cool-workflow 0.1.83 → 0.1.85

package/dist/worker-accept/telemetry-ledger.js

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.attestWorkerDelegation = attestWorkerDelegation;
+exports.recordWorkerDelegationLedger = recordWorkerDelegationLedger;
+const execution_backend_1 = require("../execution-backend");
+const telemetry_attestation_1 = require("../telemetry-attestation");
+const telemetry_ledger_1 = require("../telemetry-ledger");
+const trust_audit_1 = require("../trust-audit");
+const helpers_1 = require("../worker-isolation/helpers");
+/** Step 2 — attestSandbox/attestDelegation: verify the agent's signed telemetry
+ *  BEFORE recording it, enforce the opt-in require-attested-telemetry gate (still
+ *  fail-closed, pre-mutation), and build the agent-hop provenance. Non-agent hops
+ *  return an empty delegation. */
+function attestWorkerDelegation(accept, deps) {
+    const { run, workerId, options, task, absoluteResultPath, rawResult } = accept;
+    // Agent Delegation Drive (v0.1.38): if this worker's result.md was produced by an
+    // EXTERNAL agent, record the agent-hop attestation AS PROVENANCE — the agent
+    // (kind:process) handle, the agent-REPORTED model (never CW_AGENT_MODEL), the
+    // prompt digest, the secret-stripped args, and the result digest computed HERE
+    // from the accepted result.md. These live in the result node's metadata (covered
+    // by the v0.1.35 snapshot body) + a trust-audit event, NEVER in `evidence`.
+    // Track 1: verify the agent's signed telemetry BEFORE recording it. CW holds
+    // only the operator's PUBLIC key — it verifies attribution, never measures
+    // usage. Absent/invalid signature => `unattested`/`absent`, surfaced loudly,
+    // NEVER silently recorded as trusted.
+    const telemetry = options.agentDelegation
+        ? (0, telemetry_attestation_1.verifyTelemetryAttestation)(options.agentDelegation.reportedUsage, options.agentDelegation.usageSignature, (0, telemetry_attestation_1.resolveTrustPublicKey)(options.agentDelegation.usageTrustPublicKey), { runId: run.id, taskId: task.id, promptDigest: options.agentDelegation.promptDigest })
+        : undefined;
+    // Track 1 fail-closed (Decision 2 — OPT-IN, off by default). When the operator
+    // requires attested telemetry, a delegated hop whose verdict is not `attested`
+    // is REJECTED here — BEFORE any accept-side state mutation — so the drive parks
+    // it instead of recording unverifiable usage. Default behavior is unchanged
+    // (flag-and-surface). Non-agent hops carry no verdict and are never blocked.
+    if (options.requireAttestedTelemetry && telemetry && telemetry.status !== "attested") {
+        const error = (0, helpers_1.structuredError)("telemetry-unattested-blocked", `Worker ${workerId} telemetry is ${telemetry.status} (${telemetry.reason || "unverified"}) and require-attested-telemetry is enabled — refusing to accept a hop whose usage cannot be cryptographically verified`, { path: absoluteResultPath, retryable: false });
+        deps.recordWorkerFailure(run, workerId, error, { ...options, persist: options.persist });
+        throw new Error(error.message);
+    }
+    const agentDelegation = options.agentDelegation
+        ? {
+            schemaVersion: 1,
+            backendId: "agent",
+            handle: options.agentDelegation.handle,
+            model: options.agentDelegation.model,
+            promptDigest: options.agentDelegation.promptDigest,
+            resultDigest: (0, execution_backend_1.sha256)(rawResult),
+            command: options.agentDelegation.command,
+            args: options.agentDelegation.args,
+            exitCode: options.agentDelegation.exitCode,
+            ...(options.agentDelegation.reportedUsage ? { reportedUsage: options.agentDelegation.reportedUsage } : {}),
+            ...(options.agentDelegation.usageSignature ? { usageSignature: options.agentDelegation.usageSignature } : {}),
+            ...(telemetry ? { usageAttestation: telemetry.status, usageAttestationReason: telemetry.reason } : {})
+        }
+        : undefined;
+    return { agentDelegation, telemetry };
+}
+/** Step 4 — recordTelemetryLedger: the agent-hop attestation. Binds the telemetry
+ *  verdict into the append-only hash-chained ledger BEFORE the audit event (so the
+ *  event can cross-link the record hash), then emits the worker.agent-delegation
+ *  audit event. No-op for non-agent hops. */
+function recordWorkerDelegationLedger(accept, delegation) {
+    const { agentDelegation } = delegation;
+    // The agent-hop attestation event — hung off worker.output, alongside
+    // worker.backend. Recorded in trust-audit/provenance, NEVER in node evidence.
+    if (!agentDelegation)
+        return;
+    const { run, workerId, scope, task, resultNode, acceptedAuditId } = accept;
+    // Track 1 (tamper-evidence): bind this verdict into the append-only,
+    // hash-chained telemetry ledger BEFORE the audit event, so the event can
+    // cross-link the record hash. Editing the recorded verdict/usage later breaks
+    // the chain (verifyTelemetryLedger). Only when a verdict was computed.
+    const ledgerRecord = agentDelegation.usageAttestation
+        ? (0, telemetry_ledger_1.appendTelemetryAttestation)(run, {
+            workerId,
+            taskId: task.id,
+            promptDigest: agentDelegation.promptDigest,
+            reportedUsage: agentDelegation.reportedUsage,
+            usageSignature: agentDelegation.usageSignature,
+            attestation: agentDelegation.usageAttestation,
+            attestationReason: agentDelegation.usageAttestationReason
+        })
+        : undefined;
+    (0, trust_audit_1.recordTrustAuditEvent)(run, {
+        kind: "worker.agent-delegation",
+        decision: "recorded",
+        source: "host-attested",
+        workerId,
+        taskId: task.id,
+        nodeId: resultNode.id,
+        sandboxProfileId: scope.sandboxProfileId,
+        policySnapshot: scope.sandboxPolicy,
+        parentEventIds: [acceptedAuditId],
+        metadata: {
+            backendId: agentDelegation.backendId,
+            handleKind: agentDelegation.handle.kind,
+            handleRef: agentDelegation.handle.ref,
+            model: agentDelegation.model,
+            promptDigest: agentDelegation.promptDigest,
+            resultDigest: agentDelegation.resultDigest,
+            command: agentDelegation.command,
+            args: agentDelegation.args,
+            exitCode: agentDelegation.exitCode,
+            // Track 1: the telemetry verdict travels with the agent-hop event so the
+            // audit report can surface `unattested` usage loudly. Absent => no usage.
+            ...(agentDelegation.usageAttestation
+                ? {
+                    telemetryAttestation: agentDelegation.usageAttestation,
+                    ...(agentDelegation.usageAttestationReason ? { telemetryAttestationReason: agentDelegation.usageAttestationReason } : {}),
+                    ...(agentDelegation.reportedUsage ? { reportedUsage: agentDelegation.reportedUsage } : {}),
+                    // Cross-link to the hash-chained ledger entry (tamper-evidence).
+                    ...(ledgerRecord ? { telemetryRecordId: ledgerRecord.recordId, telemetryRecordHash: ledgerRecord.recordHash, telemetryPrevHash: ledgerRecord.prevHash } : {})
+                }
+                : {})
+        }
+    });
+}

package/dist/worker-accept/validation.js

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+"use strict";
+var __importDefault = (this && this.__importDefault) || function (mod) {
+    return (mod && mod.__esModule) ? mod : { "default": mod };
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.validateWorkerResult = validateWorkerResult;
+const node_fs_1 = __importDefault(require("node:fs"));
+const node_path_1 = __importDefault(require("node:path"));
+const verifier_1 = require("../verifier");
+const evidence_grounding_1 = require("../evidence-grounding");
+const trust_audit_1 = require("../trust-audit");
+const helpers_1 = require("../worker-isolation/helpers");
+/** Step 1 — validateResult: resolve scope/task, enforce the sandbox boundary, the
+ *  result-file existence, the envelope contract, and (opt-in) resolvable evidence.
+ *  Fail-closed: any guard records a worker failure and throws BEFORE accept-side
+ *  state mutation. Returns the partially-filled accept context on success. */
+function validateWorkerResult(run, workerId, resultPath, options, deps) {
+    const scope = deps.requireWorkerScope(run, workerId);
+    const task = deps.requireWorkerTask(run, scope);
+    const absoluteResultPath = node_path_1.default.resolve(resultPath);
+    const violation = deps.validateWorkerBoundary(run, workerId, { ...options, policy: options.policy, path: absoluteResultPath });
+    if (violation) {
+        (0, trust_audit_1.recordSandboxPathDecision)(run, {
+            workerId,
+            taskId: task.id,
+            sandboxProfileId: scope.sandboxProfileId,
+            policySnapshot: scope.sandboxPolicy,
+            target: absoluteResultPath,
+            decision: "denied",
+            metadata: { code: violation.code, allowedPaths: violation.allowedPaths }
+        });
+        deps.recordWorkerFailure(run, workerId, violation, { ...options, path: absoluteResultPath, code: violation.code, retryable: false });
+        throw new Error(violation.message);
+    }
+    if (!node_fs_1.default.existsSync(absoluteResultPath)) {
+        const error = (0, helpers_1.structuredError)("worker-result-missing", `Worker result file does not exist: ${absoluteResultPath}`, {
+            path: absoluteResultPath,
+            retryable: true
+        });
+        deps.recordWorkerFailure(run, workerId, error, { ...options, persist: options.persist });
+        throw new Error(error.message);
+    }
+    const rawResult = node_fs_1.default.readFileSync(absoluteResultPath, "utf8");
+    const parsedResult = (0, verifier_1.parseResultEnvelope)(rawResult);
+    (0, verifier_1.validateResultEnvelope)(task, parsedResult);
+    // Strict evidence resolution (v0.1.40 self-audit P1, opt-in via
+    // CW_REQUIRE_RESOLVABLE_EVIDENCE): fail closed if the result cites file-style
+    // evidence that does not resolve on disk, so a worker cannot land a result
+    // whose evidence locators point nowhere. Off by default — the default gate is
+    // the deterministic grounding check in validateResultEnvelope.
+    if ((0, evidence_grounding_1.requireResolvableEvidence)()) {
+        const baseDirs = Array.from(new Set([run.cwd, process.cwd(), scope.workerDir, run.paths.runDir].filter(Boolean)));
+        const unresolved = (0, evidence_grounding_1.unresolvedFileEvidence)(parsedResult.evidence, baseDirs);
+        if (unresolved.length) {
+            const error = (0, helpers_1.structuredError)("worker-evidence-unresolvable", `Worker ${workerId} result cites file evidence that does not resolve on disk: ${unresolved.join(", ")}`, { path: absoluteResultPath, retryable: false });
+            deps.recordWorkerFailure(run, workerId, error, { ...options, persist: options.persist });
+            throw new Error(error.message);
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        run,
+        workerId,
+        options,
+        scope,
+        task,
+        absoluteResultPath,
+        rawResult,
+        parsedResult,
+        destination: "",
+        pathAuditId: "",
+        acceptedAuditId: "",
+        resultNode: undefined,
+        verifierNodeId: "",
+        verifierStatus: "",
+        output: undefined
+    };
+}

package/dist/worker-accept/verifier-completion.js

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.runWorkerVerify = runWorkerVerify;
+exports.recordWorkerCompletion = recordWorkerCompletion;
+const pipeline_runner_1 = require("../pipeline-runner");
+const telemetry_attestation_1 = require("../telemetry-attestation");
+const execution_backend_1 = require("../execution-backend");
+/** Step 5 — runVerify: drive the verify pipeline stage off the accepted result node
+ *  and record the verifier node id on the task + accept context. */
+function runWorkerVerify(accept) {
+    const { run, workerId, scope, task, parsedResult, destination, resultNode } = accept;
+    const verifierResult = (0, pipeline_runner_1.createPipelineRunner)({ persist: false }).runPipelineStage(run, "verify", resultNode.id, {
+        outputNodeId: `${run.id}:verifier:${task.id}`,
+        outputStatus: "verified",
+        loopStage: "adjust",
+        outputs: { accepted: true, workerId },
+        artifacts: [{ id: "result", kind: "markdown", path: destination }],
+        evidence: resultNode.evidence.length
+            ? resultNode.evidence
+            : [{ id: "result:summary", source: "summary", summary: parsedResult.summary }],
+        metadata: { taskId: task.id, workerId, resultNodeId: resultNode.id, sandboxProfileId: scope.sandboxProfileId }
+    });
+    task.verifierNodeId = verifierResult.outputNodeId;
+    accept.verifierNodeId = verifierResult.outputNodeId;
+    // Carry the verify verdict for the scope-status transition in recordWorkerCompletion.
+    accept.verifierStatus = verifierResult.status;
+}
+/** Step 6 — recordStateNode (worker record): assemble the worker output record +
+ *  host-attested usage record, then persist the worker scope with the verify-derived
+ *  status, output digest/size, and (when present) usage. */
+function recordWorkerCompletion(accept, delegation, deps) {
+    const { run, workerId, scope, task, absoluteResultPath, rawResult, resultNode, verifierNodeId, verifierStatus, pathAuditId, acceptedAuditId } = accept;
+    const { agentDelegation, telemetry } = delegation;
+    const output = {
+        workerId,
+        taskId: task.id,
+        resultPath: absoluteResultPath,
+        recordedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+        stateNodeId: resultNode.id,
+        verifierNodeId,
+        auditEventIds: [pathAuditId, acceptedAuditId]
+    };
+    // Host-attested usage rides on the worker record. Recorded when the agent
+    // REPORTED a model OR token usage — `unreported`/absent stays ABSENT (never
+    // backfilled from the operator-chosen CW_AGENT_MODEL, never synthesized).
+    // Track 1: the attestation verdict (`attested`/`unattested`/`absent`) and its
+    // reason ride along, and the token buckets come from the (verified-or-not)
+    // reported usage — CW still never measures them, it records + labels them.
+    const reportedModel = agentDelegation && agentDelegation.model && agentDelegation.model !== "unreported" ? agentDelegation.model : undefined;
+    const usageRecord = agentDelegation && (reportedModel || agentDelegation.reportedUsage)
+        ? {
+            schemaVersion: 1,
+            source: "host-attested",
+            ...(reportedModel ? { model: reportedModel } : {}),
+            ...(0, telemetry_attestation_1.normalizeReportedUsage)(agentDelegation.reportedUsage),
+            attestedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+            ...(telemetry ? { attestation: telemetry.status, ...(telemetry.reason ? { attestationReason: telemetry.reason } : {}) } : {}),
+            note: "agent-delegation host-attested usage"
+        }
+        : undefined;
+    deps.updateWorkerScope(run, {
+        ...scope,
+        updatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+        status: verifierStatus === "advanced" ? "verified" : "completed",
+        resultNodeId: resultNode.id,
+        output,
+        // Output integrity (v0.1.63): SHA256 digest + file size
+        outputDigest: (0, execution_backend_1.sha256)(rawResult),
+        outputSizeBytes: Buffer.byteLength(rawResult, "utf8"),
+        ...(usageRecord ? { usage: usageRecord } : {})
+    });
+    accept.output = output;
+}