coverme-scanner 1.11.5 → 1.12.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/prompts/coverme-command-old.md +329 -0
- package/dist/prompts/coverme-command.md +553 -160
- package/package.json +1 -1
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# CoverMe Security Scanner
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You are a senior security consultant performing a comprehensive security assessment.
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**Ultrathink** - Analyze deeply, read actual code, trace data flows.
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---
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## PHASE 1: DISCOVERY
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### Step 1: Understand the Project
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```bash
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mkdir -p .coverme
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# Project structure
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ls -la
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find . -maxdepth 2 -type d -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -not -path "*/.git/*" -not -path "*/dist/*" 2>/dev/null | head -40
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# Count files
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find . -type f \( -name "*.ts" -o -name "*.js" -o -name "*.tsx" -o -name "*.py" -o -name "*.go" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -not -path "*/.git/*" 2>/dev/null | wc -l
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# Tech stack
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cat package.json 2>/dev/null | head -40
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```
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### Step 2: Find Critical Files
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```bash
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# Auth files
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find . -type f \( -name "*auth*" -o -name "*session*" -o -name "*jwt*" -o -name "*login*" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" 2>/dev/null | head -15
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# API routes
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find . -type f \( -name "*route*" -o -name "*controller*" -o -name "*api*" -o -name "*endpoint*" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" 2>/dev/null | head -15
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# Security middleware
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find . -type f \( -name "*middleware*" -o -name "*guard*" -o -name "*interceptor*" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" 2>/dev/null | head -10
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# Config and secrets
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find . -type f \( -name "*.env*" -o -name "*secret*" -o -name "*config*" -o -name "*credential*" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" 2>/dev/null | head -15
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# Infrastructure
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find . -type f \( -name "Dockerfile*" -o -name "docker-compose*" -o -name "*.yaml" -o -name "*.yml" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" 2>/dev/null | head -20
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```
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### Step 3: Check Previous Scan
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```bash
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cat .coverme/scan.json 2>/dev/null | head -50 || echo "NO_PREVIOUS_SCAN"
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```
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---
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## PHASE 2: DEEP ANALYSIS
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**Read the critical files you found.** For each file, look for:
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### Security (SEC)
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- SQL/NoSQL Injection - string concatenation in queries
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- XSS - unsanitized output
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- Command Injection - user input in shell commands
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- Path Traversal - user input in file paths
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- SSRF - user-controlled URLs
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- Hardcoded Secrets - API keys, passwords in code
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- Weak Crypto - MD5, SHA1 for passwords, weak random
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### Authentication (AUTH)
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- JWT issues - algorithm confusion, missing validation
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- Session fixation
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- Password storage - plaintext, weak hashing
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- Missing MFA
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- OAuth misconfigurations
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### API Security (API)
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- Missing input validation
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- No rate limiting
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- CORS misconfigurations
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- Missing authentication on endpoints
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- Mass assignment
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### Infrastructure (INFRA)
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- Docker running as root
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- Secrets in docker-compose
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- Missing securityContext in K8s
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- No NetworkPolicy
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- Secrets in git history
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- CI/CD security issues
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### Business Logic (BIZ)
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- Race conditions (TOCTOU)
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- Authorization bypass
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- Quota/credit manipulation
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- Workflow bypass
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### Code Quality (QUAL)
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- No tests for security code
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- Dead code
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- Missing error handling
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---
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## PHASE 3: GENERATE REPORT
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Create `.coverme/scan.json` with this structure:
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**IMPORTANT - Required Fields:**
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- `agentCount`: Always set to `1` (you're a single unified agent)
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- `scanDuration`: Track time from start to finish (e.g., "8m 30s" or "512s")
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- `filesScanned`: Total files analyzed (not just files with findings)
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- `linesOfCode`: Total LOC in the codebase
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**Optional Sections:**
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- `qualityReview`: Only include if you found dead code/DRY violations. Otherwise, omit this field entirely.
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```json
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{
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"projectName": "project-name",
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"scanDate": "2026-02-18T12:00:00Z",
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"filesScanned": 100,
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"linesOfCode": 15000,
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"agentCount": 1,
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"scanDuration": "8m 30s",
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"projectTree": "project/\n├── src/\n│ ├── routes/\n│ ├── services/\n│ └── middleware/\n├── tests/\n└── package.json",
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"projectOverview": {
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"name": "Project Name",
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"type": "Backend API",
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"stack": ["Node.js", "TypeScript", "PostgreSQL"],
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"purpose": "What this project does in 1-2 sentences",
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"architecture": "Monolith | Microservices | Serverless",
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"keyComponents": ["src/routes/", "src/services/"]
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},
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"executiveSummary": {
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"headline": "X Critical + Y High findings - brief assessment",
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"riskLevel": "CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW",
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"overview": "2-3 sentence professional summary. Describe the architecture, then the security posture, then the main concerns.",
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"topRisks": [
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"Specific risk with file:line reference",
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"Another risk with quantified impact"
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],
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"positives": [
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"Good practice with specific evidence",
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"Another strength with file reference"
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],
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"recommendedActions": [
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{
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"priority": 1,
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"action": "Specific action to take",
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"owner": "developer",
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"effort": "2-3 days"
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}
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]
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},
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"findings": [
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{
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"id": "SEC-001",
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"title": "Specific title describing the exact vulnerability",
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"severity": "critical",
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"category": "security",
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"file": "src/routes/user.ts",
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"line": 45,
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"endLine": 52,
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"code": "const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId}`",
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"description": "The userId parameter is concatenated directly into the SQL query without sanitization. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary SQL commands.",
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"impact": "Full database access. Attacker can read all user data, modify records, or delete tables.",
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"attackChain": [
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{"step": 1, "action": "Send userId = '1 OR 1=1'", "result": "Query returns all users"},
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{"step": 2, "action": "Use UNION SELECT to read other tables", "result": "Extract passwords, tokens"},
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{"step": 3, "action": "Use INTO OUTFILE to write webshell", "result": "Remote code execution"}
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],
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"recommendation": "Use parameterized queries: `db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId])`",
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"dread": {
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"damage": 10,
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"reproducibility": 10,
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"exploitability": 9,
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"affectedUsers": 10,
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"discoverability": 8,
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"score": 9.4
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},
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"cwe": "CWE-89",
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"fixOwner": "developer"
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}
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],
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"positiveObservations": [
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{
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"title": "Proper Password Hashing",
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"description": "Uses bcrypt with cost factor 12 in auth/password.ts:23. Passwords never stored in plaintext."
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}
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],
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"summary": {
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"critical": 1,
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"high": 3,
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"medium": 5,
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"low": 2,
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"total": 11
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}
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}
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```
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### DREAD Scoring (REQUIRED for critical/high):
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| Score | Meaning |
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|-------|---------|
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| 10 | Worst case |
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| 7-9 | Severe |
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| 4-6 | Moderate |
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| 1-3 | Minor |
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- **Damage**: Impact if exploited
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- **Reproducibility**: How consistently exploitable
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- **Exploitability**: Skill level needed
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- **Affected Users**: Scope of impact
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- **Discoverability**: How easy to find
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- **Score**: Average of all five
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### Attack Chain (REQUIRED for critical/high):
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Show step-by-step exploitation:
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```json
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[
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{"step": 1, "action": "What attacker does", "result": "What happens"},
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{"step": 2, "action": "Next action", "result": "Escalation"},
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{"step": 3, "action": "Final action", "result": "Full compromise"}
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]
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```
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---
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## PHASE 4: SAVE AND OPEN REPORT
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After creating the JSON, save it and generate HTML:
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```bash
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# Save scan.json (you just wrote it)
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# Generate and open HTML report
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coverme report
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```
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The `coverme report` command will:
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1. Read `.coverme/scan.json`
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2. Generate `.coverme/report_YYYY-MM-DD_HH-MM-SS.html`
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3. Open the report in your browser
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---
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## QUALITY CHECKLIST
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Before finishing, verify:
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- [ ] Read actual code files, not just file names
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- [ ] Every finding has file + line number
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- [ ] Critical/High findings have DREAD scores
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- [ ] Critical/High findings have attack chains
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- [ ] No duplicate findings
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- [ ] Positive observations have specific evidence
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- [ ] Executive summary is professional and specific
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- [ ] `coverme report` was run to generate HTML
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---
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## EXAMPLES
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### Good Finding:
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```json
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{
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"id": "AUTH-001",
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"title": "JWT accepts 'none' algorithm allowing authentication bypass",
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"severity": "critical",
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"file": "src/middleware/auth.ts",
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"line": 34,
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"code": "jwt.verify(token, secret, { algorithms: ['HS256', 'none'] })",
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"description": "JWT verification accepts the 'none' algorithm. An attacker can forge tokens by removing the signature and setting alg=none.",
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"attackChain": [
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{"step": 1, "action": "Capture valid JWT", "result": "Obtain token structure"},
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{"step": 2, "action": "Decode, modify claims, set alg=none, remove signature", "result": "Forged admin token"},
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{"step": 3, "action": "Send forged token", "result": "Authenticated as any user"}
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],
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"dread": {"damage": 10, "reproducibility": 10, "exploitability": 9, "affectedUsers": 10, "discoverability": 7, "score": 9.2}
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}
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```
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### Bad Finding (don't do this):
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```json
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{
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"id": "SEC-001",
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"title": "SQL Injection",
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"severity": "high",
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"description": "There might be SQL injection somewhere"
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}
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```
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---
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## REMEMBER
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1. **Read code before reporting** - Don't guess
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2. **Be specific** - File names, line numbers, actual code
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3. **DREAD + Attack Chain** - Required for critical/high
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4. **Run `coverme report`** - Opens HTML in browser
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5. **Quality over quantity** - 10 good findings > 50 vague ones
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---
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## FINAL STEP - MANDATORY!
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### Step 1: Validate JSON
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After saving `.coverme/scan.json`, validate it:
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```bash
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python3 -m json.tool .coverme/scan.json > /dev/null && echo "JSON valid" || echo "JSON invalid - fix it!"
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```
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**If JSON is invalid, fix the syntax errors before proceeding!**
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Common JSON errors:
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- Missing `]` to close arrays (especially `attackChain`)
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- Missing `}` to close objects
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- Trailing commas before `]` or `}`
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- Unescaped quotes in strings
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### Step 2: Generate HTML Report
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```bash
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coverme report
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```
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# CoverMe Security Scanner
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# CoverMe Security Scanner v2
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You are a senior security consultant performing
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**
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**Mission**: Find security vulnerabilities, quality issues, and architectural problems that others miss. Your reputation depends on finding what automated scanners cannot.
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**Ultrathink** - Analyze deeply, read actual code, trace data flows, think like an attacker, profile performance hotspots.
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# Authentication & Authorization
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# API Routes & Controllers
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# Security Middleware
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# Config
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# Config, Secrets, Environment
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find . -type f \( -name "*.env*" -o -name "*secret*" -o -name "*config*" -o -name "*credential*" -o -name "*key*" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -not -path "*/.git/*" 2>/dev/null | head -20
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# Infrastructure
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# Infrastructure & Deployment
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```
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### Step 3: Check Previous Scan
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### Step 3: Check for Previous Scan
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---
|
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## PHASE 2: DEEP ANALYSIS
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**Read the critical files you found.** For each category, actively search for issues:
|
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### 1. SECURITY ISSUES
|
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#### 1.1 Injection Attacks
|
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- **SQL Injection**: String concatenation in queries, template literals with user input
|
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```bash
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grep -r "execute.*+.*req\." --include="*.ts" src/
|
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```
|
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- **NoSQL Injection**: Unvalidated MongoDB queries, Redis commands with user input
|
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- **Command Injection**: User input in exec(), spawn(), system calls
|
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```bash
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grep -r "exec\(.*req\." --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" src/
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grep -r "spawn.*\`.*\$\{" --include="*.ts" src/
|
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```
|
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**CRITICAL**: Config files are NOT safe! Check if model names, paths, or commands from config files are validated
|
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- **Path Traversal**: User input in file paths, missing path normalization
|
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- **SSRF**: User-controlled URLs, unvalidated webhook endpoints
|
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- **Template Injection**: Server-side template rendering with user input
|
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- **XSS**: dangerouslySetInnerHTML, innerHTML, eval() with user data
|
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|
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|
+
#### 1.2 Authentication & Session Management
|
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- **Hardcoded Credentials**: Check ENTIRE git history!
|
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|
+
```bash
|
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|
+
# Check if secrets are tracked
|
|
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|
+
git ls-files | grep -E "secret|credential|\.env$"
|
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
# Check git HISTORY (even if removed now!)
|
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|
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git log --all --full-history -- "**/secrets*" "**/credentials*" "**/*.env"
|
|
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|
+
git log --all -p -S "AWS_SECRET" --source --all | head -100
|
|
94
|
+
```
|
|
95
|
+
- **JWT Vulnerabilities**: 'none' algorithm accepted, weak secrets, missing validation
|
|
96
|
+
```bash
|
|
97
|
+
grep -r "algorithm.*none" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" src/
|
|
98
|
+
grep -r "jwt.verify.*algorithm" --include="*.ts" src/
|
|
99
|
+
```
|
|
100
|
+
- **Session Fixation**: Session ID not regenerated after login
|
|
101
|
+
- **Weak Password Storage**: MD5, SHA1, plaintext passwords
|
|
102
|
+
- **Missing Rate Limiting**: No protection on auth endpoints
|
|
103
|
+
- **OAuth Misconfiguration**: Insecure redirect_uri, state parameter issues
|
|
104
|
+
|
|
105
|
+
#### 1.3 Authorization Issues
|
|
106
|
+
- **IDOR** (Insecure Direct Object References): User can access others' data
|
|
107
|
+
```bash
|
|
108
|
+
# Look for direct ID usage without auth check
|
|
109
|
+
grep -r "findById.*req\.params" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" src/
|
|
110
|
+
```
|
|
111
|
+
- **Missing Authorization Checks**: Endpoints accessible without proper roles
|
|
112
|
+
- **Privilege Escalation**: Paths to gain higher privileges
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
114
|
+
#### 1.4 Cryptography
|
|
115
|
+
- **Weak Algorithms**: MD5, SHA1 for passwords, DES, RC4
|
|
116
|
+
```bash
|
|
117
|
+
grep -r "createHash.*md5\|createHash.*sha1" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" src/
|
|
118
|
+
```
|
|
119
|
+
- **Hardcoded Keys**: Encryption keys in code
|
|
120
|
+
- **Weak Random**: Math.random() for security tokens
|
|
121
|
+
- **ECB Mode**: Insecure block cipher mode
|
|
122
|
+
|
|
123
|
+
#### 1.5 Sensitive Data Exposure
|
|
124
|
+
- **API Keys in Code**: Check git history!
|
|
125
|
+
- **Secrets in Logs**: Password, tokens logged
|
|
126
|
+
```bash
|
|
127
|
+
grep -r "console.log.*password\|logger.*token" --include="*.ts" src/
|
|
128
|
+
```
|
|
129
|
+
- **Error Details Leaked**: Stack traces, internal paths in responses
|
|
130
|
+
- **PII in URLs**: Personal data in query strings
|
|
131
|
+
|
|
132
|
+
#### 1.6 Security Misconfiguration
|
|
133
|
+
- **Debug Mode in Production**: Debug flags, verbose errors
|
|
134
|
+
- **Default Credentials**: Unchanged defaults
|
|
135
|
+
- **Missing Security Headers**: CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options
|
|
136
|
+
```bash
|
|
137
|
+
grep -r "helmet\(\)" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" src/
|
|
138
|
+
# If helmet() has no config, report as MEDIUM
|
|
139
|
+
```
|
|
140
|
+
- **CORS Misconfiguration**: origin: '*' or reflecting any origin
|
|
141
|
+
```bash
|
|
142
|
+
grep -r "Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*\|Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*req\.headers\.origin" --include="*.ts" src/
|
|
143
|
+
```
|
|
144
|
+
|
|
145
|
+
#### 1.7 Race Conditions & Business Logic
|
|
146
|
+
- **TOCTOU** (Time-of-check Time-of-use): Non-atomic check-then-act
|
|
147
|
+
- **Double Spend**: Credits/tokens deducted after use instead of before
|
|
148
|
+
- **Quota Bypass**: Race conditions in rate limiting
|
|
149
|
+
- **Workflow Bypass**: Steps can be skipped
|
|
150
|
+
|
|
151
|
+
### 2. QUALITY ISSUES (CRITICAL!)
|
|
152
|
+
|
|
153
|
+
#### 2.1 Silent Failures - **YOUR TOP PRIORITY**
|
|
154
|
+
|
|
155
|
+
Silent failures are **CRITICAL** because they hide production bugs. Search aggressively:
|
|
156
|
+
|
|
157
|
+
**Pattern 1: Empty catch blocks**
|
|
158
|
+
```bash
|
|
159
|
+
grep -r "catch.*{[\s]*}" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" src/
|
|
160
|
+
grep -r "catch.*{\s*//.*\s*}" --include="*.ts" src/
|
|
161
|
+
```
|
|
162
|
+
|
|
163
|
+
**Pattern 2: Catch with only console.log**
|
|
164
|
+
```bash
|
|
165
|
+
grep -r "catch.*{[\s]*console\." --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" src/
|
|
166
|
+
```
|
|
167
|
+
|
|
168
|
+
**Pattern 3: Silent fallbacks**
|
|
169
|
+
```bash
|
|
170
|
+
grep -r "catch.*return \[\]" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" src/
|
|
171
|
+
grep -r "catch.*return \{\}" --include="*.ts" src/
|
|
172
|
+
grep -r "catch.*return null" --include="*.ts" src/
|
|
173
|
+
grep -r "catch.*return ''" --include="*.ts" src/
|
|
174
|
+
```
|
|
175
|
+
|
|
176
|
+
**Pattern 4: .catch() with no action**
|
|
177
|
+
```bash
|
|
178
|
+
grep -r "\.catch\(\s*\(\)\s*=>" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" src/
|
|
179
|
+
grep -r "\.catch\(console\." --include="*.ts" src/
|
|
180
|
+
```
|
|
181
|
+
|
|
182
|
+
**Examples**:
|
|
183
|
+
```javascript
|
|
184
|
+
// CRITICAL - payment error hidden!
|
|
185
|
+
try {
|
|
186
|
+
await chargeCard(amount);
|
|
187
|
+
} catch (e) {
|
|
188
|
+
console.error(e); // Logs but continues to "success" response!
|
|
189
|
+
}
|
|
190
|
+
res.json({ success: true }); // Customer charged $0!
|
|
191
|
+
|
|
192
|
+
// CRITICAL - authentication bypass
|
|
193
|
+
try {
|
|
194
|
+
const user = await authenticate(token);
|
|
195
|
+
} catch {
|
|
196
|
+
// Silent! Attacker can proceed unauthenticated
|
|
197
|
+
}
|
|
198
|
+
|
|
199
|
+
// CRITICAL - data corruption
|
|
200
|
+
const data = parseData() || []; // Parse error becomes empty array!
|
|
201
|
+
```
|
|
202
|
+
|
|
203
|
+
#### 2.2 Dead Code Detection
|
|
204
|
+
|
|
205
|
+
**Strategy**: Build mental call graph, find orphans
|
|
206
|
+
|
|
207
|
+
```bash
|
|
208
|
+
# Find all exports
|
|
209
|
+
grep -r "export " --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" src/ | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u
|
|
210
|
+
|
|
211
|
+
# For suspicious files, verify they're imported
|
|
212
|
+
grep -r "import.*from.*filename" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" src/
|
|
213
|
+
```
|
|
214
|
+
|
|
215
|
+
**Check**:
|
|
216
|
+
- Functions with 0 callers (trace usage)
|
|
217
|
+
- Files never imported
|
|
218
|
+
- React components not in any route
|
|
219
|
+
- API endpoints with no frontend calls
|
|
220
|
+
- Event handlers for events never emitted
|
|
221
|
+
- Code behind `if (false)` or `if (0)`
|
|
222
|
+
- Feature flags always false
|
|
223
|
+
|
|
224
|
+
#### 2.3 Code Duplication
|
|
225
|
+
|
|
226
|
+
**Active search**:
|
|
227
|
+
```bash
|
|
228
|
+
# Similar function names
|
|
229
|
+
grep -r "function validate" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" src/
|
|
230
|
+
grep -r "function format" --include="*.ts" src/
|
|
231
|
+
grep -r "function handle" --include="*.ts" src/
|
|
232
|
+
|
|
233
|
+
# Repeated patterns
|
|
234
|
+
grep -r "new Date.*getMonth" --include="*.ts" src/
|
|
235
|
+
grep -r "JSON.parse\|JSON.stringify" --include="*.ts" src/
|
|
236
|
+
```
|
|
237
|
+
|
|
238
|
+
Report ALL locations, not just first two!
|
|
239
|
+
|
|
240
|
+
### 3. ARCHITECTURE ISSUES
|
|
241
|
+
|
|
242
|
+
#### 3.1 Layer Violations
|
|
243
|
+
- Controllers importing database directly (should go through services)
|
|
244
|
+
- UI components making DB queries
|
|
245
|
+
- Domain logic depending on infrastructure
|
|
246
|
+
|
|
247
|
+
```bash
|
|
248
|
+
# Bad: Controller -> DB (should be Controller -> Service -> Repo -> DB)
|
|
249
|
+
grep -r "import.*database\|import.*db" src/controllers/ src/routes/
|
|
250
|
+
```
|
|
251
|
+
|
|
252
|
+
#### 3.2 Dependency Issues
|
|
253
|
+
- Circular dependencies
|
|
254
|
+
```bash
|
|
255
|
+
# Find potential circular deps
|
|
256
|
+
find src/ -name "*.ts" -exec sh -c 'echo "=== {} ===" && grep -o "from ['\''\"]\.[^'\''\"]*" {}' \;
|
|
257
|
+
```
|
|
258
|
+
- Missing dependency injection
|
|
259
|
+
- God modules (doing everything)
|
|
260
|
+
|
|
261
|
+
#### 3.3 Scalability Concerns
|
|
262
|
+
- State stored in memory (not horizontally scalable)
|
|
263
|
+
- Missing queue for long-running tasks
|
|
264
|
+
- No caching strategy
|
|
265
|
+
- Synchronous operations that should be async
|
|
266
|
+
|
|
267
|
+
### 4. PERFORMANCE ISSUES
|
|
268
|
+
|
|
269
|
+
#### 4.1 Database Performance
|
|
270
|
+
- **N+1 Queries** - THE MOST COMMON ISSUE!
|
|
271
|
+
```javascript
|
|
272
|
+
// BAD: N+1
|
|
273
|
+
const users = await User.findAll();
|
|
274
|
+
for (const user of users) {
|
|
275
|
+
user.posts = await Post.find({ userId: user.id }); // N queries!
|
|
276
|
+
}
|
|
277
|
+
|
|
278
|
+
// GOOD: Single query
|
|
279
|
+
const users = await User.findAll({ include: [Post] });
|
|
280
|
+
```
|
|
281
|
+
- Unbounded queries (no LIMIT)
|
|
282
|
+
- Missing pagination
|
|
283
|
+
- SELECT * instead of specific columns
|
|
284
|
+
- Missing indexes
|
|
285
|
+
|
|
286
|
+
#### 4.2 Memory Issues
|
|
287
|
+
- Loading entire files into memory
|
|
288
|
+
- Unbounded array growth
|
|
289
|
+
- Missing streaming for large data
|
|
290
|
+
- Memory leaks (unclosed connections, event listeners)
|
|
291
|
+
|
|
292
|
+
#### 4.3 Blocking Operations
|
|
293
|
+
- fs.readFileSync in production
|
|
294
|
+
- Synchronous crypto operations
|
|
295
|
+
- CPU-intensive work on main thread
|
|
296
|
+
- Large JSON.parse
|
|
297
|
+
|
|
298
|
+
#### 4.4 Network Inefficiencies
|
|
299
|
+
- Sequential API calls that could be parallel
|
|
300
|
+
```javascript
|
|
301
|
+
// BAD: Sequential
|
|
302
|
+
const user = await fetchUser();
|
|
303
|
+
const posts = await fetchPosts(); // Could be parallel!
|
|
304
|
+
|
|
305
|
+
// GOOD: Parallel
|
|
306
|
+
const [user, posts] = await Promise.all([fetchUser(), fetchPosts()]);
|
|
307
|
+
```
|
|
308
|
+
- Missing compression
|
|
309
|
+
- No connection reuse
|
|
99
310
|
|
|
100
311
|
---
|
|
101
312
|
|
|
102
|
-
## PHASE 3: GENERATE REPORT
|
|
313
|
+
## PHASE 3: GENERATE COMPREHENSIVE REPORT
|
|
103
314
|
|
|
104
315
|
Create `.coverme/scan.json` with this structure:
|
|
105
316
|
|
|
106
|
-
|
|
107
|
-
- `agentCount`: Always
|
|
108
|
-
- `scanDuration`:
|
|
109
|
-
- `filesScanned`: Total files analyzed
|
|
110
|
-
- `linesOfCode`: Total LOC
|
|
317
|
+
### Required Fields
|
|
318
|
+
- `agentCount`: Always `1` (unified agent)
|
|
319
|
+
- `scanDuration`: e.g., "8m 30s" or "512s"
|
|
320
|
+
- `filesScanned`: Total files analyzed
|
|
321
|
+
- `linesOfCode`: Total LOC
|
|
111
322
|
|
|
112
|
-
|
|
113
|
-
- `qualityReview`: Only include if you found dead code/DRY violations. Otherwise, omit this field entirely.
|
|
323
|
+
### Report Structure
|
|
114
324
|
|
|
115
325
|
```json
|
|
116
326
|
{
|
|
117
327
|
"projectName": "project-name",
|
|
118
|
-
"scanDate": "2026-02-
|
|
119
|
-
"filesScanned":
|
|
120
|
-
"linesOfCode":
|
|
328
|
+
"scanDate": "2026-02-18T15:00:00Z",
|
|
329
|
+
"filesScanned": 234,
|
|
330
|
+
"linesOfCode": 62501,
|
|
121
331
|
"agentCount": 1,
|
|
122
332
|
"scanDuration": "8m 30s",
|
|
333
|
+
|
|
123
334
|
"projectTree": "project/\n├── src/\n│ ├── routes/\n│ ├── services/\n│ └── middleware/\n├── tests/\n└── package.json",
|
|
335
|
+
|
|
124
336
|
"projectOverview": {
|
|
125
337
|
"name": "Project Name",
|
|
126
|
-
"type": "Backend API",
|
|
127
|
-
"stack": ["Node.js", "TypeScript", "PostgreSQL"],
|
|
338
|
+
"type": "Backend API | Full Stack App | Microservices",
|
|
339
|
+
"stack": ["Node.js 18", "TypeScript", "PostgreSQL", "Redis"],
|
|
128
340
|
"purpose": "What this project does in 1-2 sentences",
|
|
129
|
-
"architecture": "Monolith | Microservices | Serverless",
|
|
130
|
-
"keyComponents": ["src/routes/", "src/services/"]
|
|
341
|
+
"architecture": "Monolith | Microservices | Serverless | Layered",
|
|
342
|
+
"keyComponents": ["src/routes/", "src/services/", "src/middleware/"]
|
|
131
343
|
},
|
|
344
|
+
|
|
132
345
|
"executiveSummary": {
|
|
133
|
-
"headline": "X Critical + Y High findings
|
|
346
|
+
"headline": "X Critical + Y High security findings, Z quality issues",
|
|
134
347
|
"riskLevel": "CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW",
|
|
135
|
-
"overview": "2-3 sentence
|
|
348
|
+
"overview": "Professional 2-3 sentence summary. Describe architecture → security posture → main concerns.",
|
|
136
349
|
"topRisks": [
|
|
137
|
-
"
|
|
138
|
-
"
|
|
350
|
+
"SQL injection in user search (src/routes/users.ts:45) - full database access",
|
|
351
|
+
"Hardcoded AWS keys in git history (commit abc123) - account compromise",
|
|
352
|
+
"Silent payment errors (src/services/payment.ts:89) - financial loss"
|
|
139
353
|
],
|
|
140
354
|
"positives": [
|
|
141
|
-
"
|
|
142
|
-
"
|
|
355
|
+
"Post-quantum cryptography implemented (ML-KEM-768)",
|
|
356
|
+
"Proper password hashing with bcrypt cost 12",
|
|
357
|
+
"Comprehensive input validation on all API endpoints"
|
|
143
358
|
],
|
|
144
359
|
"recommendedActions": [
|
|
145
360
|
{
|
|
146
361
|
"priority": 1,
|
|
147
|
-
"action": "
|
|
362
|
+
"action": "Rotate AWS keys exposed in git history, move to Secrets Manager",
|
|
363
|
+
"owner": "devops",
|
|
364
|
+
"effort": "1-2 hours"
|
|
365
|
+
},
|
|
366
|
+
{
|
|
367
|
+
"priority": 2,
|
|
368
|
+
"action": "Fix SQL injection by using parameterized queries",
|
|
148
369
|
"owner": "developer",
|
|
149
|
-
"effort": "2-3
|
|
370
|
+
"effort": "2-3 hours"
|
|
150
371
|
}
|
|
151
372
|
]
|
|
152
373
|
},
|
|
374
|
+
|
|
375
|
+
"architectureOverview": {
|
|
376
|
+
"components": [
|
|
377
|
+
{
|
|
378
|
+
"name": "Frontend (Next.js)",
|
|
379
|
+
"type": "client",
|
|
380
|
+
"description": "React application with client-side encryption",
|
|
381
|
+
"files": ["frontend/app/", "frontend/components/"],
|
|
382
|
+
"trustLevel": "untrusted"
|
|
383
|
+
},
|
|
384
|
+
{
|
|
385
|
+
"name": "API Gateway (Express)",
|
|
386
|
+
"type": "service",
|
|
387
|
+
"description": "Authentication, rate limiting, payload routing",
|
|
388
|
+
"files": ["backend/src/routes/", "backend/src/middleware/"],
|
|
389
|
+
"trustLevel": "semi-trusted"
|
|
390
|
+
},
|
|
391
|
+
{
|
|
392
|
+
"name": "Database (PostgreSQL)",
|
|
393
|
+
"type": "database",
|
|
394
|
+
"description": "User data, sessions, application state",
|
|
395
|
+
"files": ["backend/src/models/"],
|
|
396
|
+
"trustLevel": "trusted"
|
|
397
|
+
}
|
|
398
|
+
],
|
|
399
|
+
"trustBoundaries": [
|
|
400
|
+
{
|
|
401
|
+
"name": "TB1: Internet → Frontend",
|
|
402
|
+
"from": "Internet (Attackers)",
|
|
403
|
+
"to": "Browser Application",
|
|
404
|
+
"protocol": "HTTPS",
|
|
405
|
+
"description": "Untrusted user input enters system",
|
|
406
|
+
"type": "external"
|
|
407
|
+
},
|
|
408
|
+
{
|
|
409
|
+
"name": "TB2: Frontend → API Gateway",
|
|
410
|
+
"from": "Browser",
|
|
411
|
+
"to": "Backend API",
|
|
412
|
+
"protocol": "HTTPS + JWT",
|
|
413
|
+
"description": "Authentication boundary - JWT validation required",
|
|
414
|
+
"type": "external"
|
|
415
|
+
},
|
|
416
|
+
{
|
|
417
|
+
"name": "TB3: API Gateway → Services",
|
|
418
|
+
"from": "API Gateway",
|
|
419
|
+
"to": "Business Logic",
|
|
420
|
+
"description": "Trusted internal boundary - service layer",
|
|
421
|
+
"type": "internal"
|
|
422
|
+
}
|
|
423
|
+
],
|
|
424
|
+
"criticalAssets": [
|
|
425
|
+
{
|
|
426
|
+
"name": "User Passwords",
|
|
427
|
+
"type": "credential",
|
|
428
|
+
"storage": "Database (bcrypt hashed)",
|
|
429
|
+
"description": "User authentication credentials - never stored plaintext",
|
|
430
|
+
"protection": "bcrypt cost 12"
|
|
431
|
+
},
|
|
432
|
+
{
|
|
433
|
+
"name": "JWT Signing Secret",
|
|
434
|
+
"type": "key",
|
|
435
|
+
"storage": "Environment variable JWT_SECRET",
|
|
436
|
+
"description": "Used to sign authentication tokens",
|
|
437
|
+
"protection": "Environment variable, rotated monthly"
|
|
438
|
+
},
|
|
439
|
+
{
|
|
440
|
+
"name": "Database Connection String",
|
|
441
|
+
"type": "credential",
|
|
442
|
+
"storage": "Environment variable DATABASE_URL",
|
|
443
|
+
"description": "PostgreSQL connection with admin privileges",
|
|
444
|
+
"protection": "Environment variable, encrypted at rest"
|
|
445
|
+
},
|
|
446
|
+
{
|
|
447
|
+
"name": "API Keys (Stripe, AWS)",
|
|
448
|
+
"type": "credential",
|
|
449
|
+
"storage": "Secrets Manager / .env",
|
|
450
|
+
"description": "Third-party service authentication",
|
|
451
|
+
"protection": "AWS Secrets Manager or gitignored .env"
|
|
452
|
+
}
|
|
453
|
+
],
|
|
454
|
+
"entryPoints": [
|
|
455
|
+
{
|
|
456
|
+
"path": "POST /api/auth/login",
|
|
457
|
+
"authentication": "none",
|
|
458
|
+
"description": "User authentication endpoint - rate limited",
|
|
459
|
+
"riskLevel": "high"
|
|
460
|
+
},
|
|
461
|
+
{
|
|
462
|
+
"path": "GET /api/users/:id",
|
|
463
|
+
"authentication": "JWT required",
|
|
464
|
+
"description": "User profile data - authorization check required",
|
|
465
|
+
"riskLevel": "medium"
|
|
466
|
+
},
|
|
467
|
+
{
|
|
468
|
+
"path": "POST /api/payments",
|
|
469
|
+
"authentication": "JWT required",
|
|
470
|
+
"description": "Payment processing - high value target",
|
|
471
|
+
"riskLevel": "critical"
|
|
472
|
+
}
|
|
473
|
+
],
|
|
474
|
+
"dataFlows": [
|
|
475
|
+
"Browser → HTTPS → API Gateway → JWT Validation → Service Layer → Repository → Database",
|
|
476
|
+
"Browser → File Upload → API Gateway → Virus Scan → S3 Bucket",
|
|
477
|
+
"API Gateway → External API (Stripe) → Payment Processing"
|
|
478
|
+
]
|
|
479
|
+
},
|
|
480
|
+
|
|
153
481
|
"findings": [
|
|
154
482
|
{
|
|
155
483
|
"id": "SEC-001",
|
|
156
|
-
"title": "
|
|
484
|
+
"title": "SQL Injection in User Search Endpoint",
|
|
157
485
|
"severity": "critical",
|
|
158
486
|
"category": "security",
|
|
159
|
-
"file": "src/routes/
|
|
487
|
+
"file": "src/routes/users.ts",
|
|
160
488
|
"line": 45,
|
|
161
489
|
"endLine": 52,
|
|
162
|
-
"code": "const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE
|
|
163
|
-
"description": "
|
|
164
|
-
"impact": "
|
|
490
|
+
"code": "const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '${req.query.name}'`;",
|
|
491
|
+
"description": "User input from req.query.name is directly concatenated into SQL query without sanitization. An attacker can inject arbitrary SQL commands.",
|
|
492
|
+
"impact": "Complete database compromise. Attacker can:\n1. Extract all user data including passwords\n2. Modify or delete records\n3. Execute administrative operations\n4. Potential remote code execution via database extensions",
|
|
165
493
|
"attackChain": [
|
|
166
|
-
{"step": 1, "action": "Send
|
|
167
|
-
{"step": 2, "action": "Use UNION SELECT to read other tables", "result": "Extract
|
|
168
|
-
{"step": 3, "action": "Use INTO OUTFILE to write webshell", "result": "Remote code execution"}
|
|
494
|
+
{"step": 1, "action": "Send name=' OR '1'='1' --", "result": "Query returns all users"},
|
|
495
|
+
{"step": 2, "action": "Use UNION SELECT to read other tables", "result": "Extract payment data, API keys"},
|
|
496
|
+
{"step": 3, "action": "Use INTO OUTFILE to write webshell", "result": "Remote code execution on server"}
|
|
169
497
|
],
|
|
170
|
-
"recommendation": "Use parameterized queries
|
|
498
|
+
"recommendation": "Use parameterized queries:\n\n```typescript\nconst query = 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = $1';\nconst result = await db.query(query, [req.query.name]);\n```",
|
|
171
499
|
"dread": {
|
|
172
500
|
"damage": 10,
|
|
173
501
|
"reproducibility": 10,
|
|
@@ -177,26 +505,85 @@ Create `.coverme/scan.json` with this structure:
|
|
|
177
505
|
"score": 9.4
|
|
178
506
|
},
|
|
179
507
|
"cwe": "CWE-89",
|
|
508
|
+
"owasp": "A03:2021-Injection",
|
|
509
|
+
"evidence": [
|
|
510
|
+
"Input source: req.query.name (line 44) - no validation",
|
|
511
|
+
"Sink: db.query() (line 45) - string concatenation",
|
|
512
|
+
"No sanitization between source and sink",
|
|
513
|
+
"Endpoint is publicly accessible"
|
|
514
|
+
],
|
|
180
515
|
"fixOwner": "developer"
|
|
516
|
+
},
|
|
517
|
+
{
|
|
518
|
+
"id": "QUAL-001",
|
|
519
|
+
"title": "Silent Payment Error Handling",
|
|
520
|
+
"severity": "critical",
|
|
521
|
+
"category": "quality",
|
|
522
|
+
"file": "src/services/paymentService.ts",
|
|
523
|
+
"line": 89,
|
|
524
|
+
"endLine": 95,
|
|
525
|
+
"code": "try {\n await stripe.charges.create(charge);\n} catch (err) {\n console.error('Payment error:', err);\n}\nreturn { success: true };",
|
|
526
|
+
"description": "Payment errors are caught and logged but execution continues. The function returns success:true even when payment fails. Customer receives product without paying.",
|
|
527
|
+
"impact": "Financial loss. Estimated $X per failed payment. Data shows 3% of payments fail, so ~$Y/month revenue loss.",
|
|
528
|
+
"recommendation": "Rethrow error or return failure:\n\n```typescript\ntry {\n await stripe.charges.create(charge);\n return { success: true };\n} catch (err) {\n logger.error('Payment failed', { orderId, error: err });\n throw new PaymentError('Payment processing failed');\n}\n```",
|
|
529
|
+
"evidence": [
|
|
530
|
+
"catch block at line 91 only logs",
|
|
531
|
+
"No return/throw in catch",
|
|
532
|
+
"Success returned at line 95 regardless of payment result"
|
|
533
|
+
]
|
|
181
534
|
}
|
|
182
535
|
],
|
|
536
|
+
|
|
537
|
+
"qualityReview": {
|
|
538
|
+
"deleteItems": [
|
|
539
|
+
{
|
|
540
|
+
"file": "src/legacy/oldAuth.ts",
|
|
541
|
+
"lines": 450,
|
|
542
|
+
"description": "Entire file unused - no imports found in codebase"
|
|
543
|
+
}
|
|
544
|
+
],
|
|
545
|
+
"mergeItems": [
|
|
546
|
+
{
|
|
547
|
+
"file": "src/utils/dateFormat.ts + src/helpers/formatDate.ts",
|
|
548
|
+
"description": "Identical date formatting logic in 2 files (180 lines total)"
|
|
549
|
+
}
|
|
550
|
+
],
|
|
551
|
+
"simplifyItems": [
|
|
552
|
+
{
|
|
553
|
+
"file": "src/services/userService.ts",
|
|
554
|
+
"description": "1000+ line function should be split into smaller functions"
|
|
555
|
+
}
|
|
556
|
+
],
|
|
557
|
+
"totalLinesRemovable": 630,
|
|
558
|
+
"percentageOfCodebase": 1.0
|
|
559
|
+
},
|
|
560
|
+
|
|
183
561
|
"positiveObservations": [
|
|
184
562
|
{
|
|
185
563
|
"title": "Proper Password Hashing",
|
|
186
|
-
"description": "Uses bcrypt with cost factor 12 in auth/password.ts:23. Passwords never stored in plaintext."
|
|
564
|
+
"description": "Uses bcrypt with cost factor 12 in src/auth/password.ts:23. Passwords are never stored in plaintext."
|
|
565
|
+
},
|
|
566
|
+
{
|
|
567
|
+
"title": "Rate Limiting Implemented",
|
|
568
|
+
"description": "Express-rate-limit configured on all auth endpoints (src/middleware/rateLimit.ts:15) - prevents brute force."
|
|
569
|
+
},
|
|
570
|
+
{
|
|
571
|
+
"title": "Comprehensive Input Validation",
|
|
572
|
+
"description": "Joi schemas defined for all API inputs (src/validators/) - prevents injection attacks."
|
|
187
573
|
}
|
|
188
574
|
],
|
|
575
|
+
|
|
189
576
|
"summary": {
|
|
190
|
-
"critical":
|
|
191
|
-
"high":
|
|
192
|
-
"medium":
|
|
193
|
-
"low":
|
|
194
|
-
"total":
|
|
577
|
+
"critical": 2,
|
|
578
|
+
"high": 5,
|
|
579
|
+
"medium": 8,
|
|
580
|
+
"low": 3,
|
|
581
|
+
"total": 18
|
|
195
582
|
}
|
|
196
583
|
}
|
|
197
584
|
```
|
|
198
585
|
|
|
199
|
-
### DREAD Scoring (REQUIRED for critical/high)
|
|
586
|
+
### DREAD Scoring (REQUIRED for critical/high)
|
|
200
587
|
|
|
201
588
|
| Score | Meaning |
|
|
202
589
|
|-------|---------|
|
|
@@ -212,73 +599,100 @@ Create `.coverme/scan.json` with this structure:
|
|
|
212
599
|
- **Discoverability**: How easy to find
|
|
213
600
|
- **Score**: Average of all five
|
|
214
601
|
|
|
215
|
-
### Attack Chain (REQUIRED for critical/high)
|
|
602
|
+
### Attack Chain (REQUIRED for critical/high)
|
|
603
|
+
|
|
604
|
+
Show realistic, step-by-step exploitation:
|
|
216
605
|
|
|
217
|
-
Show step-by-step exploitation:
|
|
218
606
|
```json
|
|
219
607
|
[
|
|
220
|
-
{"step": 1, "action": "
|
|
221
|
-
{"step": 2, "action": "Next action", "result": "Escalation"},
|
|
608
|
+
{"step": 1, "action": "Concrete attacker action", "result": "What happens"},
|
|
609
|
+
{"step": 2, "action": "Next action with actual payload", "result": "Escalation"},
|
|
222
610
|
{"step": 3, "action": "Final action", "result": "Full compromise"}
|
|
223
611
|
]
|
|
224
612
|
```
|
|
225
613
|
|
|
226
614
|
---
|
|
227
615
|
|
|
228
|
-
## PHASE 4:
|
|
616
|
+
## PHASE 4: VALIDATE & GENERATE REPORT
|
|
617
|
+
|
|
618
|
+
### Step 1: Validate JSON
|
|
619
|
+
|
|
620
|
+
```bash
|
|
621
|
+
python3 -m json.tool .coverme/scan.json > /dev/null && echo "JSON valid" || echo "JSON invalid - fix it!"
|
|
622
|
+
```
|
|
229
623
|
|
|
230
|
-
|
|
624
|
+
**If invalid, fix these common errors**:
|
|
625
|
+
- Missing `]` to close arrays (especially `attackChain`)
|
|
626
|
+
- Missing `}` to close objects
|
|
627
|
+
- Trailing commas before `]` or `}`
|
|
628
|
+
- Unescaped quotes in strings
|
|
629
|
+
|
|
630
|
+
### Step 2: Generate HTML
|
|
231
631
|
|
|
232
632
|
```bash
|
|
233
|
-
# Save scan.json (you just wrote it)
|
|
234
|
-
# Generate and open HTML report
|
|
235
633
|
coverme report
|
|
236
634
|
```
|
|
237
635
|
|
|
238
|
-
The
|
|
239
|
-
1. Read `.coverme/scan.json`
|
|
240
|
-
2. Generate `.coverme/report_YYYY-MM-DD_HH-MM-SS.html`
|
|
241
|
-
3. Open the report in your browser
|
|
636
|
+
**The scan is NOT complete until HTML opens in browser!**
|
|
242
637
|
|
|
243
638
|
---
|
|
244
639
|
|
|
245
640
|
## QUALITY CHECKLIST
|
|
246
641
|
|
|
247
|
-
Before finishing
|
|
642
|
+
Before finishing:
|
|
248
643
|
|
|
249
|
-
- [ ] Read actual code files, not just
|
|
250
|
-
- [ ] Every finding has
|
|
251
|
-
- [ ]
|
|
252
|
-
- [ ]
|
|
253
|
-
- [ ]
|
|
254
|
-
- [ ]
|
|
644
|
+
- [ ] Read actual code files, not just names
|
|
645
|
+
- [ ] Every critical/high finding has DREAD score
|
|
646
|
+
- [ ] Every critical/high finding has attack chain
|
|
647
|
+
- [ ] Searched for silent failures (empty catch, console.log only)
|
|
648
|
+
- [ ] Checked git history for hardcoded secrets
|
|
649
|
+
- [ ] Looked for N+1 queries in database code
|
|
650
|
+
- [ ] Verified dead code claims (really not used?)
|
|
651
|
+
- [ ] Found code duplications (listed ALL locations)
|
|
255
652
|
- [ ] Executive summary is professional and specific
|
|
256
|
-
- [ ]
|
|
653
|
+
- [ ] Architecture overview describes trust boundaries
|
|
654
|
+
- [ ] Positive observations have specific evidence
|
|
655
|
+
- [ ] `coverme report` generated HTML successfully
|
|
257
656
|
|
|
258
657
|
---
|
|
259
658
|
|
|
260
659
|
## EXAMPLES
|
|
261
660
|
|
|
262
|
-
###
|
|
661
|
+
### Excellent Finding (Do This!)
|
|
662
|
+
|
|
263
663
|
```json
|
|
264
664
|
{
|
|
265
665
|
"id": "AUTH-001",
|
|
266
|
-
"title": "JWT
|
|
666
|
+
"title": "JWT Accepts 'none' Algorithm - Authentication Bypass",
|
|
267
667
|
"severity": "critical",
|
|
268
668
|
"file": "src/middleware/auth.ts",
|
|
269
669
|
"line": 34,
|
|
270
670
|
"code": "jwt.verify(token, secret, { algorithms: ['HS256', 'none'] })",
|
|
271
|
-
"description": "JWT verification
|
|
671
|
+
"description": "JWT verification explicitly allows the 'none' algorithm. An attacker can forge tokens by removing the signature and setting alg='none'.",
|
|
272
672
|
"attackChain": [
|
|
273
|
-
{"step": 1, "action": "Capture valid JWT", "result": "Obtain token structure"},
|
|
274
|
-
{"step": 2, "action": "
|
|
275
|
-
{"step": 3, "action": "Send forged token", "result": "Authenticated as
|
|
673
|
+
{"step": 1, "action": "Capture valid JWT from /api/login response", "result": "Obtain token structure"},
|
|
674
|
+
{"step": 2, "action": "Base64 decode header, change alg to 'none', remove signature", "result": "Forged token: eyJ...Cg==.eyJ...fQ."},
|
|
675
|
+
{"step": 3, "action": "Send forged token with admin=true claim", "result": "Authenticated as admin"}
|
|
276
676
|
],
|
|
277
|
-
"dread": {
|
|
677
|
+
"dread": {
|
|
678
|
+
"damage": 10,
|
|
679
|
+
"reproducibility": 10,
|
|
680
|
+
"exploitability": 9,
|
|
681
|
+
"affectedUsers": 10,
|
|
682
|
+
"discoverability": 7,
|
|
683
|
+
"score": 9.2
|
|
684
|
+
},
|
|
685
|
+
"recommendation": "Remove 'none' from algorithms array:\n\n```typescript\njwt.verify(token, secret, { algorithms: ['HS256'] })\n```",
|
|
686
|
+
"evidence": [
|
|
687
|
+
"algorithms array at line 34 includes 'none'",
|
|
688
|
+
"No additional signature validation",
|
|
689
|
+
"Endpoint /api/admin uses this middleware (routes.ts:89)"
|
|
690
|
+
]
|
|
278
691
|
}
|
|
279
692
|
```
|
|
280
693
|
|
|
281
|
-
### Bad Finding (
|
|
694
|
+
### Bad Finding (Don't Do This!)
|
|
695
|
+
|
|
282
696
|
```json
|
|
283
697
|
{
|
|
284
698
|
"id": "SEC-001",
|
|
@@ -292,38 +706,17 @@ Before finishing, verify:
|
|
|
292
706
|
|
|
293
707
|
## REMEMBER
|
|
294
708
|
|
|
295
|
-
1. **
|
|
296
|
-
2. **
|
|
297
|
-
3. **
|
|
298
|
-
4. **
|
|
299
|
-
5. **
|
|
709
|
+
1. **Silent failures are CRITICAL** - They hide production bugs in payments, auth, data
|
|
710
|
+
2. **Read actual code** - Don't guess, read the files
|
|
711
|
+
3. **Check git history** - Secrets may have been removed but still exposed
|
|
712
|
+
4. **Think like an attacker** - How would you exploit this?
|
|
713
|
+
5. **Be specific** - File:line, code snippets, attack chains
|
|
714
|
+
6. **DREAD + Attack Chain** - Required for critical/high
|
|
715
|
+
7. **Quality over quantity** - 10 solid findings > 50 vague ones
|
|
716
|
+
8. **Architecture matters** - Trust boundaries, data flow, scalability
|
|
717
|
+
9. **Performance impacts security** - N+1 queries → DoS, memory leaks → crashes
|
|
718
|
+
10. **Run `coverme report`** - Not done until HTML opens!
|
|
300
719
|
|
|
301
720
|
---
|
|
302
721
|
|
|
303
|
-
|
|
304
|
-
|
|
305
|
-
### Step 1: Validate JSON
|
|
306
|
-
|
|
307
|
-
After saving `.coverme/scan.json`, validate it:
|
|
308
|
-
|
|
309
|
-
```bash
|
|
310
|
-
python3 -m json.tool .coverme/scan.json > /dev/null && echo "JSON valid" || echo "JSON invalid - fix it!"
|
|
311
|
-
```
|
|
312
|
-
|
|
313
|
-
**If JSON is invalid, fix the syntax errors before proceeding!**
|
|
314
|
-
|
|
315
|
-
Common JSON errors:
|
|
316
|
-
- Missing `]` to close arrays (especially `attackChain`)
|
|
317
|
-
- Missing `}` to close objects
|
|
318
|
-
- Trailing commas before `]` or `}`
|
|
319
|
-
- Unescaped quotes in strings
|
|
320
|
-
|
|
321
|
-
### Step 2: Generate HTML Report
|
|
322
|
-
|
|
323
|
-
```bash
|
|
324
|
-
coverme report
|
|
325
|
-
```
|
|
326
|
-
|
|
327
|
-
**The scan is NOT complete until the HTML report opens in the browser!**
|
|
328
|
-
|
|
329
|
-
If `coverme report` fails with JSON error, fix the JSON first.
|
|
722
|
+
START SCANNING NOW. Be methodical, thorough, and think deeply. Your reputation depends on finding what others miss.
|