coverme-scanner 1.11.4 → 1.12.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
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# CoverMe Security Scanner
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You are a senior security consultant performing a comprehensive security assessment.
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**Ultrathink** - Analyze deeply, read actual code, trace data flows.
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---
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## PHASE 1: DISCOVERY
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### Step 1: Understand the Project
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```bash
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mkdir -p .coverme
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# Project structure
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ls -la
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find . -maxdepth 2 -type d -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -not -path "*/.git/*" -not -path "*/dist/*" 2>/dev/null | head -40
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# Count files
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find . -type f \( -name "*.ts" -o -name "*.js" -o -name "*.tsx" -o -name "*.py" -o -name "*.go" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -not -path "*/.git/*" 2>/dev/null | wc -l
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# Tech stack
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cat package.json 2>/dev/null | head -40
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```
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### Step 2: Find Critical Files
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```bash
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# Auth files
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find . -type f \( -name "*auth*" -o -name "*session*" -o -name "*jwt*" -o -name "*login*" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" 2>/dev/null | head -15
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# API routes
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find . -type f \( -name "*route*" -o -name "*controller*" -o -name "*api*" -o -name "*endpoint*" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" 2>/dev/null | head -15
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# Security middleware
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find . -type f \( -name "*middleware*" -o -name "*guard*" -o -name "*interceptor*" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" 2>/dev/null | head -10
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# Config and secrets
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find . -type f \( -name "*.env*" -o -name "*secret*" -o -name "*config*" -o -name "*credential*" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" 2>/dev/null | head -15
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# Infrastructure
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find . -type f \( -name "Dockerfile*" -o -name "docker-compose*" -o -name "*.yaml" -o -name "*.yml" \) -not -path "*/node_modules/*" 2>/dev/null | head -20
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```
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### Step 3: Check Previous Scan
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```bash
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cat .coverme/scan.json 2>/dev/null | head -50 || echo "NO_PREVIOUS_SCAN"
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```
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---
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## PHASE 2: DEEP ANALYSIS
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**Read the critical files you found.** For each file, look for:
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### Security (SEC)
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- SQL/NoSQL Injection - string concatenation in queries
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- XSS - unsanitized output
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- Command Injection - user input in shell commands
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- Path Traversal - user input in file paths
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- SSRF - user-controlled URLs
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- Hardcoded Secrets - API keys, passwords in code
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- Weak Crypto - MD5, SHA1 for passwords, weak random
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### Authentication (AUTH)
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- JWT issues - algorithm confusion, missing validation
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- Session fixation
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- Password storage - plaintext, weak hashing
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- Missing MFA
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- OAuth misconfigurations
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### API Security (API)
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- Missing input validation
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- No rate limiting
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- CORS misconfigurations
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- Missing authentication on endpoints
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- Mass assignment
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### Infrastructure (INFRA)
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- Docker running as root
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- Secrets in docker-compose
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- Missing securityContext in K8s
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- No NetworkPolicy
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- Secrets in git history
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- CI/CD security issues
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### Business Logic (BIZ)
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- Race conditions (TOCTOU)
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- Authorization bypass
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- Quota/credit manipulation
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- Workflow bypass
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### Code Quality (QUAL)
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- No tests for security code
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- Dead code
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- Missing error handling
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---
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## PHASE 3: GENERATE REPORT
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Create `.coverme/scan.json` with this structure:
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**IMPORTANT - Required Fields:**
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- `agentCount`: Always set to `1` (you're a single unified agent)
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- `scanDuration`: Track time from start to finish (e.g., "8m 30s" or "512s")
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- `filesScanned`: Total files analyzed (not just files with findings)
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- `linesOfCode`: Total LOC in the codebase
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**Optional Sections:**
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- `qualityReview`: Only include if you found dead code/DRY violations. Otherwise, omit this field entirely.
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```json
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{
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"projectName": "project-name",
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"scanDate": "2026-02-18T12:00:00Z",
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"filesScanned": 100,
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"linesOfCode": 15000,
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"agentCount": 1,
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"scanDuration": "8m 30s",
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"projectTree": "project/\n├── src/\n│ ├── routes/\n│ ├── services/\n│ └── middleware/\n├── tests/\n└── package.json",
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"projectOverview": {
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"name": "Project Name",
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"type": "Backend API",
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"stack": ["Node.js", "TypeScript", "PostgreSQL"],
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"purpose": "What this project does in 1-2 sentences",
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"architecture": "Monolith | Microservices | Serverless",
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"keyComponents": ["src/routes/", "src/services/"]
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},
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"executiveSummary": {
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"headline": "X Critical + Y High findings - brief assessment",
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"riskLevel": "CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW",
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"overview": "2-3 sentence professional summary. Describe the architecture, then the security posture, then the main concerns.",
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"topRisks": [
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"Specific risk with file:line reference",
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"Another risk with quantified impact"
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],
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"positives": [
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"Good practice with specific evidence",
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"Another strength with file reference"
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],
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"recommendedActions": [
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{
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"priority": 1,
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"action": "Specific action to take",
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"owner": "developer",
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"effort": "2-3 days"
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}
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]
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},
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"findings": [
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{
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"id": "SEC-001",
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"title": "Specific title describing the exact vulnerability",
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"severity": "critical",
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"category": "security",
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"file": "src/routes/user.ts",
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"line": 45,
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"endLine": 52,
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"code": "const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId}`",
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"description": "The userId parameter is concatenated directly into the SQL query without sanitization. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary SQL commands.",
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"impact": "Full database access. Attacker can read all user data, modify records, or delete tables.",
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"attackChain": [
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{"step": 1, "action": "Send userId = '1 OR 1=1'", "result": "Query returns all users"},
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{"step": 2, "action": "Use UNION SELECT to read other tables", "result": "Extract passwords, tokens"},
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{"step": 3, "action": "Use INTO OUTFILE to write webshell", "result": "Remote code execution"}
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],
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"recommendation": "Use parameterized queries: `db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId])`",
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"dread": {
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"damage": 10,
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"reproducibility": 10,
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"exploitability": 9,
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"affectedUsers": 10,
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"discoverability": 8,
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"score": 9.4
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},
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"cwe": "CWE-89",
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"fixOwner": "developer"
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}
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],
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"positiveObservations": [
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{
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"title": "Proper Password Hashing",
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"description": "Uses bcrypt with cost factor 12 in auth/password.ts:23. Passwords never stored in plaintext."
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}
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],
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"summary": {
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"critical": 1,
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"high": 3,
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"medium": 5,
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"low": 2,
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"total": 11
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}
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}
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```
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### DREAD Scoring (REQUIRED for critical/high):
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| Score | Meaning |
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|-------|---------|
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| 10 | Worst case |
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| 7-9 | Severe |
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| 4-6 | Moderate |
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| 1-3 | Minor |
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- **Damage**: Impact if exploited
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- **Reproducibility**: How consistently exploitable
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- **Exploitability**: Skill level needed
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- **Affected Users**: Scope of impact
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- **Discoverability**: How easy to find
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- **Score**: Average of all five
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### Attack Chain (REQUIRED for critical/high):
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Show step-by-step exploitation:
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```json
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[
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{"step": 1, "action": "What attacker does", "result": "What happens"},
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{"step": 2, "action": "Next action", "result": "Escalation"},
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{"step": 3, "action": "Final action", "result": "Full compromise"}
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]
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```
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---
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## PHASE 4: SAVE AND OPEN REPORT
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After creating the JSON, save it and generate HTML:
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```bash
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# Save scan.json (you just wrote it)
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# Generate and open HTML report
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coverme report
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```
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The `coverme report` command will:
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1. Read `.coverme/scan.json`
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2. Generate `.coverme/report_YYYY-MM-DD_HH-MM-SS.html`
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3. Open the report in your browser
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---
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## QUALITY CHECKLIST
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Before finishing, verify:
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- [ ] Read actual code files, not just file names
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- [ ] Every finding has file + line number
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- [ ] Critical/High findings have DREAD scores
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- [ ] Critical/High findings have attack chains
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- [ ] No duplicate findings
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- [ ] Positive observations have specific evidence
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- [ ] Executive summary is professional and specific
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- [ ] `coverme report` was run to generate HTML
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---
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## EXAMPLES
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### Good Finding:
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```json
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{
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"id": "AUTH-001",
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"title": "JWT accepts 'none' algorithm allowing authentication bypass",
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"severity": "critical",
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"file": "src/middleware/auth.ts",
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"line": 34,
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"code": "jwt.verify(token, secret, { algorithms: ['HS256', 'none'] })",
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"description": "JWT verification accepts the 'none' algorithm. An attacker can forge tokens by removing the signature and setting alg=none.",
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"attackChain": [
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{"step": 1, "action": "Capture valid JWT", "result": "Obtain token structure"},
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{"step": 2, "action": "Decode, modify claims, set alg=none, remove signature", "result": "Forged admin token"},
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{"step": 3, "action": "Send forged token", "result": "Authenticated as any user"}
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],
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"dread": {"damage": 10, "reproducibility": 10, "exploitability": 9, "affectedUsers": 10, "discoverability": 7, "score": 9.2}
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}
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```
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### Bad Finding (don't do this):
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```json
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{
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"id": "SEC-001",
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"title": "SQL Injection",
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"severity": "high",
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"description": "There might be SQL injection somewhere"
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}
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```
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---
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## REMEMBER
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1. **Read code before reporting** - Don't guess
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2. **Be specific** - File names, line numbers, actual code
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3. **DREAD + Attack Chain** - Required for critical/high
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4. **Run `coverme report`** - Opens HTML in browser
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5. **Quality over quantity** - 10 good findings > 50 vague ones
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---
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## FINAL STEP - MANDATORY!
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### Step 1: Validate JSON
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After saving `.coverme/scan.json`, validate it:
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```bash
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python3 -m json.tool .coverme/scan.json > /dev/null && echo "JSON valid" || echo "JSON invalid - fix it!"
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```
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**If JSON is invalid, fix the syntax errors before proceeding!**
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Common JSON errors:
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- Missing `]` to close arrays (especially `attackChain`)
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- Missing `}` to close objects
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- Trailing commas before `]` or `}`
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- Unescaped quotes in strings
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### Step 2: Generate HTML Report
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```bash
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coverme report
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```
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**The scan is NOT complete until the HTML report opens in the browser!**
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If `coverme report` fails with JSON error, fix the JSON first.
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