cowork-harness 0.1.1 → 0.2.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,60 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented here. The format is based on
 [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/). The project uses
 [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/); pre-1.0 minor versions may include breaking changes.
 
+## [Unreleased]
+
+## [0.2.0] — 2026-06-17
+
+Binary-verified the AskUserQuestion answer wire shape (agent ELF 2.1.170), implemented the
+harness-improvements plan, and resolved a 39-finding code-review pass behind two centralizing seams.
+
+### Added
+
+- **AskUserQuestion answer shapes.** `multiSelect` gates (answer with a list of labels → the verified
+  comma-joined wire shape); free-text **"Other"** via `answer:` (distinct from the label-validated
+  `choose:`); `choose` tolerates the `(Recommended)` suffix + `recommended`/`first` keywords. A partial
+  match on a batched gate now **names the unmatched sub-questions**.
+- **`artifact_json` assertion** — assert a JSON artifact's contents via a dotted path
+  (`equals`/`gt`/`exists`/`absent`/`is_null`); `absent`, `is_null`, and an unresolved intermediate are
+  distinct (the last fails loud, never a vacuous pass).
+- **Artifact manifest in cassettes** — `record` snapshots `outputs/`/`.projects/` (paths + hashes + small
+  JSON bodies) so `file_exists`/`user_visible_artifact`/`artifact_json` run on token-free `replay`. A
+  cassette→skill/baseline **staleness fingerprint** warns on drift; `replay --strict` fails on it. Cassettes
+  now carry a `cassetteVersion` (forward-compat guard).
+- **`RunResult.artifacts`** (ENV-MANIFEST) — observed user-visible files (path + bytes); also surfaced as
+  `Result.artifacts` in the Python helper.
+- **`allow_permissive_auto_allow` assertion + `RunResult.scan`** — a security-scan surface for the
+  Cowork-parity verdict (below); the assertion opts a scenario into a permissive auto-allow on purpose.
+- **CLI:** `trace --dispatches` (sub-agent dispatch tree + real total), `assert --list` (schema-generated),
+  `scaffold --from-run <id>` (kept run → starter scenario YAML).
+- **Python:** `run_scenario()` — run an authored scenario YAML and get the typed `Result`.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **Single verdict source (`computeVerdict()`)** wired into all five pass/fail sites (run/skill exit, footer,
+  replay exit, JSON-envelope `ok`) plus the Python `assert_success`. A Cowork-parity violation — a permissive
+  auto-allow, a recorded `outputs/` delete, or a host-path leak — now **default-fails** the run unless the
+  scenario explicitly asserts about it.
+- **Single fail-loud staging policy (`src/staging/resolve.ts`)** for every declared input (marketplace
+  manifest, enabled-plugin resolution, local skills, `mcp.config`, uploads, folders), with a Docker-safe
+  marketplace charset.
+- The run root honors `COWORK_HARNESS_RUNS_DIR`.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Egress / runtime hardening:** per-hop redirect egress logging, allowlist validation, a per-run proxy
+  port, proxy/sidecar readiness handshakes, fail-loud Lima provisioning, and boundary teardown in
+  `try/finally`.
+- **Protocol / decider hardening:** oversized control-frame hard-fail, a nonzero child-exit error event,
+  provenance untruncation, TTY-elicit cancel, and a JSON-safe `reply_with` key.
+- **Detection / packaging:** `%2F`/backslash decode in the outputs-delete detector; the npm package now
+  ships `schema/`, `docs/`, `python/`, and `scripts/`; assertion path containment; resume empty-tree warning.
+
+### Notes
+
+- Held/deferred per the plan's gating: composed partial-gate answering, `decider_intent:` in scenario YAML,
+  a whole-gate `response:` freeform, and `artifacts_share_field`. All additive/opt-in when built.
+
 ## [0.1.1] — 2026-06-16
 
 Docs, distribution, and packaging. No CLI behavior change.

package/README.md

@@ -74,8 +74,10 @@ Skill testing is the headline use, but the tool is a general harness over the Co
 | `skill <folder> "<prompt>"` | Run a local skill/plugin folder once against the staged agent | ad-hoc "is the skill alive / does it do X?" — the fast inner loop |
 | `run <scenario.yaml \| dir/>` | Run authored scenarios with `assert:` + a CI-ready exit code | you want a repeatable, **asserted regression test** |
 | `chat <folder>` | Interactive multi-turn REPL against a skill (TTY) | debugging a multi-turn flow by hand |
-| `record` / `replay` | Save a control-protocol cassette, then replay it deterministically | **token-free, Docker-free CI** from a once-recorded run |
-| `trace <run-id>` | Digest a run's `events.jsonl` (tools, sub-agent dispatches, decisions) | "how many sub-agents *actually* dispatched, and which?" |
+| `record` / `replay` | Save a control-protocol cassette, then replay it deterministically (`replay --strict` fails on a stale cassette) | **token-free, Docker-free CI** from a once-recorded run |
+| `trace <run-id>` | Digest a run's `events.jsonl` (`--tools`, `--gates`, `--dispatches` for the sub-agent dispatch tree + total) | "how many sub-agents *actually* dispatched, and which?" |
+| `scaffold --from-run <id>` | Turn a kept run into a starter scenario YAML (gates→answers, artifacts→`file_exists`) | authoring a scenario from a real run instead of guessing |
+| `assert --list` | List the available scenario assertions (generated from the schema) | "what can I assert?" without grepping the source |
 | `decide` | Validate a decider against a sample question in ~2 s (no run) | sanity-check a `--decider-*` / `--answer` wiring before a long run |
 | `gates` / `answer` | Stream / answer in-band gates for `--decider-dir` | a **driving agent** answers live questions via a Monitor |
 | `boundary-check [baseline]` | Prove the sandbox enforces Cowork's limitations | verifying the harness's own fidelity |
@@ -171,7 +173,7 @@ This repo ships a **companion skill** (`.claude/skills/cowork-harness/`) that te
 /plugin install cowork-harness@cowork-harness
 ```
 
-The skill **self-bootstraps the CLI**: if `cowork-harness` isn't on your PATH it falls back to `npx cowork-harness@latest` (Node ≥ 20). Tiers above `protocol` still need Docker/Lima and a Claude Desktop agent binary — see the prerequisites below.
+The skill **self-bootstraps the CLI**: if `cowork-harness` isn't on your PATH it falls back to `npx cowork-harness@>=0.2.0` (a version floor that fails loud rather than silently fetching a too-old CLI; Node ≥ 20). Tiers above `protocol` still need Docker/Lima and a Claude Desktop agent binary — see the prerequisites below.
 
 It also follows the open [Agent Skills](https://github.com/vercel-labs/skills) spec, so it installs cross-editor (Cursor, Codex, OpenCode, …) by pointing the `npx skills` CLI at `.claude/skills/cowork-harness` in this repo. (Working *inside* this repo, the skill auto-loads as a project skill — no install needed.)
 

package/dist/agent/session.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { warn } from "../io.js";
 import { createWriteStream } from "node:fs";
 import { join } from "node:path";
 import readline from "node:readline";
@@ -159,6 +160,8 @@ export class LiveAgentSession {
     /** Reject function set when proc emits an error — bridges the callback into the async generator.
      *  Set before the generator loop starts; called at most once (the Promise settles once). */
     rejectError;
+    /** Bounded tail of the child's stderr, for the nonzero-exit error message. */
+    stderrTail = "";
     constructor(proc, outDir) {
         this.proc = proc;
         this.outDir = outDir;
@@ -166,6 +169,11 @@ export class LiveAgentSession {
         this.controlOut = createWriteStream(join(outDir, "control-out.jsonl"), { flags: "a" });
         const errLog = createWriteStream(join(outDir, "agent.stderr.log"), { flags: "a" });
         this.proc.stderr.pipe(errLog);
+        // keep a bounded stderr tail and capture the exit code/signal so a child that dies nonzero
+        // (with no structured {type:"result"} error) is surfaced as a typed error event, not a silent stop.
+        this.proc.stderr.on("data", (d) => {
+            this.stderrTail = (this.stderrTail + d.toString()).slice(-2000);
+        });
         // #15: attach stdin error listener once at construction so dead-child writes don't produce
         // unhandled process errors. Routes to the same error path as spawn errors when possible.
         this.proc.stdin.on("error", (e) => {
@@ -241,6 +249,20 @@ export class LiveAgentSession {
                 }
                 yield* this.translate(msg);
             }
+            // stdout closed. Give a pending 'exit' one tick to land (NOT a blocking wait on 'close' — a
+            // mock/fake child may never emit it), then surface a nonzero/signal exit as a typed error — a
+            // crashed child that emitted no {type:"result"} error line would otherwise be a silent stop.
+            await new Promise((res) => setImmediate(res));
+            const code = this.proc.exitCode;
+            const signal = this.proc.signalCode;
+            if (signal || (code !== null && code !== 0)) {
+                const tail = this.stderrTail.trim();
+                yield {
+                    type: "error",
+                    source: "exit",
+                    message: `agent process exited ${signal ? `on signal ${signal}` : `with code ${code}`}${tail ? ` — stderr tail: ${tail}` : ""}`,
+                };
+            }
         }
         finally {
             this.rejectError = undefined; // generator is done; stop routing errors here
@@ -274,7 +296,7 @@ export class LiveAgentSession {
                     // reply — an unanswered mcp_message blocks the in-VM agent on the round-trip forever (deadlock).
                     // Reply with a JSON-RPC error instead, mirroring the no-handler defense below.
                     const message = e?.message ?? String(e);
-                    process.stderr.write(`::warning:: sdkMcp.handle threw for "${server}" — replying with a JSON-RPC error: ${message}\n`);
+                    warn(`::warning:: sdkMcp.handle threw for "${server}" — replying with a JSON-RPC error: ${message}\n`);
                     out = { error: { code: -32603, message: `handler error: ${message}` } };
                 }
                 this.write(mcpResponseEnvelope(msg.request_id, out, jr.id));
@@ -294,7 +316,7 @@ export class LiveAgentSession {
             // #10: an mcp_message arrived but no sdkMcp handler is configured. Reply with a JSON-RPC error
             // (well-formed via mcpResponseEnvelope) instead of silently dropping it — a dropped request
             // leaves the in-VM agent waiting on the round-trip forever (protocol deadlock in host-loop mode).
-            process.stderr.write(`::warning:: mcp_message for server "${server}" arrived but no sdkMcp handler is configured — replying with a JSON-RPC error (would otherwise deadlock)\n`);
+            warn(`::warning:: mcp_message for server "${server}" arrived but no sdkMcp handler is configured — replying with a JSON-RPC error (would otherwise deadlock)\n`);
             this.write(mcpResponseEnvelope(msg.request_id, { error: { code: -32601, message: "no sdkMcp handler configured" } }, jr.id));
             return;
         }
@@ -312,7 +334,7 @@ export class LiveAgentSession {
         if (!req) {
             // #13: an id with no matching request_id is a protocol drift. Writing a guessed envelope would
             // be worse, but a silent return leaves the agent blocked until timeout (looks like a hang).
-            process.stderr.write(`::warning:: respond() for unknown decision id "${decisionId}" — no matching request_id was seen; the agent may block until timeout (protocol drift)\n`);
+            warn(`::warning:: respond() for unknown decision id "${decisionId}" — no matching request_id was seen; the agent may block until timeout (protocol drift)\n`);
             return;
         }
         // #14: serializeDecision returns a safe deny envelope on a kind mismatch (defense in depth). That
@@ -320,7 +342,7 @@ export class LiveAgentSession {
         // while the agent actually received a deny. (serializeDecision stays a pure declared inverse of
         // deserializeDecision; the warning lives here in the caller, not in the pure function.)
         if (req.kind !== r.kind)
-            process.stderr.write(`::warning:: decider returned kind "${r.kind}" for a "${req.kind}" request (id ${decisionId}) → sending a safe deny/cancel; the agent did NOT receive an answer\n`);
+            warn(`::warning:: decider returned kind "${r.kind}" for a "${req.kind}" request (id ${decisionId}) → sending a safe deny/cancel; the agent did NOT receive an answer\n`);
         this.write(serializeDecision(req, r));
     }
     close() {
@@ -333,13 +355,12 @@ export class LiveAgentSession {
     }
     write(obj) {
         const line = JSON.stringify(obj);
-        // #54: the control protocol writes small single-line JSON frames, so stdin backpressure
-        // effectively never engages; we intentionally ignore the write() return / drain here. If frame
-        // sizes ever grow, revisit with a drain-aware queue (which would make write()/respond() async).
-        // #47: guard that assumption — a frame past the threshold warns loudly so the "revisit" trigger
-        // fires instead of silently risking partial buffering on a frame far larger than expected.
+        // The control protocol writes small single-line JSON frames, so stdin backpressure effectively never
+        // engages; we ignore the write() return / drain here. A frame past the safe threshold is anomalous —
+        // hard-FAIL rather than risk a partially-buffered write that silently corrupts the protocol stream.
+        // (If large control frames ever become legitimate, switch to a drain-aware queue, making writes async.)
         if (line.length > 256 * 1024)
-            process.stderr.write(`::warning:: control frame is ${line.length} bytes (> 256 KiB) — stdin backpressure may engage; revisit write() with a drain-aware queue\n`);
+            throw new Error(`control frame is ${line.length} bytes (> 256 KiB safe limit) — refusing to write to avoid partial stdin buffering; this indicates an unexpectedly large control payload`);
         this.controlOut.write(line + "\n");
         this.proc.stdin.write(line + "\n");
     }
@@ -393,6 +414,7 @@ export function parseMessage(msg) {
                         ev.push({
                             type: "subagent_dispatch",
                             toolUseId: String(block.id ?? ""),
+                            parentToolUseId,
                             // Skills often dispatch with only {description, prompt} (no subagent_type) → agentType is
                             // "unknown" but the description still identifies the dispatch (e.g. "TOP_DOWN market sizing").
                             agentType: String(inp.subagent_type ?? inp.subagentType ?? "unknown"),
@@ -415,6 +437,7 @@ export function parseMessage(msg) {
                         toolUseId: block.tool_use_id ? String(block.tool_use_id) : undefined,
                         isError: !!block.is_error,
                         text: toolResultText(block.content),
+                        provenanceText: toolResultRaw(block.content),
                     });
             }
             break;
@@ -424,17 +447,27 @@ export function parseMessage(msg) {
     }
     return ev;
 }
-/** Flatten a tool_result `content` (a string, or an array of `{type:"text",text}` blocks) to a short string. */
-function toolResultText(content) {
+/** Flatten a tool_result `content` (a string, or an array of `{type:"text",text}` blocks), capped at
+ *  `max` chars. The 500-char DISPLAY value (toolResultText) keeps the recorder/trace compact; the larger
+ *  PROVENANCE value (toolResultRaw) is what seeds web_fetch provenance, so a URL past char 500 isn't lost. */
+function flattenToolResult(content, max) {
     if (typeof content === "string")
-        return content.slice(0, 500);
+        return content.slice(0, max);
     if (Array.isArray(content))
         return content
             .map((b) => (b && typeof b === "object" && "text" in b ? String(b.text) : ""))
             .join(" ")
-            .slice(0, 500);
+            .slice(0, max);
     return "";
 }
+function toolResultText(content) {
+    return flattenToolResult(content, 500);
+}
+/** Larger cap for provenance (URL extraction) — matches the web_fetch body cap so any URL the agent
+ *  could realistically act on is seeded; still bounded so a pathological result can't blow up memory. */
+function toolResultRaw(content) {
+    return flattenToolResult(content, 200_000);
+}
 export function toDecisionRequest(msg) {
     const sub = msg.request?.subtype;
     const id = msg.request_id;

package/dist/assert.js

@@ -1,5 +1,41 @@
-import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
-import { join } from "node:path";
+import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { resolve, relative, isAbsolute, sep } from "node:path";
+import { compileUserRegex } from "./regex.js";
+/** Resolve a user-authored assertion path under `workRoot`, rejecting absolute paths and any `..` that
+ *  escapes the root. Returns the absolute path, or null if it would leave `workRoot`. Assertion paths are
+ *  author-controlled, not attacker input, but a `file_exists: "../../etc/passwd"` silently probing the host
+ *  FS (or an `outputs/../../x` slipping past the user-visible prefix check) is a containment bug regardless. */
+function containedPath(workRoot, p) {
+    if (isAbsolute(p))
+        return null;
+    const root = resolve(workRoot);
+    const abs = resolve(root, p);
+    const rel = relative(root, abs);
+    if (rel === ".." || rel.startsWith(".." + sep) || isAbsolute(rel))
+        return null;
+    return abs;
+}
+export function resolveDotPath(doc, path) {
+    if (!path)
+        return { state: "value", value: doc };
+    const segs = path.split(".");
+    let cur = doc;
+    for (let i = 0; i < segs.length; i++) {
+        const seg = segs[i];
+        const last = i === segs.length - 1;
+        if (cur === null || typeof cur !== "object")
+            return { state: "unresolved", at: segs.slice(0, i).join(".") || "(root)" };
+        const obj = cur;
+        const has = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, seg);
+        if (last)
+            return has ? { state: "value", value: obj[seg] } : { state: "absent" };
+        if (!has)
+            return { state: "unresolved", at: segs.slice(0, i + 1).join(".") };
+        cur = obj[seg];
+    }
+    return { state: "value", value: cur };
+}
+const jsonEq = (a, b) => JSON.stringify(a) === JSON.stringify(b);
 /**
  * Boundary-aware host matching: `host` must equal `needle` exactly or be a proper subdomain of it.
  * `evilanthropic.com` does NOT match `anthropic.com`; `x.anthropic.com` does.
@@ -30,36 +66,41 @@ function check(a, ctx) {
     // `evaluate()` is a bare `.map(check)` with no error boundary, so a malformed pattern must be a
     // clean assertion failure, not an uncaught throw. Case-insensitive ("i").
     if (a.transcript_matches !== undefined) {
-        let re;
-        try {
-            re = new RegExp(a.transcript_matches, "i");
-        }
-        catch (e) {
-            results.push(fail(`transcript_matches: bad regex "${a.transcript_matches}": ${String(e.message)}`));
-        }
-        if (re)
-            results.push(re.test(ctx.transcript) ? ok() : fail(`transcript did not match /${a.transcript_matches}/i`));
+        const c = compileUserRegex(a.transcript_matches);
+        if ("error" in c)
+            results.push(fail(`transcript_matches: bad regex "${a.transcript_matches}": ${c.error}`));
+        else
+            results.push(c.re.test(ctx.transcript) ? ok() : fail(`transcript did not match /${a.transcript_matches}/i`));
     }
     if (a.transcript_not_matches !== undefined) {
-        let re;
-        try {
-            re = new RegExp(a.transcript_not_matches, "i");
-        }
-        catch (e) {
-            results.push(fail(`transcript_not_matches: bad regex "${a.transcript_not_matches}": ${String(e.message)}`));
-        }
-        if (re)
-            results.push(!re.test(ctx.transcript) ? ok() : fail(`transcript unexpectedly matched /${a.transcript_not_matches}/i`));
+        const c = compileUserRegex(a.transcript_not_matches);
+        if ("error" in c)
+            results.push(fail(`transcript_not_matches: bad regex "${a.transcript_not_matches}": ${c.error}`));
+        else
+            results.push(!c.re.test(ctx.transcript) ? ok() : fail(`transcript unexpectedly matched /${a.transcript_not_matches}/i`));
+    }
+    if (a.file_exists !== undefined) {
+        const abs = containedPath(ctx.workRoot, a.file_exists);
+        if (!abs)
+            results.push(fail(`unsafe file_exists path "${a.file_exists}" — must stay under the work root (no absolute paths or "..")`));
+        else
+            results.push(existsSync(abs) ? ok() : fail(`file not found: ${a.file_exists} (under ${ctx.workRoot})`));
     }
-    if (a.file_exists !== undefined)
-        results.push(existsSync(join(ctx.workRoot, a.file_exists)) ? ok() : fail(`file not found: ${a.file_exists} (under ${ctx.workRoot})`));
     if (a.user_visible_artifact !== undefined) {
         const p = a.user_visible_artifact;
-        const visible = ctx.userVisiblePrefixes.some((pre) => p === pre || p.startsWith(pre + "/"));
-        if (!visible)
-            results.push(fail(`"${p}" is not under a user-visible prefix (${ctx.userVisiblePrefixes.join(", ")}) — invisible to the user in Cowork`));
-        else
-            results.push(existsSync(join(ctx.workRoot, p)) ? ok() : fail(`user-visible artifact not found: ${p}`));
+        const abs = containedPath(ctx.workRoot, p);
+        if (!abs) {
+            // normalize/contain BEFORE the prefix test so `outputs/../../x` can't pass startsWith("outputs/")
+            results.push(fail(`unsafe user_visible_artifact path "${p}" — must stay under the work root (no absolute paths or "..")`));
+        }
+        else {
+            const rel = relative(resolve(ctx.workRoot), abs); // normalized, guaranteed under workRoot
+            const visible = ctx.userVisiblePrefixes.some((pre) => rel === pre || rel.startsWith(pre + "/"));
+            if (!visible)
+                results.push(fail(`"${p}" is not under a user-visible prefix (${ctx.userVisiblePrefixes.join(", ")}) — invisible to the user in Cowork`));
+            else
+                results.push(existsSync(abs) ? ok() : fail(`user-visible artifact not found: ${p}`));
+        }
     }
     if (a.tool_called !== undefined)
         results.push(ctx.toolsCalled.has(a.tool_called) ? ok() : fail(`tool not called: ${a.tool_called}`));
@@ -72,15 +113,11 @@ function check(a, ctx) {
     if (a.subagent_dispatched !== undefined) {
         // Match the agentType OR the description — skills often dispatch with only a `description`
         // (no subagent_type → agentType "unknown"), so name-matching alone would miss those (O1).
-        let rx;
-        try {
-            rx = new RegExp(a.subagent_dispatched, "i");
-        }
-        catch (e) {
-            results.push(fail(`subagent_dispatched: bad regex "${a.subagent_dispatched}": ${String(e.message)}`));
-        }
-        if (rx)
-            results.push(ctx.subagents.some((s) => rx.test(s.agentType) || rx.test(s.description ?? ""))
+        const c = compileUserRegex(a.subagent_dispatched);
+        if ("error" in c)
+            results.push(fail(`subagent_dispatched: bad regex "${a.subagent_dispatched}": ${c.error}`));
+        else
+            results.push(ctx.subagents.some((s) => c.re.test(s.agentType) || c.re.test(s.description ?? ""))
                 ? ok()
                 : fail(`no sub-agent matching "${a.subagent_dispatched}" was dispatched (by type or description)`));
     }
@@ -112,18 +149,18 @@ function check(a, ctx) {
             : fail(`delete op(s) touched outputs (forbidden in Cowork): ${ctx.outputsDeletes.slice(0, 3).join("; ")}`));
     if (a.self_heal_ran !== undefined)
         results.push(ctx.selfHealRan === a.self_heal_ran ? ok() : fail(`self_heal_ran was ${ctx.selfHealRan}, expected ${a.self_heal_ran}`));
+    // Verdict modifier (consumed by computeVerdict, not here). It always "passes" as an assertion so a
+    // standalone `{allow_permissive_auto_allow: true}` is a valid non-empty assertion, not "empty assertion".
+    if (a.allow_permissive_auto_allow !== undefined)
+        results.push(ok());
     if (a.transcript_no_host_path !== undefined)
         results.push(!ctx.hostPathLeaked === a.transcript_no_host_path ? ok() : fail(`host path leaked into model-visible text: ${ctx.hostPathLeaked}`));
     if (a.question_asked !== undefined) {
-        let rx;
-        try {
-            rx = new RegExp(a.question_asked, "i");
-        }
-        catch (e) {
-            results.push(fail(`question_asked: bad regex "${a.question_asked}": ${String(e.message)}`));
-        }
-        if (rx)
-            results.push(ctx.questions.some((q) => rx.test(q)) ? ok() : fail(`no question matched: ${a.question_asked}`));
+        const c = compileUserRegex(a.question_asked);
+        if ("error" in c)
+            results.push(fail(`question_asked: bad regex "${a.question_asked}": ${c.error}`));
+        else
+            results.push(ctx.questions.some((q) => c.re.test(q)) ? ok() : fail(`no question matched: ${a.question_asked}`));
     }
     if (a.questions_count_max !== undefined)
         results.push(ctx.questions.length <= a.questions_count_max ? ok() : fail(`asked ${ctx.questions.length} questions, max ${a.questions_count_max}`));
@@ -150,6 +187,67 @@ function check(a, ctx) {
             results.push(failedConfirmed.length > 0 ? ok() : fail(`expected a confirmed gate-delivery failure but none was observed`));
         }
     }
+    if (a.artifact_json !== undefined) {
+        const aj = a.artifact_json;
+        const file = containedPath(ctx.workRoot, aj.artifact);
+        if (!file)
+            results.push(fail(`unsafe artifact_json path "${aj.artifact}" — must stay under the work root (no absolute paths or "..")`));
+        else if (!existsSync(file))
+            results.push(fail(`artifact_json: file not found: ${aj.artifact} (under ${ctx.workRoot})`));
+        else {
+            let doc;
+            let parsed = true;
+            try {
+                doc = JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, "utf8"));
+            }
+            catch (e) {
+                parsed = false;
+                results.push(fail(`artifact_json: ${aj.artifact} is not valid JSON: ${String(e.message)}`));
+            }
+            if (parsed) {
+                const r = resolveDotPath(doc, aj.path);
+                if (r.state === "unresolved") {
+                    // Malformed/truncated artifact for this path — fail loud, NOT a vacuous "absent" pass (the H4
+                    // false-green at the field level).
+                    results.push(fail(`artifact_json: path "${aj.path}" unresolvable in ${aj.artifact} — intermediate "${r.at}" is missing or not an object`));
+                }
+                else {
+                    const present = r.state === "value";
+                    const val = r.state === "value" ? r.value : undefined;
+                    let any = false;
+                    if (aj.exists !== undefined) {
+                        any = true;
+                        results.push(present === aj.exists ? ok() : fail(`artifact_json: "${aj.path ?? "(root)"}" exists=${present}, expected ${aj.exists}`));
+                    }
+                    if (aj.absent !== undefined) {
+                        any = true;
+                        const absent = r.state === "absent";
+                        results.push(absent === aj.absent ? ok() : fail(`artifact_json: "${aj.path}" absent=${absent}, expected ${aj.absent}`));
+                    }
+                    if (aj.is_null !== undefined) {
+                        any = true;
+                        const isNull = present && val === null;
+                        results.push(isNull === aj.is_null ? ok() : fail(`artifact_json: "${aj.path}" is_null=${isNull}, expected ${aj.is_null}`));
+                    }
+                    if (aj.equals !== undefined) {
+                        any = true;
+                        results.push(present && jsonEq(val, aj.equals)
+                            ? ok()
+                            : fail(`artifact_json: "${aj.path}" = ${JSON.stringify(val)}, expected ${JSON.stringify(aj.equals)}`));
+                    }
+                    if (aj.gt !== undefined) {
+                        any = true;
+                        results.push(typeof val === "number" && val > aj.gt
+                            ? ok()
+                            : fail(`artifact_json: "${aj.path}" = ${JSON.stringify(val)}, expected > ${aj.gt}`));
+                    }
+                    // No operator → an existence assertion (the value must be present).
+                    if (!any)
+                        results.push(present ? ok() : fail(`artifact_json: "${aj.path ?? "(root)"}" is not present (no operator given → existence check)`));
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
     if (a.result !== undefined)
         results.push(ctx.result === a.result ? ok() : fail(`result was ${ctx.result}, expected ${a.result}`));
     if (results.length === 0)

package/dist/boundary.js

@@ -23,67 +23,73 @@ export function runBoundaryChecks(baseline, session) {
     const sidecar = startEgressSidecar(boundaryAllowList(baseline, session), mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "cowork-bchk-")), runId);
     const network = sidecar.network;
     const proxy = sidecar.proxyUrl;
-    const probe = (shell, withProxy = false) => spawnSync(runtime, [
-        "run",
-        "--rm",
-        "--platform",
-        "linux/arm64",
-        "--network",
-        network,
-        ...(withProxy ? ["-e", `HTTPS_PROXY=${proxy}`, "-e", `HTTP_PROXY=${proxy}`] : []),
-        "--entrypoint",
-        "sh",
-        image,
-        "-c",
-        shell,
-    ], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 30_000 });
-    // 1. Host filesystem is NOT visible (no /Users, no host home bind).
-    {
-        const r = probe(`ls /Users 2>&1 || true; ls /host 2>&1 || true`);
-        const out = (r.stdout ?? "") + (r.stderr ?? "");
-        const blocked = isHostFsSealed(out);
-        results.push({
-            check: "host-fs-sealed",
-            expectation: "host paths (/Users, /host) invisible",
-            pass: blocked,
-            detail: out.trim().slice(0, 200),
-        });
+    // Probes can throw (spawnSync setup errors, etc.); tear the sidecar down in `finally` so an unexpected
+    // throw never leaks the proxy container + both Docker networks.
+    try {
+        const probe = (shell, withProxy = false) => spawnSync(runtime, [
+            "run",
+            "--rm",
+            "--platform",
+            "linux/arm64",
+            "--network",
+            network,
+            ...(withProxy ? ["-e", `HTTPS_PROXY=${proxy}`, "-e", `HTTP_PROXY=${proxy}`] : []),
+            "--entrypoint",
+            "sh",
+            image,
+            "-c",
+            shell,
+        ], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 30_000 });
+        // 1. Host filesystem is NOT visible (no /Users, no host home bind).
+        {
+            const r = probe(`ls /Users 2>&1 || true; ls /host 2>&1 || true`);
+            const out = (r.stdout ?? "") + (r.stderr ?? "");
+            const blocked = isHostFsSealed(out);
+            results.push({
+                check: "host-fs-sealed",
+                expectation: "host paths (/Users, /host) invisible",
+                pass: blocked,
+                detail: out.trim().slice(0, 200),
+            });
+        }
+        // 2. Direct (non-proxied) egress is impossible — no route off the internal net.
+        {
+            const r = probe(`curl -sS -m 5 -o /dev/null http://example.com && echo REACHED || echo BLOCKED`);
+            const out = ((r.stdout ?? "") + (r.stderr ?? "")).trim();
+            results.push({
+                check: "direct-egress-denied",
+                expectation: "no route to internet without proxy",
+                pass: /BLOCKED/.test(out) && !/REACHED/.test(out),
+                detail: out,
+            });
+        }
+        // 3. Non-allowlisted egress via the proxy is refused (403).
+        {
+            const r = probe(`curl -sS -m 5 -o /dev/null https://example.com && echo REACHED || echo BLOCKED`, true);
+            const out = ((r.stdout ?? "") + (r.stderr ?? "")).trim();
+            results.push({
+                check: "allowlist-enforced",
+                expectation: "off-list host refused by proxy",
+                pass: /BLOCKED|403/.test(out) && !/REACHED/.test(out),
+                detail: out.slice(0, 200),
+            });
+        }
+        // 4. Allowlisted egress via the proxy works (so the agent can reach inference).
+        {
+            const r = probe(`curl -sS -m 8 -o /dev/null https://api.anthropic.com && echo OK || echo FAIL`, true);
+            const out = ((r.stdout ?? "") + (r.stderr ?? "")).trim();
+            results.push({
+                check: "allowlist-permits",
+                expectation: "allowlisted host reachable via proxy",
+                pass: /OK/.test(out),
+                detail: out.slice(0, 200),
+            });
+        }
+        return results;
     }
-    // 2. Direct (non-proxied) egress is impossible — no route off the internal net.
-    {
-        const r = probe(`curl -sS -m 5 -o /dev/null http://example.com && echo REACHED || echo BLOCKED`);
-        const out = ((r.stdout ?? "") + (r.stderr ?? "")).trim();
-        results.push({
-            check: "direct-egress-denied",
-            expectation: "no route to internet without proxy",
-            pass: /BLOCKED/.test(out) && !/REACHED/.test(out),
-            detail: out,
-        });
+    finally {
+        sidecar.teardown();
     }
-    // 3. Non-allowlisted egress via the proxy is refused (403).
-    {
-        const r = probe(`curl -sS -m 5 -o /dev/null https://example.com && echo REACHED || echo BLOCKED`, true);
-        const out = ((r.stdout ?? "") + (r.stderr ?? "")).trim();
-        results.push({
-            check: "allowlist-enforced",
-            expectation: "off-list host refused by proxy",
-            pass: /BLOCKED|403/.test(out) && !/REACHED/.test(out),
-            detail: out.slice(0, 200),
-        });
-    }
-    // 4. Allowlisted egress via the proxy works (so the agent can reach inference).
-    {
-        const r = probe(`curl -sS -m 8 -o /dev/null https://api.anthropic.com && echo OK || echo FAIL`, true);
-        const out = ((r.stdout ?? "") + (r.stderr ?? "")).trim();
-        results.push({
-            check: "allowlist-permits",
-            expectation: "allowlisted host reachable via proxy",
-            pass: /OK/.test(out),
-            detail: out.slice(0, 200),
-        });
-    }
-    sidecar.teardown();
-    return results;
 }
 /** Escape regex metacharacters in a literal so it can be embedded in a RegExp. */
 function escapeRegex(s) {