbox_messages` (list), `get_inbox_message` (item read), `mark_inbox_message_done` (PATCH) and `accept_inbox_message` (`POST …/:leadId/accept`).
-- `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/submissions` (GET, `?limit=&state=unhandled&magnetId=`), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/submissions/:leadId` (GET, PATCH) — the Inbox submissions API (#7535, `src/routes/workspaces/submissions.ts` over `src/services/inbox-submissions.ts`): every flow completion and waitlist signup of the caller's active workspace, newest first and bounded (`?limit=` 1–200, default 50), the item read (handled or not), and the one-way idempotent handled stamp (`{ "handled": true }` only, `.strict()`; a second PATCH returns the first `handledAt`). Same registration, scope and tenant guard as the messages bullet above. A submission is a `Lead` whose `source` is a fixed submission source (`SUBMISSION_FIXED_SOURCE_LIST` in `@working-theory/validation`) or `flow:<slug>` for a NON-newsletter magnet of THIS workspace — decided only in `tenantDb(tenant).leads`, never in the route; a `flow:` row naming no magnet of the workspace never lists. The list row is seven keys — the message row's six plus `magnet: { slug, title } | null` — and never `payload`. `?magnetId=` narrows to one magnet (limit 1–50) and adds `answers`, `answersTruncated` and `deliverableSentAt` per row; the item read serves the same three. `answers` is `payload` narrowed by `toAnswers`: server-owned keys dropped, control and bidi characters stripped, every key, value and the entry count bounded. `?state=unhandled` filters `handledAt IS NULL` in the query (the Admin's For-you read); any other `state` is a 400. Every miss on the item read and the PATCH — a malformed, absent or foreign id, a message, an application, a newsletter-magnet lead — is the SAME `404 No such submission`; a `?magnetId=` that is absent, foreign or a newsletter magnet is `404 No such magnet`. Every success body is re-parsed against its own `.strict()` schema before it is sent. Role floor: `inbox-read` on the GETs and `inbox-act` on PATCH (`@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2) — every role, a member included), checked before any read or write. The handlers and the service never log a lead id, email, name or answer. No anonymous MCP twin — identity-bound tenant routes. Each route's twin is a signed-in tool on `/mcp/workspace` (#3591 D13): `list_inbox_submissions` (list), `get_inbox_submission` (item read) and `mark_inbox_submission_done` (PATCH).
+- `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/messages` (GET, `?limit=`), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/messages/:leadId` (GET, PATCH) — the Inbox message API (#6216 S7e, `src/routes/workspaces/messages.ts`): the workspace's unhandled messages newest first, the item read (resolves a message handled or not, serving `handledAt`), and the one-way idempotent handled stamp over #6204's `markMessageHandled`. Registered under `isModuleEnabled("workspace") || isModuleEnabled("multi-tenant")`, the same scope as the two routes above. A message is a `Lead` whose `source` is in #6204's closed `MESSAGE_LEAD_SOURCE_LIST` allowlist and that is not an order (#9170, the orders bullet below) — both checked only in `tenantDb(tenant).leads`, never in this file; a non-message lead is a 404 on the item read and the PATCH and absent from the list, the SAME 404 body as an absent id, another workspace's id, or an unbackfilled `workspaceId`. **One served row across all four routes** — `id`, `name`, `email`, `source`, `createdAt`, `handledAt`, `personId`, `body`, `excerpt` — and nothing else (#9349, superseding the 2026-09-19 six-key ruling): `personId` is the lead's Person or `null`; `body` is `payload.message` alone — cut to 16384 code units, line breaks normalized, control, bidi, zero-width and tag characters stripped (`\t` and `\n` kept), trimmed and cut at 4096 code points (`inbox-messages.ts`'s `readMessageBody`), else `null`; `excerpt` is its first line, cut at 140 code points. `payload` itself and every other payload key never cross, and every success body is re-parsed against `inboxMessageSchema` (`inboxMessageListSchema` for the list) — a mismatch is `500 internal_error` logged with issue codes and paths only. `leads-inbox.ts`'s `GET /v1/leads` row is unchanged. PATCH takes `{ "handled": true }` only, `.strict()`; there is no un-handle path (#6204 D4), so `{ "handled": false }` is a 400. The stamp records the actor via `tenant.userId` in `Lead.handledBy` — written, not served. Role floor: `inbox-read` on the GETs and `inbox-act` on PATCH and accept (`@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2) — every role, a member included), the SAME rows `services/inbox-messages.ts` re-checks, checked before any read or write. The role is not self-servable: since #7523 `multi-tenant`'s null-binding fallback grants the default tenant only to the pinned, verified operator, the same check the base `workspace`-only guard applies (see the `AILK_OPERATOR_EMAIL` paragraph below). No anonymous MCP twin — identity-bound tenant routes, and the anonymous `/mcp` carries no caller identity. Each route's twin is a signed-in tool on `/mcp/workspace` (#3591 D13), which forwards the caller's agent key here: `list_inbox_messages` (list), `get_inbox_message` (item read), `mark_inbox_message_done` (PATCH) and `accept_inbox_message` (`POST …/:leadId/accept`).
+- `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/submissions` (GET, `?limit=&state=unhandled&magnetId=`), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/submissions/:leadId` (GET, PATCH) — the Inbox submissions API (#7535, `src/routes/workspaces/submissions.ts` over `src/services/inbox-submissions.ts`): every flow completion and waitlist signup of the caller's active workspace, newest first and bounded (`?limit=` 1–200, default 50), the item read (handled or not), and the one-way idempotent handled stamp (`{ "handled": true }` only, `.strict()`; a second PATCH returns the first `handledAt`). Same registration, scope and tenant guard as the messages bullet above. A submission is a `Lead` whose `source` is a fixed submission source (`SUBMISSION_FIXED_SOURCE_LIST` in `@working-theory/validation`) or `flow:<slug>` for a NON-newsletter magnet of THIS workspace — decided only in `tenantDb(tenant).leads`, never in the route; a `flow:` row naming no magnet of the workspace never lists. The list row is seven keys — the message row's six plus `magnet: { slug, title } | null` — and never `payload`. `?magnetId=` narrows to one magnet (limit 1–50) and adds `answers`, `answersTruncated` and `deliverableSentAt` per row; the item read serves the same three, plus `personId` — the lead's Person or `null` — on the item read and the PATCH alone (#9348, `inboxSubmissionItemSchema`); no list row carries it. `answers` is `payload` narrowed by `toAnswers`: server-owned keys dropped, control and bidi characters stripped, every key, value and the entry count bounded. `?state=unhandled` filters `handledAt IS NULL` in the query (the Admin's For-you read); any other `state` is a 400. Every miss on the item read and the PATCH — a malformed, absent or foreign id, a message, an application, a newsletter-magnet lead — is the SAME `404 No such submission`; a `?magnetId=` that is absent, foreign or a newsletter magnet is `404 No such magnet`. Every success body is re-parsed against its own `.strict()` schema before it is sent. Role floor: `inbox-read` on the GETs and `inbox-act` on PATCH (`@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2) — every role, a member included), checked before any read or write. The handlers and the service never log a lead id, email, name or answer. No anonymous MCP twin — identity-bound tenant routes. Each route's twin is a signed-in tool on `/mcp/workspace` (#3591 D13): `list_inbox_submissions` (list), `get_inbox_submission` (item read) and `mark_inbox_submission_done` (PATCH).
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/subscribers` (GET, `?limit=`) — the workspace's newsletter signups, read-only (#7535, `src/routes/workspaces/subscribers.ts`): `{ count, items }`, where `count` is every signup and `items` the newest (1–200, default 50), each `{ id, email, source, subscribedAt, magnet: { slug, title } | null }`. A signup is a `Subscriber` row of this workspace or the `Lead` a newsletter-kind magnet of this workspace wrote, both from `tenantDb(tenant).subscribers`, called directly. No item route and no write: a subscriber is never an item to open or mark handled. Same registration, scope, tenant guard and `inbox-read` floor as the submissions bullet above. No MCP twin — identity-bound tenant route (#3591 exception).
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/orders` (GET, `?limit=`), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/orders/:leadId` (GET) — the Inbox orders read (#9170, `src/routes/workspaces/orders.ts` over `src/services/inbox-orders.ts`): the purchases of the caller's active workspace, newest first and bounded (`?limit=` 1–200, default 50, the messages list's own query), and the item read. Same registration, scope, tenant guard and `inbox-read` floor as the messages bullet above. An order is a `Lead` the hub recorded as a purchase — `spokeCheckout`, or `source: "web"` with `payload.page: "checkout"` (the Offerings webhook's and a spoke's checkout leads, marked or not) — decided by ONE predicate in `tenantDb(tenant).leads` (`ORDER_LEAD_WHERE`), whose exact complement (`NON_ORDER_LEAD_WHERE`, written out so a missing `page` is never SQL NULL) every message read and write carries, so an order is never a message, never stamped handled or accepted, and never a For-you item. The hub's own flow checkout writes no lead of its own (its lead is the flow's `flow:<slug>` submission), so it is not an order. The list row is `id`, `name`, `email`, `offering` (the checkout's lookup key or legacy offering code, stripped and bounded), `planName` (the workspace's own listed name for it — `listPlanOfferings`, matched with any leading `<site>_` removed, one read per request bounded at 1.5 s, else `null`), `amount` (a positive integer of minor units, else `null`), `currency` (three letters upper-cased, else `null`), `createdAt` and `source`; the item adds `personId`. Never `payload`. Every success body is re-parsed against its own `.strict()` schema. Every miss on the item read — a malformed, absent or foreign id, a lead that is not an order — is the SAME `404 No such order`. There is no handled stamp: an order is not an ask. No MCP twin, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
-- `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/people` (GET, `?limit=&cursor=`), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/people/:personId` (GET), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/people/:personId/contact` (PATCH) — the workspace's clients (#852, `src/routes/workspaces/people.ts` over `tenantDb(tenant).people`; the Person writer is `src/services/person.ts`). A **Person** is one client of one workspace, keyed on a lowercased, trimmed email unique per workspace and created only by `findOrCreatePerson` — called by lead capture, the hub's own Stripe checkout webhook (a live-mode event's `session.customer` only), appointment creation and the inbox accept; `Person.userId` is stamped only on a verified-email match (`stampPersonUser`), never overwritten. The list serves `{ items, nextCursor }` — five keys per row (`id`, `email`, `name`, `planOffering`, `createdAt`), newest first, `limit` 1–200 (default 50); a cursor that does not resolve to a Person of this workspace is `400 invalid_cursor`. The record serves `{ person, timeline, timelineTruncated }`: the Person (`userId` projected to `hasAccount`, never served; the billing pair served) over a timeline derived at read time — leads and appointments by `personId`, flow sessions, checkouts, deliverable grants and project listings by the Person's newest 200 lead ids, plus an exact-normalized-email fallback for lead-less flow sessions and listings older than the Person backfill, (since #7877) the Person's member-area messages as `message` entries carrying the subject, `hasFile` and `readAt` only, and (since #8171 D4) the Person's inbound member rows as `request` entries (`requestKind`, `subject`) and the versions delivered to them as `version` entries (`pieceId`, `version`, `review`; `at` is `deliveredAt`) — keyed by `personId`, never the email grouping, and never a body, link, quote answer, note or review comment — newest first, at most 50 entries; a malformed, absent or foreign id is one `404 not_found`. Never selected or served: a grant id, a flow-session id, a checkout id, a lead `payload`, a permalink, a Stripe session id, an attendee email, a founder email. Role floor: `people-read` (owner, admin and, since #8514, member — `@working-theory/validation`'s permission table) via `allows`, checked before any read, so an agent key granted `people-read` (the sixth `AGENT_GRANTABLE_PERMISSIONS` entry, clamped to its person's role) reads both in its one workspace. **Agents are withheld (#8514 D3, D4):** `people-read`, `people-write` and `member-pieces-manage` are `AGENT_WITHHELD_PERMISSIONS` — a member holds them by role, an agent (every agent acts at member) never does: `roleAllows` and `allows` read the `agent: true` marker `agentTenant` sets on every agent tenant, so an agent holds the grantable two only by an explicit grant and `people-write` never, and both tenant guards refuse an agent request whose tenant lacks the marker (403, one `agent-tenant-unmarked` error line — fail closed). An operator read only: a Person groups rows by an unverified email, so no client-facing read may key on that grouping (#7877's feed keys on a verified link). **The contact details (#8435, spec `docs/specs/8435-contact-details-on-the-client-spec.md`):** the Person also carries a given name, a family name, an E.164 telephone, a six-part address (the magnet's `addressLine1`/`addressLine2`/`city`/`region`/`postalCode`/`country`, stored whole or not at all), a company name and a job title, plus `contactConfirmedAt`/`contactConfirmedBy` — who last saved the contact by hand. The record serves them as `person.contact` (six keys, `null` where blank) and `person.contactConfirmed` (`{ by: "operator" | "client", at }`, `null` while only captures have written it). **A capture fills a BLANK field of an UNCURATED Person only** (`findOrCreatePerson`'s `contact`: no linked user and never saved by hand; every guarded `updateMany` repeats that condition): a stored value is never overwritten and a cleared field is never refilled. A magnet field's `mapsTo` tag now names the contact field it fills (`email`, `name`, `givenName`, `familyName`, `phone`, `address`, `company`, `jobTitle`); the flow engine hands the visible steps' tagged answers to `routeLead` as `options.contact` and the lead's `payload` keeps every raw answer. A subscriber and a callback with a storable email (a callback's is `payload.email`; at confirm, `recordPaymentLink` links the buyer email when capture had none) now carry a `personId` — a composite foreign key onto `people(id, workspace_id)`, `RESTRICT`. `PATCH …/people/:personId/contact` needs `people-write` (owner, admin, member — by role; never an agent) and takes any of the six keys (`null` clears; an address is whole or `null`; `400 telephone_invalid` for a telephone that is not E.164, `400 validation_failed` otherwise, an 8 KiB body bound), stamps `contactConfirmedBy: "operator"`, answers `{ contact }` and writes one `people.contact.update` audit row naming the actor and the Person, never a value. **The private notes (#8514, spec `docs/specs/8514-redesign-the-person-record-page-spec.md` D5–D8):** `GET`/`PUT …/people/:personId/notes` — the team's one note on a client (`notes`, ≤ 5000 code points), who last saved it and when, and which agent when one did; never selected by any other read and never served to the client (`lib/member-store.ts` names no notes column). The GET needs a person's `people-read` role or an agent's `member-pieces-manage` grant (never a `people-read` grant alone); the PUT needs `member-pieces-manage` through `allows`, takes `{ notes, ifUpdatedAt }` (both required; `null` clears; `ifUpdatedAt` is the `updatedAt` read, a stale one `409 notes_changed` with nothing written; `400 notes_too_long`), and writes one `people.notes.set` audit row whose summary is `{ ok, cleared }`, never the text. Both answer `{ notes: { text, updatedAt, updatedBy: { name, viaAgent } | null } }` with `Cache-Control: private, no-store`, through `tenantDb(tenant).people.notes`/`setNotes`; a malformed, absent or foreign id is one `404 not_found`. Same registration, scope and tenant guard as the routes above (`workspace || multi-tenant`). The notes pair has MCP twins on `/mcp/workspace`: `get_person_notes` and `set_person_notes` (#8514 D8). The other People routes have no MCP twin, by decision — People MCP tools are a later phase of the CRM nucleus (#852 AC 6), recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
+- `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/people` (GET, `?limit=&cursor=`), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/people/:personId` (GET), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/people/:personId/contact` (PATCH) — the workspace's clients (#852, `src/routes/workspaces/people.ts` over `tenantDb(tenant).people`; the Person writer is `src/services/person.ts`). A **Person** is one client of one workspace, keyed on a lowercased, trimmed email unique per workspace and created only by `findOrCreatePerson` — called by lead capture, the hub's own Stripe checkout webhook (a live-mode event's `session.customer` only), appointment creation and the inbox accept; `Person.userId` is stamped only on a verified-email match (`stampPersonUser`), never overwritten. The list serves `{ items, nextCursor }` — five keys per row (`id`, `email`, `name`, `planOffering`, `createdAt`), newest first, `limit` 1–200 (default 50); a cursor that does not resolve to a Person of this workspace is `400 invalid_cursor`. The record serves `{ person, timeline, timelineTruncated }`: the Person (`userId` projected to `hasAccount`, never served; the billing pair, and `stripeCustomerUrl` — the Stripe Dashboard link to the customer, built from `billingCustomerId` by `services/person.ts`'s `stripeCustomerDashboardUrl` in the Organization's stored connection's mode, else the environment key's for the Organization that owns it, else `null` — served only to a caller holding `billing-read`; every other caller, an agent key included, gets `billingProvider`, `billingCustomerId` and `stripeCustomerUrl` as `null` and no connection read runs (#9349 DD5/DD6); a failed connection read is a `null` link, the record still `200`, and one `{ event: "person-stripe-link", outcome: "connection_unavailable" }` warn) over a timeline derived at read time — leads and appointments by `personId`, flow sessions, checkouts, deliverable grants and project listings by the Person's newest 200 lead ids, plus an exact-normalized-email fallback for lead-less flow sessions and listings older than the Person backfill, (since #7877) the Person's member-area messages as `message` entries carrying the subject, `hasFile` and `readAt` only, and (since #8171 D4) the Person's inbound member rows as `request` entries (`requestKind`, `subject`) and the versions delivered to them as `version` entries (`pieceId`, `version`, `review`; `at` is `deliveredAt`) — keyed by `personId`, never the email grouping, and never a body, link, quote answer, note or review comment — newest first, at most 50 entries; a malformed, absent or foreign id is one `404 not_found`. Never selected or served: a grant id, a flow-session id, a checkout id, a lead `payload`, a permalink, a Stripe session id, an attendee email, a founder email. Role floor: `people-read` (owner, admin and, since #8514, member — `@working-theory/validation`'s permission table) via `allows`, checked before any read, so an agent key granted `people-read` (the sixth `AGENT_GRANTABLE_PERMISSIONS` entry, clamped to its person's role) reads both in its one workspace. **Agents are withheld (#8514 D3, D4):** `people-read`, `people-write` and `member-pieces-manage` are `AGENT_WITHHELD_PERMISSIONS` — a member holds them by role, an agent (every agent acts at member) never does: `roleAllows` and `allows` read the `agent: true` marker `agentTenant` sets on every agent tenant, so an agent holds the grantable two only by an explicit grant and `people-write` never, and both tenant guards refuse an agent request whose tenant lacks the marker (403, one `agent-tenant-unmarked` error line — fail closed). An operator read only: a Person groups rows by an unverified email, so no client-facing read may key on that grouping (#7877's feed keys on a verified link). **The contact details (#8435, spec `docs/specs/8435-contact-details-on-the-client-spec.md`):** the Person also carries a given name, a family name, an E.164 telephone, a six-part address (the magnet's `addressLine1`/`addressLine2`/`city`/`region`/`postalCode`/`country`, stored whole or not at all), a company name and a job title, plus `contactConfirmedAt`/`contactConfirmedBy` — who last saved the contact by hand. The record serves them as `person.contact` (six keys, `null` where blank) and `person.contactConfirmed` (`{ by: "operator" | "client", at }`, `null` while only captures have written it). **A capture fills a BLANK field of an UNCURATED Person only** (`findOrCreatePerson`'s `contact`: no linked user and never saved by hand; every guarded `updateMany` repeats that condition): a stored value is never overwritten and a cleared field is never refilled. A magnet field's `mapsTo` tag now names the contact field it fills (`email`, `name`, `givenName`, `familyName`, `phone`, `address`, `company`, `jobTitle`); the flow engine hands the visible steps' tagged answers to `routeLead` as `options.contact` and the lead's `payload` keeps every raw answer. A subscriber and a callback with a storable email (a callback's is `payload.email`; at confirm, `recordPaymentLink` links the buyer email when capture had none) now carry a `personId` — a composite foreign key onto `people(id, workspace_id)`, `RESTRICT`. `PATCH …/people/:personId/contact` needs `people-write` (owner, admin, member — by role; never an agent) and takes any of the six keys (`null` clears; an address is whole or `null`; `400 telephone_invalid` for a telephone that is not E.164, `400 validation_failed` otherwise, an 8 KiB body bound), stamps `contactConfirmedBy: "operator"`, answers `{ contact }` and writes one `people.contact.update` audit row naming the actor and the Person, never a value. **The private notes (#8514, spec `docs/specs/8514-redesign-the-person-record-page-spec.md` D5–D8):** `GET`/`PUT …/people/:personId/notes` — the team's one note on a client (`notes`, ≤ 5000 code points), who last saved it and when, and which agent when one did; never selected by any other read and never served to the client (`lib/member-store.ts` names no notes column). The GET needs a person's `people-read` role or an agent's `member-pieces-manage` grant (never a `people-read` grant alone); the PUT needs `member-pieces-manage` through `allows`, takes `{ notes, ifUpdatedAt }` (both required; `null` clears; `ifUpdatedAt` is the `updatedAt` read, a stale one `409 notes_changed` with nothing written; `400 notes_too_long`), and writes one `people.notes.set` audit row whose summary is `{ ok, cleared }`, never the text. Both answer `{ notes: { text, updatedAt, updatedBy: { name, viaAgent } | null } }` with `Cache-Control: private, no-store`, through `tenantDb(tenant).people.notes`/`setNotes`; a malformed, absent or foreign id is one `404 not_found`. Same registration, scope and tenant guard as the routes above (`workspace || multi-tenant`). The notes pair has MCP twins on `/mcp/workspace`: `get_person_notes` and `set_person_notes` (#8514 D8). The other People routes have no MCP twin, by decision — People MCP tools are a later phase of the CRM nucleus (#852 AC 6), recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/people/:personId/pieces` (GET, POST), `…/people/:personId/pieces/:pieceId` (PATCH), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/piece-stages` (GET, PUT), `…/people/:personId/plan` (PUT), `…/people/:personId/messages` (GET, POST) — the member area as an operator keeps it (#7877, `src/routes/workspaces/{pieces,plan,messages-out}.ts` over `tenantDb(tenant).memberArea`; spec `docs/specs/7877-the-member-area-contract-a-spec.md`). A **Piece** is one deliverable for one client: a title (1–200), a **stage** drawn from the workspace's OWN declared list (`WorkspacePieceStages`, one row per workspace; no row is the product default `requested, in-progress, in-review, delivered`, which lives only in `lib/tenant-db.ts`'s `DEFAULT_PIECE_STAGES` — there is no stage enum anywhere), a `needsClient` flag and `updatedBy`. The **plan** is `Person.planOffering` (#852's field — never a Plan model), written only by `services/person.ts`'s `setPersonPlanOffering`. A **message** is an `Interaction` on the `member` channel, direction `outbound`: a plain-text subject (1–200) and body (1–10000), both stripped of control and bidi characters (the body keeps `\n`, `\t`), and an optional attachment that must be an `Asset` of THIS workspace tagged `private` with a raster-image or PDF type (never SVG) — `400 asset_not_found` / `400 asset_not_attachable` otherwise. Both records reference a Person of the same workspace through a composite `(person_id, workspace_id)` foreign key. Role floors from `@working-theory/validation`'s permission table: the two list reads need `people-read`, the stage PUT `workspace-settings`, the stage GET the guard alone, each checked by role (`roleAllows(tenant, …)`) before any read, so an agent's `people-read` grant does not reach pieces or message bodies; the four writes — piece POST and PATCH, plan PUT, message POST — need `member-pieces-manage` (owner, admin, member since #8514), checked with `allows(tenant, "member-pieces-manage")` before any read, so an agent key granted it (#7878, the seventh `AGENT_GRANTABLE_PERMISSIONS` entry) keeps them in its one workspace, attaching only an asset the message's own checks admit; attaching a file to a message or delivering one as a version also needs `assets-write` (#8514 D19), so a member sends text and link versions, never a private file. `GET …/plan-offerings` (#8514 D9, `people-read`) lists plan keys for the Admin's picker from one of two sources (#8934, `services/plan-offerings.ts`): with the `commerce` claim, a connected workspace with a current Offerings snapshot lists one item per sellable Price in its shown set (`getWorkspaceShownSet`, never Stripe) — `key` the full lookup key, `name` the product name and its billing word, `type` `plan` or `addon`; an unclaimed workspace, or one with no connection or no selection, lists its own Service then Product pages (`services/public-site-resolver.ts`'s `workspaceContentAdapter`: off the database adapter only the default workspace has content, every other workspace `[]`). An undetermined licence or an expired or empty snapshot is a failed read (`{ offerings: [] }` and one warn line), and so the magnet checkout check and the purchase name fail closed. `people-write` (owner, admin, member since #8514) is never agent-grantable and is no longer read by these routes — the Admin person page reads it to render its forms. A malformed, absent or foreign Person or piece is one `404 not_found`; a stage outside the declared list `400 invalid_stage`; a stage-list PUT that drops a stage a piece still holds `409 stage_in_use` with nothing written — piece writes and stage changes take one per-workspace advisory lock first, in one transaction. Lists hold at most 50 rows, newest first. Every write that reaches the store records one `recordAuditAction` row naming the actor (`people.piece.create`, `people.piece.update`, `people.stages.set`, `people.plan.set`, `people.message.create`); no audit summary or log line carries a title, subject, body or offering. The operator's message read never stamps `readAt`, and serves an attachment by its sanitized download name, never its asset id. **The checkout plan rule:** a `POST /v1/leads/submit` from a registered spoke (`viaSpoke`) whose `Idempotency-Key` is a LIVE Checkout Session id (`cs_live_…`), with `source: "web"`, `payload.page: "checkout"`, a string `payload.offering` and `payload.site`, and an `amountTotal` that is absent, `null` or positive, names a plan — the offering minus a leading `<site>_` — but never writes one (#8793): its email is what the buyer typed at Stripe Checkout, so the lead HOLDS the plan (`services/lead-routing.ts`, one `{ event: "checkout-plan", outcome: "held" | "skipped", siteId }` line, no Person call; a request relayed for a visitor never reaches it). `services/person.ts`'s `releaseHeldCheckoutPlan` releases it once, when `resolveMemberPersonId` (a member read, or `GET /v1/hub-sign-in/me`) first links the Person to the signed-in user whose verified email is the Person's own (a fresh `stamped` only — never a Person linked earlier, never the Inbox accept's link): into a blank plan only, through `setPersonPlanOffering`'s link guard, and only when the Person has at most 50 marked leads and those under that email all name one key — two keys, or more than 50 marked leads, release nothing and the operator sets the plan. Never on a replay, never refusing or changing the lead, the purchase message, the purchase email or the consent grant, and with no spoke change. Same registration, scope and tenant guard as the routes above (`workspace || multi-tenant`). **Proposals (#8516, spec `docs/specs/8516-proposals-as-an-artifact-kind-spec.md`):** a piece now carries a `kind` — `deliverable` (every piece before #8516, the column default) or `proposal` — served on every piece row and never set or changed through the piece routes (a body naming it is `400 validation_failed`), plus a proposal's optional price (minor units of `usd`/`eur`/`gbp`/`cad`/`aud`). `GET …/people/:personId/proposals` (a person's `people-read` role or an agent's `member-pieces-manage` grant) lists the Person's proposals with their price, approval, paid stamp and latest version, and `payments` (`on-approval` or `off`); `POST …/people/:personId/proposals` (`member-pieces-manage`; a file version also `assets-write`) is Send proposal — the proposal (`needsClient: true`, the first declared stage unless named) and its version 1 in one transaction under the piece lock, one `people.proposal.create` audit row whose summary is `{ priced }` alone. **Only a person prices (C4, the money gate):** an agent's create with a price, and an agent's PATCH or Deliver a version on a priced proposal, are `403 proposal_needs_person` with nothing written. Both read and write through `tenantDb(tenant).memberArea`. The proposals pair has MCP twins on `/mcp/workspace`: `list_proposals` and `create_proposal` (#8516 D7). **Start onboarding (#8515 D5, D6):** `POST …/people/:personId/onboarding` (`member-pieces-manage` through `allows`) takes `{ subject, body }` (the message bounds, no attachment — a body naming `assetId` is `400 validation_failed`) and writes one outbound member message whose `payload` is `{ action: "onboarding" }` — the one outbound payload `interactions_outbound_shape` admits — which the client's own site renders as a link to its `/account/onboarding`; it reads the workspace's onboarding magnet through `tenantDb(tenant).flows.bySlug` and never seeds one: no `diagnostic` row at that slug with `customersEnabled` is `409 onboarding_off` with nothing written. A malformed, absent or foreign Person is the same `404 not_found`; one `people.onboarding.start` audit row, no summary. The message POST never carries the action. The other member-area routes have no MCP twin, by decision — member-area MCP tools are a later phase of the CRM nucleus, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
 - `/v1/member/pieces` (GET), `/v1/member/messages` (GET), `/v1/member/messages/:id/file` (GET) — the member reads: a client's OWN pieces and messages, served to the spoke that signed them in (#7877, `src/routes/member/{pieces,messages}.ts`). Registered in `authScope` only (auth, NOT tenant-guarded — a client holds no membership; an agent key is 403 at the preHandler) under the same `workspace || multi-tenant` predicate, at the exact URLs `HUB_SESSION_ROUTES` admits a hub credential on. Who and where come only from `services/member-area.ts`'s `resolveMember`, before any member read: the caller through `middleware/auth.ts`'s `memberCaller` — the hub's own cookie session or a hub credential, never a personal `ApiToken` (`401 { error: "unauthorized" }`); the workspace from the calling spoke's `x-ailk-spoke-key` (a keyless call only on a one-workspace deployment that is not a hub), and a hub credential must name that same workspace, else `503 tenant_unresolved`; an unverified email `403 email_unverified`. The Person is the one linked by `Person.userId`, else the one whose email is the caller's verified email, linked on that first read by `stampPersonUser`'s rule; no Person is `items: []`. Every read goes through the named boundary `src/lib/member-store.ts`, scoped by that resolved workspace AND Person: at most 50 rows, newest first; a message serves `{ id, subject, body, file: { filename, contentType } | null, createdAt, readAt }` — never an asset, creator, person or workspace id — and the first read stamps `readAt` ("shown to the client's spoke", not "read"; served as it stood before the stamp). The file read streams the attachment only when the message is the caller's own and its stored type is attachable — any other case is one `404 not_found` — `attachment` with a sanitized, extension-pinned name, `nosniff`, the sandbox `Content-Security-Policy` and `Cache-Control: private, no-store`. `@working-theory/api-client`'s `member.*` is the spoke's caller; a spoke that re-serves the bytes sends those five headers unchanged. No MCP twin, by decision — identity-bound client reads behind a hub credential; the anonymous MCP surface is identity-blind, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
 - `/v1/member/purchases`, `/v1/member/appointments`, `/v1/member/artifacts`, `/v1/member/artifacts/:pieceId/versions/:version/file`, `/v1/member/meeting-types`, `/v1/member/availability`, `/v1/member/request-form`, `/v1/member/billing` (all GET) — the Phase 1 member reads (#8169, `src/routes/member/{purchases,appointments,artifacts,meeting-types,availability,request-form,billing}.ts`; spec `docs/specs/8169-member-reads-spec.md`). Same caller seam, refusals and registration as the bullet above, each read through one `src/lib/member-store.ts` function, each success body re-parsed against its `@working-theory/validation` `member.ts` schema. All eight are in `HUB_SESSION_ROUTES` (#8220). Appointments, artifacts and the file read are scoped by the resolved workspace AND Person (≤ 50, never an attendee's name, email or time zone; never a version or asset id; the file read is one `404 not_found` for every miss, a version above the 32-bit column included, and sends `messages.ts`'s five headers). **Purchases and billing read at organization grain** (the operator's #8140 ruling): only Persons whose `userId` is ALREADY the caller, inside the calling workspace's organization — they link nothing, so a caller with no Person here still sees a linked Person elsewhere. That grain rests on one precondition nothing enforces (SEC-8169-2, stated at `lib/member-store.ts`'s `linkedPersonsInOrganization` and pinned by `src/__tests__/member-isolation.test.ts`): every workspace of one organization belongs to one owner, so a deployment must never put two businesses' workspaces in one organization. A purchase is a completed hub `FlowCheckout` whose lead carries its Person's own email, or (#8185) a `Lead` the hub marked `spokeCheckout` when it was written — a registered spoke's unrelayed (`x-ailk-relayed` absent), LIVE paid checkout, the #7877 plan rule's own predicate evaluated in `services/lead-routing.ts` before the create and never updated, or (#8932) the per-Organization Stripe webhook's live, recorded, paid Offerings session, marked by that predicate's Offerings twin — served with the same Person-workspace and Person-email rules, its offering kept only if it is a plan-offering key (SEC-8169-6); an anonymous, relayed, test-mode or pre-#8185 lead is never marked and never served (no backfill), and `tests/architecture/idempotency-key-producers.test.ts` fails if any spoke-side file, MCP tool or client wrapper starts sending an `Idempotency-Key`. **Billing answers a hub credential only**: any other caller gets `404 not_found` before `resolveMember` and before any read, and no log line ever names a `cus_` id; a hub credential reads it at the organization grain, under that precondition. Meeting types and availability join the workspace's `customerSlugs` (independent of `enabledSlugs`) to the scheduling provider — a provider failure is its `SCHEDULING_ERROR_STATUS`, never an empty list; a slug outside `customerSlugs` is `404 meeting_type_not_offered` with no provider call — and register under `scheduling && (workspace || multi-tenant)`, because only the `scheduling` module delivers `services/scheduling/`. The request form is the `request-quote` contact row while `customersEnabled`, whatever its status, else `{ form: null }`. **`GET /v1/member/onboarding` (#8515 D7)** serves the standard onboarding magnet — the `diagnostic` row at slug `onboarding` while `customersEnabled`, whatever its status — reduced to display keys (a field's name, input type, `required`, select options and label/help/placeholder; a choice question's name, options, `multi` and `exclusiveValues`; never a `showIf`, `mapsTo`, `purposes`, field rule, `segments`, `whenHidden` or `resultsReveal`), else `{ form: null }`. `GET /v1/member/messages` items carry `action: "onboarding" | null` (#8515 D6). No MCP twin, by decision — the same reason, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
 - `/v1/member/requests` (POST), `/v1/member/messages` (POST), `/v1/member/bookings` (POST), `/v1/member/artifacts/:pieceId/review` (POST), `/v1/member/profile` (PATCH), `/v1/member/profile/contact` (GET, PATCH), `/v1/member/deletion-request` (POST) — the Phase 1 member writes (#8170, the contact pair #8435, `src/routes/member/{requests,messages,bookings,artifact-review,profile,deletion-request}.ts`; spec `docs/specs/8170-member-writes-spec.md`). Same caller seam and refusals as the reads, and a cookie write must carry a trusted `Origin` (the preHandler's 401). Nothing in a body, path or query names a person, user or workspace; every body parses its `@working-theory/validation` `member.ts` schema (`400 invalid_input`, or `400 link_not_https` when a link is why) and every success body is re-parsed before it is sent. **Requests, messages and reviews are each ONE inbound `Interaction` on the caller's own Person** — channel `member`, direction `inbound`, `createdBy` the caller — and never a `Lead`: a request is checked against the `request-quote` magnet's CURRENT field steps (`400 answers_invalid` for a key the form does not ask, a missing required answer, an array answer or a failed field rule; `409 request_form_off` when the form is off or the caller has no Person) and stores `{ flowSlug, items }` with each label as the form shows it; a message stores `{ link }` when one is sent (`404 not_found` with no Person). **The cap:** every inbound write runs in one transaction whose first statement is the Person's advisory lock (`ailk:member-inbound:<personId>`), then counts the Person's inbound rows of the last hour — 30 or more is `429 too_many_requests` with nothing written. **The review** lands only on the piece's LATEST version (`409 version_not_latest`), only once per version and never after `Piece.approvedAt` is set (`409 review_closed`); a missing, foreign or approved piece is refused from one read before any lock, otherwise the Person lock then the workspace's piece lock (`lib/tenant-db.ts`'s `pieceStagesLockKey`, the key the operator's piece writes take), and it writes the version's `review`, `reviewComment`, `reviewedAt`, the piece's `approvedAt` on an approval and the `review` Interaction in that one transaction — never a title, stage, link, asset or note; asking for changes stays open on every new latest version (#8140 disposition 3). **The booking** books an offered `customerSlugs` meeting type at `<handle>/<slug>` as the caller (verified email, own name), refuses a Person holding 10 upcoming non-cancelled appointments `429` before any provider call, answers a provider failure through `SCHEDULING_ERROR_STATUS`, and binds a spoke caller's booking to its workspace as `/v1/schedule/book` does; it registers under `scheduling && (workspace || multi-tenant)`. **The profile** writes only the caller's own `User.name` / `User.image` (https only) and answers `{ name, image }`. **The contact** (`profile/contact`, #8435) is the caller's contact details on THIS site, never on the hub `User` and never synced to another site: the GET serves the contact of the caller's linked Person only once a human saved it (`contactConfirmedAt` set — a value only an anonymous capture wrote is `{ contact: null }`, SEC-8435-B); the PATCH takes all six keys, each nullable and required, and REPLACES the whole contact (so no value the client never saw survives), stamping `contactConfirmedBy: "client"`. With no Person yet it finds or creates the Person for the caller's VERIFIED email and links it through `stampPersonUser`'s rule; any outcome but linked is `409 contact_unavailable`, nothing written. Only the caller's own linked Person (`{ id, workspaceId, userId }`) is ever written; `400 invalid_input` or `400 telephone_invalid` for a refused body, an 8 KiB body bound, and `{ event: "member-contact", outcome }` as its one log line. **The deletion request** is filed through `routeLead` as a `web` message lead (kind `deletion`, the caller's verified email, no idempotency key) into `resolveSiteWorkspaceId()` — the deployment's own site workspace, so a spoke caller's request reaches the hub operator (`sentTo: "hub-operator"`), never the spoke's. Every data write goes through `src/lib/member-store.ts`; every write logs only `{ event, outcome }` and a `ref` of at most 8 characters (`services/member-area.ts`'s `memberWriteLog`), never a subject, body, answer, link, note, name, email or full id. All six (and the two contact routes) are in `HUB_SESSION_ROUTES` (#8220): a spoke's deletion request reaches the hub operator, and a spoke's profile write changes the name and photo the hub's `me` answers. **The onboarding submission (#8515 D8–D10):** `POST /v1/member/onboarding` takes the request body's `{ answers }` (`plainText`, ≤ 64), checks them against the served onboarding form (every key a served field or question; a required field non-blank; `email`, https `url`, `select` options and `minLength` as the request checker applies them; a single choice one option value; a `multi` choice 1…options distinct option values, an exclusive value only alone — `400 answers_invalid` / `link_not_https`; `409 onboarding_off` with no Person or no form) and writes ONE `flow:onboarding` `Lead` — never an `Interaction` — on the caller's own Person with the Person's email, the answers, `flowSlug`, `locale` and the server-written `submittedBy` (the caller's user id, a server-owned key the Inbox never shows as an answer), so it is an Inbox submission and a `lead` Activity entry with no reader change. Under the Person's inbound lock, at most five of the caller's OWN submissions an hour (`429 too_many_requests`) — only leads carrying the caller's `submittedBy` count, so an anonymous `POST /v1/leads/submit` with that source and the client's email never fills the allowance. Both onboarding routes are in `HUB_SESSION_ROUTES`. **A proposal (#8516):** the artifacts read and the review answer carry `kind`, `price` and `payment` (`{ status: "due" }` for an approved, priced, unpaid proposal where payment runs; `{ status: "paid", paidAt }` once paid; else `null`), and a proposal's review — the same write, which is how a proposal is accepted or sent back — also writes one `people.proposal.client_review` audit row as the client (`recordWorkspaceAuditAction`). **`POST /v1/member/artifacts/:pieceId/payment`** opens the client's Stripe Checkout page for their own approved, priced, unpaid proposal and answers `{ url }` — a `checkout.stripe.com` URL only (`isStripeCheckoutUrl`, checked before anything is stored), `Cache-Control: private, no-store`. It sits behind the commerce claim (`requireCommerceClaim`, the module-disabled 404 before any read) and its own strict per-IP limiter (`proposalpay`); it is NOT on `HUB_SESSION_ROUTES`. **Same site, sandbox only:** `services/proposal-payments.ts`'s `proposalPaymentsFor` is `on-approval` only with the claim, on a one-workspace deployment whose workspace is the proposal's (the deployment's one Stripe account is provably that seller's), with a key `assertSandboxKey` admits and `FRONTEND_URL` set — and never for a call carrying a spoke key or a hub credential; anywhere else approval records acceptance only and the pay route is `404 not_found`. The session is card only, expires in an hour, carries a fixed product name and the stored amount (never a request value), and is reused while it has more than five minutes left; a concurrent second session is expired. `409 proposal_not_approved` / `409 proposal_paid` / `502 payment_unavailable`; each opened session writes one `people.proposal.checkout` audit row. No MCP twin, by decision — identity-bound client writes, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
 - `/v1/consent/cookie` (POST), `/v1/consent/unsubscribe` (POST), `/v1/consent/sign-up` (GET), `/v1/consent/account` (GET, POST), `/v1/consent/platform` (GET, POST), `/v1/member/consents` (GET, POST), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/people/:personId/consents` (GET) — the consent ledger's routes (#8438, spec `docs/specs/8438-consent-registry-and-ledger-step-spec.md`; #8765, spec `docs/specs/8765-sign-up-refuses-without-the-spec.md`). `consent_grants` is THE ledger: append-only (the database refuses any change to a stored row, and any truncation, on it and on `consent_visitor_links`), every row naming its `source`, its `policyVersion` and, when known, its Person; it has two writers — `src/services/consent.ts` (`recordConsent`, `recordPersonConsent`, `recordCookieChoice`, `linkConsentVisitor`, `recordCheckoutConsent`; every source) and the web's sign-up hook `apps/web/lib/sign-up-agreements.ts` (#8765 D4), which writes only `sign_up` rows (subject `user`) of a user it creates in the same Better Auth transaction, from the evidence `GET /v1/consent/sign-up` built with `consent.ts`'s own functions — and every reader is `src/lib/consent-store.ts` (`DISTINCT ON` current-state reads, never a window). **Two readings of a Person's rows:** the OWN reading (`sign_up`, `account_settings`, `email_unsubscribe` — a verified caller or a signed link) is what the member's screens and any send read; the ANY-SOURCE reading (adds `magnet`, `api`, `cookie_banner`, `checkout`, and linked visitors' cookie rows) is the operator's, marked `unverified` — an anonymous form's row never changes a member's own answer. **The checkout grant (#8765 D13, D14):** `checkout` is the eighth source (the `consent_grants_source_known` CHECK names all eight). The hub webhook's `checkout.session.completed` arm, after the flow-checkout Person step, writes one `account_terms` row (subject `person`, source `checkout`, `sourceRef` the Checkout Session id, locale `en`, the current statement and version) through `recordCheckoutConsent` — one transaction under the `ailk:consent:<workspaceId>:checkout:<sessionId>` lock, nothing written when that Person already holds that session's row — only when `consent.terms_of_service` is `accepted` and `metadata.ailk_terms` is `account_terms@<current version>`; the Person is `services/checkout-buyer.ts`'s `checkoutBuyerPerson` (a proposal session → the piece's Person in its `ailk_workspace` through `lib/proposal-paid-store.ts`'s `proposalPersonId`; a flow checkout → the Person the Person step's `resolveCheckoutPerson` found or created, never created here; a signed-in buyer's `ailk_user_id` → the Person of that user's verified email in the site workspace, test mode included; else, for a paid live-mode session only, `customer_details.email`'s Person). **A spoke purchase records the same grant (#8778):** a spoke's checkout runs on the spoke's own Stripe account, so the hub webhook never sees it; instead the first write of a `spokeCheckout` lead with a Person (`services/lead-routing.ts`) whose `payload.termsAccepted` equals the current `account_terms@<version>` stamp (`currentAccountTermsStamp`) calls `recordCheckoutConsent` for the lead's Person, `sourceRef` the lead's `Idempotency-Key` (the Checkout Session id) — a `null` or absent value writes nothing (`consent_absent`), any other value nothing (`terms_unstamped`), a replay never reaches it (and `termsAccepted` is left out of the replay comparison, so a redelivery across a spoke's update still replays), and the store's per-session guard keeps it to one row; it logs `{ event: "checkout-consent", outcome, siteId }` only and never changes the lead's answer. A `checkout` row is unverified: the payer is not a signed-in user, so it never satisfies the account interstitial. It logs `{ event: "checkout-consent", outcome, eventIdPrefix }` only (`consent_absent`, `terms_unstamped`, `person_unresolved`, `recorded`, `unchanged`, `version_changed` — the site registry has moved past the stamped version, so nothing is written — and `failed`, which adds the error's `errName`) and never changes the 200. A write appends only when the answer changes the reading it is checked against, under an advisory lock on the (subject, purpose) pair. `POST /v1/consent/cookie` takes `{ visitorId, choice, locale }` and never a workspace (it comes from `resolvePublicWorkspace`); `POST /v1/consent/unsubscribe` takes a token signed with `AILK_CONSENT_LINK_SECRET` (≥ 32 bytes, optional; unset ⇒ `503 link_secret_not_configured`) and answers every defect as one `400 invalid_link`. Both are top-level, outside every module gate, in their own rate-limit scopes (`consent`, `unsubscribe`) and on `FORWARDED_VISITOR_ROUTES`. **A sign-up agreement is the account's (#8765 C3, D5, D6):** a `signUp` purpose (`account_terms`) is recorded once per `User`, subject `user` / the user id in the deployment's own site workspace (`resolveSiteWorkspaceId()`, the owner platform consents' footing, read by `userPlatformRows`), never per Person, so the hub and every spoke signed in through it read one row. `GET /v1/consent/sign-up` is anonymous: `{ workspaceId, agreements: [{ purposeId, policyVersion, locale, statement, statementHash }] }` for the site workspace (`locale` default `en`, `null` workspace `503 tenant_unresolved`, `Cache-Control: no-store`), top level beside the cookie route in its own rate-limit scope `signupevidence`, outside every module gate. **Its budget is per site key (#8805):** a request presenting a valid `x-ailk-spoke-key` (`resolveCallerSite` → a registered, unrevoked spoke) is counted against that key's `site,<spokeId>` bucket at `DEFAULT_SIGNUPEVIDENCE_PER_KEY_PER_MINUTE` (120; `AILK_RATE_LIMIT_SIGNUPEVIDENCE_PER_KEY_PER_MINUTE` overrides) and let through the server-wide per-IP ceiling, so a spoofed `X-Forwarded-For` cannot spend it; an invalid or absent key, or a failed lookup, keeps `DEFAULT_PER_IP_PER_MINUTE_STRICT` per IP. The key picks the bucket only — the workspace stays `resolveSiteWorkspaceId()` (`middleware/rate-limit.ts`'s `siteKeyReader`, `SITE_KEYED_ROUTES`). `GET /v1/consent/account` answers `{ agreements: [{ id, statement, policyVersion, acceptedVersion, acceptedAt, current }], complete }` for the caller (`memberCaller` — a cookie session or a hub credential; a personal token `401`); `POST` takes `{ purposeIds, locale? }`, refuses any id that is not a `signUp` agreement `404 purpose_unknown` before writing anything, writes each through `recordPersonConsent` (source `account_settings`, `sourceRef: spoke:<id>` for a hub credential) and answers the GET body; both register in `authScope` unconditionally and log `{ event: "account-agreements", outcome }` only. The member pair reads and writes that same row for a `signUp` purpose (no Person is created) and is unchanged for every other purpose; a `null` site workspace keeps the old per-Person reading; a hub credential's `via: "sign_up"` is `400 sign_up_window_closed` with nothing written (SEC-8765-B). The member pair and the account pair are in `HUB_SESSION_ROUTES` (26 entries since #8765); the anonymous `GET /v1/consent/sign-up` is not, and neither is `/v1/consent/platform` — it is the deployment owner's own consent to Working Theory, a cookie session holding `platform-consents`, under `multi-tenant`. The banner's visitor id travels in `x-ailk-consent-visitor` (only a v4 UUID counts) on the lead and flow routes and the member write, linking the visitor to the Person; the header is never echoed or logged. A `consent` flow field now stores `{ [purposeId]: boolean }` and writes the ledger at completion (source `magnet`, `sourceRef` the flow slug). The operator's `…/consents` answers `{ own, anySource, history, nextCursor }` (history 500 a page, `Cache-Control: private, no-store`, never a subject id). No MCP twin for any of them, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/requests` (GET, `?limit=`), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/people/:personId/pieces/:pieceId/versions` (POST) — the provider routes (#8171, `src/routes/workspaces/{requests,pieces}.ts` over `tenantDb(tenant).memberArea`; spec `docs/specs/8171-provider-routes-the-workspace-requests-spec.md`). **The Requests read** lists the workspace's inbound member rows (#8170's messages, quote requests and reviews), newest first, `limit` 1–50 (default 50, no cursor), behind `inbox-read` (every role) checked with `can(tenant.role, …)`. It is tiered: a role holding `people-read` (owner, admin) gets the full row — the subject, body and the kind's own fields (a message's `link`, a quote's `items`, a review's `pieceId`, `version`, `review`); every other caller, every agent key included, gets `{ id, kind, person, createdAt }` and the content is never selected. A row whose payload fails its kind's schema, or whose Person is gone, is left out and counted in one `warn`. **Deliver a version** numbers version n+1 under the piece lock (`withPieceStagesLock`), behind `member-pieces-manage` through `allows` (an agent granted it delivers); the body is exactly one of an `https` link (`isHttpsLink`, else `400 link_not_https`) and a private attachable asset of this workspace (`400 asset_not_found` / `asset_not_attachable`), plus an optional note; `version`, `deliveredBy` and `deliveredAt` are the server's (a body naming one is `400 validation_failed`); a piece with `approvedAt` set is `409 piece_approved`; a malformed, absent or foreign Person or piece is `404 not_found`. There is no round count, limit or remaining count (#8140 disposition 3). It answers `201 { version: { id, pieceId, version, file, link, note, deliveredAt } }` — the file's download name, never an asset id or `deliveredBy` — and every call that reaches the store writes one `people.version.create` audit row. Same registration, scope and tenant guard as the routes above (`workspace || multi-tenant`). No MCP twin, by decision — member-area MCP tools are a later phase of the CRM nucleus, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
+- `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/callbacks` (GET, `?limit=`) — the Inbox callbacks read (#9254, `src/routes/workspaces/callbacks.ts` over `tenantDb(tenant).callbacks`; spec `docs/specs/9254-callback-rows-inbox-spec.md`): the workspace's request-and-confirm `Callback` rows (#5970), newest first, `limit` 1–50 (default 50, the Requests read's own query; any other key `400 validation_failed`), behind `inbox-read` (every role, a member and an agent key included) through `permitted`, checked before any read. Same registration, scope and tenant guard as the Requests read (`workspace || multi-tenant`); the scope is always `request.tenant.workspaceId`. The row is `id`, `name`, `phone`, `preferredTime` (the window asked for, as typed), `personId` (`null` for a callback captured with no email), `confirmedAt`, `confirmedTime`, `paidAt` and `createdAt` — read through the fixed `CALLBACK_ROW_SELECT`, so never `payload`, the confirm digest or expiry, `buyerEmail`, `amountMinor`, `currency` or a Stripe id. The confirm state is the reader's to derive (`paidAt` → paid, else `confirmedAt` → confirmed, else awaiting). No item read, no cursor, no stamp, no audit row; the body is re-parsed against its own `.strict()` schema. The Admin Inbox lists each row under Interested. No MCP twin, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
+- `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/submissions/:leadId/trial` (POST), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/people/:personId/trial` (GET), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/people/:personId/trial/extend` (POST) — the operator's Start, Get and Extend trial (#9287 C3, `src/routes/workspaces/trial.ts` over `src/services/trial.ts`; spec `docs/specs/9287-operator-started-trials-spec.md` DD2–DD7; Start trial since #9342, spec `docs/specs/9342-start-trial-needs-customers-and-spec.md` DD1–DD7). Same registration, scope and tenant guard as the callbacks read (`workspace || multi-tenant`); the scope is always `request.tenant`. All three need `billing-manage` by role — the owner alone; an admin, a member and every agent key are `403` before any read or Stripe call — and the two POSTs charge a write budget of 30 an hour per person (`chargeWriteBudget` scope `trial`, `429 rate_limited` with `Retry-After`) before their strict body (`bodyLimit` 4 KiB, `400 validation_failed`). The Stripe client is the tenant's own Organization's, `stripeClientForOrganization` only, never the env key (`409 stripe_not_connected`; unusable, or any thrown Stripe error, a fixed `502 stripe_unavailable`, logged by class name only). **Start trial** is a hosted Checkout trial (#9342): it accepts a lead only when it is a `flow:trial` submission of this workspace whose `trial` magnet is a `diagnostic` and names a Person (else one `404 not_found`); the `{ lookupKey }` must be a `plan` `listPlanOfferings` lists (`400 plan_unknown`; a failed read `503 offerings_unavailable`); with no usable `FRONTEND_URL` it is `503 checkout_not_configured` before any Stripe call. It then makes exactly three Stripe calls, all within the Offerings key contract (#8879 §3.3, unchanged): `prices.list` for exactly one active recurring Price under the key (`409 plan_unavailable`); `checkout.sessions.list` of the Person's email's completed sessions, where one tagged `ailk_origin: ailk-trial` is `409 trial_exists` with nothing created; and one session through `lib/stripe.ts`'s `createTrialCheckoutSession` (`@working-theory/stripe-client`) — subscription mode, `trial_period_days: 14`, `payment_method_collection: "if_required"`, `trial_settings.end_behavior.missing_payment_method: "pause"`, the terms box required (`409 terms_not_configured` when the account has no Terms of service URL), `customer_email` the Person's, `subscription_data.metadata` `{ ailk_origin: "ailk-trial", ailk_workspace, ailk_person, site }` with `site` the workspace id (`TRIAL_ORIGIN_TAG`, the tag ailk-billing's trial mint reads), returning to `<FRONTEND_URL origin>/trial`, keyed `trial-checkout:<leadId>:<lookupKey>`. It calls no Customers or Subscriptions endpoint and writes nothing to the Person: Stripe creates the customer and the trialing subscription when the person completes Checkout, and ailk-billing mints from `customer.subscription.created`. A session URL `isStripeCheckoutUrl` refuses is `502 stripe_unavailable` with nothing sent. The person is then emailed the link (`@working-theory/email`'s `sendTrialCheckoutEmail`, from `deliverableSenderAddress()`); a failed send is one `warn` with its kind and still a success. The answer is `201 { checkout: { url, emailed } }` with `Cache-Control: private, no-store`, re-parsed against `startTrialResponseSchema`. **Get trial** lists the customer's ten newest subscriptions (the stored id, or — with none, or one missing on this client — the first customer whose email is the Person's) and serves the newest tagged `ailk-trial` as `{ subscriptionId, status, trialEnd, lookupKey }`, or `null`. **Extend trial** moves that trial's `trial_end` with `proration_behavior: "none"` only while it is `trialing` (`409 trial_not_active`), to a `trialEnd` strictly later than the current one and no later than 90 days after the request (`400 trial_end_invalid`), nothing written on a refusal. **Get and Extend trial need Customers and Subscriptions access, which a key that keeps §3.3 lacks** (#9342 DD7): on such a key Stripe refuses, the route answers `502 stripe_unavailable` and the Person page hides its Trial box; they work on a key that grants that access. Each success writes one `recordAuditAction` row naming the actor and the Person — `people.trial.start` (summary `{ emailed }`, `"true"` or `"false"`) and `people.trial.extend`; a refusal writes none, and Start trial does not mark the lead handled. No log line or audit summary carries the Checkout URL, and no response, log line or audit summary carries an email, a key or a `cus_`/`price_` id (the one `cs_` id served is inside Start trial's URL); Get and Extend's bodies are re-parsed against `trialResponseSchema` (`@working-theory/validation`'s `trial.ts`). No MCP twin — owner-only, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/members` (GET) — the org's member roster (`userId`, `name`, `email`, `role`), the Pro `workspace` module's Team tab (#5371). Read-only by design: granting a Membership is the invite flow, which is its own spec with a mandatory security review (§2.3), so no POST/PUT/DELETE is routed at this path. Scoped to `request.tenant.organizationId` — Membership is org-level — server-resolved from the validated session. Role floor: `members-read` (owner, admin — `@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2)): the roster carries every member's email, and who the other members are is not a member's job. No MCP twin — identity-bound tenant route (#3591 exception).
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/agents` (GET `?userId=`, POST), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/agents/:agentId/key` (POST), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/agents/:agentId` (PATCH `{ enabled }`), `PUT /v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/agents/:agentId/grants` (`{ grants }`, #7864), and `/v1/agent/context` (GET) — the agent seat (#3591, `src/routes/workspaces/agents.ts` over `src/lib/agent-store.ts`, `// oss: false`). An agent is a stored delegate of one person, bound to one workspace. The five management routes refuse an agent caller outright (403), check `agents-manage` (owner, admin) before any read, and scope every read and write to `tenant.organizationId`, never a body or query value; an agent of another organization is the same 404 as a missing one. Create returns 201 with the key shown once; re-key returns the new key once. Each successful create, re-key, switch and grant change writes an `agents.*` audit record. **Grants (#7864, `docs/specs/7864-agent-key-grants-spec.md`).** An agent acts at `member`, plus any of seven permissions an owner or admin granted it one by one — `content-edit`, `content-publish`, `assets-write`, `magnets-manage`, `meeting-types-manage`, `people-read` since #852, and `member-pieces-manage` since #7878 (`@working-theory/validation`'s `AGENT_GRANTABLE_PERMISSIONS`, held to that set by the `agents_grants_allowed` CHECK). The grant PUT replaces the whole set (an empty list removes every grant) and refuses a grant the agent's person's own role does not hold, `409 grant_exceeds_person`. The clamp is one function both tenant guards call (`services/default-tenant.ts`'s `agentTenant`): an agent holds a stored grant only while its person's role holds it, so a demoted person's agent keeps the row but not the permission. The routes for the seven check `allows(tenant, "<permission>")`, which reads the grants; every other check keeps `can(tenant.role, …)`, so no other owner or admin permission is reachable. Every agent write on content, assets and meeting types writes one `recordAgentWrite` row naming the agent and its person (magnets already did); a person's writes there stay unaudited. The member-area writes audit every caller through `recordAuditAction`, whose actor names an agent as the agent. No grant raises the ceiling. `/v1/agent/context` is the agent's own read, unchanged by grants, and needs no permission beyond the workspace guard. Same registration scope as the routes above (`workspace || multi-tenant`).
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/content` (GET, POST), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/content/:type/:slug` (GET, PATCH), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/content/:type/:slug/{publish,unpublish}` (POST) — the tenant-guarded content editor's write surface (#5853, `src/routes/workspaces/content.ts`): list, create, read/save the draft tip (under `If-Match`), and publish/unpublish, all over `Artifact`/`ArtifactVersion`. `:type` is validated against the page-type registry (`z.enum(SCHEMA_ORG_TYPES)`) rather than accepted as a free string on every addressed operation — an unregistered type is a 400 before any lookup, since it is echoed back and passed to `notifyRevalidate` as the site's cache tag. Role floors from `@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2): publish and unpublish need `content-publish`, and create, read and save need `content-edit` (both owner, admin — an admin builds, a member operates). The list serves `content-edit` the editor's full view and a caller holding only `docs-read` (a member) a published-only projection (D4): draft rows dropped, every row `status: "published"`, `version: null`, `valid: true`, and a `published_with_draft` page's `type`/`tags` read from its PUBLISHED version — applied before every filter, so a member's `?status=draft` or a draft tip's `?tag=` matches nothing. **The GET list is a UNION of page artifacts and DOCUMENT assets** (#6093, D1/D9 — "one store, two views"): every row carries `tags: string[]` (never null, read from the draft tip's stored content for a page, from `Asset.tags` for a file) and a DERIVED `kind: "page" | "post" | "file"` (`BlogPosting` alone maps to `"post"`; an asset row is always `"file"`) — an optional `?tag=<slug>` filters the union AFTER it is built, so a file is returned under either its own tag or a shared one. The asset half of the union (`DOCUMENT_CONTENT_TYPES`, i.e. `application/pdf`) is skipped entirely when `locale`/`type` is supplied or `status` names anything but `"published"`, since a file row can never satisfy those. A foreign `:workspaceId` costs zero artifact **and** zero asset queries. No MCP twin — identity-bound tenant routes (#3591 exception, same shape as the sibling `/v1/workspaces/*` routes).
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/assets` (GET, POST), `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/assets/:assetId` (PATCH, DELETE), `/v1/assets/:assetId` (GET, public/anonymous) — the workspace asset store (#5854 upload/read; #6093 list/PATCH/DELETE, `src/routes/assets/{index,upload,read,manage}.ts`). Upload accepts an allowlisted union of three named classes (`src/routes/assets/index.ts`): five RASTER images (`image/png`, `image/jpeg`, `image/gif`, `image/webp`, `image/avif`), one VECTOR image (`image/svg+xml`, admitted under the operator's 2026-09-18 `allow-svg-assets` ruling — issue #6093 comment `5731573595` — superseding #5854's original SVG exclusion) and one DOCUMENT type (`application/pdf`), all under the existing 20 MB cap; `?tags=<slug>[,<slug>…]` stores tags on the row. The public read serves a RASTER type `inline` exactly as before; every OTHER admitted type (SVG, PDF) is served `attachment`, with the filename's extension pinned to the stored content type (closing extension spoofing) and a five-directive `Content-Security-Policy` (`default-src 'none'; sandbox; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'`) that makes the bytes never a document on this origin — this is what makes admitting SVG safe with NO server-side sanitizer. `GET …/assets` (`assets-read` — every role, a member included) lists a workspace's assets, metadata only, never `bytes`, with an optional `?tag=<slug>` filter; this is what narrows the store's prior "nothing lists assets" premise to its precise form — no ANONYMOUS and no CROSS-TENANT enumeration, both still true. `PATCH …/assets/:assetId` updates `title`/`description`/`tags` (`assets-write`, owner and admin, the upload's permission too; `null` clears a text field to SQL `NULL`, `""` stores empty; the asset's `id` and public URL are untouched). `DELETE …/assets/:assetId` (`assets-write`) removes the row and the bytes at the ORIGIN only — already-cached copies elsewhere are not recallable under the year-long `immutable` promise, and no reference check protects a page that still embeds the URL; absent and foreign ids both take the same 404. Every tenant route here is identity-bound; no MCP twin (#3591 exception). The public read has no MCP twin either — it serves bytes to an `<img>`/download, the same boundary `upload.ts` records for its own sibling. **A client's file is never in the library's public life (#7877 D18):** the default `GET …/assets` listing leaves out every asset tagged `private` — only `?tag=private` lists them (the Admin's Compose) — and the public read answers its uniform 404 for an asset tagged `private`, attached to any member-area message, or (#8171 D3) named by a delivered piece version (one `pieceVersion.count`, since the tag can be removed after delivery), so such a file's bytes are served only by its owner's member reads.
 - `/v1/subscription/me` (GET) — `?include=billing` (#8171 D7), from a cookie session only, adds the optional `planName` and `paymentMethod` (brand, last four, expiry) read from Stripe through `lib/stripe.ts`'s `readCustomerBillingSummary` for the caller's own resolved customer: cached per customer for 60 s (a failure too), one read in flight per customer, bounded at 3 s; a failure leaves both keys absent, a value outside the schema's bounds is `null`, and no id is served or logged. A bearer token, another value or none answers exactly as before.
-- `/v1/billing` (GET), `/v1/billing/portal-session` (POST) — org-scoped billing read + Stripe customer-portal session creation. The read stays open to every member (the Admin's plan gate reads it); the portal needs `billing-manage` — the owner alone (`@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2); an admin is refused before any Stripe call). `/v1/billing/usage` (GET) needs `billing-read` (owner, admin). **The read's `commerce` field (#8907 D14)** is the deployment's commerce claim, `claimed | unclaimed | undetermined` (`resolveCommerceClaim()`; a rejected read is `undetermined` and the answer stays `200`) — what the Admin's Billing card reads (#8908 D10). **`?include=billing` (#9067 D1)** — exactly that string, never an array — adds `details` only for a caller holding `billing-manage` (the owner; an agent never qualifies): `licenseExpiresAt` (`checkLicense().expiresAt`, `null` on a failed read) always, and for an Organization with a Stripe customer `renewsAt` (the current subscription's first item's `current_period_end`, only while it will renew), `sites` (its quantity) and `paymentMethod` (brand, last four, expiry), read through `lib/stripe.ts`'s `readCustomerBillingSummary` by `services/entitlements.ts`'s `readOrgBillingSummary` — cached per customer for 60 s (a failure too), one read in flight per customer, bounded at 3 s; a failure answers `details: { licenseExpiresAt }` and still `200`, a value outside `orgBillingDetailsSchema`'s bounds is `null`, no id is served or logged, and the reply carries `Cache-Control: private, no-store`. Every other request is answered exactly as before, with no Stripe or licence read. **`POST /v1/billing/plan-checkout` (#9067 D3, `routes/billing/plan-checkout.ts`)** is the Billing tab's Purchase plan: a subscription Checkout for the caller's own Organization's plan (`planPurchaseLookupKey` — `ailk-pro` / `ailk-pro-plus`), sandbox-only like the portal. Check order: tenant → `billing-manage` (403 before any lookup) → write budget (`chargeWriteBudget` scope `plancheckout`, 10 an hour per Organization and per person, `429` with `Retry-After`) → the commerce claim (`409 purchase_unavailable`, `503 license_undetermined`) → a strict `{ returnUrl }` (`bodyLimit` 4 KiB, `400 validation_failed`) → the return URL (canonical, no userinfo, query, fragment or `//` path, `https:` or a local `http:`, on `config.TRUSTED_ORIGINS`; `400 return_url_refused`, `500 config-error` when none is trusted) → no customer yet (`409 billing_customer_exists`) and a purchasable tier (`409 plan_not_purchasable`) → `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY` and `assertSandboxKey` → one payable session (an open earlier one is expired first, a completed one is `409 purchase_pending`) → `createCheckoutSession` with `mode: "subscription"`, 1–50 sites, `metadata` and `subscriptionMetadata` `{ organizationId, ...siteStamp() }` and `PLATFORM_TERMS_OF_SERVICE`, never a `buyer` → a Checkout URL only → the session id recorded on `Organization.planCheckoutSessionId` by compare-and-set (a lost race or a failed write expires the new session). It answers `{ url }` with `Cache-Control: private, no-store`; no body or log line carries the return URL, an id or a Stripe message. **The webhook's Organization arm binds only that recorded session (#9067 D13):** a `checkout.session.completed` with `metadata.organizationId` links `session.customer` through one guarded `updateMany` on `{ id, planCheckoutSessionId: session.id, billingCustomerId: null }` (clearing the session); anything else — an unrecorded session, a bound customer, every `customer.created` — writes nothing and logs `org_bind_unproven`. No MCP twin for the purchase — owner-only, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
-- `/v1/billing/stripe-connection` (GET, PUT, DELETE), `/v1/billing/stripe-connection/live` (POST), `/v1/billing/stripe-connection/webhook-secret` (PUT), `/v1/billing/stripe-connection/webhook-reset` (POST) — the Organization's own Stripe connection (#8907, `src/routes/billing/stripe-connection.ts`; spec `docs/specs/8907-the-organization-stripe-connection-custody-spec.md`; contract `docs/specs/8879-the-offerings-security-contract-key-spec.md`). Registered from `routes/billing/index.ts`, so the same multi-tenant tenant scope and module gate; the target is always `request.tenant.organizationId`. **Data access and the cipher** are `src/services/offerings/connection.ts`, the only file that touches the StripeConnection model (exactly ten delegate calls, `architecture.yaml` `paths_scoped`): the key and the webhook secret are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under `STRIPE_CONNECTION_KEY`, bound to the Organization, the column and (for the secret) the mode; decryption also tries `STRIPE_CONNECTION_KEY_PREVIOUS`. The GET needs `billing-read` and answers `null` or exactly `{ mode, last4, webhookPath, webhookSecretSet, connectedAt, liveAt, updatedAt }` (a corrupt row `500 connection_unreadable`); every write needs `billing-manage` (the owner alone), checked before the body is read, and answers `{ mode, webhookSecretSet, liveAt, updatedAt }` — never `last4` or the path. PUT `{ key }` admits a restricted test key only (`400 stripe_key_refused` with a `reason` from the class table: `key_unrestricted`, `key_publishable`, `live_key_needs_go_live`, `key_unrecognized`); a replace keeps the webhook token and returns the connection to test mode, clearing a live secret. POST `…/live` `{ key, webhookSecret, confirm: "go-live" }` admits a restricted live key only when a cookie session (`403 session_required`), the commerce claim (`409 commerce_required`, `503 license_undetermined`), a production build (`409 live_mode_unavailable` — `lib/stripe.ts`'s `isProductionBuild`), the confirmation (`400 confirmation_required`) and a `whsec_` secret (`400 webhook_secret_invalid`) all hold. Connect and go-live run three read probes — `products.list`, `prices.list`, `checkout.sessions.list`, together, 10 s — through `lib/stripe.ts`'s `stripeClientForConnection` (the per-key factory's one caller, confined in `architecture.yaml`) before anything is stored: `400 stripe_key_refused` `key_not_usable` or `502 stripe_unavailable`, nothing written. The secret PUT binds it to the row's mode; the reset mints a new token and clears the secret; DELETE removes the row, so the token's lookup (`findStripeConnectionByWebhookToken`, #8861's receiver) answers `not-found` at once; it is a compare-and-swap on the row it read, so it answers `{ revoked: false }` when that read found none, and `409 connection_changed` when the row keeps changing between the read and the delete. On a build that is not production, every write to a live row is `409 live_mode_unavailable` and nothing decrypts one. With `STRIPE_CONNECTION_KEY` unset, connect, go-live and the secret answer `503 credential_key_not_configured`; the GET, reset and DELETE need no key and no claim. **The write budget (K10):** every write but DELETE that passes the permission is counted, refused keys included — 10 an hour per Organization, 20 per person (`middleware/rate-limit.ts`'s `chargeWriteBudget`, always its own database store) — `429 rate_limited` with `Retry-After`. Every success writes one `billing.stripe_connection.<connect|replace|go_live|webhook_secret|webhook_reset|remove>` audit row whose summary is `{ mode, last4 }` and emails every owner, the actor included (`@working-theory/email`'s `sendStripeConnectionChangedEmail`); neither can change the answer. Every response is `Cache-Control: private, no-store`; no response, log line, audit row or email carries the key, the secret, the token or a ciphertext. The rekey bin is `stripe-connections:rekey` (`node dist/bin/stripe-connections-rekey.js`), run with the production environment; anywhere else it answers `not_production` and touches nothing. No MCP twin — owner-only key custody that no agent can hold, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
+- `/v1/billing` (GET), `/v1/billing/portal-session` (POST) — org-scoped billing read + Stripe customer-portal session creation. The read stays open to every member (the Admin's plan gate reads it); the portal needs `billing-manage` — the owner alone (`@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2); an admin is refused before any Stripe call). `/v1/billing/usage` (GET) needs `billing-read` (owner, admin). **The read's `commerce` field (#8907 D14)** is the deployment's commerce claim, `claimed | unclaimed | undetermined` (`resolveCommerceClaim()`; a rejected read is `undetermined` and the answer stays `200`) — what the Admin's Billing card reads (#8908 D10). **`?include=billing` (#9067 D1)** — exactly that string, never an array — adds `details` only for a caller holding `billing-manage` (the owner; an agent never qualifies): `licenseExpiresAt` (`checkLicense().expiresAt`, `null` on a failed read) always, and for an Organization with a Stripe customer `renewsAt` (the current subscription's first item's `current_period_end`, only while it will renew), `sites` (its quantity) and `paymentMethod` (brand, last four, expiry), read through `lib/stripe.ts`'s `readCustomerBillingSummary` by `services/entitlements.ts`'s `readOrgBillingSummary` — cached per customer for 60 s (a failure too), one read in flight per customer, bounded at 3 s; a failure answers `details: { licenseExpiresAt }` and still `200`, a value outside `orgBillingDetailsSchema`'s bounds is `null`, no id is served or logged, and the reply carries `Cache-Control: private, no-store`. Every other request is answered exactly as before, with no Stripe or licence read. **`POST /v1/billing/plan-checkout` (#9067 D3, `routes/billing/plan-checkout.ts`)** is the Billing tab's Purchase plan: a subscription Checkout for the caller's own Organization's plan (`planPurchaseLookupKey` — `ailk-pro_monthly` / `ailk-pro-plus_monthly`, `PLAN_PURCHASE_LOOKUP_KEYS` built by the Offerings lookup-key grammar, #9338 DD1), sandbox-only like the portal. **It sells only an Offerings plan (#9338 DD4):** `createCheckoutSession` gets a `refuseProduct` that refuses every Product whose `metadata.ailk_group` is not exactly `plan` (`isOfferingsPlanProduct`, `services/offerings/catalog.ts`), checked on the same expanded Price it sells; a refused or unexpanded Product answers `500 plan_price_missing`. Check order: tenant → `billing-manage` (403 before any lookup) → write budget (`chargeWriteBudget` scope `plancheckout`, 10 an hour per Organization and per person, `429` with `Retry-After`) → the commerce claim (`409 purchase_unavailable`, `503 license_undetermined`) → a strict `{ returnUrl }` (`bodyLimit` 4 KiB, `400 validation_failed`) → the return URL (canonical, no userinfo, query, fragment or `//` path, `https:` or a local `http:`, on `config.TRUSTED_ORIGINS`; `400 return_url_refused`, `500 config-error` when none is trusted) → no customer yet (`409 billing_customer_exists`) and a purchasable tier (`409 plan_not_purchasable`) → `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY` and `assertSandboxKey` → one payable session (an open earlier one is expired first, a completed one is `409 purchase_pending`) → `createCheckoutSession` with `mode: "subscription"`, 1–50 sites, `metadata` and `subscriptionMetadata` `{ organizationId, ...siteStamp() }` and `PLATFORM_TERMS_OF_SERVICE`, never a `buyer` → a Checkout URL only → the session id recorded on `Organization.planCheckoutSessionId` by compare-and-set (a lost race or a failed write expires the new session). It answers `{ url }` with `Cache-Control: private, no-store`; no body or log line carries the return URL, an id or a Stripe message. **The webhook's Organization arm binds only that recorded session (#9067 D13):** a `checkout.session.completed` with `metadata.organizationId` links `session.customer` through one guarded `updateMany` on `{ id, planCheckoutSessionId: session.id, billingCustomerId: null }` (clearing the session); anything else — an unrecorded session, a bound customer, every `customer.created` — writes nothing and logs `org_bind_unproven`. No MCP twin for the purchase — owner-only, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
+- `/v1/billing/stripe-connection` (GET, PUT, DELETE), `/v1/billing/stripe-connection/live` (POST), `/v1/billing/stripe-connection/webhook-secret` (PUT), `/v1/billing/stripe-connection/webhook-reset` (POST) — the Organization's own Stripe connection (#8907, `src/routes/billing/stripe-connection.ts`; spec `docs/specs/8907-the-organization-stripe-connection-custody-spec.md`; contract `docs/specs/8879-the-offerings-security-contract-key-spec.md`). Registered from `routes/billing/index.ts`, so the same multi-tenant tenant scope and module gate; the target is always `request.tenant.organizationId`. **Data access and the cipher** are `src/services/offerings/connection.ts`, the only file that touches the StripeConnection model (exactly ten delegate calls, `architecture.yaml` `paths_scoped`): the key and the webhook secret are AES-256-GCM ciphertext under `STRIPE_CONNECTION_KEY`, bound to the Organization, the column and (for the secret) the mode; decryption also tries `STRIPE_CONNECTION_KEY_PREVIOUS`. The GET needs `billing-read` and answers `null` or exactly `{ mode, last4, webhookPath, webhookSecretSet, connectedAt, liveAt, updatedAt }` (a corrupt row `500 connection_unreadable`); with no stored row it answers `{ source: "environment", mode }` to the Organization that owns `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY` and `null` to every other (#9285 — without the `multi-tenant` module the single Organization owns it; with it, only the one `STRIPE_ENV_ORGANIZATION_ID` names, so unset is nobody), and that Organization's Offerings reads and shown set go through the same key (`services/offerings/connection.ts`'s `getOfferingsConnectionState` and the `stripeClientForOrganization` fallback), but its checkout stays on the env path — `resolveOfferingsCheckoutPath` returns the Offerings path only for a stored connection, because a session stamped `ailk_offering` on the environment key is acked `offerings_path` by the legacy webhook and never recorded (#9296; the bridge until a stored connection exists, #8936); every write needs `billing-manage` (the owner alone), checked before the body is read, and answers `{ mode, webhookSecretSet, liveAt, updatedAt }` — never `last4` or the path. PUT `{ key }` admits a restricted test key only (`400 stripe_key_refused` with a `reason` from the class table: `key_unrestricted`, `key_publishable`, `live_key_needs_go_live`, `key_unrecognized`); a replace keeps the webhook token and returns the connection to test mode, clearing a live secret. POST `…/live` `{ key, webhookSecret, confirm: "go-live" }` admits a restricted live key only when a cookie session (`403 session_required`), the commerce claim (`409 commerce_required`, `503 license_undetermined`), a production build (`409 live_mode_unavailable` — `lib/stripe.ts`'s `isProductionBuild`), the confirmation (`400 confirmation_required`) and a `whsec_` secret (`400 webhook_secret_invalid`) all hold. Connect and go-live run three read probes — `products.list`, `prices.list`, `checkout.sessions.list`, together, 10 s — through `lib/stripe.ts`'s `stripeClientForConnection` (the per-key factory's one caller, confined in `architecture.yaml`) before anything is stored: `400 stripe_key_refused` `key_not_usable` or `502 stripe_unavailable`, nothing written. The secret PUT binds it to the row's mode; the reset mints a new token and clears the secret; DELETE removes the row, so the token's lookup (`findStripeConnectionByWebhookToken`, #8861's receiver) answers `not-found` at once; it is a compare-and-swap on the row it read, so it answers `{ revoked: false }` when that read found none, and `409 connection_changed` when the row keeps changing between the read and the delete. On a build that is not production, every write to a live row is `409 live_mode_unavailable` and nothing decrypts one. With `STRIPE_CONNECTION_KEY` unset, connect, go-live and the secret answer `503 credential_key_not_configured`; the GET, reset and DELETE need no key and no claim. **The write budget (K10):** every write but DELETE that passes the permission is counted, refused keys included — 10 an hour per Organization, 20 per person (`middleware/rate-limit.ts`'s `chargeWriteBudget`, always its own database store) — `429 rate_limited` with `Retry-After`. Every success writes one `billing.stripe_connection.<connect|replace|go_live|webhook_secret|webhook_reset|remove>` audit row whose summary is `{ mode, last4 }` and emails every owner, the actor included (`@working-theory/email`'s `sendStripeConnectionChangedEmail`); neither can change the answer. Every response is `Cache-Control: private, no-store`; no response, log line, audit row or email carries the key, the secret, the token or a ciphertext. The rekey bin is `stripe-connections:rekey` (`node dist/bin/stripe-connections-rekey.js`), run with the production environment; anywhere else it answers `not_production` and touches nothing. No MCP twin — owner-only key custody that no agent can hold, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
 - `/v1/billing/stripe-products` (GET, PUT) — the may-sell product list and the org-enabled write (#8922, `src/routes/billing/stripe-products.ts`; spec `docs/specs/8922-the-may-sell-product-list-spec.md`; contract A12, G3, G4, T6). Registered from `routes/billing/index.ts`, so the same multi-tenant tenant scope and module gate; the target is always `request.tenant.organizationId`. Check order: tenant → permission (GET `billing-read`, owner and admin; PUT `billing-manage`, the owner alone — checked before the body, so an admin, a member and an agent key get `403` whatever they send) → the commerce claim (`409 commerce_required`, `503 license_undetermined` with `Retry-After: 300`) → the body → the connection → the catalog read. The GET answers `{ ok: true, data: { connected, products } }`: every active Product `normalizeCatalog` keeps, offerings first in its order then the held ones, each exactly `{ productId, name, description, enabled, heldReason }` — `heldReason` an `OFFERINGS_HELD_REASONS` value or `null`, a held entry always `enabled: false` with `description: null`, and no price, lookup key, image or URL. No connection is `connected: false, products: []`; a corrupt one is `409 connection_unreadable` on both routes, never the empty list. The PUT takes a strict `{ productIds }` (`bodyLimit` 32 KiB; `400 validation_failed` for a malformed body, a duplicate or a malformed id) and replaces the whole set: more than 100 ids, an id in neither list, and a held id are `400 offerings_enabled_refused` with `reason` `too_many_products`, `product_not_in_catalog` or `product_held` (the lookup-key gate — `needs_lookup_key` covers a missing `{plan}_{period}` key and a period that disagrees with the Price, `plan_conflict` a plan two Products share), nothing written; no connection is `409 stripe_not_connected`. It answers the GET body for the new set, parsed before the write. The set's one writer is `services/offerings/store.ts`'s `writeEnabledProductIds` (an `upsert`, `architecture.yaml` `paths_scoped`), through `services/offerings/index.ts`'s `listOrgProducts` and `setOrgEnabledProducts`; both share the per-Organization catalog read (one a minute per process, T7), so `getOrgEnabledProducts` afterwards reads the row with no Stripe call. The catalog comes from `services/offerings/source.ts`'s `stripeCatalogSourceFor` — the Organization's own client (`stripeClientForOrganization`), paged at most 10 product and 30 price calls, 20 s for the whole read, confined in `architecture.yaml`; a disconnected or unusable connection rejects rather than reading as empty, and any source failure is `502 offerings_source_unavailable` with a fixed message. Every successful write records one `offerings.enabled.set` audit row naming the actor, whose summary is `{ enabled, added, removed }` counts only; a failed audit write is one `error` line and the answer stays `200`. Every response is `Cache-Control: private, no-store`, every error message is fixed, and no log line carries a product or price id, a name or the body. The wire names are #8923's, the Admin card that reads it. No MCP twin — owner and admin settings that no agent can hold, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
 - `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/offerings` (GET, PUT) — the Library → Offerings tab's read and the workspace's selection write (#8926, `src/routes/workspaces/offerings.ts`; spec `docs/specs/8926-the-workspace-offerings-route-get-spec.md`; contract A12, T6, T7; the wire shape is #8928 D10's, made per Stripe Price by #9070, spec `docs/specs/9070-the-workspace-offerings-page-becomes-spec.md`). Registered in the multi-tenant tenant scope beside the billing routes; every read and write keys on `request.tenant`, never the path or the body. The GET is open to every member, an agent key included: with the `commerce` claim `unclaimed` it answers `{ status: "unavailable", reason: "no_commerce" }`, with no StripeConnection `reason: "no_connection"` (both `200`, no catalog read); `undetermined` is `503 license_undetermined` with `Retry-After: 300`, and an unreadable connection is `502 offerings_source_unavailable`, never unconnected or an empty list. Available, it answers `{ status: "available", products, shown, recommended: { plan, addon } }`: `products` are `getOrgEnabledProducts`' offerings (enabled and sellable, the normalizer's order, plans before add-ons, each `recommended: false`, never a held product), `shown` one `{ productId, periods }` per Product with an effective shown Price, in products order with each Product's periods in its Price order, and each Recommended only while it is such a Product of its group, read from the selection row (`readWorkspaceSelection`), never the snapshot; a read never rewrites the row. **The shown set is per Stripe Price (#9070):** the row stores `shown_price_ids` beside `shown_product_ids` (the Products with at least one of them), and `services/offerings/index.ts`'s `shownPriceIdsFor` is the one rule every reader applies — the stored Price ids the catalog still carries, or, for a row saved before #9070 (none stored), every Price of each shown Product; a Price the seller replaced in Stripe is off until switched on. The PUT needs `workspace-settings` (owner, admin; never agent-grantable) checked by role before the body, then the claim (`409 offerings_unavailable`, `503 license_undetermined`), then a write budget charged before the body — 30 saves an hour per person, then 60 per Organization only while the person is within theirs (`chargeWriteBudget`, scope `offeringsshown`; `429 rate_limited` with `Retry-After`) — then a strict `{ productId, period, shown }` — ONE Price's switch, named by its Product and period, never a price id (`bodyLimit` 32 KiB, `400 validation_failed`, so no body can name a Recommended or a whole set) — the connection (`409 offerings_unavailable` for none, `502` for unreadable) and the catalog read (`502 offerings_source_unavailable`). A Product that is not enabled and sellable is `400 offerings_shown_refused` `reason: "product_not_enabled"`, a period it has no Price for `reason: "price_not_offered"`, nothing written; it never writes the Organization's enabled set. The save adds or removes that Price from the previous row's effective set (a legacy row expanded once, here), and keeps each stored Recommended while its Product keeps a shown Price, clearing it otherwise — it never sets one (a Recommended is written only by code or a recommender). A save goes through `services/offerings/store.ts`'s `writeWorkspaceSelection` (an `upsert` that creates the row on a first save and never names the snapshot, `architecture.yaml` `paths_scoped`), records one `offerings.shown.set` audit row whose summary is `{ shown, added, removed, recommended }` counts only — `shown`, `added` and `removed` count Prices against the previous effective set since #9070 (a failed audit is one `error` line and the answer stays `200`), and awaits `refreshWorkspaceSnapshot` with `force` — logged once as `snapshot_refreshed` or `snapshot_pending`; a failed refresh never fails the save — then answers `{ shown, recommended }`. The read-then-write is not atomic: two saves in the same instant can lose one. Every response is `Cache-Control: private, no-store`, every error message is fixed, and no log line carries a product or price id, a name or the body. No MCP twin — a workspace's choice of the Organization's Stripe products, identity-bound; agents read what a site sells through `get_pricing` / `get_offerings`, recorded in `tests/parity/README.md`.
 - `/v1/schedule/availability` (GET), `/v1/schedule/event-meta` (GET), `/v1/schedule/book` (POST) — anonymous scheduling proxy behind the provider seam (`src/services/scheduling/`); Cal.com v2 today, a self-hosted engine later, same three calls. `event-meta` is the meta-only read (title · duration · description · price) so rendering an event's facts never fetches an availability window (#4633). `CAL_API_KEY` is read server-side only. Which account answers is `resolvePublicSchedulingProvider` (#7533 D4), from `resolvePublicWorkspace()` and never the request: off the database adapter, the env credential as before; a resolved workspace, its own connection (or the env credential on a one-workspace deployment); an unresolved one, `503 not_configured` — fail closed. MCP twins: `list_availability` / `get_event_meta` / `create_booking` (#4416, #4633), unchanged — same arguments, same result shape. **A hub's spokes (#7944):** a call carrying a spoke key passes one gate before any event, slot or booking call — every calLink's slug must be one its workspace has enabled (no provider call at all), and every calLink's owner must equal the handle of the account the workspace's credential belongs to (`SchedulingProvider.getAccountHandle()`, Cal `GET /v2/me`, remembered 60 s per key, an empty answer never remembered); a refusal is `404 event_not_found`, an unreadable handle the read's own kind (`502 provider_error`), and each refusal logs one `warn` of `{ route, spokeId, reason }` and nothing else. A refused key keeps the answer each route gave it before; keyless callers skip the gate and never read the handle. The MCP twins forward no visitor identity, so every MCP caller shares the MCP host's one per-IP `schedule` bucket on the hub (`availability`, `event-meta` and `book` counted together): one caller's reads can make `create_booking` answer 429 for every other MCP caller of that host. This is accepted (#7944 D6) — the site's own booker carries the visitor's identity through the relay and is unaffected; the reopen trigger is recorded in `apps/mcp/src/tools/create_booking.ts`'s header
@@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ Routes are versioned under `/v1/*`:
 - `POST /v1/webhooks/calcom` — the scheduling booking-event receiver (#6085, brief H7): verifies the provider's HMAC-SHA256 signature (`x-cal-signature-256`) over the raw body, then normalizes one of six `BOOKING_*` trigger events into an `Appointment` row (`src/services/scheduling/appointments.ts`). `CAL_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is read server-side only (`config/index.ts`); an unset secret answers `503`, never a silent accept. Registered on the same `webhooksScope` as `/v1/webhooks/stripe` (its raw-body content-type parser is what a signed receiver needs), module-conditional (`scheduling`, `src/routes/webhooks/index.ts`). No commerce-claim read: a booking event is not a money event (D-67 puts the payment on the provider's own side). No MCP twin — an inbound receiver for one named provider, not an endpoint an agent could reasonably call, the same footing `POST /v1/webhooks/stripe` already takes.
 - `POST /v1/webhooks/calcom/:connectionToken` — the same receiver for ONE workspace's own connection (#7533 D6, `calcomConnectionWebhookHandler`). The 43-character token in the path names one `SchedulingConnection` row, whose own decrypted secret verifies `x-cal-signature-256` and whose `workspaceId` the Appointment is written to — nothing in the body, query or headers reaches the workspace. A malformed or unknown token, or another provider's connection, is `404 not-found` (logged nothing); a secret that will not decrypt is `503 webhook-not-configured`; the rest of the ladder is the legacy route's, by the same code. Same module gate and `loadSlice` call as the legacy route, its own rate-limit bucket. The legacy `POST /v1/webhooks/calcom` is unchanged: the env account's receiver, writing into the `AILK_SITE_ID` workspace (SEC-7533-2, accepted). No MCP twin — the same inbound-receiver footing as the legacy route.
 - `POST /v1/webhooks/stripe/:connectionToken` — the per-Organization Stripe receiver (#8932, `src/routes/webhooks/stripe-offerings.ts`; spec `docs/specs/8932-the-per-organization-stripe-webhook-spec.md`; contract W1, W3–W11, G5, T8). The 43-character token names one `StripeConnection` row (`findStripeConnectionByWebhookToken`, #8907), whose own decrypted secret verifies the signature through `verifyWebhookSignatureKeyless` (`@working-theory/stripe-client`, no env key) and whose `organizationId` is the only Organization the event can act for — nothing in the body, query or headers changes it. It acts only on `checkout.session.completed` / `.async_payment_succeeded` for a session the hub's own checkout recorded (`readCheckoutSessionRecord`, #8930) for that Organization, whose signed `metadata.site` is the record's workspace, whose mode is the row's, and whose one line item — re-read with the connection's own client, never the env key — has the record's Price id; then it writes ONE lead through `routeLead` (key `"stripe-offerings " + sessionId`, a space no `Idempotency-Key` header can carry; `offeringsCheckout: true`; offering the record's full lookup key), marked `spokeCheckout` for a live session so #8793's release holds the plan, unmarked for a test one. A malformed or unknown token is `404 not-found` and logs nothing; a store failure `503 webhook-unavailable`; no usable secret `503 webhook-not-configured`; the claim, signature and livemode steps are the legacy route's; an unreadable record, Stripe read or lead write is a non-2xx that is never marked seen, so Stripe retries. Every `200` body is `{ received: true }` (the outcome is the log line's: `unrecorded`, `foreign_organization`, `offering_mismatch`, `fulfilled`, …). Dedup is its own per-Organization store (`hasSeenForOrganization`); the legacy `POST /v1/webhooks/stripe` acks any `ailk_offering`-stamped event `offerings_path` before `markSeen` and writes nothing. Log lines carry `organizationId`, `eventType`, an 8-character event-id prefix and the outcome only, and the request and error lines log the path with the token replaced whole (`lib/error-serializer.ts`'s `redactLogPath`, which also covers the calcom token route). No billing identity is bound from a connection's event (W11). Its own 100/min per-IP bucket. No MCP twin — the same inbound-receiver footing as the legacy route.
-- `/v1/schedule/appointments` (GET, `?limit=&cursor=&window=`) — the SITE's own appointments (#6085), tenant-guarded and role-floored at `appointments-read` (`@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2) — every role, a member included; the rows carry attendee contact PII, which the operator opened to the member who works the inbox). Registered in its OWN tenant scope, gated on `isModuleEnabled("scheduling")` alone, behind `tenantPreHandlerForBuild()` — NOT the anonymous schedule scope above (a prospect booking a call has no account). Scope is ALWAYS `request.tenant.workspaceId`, NEVER `currentSiteId()` (the receiver's own write scope) — and deliberately carries NO platform-operator escape hatch, unlike `/v1/waitlist-experiments/*`: an appointment book is a seller's customer list. `window` defaults to `upcoming`; `cursor` is the previous page's last row id, and one that does not resolve within the caller's scope is a `400`, never a silent page 1 (the `/v1/waitlist-experiments/*/signups` cursor discipline). Eight fields per row and nothing more — `id`, `startTime`, `endTime`, `title`, `attendeeName`, `attendeeEmail`, `status`, `paid`; `siteId`, `providerBookingUid`, `provider`, the three watermark columns, `paymentInitiatedAt`, `noShow`, `cancelledAt`, `createdAt` and `updatedAt` are never selected (`src/services/scheduling/appointments.ts`'s `listAppointments` is the only read path). No MCP twin — identity-bound tenant route (#3591 exception, the same shape as `/v1/waitlist-experiments/*`).
+- `/v1/schedule/appointments` (GET, `?limit=&cursor=&window=`) — the SITE's own appointments (#6085), tenant-guarded and role-floored at `appointments-read` (`@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2) — every role, a member included; the rows carry attendee contact PII, which the operator opened to the member who works the inbox). Registered in its OWN tenant scope, gated on `isModuleEnabled("scheduling")` alone, behind `tenantPreHandlerForBuild()` — NOT the anonymous schedule scope above (a prospect booking a call has no account). Scope is ALWAYS `request.tenant.workspaceId`, NEVER `currentSiteId()` (the receiver's own write scope) — and deliberately carries NO platform-operator escape hatch, unlike `/v1/waitlist-experiments/*`: an appointment book is a seller's customer list. `window` defaults to `upcoming`; `cursor` is the previous page's last row id, and one that does not resolve within the caller's scope is a `400`, never a silent page 1 (the `/v1/waitlist-experiments/*/signups` cursor discipline). Nine fields per row and nothing more — `id`, `startTime`, `endTime`, `title`, `attendeeName`, `attendeeEmail`, `status`, `paid`, `personId` (#9348 — the Person the booking was stored against when it was created, or `null`; a later provider event that rewrites the attendee does not move it); `siteId`, `providerBookingUid`, `provider`, the three watermark columns, `paymentInitiatedAt`, `noShow`, `cancelledAt`, `createdAt` and `updatedAt` are never selected (`src/services/scheduling/appointments.ts`'s `listAppointments` is the only read path). No MCP twin — identity-bound tenant route (#3591 exception, the same shape as `/v1/waitlist-experiments/*`).
 - `/v1/aeo/score` (POST), `/v1/aeo/score/example` (GET) — anonymous instant AEO score for a respondent-supplied URL, and the bundled pre-launch example, both fed by the SSRF-guarded crawler at `@working-theory/aeo/fetch` and the pure scorer at `@working-theory/aeo` (`src/services/aeo-score.ts`, #4666). No MCP twin — recorded exception, brief D7 (exposing an arbitrary-URL crawler to anonymous agents is a security-posture decision; `apps/mcp/src/tools/audit.ts` deliberately stays same-origin-locked instead).
 - `/v1/waitlist-experiments` (GET), `/v1/waitlist-experiments/:experimentId` (GET), `/v1/waitlist-experiments/:experimentId/signups` (GET), `/v1/waitlist-experiments/:experimentId/signups/:leadId` (GET) — the operator-dashboard read API for Parallel Waitlist Validation (#4665 D7, B0): tenant-scoped list + rollup, per-waitlist comparison, paginated signups, and a signup drill-down over A1's `WaitlistExperiment` / `WaitlistScore` / `Lead` rows (`src/services/waitlist-dashboard.ts`, #4671). Role floor `waitlist-read` (`@working-theory/validation`'s permission table (#7636 D2) — every role, a member included; signup PII); the platform-operator scope (`isSentinel(organizationId)` and the `platform-read-all-sites` permission, owner only, ALSO requiring the caller's VERIFIED email to equal `AILK_OPERATOR_EMAIL` — fail-closed, PR #4687, compared to the caller since #7523) sees every site, every other caller sees only its own `siteId`. No MCP twin — identity-bound tenant routes (#3591 exception, same shape as `/v1/billing/*`).
 - `/v1/waitlist-signups/me` (GET, `?experimentKey=<slug>`) — the respondent read (#4731): a signed-in, **email-verified** user's OWN newest signup for one experiment (`experimentKey`, `waitlistKey`, `completedAt`, `tier`, `score`, `aeoScore`, `answers.q3` — seven fields, nothing more; `src/services/waitlist-signups.ts` is the only read path). Registered in `authScope` only (auth, no tenant guard — a respondent has no workspace). Identity is `request.userId`; the email is the `User`'s, never a parameter; `emailVerified !== true` → 403 `email_unverified` before any `Lead` read; no match → 404 `signup_not_found`; every read scoped to `currentSiteId()`. Module: `signal-collectors` (D-48, #5366). No MCP twin — identity-bound (#3591 exception).
@@ -187,7 +189,19 @@ sweep's own DB constraint (never a caller-side lock).
 - Don't put session state in `apps/api`. It's stateless.
 - Don't bundle `apps/api` (esbuild, rollup, webpack). Slice specifiers cannot survive it — see `## Deploy path`.
 
-Last updated: 2026-10-18 — the Inbox orders read (#9170): added the `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/orders` bullet and named the order exclusion in the messages bullet — verified against `apps/api/src/routes/workspaces/orders.ts`, `apps/api/src/services/inbox-orders.ts`, `apps/api/src/lib/tenant-db.ts` and `apps/api/src/server.ts`.
+Last updated: 2026-10-20 — Inbox Reply records the message (#9348): the submissions bullet names `personId` on the item read and PATCH, and the appointments bullet names the ninth field — verified against `apps/api/src/services/{inbox-submissions,scheduling/appointments}.ts`, `apps/api/src/routes/workspaces/submissions.ts`, `apps/api/src/lib/tenant-db.ts` and `packages/validation/src/schemas/{inbox,scheduling}.ts`.
+
+Prior: 2026-10-20 — the Inbox message row serves its body and Person (#9349): the messages bullet names the nine-key row, `readMessageBody` and the strict re-parse; the People bullet names `stripeCustomerUrl` and the `billing-read` withholding — verified against `apps/api/src/routes/workspaces/{messages,people}.ts`, `apps/api/src/services/{inbox-messages,person}.ts` and `packages/validation/src/schemas/{inbox,people}.ts`.
+
+Prior: 2026-10-20 — the hub's plans become Offerings plans (#9338): the plan-checkout sentence names `ailk-pro_monthly` / `ailk-pro-plus_monthly` and the plan-only `refuseProduct` (DD4), and the checkout bullet adds the Offerings path's hub-plan refusal beside A9 (DD5) — verified against `apps/api/src/routes/billing/plan-checkout.ts`, `apps/api/src/services/offerings/{catalog,checkout-authorization}.ts` and `packages/validation/src/schemas/{billing,offerings}.ts`.
+
+Prior: 2026-10-20 — Start trial becomes a hosted Checkout trial (#9342): the trial bullet names the three Stripe calls, the session's parameters, the completed-session guard, the email, the `{ checkout }` answer, the two new refusals and the `{ emailed }` audit summary, and Get and Extend's §3.3 limit — verified against `apps/api/src/services/trial.ts`, `apps/api/src/routes/workspaces/trial.ts`, `packages/stripe-client/src/checkout.ts` and `packages/validation/src/schemas/trial.ts`.
+
+Prior: 2026-10-20 — the lead writes become parity twins (#7171, #7172, #7173): the `/v1/leads` bullet names the three registrations, their body exports, the body gate and the unchanged raw-body persistence — verified against `apps/api/src/routes/leads/index.ts`, `packages/validation/src/schemas/leads.ts` and `tests/parity/api-parity/kinds/site.ts`.
+
+Prior: 2026-10-20 — the content reads become parity twins (#7167, #7168, #7169): the public content reads bullet names the three routes as `search_content`'s, `list_pages`' and `read_content`'s twins through the validation exports and the shared builders — verified against `apps/api/src/routes/content/{search,list-pages,get-page}.ts`, `packages/content-adapters/src/content-reads.ts` and `tests/parity/api-parity/kinds/site.ts`.
+
+Prior: 2026-10-18 — the Inbox orders read (#9170): added the `/v1/workspaces/:workspaceId/orders` bullet and named the order exclusion in the messages bullet — verified against `apps/api/src/routes/workspaces/orders.ts`, `apps/api/src/services/inbox-orders.ts`, `apps/api/src/lib/tenant-db.ts` and `apps/api/src/server.ts`.
 
 Prior: 2026-10-18 — the env path is the hub's own-products path only, never a spoke's (#9142): the `/v1/checkout/sessions` bullet and § BYO Stripe say a spoke sells through its Offerings buy route — verified against `src/routes/checkout/sessions.ts` and `apps/web/app/api/offerings/checkout/[lookupKey]/route.ts`.
 

package/templates/apps/api/src/lib/__mocks__/prisma.ts

@@ -399,10 +399,13 @@ export const prisma = {
   // ── Inbox namespace (WaitlistScore — #4662 D6) ───────────────────────────
   // `upsert` — the ONLY write path into waitlist_scores (scoreCompletedSignup).
   // `findMany` — the #4732 follow-up sweep's tier lookup, batched by leadId.
-  // `count` — the #4998 project-listings dashboard's waitlistCount join.
+  // `groupBy` — the #4998 project-listings dashboard's waitlistCount join
+  // (one grouped read per call since #9243). `count` — the single-row
+  // waitlistCount in project-listing-decision.ts.
   waitlistScore: {
     upsert: jest.fn(),
     count: jest.fn(),
+    groupBy: jest.fn(),
     findMany: jest.fn(),
   },
   // ── Inbox namespace (PlaybookInstance — FEAT-074 U4a #4715, extended U4b #4718) ──

package/templates/apps/api/src/lib/__tests__/site.test.ts

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ import {
   currentSiteId,
   isForeignSiteStamp,
   resolveSiteWorkspaceId,
+  resolveWorkspaceIdForAlias,
   siteStamp,
 } from "../site.js";
 
@@ -78,10 +79,25 @@ describe("resolveSiteWorkspaceId / assertSiteAliasResolves (#6155 D2/D5/D6)", ()
     expect(resolved).toBe(PINNED_WORKSPACE_ID);
     expect(prisma.workspace.findUnique).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
       where: { id: PINNED_WORKSPACE_ID },
+      select: { id: true },
     });
     await expect(assertSiteAliasResolves()).resolves.toBeUndefined();
   });
 
+  it("case 1b — resolveWorkspaceIdForAlias reads ONLY `id` for a non-default alias: an existence test, never a row fetch (#9247)", async () => {
+    (prisma.workspace.findUnique as jest.Mock).mockResolvedValue({
+      id: PINNED_WORKSPACE_ID,
+    });
+
+    await expect(
+      resolveWorkspaceIdForAlias(PINNED_WORKSPACE_ID),
+    ).resolves.toBe(PINNED_WORKSPACE_ID);
+    expect(prisma.workspace.findUnique).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      where: { id: PINNED_WORKSPACE_ID },
+      select: { id: true },
+    });
+  });
+
   it("case 2 — the unset alias (the scaffold default) resolves to the seeded sentinel workspace (D2 rule 2)", async () => {
     delete process.env.AILK_SITE_ID;
     (prisma.workspace.findUnique as jest.Mock).mockResolvedValue({

package/templates/apps/api/src/lib/site.ts

@@ -144,7 +144,10 @@ export async function resolveWorkspaceIdForAlias(
     const row = await resolveSentinelWorkspaceRow(prisma);
     return row?.id ?? null;
   }
-  const row = await prisma.workspace.findUnique({ where: { id: alias } });
+  const row = await prisma.workspace.findUnique({
+    where: { id: alias },
+    select: { id: true },
+  });
   return row ? alias : null;
 }
 

package/templates/apps/api/src/lib/stripe.ts

@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ export {
   createCheckoutSessionForPrice,
   createPaymentLink,
   createQuotedCheckoutSession,
+  // Start trial's hosted trial session (#9342 DD2), on the Organization's client.
+  createTrialCheckoutSession,
   expireCheckoutSessionWith,
   findActivePriceByLookupKey,
   getStripeClient,
@@ -77,6 +79,7 @@ export type {
   CreateCheckoutSessionParams,
   CreateQuotedCheckoutSessionInput,
   CreateQuotedCheckoutSessionOutput,
+  CreateTrialCheckoutSessionInput,
   RetrieveCheckoutSessionInput,
   RetrieveCheckoutSessionOutput,
   Stripe,