create-agent-rig 0.2.0 → 0.3.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+# Changelog
+
+Notable changes per release. The generated projects are the product, so an entry
+says what a **newly scaffolded project** gains or loses — not what moved inside
+the generator.
+
+Versions are published to npm as [`create-agent-rig`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/create-agent-rig);
+`npx github:serhii-baksheiev/create-agent-rig` keeps working for either path.
+
+## 0.3.0
+
+The factory extraction: a scaffolded project now arrives with a working
+autonomous loop and the mechanisms that watch it, rather than an empty `.claude/`.
+
+### Added
+
+- **`guard-bash` hook** — the "Never" tier made mechanical: force-pushing or
+  deleting a shared branch, a direct push to the default branch, a production
+  deploy trigger, a catastrophic delete. It **parses** the command (quotes
+  honoured) instead of pattern-matching, so a commit message that mentions a
+  forbidden flag is prose, not a bypass.
+- **A kill switch that is a real file.** `touch ~/.claude/<project>-loop-STOP`
+  and no merge lands until it is removed. Everything short of the merge stays
+  allowed on purpose — stopping cleanly must not mean losing work.
+- **The queue seam.** `loop` no longer reads one tracker: selection goes through
+  `.claude/scripts/queue/`, with a pure core (filters, blocker resolution, tier
+  ration, sort, stop conditions) and three adapters — `plan-md` (the default; the
+  only one that works before a project has a remote), `github-issues`, `jira`.
+- **Two sweeps that run outside any session** — `detect-missed-gate` finds merges
+  that crossed an elevated path with no recorded reviewer verdict;
+  `reconcile-external-prs` accounts for work that reached the default branch
+  outside the queue. Both exist because a run cannot report its own missed gate.
+- **`preflight`** — the pre-run checks, which also print the items it did _not_
+  check, every time.
+- **Skills** — `worktree-task` (isolation when a second session may run) and
+  `new-invariant` (a generator for the invariant→hook→test pattern, with a
+  working example and its test).
+- **`rules/invariants.md`** — the pattern behind every hook here, stated once, so
+  the hooks read as examples rather than as laws.
+- **`aws-cdk` target extras** — the `ro-debug` skill (read-only runtime
+  investigation, with the traps that produce confident wrong diagnoses) and the
+  transferable AWS rules.
+- **`elevated-paths`** — a declaration in `CLAUDE.md`, composed with any block in
+  `.claude/rules/`, naming the paths where Tier-2 changes live.
+
+### Changed
+
+- The governance summary counts `.mjs` hooks only — a config file listed as an
+  enforced hook overstated the one number this tool exists to make credible.
+- `autonomy.md`: the tier is decided by what a change **touches**, not by what
+  the task predicted it would touch.
+
+### Fixed
+
+Four review rounds, ten reviewers, on this release's own code. What they caught,
+each reproduced before the fix and re-verified after:
+
+- a PR body could **forge its own reviewer verdict** and suppress the gate sweep
+  — the body is written by the actor being audited, so only the `human-review`
+  label (which needs repository permission) suppresses now;
+- the `plan-md` adapter's close **deleted the wrong line**, destroying a human's
+  Operator-queue entry and leaving the shipped item selectable;
+- every `github-issues` write **threw on success** (those `gh` subcommands print
+  text, not JSON) — `escalate` posted its diagnosis and then died before applying
+  the label that stops the item being re-picked;
+- the kill switch could be **disarmed by an env variable**, and was fixed in the
+  hook while the identical hole sat in `preflight` — the brake now has one
+  implementation;
+- three **total bypasses** in the guard, each an exception inside its own work
+  that the fail-open catch turned into "allow": an unbounded spread, a recursive
+  brace expansion, and a quadratic path collapse;
+- a heredoc pre-pass that could **hide any command** from every rule;
+- a ReDoS in the blocker parser reachable by anyone able to open an issue.
+
+Rounds 4 and 5, on the fixes themselves:
+
+- a here-string (`cat <<<X`) and an arithmetic left shift (`$((1<<n))`) were each
+  read as heredoc markers, **hiding every command up to the next matching line**;
+- `git commit -nm "msg"` bypassed the pre-commit gate outright — the one thing
+  that hook exists to stop, in the spelling people actually type;
+- with the kill switch armed, `git merge feat/x && git push` still landed a merge
+  on the default branch; a push must now name its ref while stopped;
+- pointing `HOME` at an empty directory disarmed the brake; it is now found
+  through the password database as well as the environment;
+- `gh --json files` truncates at 100 with **no marker**, and the gate sweep read
+  the short list as "touched nothing elevated" — a PR padded past 100 files hid
+  its elevated change. The sweep now compares against `changedFiles`;
+- declaring `.claude/` elevated was a no-op, because every `.md` under it counted
+  as inert — so a merge rewriting the autonomy tiers passed the gate meant to
+  catch exactly that;
+- a quadratic reviewer-name regex cost ~4 s per crafted PR body, minutes across a
+  sweep that reports nothing when killed.
+
+The README's enforcement claims were overstated and are now scoped to what the
+guard actually inspects, with the omissions listed in the hook itself: only `rm`
+for deletes, only a workflow dispatch for deploys, only a push that names its
+branch, and nothing carried as a flag value.
+
+The lesson that generalises is now a rule (`invariants.md`): **a guard that fails
+open must do provably bounded work**, because fail-open makes every line of work
+a potential total bypass — and prefer deleting a rule to adding one.
+
+## 0.2.0
+
+Distribution hardening (file modes, the `gitignore`→`.gitignore` trick, a
+pack-path e2e per target), agent-os v2 (`pr-ship`, `post-deploy-verify`,
+`cdk-diff-reviewer`, review-context isolation, session staleness), the `apps/web`
+frontend proving core purity across the wire, the `gate-stop-dod` and
+`inject-rules` hooks, `agent-rig init`, the `loop` skill, and the dev deploy
+workflows.
+
+## 0.1.0
+
+First release: the CLI, `agent-os/universal` + the `node-ts`/`aws-cdk` stack
+layers, and the `aws-serverless` and `node-service` targets.
+
+---
+
+## Releasing
+
+`npm publish` needs 2FA and cannot be undone, so an agent prepares a release and
+**stops at that command**. Everything before it is mechanical:
+
+1. `pnpm test` — the full suite, including the e2e that generates both targets
+   cold and runs their own checks through the git path **and** the pack path.
+2. `npm pack --dry-run` — confirm the templates, including the dotted `.claude/`
+   tree, are in the tarball. This is where scaffolders break, and the git path
+   cannot catch it.
+3. Version in `package.json` (and the private inner package, kept in step).
+4. This file, and `PLAN.md` if the plan's claims changed.
+5. `git tag v<version> && git push --tags`.
+6. **Owner:** `npm publish`.
+7. **Owner:** smoke the published artifact — `npx create-agent-rig@<version>` in
+   an empty directory, then `pnpm install && pnpm check` inside it.

package/README.md

@@ -39,19 +39,55 @@ never inflated). The hooks live in `.claude/hooks/` and are wired in
 - **`block-no-verify`** — refuses bypassing pre-commit checks (and knows the
   difference between using the `--no-verify`/`-n` flag and merely mentioning it
   in a message);
+- **`guard-bash`** — refuses the part of the "Never" tier a text scan can decide:
+  a force-push or `--delete` naming a shared branch, a push that names the default
+  branch, `gh workflow run`/`gh api …/dispatches` against a production workflow,
+  and `rm` on a catastrophic target. It **parses** the command rather than
+  pattern-matching it, so a commit message mentioning a forbidden flag is prose,
+  not a bypass — and the file states exactly what it does **not** inspect
+  (`cdk deploy`, `find -delete`, a bare `git push`, and more);
 - **`gate-stop-dod`** — refuses to end the session while a Definition-of-Done
   check is red; it fails open (a missing or corrupt config never makes the
   session unquittable) and never blocks twice in a row;
 - **`inject-rules`** — re-injects the autonomy rules at session start, so they
   survive compaction and resumes.
 
-Around the hooks, the operating system: **autonomy tiers** (what an agent does
-alone / after review / never), **stop rules** (three strikes, flaky ≠ retry,
-session staleness), **subagent gates** (`test-writer`, `code-reviewer`,
-`security-scanner`, and `cdk-diff-reviewer` on the AWS target), **skills**
-(`pr-ship` pre-merge gate; `loop` queue driver; `post-deploy-verify` with its
-binary HEALTHY/REGRESSION verdict on the AWS target), and a one-page
-`CLAUDE.md` map a fresh session orients by.
+**A brake that is a real file.** `touch ~/.claude/<project>-loop-STOP` and no
+merge lands until it is removed — enforced at the tool layer, so it holds even if
+nothing reads the rule. Everything short of the merge stays allowed on purpose:
+finish the task, push the branch, open the PR, write the journal. Stopping
+cleanly must not mean losing work.
+
+**Two sweeps meant to run outside any session** — nothing schedules them for you;
+that is deliberate, because a check a run performs on itself is one a hurried run
+skips. `detect-missed-gate` finds merges
+that crossed an elevated path with no recorded reviewer verdict;
+`reconcile-external-prs` accounts for work that reached the default branch outside
+the queue. They exist because the one failure a run cannot report is its own
+missed gate — the run that skipped it is exactly the run that will not mention it.
+
+**A queue behind an adapter.** The `loop` driver selects through
+`.claude/scripts/queue/`: a pure core (filters in order, blocker resolution, the
+elevated-tier ration, stop conditions) with adapters for `PLAN.md` (the default,
+working before a project has a remote), GitHub Issues, and Jira. Two rules are
+load-bearing and tested from both directions — **blockers resolve from links,
+never labels**, and **the agent never files its own work items**.
+
+Around all of it: **autonomy tiers** (what an agent does alone / after review /
+never), **stop rules** (three strikes, flaky ≠ retry, session staleness),
+**subagent gates** (`test-writer`, `code-reviewer`, `security-scanner`, and
+`cdk-diff-reviewer` on the AWS target), **skills** (`pr-ship` pre-merge gate;
+`loop` queue driver; `worktree-task` for concurrent sessions; `new-invariant`, a
+generator for the invariant→hook→test pattern; `post-deploy-verify` and
+`ro-debug` on the AWS target), and a one-page `CLAUDE.md` map a fresh session
+orients by.
+
+**The hooks are examples, not laws.** `.claude/rules/invariants.md` states the
+pattern behind each one — a stated invariant, a mechanical check, a test for the
+check — so you can delete the ones whose invariant your project does not have and
+spend the slot on one it does. An inherited rule nobody chose is worse than an
+empty rule file: the empty one is visibly incomplete, the inherited one is
+invisibly wrong.
 
 The skeleton around it is real and runnable — pure core shared by server _and_
 browser (one schema validates on both sides of the wire), a mandatory usecase
@@ -117,5 +153,17 @@ dependencies fresh to catch upstream breakage early. This repo dogfoods its own
 rulebook — `CLAUDE.md` and `.claude/` are composed from the templates, and
 drift fails the suite.
 
-Development: `pnpm test` (full), `pnpm test:unit` (fast loop),
-`pnpm template:check` (templates in place). The plan of record is `PLAN.md`.
+**And the enforcement layer is adversarially reviewed, not just tested.** The
+Bash guard went through four review rounds with ten reviewers, who executed it
+rather than read it. They found a PR body that could forge its own reviewer
+verdict, a queue write that deleted the wrong line, and three ways to make the
+guard crash into permitting everything. Each round's findings — including the
+ones introduced by the previous round's _fix_ — are in the git history and in
+`CHANGELOG.md`. The rule that came out of it is now part of what ships: a guard
+that fails open must do provably bounded work, because fail-open turns every line
+of its own work into a potential bypass.
+
+Development (from a clone — `PLAN.md` and `demo.sh` live in the repository, not
+in the published tarball): `pnpm test` (full), `pnpm test:unit` (fast loop),
+`pnpm template:check` (templates in place). The plan of record is `PLAN.md`;
+release notes and the release checklist ship in `CHANGELOG.md`.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "create-agent-rig",
-  "version": "0.2.0",
+  "version": "0.3.0",
   "description": "Scaffold a new project with an agent operating system (rules, gates, hooks) and a runnable code skeleton",
   "keywords": [
     "create",
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@
     "node-service"
   ],
   "license": "MIT",
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "git+https://github.com/serhii-baksheiev/create-agent-rig.git"
+  },
+  "homepage": "https://github.com/serhii-baksheiev/create-agent-rig#readme",
+  "bugs": "https://github.com/serhii-baksheiev/create-agent-rig/issues",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {
     "create-agent-rig": "packages/cli/dist/index.js"
@@ -22,7 +28,8 @@
   "files": [
     "packages/cli/dist",
     "templates",
-    "scripts/prepare.mjs"
+    "scripts/prepare.mjs",
+    "CHANGELOG.md"
   ],
   "engines": {
     "node": ">=20"

package/packages/cli/dist/lib/summary.js

@@ -1,21 +1,35 @@
 import { readdir } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import path from 'node:path';
-const names = async (dir, strip) => {
+const names = async (dir, strip, keep) => {
     try {
-        return (await readdir(dir)).map((entry) => entry.replace(strip, '')).sort();
+        return (await readdir(dir))
+            .filter((entry) => !keep || keep.test(entry))
+            .map((entry) => entry.replace(strip, ''))
+            .sort();
     }
     catch {
         return [];
     }
 };
+/**
+ * Hooks whose filename names the *tool* they intercept rather than the
+ * invariant they enforce. Stripping the prefix would print "bash", which tells
+ * the reader nothing — and a screen that sells enforcement may not be vague.
+ */
+const HOOK_LABELS = {
+    'guard-bash': 'never tier',
+};
 export async function collectGovernance(projectDir) {
     const claude = path.join(projectDir, '.claude');
     return {
         rules: await names(path.join(claude, 'rules'), /\.md$/),
         agents: await names(path.join(claude, 'agents'), /\.md$/),
-        hooks: (await names(path.join(claude, 'hooks'), /\.mjs$/))
-            // guard-core-purity → "core purity": the mechanism, not the filename
-            .map((hook) => hook.replace(/^(guard|block)-/, '').replaceAll('-', ' ')),
+        // `.mjs` only: the stack layer also drops config (dod-checks.json) in this
+        // directory, and counting a config file as an enforced hook would make the
+        // screen overstate the one thing this tool actually sells.
+        hooks: (await names(path.join(claude, 'hooks'), /\.mjs$/, /\.mjs$/)).map(
+        // guard-core-purity → "core purity": the mechanism, not the filename
+        (hook) => HOOK_LABELS[hook] ?? hook.replace(/^(guard|block)-/, '').replaceAll('-', ' ')),
         skills: await names(path.join(claude, 'skills'), /$^/),
     };
 }

package/templates/agent-os/stack/aws-cdk/.claude/rules/aws-cdk.md

@@ -3,6 +3,17 @@
 How the universal boundaries land on AWS. If a rule here seems to fight a
 universal rule, that is an invariant conflict — stop and surface it.
 
+## The elevated paths this layer adds
+
+`CLAUDE.md` declares the project's own elevated paths; this block adds the ones
+that exist only because this layer does. The gate sweep
+(`.claude/scripts/detect-missed-gate.mjs`) unions every declaration it finds, so a
+target without infrastructure never declares a directory it does not have.
+
+```elevated-paths
+infra/
+```
+
 ## Infrastructure is code, and only code
 
 - Everything lives in the CDK app under `infra/`. A console change ("click-ops")
@@ -17,6 +28,24 @@ universal rule, that is an invariant conflict — stop and surface it.
   teardown; flip to RETAIN before real data arrives — that flip is a Tier-2
   decision.
 
+## Stacks: what may move, and what may never
+
+- 🔴 **Never move a stateful construct between stacks.** A Table, Bucket, Secret
+  or user pool that changes stack is **deleted and recreated** by
+  CloudFormation — that is data loss, not a refactor, and it passes review as
+  "tidying" if nobody knows this rule. Stateful constructs stay put and are
+  referenced cross-stack.
+- **A stack has a hard resource ceiling (500).** One HTTP route costs several
+  resources, so a growing API stack approaches it long before it looks big. When
+  it does, split out the least-coupled domain as a **stateless-only** stack —
+  functions, roles, routes — attached to the same API cross-stack, with a
+  **one-way** dependency. Splitting stateless costs nothing; splitting stateful
+  costs the data (above).
+- **Fleet-wide function defaults live in one module, not in a stack.**
+  Architecture, runtime, `NODE_OPTIONS`, tracing: one edit there reaches every
+  function. A per-stack override of a fleet default is the thing to reject in
+  review — it is invisible from anywhere except that stack.
+
 ## IAM: least privilege, by construction
 
 - Use the narrow grant for the operation actually performed
@@ -48,6 +77,23 @@ universal rule, that is an invariant conflict — stop and surface it.
   clients constructed once, handler exported. Nothing else imports an entry.
 - Functions stay single-purpose — one route or one event source each. Fan-out
   belongs to infrastructure (queues, topics), not to in-process branching.
+- **SDK clients are constructed at module top level, never inside the handler.**
+  Containers are reused across warm invocations, so a client built in the handler
+  body is paid on every invocation and defeats connection reuse — the most common
+  Lambda performance bug, and invisible in tests because tests are always cold.
+  The same applies to anything expensive and stateless: build once per container.
+- Environment is parsed **once, at module scope**, through `loadEnv(zod)`. A
+  misconfigured function then fails its cold start loudly instead of misbehaving
+  quietly per request, and no code below the entry file reads the environment
+  directly.
+
+## When the deployed runtime misbehaves
+
+Investigate before writing anything: the **`ro-debug` skill** has the read-only
+recipes and, more usefully, the traps that have produced confident wrong
+diagnoses — a stale local branch read as current, `UPDATE_COMPLETE` left over
+from the previous deploy, an empty metric read as healthy when it means the
+function was never invoked.
 
 ## Post-deploy verification (target-specific means)
 

package/templates/agent-os/stack/aws-cdk/.claude/skills/ro-debug/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+---
+name: ro-debug
+description: Investigate the deployed runtime read-only — Lambda logs and error rates, DLQ depth and message age, table reads — with the traps that have produced confidently-wrong diagnoses before. Use when something on the deployed stage misbehaves, and before writing any fix.
+allowed-tools: Bash, Read, Grep
+---
+
+# Read-only runtime investigation
+
+A fix is always a code change through a PR. This skill only **looks** — and it is
+scoped read-only so that a session diagnosing an incident cannot become a session
+mutating production state under pressure, which is when that decision is worst.
+
+## The role this assumes, and the honest caveat
+
+Every command below wants a **read-only profile**: permission to read logs,
+metrics, queue attributes and table items, and nothing else. No decrypt, no
+secret reads, no mutations — so a credential cannot leak through this path even
+by accident.
+
+⚠ **The skeleton does not provision that role.** It ships the application, not
+your account's access model, and minting a role is an **owner action** (a Tier-2
+decision — it is IAM). Until it exists, either create it once with those four
+read scopes, or accept that you are investigating with wider credentials than the
+task needs and say so in the write-up. Do not silently upgrade to an admin
+profile and carry on.
+
+```sh
+export AWS_PROFILE=<your read-only profile>
+export AWS_REGION=__REGION__
+```
+
+## Before reading ANY code to explain a runtime behaviour
+
+```sh
+git fetch origin && git rev-parse HEAD "origin/$(git symbolic-ref --short HEAD)"
+```
+
+**If the local branch differs from its remote, diagnose from the remote**
+(`git show origin/<branch>:<file>`, or a worktree). **A fetch does not move your
+checkout** — reading stale local code while describing deployed behaviour is
+the single most reliable way to produce a confident, wrong diagnosis, and it has
+happened more than once. See `.claude/rules/autonomy.md`, "Session staleness".
+
+## Recipes
+
+**Find the function first** — CDK generates the physical names, so never guess one:
+
+```sh
+aws lambda list-functions \
+  --query "Functions[?contains(FunctionName,'Notes')].FunctionName" --output text
+```
+
+**Errors in a window:**
+
+```sh
+aws logs filter-log-events --log-group-name "/aws/lambda/<fn>" \
+  --start-time <epoch-ms> --filter-pattern "ERROR" \
+  --max-items 20 --query 'events[].message' --output text
+```
+
+**DLQ depth, then message age.** Depth comes from the queue; **age does not** —
+`ApproximateAgeOfOldestMessage` is a **CloudWatch metric, not an SQS attribute**,
+and asking for it as an attribute fails with `InvalidAttributeName`:
+
+```sh
+aws sqs get-queue-attributes --queue-url <notes-dlq-url> \
+  --attribute-names ApproximateNumberOfMessages
+
+aws cloudwatch get-metric-statistics --namespace AWS/SQS \
+  --metric-name ApproximateAgeOfOldestMessage \
+  --dimensions Name=QueueName,Value=<notes-dlq-name> \
+  --start-time <iso> --end-time <iso> --period 300 --statistics Maximum
+```
+
+Age is what tells you whether a non-empty DLQ **predates** the thing you are
+investigating. A days-old backlog is not your regression, and treating it as one
+sends the whole diagnosis in the wrong direction.
+
+**Table reads** — key by whatever `packages/db` composes; nothing else knows the
+key shape:
+
+```sh
+aws dynamodb query --table-name <NotesTable output> \
+  --key-condition-expression "pk = :pk" \
+  --expression-attribute-values '{":pk":{"S":"NOTE#<id>"}}' --max-items 3
+```
+
+**Error rate:** `AWS/Lambda` `Errors`, `Sum`, by `FunctionName`, over the suspect
+window.
+
+## Interpretation rules — where wrong diagnoses actually come from
+
+- 🔴 **An empty metric result is "no signal", never "healthy".** Zero datapoints
+  means **no invocations in the window** — the function was not exercised, so the
+  metric says nothing about whether it works. Report it as no signal and go find
+  a window with traffic. This is the same rule the `post-deploy-verify` skill
+  states, and for the same reason: a vacuous pass is worse than a missing one,
+  because it gets believed.
+- 🔴 **`StackStatus: UPDATE_COMPLETE` is stale evidence.** It persists from the
+  previous deploy, so it is true of a stack whose latest deploy failed. The
+  authoritative signals are the **deploy job's conclusion**
+  (`gh run list --workflow deploy`) and the stack's `LastUpdatedTime` freshness.
+- **DNS and asset-upload failures are infrastructure flakes, not code
+  regressions.** A deploy that died at asset publish or checkout tells you nothing
+  about the change. Your own read-only calls can hit the same flake — a failed
+  probe is `unknown`, not a finding.
+- **Never work around the profile's denials — that is the point of the profile.**
+  Needing a decrypt, a secret or a mutation means the investigation has reached
+  its boundary: escalate to the human with what you found
+  (`.claude/rules/autonomy.md`, "Escalation format").
+
+## What to hand back
+
+What was observed (verbatim, not summarised), which window, which signals were
+**unavailable** and why, the current hypothesis, and the narrowest reproduction.
+A read-only investigation that ends in a named uncertainty is a good outcome; one
+that ends in a confident story built on a stale read is not.

package/templates/agent-os/universal/.claude/hooks/block-no-verify.mjs

@@ -4,6 +4,14 @@
 //
 // Contract (Claude Code): JSON on stdin; exit 0 = allow, exit 2 = block, and
 // stderr is shown to the agent as the reason.
+//
+// Stated limit: it strips QUOTED text so prose about the flag is not a bypass,
+// but it does not parse heredocs. Writing `git commit -nm …` inside a heredoc
+// body — a doc, a test fixture, a PR description — is therefore blocked. That
+// happened while writing this hook's own tests. The fix is not to teach this file
+// to tokenise: it owns exactly one invariant and stays readable because of it
+// (see .claude/rules/invariants.md, "One invariant per hook"). Use a file rather
+// than a heredoc, or quote the example.
 import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
 
 function main() {
@@ -26,8 +34,10 @@ function main() {
     const [segment, verb] = match;
     const bypasses =
       /(^|\s)--no-verify\b/.test(segment) ||
-      // -n is --no-verify for commit only (for push it means --dry-run).
-      (verb === 'commit' && /(^|\s)-n\b/.test(segment));
+      // `-n` is --no-verify for commit only (for push it means --dry-run), and it
+      // counts inside a COMBINED cluster: `git commit -nm "msg"` bypassed the
+      // pre-commit gate outright, which is the one thing this hook exists to stop.
+      (verb === 'commit' && /(^|\s)-[a-zA-Z]*n[a-zA-Z]*(\s|$)/.test(segment));
     if (bypasses) {
       process.stderr.write(
         'BLOCKED — bypassing pre-commit checks is never allowed. ' +