create-agdf 0.14.5 → 0.20.0

package/generated/plugins/copilot/agdf/runtime/create-agdf/runtime/core/lib/control-read/snapshot.js

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+import * as fs from 'node:fs';
+import { resolve, join, dirname, relative, sep } from 'node:path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import { createHash, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
+import { withControlReadView } from './fs.js';
+
+export const READ_LIMITS = Object.freeze({ files: 20_000, total: 256 * 1024 ** 2, file: 32 * 1024 ** 2,
+  preview: 2 * 1024 ** 2, response: 8 * 1024 ** 2, timeout: 10_000 });
+export class ControlReadError extends Error {
+  constructor(code) { super(code); this.code = code; }
+}
+export const fail = code => { throw new ControlReadError(code); };
+const hash = value => createHash('sha256').update(value).digest('hex');
+const keyOf = value => resolve(value instanceof URL ? fileURLToPath(value) : String(value));
+const identity = s => `${s.dev}:${s.ino}:${s.mode}`;
+// Windows bumps ChangeTime when scanners or indexers touch an unchanged new file, so it is no
+// change signal there. Size, mtime and the captured content digest still bind the source.
+const changeTime = process.platform === 'win32' ? () => '' : s => s.ctimeNs;
+const signature = s => `${identity(s)}:${s.size}:${s.mtimeNs}:${changeTime(s)}`;
+
+// Both broad and dependency captures use the same bounded descriptor read.
+function capturedFile(path, before, deadline, verifyAncestors, checkpoint) {
+  const check = () => { if (Date.now() > deadline) fail('timeout'); };
+  verifyAncestors(path);
+  let fd;
+  try {
+    fd = fs.openSync(path, fs.constants.O_RDONLY | (fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0));
+    const opened = fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true });
+    if (signature(before) !== signature(opened) || !opened.isFile()) fail('source_changed');
+    const bytes = Buffer.alloc(Number(opened.size));
+    let offset = 0;
+    while (offset < bytes.length) {
+      check(); const read = fs.readSync(fd, bytes, offset, Math.min(64 * 1024, bytes.length - offset), offset);
+      if (!read) fail('source_changed'); offset += read;
+    }
+    const extra = Buffer.alloc(1);
+    if (fs.readSync(fd, extra, 0, 1, offset) || signature(opened) !== signature(fs.fstatSync(fd, { bigint: true }))) fail('source_changed');
+    checkpoint?.('file_read', path);
+    const after = fs.lstatSync(path, { bigint: true });
+    verifyAncestors(path);
+    if (signature(opened) !== signature(after)) fail('source_changed');
+    return { stats: opened, kind: 'file', bytes, digest: hash(bytes), signature: signature(opened) };
+  } finally { if (fd !== undefined) fs.closeSync(fd); }
+}
+
+// Bounded synchronous reads execute only inside the dedicated read worker in the service.
+function collect(root, limits, deadline, checkpoint) {
+  const control = join(root, '.agdf', 'control'), entries = new Map();
+  let total = 0, files = 0, nodes = 0;
+  const check = () => { if (Date.now() > deadline) fail('timeout'); };
+  function directory(path, anchor = false) {
+    check();
+    const stats = fs.lstatSync(path, { bigint: true });
+    if (!stats.isDirectory() || stats.isSymbolicLink()) fail('resource_denied');
+    const record = { stats, kind: 'directory', signature: anchor ? identity(stats) : signature(stats), children: [] };
+    entries.set(path, record);
+    return record;
+  }
+  const rootEntry = directory(root, true);
+  const agdf = join(root, '.agdf');
+  const absent = path => {
+    try { fs.lstatSync(path); return false; }
+    catch (error) { if (error.code === 'ENOENT') return true; throw error; }
+  };
+  if (absent(agdf)) { rootEntry.children = []; return { entries, total, files, absent: true }; }
+  const agdfEntry = directory(agdf, true); rootEntry.children = ['.agdf'];
+  if (absent(control)) return { entries, total, files, absent: true };
+  agdfEntry.children = ['control'];
+  function verifyAncestors(path) {
+    if (path === root) return;
+    for (let cursor = dirname(path); ; cursor = dirname(cursor)) {
+      const before = entries.get(cursor);
+      const now = fs.lstatSync(cursor, { bigint: true });
+      if (!before || now.isSymbolicLink() || !now.isDirectory() || identity(now) !== identity(before.stats)) fail('source_changed');
+      if (cursor === root) break;
+    }
+  }
+  function walk(path, depth = 0) {
+    if (depth > 128 || ++nodes > limits.files * 2 + 16) fail('resource_limit');
+    const record = directory(path);
+    record.children = fs.readdirSync(path).sort();
+    for (const name of record.children) {
+      check(); const child = join(path, name), before = fs.lstatSync(child, { bigint: true });
+      if (before.isSymbolicLink()) fail('resource_denied');
+      if (before.isDirectory()) { walk(child, depth + 1); continue; }
+      if (!before.isFile()) fail('resource_denied');
+      if (++files > limits.files || before.size > BigInt(limits.file) || total + Number(before.size) > limits.total) fail('resource_limit');
+      const entry = capturedFile(child, before, deadline, verifyAncestors, checkpoint);
+      entries.set(child, entry); total += entry.bytes.length;
+    }
+    if (signature(record.stats) !== signature(fs.lstatSync(path, { bigint: true }))) fail('source_changed');
+  }
+  walk(control);
+  return { entries, total, files, absent: false };
+}
+
+function fingerprint(root, capture) {
+  return hash(JSON.stringify([...capture.entries].map(([path, e]) => [relative(root, path), e.signature, e.digest ?? e.children])));
+}
+function observation(root, limits, deadline, checkpoint) {
+  try { return collect(root, limits, deadline, checkpoint); }
+  catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof ControlReadError) throw error;
+    if (['ENOENT', 'ENOTDIR', 'ELOOP'].includes(error.code)) fail('source_changed');
+    fail('read_failed');
+  }
+}
+function statCopy(entry, bigint = false) {
+  const s = entry.stats;
+  const result = {};
+  for (const key of ['dev', 'ino', 'mode', 'nlink', 'uid', 'gid', 'rdev', 'size', 'blksize', 'blocks', 'atimeMs', 'mtimeMs', 'ctimeMs', 'birthtimeMs'])
+    result[key] = bigint ? s[key] : Number(s[key]);
+  for (const key of ['atime', 'mtime', 'ctime', 'birthtime']) result[key] = new Date(Number(s[key + 'Ms']));
+  if (bigint) for (const key of ['atimeNs', 'mtimeNs', 'ctimeNs', 'birthtimeNs']) result[key] = s[key];
+  for (const name of ['File', 'Directory', 'SymbolicLink', 'BlockDevice', 'CharacterDevice', 'FIFO', 'Socket'])
+    result['is' + name] = () => name.toLowerCase() === entry.kind;
+  return result;
+}
+
+export function captureControl(rootInput, options = {}) {
+  const root = fs.realpathSync(resolve(rootInput));
+  if (!fs.lstatSync(resolve(rootInput)).isDirectory() || fs.lstatSync(resolve(rootInput)).isSymbolicLink()) fail('resource_denied');
+  const limits = { ...READ_LIMITS, ...options.limits }, deadline = Date.now() + limits.timeout;
+  let capture, digest, lastError;
+  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {
+    try {
+      capture = observation(root, limits, deadline, options.checkpoint);
+      options.checkpoint?.('captured', root);
+      digest = fingerprint(root, capture);
+      if (digest !== fingerprint(root, observation(root, limits, deadline))) fail('source_changed');
+      lastError = null; break;
+    } catch (error) { lastError = error; if (error.code !== 'source_changed') throw error; }
+  }
+  if (lastError) throw lastError;
+  const entries = capture.entries, control = join(root, '.agdf', 'control'), decoded = new Map();
+  let violated = false;
+  function allowed(path) {
+    if (path === root || path === join(root, '.agdf') || path === control || path.startsWith(control + sep)) return;
+    violated = true; fail('resource_denied');
+  }
+  function get(input) {
+    const path = keyOf(input); allowed(path);
+    const entry = entries.get(path);
+    if (!entry) throw Object.assign(new Error('Captured entry absent'), { code: 'ENOENT' });
+    return { path, entry };
+  }
+  const snapshotId = randomUUID(), capturedAt = new Date().toISOString();
+  const view = {
+    root, snapshot_id: snapshotId, observed_as_of: capturedAt, digest,
+    control_absent: capture.absent, file_count: capture.files, byte_count: capture.total,
+    assertBoundary: () => { if (violated) fail('resource_denied'); },
+    existsSync(input) { const path = keyOf(input); allowed(path); return entries.has(path); },
+    readFileSync(input, encoding) {
+      const { entry } = get(input); if (entry.kind !== 'file') throw Object.assign(Error('Is directory'), { code: 'EISDIR' });
+      const format = typeof encoding === 'object' ? encoding.encoding : encoding;
+      if (!format) return Buffer.from(entry.bytes);
+      let formats = decoded.get(entry);
+      if (!formats) { formats = new Map(); decoded.set(entry, formats); }
+      if (!formats.has(format)) formats.set(format, entry.bytes.toString(format));
+      return formats.get(format);
+    },
+    statSync(input, options) { return statCopy(get(input).entry, options?.bigint); },
+    lstatSync(input, options) { return statCopy(get(input).entry, options?.bigint); },
+    lstatKindSync(input) { return get(input).entry.kind; },
+    realpathSync(input) { return get(input).path; },
+    readdirSync(input, options) {
+      const { path, entry } = get(input); if (entry.kind !== 'directory') throw Object.assign(Error('Not directory'), { code: 'ENOTDIR' });
+      return entry.children.map(name => options?.withFileTypes
+        ? { name, parentPath: path, ...statCopy(entries.get(join(path, name))) } : name);
+    },
+    revalidate() {
+      if (fingerprint(root, observation(root, limits, Date.now() + limits.timeout)) !== digest) fail('source_changed');
+      return true;
+    },
+  };
+  return Object.freeze(view);
+}
+
+// Record one existing Core operation, then replay it from its frozen dependencies.
+// Callers never supply a path allowlist or substitute missing policy inputs.
+export function captureControlScope(rootInput, project, options = {}) {
+  const input = resolve(rootInput), root = fs.realpathSync(input);
+  if (!fs.lstatSync(input).isDirectory() || fs.lstatSync(input).isSymbolicLink()) fail('resource_denied');
+  const control = join(root, '.agdf', 'control'), limits = { ...READ_LIMITS, ...options.limits };
+  const deadline = Date.now() + limits.timeout, entries = new Map();
+  let total = 0, files = 0, frozen = false, building = true, fatal = null, sourceDigest = null;
+  const absentError = code => Object.assign(Error('Observed entry absent'), { code });
+  const guard = work => {
+    if (fatal) throw fatal;
+    try { return work(); }
+    catch (error) {
+      if (!['ENOENT', 'ENOTDIR', 'EISDIR', 'EINVAL'].includes(error.code)) {
+        fatal = error instanceof ControlReadError ? error
+          : new ControlReadError(['EACCES', 'EPERM', 'ELOOP'].includes(error.code) ? 'resource_denied' : 'read_failed');
+        throw fatal;
+      }
+      throw error;
+    }
+  };
+  function check() { if (building && Date.now() > deadline) fail('timeout'); }
+  function pathOf(value) {
+    check(); const path = keyOf(value);
+    if (path !== root && path !== join(root, '.agdf') && path !== control && !path.startsWith(control + sep)) fail('resource_denied');
+    if (relative(control, path).split(sep).length > 128) fail('resource_limit');
+    return path;
+  }
+  function verifyAncestors(path) {
+    if (path === root) return;
+    for (let cursor = dirname(path); ; cursor = dirname(cursor)) {
+      const before = entries.get(cursor), now = fs.lstatSync(cursor, { bigint: true });
+      if (!before || before.kind !== 'directory' || now.isSymbolicLink() || !now.isDirectory()
+        || identity(now) !== identity(before.stats)) fail('source_changed');
+      if (cursor === root) break;
+    }
+  }
+  function observe(path, optional = false) {
+    if (entries.has(path)) {
+      const entry = entries.get(path);
+      if (entry.kind === 'denied' && !optional) fail('resource_denied');
+      return entry;
+    }
+    // Descendants of an observed denied ancestor were intentionally not traversed.
+    // Replay may return that same denial without introducing a new dependency.
+    if (optional) for (let ancestor = dirname(path); ancestor.startsWith(root); ancestor = dirname(ancestor)) {
+      const denied = entries.get(ancestor);
+      if (denied?.kind === 'denied') return denied;
+      if (ancestor === root) break;
+    }
+    if (frozen) fail('source_changed');
+    if (entries.size >= limits.files * 2 + 16) fail('resource_limit');
+    if (path !== root) {
+      const parent = observe(dirname(path), optional);
+      // An optional source may report a denied ancestor, but never traverse it.
+      if (parent.kind === 'denied') return parent;
+      if (parent.kind === 'directory') verifyAncestors(path);
+    }
+    let stats;
+    try { stats = fs.lstatSync(path, { bigint: true }); }
+    catch (error) {
+      if (!['ENOENT', 'ENOTDIR'].includes(error.code)) throw error;
+      const record = { kind: 'absent', code: error.code };
+      entries.set(path, record); options.checkpoint?.('dependency', path);
+      return record;
+    }
+    if (stats.isSymbolicLink() || !stats.isDirectory() && !stats.isFile()) {
+      if (!optional) fail('resource_denied');
+      const entry = { stats, kind: 'denied', signature: signature(stats) };
+      entries.set(path, entry); options.checkpoint?.('dependency', path);
+      return entry;
+    }
+    const record = { stats, kind: stats.isDirectory() ? 'directory' : 'file',
+      signature: stats.isDirectory() ? identity(stats) : signature(stats) };
+    entries.set(path, record); options.checkpoint?.('dependency', path);
+    return record;
+  }
+  function get(value) {
+    const path = pathOf(value), entry = observe(path);
+    if (entry.kind === 'absent') throw absentError(entry.code);
+    return { path, entry };
+  }
+  const methods = {
+    readOptionalFileSync(value, maximum = limits.preview) {
+      const path = pathOf(value), entry = observe(path, true);
+      if (entry.kind === 'denied') return { code: 'resource_denied', bytes: null };
+      if (entry.kind === 'absent') return { code: 'document_missing', bytes: null };
+      if (entry.kind !== 'file') return { code: 'document_unsupported', bytes: null };
+      if (entry.stats.size > BigInt(maximum)) return { code: 'resource_limit', bytes: null };
+      return { code: null, bytes: methods.readFileSync(path) };
+    },
+    existsSync(value) { return observe(pathOf(value)).kind !== 'absent'; },
+    readFileSync(value, encoding) {
+      const { path, entry } = get(value);
+      if (entry.kind !== 'file') throw absentError('EISDIR');
+      if (!entry.bytes) {
+        if (frozen) fail('source_changed');
+        if (files + 1 > limits.files || entry.stats.size > BigInt(limits.file)
+          || total + Number(entry.stats.size) > limits.total) fail('resource_limit');
+        Object.assign(entry, capturedFile(path, entry.stats, deadline, verifyAncestors, options.checkpoint));
+        files++; total += entry.bytes.length;
+      }
+      const format = typeof encoding === 'object' ? encoding?.encoding : encoding;
+      return format ? entry.bytes.toString(format) : Buffer.from(entry.bytes);
+    },
+    statSync(value, opts) {
+      const { path, entry } = get(value);
+      // Root and .agdf are containment anchors whose children outside control are never read;
+      // their timestamps change with unrelated project entries, so only identity and type bind.
+      const anchor = path === root || path === join(root, '.agdf');
+      if (entry.kind === 'directory' && !entry.statObserved && !anchor) {
+        if (frozen) fail('source_changed');
+        entry.statObserved = true; entry.signature = signature(entry.stats);
+      }
+      return statCopy(entry, opts?.bigint);
+    },
+    lstatSync(value, opts) { return methods.statSync(value, opts); },
+    lstatKindSync(value) { return get(value).entry.kind; },
+    realpathSync(value) { return get(value).path; },
+    readdirSync(value, opts) {
+      const { path, entry } = get(value);
+      if (entry.kind !== 'directory') throw absentError('ENOTDIR');
+      if (!entry.children) {
+        if (frozen) fail('source_changed');
+        verifyAncestors(path);
+        entry.children = fs.readdirSync(path).sort();
+        if (entry.children.length > limits.files * 2 + 16) fail('resource_limit');
+        options.checkpoint?.('directory_read', path);
+        if (identity(fs.lstatSync(path, { bigint: true })) !== identity(entry.stats)) fail('source_changed');
+        verifyAncestors(path);
+      }
+      return entry.children.map(name => opts?.withFileTypes
+        ? { name, parentPath: path, ...statCopy(get(join(path, name)).entry) } : name);
+    },
+  };
+  function revalidate(until = Date.now() + limits.timeout) {
+    return guard(() => {
+      for (const [path, entry] of entries) {
+        if (Date.now() > until) fail('timeout');
+        let now;
+        try { now = fs.lstatSync(path, { bigint: true }); }
+        catch (error) {
+          if (entry.kind === 'absent' && error.code === entry.code) continue;
+          if (['ENOENT', 'ENOTDIR'].includes(error.code)) fail('source_changed');
+          throw error;
+        }
+        if (entry.kind === 'denied') {
+          if (signature(now) !== entry.signature || (!now.isSymbolicLink() && (now.isFile() || now.isDirectory()))) fail('source_changed');
+          continue;
+        }
+        if (entry.kind === 'absent' || now.isSymbolicLink()
+          || (entry.kind === 'directory' && !now.isDirectory()) || (entry.kind === 'file' && !now.isFile())) fail('source_changed');
+        const current = entry.kind === 'directory' && !entry.statObserved ? identity(now) : signature(now);
+        if (entry.signature !== current) fail('source_changed');
+        if (entry.children) {
+          verifyAncestors(path);
+          if (JSON.stringify(fs.readdirSync(path).sort()) !== JSON.stringify(entry.children)
+            || identity(fs.lstatSync(path, { bigint: true })) !== identity(entry.stats)) fail('source_changed');
+        }
+        if (entry.bytes && capturedFile(path, entry.stats, until, verifyAncestors).digest !== entry.digest) fail('source_changed');
+      }
+      // Check containment anchors again after child/absence observations.
+      for (const [path, entry] of entries) {
+        if (Date.now() > until) fail('timeout');
+        if (entry.kind === 'directory') {
+          const now = fs.lstatSync(path, { bigint: true });
+          if (!now.isDirectory() || now.isSymbolicLink() || identity(now) !== identity(entry.stats)) fail('source_changed');
+        }
+      }
+      return true;
+    });
+  }
+  function makeView() {
+    const view = { root, snapshot_id: randomUUID(), observed_as_of: new Date().toISOString(),
+      get digest() { return sourceDigest; },
+      get control_absent() { return guard(() => observe(control).kind === 'absent'); },
+      get file_count() { return files; }, get byte_count() { return total; },
+      // Private dependency inventory for change hints; never an API filesystem selector.
+      get dependencies() { return [...entries].flatMap(([path, entry]) =>
+        entry.kind === 'directory' ? entry.children || entry.statObserved ? [{ path, directory: true }] : [] : [{ path, directory: false }]); },
+      assertBoundary() { if (fatal) throw fatal; }, revalidate,
+    };
+    for (const [name, method] of Object.entries(methods)) view[name] = (...args) => guard(() => method(...args));
+    return Object.freeze(view);
+  }
+  const recording = makeView();
+  const recorded = withControlReadView(recording, () => project(recording));
+  if (recorded?.then) fail('read_failed');
+  recording.assertBoundary(); options.checkpoint?.('captured', root);
+  frozen = true; revalidate(deadline);
+  sourceDigest = hash(JSON.stringify([...entries].sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b))
+    .map(([path, entry]) => [relative(root, path), entry.kind, entry.signature ?? entry.code, entry.digest ?? null, entry.children ?? null])));
+  // New view identity also gives the replay a fresh memo cache in the FS seam.
+  const view = makeView(); options.checkpoint?.('replay', root);
+  const data = withControlReadView(view, () => project(view));
+  if (data?.then) fail('read_failed');
+  view.assertBoundary(); options.checkpoint?.('published', root); revalidate(deadline);
+  building = false;
+  return Object.freeze({ view, data });
+}

package/generated/plugins/copilot/agdf/runtime/create-agdf/runtime/core/lib/control-read-boundary.js

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+import { existsSync, lstatSync, readdirSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs";
+import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
+
+export function assertMcpControlReadBoundary(target) {
+  const root = realpathSync(resolve(target));
+  const agdfRoot = join(root, ".agdf");
+  const controlRoot = join(agdfRoot, "control");
+  if (!existsSync(controlRoot)) return;
+  for (const directory of [agdfRoot, controlRoot]) {
+    const stats = lstatSync(directory);
+    if (!stats.isDirectory() || stats.isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error("control_read_boundary_invalid");
+  }
+  function visit(directory) {
+    for (const entry of readdirSync(directory, { withFileTypes: true })) {
+      if (entry.isSymbolicLink() || (!entry.isDirectory() && !entry.isFile())) {
+        throw new Error("control_read_boundary_invalid");
+      }
+      if (entry.isDirectory()) visit(join(directory, entry.name));
+    }
+  }
+  visit(controlRoot);
+}

package/generated/plugins/copilot/agdf/runtime/create-agdf/runtime/core/lib/control-state/approval-command-contract.js

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { realpathSync, statSync } from "../control-read/fs.js";
+import { isAbsolute } from "node:path";
+import { APPROVAL_GATES, REVISION_ID_PATTERN, RUN_ID_PATTERN } from "./run-identity.js";
+
+export const CONTROL_COMMAND_SCHEMA_VERSION = "1";
+export const COOPERATIVE_ASSURANCE = Object.freeze({
+  lane: "cooperative_local",
+  reply_provenance: "caller_forwarded_deliberate_reply",
+  independent_human_proof: "unavailable",
+});
+export const DIGEST_PATTERN = /^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$/u;
+const FIELDS = Object.freeze(["schema_version", "action", "target_id", "run_id", "gate", "expected_revision_id", "presentation_id", "response", "operation_id", "assurance"]);
+
+export function digest(value) {
+  return `sha256:${createHash("sha256").update(value, "utf8").digest("hex")}`;
+}
+
+export function exactObject(value, fields) {
+  return value !== null && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value)
+    && [Object.prototype, null].includes(Object.getPrototypeOf(value))
+    && Reflect.ownKeys(value).length === fields.length && fields.every((key) => Object.hasOwn(value, key)
+      && Object.hasOwn(Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(value, key), "value"));
+}
+
+// Schema diagnostics must not evaluate accessors on a rejected caller object.
+export function ownDataValue(value, key) {
+  if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return undefined;
+  const descriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(value, key);
+  return descriptor && Object.hasOwn(descriptor, "value") ? descriptor.value : undefined;
+}
+
+export function canonicalJson(value) {
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(canonicalJson).join(",")}]`;
+  if (value !== null && typeof value === "object") {
+    return `{${Object.keys(value).sort().map((key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalJson(value[key])}`).join(",")}}`;
+  }
+  return JSON.stringify(value);
+}
+
+// A local binding, not an authorization token or portable repository identity.
+export function resolveControlCommandTarget(root) {
+  if (typeof root !== "string" || !isAbsolute(root)) throw new Error("target_invalid");
+  const canonicalRoot = realpathSync(root);
+  if (!statSync(canonicalRoot).isDirectory()) throw new Error("target_invalid");
+  return Object.freeze({ root: canonicalRoot, target_id: digest(`agdf-command-target/1\0${canonicalRoot}`) });
+}
+
+export function validateApprovalCommand(command) {
+  const assurance = ownDataValue(command, "assurance");
+  if (assurance !== undefined && assurance !== "cooperative_local") return "unsupported_authority";
+  if (!exactObject(command, FIELDS) || FIELDS.some((key) => typeof command[key] !== "string")) return "command_schema_invalid";
+  if (command.schema_version !== CONTROL_COMMAND_SCHEMA_VERSION) return "command_version_unsupported";
+  if (command.action !== "record_gate_approval") return "command_action_unsupported";
+  if (command.assurance !== "cooperative_local") return "unsupported_authority";
+  if (!DIGEST_PATTERN.test(command.target_id) || !RUN_ID_PATTERN.test(command.run_id)
+      || !APPROVAL_GATES.includes(command.gate)
+      || ![command.operation_id, command.expected_revision_id, command.presentation_id].every((id) => REVISION_ID_PATTERN.test(id))) {
+    return "command_binding_invalid";
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+export function approvalRequestDigest(command) {
+  return digest(`agdf-approval-request/1\0${JSON.stringify(FIELDS.filter((key) => key !== "operation_id").map((key) => [key, command[key]]))}`);
+}
+
+export function commandBinding(command) {
+  return Object.freeze(Object.fromEntries(["target_id", "run_id", "gate", "expected_revision_id", "presentation_id"].map((key) => {
+    const value = ownDataValue(command, key);
+    return [key, typeof value === "string" ? value : null];
+  })));
+}

package/generated/plugins/copilot/agdf/runtime/create-agdf/runtime/core/lib/control-state/approval-command.js

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+import { assertRunOperationIdentity } from "./run-operation-identity.js";
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { prepareGateApproval } from "./run-recording.js";
+import { validateRunPresentationRecord } from './run-presentation.js';
+import { readRun } from "./run-state-edits.js";
+import { parseControlState, parseRunState } from "./run-state-parser.js";
+import { runSealState } from "./run-seal.js";
+import { containedRegularFile, hasSymlinkComponent } from "./contained-file.js";
+import { appendApprovalOperation, readApprovalOperations } from "./approval-operations.js";
+import { approvalRequestDigest, commandBinding, COOPERATIVE_ASSURANCE, ownDataValue, resolveControlCommandTarget, validateApprovalCommand } from "./approval-command-contract.js";
+import { flushRunCommit } from "./run-state-writer.js";
+import { withRunBacklogLock, writeRunWithBacklogLocked } from "./run-backlog-writer.js";
+import { backlogSkip } from "./run-backlog.js";
+
+function sealIsValid(root, content) {
+  try { return runSealState(root, content).status === "valid"; } catch { return false; }
+}
+
+function observe(root, command, evaluateGateCheck) {
+  const run = readRun(root, command.run_id);
+  if (run.rejection || !sealIsValid(root, run.content)) return { available: false, reason: run.rejection?.reason ?? "seal_invalid" };
+  let report;
+  try {
+    const presented = validateRunPresentationRecord(root, { runId: command.run_id, gate: command.gate,
+      revisionId: command.expected_revision_id, presentationId: command.presentation_id });
+    const language = presented.reason ? undefined : presented.record.presentation_language;
+    report = evaluateGateCheck(root, { runId: command.run_id, ...(typeof language === 'string' ? { presentationLanguage: language } : {}) });
+  } catch { return { available: false, reason: "evaluation_unavailable" }; }
+  return { available: true, revision: Number(run.meta.revision), revision_id: run.meta.revision_id,
+    approval_status: parseControlState(run.content, { userGates: [command.gate] }).approvals.get(command.gate)?.status ?? "missing",
+    lifecycle: run.meta.lifecycle, gate: report.current_gate, status: report.status,
+    missing_approval: report.missing_approval, next_allowed_action: report.next_allowed_action,
+    blocking_reason: report.blocking_reason ?? null };
+}
+
+// Internal dependencies expose I/O checkpoints for deterministic fault/process tests. The public
+// facade supplies only canonical policy, Git observations and package metadata, never caller policy.
+export function executeApprovalCommand(root, command, { evaluateGateCheck, packageVersion,
+  checkpoint = () => {}, flush = flushRunCommit, afterWrite, commandContext } = {}) {
+  let target, requestDigest, path, snapshot;
+  const result = (outcome, reason = null, receipt = null, details = {}) => Object.freeze({
+    schema_version: "1", outcome, reason,
+    operation_id: typeof ownDataValue(command, "operation_id") === "string" ? ownDataValue(command, "operation_id") : null, request_digest: requestDigest ?? null,
+    binding: command && typeof command === "object" ? commandBinding(command) : null,
+    effect: receipt?.effect ?? null, assurance: COOPERATIVE_ASSURANCE,
+    current: target ? observe(target.root, command, evaluateGateCheck) : { available: false, reason: "target_unavailable" },
+    observations: { commit: receipt ? "canonical_receipt_observed" : "no_receipt_acknowledged",
+      durability: ["accepted", "already_applied"].includes(outcome) ? (process.platform === "win32" ? "file_sync_completed_directory_sync_unavailable" : "file_and_directory_sync_completed") : "unconfirmed",
+      independent_human_proof: "unavailable" },
+    recovery: outcome === "retryable_failure" ? "Retry the identical command with the original operation UUID and payload; do not create a new decision."
+      : outcome === "recovery_required" ? "Inspect the canonical run and pending transaction or lock owner before retrying; preserve the original command and do not infer approval."
+      : null,
+    ...details,
+  });
+  const invalid = validateApprovalCommand(command);
+  if (invalid) return result("rejected", invalid);
+  requestDigest = approvalRequestDigest(command);
+  const operationContext = commandContext ? { kind: 'approval.record', operation_id: command.operation_id, target_id: command.target_id, request_digest: requestDigest } : undefined;
+  try { target = resolveControlCommandTarget(root); } catch { return result("rejected", "target_invalid"); }
+  if (target.target_id !== command.target_id) return result("rejected", "target_binding_mismatch");
+  const relativePath = `.agdf/control/runs/${command.run_id}/RUN_STATE.md`;
+  path = join(target.root, relativePath);
+  if (hasSymlinkComponent(target.root, relativePath) || containedRegularFile(target.root, relativePath).status !== "valid") {
+    return result("rejected", "run_path_invalid");
+  }
+  try {
+    return withRunBacklogLock(target.root, path, () => {
+      const run = readRun(target.root, command.run_id);
+      if (run.rejection) return result("recovery_required", run.rejection.reason);
+      assertRunOperationIdentity(target.root, run, command.operation_id, "approval.record");
+      snapshot = run.content;
+      if (!sealIsValid(target.root, run.content)) return result("recovery_required", "seal_invalid");
+      const operations = readApprovalOperations(run.content);
+      const existing = operations.receipts.find((item) => item.operation_id === command.operation_id);
+      // Check history before freshness: an acknowledged historical effect grants no current approval.
+      if (existing) {
+        if (existing.request_digest !== requestDigest || (existing.command_digest ?? null) !== (commandContext?.request_digest ?? null)) return result("rejected", "operation_payload_conflict");
+        flush(path);
+        return result("already_applied", null, existing);
+      }
+      const prepared = prepareGateApproval(target.root, {
+        runId: command.run_id, gate: command.gate, revisionId: command.expected_revision_id,
+        presentationId: command.presentation_id, response: command.response,
+      }, { evaluateGateCheck });
+      if (prepared.outcome === "rejected") return result("rejected", prepared.reason, null, {
+        recovery: prepared.recovery ?? "Follow current.next_allowed_action. For a changed binding, prepare the current presentation and obtain a NEW deliberate reply; never rebind an earlier reply.",
+      });
+      const receipt = {
+        schema_version: prepared.qaAcceptance ? "3" : "2", action: command.action, operation_id: command.operation_id,
+        request_digest: requestDigest, command_digest: commandContext?.request_digest ?? null, binding: commandBinding(command), assurance: COOPERATIVE_ASSURANCE,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(), producer: { contract: "approval-service/1", package_version: packageVersion },
+        effect: { previous_revision_id: command.expected_revision_id, resulting_revision_id: randomUUID(),
+          revision: Number(run.meta.revision) + 1, gate: command.gate, approval: `Approval: ${command.gate}`,
+          material_version: prepared.material.material_version, material_sources: prepared.material.sources,
+          artefact_digest: prepared.digest, presentation_digest: prepared.presentation.digest,
+          ...(prepared.qaAcceptance ? { qa_acceptance: prepared.qaAcceptance } : {}),
+          next_gate_after_approval: prepared.after.current_gate, allowed_after_approval: prepared.after.next_allowed_action },
+      };
+      checkpoint("before_final_validation");
+      const written = writeRunWithBacklogLocked(target.root, path, appendApprovalOperation(prepared.next, receipt), command.expected_revision_id, {
+        allowApprovalChange: true, expectedContent: run.content, appendedReceipt: receipt,
+        nextRevisionId: receipt.effect.resulting_revision_id, validateBeforeWrite: prepared.validateBeforeWrite,
+        validateDuringTransaction: prepared.validateDuringTransaction, checkpoint, afterWrite,
+        operationContext,
+      });
+      checkpoint("before_response");
+      return result("accepted", null, receipt, backlogSkip({ status: written.backlog, reason: written.backlog_reason }));
+    }, { checkpoint, operationContext });
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error.message === 'AGDF_OPERATION_PAYLOAD_CONFLICT') return result('rejected', 'operation_payload_conflict');
+    if (error.message === "AGDF_RUN_WRITE_LOCKED") return result(error.lock_owner_status === "unknown" ? "recovery_required" : "retryable_failure",
+      error.lock_owner_status === "unknown" ? "lock_owner_unconfirmed" : "run_write_locked");
+    if (error.message === "AGDF_STALE_RUN_REVISION") return result("rejected", "stale_revision", null,
+      { recovery: "Prepare the current presentation and obtain a NEW deliberate reply; never rebind an earlier reply." });
+    // Rename can succeed before sync or lock release fails. Never infer absence from an exception.
+    let current = readRun(target.root, command.run_id);
+    // A committed receipt remains observable while its Backlog journal is pending.
+    // This acknowledgement is recovery-required, never a readiness/approval claim.
+    if (current.rejection?.reason === "run_step_recovery_required") {
+      try {
+        if (hasSymlinkComponent(target.root, relativePath) || containedRegularFile(target.root, relativePath).status !== "valid") throw Error("run_path_invalid");
+        const content = readFileSync(path, "utf8"), parsed = parseRunState(content, command.run_id);
+        if (parsed.valid) current = { content, meta: parsed.meta };
+      } catch { /* Preserve the unavailable observation. */ }
+    }
+    if (!current.rejection && sealIsValid(target.root, current.content)) {
+      const receipt = readApprovalOperations(current.content).receipts.find((item) => item.operation_id === command.operation_id);
+      if (receipt?.request_digest === requestDigest) return result("recovery_required", "commit_acknowledgement_unconfirmed", receipt,
+        { recovery: "Retry the identical command to synchronize and acknowledge the canonical receipt." });
+      if (current.content === snapshot) return result("retryable_failure", "write_not_committed");
+    }
+    return result("recovery_required", "canonical_state_unconfirmed",
+      null, { recovery: "Inspect the canonical run and pending transaction before retrying; do not infer approval from this response." });
+  }
+}